THE

POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

JOWETT

VOL. II.
THE

POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

WITH INTRODUCTION, MARGINAL ANALYSIS

ESSAYS, NOTES AND INDICES

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VOL. II. PART I

CONTAINING THE NOTES

17062

Oxford

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1885

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NOTES
ON ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

BOOK I.

ἐπειδὴ πᾶσαν πόλιν κ.τ.λ.

The order of the first paragraph is disturbed by the repetition of the statement that every community aims at some good. The meaning will be clearer if drawn out in a technical form:

Every community aims at some good:
Every city is a community; and therefore
Every city aims at some good.

Upon which rests a second syllogism with added determinants:

Whereas all communities aim at some good, the highest aim at the highest good:
The city is the highest community; and therefore
The city aims at the highest good.

Compare the opening of the Nicom. Ethics, i. 1. § 1,—

πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξις καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίσθαι δοκεῖ διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφημαντὸ τέσσαρος οὐ πάντ' ἐφίσθαι.

Similarly the Metaphysics begin with a general proposition, πάντες ἀνθρώποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὁρίζονται φύσει; and the Posterior Analytics, πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως.

The connexion of what follows in § 2, if there be any, is not easy to trace: ‘But a community is a complex organisation;’ Or, ‘But we must not suppose the different forms of communities to be the same;’ Or, the agreement described in the first sentence may be contrasted with the difference of opinion in the second;—
‘We are all agreed about the end of the state, but we are not equally agreed about the definition of the ruler.’

1. 2. "Όσοι μὲν οὖν οἴονται πολιτικῶν καὶ βασιλικῶν καὶ οἰκονομικῶν καὶ διοικητικοῦ εἶναι τῶν αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.

The starting-point of Aristotle’s enquiry here, as in many other passages, is a criticism of Plato. See Politic, 259 C, φανερῶν ὡς ἐπιστήμη μία περὶ πάντ’ ἐστὶ ταύτα· ταύτην δὲ εἶτε βασιλικὴν εἶτε πολιτικὴν εἴτε οἰκονομικὴν τις ὁμολογεῖ, μηδὲν αὐτῷ διαφερόμεθα.

This criticism is further worked out in ii. c. 1–5; cp. especially, c. 2. §§ 2–8, where Aristotle shows that the state is composed of dissimilar elements. An opposite view is maintained, or appears to be maintained by Socrates in Xen. Mem. iii. 4. § 12, where he says, ἡ τῶν ἴδιων ἐπιμελεία πλήθει μόνον διαφέρει μία τῶν κοινῶν; and § 7, where the good οἰκονόμος is said to be the good στρατηγός. This is a paradoxical way of insisting on the interdependence or identity of different callings; Aristotle rather dwells upon their diversity.

1. 2. ὁμοιὸς ἄν μὲν ὅλεγην. Sc. ἀρχαῖος ἂν οὖν ἢ ἀρχηγός.

A general notion gathered from the words πολιτικῶν καὶ βασιλικῶν κ.τ.λ.

1. 2. καὶ πολιτικῶν δὲ κ.τ.λ.,

sc. τῶν ἀρχαίων λέγουσι.

1. 2. τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς τοιούτης,

sc. πολιτικῆς, to be supplied either from the preceding part of the sentence, or from the word πολιτικῶν which follows:—‘According to the principles of the science which deals with this subject.’ Cp. i. 8. § 7, θύλαται τοιούτην, where τοιούτην is to be explained from ἀληθεία which precedes: and in the same chapter, § 9, τοιούτη κτήσις, where τοιούτη (meaning ‘in the sense of a bare livelihood’) is gathered from αὐτόφυτοι and μη δὲ ἀλλαγῆς in the previous section; and ii. 4. § 4, δει δὲ τοιούτους εἶναι τοὺς ἀρχαιούς πρὸς τὸ πειθαρχεῖν καὶ μη νεωτέρεσσεν; where τοιούτους, meaning ‘disunited,’ is a notion supplied from the preceding words,—ἡπτὸν γὰρ ἵστατι φαλία κοινῶν δυντῶν τῶν τίκτων καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν: and ii. 6. § 22, ὡς μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ μοναρχίας δεῖ συνιστᾶναι τὴν τοιούτην πολιτείαν, where the
idea of an ‘imperfect’ state, like that contained in Plato’s Laws, has to be gathered from the whole preceding passage.

κατὰ τὴν ὑφηγημένην μέθοδον. 1. 3.

i.e. the method of analysis which resolves the compound into the simple. Cp. c. 8. § 1, ὅλως δὲ περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς θεωρήσωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον, ἐπείπερ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος τῆς κτήσεως μέρος τι ἦν.

ὑφηγημένην, ‘which we have followed,’ not merely in the Ethics, as Schneider and others; for the same expression occurs N. Ε. ii. 7. § 9 (κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον), and therefore can hardly refer to them, but ‘generally’ or ‘in this discussion.’ The μέθοδος, like the λόγος in Plato, goes before and we follow. Cp. De Gen. Anim. 3. 758 a. 28, and note on c. 13. § 6.

ὁσπερ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ σύνθετον μέχρι τῶν ἀσυνθέτων ἀνάγει 1. 3.

διαιρεῖν (ταῦτα γάρ ἐλάχιστα μόρια τοῦ παντὸς), οὕτω καὶ πόλιν εἴς δὲν σύγκειται σκοποῦντες ὑφόμεθα καὶ περὶ τούτων μᾶλλον, τί τε διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων καὶ εἴ τε τεχνικῶν ἐνθέχεται λαβεῖν περὶ ἐκαστον τῶν ῥήματων.

τούτων may either refer 1)* to εἶ δὲν σύγκειται, i.e. the elements of the state which he is going to distinguish in this book; or 2) to the different kinds of rule mentioned in the preceding paragraph (Bernays, SusEmhIl): in the latter case it is paraphrased by περὶ ἐκαστον τῶν ῥήματων, in the next clause. (For the vague antecedent to τούτων cp. supra c. 2. §§ 2, 12, etc., etc.) Aristotle treats of ‘the kinds of rule’ in Book iii. cc. 7, 8, and in the fourth and sixth books.

καὶ, according to the first explanation—‘as about the state so about the elements of the state,’ according to the second,—‘about kinds of government as well as about other things.’ ὁσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις .. καὶ περὶ τούτων is repeated or resumed in ὁσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ ἐν τούτωι at the beginning of the next paragraph, c. 2. § 1.

The argument is to the effect that if we analyse forms of government into their parts, or into their kinds, we shall see that they differ in something besides number—e.g. in the nature of the authority exercised in them, or in the character of their magistracies, or in the classification of their citizens. (Cp. iv. 4. § 7 ff.) That states consist not only of their elements, but have in them something analogous to the principle of life in the human
frame, is a truth strongly felt by Plato (Rep. v. 462 D), less strongly by Aristotle (infra c. 2. § 13).

2. 1. eι δή τις εξ ἄρχης τὰ πράγματα φυόμενα βλέψεις, ὥσπερ εἰν τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ εἰ τούτοις κάλλιστοι ἄν οὕτω βεβηρήσεις.

Aristotle does not mean that politics are to be studied in the light of history; but rather that the complex structure of the state is to be separated into the simple elements out of which it appears to be created. Yet the two points of view are not always distinguished by him; and his method of procedure is often historical (e.g. in Book v) as well as analytical.

2. 2. καὶ ἐν ... φυτῶι φυσικῶν τὸ ἐφίσθα, οἷον αὐτό, τοιοῦτον καταλιπεῖν ἔτερον.

Aristotle, like Plato (Sysp. 186), attributed sex to plants, male and female being combined in the same plant. The analogy of plants and animals is drawn out; De Gen. Anim. i. c. 23.

2. 2. ταῦτα ποιεῖν,

sc. τὰ προορώμενα ἐπὸ τοῦ ἄρχοντος, another instance of the vague antecedent (c. 1. § 2 and c. 2. § 12).

2. 3. τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν.

Evidently an instrument that could serve other purposes than that of a knife. Compare the ὀξείσκολαίχρονον mentioned in iv. 15. § 8. The Delphian knife is described by Hesychius as λαμβάνοντα ἐμπρόσθεν μέρος σιδηροῦν, 'having an iron part added to it in front.' The name is in some way connected with the sacrifice at Delphi, and is said in the appendix to the Proverbiorum Centuria, 1. 94 (p. 393 Schneidewin) to have passed into a proverb directed against the meanness of the Delphians in taking a part of the sacrifices and in charging for the use of the sacrificial knife. (See Goettling, Commentatio de Machaera Delphica, Jena, 1856.) We may agree with Schlosser in thinking that the matter is unimportant.

2. 4. τὸ φύσει ἄρχον οὐκ ἔχουσιν, ... γίνεται ἡ κοινωνία αὐτῶν δοῦλης καὶ δοῦλων.

'Among barbarians women are slaves. The reason is that all barbarians are equally slaves: there is no ruling principle among them such as gives the true relation of husband and wife, of master and slave; they are all upon a level.' Cp. infra, cc. 12, 13.
NOTES, BOOK I. 2.

'οἰκον μὲν πρῶτον γυναικά τε βοῶν τ' ὑπογέες.'

Compare Wallace's Russia (p. 90. ed. 8). 'The natural labour unit (i.e. the Russian peasant family of the old type) comprises a man, a woman, and a horse.'

'eis πᾶσαν ἡμέραν.

'For wants which recur every day,' and therefore can never be left unsatisfied.

ὁμοκάτονος.

'Sitting in the smoke of one fire' is read by MSS. of the better class, P₄, L₄, corr. Mᵇ, William de Moerbeek; ὁμοκάτονος by the rest (Susemihl). The meaning of the latter word 'fed at the same manger' is better suited to the context.

ἡ δ' ἐκ πλειώνων οἰκίων κοινωνία πρῶτη χρήσεως ἐνεκεν μή ἐφημέρου κῶμη. 2. 5.

There was a time when the κώμη or village community had an important place in Greek life. Cp. iii. 9. § 14, where it is joined with γένος (πόλις δὲ ἡ γενεὰ καὶ κοιμῶν κοινωνία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκειας), and Thucydides, i. 5: ib. 10 (κατὰ κώμας δὲ τῷ παλαιῷ τῆς Ἐλλάδος τρόπῳ οἰκισθείσης, sc. τῆς Σπάρτης). Such communities lasted into historical times in Αἰtolia, Acarnania, Arcadia, and even in Laconia. During the life of Aristotle himself the villages of Arcadia had been united by Epaminondas in the city of Megalopolis (cp. note on ii. 2. § 3).

πρώτη. 'To be taken with the words which follow: 'When they began no longer to regard only the necessities of life.'

μάλιστα δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἔοικεν ἡ κώμη ἀποκία οἰκίας εἶναι: οὔς καλοῦσι 2. 6.

τινες ὁμογάλακτος, παιδᾶς τε καὶ παιδῶν παιδᾶς.

'The tie of relationship is still acknowledged in the village, which in its most natural form is only a larger family or a colony of the family.' (There should be a comma in the Greek after ὁμογάλακτος; the words παιδᾶς τε κ.τ.λ. though construed with καλοῦσι, being really an explanation of ἀποκία. The form of the village community is most natural, not when composed of individuals combined by chance, say, for the purposes of plunder or self-defence, but when the family becoming enlarged leaves its original seat and finds a new home. The expression ἀποκία οἰκίας is not strictly accurate, for the village might grow up on the same spot.
Cp. Cicero de Officiis, i. 17, 'Nam cum sit hoc natura commune animantium, ut habeant lubidinem procreandi, prima societas in ipso conjugio est: proxima in liberis: deinde una domus, communia omnia. Id autem est principium urbis et quasi seminarium reipublicae. Sequuntur fratrum conjunctiones, post consobrinorum sobrinorumque; qui cum una domo jam capi non possunt, in alias domos tanquam in colonias exeunt. Sequuntur connubia et affinitates, ex quibus etiam plures pro-pinquii. Quae propagatio et soboles origo est rerum publicarum.'

όμογόλακτες, a rare term for γεννήται or φράτερες.

2. 6. διὸ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἐβασιλεύοντο αἱ πόλεις, καὶ νῦν ἔτε τὰ ἔθνη ἐκ βασιλευομένων γὰρ συνῆλθον. πᾶσα γὰρ οἰκία βασιλεύεται ὑπὸ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου, ὡστε καὶ αἱ ἁπαξίαι διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν. καὶ τούτ' ἐστὶν ὁ λέγει ὁ Ομηρος,

'θεμιστεύ' δὲ ἐκαστος

παιδών ἄθελων.

σποράδες γὰρ καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἀρχαῖον ὄκουν. καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς δὲ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες φασὶ βασιλεύσεως, ὡστε καὶ αὐτοί οἱ μὲν ἔτε καὶ νῦν, οἱ δὲ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐβασιλεύοντο· ὡσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ ἔθνη ἐκαστὸς ἀφομοιώτας οἱ ἄνθρωποι, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν.

The argument is as follows: The rise of the village from the family explains also the existence of monarchy in ancient Hellas. For in the family the eldest rules. This rule of the eldest in the family is continued into the village, and from that passes into the state. In support of his opinion Aristotle quotes what Homer says of the Cyclopes (a passage also quoted by Plato, Laws 680, in a similar connexion), and he further illustrates it by men's ideas about the Gods, to whom they attribute a regal or patriarchal form of government, such as their own had been in primitive times.

τὰ ἔθνη here as in ii. 5. § 2 (see note in loco), a general term for barbarians.

ἐκ βασιλευομένων γὰρ συνῆλθον.

Aristotle is here speaking of one kind of monarchy, which may be called the patriarchal. In iii. 14. § 12, he attributes the rise of monarchy to the benefits conferred on the inhabitants of a country in peace or war by distinguished individuals, whereas in this passage he assigns to it a patriarchal origin. Both accounts
have probably a certain degree of truth in them. And doubtless in history either form of monarchy may have taken the place of the other; a series of undistinguished kings may have been interrupted by the hero or legislator, and the hero or legislator may have transmitted his power to his posterity. Cp. also iv. 13. § 12.

διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν.

Either 'the relation of the members of the κόμη (γένος) to one another,' or 'to the original οἰκία.'

θεμοστεύει δὲ ἐκατοσκ παίδων ἢ δ' ἀλόχων.

Odyssey ix. 114; again alluded to in Nicom. Ethics x. 9. § 13, κυκλωπίως θεμοστεύων παίδων ἢ δ' ἀλόχων.

ὡσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἰδη ἐαυτοὶς ἀφομοιοῦσιν οἱ ἀνθρώποι οὖτω καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν.

This is especially true of the Greeks, who limited the divine by the human; in other mythologies the idea of a superior being who could not be conceived, led to extravagance and grotesqueness. And even among the Greeks, the light of fancy was always breaking in, though not in such a manner as to impair the harmony of the poetical vision.

tελειος πόλεις.

Opposed to πρώτη (§ 5).

γινομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζην ἐνεκεν, οὖσα δὲ τοῦ εύ ζην.

'The state is created for the maintenance of life, but when once established has a higher aim.'

οὖσα partly derives its meaning from γινομένη, 'having a true being' opposed to 'coming into being' (cp. οὖσια and γένεσις).

ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἑστίων.

By Aristotle the end of a thing is said to be its nature; the best and alone self-sufficing development of it. From this transcendent point of view the state is prior to the individual, the whole to the part (§ 12). But he is not always consistent in his use of language; for while in this passage he speaks of the state as the end or final cause of the οἰκία, in Nic. Ethics viii. 12. § 7 he also speaks of the οἰκία as prior to the state and more necessary (πρῶτον καὶ ἀναγκαίωτερον οἰκία πόλεως). Cp. Categories c. 12, 14 a 26.

ἐξερ καὶ αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι.
'If the original elements of the state exist by nature, the state must exist by nature.' But is the argument sound? are not two senses of the word nature here confused?

2. 9. τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις.
   i.e. because it is the end, the fulfilment, the self-sufficing, the good: yet there is another sense of the word φύσις, which is not applicable to the state.

2. 10. φύσει τοιούτος καὶ πολέμων ἐπιθυμητής, ἢτε περ ἀξιών ὄν ἄσπερ ἐν πεπτοίς.
   Lit. 'For the alien, who is by nature such as I have described, is also a lover of war.'

   The margin of one MS. supported by the old Latin Version (which gives 'sicut in volatilibus') reads πεπτοίσις. πεπτοῖς is the reading of one late MS., πεπτοῖς apparently of all the rest. In support of the last a very difficult epigram of Agathias (Pal. Anthology, ix. 482) is adduced in which the term ἀξιών occurs in the description of a game played with dice and similar to our backgammon; the game is not however called πεπτοῖ, nor does the description answer to the game of πεπτοῖ. The word ἀξιών, when applied to a game, may mean either 'exposed' or 'blocked,' and so incapable of combination or action. With ἐν πεπτοῖσι, ἀξιών might be interpreted of birds of prey which fly alone, the solitary opposed to the gregarious: cp. παντὸς ἕγελαιον ἄξιων in the next sentence.

   But neither ἐν πεπτοῖσι nor ἐν πεπτοῖσι can be precisely explained. The variations of reading (omission of ἀξιών ὄν, alteration into ἀνευ ἄγων τυγχάνον) shew that the copyists were in a difficulty. We can only infer that whether applied to birds or to the pieces of a game, the word ἀξιών is here used as a figure representing the solitude of a savage who has no city or dwelling-place.

2. 10. διότι.
   , Either 1) *'why,' or 2) 'that.' In either case the reason is supplied from what follows (§ 11):—'Man has the faculty of speech, and speech was given him that he might express pleasure and pain, good and evil, the ideas which lie at the basis of the state.'

2. 12. ἢ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκεῖ καὶ πολιν.
   τούτων, sc. 'of these perceptions,' or rather 'of those who have these perceptions.' For the vague antecedent see note on § 2.
NOTES, BOOK I. 2.

καὶ πρότερον δὴ τῇ φύσει κ.τ.λ.

In idea the state is prior to the family, as the whole is prior to the part, for the true or perfect family cannot exist until human nature is developed in the state: but in time, and in history, the family and the village are prior to the state. The state is φύσει πρότερον, but the family χρόνῳ πρότερον. See above, note on § 8, and Categ. c. 12, 14 a, 26.

διαφθαρεῖσα γὰρ ἵσται τοιαύτη.

Referring either 1) to ὄμωνύμως:—‘When the powers of the hand are destroyed (διαφθαρεῖσα) it will only be such in an equivocal sense;’ or 2) *to ὀστερ λιθίνη ‘it will be like a stone hand.’ Cp. Sir J. F. Stephen’s Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, p. 128, ‘A man would no more be a man if he was alone in the world, than a hand would be a hand without the rest of the body.’

ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ πόλις καὶ φύσει καὶ πρότερον ἢ ἐκαστος, δῆλον εἰ γὰρ μὴ 2. 14.

αὐτάρκης ἐκαστος χωρεῖσθε, δομοίως τοῖς ἄλλοις μέρεσιν ἔσται πρὸς τὸ διον.

This is a resumption of the words; καὶ πρότερον δὴ τῇ φύσει κ.τ.λ. in § 12. ‘That the state exists by nature and is prior to the individual is proved by the consideration that the individual is not self-sufficing; he is therefore a part, like every other part, relative to the whole and so implying it.’

ὡσεὶ ἡ θηρίων ἡ θεός.

Compare the old scholastic aphorism derived from Aristotle that ‘the man who lives wholly detached from others must be either an angel or a devil,’ quoted by Burke, ‘Thoughts on the causes of the present discontent,’ vol. i. p. 340, edit. 1826.

φύσει μὲν οὖν ἡ ὀρμή.

‘True, the political instinct is implanted in all men by nature: yet he who brought them together in a state was the greatest of benefactors’: or 2) with a less marked opposition: ‘The political instinct is natural; and he who first brought men together [and so developed it] was the greatest of benefactors.’

Here as elsewhere Aristotle presupposes a given material, upon which, according to the traditional Greek notion, the legislator works. Society is born and grows, but it is also made.
2. 16. "δ' ἀνθρωπος ὁπλα ἐχων φύεται φρονήσει καὶ ἀρετῇ, οἷς ἐπὶ τάναντι ἕστι χρήσθαι μάλιστα.

1) ὁπλα ἐχων = ὀπλισμένος, the words φρονήσει καὶ ἀρετῇ being datives of the instrument. It seems strange at first sight to speak of φρόνησις and ἀρετῇ as capable of a wrong direction. We might rather have expected Aristotle to have distinguished φρόνησις from what in Nic. Eth. vi. 12. § 9, is called δεινήτης, (an intellectual capacity which may receive a good direction and become φρόνησις; but may also when receiving a bad direction become πανουργία) and ἀρετῇ, from what in the same passage of the Ethics is spoken of as mere φυσική ἀρετῆ (Nic. Eth. vi. 13. §§ 1 and 2) or in the Magna Moralia i. c. 35. 1197 b. 39, ὡς ὁμαί τινες ἄνευ λόγου πρὸς τὰ ἀνθρεῖα καὶ τὰ ἀνθρεῖα κ.τ.λ., which may become injurious unless directed by reason (ἄνευ νοῦ βλαβερας φαίνουται οὖσαι, Nic. Eth. vi. 13. § 1). But the transfer of certain words from a good to a neutral sense or from a technical to a general one is common in Aristotle; and in the fluctuating state of philosophical language may be expected to occur. We must not suppose that he always employed words in the same senses; or that he had a scientific vocabulary fixed by use and ready on all occasions.

2) Bernays and others translate 'Man is by nature equipped with arms or instruments for wisdom and virtue;' i.e. Man has a natural capacity which may be developed into φρόνησις and ἀρετῇ, or may degenerate into their opposites. This gives an excellent meaning and agrees in the use of words as well as in thought with the passage in the Ethics referred to above. But the construction of the dative in the sense of 'for' after ὁπλα ἐχων is impossible. Or if 3) the datives are taken with φύεται, a construction which is quite possible, the words ὁπλα ἐχων become pointless. In this uncertainty of the construction the general meaning is clear; viz., that 'man has intelligence and an aptitude for virtue, gifts which are in the highest degree capable of abuse.'

ἐπὶ τάναντι ἕστι χρήσθαι μάλιστα. There is an inaccuracy in these words; for it is not virtue and knowledge which can be turned to the worst uses (cp. Rhet. i. 1355 b. 4) but the finer nature which is alone capable of virtue. Cp. Goethe's Faust, Prologue in Heaven, where Mephistopheles says, 'Er nennt's Vernunft und braucht's allein nur thierischer als jedes Thier zu sein;' and Nic. Eth. vii. 6.
NOTES, BOOK I. 3.

§ 7, Ελευθερία κακίας φοβερότερον δέ. Compare also Plato Repub. vi. 495 A, B, where it is said that the best, i.e. the greatest natures, if they are ill educated, become the worst:—καὶ ἐκ τούτων δή τῶν ἄνδρων καὶ οἱ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργαζόμενοι τὰς πόλεις γίγνονται καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας καὶ οἱ τάγαθι, οὐ ἂν ταύτη τῆς χωρεῖν ρύντες’ σμικρὰ δὲ φύσις οὐδέν μέγα οὐδέποτε οὐδένα οὔτε ἰδιώτην οὔτε πόλιν ὅρᾳ.

ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη πολιτικόν’ ἡ γὰρ δίκη πολιτικής κοινωνίας τάξις ἐστίν’ ἡ 2. 16. δὲ δική τοῦ δικαίου κρίσις.

‘But the virtue of justice unites men in states (i.e. is the quality opposed to the lawlessness which makes men lower than the beasts), and executive justice is the ordering of political society and the decision of what is just.’

In this passage δίκη is the ‘administration of justice’: δικαιοσύνη, ‘the virtue of justice’: τὸ δίκαιον, ‘the principle of justice to be applied in each case.’

οἰκίας δὲ μέρη, ἐξ ὧν αὐθεντεύονται οἰκία δὲ τελειοὶ ἐκ 3. 1. δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων.

αὐθεντὴς = ‘in turn.’ ‘As the state is made up of households, so the household in turn is made up of lesser parts; and a complete household includes both slaves and freemen.’ Of these elements of the household Aristotle now proceeds to speak.

ταύτα δ’ ἐστὶ διεσπορτικὴ καὶ γαμική (ἀνώνυμον γὰρ ἡ γυναῖκος καὶ ἄνδρος 3. 2. σύζυγος) καὶ τρίτον τεκνοποιητική.

Not finding common words which express his idea, Aristotle gives new senses to γαμική and τεκνοποιητική. In ordinary Greek they would have meant ‘of or referring to marriage,’ and ‘to the procreation of children’: here he extends their meaning to the whole marital or parental relation. It was natural in the beginning of philosophy to make new words, or to give new meanings to old ones; cp. Plato, Theet. 182 A, where he calls ποιύσις an ἀλλόκοτον ἄνωμα, and Nic. Eth. v. 6. § 9, where the relation of husband and wife is termed by a periphrasis τὸ οἰκονομικόν δίκαιον, or τὸ πρὸς γυναῖκα δίκαιον: cp. also c. 12. § 1 infra, where πατρική is used for what is here called τεκνοποιητική. That Aristotle found many words wanting in his philosophical vocabulary, we gather from Nic. Eth. ii. 7. §§ 2,
3, 8, 11, De Interp. c. 2 and 3, and infra iii. i. § 7, where similar remarks are made upon ἀνασθησία, upon the anonymous mean of φιλοτιμία and ἀφιλοτιμία, upon ἀφοβία the excess of courage, and upon δῶμα ἀδύσιμον, ῥῆμα ἀδύσιμον, ἀδύσιμος ἄρχῃ.

3. 2. ἔστωσαν δ' αὕτα τρεῖς ἢ εἴπομεν.

'Let us assume the relationships, by whatever names they are called, to be three, those which I have mentioned.' Cp. περὶ τριῶν § 1 above. The passage would read more smoothly if αἱ were inserted before τρεῖς: 'let there be those three.'

3. 4. τοῖς δὲ παρὰ φύσιν τὸ δεσπόζειν.

Many traces of this sophistic or humanistic feeling occur in Greek Poetry, especially in Euripides: some of the most striking are collected by Oncken, Die Staatslehre des Aristoteles, vol. ii. pp. 34–36:

Eurip. Ion, 854–856,—

ἐν γὰρ τι τοῖς δούλουσιν αἰσχύνη φέρει
tούνομα' τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα τῶν ἔλευθερων
οὐδέσι κακῶς δοῦλος, ὅστις ἐσθλὸς ἦ.

ib. Helena, 726 ff.,—

κακῶς γὰρ ὅστις μὴ σέβει τὰ δεσποτῶν
καὶ ἐνυγγέγηθε καὶ ἐνυκωδίνει κακοίς.
ἐγὼ μὲν εἰην, κεὶ πέφυχ' ὑμῶν λάτρει,
ἐν τοῖσι γενναίοισιν ἥρωμμηνοις
dούλουσι, τούνομοι' οὐκ ἑχον ἔλευθερον
tῶν νοῦν δέ.

ib. Melanippe, fr. 515,—

δοῦλον γὰρ ἐσθλὸν τούνομ' οὗ διαφθερεῖ
pολλοὶ δ' ἀμείνους εἰσὶ τῶν ἔλευθερων.

Philem. apud Stobæum,—

κἂν δοῦλος ἦ τις, οὐδέν ἤπτον, δέσποτα,
ἀνθρωπος οὕτος ἔστιν, ἂν ἀνθρωπος ἦ.

ib. fr. 39,—

κἂν δοῦλος ἐστι, σάρκα τὴν αὐτήν ἔχει
φύσει γὰρ οὐδέσι δοῦλος ἐγεννήθη ποτε:
ἡ δ' αὐς Τύχη τὸ σῶμα κατεδουλώσατο.

3. 4. βίαιον γάρ.
Either 1) * = παρὰ φύσις or simply 2) ‘brought about by violence’; 
βία may be opposed either to φύσις or νόμος or both.

δόσπερ δὲ ἐν ταῖς ὁρισμέναις τέχναις ἀναγκαῖοι ἂν εἰπῇ ὑπάρχειν τὰ 4. 1. 
οἰκεία ὄργανα, εἰ μέλλει ἀποτελεσθῆσθαι τὸ ἄργον, οὕτω καὶ τῶν οἰκονομικῶν.

The first six words δόσπερ ... τέχναις are read as in Bekker supported by some MSS. There is also MS. authority for the omission of δὲ; and for the omission of both δὲ and ἐν.

Retaining Bekker’s reading, we must either 1) *translate, as in the text, making the apodosis to ἐπεί οὐν begin with καὶ ἡ κτητική; or 2) δὲ after δόσπερ may be regarded as marking the apodosis; or 3) the sentence may be an anacoluthon; as frequently after ἐπεί in Aristotle (cp. Rhet. ii. 25, 1402 b. 26 ἐπεί γὰρ ὁ μὲν κατηγορῶν δι’ εἰκότων ἀποδείκνυσιν κ.τ.λ.). If we omit δὲ, the apodosis still begins with δόσπερ.

ταῖς ὁρισμέναις τέχναις: The arts which have a definite sphere, such as the art of the pilot, or of the carpenter, contrasted with the ill defined arts of politics or household management, cp. c. 13, § 13 ὁ γὰρ βίανασι τεχνίτης ἀφωρισμένη τινὰ ἔχει δουλείαν.

Instead of Bekker’s reading οὕτω καὶ τῶν οἰκονομικῶν another reading οὕτω καὶ τῷ οἰκονομικῷ has been proposed on the authority of the old translation (Moerbek) ‘sic et yconomico.’ But τῶν οἰκονομικῶν is more idiomatic and has the support of the greater number of MSS. Sc. οἰκεία ὄργανα δεῖ ὑπάρχειν.

καὶ δόσπερ ὄργανον πρὸ ὄργανων.

Not ‘instead of’ but ‘taking precedence of’—the slave is in idea prior to the tool which he uses. He is an instrument, but he is also a link between his master and the inferior instruments which he uses and sets in motion.

For the use of πρὸ cp. the proverb quoted in c. 7. § 3 δοῦλος πρὸ δοῦλου, δεσπότης πρὸ δεσπότου. So the hand is spoken of as ὄργανον πρὸ ὄργανων (De Part. Anim. iv. 10, 687 a. 21).

εἰ γὰρ ἰδίωνατο κ.τ.λ.

The connexion is as follows:—‘There are not only lifeless but living instruments; for the lifeless instrument cannot execute its purpose without the living.’
4. 4. τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ὅργανα ποιητικὰ ὅργανα ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ κτήμα πρακτικῷ· ἀπὸ μὲν γὰρ τῆς κερκίδος ἐτερῶν τι γίνεται παρὰ τὴν χρήσιν αὐτῆς, ἀπὸ δὲ τῆς ἐσθήσεως καὶ τῆς κλήσεως ἡ χρήσις μόνον.

It was said that a possession is an instrument for maintaining life, and there seems to be no reason why both κτήματα and ὅργανα should not be regarded as different aspects of wealth (cp. infra c. 8. § 15, ὁ δὲ πλοῦτος ὅργανον πληθοῦς ἐστιν οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν, and Plato Politeicus 287 D, who feels the difficulty of specialising the notion of an ὅργανον: ‘there is plausibility in saying that everything in the world is the instrument of doing something’). But here the term instrument, used in a narrower sense, is opposed to a possession, and regarded as a mere instrument of production. A parallel distinction is drawn between production and action, and the slave is described as the instrument of action. But he is also spoken of as the ‘instrument preceding instruments’ (§ 2), words which rather indicate the minister of production. Aristotle passes from one point of view to another without marking the transition.

He wants to discriminate the household slave from the artisan; but in the attempt to make this distinction becomes confused. The conception of the slave on which he chiefly insists is that he is relative to a master and receives from him a rule of life: c. 13. §§ 12–14. He therefore differs from the artisan.

τὰ λεγόμενα, e.g. instruments such as the shuttle, etc.

4. 5. ὁ δὲ βίος πρᾶξις, οὐ ποιησὶς ἐστιν· διὸ καὶ ὁ δούλος ὑπηρέτης τῶν πρὸς τὴν πράξειν.

‘Life is action, and therefore the slave, i.e. the household slave, is the minister of action, because he ministers to his master’s life.’

4. 5. τὸ γὰρ μόριον οὐ μόνον ἄλλου ἐστὶ μόριον, ἄλλα καὶ ὅλος ἄλλου.


4. 5. ὅλος ἐκεῖνον.

The master although relative to the slave has an existence of his own, but the slave’s individuality is lost in his master.

5. 1. τῷ λόγῳ ἑωρῆσαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν γινόμενων καταμαθεῖν.

Here as elsewhere Aristotle distinguishes between reasoning and
NOTES, BOOK i. 5.

facts, the analogy of nature supplying the theory, the observation of the differences which exist among mankind, the fact. Cp. infra vii. 1. § 6, and Nic. Eth. i. 8. § 1; ix. 8. § 2; x. 1. § 4, and Plato (Polit. 278 D), who speaks of the 'long and difficult language of facts.' The verbal antithesis of λόγος and ἔργον, which in Thucydides is often merely rhetorical, enters deeply into the philosophy of Aristotle. There is however no real opposition between them any more than between the a priori and a posteriori reasoning of modern philosophers, which are only different modes of proving or of conceiving the same fact.

εὕθυς ἐκ γενετῆς.

'From their very birth,' or, with a logical turn, 'to go no further than the state of birth;' cp. c. 13. § 6, καὶ τοῦτο εὕθυς ὑφίσταται περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς and infra § 4, τὸ δὲ δύον πρῶτον κ.τ.λ.

ὅπου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀρχεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἀρχεῖται, ἕστι τι τούτων ἔργον.

'As ruler and subject, they may be said to have a work or function—the one to command, the other to obey, apart from any other work or function.'

ἐίτ' ἐκ συνεχῶν ἐίτ' ἐκ διηρημένων.

5. 2.

For the division of quantity into continuous and discrete, cp. Categ. 6. 1, p. 4 b. 20, and Nic. Eth. ii. 6. § 4. The human frame would be an instance of the first, musical harmony or a chorus or an army of the second. The πόλις may be said to partake of the nature of both in being one body and having many offices or members.

καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως ἐνυπάρχει τοῖς ἐμψύχους· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ μετέχουσι ζωῆς ἐστὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς, οἶον ἄρμονια.

5. 3.

1) The connexion is as follows: 'This principle of a superior is found in living beings, but not confined to them. *It is derived from the universal nature, for it pervades all things, inanimate as well as animate' (so Bernays). It is remarkable that Aristotle recognises a common principle pervading alike organic and inorganic nature.

2) Or ἐκ is partitive; see Bonitz, Index Arist. 225 b. 11 ff. 'Out of all the kingdom of nature this is found [especially] in living beings' (Stahr, Susemihl). But according to this interpretation,
the addition of μᾶλιστα after ἐνπάρχει, suggested by Susemihl, appears to be indispensable to the meaning.

οὖν ἀρμονίας.

Either 1)* 'as in musical harmony there is a ruling principle determining the character of the harmony,' or 2) 'as harmony is a ruling principle governing the combinations of sounds.' The first accords best with the common meaning of the word ἀρμονία and with the use of the genitive.

5. 4. ἐξωτερικωτέρας.

'Somewhat foreign to the present subject,' not in the sense of ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι.

5. 4. τὸ δὲ ζῷον πρῶτον συνέστηκεν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος, διὸ τὸ μὲν ἁρχον ἐστὶ φύσει τὸ δ' ἀρχόμενον.

i.e. 'the living creature, as soon as we begin to analyse it, is found to consist of soul and body.'

The opposition expressed by δὲ in τὸ δὲ ζῷον is as follows: 'not to speak of the whole of nature, but of the living creature only.'

For πρῶτον (which is to be taken with συνέστηκε) meaning either 'to go no further,' or 'as the first result of analysis,' cp. πρῶτον ἐν ζῷῳ θεωρήσαν infra § 6, and the similar use of εὖδος supra § 2.

5. 5. δεῖ δὲ σκοπεῖν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσι μᾶλλον τὸ φύσει καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς διεφθαρμένοις.

Cp. Nic. Eth. ix. 9, § 8 and Cicero Tusc. Disput. i. 14 'num dubitas quin specimen naturae capi deceat ex optima quaque natura?'

5. 6. ἐστὶ δ' οὖν ὤσπερ λέγομεν.

A resumption of the words τὸ δὲ ζῷον πρῶτον above.

5. 6. ἵ μὲν γὰρ ψυχὴ κ.τ.λ.

Psychology, like logic, is constantly made by Aristotle and Plato the basis or form of politics. The individual is the image of the state in the complexity of his life and organisation, and the relations of the parts of the state are expressed and even suggested by the divisions of the soul, and the relations of mind and body.

5. 7. τυχαῖοι γὰρ σωτηρίας οὖτως.

Cp. supra c. 2. § 2 ἁρχον δὲ φύσει καὶ ἀρχόμενον διὰ τὴν σωτηρίαν.
NOTES, BOOK I. 5. 17

έπερ καὶ τοὺς εἰρημένους. 5. 8.
I.e. for the animals, for the body, for the female sex, for τὸ παθητικὸν μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς, to which he has just referred as inferiors.

διὸ καὶ ἄλλου ἐστὶν. 5. 9.
‘Because he is by nature capable of belonging to another, he does belong to another.’

τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα ζῷα οὐ λόγου αἰσθανόμενα, ἄλλα παθήμασιν ὑπηρετεῖ καὶ ἡ 5. 9. χρεία δὲ παραλλάττει μικρὸν.
‘The difference between the slave and the animal is that the slave can apprehend reason but the animal cannot; the use of them is much the same.’

Aristotle is chiefly dwelling on the resemblance between the slave and the animal: but in noting the difference, he has not duly subordinated it to the general tone of the passage. Hence an awkwardness in the connection.

βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις καὶ τὰ σώματα διαφέροντα ποιεῖν τὰ τῶν 5. 10. ἐλευθέρων καὶ τῶν δούλων, τὰ μὲν ἴσχυρὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρήσιν, τὰ δὲ ὀρθὰ καὶ ἄρεστα πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας ἐργασίας, ἄλλα χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικὸν βίον (οὗτος δὲ καὶ γίνεται διηρημένος εἰς τε τὴν πολεμικὴν χρείαν καὶ τὴν εἰρημενήν), συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τούταντον, τοὺς μὲν τὰ σώματα ἐχειν ἐλευθέρων τοὺς δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς.
‘Nature would in fact like, if she could, to make a difference between the bodies of freemen and slaves... but her intention is not always fulfilled; for some men have the bodies and some the souls of freemen:’ that is to say, they are deficient in the other half. The bodies of freemen and the souls of freemen are found indifferently among freemen and slaves: or, referring τοὺς μὲν to the freemen and τοὺς δὲ to the slaves: ‘the one (the freemen) may have the bodies only of freemen, i.e. the souls of slaves, the others (the slaves) may have the souls of freemen.’

ἐλευθέρων must be taken both with σώματα and ψυχάς.

βούλεται expresses, first of all, ‘intention’ or ‘design;’ secondly, ‘tendency.’ The personal language easily passes into the impersonal. Cp. for the use of βούλομαι Nic. Eth. v. 8. § 14, βούλεται μένειν μάλλον, sc. τὸ νόμοσμα, and infra c. 12. § 2. For the general vol. II.
thought, cp. Theognis (line 535 Bergk), ὅπως τε δούλευῃ κεφαλή ἰδέα πέφυκεν | ἀλλ' αἰεὶ σκολή, καυχένα λοξον ἔχει.

5.11. ἀλλ' οὖχ ὁμοίως ράδιον ἰδεῖν τὸ τε τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος.

The connection is,—‘There is as great difference between souls as between bodies or even greater, but not in the same degree perceptible.’ For the ‘sight of the invisible’ cp. Plat. Phaedr. 250 D, ‘For sight is the keenest of our bodily senses, though not by that is wisdom seen,’ and the words preceding.

5.11. ὅτι μὲν τοιῶν εἰσὶ φύσει τινὲς οἱ μὲν ἐλεύθεροι, οἱ δὲ δοῦλοι, φανερῶν—
οἱ μὲν and οἱ δὲ are not subdivisions of τινὲς, which is itself partitive, but there appears to be a pleonastic confusion of two constructions; 1) τινὲς μὲν ἐλεύθεροι τινὲς δὲ δοῦλοι: and 2) οἱ μὲν ἐλεύθεροι οἱ δὲ δοῦλοι. In other words the construction beginning with τινὲς has varied into οἱ μὲν—οἱ δὲ.

6.2. δάσπερ ῥήτορα γράφονται παρακόμων.

‘But a convention by which captives taken in war are made slaves, is a violation of nature, and may be accused of illegality like the author of an unconstitutional measure.’ The more common view is expressed in Xen. Cyr. vii. 5. § 73, νόμος γὰρ ἐν πάσιν ἀνθρώποις άδιός ἐστιν, ὅταν πολεμοῦντάς πόλεις ἀλλήλιον ἐστι καὶ τὰ σώματα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τὰ χρήματα.

6.3. 4. αὖτιν δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἀμφισβητήσεως, καὶ δ' οἱ ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους ἐπαλλάττεις, ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ ἀρετὴν τυχάνονα σχολής καὶ βιάζονται δυσάται μᾶλλον, καὶ ἐστιν ἀεὶ τὸ κρατοῦν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς, ὡστε δοκεῖν μὴ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βιαν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ δικαίου μόνον εἶναι τὴν ἀμφισβητήσεως. Τοῖς γὰρ τοῖς τοὺς μὲν εὖν δοκεῖ τὸ δικαίον εἶναι, τοῖς δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιου, τὸ τῶν κραίτων ἄρχειν, ἐπεὶ διαβάσοντας γε χωρὶς τῶν τῶν λόγων οὐτ' ἵσχυρὸν οὐθὲν ἔχουσιν οὐτ' πυθανὸν ἄτεροι λόγοι, ὡς ὦ δὲ τὸ βλέπων καὶ ἀρετὴν ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν.

δ' οἱ ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους, κ.τ.λ. Not ‘makes the reasons ambiguous’ (Liddell and Scott), but ‘makes the arguments pass from one side to the other,’ or, ‘makes them overlap’ or ‘invade each other’s territory,’ as in the Homeric phrase, ὁμοίως πολέμῳ | πείρατε ἐπαλ-
NOTES, BOOK I. 6.

λάβατες (II. xiii. 358, 9), and in iv. 10. § 2,—τυραννίδος δ' εἶδη δύο
μὲν διείλομεν ἐν οἷς περὶ βασιλείας ἐπεσκοποῦμεν, διὰ τὸ τὴν δύναμιν
ἐπαλλάττειν πως αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν. vi. 1. § 3,—τούτα
γὰρ συνδυαζόμενα τοιεί τὰς πολιτείας ἐπαλλάττειν, ὅστε δριστοκρατίας τε
ὀλιγαρχίκας εἶναι καὶ πολιτείας δημοκρατικώτερας. See also infra c. 9.
§ 15. Virtue and power are opposed: but from one point of
view the arguments cross over or pass into one another, because
there is an element of virtue in power and of power in virtue.

Διὰ γὰρ τούτα, κ.τ.λ. The translation given in the text nearly agrees
with that of Bernays: the phrase τούτων τῶν λόγων in § 4 refers, not
to the τῶν λόγων of § 3, but to the two positions which imme-
diately precede; the first, that justice is benevolence; the second,
that justice is the rule of a superior. These two positions, according
to Aristotle, have a common ground, which explains why such a
difference of opinion can exist (§ 3). This common ground is the
connexion between ἀρετή and βία; the point in dispute being
whether the principle of justice is benevolence or power (§§ 3, 4).
If these two propositions are simply kept apart and not allowed to
combine, there will follow the silly and unmeaning result that the
superior in virtue is not entitled to rule: 'but there is no force or
plausibility in this' [and therefore they cannot be kept apart, but
must be combined]. Aristotle is arguing from his own strong con-
viction, which is repeated again and again in the Politics, that the
superior in virtue has a right to rule. He continues: 'There are
others who maintain that what is legal is just; but they contradict
themselves, for what is allowed by law may be in a higher sense
illegal. Captives taken in war are by law usually enslaved, yet the
war may be unjust, and the persons may be 'nature's freemen,'
and unworthy to be made slaves. But all these views are untenable;
and so Aristotle shews negatively that his own view (expressed in
c. 6. §§ 1 and 3) is right, namely, that there is a slavery which is
natural and just, because based on the superior virtue of the
master, and therefore combining power and right; and that there
is a slavery which is unnatural and unjust, because based on mere
violence; also that the argument from the right of the conqueror
is invalid.
The chief difficulties in this complicated passage are the following:—

(1) The opposition of justice to virtue, which is, perhaps, only to virtue in the lower sense of the word.

(2) What is the meaning of διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο (§ 4)? See Eng. text.

(3) Is ἔννοια a) a principle excluding slavery (Bernays), or b) justifying slavery, as existing for the protection of the inferior races (cp. 5. § 11, οἴς καὶ συμφέρει τῷ δουλεύειν, 6. § 10 and iii. 6. § 6)?

The thesis that 'justice is benevolence' is held by Aristotle to be not inconsistent with slavery, that is, with the just rule of a superior.

(4) Do the words διαστάντων χωρίς=a)* 'being kept apart and not combined, placed in bare opposition,' or b) 'being set aside?' Both uses of διαστάσθαι are justified by examples; in support of the former we may quote Ar. de Caelo, ii. 13, 295 a. 30, ὅτε τὰ στοιχεῖα (sc. of Empedocles) διεστίχει χωρίς ἕπο τῶν νείκων, and supra c. 5. §§ 2, 8; and this meaning agrees better with the context.

(5) Do the words ἄρειοι λόγοι refer a) to one of the two preceding propositions, or b) to a further alternative? It is doubtful whether they are Greek, if taken in the sense of 'the latter,' or 'one of these two propositions.' It is better to translate 'the other view,' which is explained by what follows, ὃς οὐν, δεῖ κ.τ.λ., being the view which denies the natural right of the superior in virtue to rule, and which here as elsewhere, iii. 13. 25, is regarded by Aristotle as absurd. (See discussion of this passage in the Transactions of the Cambridge Philological Society, Vol. II.)

No philosopher is known to have asserted that δικαιοσύνη is ἔννοια. Aristotle in Nic. Eth. viii. 1. § 4, 9. §§ 1–3 notes some resemblances between δικαιοσύνη and φιλία: and we may cite as parallel the Christian maxim, 'Love is the fulfilling of the law.'

6. 5. ὅλως δ' ἀντεχόμενοι τινες, ὃς ἀιωνί, δικαίου τιμής.

'There are some again who identify law and justice.' ὅλως may be taken either 1) with τιμής, 'they maintain in general terms,' i.e. holding to some general notion of justice; or 2)* with ἀντεχόμενοι, 'holding absolutely to a kind of justice.'

6. 5. ἀμα δ' οὐ φαινώ.

'But in the same breath they say the opposite,' i.e. they are
compelled by facts, if they think for a moment, to contradict themselves. The language is slightly inaccurate; for it is not they who contradict themselves, but the facts which refute them.

τὴν τε γὰρ ἄρχην ἐνδέχεται μὴ δικαίων εἶναι τῶν πολέμων, καὶ τῶν 6. 5. ἀνάξιων δουλεύειν οὐδαμῶς ἀν φαίνει τὸς δοῦλον εἶναι.

Either one or two distinct grounds are alleged: 1) the cause of war may be unjust, and then the slave ought not to be a slave; or 2) the cause of war may be unjust, and also the slave, being a Greek, ought not to be a slave.

diώπερ αὐτοὺς οὐ βούλευται λέγειν δοῦλους, ἄλλα τοὺς βαρβάρους. 6. 6.


 ámbper ἡ Θεοδέκτου Ἐλένη φησί. 6. 7.

Theodectes was a younger contemporary, and, according to Suidas, scholar of Aristotle. During the earlier portion of his life he had studied rhetoric under Isocrates, and is said by Dionysius to have been one of the most famous of rhetoricians. His works are often quoted by Aristotle, e.g. Rhet. ii. 23, 1399 a. 7, παράδειγμα ἐκ τοῦ Σωκράτους τοῦ Θεοδέκτου, Εἰς ποίον ἰρένων ἡσθη-κέν; τίνας θεῶν οὐ τετύμηκεν, διὸ ἡ πολις νομίζει; Nic. Eth. vii. 7. § 6, οὐ γὰρ εἰ ταῖς λεχυρῶν καὶ ὑπερβαλλοντῶν ἡδονῶν ἡττᾶται ἡ λυπῶν, βαμματῶν, ἄλλα καὶ συγγενομοικόν, εἰ ἀντιτείνων, ámbper ὁ Θεοδέκτου Φιλοκτήτης ὑπὸ τοῦ ἕχεως πεπληγμένος, and in several other passages. See Bonitz.

διὰν δὲ τούτῳ λέγοντι, οὐθένι άλλ' ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ κακία διορίζονται τὸ 6. 8. δοῦλον καὶ εἰλεύθερον.

'When they speak of Hellenes as everywhere free and noble, they lay down the principle that slave and free are distinguished by the criterion of bad and good.'

ἡ δὲ φύσις βούλει τὰ μὲν τοῖτο ποιεῖν πολλάκις οὐ μέντοι δύναται. 6. 8.

Not 'nature sometimes intends this and sometimes not,' for
she always intends it; nor ‘nature always intends this, but often cannot accomplish it,’ which does violence to the order of the words πολλάκις ὕπ σύστοι: but ‘this nature often intends, when unable to accomplish it,’ πολλάκις adhering to both clauses.

6. 9. ὅτι μὲν ὡς ἔχει τινὰ λόγον ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις.

ἡ ἀμφισβήτησις, sc. the objection to slavery with which chapter 6 commenced, ὅτι δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰννατία φάσκοντες.

6. 9. καὶ οὐκ εἰσίν οἱ μὲν φύσει δοῦλοι οἱ δὲ ἐλεύθεροι.

'And that men are not by nature, the one class [all] slaves and the other [all] freemen, is evident,' repeating ὅτι. Aristotle had maintained at the end of chapter 5, ὅτι μὲν τοῖνυ εἰσὶ φύσει τινὲς οἱ μὲν ἐλεύθεροι, οἱ δὲ δοῦλοι, φαινομ: here he affirms the opposite of his former statement; but he does not explain in what way the two statements are to be reconciled with one another. 'Nature has divided mankind into slaves and freemen, but she has not consistently carried out the division; and there are slaves and freemen who were not the creation of nature.'

The words εἰσί καὶ are inserted before οὐκ εἰσίν by Bekker, (ed. 2); 'if there are some who are by nature slaves and some who are by nature freemen, there are some who are not.' The change has no authority, and is not required by the sense.

6. 9. ἐν τοῖς διώρισται τὸ τοιοῦτον, δὲν συμφέρει τῷ μὲν τὸ δουλεύειν τῷ δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν.

'Such a distinction has been made in some cases, and in these it is expedient that one should serve another rule'; δὲν is substituted for οἷς, that it may be in regimen with τῷ μὲν.

6. 9. ἀστε καὶ δεσπόζειν.

'And consequently the master over his slaves,' i.e. if they and he are fitted, the one to serve, the other to command.

6. 10. διὸ καὶ συμφέρον ἐστὶ τι καὶ φιλία δοῦλῳ καὶ δεσπότῃ πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

Cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 11. § 7, ἥ μὲν οὖν δοῦλος οἷς ἐστὶ φιλία πρὸς αὐτῶν, ἥ δὲ ἀδρέων. The qualification contained in the last three words shows the contradiction of Aristotle's position.
NOTES, BOOK I. 7.

Aristotle returns to the thesis with which he commenced; 'From these considerations, too, i.e. from the natural and permanent difference of freemen and slaves, our old doctrine (i. 1. § 2) that the rule of a master differs from that of a king or statesman, the art of governing a family from the art of governing freemen,' is clearly proven.

7. 1.

ετοί γὰρ ἄτερα ἄτερων κ.τ.λ.

'Slaves have various duties, higher and lower, and therefore the science which treats of them will have many branches; and there is a corresponding science of using slaves, which is the science of the master; yet neither is implied in the terms master or slave; who are so called not because they have science, but because they are of a certain character.' Yet the two propositions are not inconsistent: Plato would have said that the master must have science, and not have denied that he must be of a certain character.

7. 3.

δούλοι πρὸ δούλου, δεσπότης πρὸ δεσπότου.

Aristotle clearly uses the word πρὸ in the sense of precedence as supra c. 4. § 2, ὀργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων. Such a hierarchy among servants as well as masters is not unknown in modern society.

But compare iv. 6. § 6, where he says that the rich having to take care of their property have no leisure for politics.

7. 3.

The passage is obscurely expressed. The writer means to say that the art of acquiring slaves is not to be identified either with the art of the slave or of the master: it is a kind of war (vii. 14. § 21) or hunting. The words ὅλων ἡ δικαια imply that Aristotle is not disposed to justify every mode of acquiring slaves from inferior races: (compare below c. 8. § 12, ἡ γὰρ θηρευτικὴ μέρος αὐτῆς [sc. τῆς κτητικῆς], ἡ δὲι χρήσθαι πρὸς τε τὰ θηρία καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δουλειάς περικάτει ἄρχεσθαι μὴ δέλουσιν, ὥς φύει δικαια τούτων δυνα τῶν πόλεων).

The awkward manner of their introduction leads to the suspicion that they are a gloss, suggested by the passage just cited. The sense of ὅλων is explanatory and so corrective; not, as Bernays,
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'for example, the art of justly acquiring slaves approximates to the art of war or hunting;' for this would apply equally to every mode of acquiring slaves, and the meaning given to τις is feeble; but 'I mean to say,' or 'I am speaking of the just mode of acquiring slaves which is a kind of war or of hunting.' (See Bonitz, Index Arist., s.v. δολο.)

8. 1. ὅλως δὲ περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς θεωρῆσομεν κατὰ τῶν ὑφηγημένων τρόπων, ἔπειτε καὶ ὁ δοῦλος τῆς κτήσεως μέρος τι ἤν.

'We have been speaking (ἤν) of the possession of slaves which is a part of property, and according to our usual method of resolving the whole into its parts, we will now proceed to consider generally the other parts of property.' For ὑφηγημένων cp. note on c. 1. § 3.

8. 1. πότερον ἡ χρηματιστικὴ ἡ αὐτὴ τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἐστιν κ.τ.λ.

Aristotle proceeds to show that the art of money-making is not the same with the management of the family; it is only subordinate to it. But subordinate in what way? Bearing in mind his own distinction of instrumental and material, he argues that it provides material to the household, but is not the same with household management.

8. 3. ὅστε πρῶτον κ.τ.λ. = 'the question arises' or 'we are led to ask first of all, whether tillage is a part of the management of a household; or rather whether we must not include all the various ways of providing food,' which are then described at length.

The digression which follows is intended to contrast χρηματιστικῆ in all its branches with οἰκονομικῆ, and to prepare for the distinction between the natural and unnatural modes of acquisition.

The sentence is irregular, the clause ὅστε πρῶτον κ.τ.λ. following as if ἦστι τοῦ χρηματιστικοῦ θεωρῆσαι without εἰ had preceded. The words ἦστι τοῦ χρηματιστικοῦ κ.τ.λ. are to be repeated with πότερον μέρος τι.

8. 4. ἄλλα μὴν εἴης γε πολλὰ τροφῆς.

'The question has been asked, Is the whole provision of food a part of money-making?—But then we should remember that there are several kinds of food.'
πρὸς τὰς ῥαστώνας καὶ τὴν αἴρεσιν τὴν τούτων.  
τὰς ῥαστώνας κ.τ.λ. ‘For their convenience and the obtaining’;  
the words may also be regarded as a hendiadys, ‘for the opportu-
nity of obtaining.’  
tούτων. Sc. καρποῦ, ζφῶν, understood from ζφοφάγα, καρποφάγα.

According to the common notion the life of the hunter precedes 8. 6.  
that of the shepherd; Aristotle places the shepherd first, apparently  
because the least exertion is required of him. The remark arises  
out of the previous sentence, in which he divided the lives of men  
according to the facility with which they obtained food. Cp. Mill,  

θάλασσαν τοιαύτην.  

αὐτόφυτον.  
Either 1)* ‘immediately obtained from the products of nature’  
=ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως, or 2) =αὐτουργόν, ‘by their own labour.’  
τὸν ἐνδεώτατον βίον.  
Bernays reads ἐνδεώτερον without MS. authority, but there is  
no need to make any change. The meaning is that they supple-
ment the extreme poverty (ἐνδεώτατον) of one kind of life by  
another: the two together give them a comfortable subsistence.

σκοληκτοκεί.  
Cp. De Gen. Anim. ii. 1, 732 b. 10, τῶν δʹ ἀναίμων τὰ ἐντομα σκολη-
κεί. The term ‘vermiparous’ is not strictly correct: for all  
animals are either viviparous or oviparous. But Aristotle appears  
not to have been aware that the larva of the insect comes from an  
egg.

τὴν τοῦ καλουμένου γάλακτος φύσιν.  
A pleonasm common in Aristotle: cp. ἡ τῆς ἀγμίδος, τοῦ σπέρματος,  
tῶν καταμηνίων, φύσις, Hist. Animal. passim. (See Bonitz, Index  
Arist., p. 838 a. 8 ff.)

διότε ὁμοίως δῆλον ὅτι καὶ γενομένους οἰητέων τὰ τε φυτὰ τῶν ζφῶν ἔνεκεν 8. 11.  
ἔσται καὶ τάλλα ζφα τῶν ἀνθρώπων χάριν, τὰ μὲν ἡμέρα καὶ διὰ τὴν χρήσιν καὶ
Aristotle is tracing the design of nature in the creation of animals and plants, first at their birth, secondly at their maturity. She has provided food taken from the parents in various forms for the young of animals at or about the time of their birth, and, after they are born, she has provided one to sustain the other, plants for the sake of animals, animals for the sake of man. The principle that the lower exist for the sake of the higher is deeply rooted in the philosophy of Aristotle. The belief that the animals are intended for his use is natural to man because he actually uses a small part of them. Yet Plato would remind us (Politicus 263 D) that 'a crane or some other intelligent animal' would have a different account to give of the matter.

Compare Butler, Analogy, Pt. I., ch. vii.: 'It is highly probable, that the natural world is formed and carried on merely in subserviency to the moral, as the vegetable world is for the animal, and organized bodies for minds.' Yet how far the idea of design is applicable to nature, how far we can argue from a fact to an intention, and how far such a conception, whether in ancient or modern times, has enlightened or has blinded the minds of philosophical enquirers,—are questions not easily determined.

The opposition is between the young of animals before and after birth, answering imperfectly to κατά τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν, and εἰς καὶ τελειωθείσιν: the first is illustrated in § 10, the second in § 11. There is no necessity for omitting (with Göttling and Bernays) γενομένοις, which is found with a slight variation, γενομένοις, in all MSS. and confirmed by Moerbeke who has 'genitis.' For the use of γενομένοις = 'after they are born' cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 12. § 5, τὸν γὰρ εἶναί καὶ τραφήναι αὐτῶν (sc. οἱ γονεῖς) καὶ γενομένους τοῦ παιδευθήναι.

8. 12. ἡ γὰρ θηρευτικὴ μέρος αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς πολεμικῆς).

Cp. Plat. Soph. 222 C, where hunting is the genus of which war is a species: and Laveleye (Primitive Property, c. 7, p. 100, English trans.), who speaks of the warlike character of hunting tribes, citing this passage.
In this sentence two clauses are compressed into one:—'one kind of acquisition is according to nature, and this is a part of household management.'

κατὰ φύσιν is equivalent to ἐκ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶ, and is best taken, not with οἰκονομικὴ (Bernays) but with κτητική, as is shown by the use of the words infra § 15: οἷς μὲν τοῖνυν ἐστι τις κτητικὴ κατὰ φύσιν τοῖς οἰκονόμοις καὶ τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, καὶ δὲ ἦν αἰτίας, δῆλον.

ὅ δὲ ὁτι οὐπάρχει ἡ πορίζειν αὐτὴν ὅπως οὐπάρχῃ, ὡν ἐστὶ θησαυρισμὸς 8. 13. χρήματων πρὸς ζωὴν ἀναγκαίως καὶ χρησίμων εἰς κοινωνίαν πόλεως ἡ οἰκίας.

ὅ δὲ is a confused expression referring grammatically to ἐκ τῆς οἰκονομικῆς μέρος, but in sense to the property with which this art of acquisition is concerned. It it needless to read with Bernays καθ' ὅ δέ, for the inexact antecedent is common in Aristotle.

αὐτὴν refers to κτητικὴ or possibly to φύσις: the nominative to οὐπάρχῃ is either the same as to οὐπάρχειν, i.e. ὁὶ = κτήματα understood from ἐκ τῆς οἰκονομικῆς, or θησαυρισμός χρήματων ὅ ἐστι πρὸς ζωὴν ἀναγκαία, the genitive ὅν being substituted by attraction for the nominative ὃ = οὐπάρχῃ χρήματα ὃν ἐστὶ θησαυρισμός. It must be admitted that the words ὅν ἐστι would be better away: they read awkwardly, and, if this were a sufficient reason for rejecting them, might be deemed spurious.

πλούτου δ’ οὐθὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κεῖται. 8. 14.

Solon, Fr. xii. 71 Bergk. The line is also found in Theognis 227 with a slight variation, ἀνδρόπους for ἀνδράσι κεῖται.

κεῖται γὰρ ὅπερ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις. 8. 15.

A slight inaccuracy; either 1) πλούτῳ understood = τῇ τέχνῃ τοῦ πλούτου: or 2) ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις may be taken to mean the subjects of the other arts: or vaguely = 'in the other arts': or 3) τῇ κατὰ φύσιν κτητικῇ may be supplied from the beginning of the sentence.

οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄργανον ἀπειρον οὐδεμάς ἐστὶ τέχνης ὧντε πληθεὶς ὧντε μεγέθει, 8. 15.

ὁ δὲ πλούτος ὄργανων πληθός ἐστὶν οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν.

Life, according to Aristotle, is subject, like the arts, to a limit, and requires only a certain number of implements.
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Cp. the passage in the Republic (i. 349, 350) in which it is shewn from the analogy of the arts that the just and the wise do not aim at excess. Here as elsewhere ‘the good is of the nature of the finite,’ whereas evil is undefined. Cp. also Nic. Eth. ii. 6. § 14, τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἶκαν, τὸ δὲ ἄγαθον τοῦ πεπερασμένου: and Mill, Polit. Econ., Preliminary Remarks, ‘the definition of wealth as signifying instruments is philosophically correct but departs too widely from the custom of language.’

8. 15. δὲ ἦν αἱτίαι.
Sc. because provision has to be made for the uses of life.

9. 1. δὲ ἦν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ πέρας.
‘Owing to which,’ or ‘to the nature of which,’ ‘there appears to be no limit,’ etc.

9. 1. ἐστὶ δ’ ἡ μὲν φύσει ἡ δ’ οὐ φύσει.
So Plato divides κτιτηρικὴ into θηρευτικὴ and ἀλλακτικὴ, Soph. 223 ff.

9. 2. ἐκώστου κτήματος διττῆ ἡ χρήσις.
Cp. Adam Smith’s ‘Value in use’ and ‘Value in exchange’; Wealth of Nations, Book i. c. 4, though the order of the two ideas is inverted. For to Aristotle the value in use or teleological value is the truer and better, to Adam Smith as a political economist the value in exchange is prior in importance.

9. 4. ὅσον γὰρ ἱκανὸν αὐτοῖς.
Sc. τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

9. 5. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκουσάνυν πάντων, οἱ δὲ κεχωρισμένοι πολλῶν πάλιν καὶ ἐτέρων ὑπὸ κατὰ τὰς δεήσεις ἀναγκαίων ποιεῖσθαι τὰς μεταδόσεις.
Bernays inserts ἐτέρων before ἐτέρων, which he would translate ‘different persons want different things,’ and he assumes the idea of want to be implied in κεχωρισμένοι. But it is difficult to understand this explanation. A fair meaning may be elicited from the text, as it stands:—1) ‘In families they shared in all things alike; when they were dispersed they had many things as before, but not all the same’: or 2) καὶ ἐτέρων may be taken more simply: ‘they shared in many things as before, and had many other things as well’; i.e. the enlargement of society gave rise to new wants. The
word ἐκουσίων = κοινά εἰχον is not equally applicable to both clauses; in the second clause some other word like εἰχον or ἐκτῶντο is wanted.

For κεχώρισμένοι compare ii. 2. § 3, Διοίσει δὲ τῷ τουούτῳ καὶ πάλις ἔθνους ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κόμας δοῦν κεχώρισμένοι τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ' ὅτι 'Αρκαίδες.

οἱ μὲν, sc. οἱ ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ κοινωνίᾳ, 'mankind in the first stage of society'; οἱ δὲ, sc. πλείονοι τῆς κοινωνίας ὅσης further explained by κεχώρισμένοι, 'mankind after their dispersion.'

ὁν in the words which follow is to be connected with τὰς μεταδόσεις.

cαὶ τῶν βαρβαρικῶν ἔθνων. 9. 5.

cαὶ which is found in all the MSS., though omitted in William de Moerbeke, merely emphasizes the whole clause 'As moreover some barbarian nations still do.' There is no need to introduce νῦν after καὶ without MS. authority, as Bernays has done.

eἰς ἀναπλήρωσιν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν αὐταρκείας. 9. 6.

Lit. 'to fill up what was wanting of the self-sufficingness intended by nature,' or 'to fill up what nature demanded in order to make man self-sufficing,' = εἰς ἀναπλήρωσιν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἐνδείας ὅση αὐτάρκης εἰς.

κατὰ λόγον. 'In a natural way'; 'as might be expected.' 9. 7.

ἐνενκωτέρας γνωμονείς τῆς βοινείας. 9. 7.

'When the supply began to come more from foreign countries,' etc.

ἐξ ἀναίγης ἣ τοῦ νομίσματος ἐπορίσθη χρήσις. 9. 7.

'Of necessity there arose a currency.'


δ' τῶν χρησίμων αὐτὸ δὲν εἰχε τῆν χρείαν εὐμεταχειριστον. 9. 8.

'Money belongs to the class of things which are in themselves useful and convenient for the purposes of life,' although there may be circumstances under which it is a mere sham (ἀρος); see § 11.

πορισθέντος οὖν ἦδη νομίσματος ἐκ τῆς ἀναίγης ἀλλαγῆς θάτερον εἶδος 9. 9.

τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἐγένετο, τὸ καταλληκτικόν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἀπλῶς ἰσως γινό-
μενον, είτα δι' ἐμπειρίας ἦδη τεχνικώτερον, πόθεν καὶ πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον πλείστον ποιήσει κέρδος.

Θάτερον εἴδος, i.e. 'other' than what Aristotle before called ἐν εἴδος κτητικῆς (c. 8. § 13) which he had not yet distinguished from καπηλική. He admits that the simpler forms of exchange are necessary; but he also supposes that there are two uses to which the art of money-making may be applied, the one, the storing up of the necessaries of life, which he approves, the other, retail trade which he condemns. A prejudice against money, which is further developed in the condemnation of usury (c. 10. §§ 4, 5) underlies the whole tone of thought. We may note that καπηλική, though here applied to trade in general, carries with it the disparaging association of shopkeeping.

πόθεν καὶ πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον is dependent on δι' ἐμπειρίας.

9. 11. For the story of Midas see Ovid, Met. xi. 90–145. It is obvious that Midas would have suffered equally if his touch had produced food or clothing or any other article of commerce. In his account of money Aristotle seems to be perplexed between its usefulness and its uselessness, and between the good and bad consequences which flow from it.

9. 12. τὸ γὰρ νόμισμα στοιχεῖον καὶ πέρας τῆς ἀλλαγῆς.
Money is the element, i.e. the instrument of exchange. It is also the limit or end of it. Exchange is not possible without money and seeks for nothing beyond it.

9. 13. καὶ ἀπειρος δὴ οὗτος ὁ πλοῦτος.
There is no limit to the art of making money any more than to medicine or other arts; for we want to have as much health and wealth as we can. But there is a limit if we regard wealth as only a means to an end, i.e. to the maintenance of a household. The passage is not very clearly expressed, owing partly to the double meaning of the word πέρας, (1) 'limit' or 'measure,' as opposed to the infinite or indefinite ἀπειρος, and (2) 'end' as opposed to 'means.' Aristotle probably intends to say that the art of money making is unlimited, having no other end but wealth, which is also unlimited; whereas in the art of household management, the limit or end is fixed by natural needs.
NOTES, BOOK I. 9.

There is another confusion in this chapter. Aristotle tries to make a difference in kind between the legitimate and illegitimate use of exchange, but the difference is really one of degree. Trade is not rendered illegitimate by the use of coin, which is natural and necessary. The source of the confusion is that he never regards exchange on the great scale as the saving of labour, but only as the means of creating superfluous wealth.

ὅσπερ γὰρ ἡ ἱατρικὴ τοῦ ἴματος εἰς ἀπειρόν ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν 9. 13. τεκνῶν τοῦ τέλους εἰς ἀπειρόν (ὅτι μάλιστα γὰρ ἐκείνο βούλουνται ποιεῖν), τῶν δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος οὐκ εἰς ἀπειρόν (πέρας γὰρ τὸ τέλος πάσας), οὔτω καὶ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς οὐκ ἐστὶ τοῦ τέλους πέρας, τέλος δὲ τοῦ τοιούτου πλούτου καὶ χρημάτων κτῆσις.

'The art of money-making, like the other arts, is limited in the means, but unlimited in the end; as the physician seeks health without limit, so the money-maker seeks wealth without limit.' Yet the analogy is defective; for there is no accumulation of health in the same sense in which there may be an accumulation of wealth. The physician stands really on the same footing with the manager of the household; for both equally seek to fulfil to the utmost their respective functions, the one to order the household, the other to improve the health of the patient, and there is a limit to both. The opposition of means and ends is also questionable; for the end may be regarded as the sum of the means, and would not an unlimited end, if such a conception is allowable, imply unlimited means, or the unlimited use of limited?

τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς οὐ χρηματιστικῆς ἐστὶν πέρας οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς οἰκονομ. 9. 14. μικῆς εὑρον.

Lit. 'the art of household management which is not concerned with money-making has a limit; for this (sc. οἷ τοιοῦτος πλούτος, the unlimited making of money described above) is not its business.'

ἐπαλλάττει γὰρ ἡ χρήσις τοῦ αὐτοῦ οὖσα ἐκατέρα τῆς χρηματιστικῆς. 9. 15.

'For the two uses of money-making being concerned with the same thing, namely coin or wealth, they run into each other.'

ἡ χρήσις governs both τῆς χρηματιστικῆς and τοῦ αὐτοῦ. The emendation of Bernays ἐκατέρα τῆς χρηματιστικῆ is unnecessary.
9. 15. τῆς γὰρ αὐτῆς ἐστὶ χρήσεως κτήσις, ἀλλ' οὗ κατὰ ταύταν, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν ἐτερον τέλος, τῆς δ' ἡ αὐξησις. 

χρήσεως κτήσις. 'For acquisition belongs to the same use of χρηματιστική, i.e. in all acquisition chrematistic is used in the same way, though the ends differ, for the end in the one case is external, i.e. the supply of the household, in the other case, mere accumulation.

9. 16. ὕσσον δὲ καὶ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν ἐπιθάλλοντα, τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀπολαύσεις τὰς σωματικὰς ζητούσω, οὕτω ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτ' ἐν τῇ κτήσει φαίνεται ὑπάρχειν κ.τ.λ. 

Even good men desire pleasures, and therefore wealth, just because these (τοῦτ') depend on wealth. Cp. τοῦτο, § 15, referring to χρηματιστική.

9. 17. ἀνδρίας γὰρ οὗ χρῆματα ποιεῖν ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ θάρσος. 

I. e. whereas the virtue of courage, the art of medicine or of military command have severally ends of their own, they are perverted to the unnatural end of money-making.

10. 1. δῆλον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀπορούμενον ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τότερον τοῦ οἰκονομικοῦ καὶ πολιτικοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ χρηματιστική ἡ οὗ, ἀλλὰ δεὶ τοῦτο μὲν ὑπάρχειν κ.τ.λ. 

τὸ ἀπορούμενον see supra c. 8. §§ 1, 2. 

τοῦτο, sc. τὰ χρήματα, understood from χρηματιστική as infra § 3 τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν refers to τὰ χρήματα. ἀλλὰ δεὶ is the other alternative of the ἀπορία, implying τίς answer to the question: 'whether the art of money-making is the business of the manager of the household and of the statesman or whether [this is not the case, but] the possession of wealth must be presupposed? [We reply, the latter.] For as the art of the statesman receives men from nature, even so must nature, that is to say land or sea or some other element, provide them with food.'

10. 1. ὅσπερ γὰρ καὶ ἀνθρώποις οὐ ποιεῖ ἡ πολιτική, ἀλλὰ λαβοῦσα παρὰ τῆς φύσεως χρῆται αὐτοῖς, οὗτῳ καὶ τροφὴν τῆν φύσιν δεὶ παραδοῦναι γῆν ἡ βάλασταν ἡ ἄλλο τι. 

The last words γῆν ἡ βάλασταν ἡ ἄλλο τι are either 1) in opposition with τὴν φύσιν, or 2) accusatives after παραδοῦναι. In the first case γῆν and βάλασταν are an explanation of τὴν φύσιν. In the second case τροφὴν is a remote accusative, 'nature gives land and sea for the supply of food.' The latter way of taking the words is
forced. Nature is here said to provide food, but no real distinction can be drawn between the provision of food by nature and the acquisition or appropriation of it by the labour of man, cp. § 3.

\[ \textit{εἴ δὲ τοῦτων, ὡς δὲι, ταῦτα διαθέιναι προσήκει τὸν οἰκονόμον.} \]

\[ \textit{εἴ τοῦτων, 'thereupon,' i.e. εἴ τοῦ λαβέιν παρά φύσεως; ταῦτα διαθέιναι, 'to order them,' i.e. the things which nature gives [for the use of the household]; or εἴ τοῦτων='from what is given by nature.' ταῦτα διαθέιναι, 'to set in order,' i.e. to select and arrange the things necessary for the household.} \]

\[ \textit{kai γὰρ ἀπορήσειν ἂν τις.} \]

'Were this otherwise' (as in the translation) i.e. 'if the duty of the manager of a household consisted in producing and not in using, then he would be equally concerned with money-making and with medicine. And so he is to a certain extent concerned with both, but unlike the physician or the maker of money only to a certain extent, whereas they pursue their vocations without limit.'

\[ \textit{kai peri ιγνεῖς.} \]

About health as well as about wealth.

\[ \textit{μάλιστα δὲ, καθάπερ εἰρηται πρότερον, δεί φύσει τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν.} \]

\[ \textit{τοῦτο} refers to some general idea, such as 'the means of life,' to be gathered from τὰ χρήματα in the preceding sentence.} \]

\[ \textit{παντὶ γὰρ, ἡς οὐ γίνεται, τροφὴ τὸ λειπόμενον ἔστιν.} \]

\[ \textit{τὸ λειπόμενον=τὸ λειπόμενον ἐν ἑκείνῳ ἡς οὐ γίνεται, the residuum or that from which the offspring parts, i.e. milk, white of egg, etc. : cp. De Hist. Anim. i. 5, 48b. 8, ὄνω... ἡς οὐ γίνεται τὸ γυνόμενον ἡς οὖν ἐκ μορίου τὴν ἄρχην, τὸ δ' ἄλλο τροφὴ τὸ γυνόμενον ἔστιν: and supra c. 8. § 10.} \]

\[ \textit{διὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἔστιν ἡ χρηματιστικὴ πᾶσιν ἀπὸ τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τῶν ζῴων.} \]

Fruits and animals are the gifts of nature and intended for the subsistence of man (cp. c. 8): hence (διό), with some equivocation, the trade in them is said to be natural.

\[ \textit{ὅ δὲ τόκος γίνεται νόμισμα νομίσματος.} \]

\[ \textit{Cp. Arist. Nub. i 286, τοῦτο δ' ἐσθ' ὣ τόκος τί δηρίον; Thesm. 845, ἰδία γυνὲι τὸ τοκοῦσα τοιοῦτον τόκων.} \]
ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS.

Cp. also Shakspere’s Merchant of Venice, Act i, Scene 3,—‘A breed of barren metal.’

It has been customary, since Bentham wrote, to denounce Usury Laws on the ground 1) that they are ineffectual, or worse, 2) that they are unjust both to lender and borrower, because they interfere with the natural rate of interest. But in primitive states of society, as in India at the present day, they may have been more needed and more easy to enforce. In a simple agricultural population where the want of capital is greatly felt, and land is the only security, the usurer becomes a tyrant: hence the detestation of usury. The other and better side of usury, that is to say, the advantage of transferring money at the market rate from those who cannot use it to those who can, was not understood by Aristotle any more than the advantage of exchanging commodities.


11. i. τὰ τοιαῦτα τὴν μὲν θεωρίαν ἔλεύθερον ἔχει, τὴν δὲ ἐμπειρίαν ἀναγκαίαν.

1*) ‘To speculate about such matters is a liberal pursuit; the practice of them is servile.’ In modern language ‘a gentleman may study political economy, but he must not keep a shop.’ Cp. infra § 5, peri ἐκάστου δὲ τούτων καθόλου μὲν εἰρητικό καὶ νῦν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖται χρήσιμων μὲν πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικῶν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατριβέων: and iv. 15. § 4, ἀλλὰ ταύτα διαφέρει πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις οὐδὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν· οὐ γὰρ πώς κρίσεις γέγονεν ἄμφοτεροι περὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἔχει δὲ τῷ ἀλλην διανοητικήν πραγματείαν: also iii. 8. § 1, τῷ δὲ peri ἐκάστην μέθοδον φιλοσοφοῦντι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀποδιόγειν πρὸς τὸ πράττειν οἰκείων ἐστι τὸ μὴ παρορῶν μηδὲ τι καταλείπειν, ἀλλὰ δηλοῦν τὴν peri ἐκάστου ἄλλησιν.

Or again 2) ‘Speculation is free; but in practice we are limited by circumstances;’ i.e. speculation on such matters may go to any extent or take any direction, but in practice we must restrict ourselves to the necessities of the case, e.g. the nature of the soil, climate, neighbourhood, etc. § 5 infra may be quoted in defence of either explanation, the words χρήσιμων πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας supporting the second, φορτικῶν τὸ ἐνδιατριβέων the first. ἐμπειρίαν connects with ἔμπειρον which follows: ‘experience of live-stock is one of the useful parts of money-making.’
SYNOPSIS OF THE VARIOUS DIVISIONS OF κτητική, in c. 11. §§ 1-4.

κτητική (sometimes called χρηματιστική, ch. 8. § 1).

1. θηρευτική (which is κατά φύσιν, c. 8. § 12)
   - πρὸς τὰ θηρία
   - πρὸς τοὺς φῶσιν δούλους
     (= polemik in one of its divisions),
     cp. vii. 14. § 21

2. χρηματιστική (c. 9. § 1)
   - 1. ἡ κατὰ φύσιν (c. 9. § 12)
   - 2. ἡ μετοχή (c. 11. § 4)
     3. ἡ παρὰ φύσιν
       (μεταβλητική, c. 10. § 4)

Idiotomia

Metalleutike

Subdivided c. 11. §§ 1, 2 into:
   a. κτήσις ἵππων, βοῶν, προβάτων, etc.
   b. γεωργία, divided into (1) ψιλή,
     (2) περιφερευμένη.
   c. μελιττουργία.
   d. keeping of fish.
   e. keeping of birds.

Idiotomia, called
kaphtik in c. 9. § 4.

Metalleutike

b. τοκισμὸς (of which the worst form is
   ὀβολασσατική)

a. ἱμπορία,

1. ναυκληρία.
2. φορτηγία.
3. παράστασις.
1. ἡ τῶν βαναύσων τεχνῶν.
2. ἡ τῶν ἀτέχνων.
11. 3. ναυκληρία, φορτηγία.

ναυκληρία = 'commerce by sea,' φορτηγία = 'commerce by land.'
The word ναυκληρία may also be taken in the narrower sense of 'owning of ships'; and φορτηγία in the sense of 'carrying whether by sea or land.' But this explanation of the words does not afford so natural a division.

11. 3. διαφέρει δὲ τούτων ἐτερα ἐτέρων τῷ τὰ μὲν ἀσφαλέστερα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ πλεῖον πορίζειν τὴν ἐπικαρπίαν.

It is not certain whether in this sentence Aristotle is speaking of trades in general without reference to the three previous divisions, or, of the divisions themselves, commerce by sea being the more profitable, commerce by land the more secure mode of trading. The opposition of τὰ μὲν . . . τὰ δὲ favours the more general application of the words.

11. 4, 5. οἶνον ὑλοτομία τε καὶ πᾶσα μεταλλευτική. αὕτη δὲ πολλὰ ἡδή περιελήφθη γίνεται πολλὰ γὰρ εἰδὴ τῶν ἐκ γῆς μεταλλευμάτων ἐστίν.

In these words Aristotle is illustrating 'the third or mixed kind of chromatic,' which is concerned not only with fruits of the earth and animals, but with other products dug out of the earth and manufactured by man.

ἡδή, 'mining again is not a simple art, but already—or, not to speak of other species—contains in itself many subdivisions.'

11. 6, 7. εἰς δὲ τεχνικῶταται μὲν τῶν ἑργασιῶν ὅπου ἐλάχιστον τῆς τύχης, θανατοίσαται δ' ἐν αἷς τὰ σώματα λιβάζονται μάλιστα, δυσλικάωται δὲ ὅτι τοῦ σώματος πλείστοι χρήσεις, ἀγεννῶταται δὲ ὅτι ἐλάχιστον προσδεί ἄρετης. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ἐνίοτε γεγραμμένα περὶ τούτων, κ.τ.λ.

The connexion is with the word καθόλου in § 5. Aristotle, although he declines to go into the particulars of these arts, gives some general characteristics of them.

In the sentence which follows, the clause ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν skips the intervening passage εἰς δὲ . . . ἄρετῆς, and goes back to the previous subject. In another author we might suspect a gloss. But there are many such dislocations in Aristotle's Politics; e.g. iii. 4. §§ 11–13. For the meaning cp. Rhet. i. 4. 1359 b. 31, ἀναγκαῖον τῶν παρὰ τούτῳ ἄλλως εἰρημένων ἱστορικῶν εἶναι.
NOTES, BOOK I. 12.

οἶνον Χάρρης δῆ.

δῆ is to be taken with οἶνον like ὅλως δῆ, οὔτω δῆ, καὶ δῆ with a slight emphasis, and sometimes with a word interposed, e.g. καὶ πλούτῳ δῆ, Nic. Eth. iv. 1. § 6.

Θάλεω τοῦ Μιλησίου.

Thales is referred to in the Nic. Eth. vi. 7. § 5 and by Plato in the Theaetetus (p. 174 A) as a type of the unpractical philosopher.

'But even he could have made a fortune, if he had pleased.'

τυχάνει δὲ καθόλου τι δὲν.

Cp. §12. The device attributed to Thales is only an application of the general principle of creating a monopoly.

ἐπώλει μόνος, οὐ πολλὴν ποιήσας ὑπερβολὴν κ.τ.λ.

I. e. he bought up all the iron when it was very cheap, and having a monopoly sold it rather, but not very, dear.

δραμα Θάλεω.

δραμα, which is the reading of all the MSS., is used in the metaphorical sense of 'idea' here required, only in Pseudo-Demosthenes, 1460. 26, perhaps a sufficient authority for the meaning of a word.

*εἰρήμα (Camerarius): θεώρημα (Coraes): δράμα (Prof. Campbell) may be suggested.

Cp. Plat. Theaet. 150 Α.

ἐπὶ δὲ τρῖα μέρη, κ.τ.λ.

The apodosis is lost; the suppressed thought that 'all three parts are concerned with man' is resumed in the next chapter.

καὶ γὰρ γυναικὸς ἀρχειν καὶ τέκνων.

Sc. τὸν ἄνδρα. Supply for the construction either ἴν μέρος ὀικονομικῆς οὐ εἰρήμεν αὐτὸν from the preceding words.

έξ ἴσου γὰρ εἶναι βουλεταί τὴν φύσιν καὶ διαφέρειν μηθεῖν. ὅμως δὲ, 12. 2.

ὅταν τὸ μὲν ἀρχη τὸ δὲ ἀρχηται, ζητεῖ διαφορὰν εἶναι καὶ σχῆμαι καὶ λόγους καὶ τιμαίς, ὡσπερ καὶ Ἀρμασίς εἰπε τὸν περὶ τοῦ πολιτικῆς λόγον.

Βουλεταί sc. ἡ πολιτεία οὐ ἡ πολιτικὴ ἄρχη, understood from ἐν ταῖς πολιτικαῖς ἁρχαῖς: 'where there is a πολιτεία, political equality is implied. All other differences, such as titles of honour, are temporary and official only.' The construction of ἵστει may be similarly explained. Or both may be taken impersonally.
"Ἀμασίας, who made his foot-pan into a god, as he had himself been made into a king, cp. Herod. ii. 172. The connexion is as follows: 'Among equals, where one rules and another is ruled, we make an artificial distinction of names and titles, but this is not the case in the relation of husband and wife, because the distinction between them exists already and is permanent.'

12. 3. τὸ δ' ἀρρεν ἄει πρὸς τὸ θηλυ τούτον ἐχεῖ τῶν τρόπων.

Resuming the words in § 1 γυναικὸς μὲν πολιτικῶς, and adding the distinction that the relation between husband and wife, unlike that between ruler and subject in a πολιτεία, is permanent (ἄει). This permanence of relation between husband and wife makes it rather an 'aristocratical' than a 'constitutional' rule, and in Nic. Eth. viii. 10. § 5 and Eud. Eth. vii. 9. § 4 it is so described.

13. 2. καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν τῶν τοιούτων ἔξεσθω.

Supply ἄρετὴ τις before τῶν ἀλλῶν—assisted by οὐδεμία in the following clause. Cp. infra § 13, σκυπτοτόμος δ' οὐδείς, οἶδε τῶν ἀλλῶν τεχνιτῶν. The words τῶν τοιούτων are used inaccurately 'of such habits,' meaning the habits which have virtues like these.

13. 5. ἀνάγκη μὲν μετέχειν ἀρχοτέρους ἄρετῆς, ταύτης δ' εἶναι διαφοράς, ὡσπερ καὶ τῶν φύσει ἀρχομένων.

'Both require virtue, and of these virtues there will be different kinds since the natural subject differs [from the natural ruler]'; or, with Bernays, 'corresponding to the difference in the subject classes,' cp. infra clause 7. But why only in the subject?—a difficulty which seems to have been felt by those copyists or editors who, supported by Moerbeke, insert ἀρχοτέρων καὶ before ἀρχομένων. Better: 'There will be differences of virtue in the ruling and subject classes, similar to those which [we have already noted to exist] in the natural subject.'

13. 6. καὶ τοῖτο εὑθὺς ψφήγηται περὶ τίν ψυχῆν.

1) *And this is immediately suggested by the soul': or 2) 'And this, without looking further, is the leading or guiding principle in the soul.' There is a rule of superior and inferior, not only in states, but in the soul itself.

The verb ψφήγηται in this passage is taken passively by Bonitz,
‘and this distinction was indicated in the soul.’ Cp. Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. i. 2. 3, ἰδὴν ὅτι καθάπερ ἰσφῆγγαι περὶ τοῦτων λεκτέων. But in most other examples of its use the word must be, or is better, construed actively, and it is safer to take it so in this passage. Cp. supra c. 5. §§ 2–6.

ὡστε φύσει τὰ πλεῖω ἄρχοντα καὶ ἄρχόμενα. ἄλλοι γὰρ τρόπον τὸ ἐλευ- 13. 6–8. θεον τοῦ δούλου ἄρχει καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν τοῦ θηλεος καὶ ἀνὴρ παιδὸς καὶ πάσιν ἐνυπάρχει μὲν τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' ἐνυπάρχει διαφερόντως. ὃ μὲν γὰρ δούλος ὁ λοις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικὸν, τὸ δὲ θηλεῖν ἔχει μὲν, ἀλλ' ἀκυρον ὃ δὲ πάσιν ἔχει μὲν, ἀλλ' ἀτελεῖς. ὅμοιος τοῖς ἀναγκαῖοι ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἤθικας ἁρετάς.

By inserting ἐτει before φύσει, altering τὰ πλεῖω ἄρχοντα into πλεῖω τὰ ἄρχοντα, and omitting ἀναγκαῖοι before ἔχειν a few lines lower down, Bernays has ingeniously fused the whole train of thought with its many involutions, into a single consistent sentence. But in such a complex passage, an anacolouthon seems more probable, and Bernays’ alterations are considerable and unsupported by MS. authority. Cp. Nic. Eth. iii. 5. § 17, for a similar passage, which has also been arranged so as to form a continuous sentence; also c. 8. § 3; c. 12. § 1; iii. 9. § 6, and note. The words ἄλλοι γὰρ τρόπον go back to ταύτης εἶναι διαφορὰς.

ὡστε φανερῶν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἤθικὴ ἁρετὴ τῶν εἰρημέσων πάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἡ 13. 9. αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη κ.τ.λ.

‘Moral virtue is to be attributed to all these classes and [as they differ in character so] their virtues differ.’

καθὸλος γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες κ.τ.λ.

In the Meno of Plato (p. 73), Socrates argues for the necessity of some general definition of virtue against Gorgias, who, being unable to apprehend such a general idea, confuses the whole of virtue with its parts. Either from an imperfect recollection of the passage or perhaps also from the party spirit which made him or his school professional adversaries of Plato (see note on ii. 4. § 2), Aristotle takes a view of his meaning which, when compared with the context, is seen to be untenable. For the Platonic Socrates is maintaining what Aristotle is elsewhere quite ready to
allow,—that there must be a common idea of virtue; this Gorgias
the Sophist in the infancy of philosophy is unable to understand,
and in reply can only enumerate separate virtues. The tendency
in the Aristotelian writings to refer to Plato, the mention of
Gorgias, and the opposition between the general idea of virtue and
the particular virtues sufficiently prove that the passage in the
Meno is intended.

13. 13. καὶ ὁ μὲν δοῦλος τῶν φύσει σκυτόμοις δ᾿ οἴθεις.

Aristotle is contrasting the lot of the slave and of the artisan.
The slave is in one respect better off than the artisan because he
is directed by a master, whereas the artisan has no intelligence but
his own by which to guide his life. He too is a slave without the
advantages of slavery. Thus Socialist writers, like Lassalle and
others, in recent times have contrasted unfavourably the lot of
the modern operative with that of the medieval serf. We may
note in modern times the civilizing influence of domestic service
on the homes and manners of the poor. Many a household
servant in England has received an impress from a master or
mistress, and in Aristotle's language, 'has derived a virtue from
them.' Cp. iii. § 4, τῶν δ’ ἀναγκαῖων οἱ μὲν ἐνὶ λειτουργοῖντες τὰ
τοιαῦτα δοῦλοι, οἱ δὲ κοινὶ βίαναυσοὶ καὶ δῆτες, where, in a similar spirit,
Aristotle contrasts the duties of the artisan, which are rendered to
the community, with the duties of the slave, which are rendered to
the individual.


These strange words may be translated literally: 'But not in so
far as he possesses an art of the master such as would direct the
slave in his particular employment;' i.e. it is not as the teacher of
a craft but as a master that he imparts virtue to his slave.
The slave is relative to the master. His virtues are all received
from him, and cannot be imparted by any chance instructor. Nor
does the master instruct him in any art. But the artisan stands
in no relation to another; he has a separate art (§ 13) which he
exercises independently. He is without any ennobling influence
external to himself, whereas the slave is inspired by his master.

13. 14. διὸ λέγουσιν οὐ καλὸς οἱ λόγου τοὺς δοῦλους ἀποστερούντες καὶ
NOTES, BOOK I. 13. 41

φάσκοντες ἐπιστάξει χρῆσθαι μόνον νουθετήτειν γὰρ μᾶλλον τοὺς δούλους ἢ τοὺς παιδάς.

These words may mean: either 1)* 'who do not allow us to converse with slaves,' or 2) 'who do not allow to slaves the gift of reason.' In either case there is a reference to Plato, Laws, vi. 777, 778.

περὶ δὲ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς καὶ τέκνων καὶ πατρὸς, τῇ τε περὶ ἐκαστον 13. 15.

αὐτῶν ἀρετῆς, καὶ τῆς πρὸς σφάς αὐτοὺς ὁμολίας, τὶ τὸ καλὸς καὶ μὴ καλὸς ἐστὶ, καὶ πῶς δεῖ τὸ μὲν εἰ διώκειν τὸ δὲ κακῶς φεύγειν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον ἐπέλθειν.

This is one of the many promises in the Politics which are unfulfilled. Cp. iv. 15. § 3, a passage which is sometimes quoted in this connexion. But the reference is only to the office of παιδονόμος and γυναικονόμος.
BOOK II.

1. 1. ἐτι δὲ τὸ ζητεῖν τι παρ’ αὐτὸς ἐτερον μὴ δοκῇ πάντως εἰναι σοφίζεσθαι θυγαμένων.

τὸ ζητεῖν is the nominative of μὴ δοκῇ: πάντως is to be taken closely with μὴ, 'and that our object in seeking for a new state is not at all to make a display of ingenuity; but to supply defects in states which are known to us, both in those which are actually existing and also in theoretical states like that of Plato.' μὴ δοκῇ and δοκῶμεν are dependent on ἵνα.

1. 1. ἐπιβαλέσαι τὴν μέθοδον.

'To undertake' or 'take upon oneself,' a curious and idiomatic use of the word, found also in Plato and Thucydides. See Bonitz (Liddell and Scott), s.v.

1. 2. ὁ μὲν γὰρ τόπος εἰς ὁ τῆς μιᾶς πόλεως, οἱ δὲ πολίται κοινωνί τῆς μιᾶς πόλεως.

εἰς ὁ τῆς is required by the sense and is supported by the old Latin Translation. All the Greek MSS. however read ἵστος.

1. 3. εἰν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῆς Πλάτωνος, either the title of the book (cp. iv. c. 4. § 11; c. 7. § 1), or 'in the state which is described by Plato.'

The comments of Aristotle on Plato's Republic and Laws, contained in this and the following chapters, can hardly be dealt with properly in single notes. They are full of inaccuracies and inconsistencies. But the nature of these comments, which throw great light on the character of ancient criticism in general, will be best appreciated when they are brought together and compared with one another in a comprehensive manner. I have therefore reserved much of what has to be said about them for an essay 'On the
Criticisms of Plato in Aristotle.' Both in the essay and in the notes I have been much indebted to Susemihl.

'di ήν αἰτίαν φησι δεῖν νεομοδιτήσθαι τῶν τρόπων τούτων ὁ Σωκράτης, οὗ 2. 1. φαίνεται συμβαίνον ἐκ τῶν λόγων. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἐφησι τῇ πολει δεῖν ὑπάρχειν, ὡς μὲν εἴρηται νῦν, ἀδύνατον. πῶς δὲ δεῖ διελείν οὐδὲν διώρισται.

di ήν αἰτίαν, sc. unity.

'The argument of Socrates does not show that these enactments are to be approved for the reason which he gives [viz. as tending to unity]; and, regarded as a means to the end which he attributes to the state, unless some new explanation of them is offered, they are impossible.' Bernays places a comma after πρός, which he takes with ἔτι: cp. πρός τοῦτον ἔτι (Meteorol. i. 8, 346 a. 10); πρός δὲ ἔτι (Herod. iii. 74). The construction is thus made simpler; but the adverbial use of πρός hardly ever occurs in Aristotle. 'Moreover, the end, viz. unity, which he attributes to the state upon his own showing is impossible.'

The first of these propositions, τὸ μίαν ὅτι μάλιστα εἶναι τὴν πόλιν is discussed in the remainder of this chapter,—the second at the commencement of chapter 3.

ὡς μὲν εἴρηται νῦν, 'as it is described in his book,' or 'as it is actually described.' Cp. infra c. 5. § 23, νῦν γε οὐδὲν διώρισται.

πῶς δὲ δεῖ διελείν. Sc. τὸ τέλος, or generally 'what Plato means by unity.'

For the use of διελείν in the sense of *to interpret,* cp. Herod. vii. 16, εἰ δὲ ἀρά μὴ ἔστι τοῦτο τοῦτο ὁποῖο ἐγὼ διαμένω, ἀλλὰ τι τοῦ θεοῦ μετέχων, σὺ πάν αὐτὸ συλλαβῶν εἴρηκας. διελείν may also be taken in the more common sense of 'to distinguish,' i.e. how we are to distinguish or define unity and plurality (cp. iii. 13. § 6: εἰ δὴ τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἰσὶν ὁλίγοι πάρμανοι οἱ τῶν ἄρετῶν ἔχομεν, τίνα δεῖ διελείν τῶν τρόπων;).

οὗ γὰρ γίνεται πόλις ἐξ ὑμῶν.

The equality among citizens which is elsewhere (iii. 16. § 2; iv. 11. § 8; vii. 8. § 4) said to be the true and natural principle, is not inconsistent with a difference of character and of pursuits.

дιώσει δὲ τῷ τοιοῦτῳ καὶ πόλει ἔδυνας, ὅταν μὴ κατὰ κόμας ὅσι κεχωρίσῃ- 2. 3. μένοι τὸ πλῆθος, ἀλλ' οίον Ἀρκάδες.

The clause ὅταν μὴ κ.τ.λ. may be a description either 1)* of the
στάσεις, ‘when the inhabitants of a country are not yet distributed in villages’; or 2) of the πόλεις, ‘when they are no longer dispersed in villages.’ According to 1), the Arcadians are placed below, according to 2), above the ordinary condition of village communities.

1) Taking the first rendering, we may compare Plato’s Symposium, 193 A, νυν δὲ διὰ τὴν ἀδικίαν διψάσθημεν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ καθάπερ Ἀρκάδες ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων. But Arcadia was also the most backward state in Hellas, the type of primitive simplicity. Hence, without referring to the dispersion of the Mantineans by the Lacedaemonians (Xen. Hell. v. 2. 6) it is possible that Aristotle is speaking, not of their actual, but of their primitive and traditional state. 2) On the other hand he may be using the Arcadians as an example, not of the ἑθνος but of the πόλεις, and contrasting their condition, when centralized in Megalopolis by Epaminondas, with the ruder life of earlier times. They would certainly have furnished the latest illustration of a συνοίκιος. We may paraphrase ‘When they are not scattered in villages, but, like the Arcadians, have a central city.’

It may be argued on the other side that Aristotle would not have used the Arcadians who were the most backward of Hellenes, as the type of a civilized, but of a semi-barbarous, nation.

To Aristotle the ἑθνος is a lower stage than the πόλεις. He had no idea of a nation in the higher sense; nor did he see how ill adapted the Greek πόλεις was to the larger order of the world, which was springing up around him, or how completely it had outlived its objects.

2. 3. Εξ ὧν δὲ δεῖ ἐν γενέσθαι, εἴδει διαφέρει.

The state like the nation is not a mere aggregate, but has an organic unity of higher and lower elements.

2. 4. διόπερ τὸ ἰσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς σώζει τὰς πόλεις, διόπερ ἐν τοῖς ἡθικοῖς εἴρηται πρῶτερον.

Euclid in his 6th Book uses ἀντιπεπονθέων to express the relation of reciprocal proportion. Probably the ethical significance of the term among the Pythagoreans was derived from its mathematical
use. Cf. Nic. Eth. v. 5. § 1, and Alex. Aphrod. on Met. i. 5, τῆς μὲν δικαιοσύνης ήθων ὑπολαμβάνοντες τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός τε καὶ ἱσον, etc. (Scholia in Arist. Ed. Berol. 539 b. 12.)

ἄσσερ ἐν τοῖς ἰδιοῖς. Here, and in vii. 13. § 5, Aristotle quotes the Ethics in the Politics, as he quotes the Politics in the Rhetoric (i. 8, 1366 a. 21). But probably the references have been interpolated.

ἄσσερ ἐν εἰ μετέβαλλον οἱ σκυτεῖς καὶ οἱ τέκτονες καὶ μὴ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀεὶ 2. 5. σκυτεῖσκαι καὶ τέκτονες ἄσσον.

These words are a reflection on the proposed arrangement, not unlike the satirical remarks of Socrates in the Memorabilia (i. 2. § 9), and in the Republic ii. 374. But the connexion is imperfectly drawn out:—Aristotle, while making this reflection upon the inconvenience of the practice, admits in the next sentence that the alternation of rulers and subjects is in some cases the only arrangement possible. To Plato it seemed essential that the division between rulers and ruled should be permanent, like the division of labour in the arts, between one craftsman and another. Aristotle says, ‘yes, if possible,’ but this permanence is not always attainable, for where there is equality and freedom among the citizens, they must rule in turn (vii. c. 9; cp. also infra, c. 11. § 13).

ἐν οἷς δὲ μὴ δυνατὸν ... ἐξ ἄρχης.

‘However desirable it may be that the same should rule, yet, if they cannot, but justice requires that all, being by nature equal, should share in the government, then they must rule by turns.’

ἐν τούτοις δὲ μιμεῖσθαι τὸ ἐν μέρει τοὺς ἰσοῦς ἐκεῖστε ομοῖος τοῖς ἐξ 2. 6. ἄρχης.

ἐν τούτοις, sc. among those who are naturally equal and have a right to share in the government,

μιμεῖσθαι, ‘to imitate,’ i.e. to come as near as we can to ‘this principle of succession,’ dependent on βδελτίων.

τοῖς ἐξ ἄρχης, sc. εἰκοσιν. Like ‘the original rulers, who have yielded to them;’ or, without supplying εἰκοσιν, nearly the same meaning may be obtained. Cp. Book iii. 6. § 9, a passage which helps to explain this, διό καὶ τὰς πολιτικὰς ἄρχας, ὅταν ἡ κατ’ ἴσοτητα τῶν
ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

πολιτῶν συνεστηκυία καὶ καθ' ὀμοιότητα, κατὰ μέρος ἀξιοῦσιν ἀρχεῖν, πρότερον μὲν, ἦ πέρικεν, ἀξιοῦσιν ἐν μέρει λειτουργεῖν, καὶ σκοπεῖ τινὰ πάλιν τὸ αὐτοῦ ἄγαθον, ὅσπερ πρότερον αὐτὸς ἄρχων ἑσκόπη τὸ ἐκείνου συμφέρον.

2. 7. τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἀρχεῖν τῶν ἐτερῶν ἑτέρας ἀρχούσιν ἀρχᾶς.

1) The equalisation of rulers and ruled is attained in two ways: a) by succession; b) by the variety of offices which the same person may hold,—that is to say, instead of going out of office, he may pass from one office to another, from higher to lower and conversely; the alderman may become a common councillor or the common councillor an alderman. Or, 2) the words are a passing thought suggested by ἄλλοι γεγομένοι, confirmatory of the view that the State consists of dissimilars. ‘There is a further variety; not only do they come into and go out of office, as if they were no longer the same persons, but they have different offices.’

3. 2. εἰ μὲν οὖν ὃς ἠκατός, τάχ' ἄν εἴη μᾶλλον δ' ἄνωτεροι ποιεῖν δ' Σωκράτης . . . νῦν δ' οὐκ οὖν φήσον μοι κ.τ.λ.

‘When each man can speak of his own wife, his own son, or his own property, the clear conviction which he entertains may tend to produce unity, but this is not the meaning of those who would have all things in common; they mean “all,” not “each.”’

3. 3. τὸ γὰρ πάντες καὶ ἀμφότερα καὶ περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια διὰ τὸ διίτων καὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἐρημικοῖς ποιεῖ συλλογισμοῖς. διό οὖν τὸ πάντας τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ὃδι μὲν καλὸν, ἀλλ' οὐ δυνατὸν, ὃδι δ' οὔθεν ὀμοσπονδίκοι.

The absolute unity of ‘all’ in the sense of ‘each’ is not what Plato intended, and is in fact impracticable. The unity of all in the abstract, i.e. of the whole state, excluding individuals, does not tend to harmony. Such a unity is really inconceivable; a state without individuals is a μάταιον εἶδος. (Nic. Eth. i. 6. § 10.) The term ‘all,’ like the term ‘one,’ is ambiguous, and has a different meaning when applied to the state and to the individuals of whom the state is composed.

πάντες καὶ ἀμφότερα. The fallacy is that these words may mean ‘all’ or ‘both,’ either in a collective or individual sense.

περιττὰ καὶ ἄρτια. The fallacy consists in assuming that odd and even are the same because two odd numbers when added together
are even: e.g. the odd numbers, $5 + 7 = 12$, which is an even number; or that five is both odd and even, because it is composed of three which is an odd and two which is an even number. See Arist. Sophist. Elench. c. 4. 162 a. 33. Cp. infra c. 5. § 27, οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἄντερ τὸ ἀρτιον, κ.τ.λ.

καὶ ἐν τοῖς λέγοις κ.τ.λ. ‘For the word πάντες is fallacious, and indeed the use of this and other analogous terms is a source of contentious syllogisms in arguments.’ καὶ, ‘not only in this instance, but in arguments generally.’

The fallacy referred to is that of σύνθεσις and διαίρεσις, cp. Soph. Elench. c. 20. 177 a. 33 ff.

ἡ δοσον ἐκάστῳ ἐπιβάλλει.

Either, ‘only so far as comes in the way of,’ or, ‘is the business of each,’ or, with a slight difference of meaning, ‘only so far as it touches or affects each.’ Cp. i. 13. § 8, διὸ τὸν μὲν ἄρχοντα τελέαν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν ἡδικὴν ἀρετὴν τῶν δ’ ἄλλων ἐκαστον δοσον ἐπιβάλλει αὐτοῖς.

καὶ οὖτοι οἷς ὡς ἐκάστου.

‘Every man will have a thousand sons, and these do not properly belong to him individually, but equally to all.’

ἐκ οὖτως ἐκαστος ἐμὸς λέγει τὸν εὐ πράττοντα τῶν πολιτῶν ἡ κακῶς, ὁπότες τυγχάνει τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὡν, οἷον ἐμὸς ἡ τοῦ δείνος, τούτον τὸν τρόπον λέγων καθ’ ἐκαστον τῶν χιλιῶν.

οὖτως*, ‘on this principle’; ἐμὸς ἐμὸς ἐστι. ‘Further, on this principle [of common parentage], each one says of the citizen who fares ill or well, “he is mine,” whatever fraction he himself may be of the whole number; I mean that (οἷον) he will say, “he is mine,” or, “his,” and this will be his way of speaking about each of Plato’s thousand citizens.’ The words have a reference to Plat. Rep. v. 463 E, μάλιστα συμφωνήσουσιν ἐνὸς τινος ἡ εὖ ἡ κακῶς πράττοντος . . . δι’ τὸ ἐμὸν εὐ πράττει ἡ τὸ ἐμὸν κακῶς. The citizen speaks as one in a thousand of all the rest: he gives a thousandth part of his affection to each and all of the thousand persons who are the objects of it. Or, to put the matter in another way: we may suppose the citizens to be conversing with each other: they say, ‘my son is doing well,’ or, ‘is not doing well,’ being each of them a thousandth part
of the whole, and those of whom they speak being likewise each of them a thousandth part.

A different view of this passage has been taken in the Text. More stress is laid on the words τῶν εὖ ἡ κακῶς πράττοντα: the parent is supposed to appropriate the youth who is doing well, and to disown the one who is doing badly: ἐμὸς λέγει τῶν εὖ ἡ κακῶς πράττοντα = ἐμὸς λέγει τῶν εὖ πράττοντα, οὐκ ἐμὸς λέγει τῶν κακῶς πράττοντα. It must be remembered that, according to Aristotle, the true children are liable to be discovered by their likeness to their parents.

τῶν χιλίων, as if Plato had made his state to consist of a thousand citizens; cp. infra c. 6. § 5. This is only an inference from Rep. iv. 423 A, in which Plato says that the ideal state, even if consisting of no more than a thousand soldiers, would be invincible.

3. 7. ὧ μὲν γὰρ νίόν κ.τ.λ.

In Plato’s state they are all “mine”: in ordinary states there are many sorts of relationship, and the same person may be a father or a brother or a cousin of some one or other; there are likewise remoter degrees of affinity, and remoter still the tie of fellow wardsmen or fellow tribesman. Even a distant cousinship is preferable to that shadow of a relationship which supersedes them all.'

3. 7. ὧ δ’ ἀνεψιῶν, ἡ κατ’ ἄλλην τινὰ συγγένειαν.

The variety of human relations as ordinarily conceived is contrasted with the monotony of Plato’s society in which the state and the family are identified.

3. 7. κρείττον γὰρ ἰδιον ἀνεψιῶν εἶναι ἡ τῶν τρόπον τούτων νίόν.

A resumption of πρώτον οὕτω κρείττον; ‘Is not the present practice better? for it is better to have a cousin of your own than to have a son after Plato’s fashion.’

3. 9. φασί τινες . . τῶν τὰς τῆς γῆς περιόδους πραγματευομένων εἶναι τισὶ τῶν ἀνω Λιβύων κοινὰς τὰς γυναίκας, τὰ μέντοι γενόμενα τέκνα διαμείζουσα κατὰ τὰς ὀμοίωτας.

Cp. Herod. iv. 180, τῷ ἀν οἰκὴ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὸ παιδίον, τούτοι ποὺς νομίζεται, who is speaking, however, not of Upper, but of Lower Libya.
NOTES, BOOK II. 4.

Δὲν οὖν οδηγὸν ἔστι γίνεσθαι πρὸς πατέρας καὶ μητέρας καὶ τοὺς μη 4. 1. πόρρω τῆς συγγενείας ὅταν, ὡσπερ πρὸς τοὺς ἀπόθεν.

'Crimes of violence are worse in the republic of Plato because they are attended with impiety, and they are more likely to be committed because natural relationships are undiscoverable.' Aristotle here mixes up Plato's point of view and his own. He does not remark that Plato having abolished family relations is not really chargeable with the occurrence of offences which arise out of them. Perhaps he would have retorted that the natural relationship could not be thus abolished.

καὶ γενομένων, τῶν μὲν γνωριζόντων ενδέχεται τὰς νομιζομένας γίνεσθαι 4. 1. λύσεις, τῶν δὲ μηδεμίαν.

τῶν δὲ is opposed to τῶν μὲν, though not parallel with it = 'but in the other case,' as if τῶν μὲν without γνωριζόντων had preceded. Or a comma may be placed after τῶν μὲν, and γνωριζόντων may be separated from it. 'And when offences take place, in the one case men having knowledge of them, the customary expiations may be made, in the other case they cannot.'

ἀποσον δὲ καὶ τὸ κοινὸς ποιήσαντα τοὺς νιῶσ τὸ συνεῖναι μόνον ἀφελείν 4. 2. τῶν ἐρώτων, τὸ δὲ ἐρᾶν μὴ καλύσαι, μηδὲ τὰς χρήσεις τὰς ἄλλας, ἀπὸ πατρὶ πρὸς νιῶν εἶναι πάντων ἐστὶν ἀπεστάτατον καὶ ἀδελφῷ πρὸς ἀδελφῶν ἐπει καὶ τὸ ἐρᾶν μόνον.

The instance quoted, πατρὶ πρὸς νιῶν, shews that the reference is to Rep. iii. 403, but Aristotle has been hasty or forgetful in his citation. Plato does not say that he will allow the practice of lovers to prevail between father and son, or brother and brother, but that the endearments of lovers shall be only such as might be practised without offence between members of the same family. τὸ ἐρᾶν evidently in the lover's sense of the word.

ἔοικε δὲ μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ.

'If the legislator desire to keep the inferior classes in a state of weakness, and communism is a source, not of strength, but of weakness, then it is better adapted to them than to the guardians' — that is, according to Aristotle's view of communism, not Plato's. Cp. vii. 9. § 8; c. 10. § 13 where he argues that the legislator should vol. ii.
destroy as far as possible any tie of race among the slave population. And the traditional policy of slave-holding countries has been to deprive the slave of education and of family rights.

4. 4. τοιούτους.
   Sc. ἢτον φιλικοῦς gathered from ἢτον φιλία.

4. 5. καὶ δι' ἦν αἰτίαν ὁ Σωκράτης οὕτως οἰκεῖται δεῖν τάττειν τὰ περὶ τὰ τέκνα.
   Supply toιναιτίον (from the preceding) τῆς αἰτίας δι’ ἦ, viz. unity.
   Cp. supra c. 2. § 1, καὶ δι’ ἦν αἰτίαν φησὶ δεῖν νενομοθετήσαται τῶν τρόπων τούτων ὁ Σωκράτης οὗ φαίνεται συμβαίνον ἐκ τῶν λόγων.

4. 6, 7. ὡς καὶ δοκεῖ κάκεινος εἶναι φησὶ τῆς φιλίας ἔργον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς λόγοις ἵσμεν λέγοντα τοῦ Ἀριστοφάνης ὡς τῶν ἐρώτων διὰ τὸ σφίδρα φιλεῖν ἐπιθυμοῦντον συμφώνα καὶ γενέσθαι ἐκ διὸ διόντων ἀμφιτόρους ἕνα. ἑνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἄναγκη ἀμφιτέρους ἐφθάρθω η τὸν ἑνα· ἐν δὲ τῇ πόλει τῆς φιλίας ἄναγκαιον ἕδαρη γίνεσθαι διὰ τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς τοιαύτης, καὶ ἕκστα σέλεγεν τῶν ἑμῶν ἢ υἱῶν πατέρα ἢ πατέρα υἱῶν.

   Socrates wishes to have the city entirely one: now such a unity is either attained or not attained: if attained like that of the lovers in the Symposium (called here ἐρωτικοί λόγοι), p. 192, it would be suicidal. But it is not attained, for he only succeeds in creating a very loose tie between his citizens.


   ἦ τὸν ἑνα. ‘If they are to be absorbed in one another, both individualities cannot subsist, though one may.’

4. 8. οὕτω συμβαίνει καὶ τῆς οἰκείωτητα τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων διαφρονίζων ἕκστα ἄναγκαιον ἐν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῆς τοιαύτης, ἢ πατέρα ὡς υἱῶν ἢ υἱῶν ὡς πατρός, ἢ ὡς ἀδελφοῖς ἀλλήλων.

   ἄναγκαιον ἐν is to be taken with συμβαίνει, ἕκστα with διαφρονίζων.

   The latter word has two constructions, 1) with τινὰ for subject, and οἰκείωτητα as object; 2) with πατέρα, υἱῶν for subjects, and the genitives υἱῶν, πατρός following, e. g. ἢ πατέρα διαφρονίζων ὡς υἱῶν.

4. 9. τὸ τε ἵδων καὶ τὸ ἄγαπητὸν.

   ἄγαπητὸν, ‘that which is to be cherished or valued,’ like ἄγαπητὸς in Plat. (? Alcibiades I. 131 E, ὡς ἐγένετο, ὡς ἔοικεν, Ἀλκιβιάδη τῷ
NOTES, BOOK II. 5.

κλεινόν ἐρασθῆς οὕτ' ἔστιν ἀλλὰ ἢ εἰς μόνον, καὶ οὗτος ἁγαπητός, Σωκράτης ὁ Σωφρονίσκον καὶ Θαυμαρέτης: and Rhet. i. 7, 1365 b. 19, οὐκ ἦν ἕμια, ἀν τις τὸν ἐπερόθθαλμον τυφλόσθη καὶ τὸν δὲ ἐχόντα ἁγαπητόν γὰρ ἀφήγηται: also Homer (Odyssey ii. 365) μούνον ἐὼν ἁγαπητός. Compare the English 'dear.' Or, more simply, ἁγαπητὸν may also be taken as answering to φιλεῖν: 'men love an object which is naturally to be loved.'

καὶ πῦλιν οἱ παρὰ τοῖς φύλαξιν [eis] τούς ἄλλους πολίτας. 4. 10.

Aristotle is referring to the case of the citizens who pass from one rank to another. Those who are raised to the condition of the guardians and those who are degraded from it have both lost the natural relationships of brothers and sisters, parents and children. But the natural relations still exist although the names of them have disappeared; and therefore they are now less likely to be respected. Here again Aristotle is confusing his own point of view with that of Plato.

παρὰ τοῖς φύλαξιν must be explained as a confusion of rest and motion, lit. 'those who [having been transferred from the other citizens] are now among the guardians.' The words eis τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας have been explained as a pleonasm = 'in relation to the other citizens' (οὐ προσαγωγεύουσιν ἀδελφοὺς, κ.τ.λ.), 'they do not call them brothers.' But the use of eis in a different sense in two successive lines is objectionable. It is possible that the words eis τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας are an error of the copyist, who may have repeated the words of the previous line. The omission of eis (which is wanting in Moerbeke and in two good MSS., Ms. P1, but inserted as a correction in one of them, and found in all the rest) is the best way of amending the passage.

κἄν ἤ ἔκεινα χωρίς,

SC. τὰ περὶ τὰ τέκνα καὶ τὰς γυναίκας.

πότερον . . τὰς τε κτήσεις κοινὰς εἶναι βέλτιστον καὶ τὰς χρήσεις. 5. 2.

These words are a statement of the general question which is afterwards subdivided into three cases, though the carelessness of the language might at first sight lead to the inference that Aristotle is putting the third case only. Hence Bernays has been led, un-
necessarily, to alter the reading. The change made by him of τε into γε and of καί into κατὰ impairs the parallelism of κτήσεις and χρήσεις (τάς γε κτήσεις κοινὰς εἶναι βέλτιον κατὰ τὰς χρήσεις). The three cases are: 1) the soil divided, produce common: 2) soil common, produce divided: 3) soil and produce alike common.

5. 2. ὀπερ ἔνα ποιεῖ τῶν ἑθῶν.

poser as in i. 2. § 6, a vague expression for βαρόσαι and generally opposed to πόλεις or Ἑλληνες: also any loosely organised people, ii. 2. § 3; applied to the more general divisions of Hellas, vii. 7. § 4. The cases of Sparta, infra § 7, and of Tarentum, vi. 5. § 10, are not in point, even if their practice could be regarded as communism.

5. 3. ἔτερων μὲν ὄνων ἄντων τῶν γεωργοὺντων ἄλλοι ἂν εἴη τρόπος καὶ ῥήμα.

If the land were cultivated by serfs there would be no disputes among the cultivators, for having no property, they would have nothing to quarrel about.

5. 4. τῶν συναποθῆκων κοινωνίας σχεδὸν γὰρ οἱ πλείστοι διαφερόμενοι κ.τ.λ.

Either* ‘fellow-travellers’ or ‘fellow-settlers in a foreign city.’ Whether the κοινωνία were formed for the purposes of business or only of companionship is not determined. With the words σχεδὸν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. supply προσκροίουσι.

5. 5. καὶ ἐπικοσμηθέν... διενέγκαι.

A condensed expression put for ὅν δὲ νῦν τρόπον ἔχει, διαφέρει, καὶ ἐπικοσμηθέν (‘when it has been improved’), οὗ μικρὸν ἂν διενέγκαι.

5. 6. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιμέλειαι διηρημέναι τὰ ἐγκλήματα πρὸς ἄλλους οὐ ποιήσουσιν.

Either 1), ‘for the division of labour will give rise to no complaints,’ i.e. will prevent complaints, ἐπιμέλειαι being taken as the nominative to οὗ ποιήσουσιν: or 2) regarding (as the words πρὸς ἄλλους and the following clause μᾶλλον δ’ ἐπιδώσουσι seem to indicate) αἱ μὲν ἐπιμέλειαι as nom. absolute, or the construction of the sentence as changing, we may translate, ‘Every one having a distinct occupation, men will not complain of one another.’

5. 6. δὲ ἀρετήν δὲ.

‘But where there is virtue there will be in practice community of goods among friends.’
NOTES, BOOK II. 5.

5. 6.

' Sketched out or faintly indicated.' For ἰπογράφεων, cp. De Gen. Anim. ii. 6, 743 b. 24, οἱ γραφεῖσ ἰπογράφαντες ταῖς γραμμαῖς οὕτως ἐναλείφουσι τοῖς χρῶμασι τὸ ἄνοιον.

5. 7.

οὗν καὶ ἐν Δακεδαίμονι τοὺς τε δοῦλους χρῶνται τοῖς ἄλληλοιν ὡς εἰπεῖν ἰδίοις, ἐπὶ δὲ ἰπποῖς καὶ κυσίν, καὶ δεηθοῦσιν ἐφοδίων ἐν τοῖς ἄγροις κατὰ τὴν χώραν.

χώρα as opposed to πόλις:—' When on a journey in the country, they take the produce in the fields.' The apodosis (i.e. some such words as χρῶνται ἐφοδίως) is omitted. Cp. Xen. Respub. Lac. 6, §§ 1, 3, 4, 'Εκατοτάκτα γε μὴν ἔγνω καὶ τάδε τοῖς πλείστοις. 'Εν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἀλλαῖς πόλεσι τῶν ἐαυτοῦ ἐκαστὸς καὶ παῖδων καὶ οἰκείων καὶ χρημάτων ἄρχουσιν ὃ δὲ Δυκαλάγη, κατασκευάζει βούλημα ὡς ἀν μηδέν βλάπτοντες ἀπολαυσίν τι οἱ πολίται ἄλληλον ἅγαθον, ἐποίησε παῖδων ἐκαστὸν ὁμοίων τῶν ἐαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἄρχειν. . . . . . ἐποίησε δὲ καὶ οἰκέταις, εἰ τίς δεηθεὶς, χρῆσθαι καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις. Καὶ κυνῶν δὲ θηρευτικῶν συνήψε κοινωνιάς ὅστε οἱ μὲν δεόμενοι παρακαλοῦσιν ἐπὶ θῆραν, ὃ δὲ μὴ οὐκ ἄρξατον ἠδὲ εἴσπεμπε. Καὶ ἰπποῖς δὲ ὲσαύτως χρῶνται ὃ γὰρ ἀσθενήσας ἢ δεηθεὶς ὃ χήματος ἢ ταχύ ποι βουληθεὶς ἀφίκεσθαι, ἢν ποὺ θῆ ἰππὸν ἄντα, λαβὼν καὶ χρησάμενος καλὸς ἀποκαθίστησιν, κ.τ.λ. Also Plat. Laws, viii. 845 A, ἕαν δὲ ξένους ἐπιθυμήσας ὁπόροις ἐπιθυμήσαι φαγεῖν διαποτομᾶνό τοῖς ὦδοίς, τής μὲν γενναίας ἀπίστησι, ἕαν θηρίζεθαι, μεθ' ἐνοῦ ἀκολούθου χορίς τιμῆς, ξένω δεχόμενος, τής δὲ ἀγροίκου λεγομένης καὶ τῶν τοιοῦτων ὁ νόμος ἑλρέγετο μὴ κοινωνεῖν ἡμῖν τοὺς ξένους.

5. 8.

ὄπως δὲ γίνωσται τοιοῦτοι.

' Of such an unselfish character as to place their property at the service of others.'

tο δὲ φίλαυτον εἶναι ψέγεται δικαίως, κ.τ.λ. 5. 9.

Cp. Nic. Eth. ix. 8; Rhet. i. 11. § 26; Plato’s Laws, v. 731 E.

5. 9.

't Not only money, but anything towards which there can be an excess of love.' Cp. note on i. 1. § 2.

ἀναπροῦσιν ἔργα . . . σωφροσύνης περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας. 5. 10.

Yet Plato in his Republic aimed really at an impossible strictness
in the relation of the sexes, and is very far from allowing his
guardsian to indulge in sensuality.

5. 11. Εἰπρόσωσας μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη νομοθεσία καὶ φιλάνθρωπος ἂν εἶναι
dόξειν ὁ γὰρ ἄκροφενος ἀσμένος ἀποδέχεται, νομίζων ἵσσεσθαι φιλιὰν
tων θαυμαστὴν πάσι πρὸς ἄπαντας, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν κατηγορη
tic τῶν νῦν ἑπαρχόντων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις κακῶν ὧν γινομένων διὰ τὸ μὴ
cοινὴν εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν, λέγω δὲ διὰ τούτου περὶ συμβολαίων καὶ ἰσειμη
cρίσεως καὶ πλούσιων κολακείας.

The flow and regularity of this sentence remind us of the
opening of Book vii, noticed by Bernays. Cp. for a similar regu-
larity supra c. 1.

Mankind quickly become enamoured of socialistic theories,
especially when they are interspersed with attacks on existing

5. 12. οὐ οὐδὲν γίνεται διὰ τὴν ἀκούων οὐδὲν ἄλλα διὰ τὴν
μοχθροπίαν.

A similar unwillingness to ascribe to institutions what is due to
human nature may be remarked elsewhere: e.g. c. 7. § 8, ἐτί δ' ἐὰ
tis καὶ τὴν μετρίαν τάξειν οὐσίαν πάσιν, οὐδενὶ ἀφελοῦς· μᾶλλον γὰρ
dei τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ὁμαλίζειν ἢ τὰς οὐσίας κ.τ.λ.

The emphatic negative οὐ οὐδὲν γίνεται for ἢ οὐ γίνεται is curious.

5. 12. ἄλλα θεωροῦμεν δῆλους τοὺς ἐκ τῶν κοινωνιῶν διαφερομένους πρὸς πολ-
louos συμβάλλοντες τοὺς κεκτημένους ἠδὶ τὰς κτήσεις.

To what Aristotle may be alluding is not very clear. He may
have remarked that there were more quarrels among Pythagorean
sects, as well as among friends who had become fellow-travellers,
than among other men. A similar reflection has often been made
on the religious communities of later times. Or he may be referr-
ing to disputes arising in ‘guilds’ or ‘clubs,’ or partnerships in
business. διαφερομένου is to be repeated with κεκτημένου. The
meaning is that the owners of common property are comparatively
few, and that therefore their quarrels, though relatively more
frequent, do not so often come under our notice.

5. 15. ἄλλα δὲi πλῆθος δὲν, ὡσπερ εἶρηται πρῶτον, διὰ τὴν
παιδείαν κοινὴν καὶ
μίαν πολεῖν.

Aristotle takes up a position half way between the communism
of Plato and the existing practice of states. He would have men lend or give to their neighbours more than they do, but he would not enforce by law a community of goods; he would unite them by education, but would not destroy family life.

δοσερ τὰ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἐν Λακεδαιμονι καὶ Κρήτη τοῖς συσσιτίωσι ὁ 5. 15. νομοθέτης ἐκοίνωσεν.

This remark more truly applies to Crete, where the common tables were provided at the public expense (c. 10. § 7), than to Sparta, where he who could not afford to contribute to his mess lost the rights of citizenship (c. 9. §§ 30–32). Still in both there was a common mode of life; and an element of communism was introduced by the legislator. Compare also the remarkable description of the effect of Lacedaemonian training (iv. 9. §§ 6–9) in producing the same simple habits of life both among rich and poor; and Xen. De Rep. Laced. 6. §§ 1, 3, 4.

πάντα γὰρ σχεδόν εὑρήται μὲν, ἄλλα τὰ μὲν οὐ συνήκται, τοῖς 8' οὗ 5. 16. χρώνται γιωσκετες.

οὐ συνήκται, lit. 'they have not been put together,' implying that no comparison has been made of them, nor inference drawn from them. In other cases the inference has been drawn, but not applied to a practical use. As in Pol. vii. 10. § 7, and Metaph. xi. 8, 1074 b. 8 (ὅν εἰ τις χαρίσας αὐτῷ λάβως μόνον τὸ πρῶτον, ὅτι θεοῦς φόντο τὰς πρώτας οὕσις εἶναι, θεοὶ διὰ εὑρήσατο νομίσειν, καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς πολλάκις εὑρημένης εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ἐκάστης καὶ τέχνης καὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πάλιν ψιθυρισμόν καὶ ταῦτα τὰς δόξας ἐκείνων οἷον λείψανα περισσοῦνται μέχρι τοῦ νῦν), and several other passages, Aristotle supposes the inventions of arts and laws to have been made many times over. Compare Plat. Laws iii. 677 A foll.

μάλιστα δ' ἀν γένοιτο φανερῶν, εἰ τις τοῖς ἔργοις ἵδε τὴν τοιαύτην 5. 17. πολιτείαν κατασκευάζομεν.

In the actual process of creation.'

5. 17. μὴ μερίζων αὐτὰ καὶ χωρίζων.

αὐτὰ refers to some general subject gathered from τὴν τοιαύτην πολιτείαν. The neuter is supported by τὰ μὲν and τὰ δὲ, which follow.

5. 17. ὀπέρ καὶ νῦν Λακεδαιμόνιοι ποιεῖν ἐπιχειροῦσιν.

1)* ‘Which already,’ i.e. as a matter of fact, without having recourse to Plato’s ideal, the Lacedaemonians are actually carrying out; or 2), ‘which at this very time the Lacedaemonians are trying to carry out [as though they had fallen into desuetude]’ (Schneider). For the use of νῦν compare ii. 8. 6.

ἐπιχειροῦσιν according to 1), (as often in Plato. See Ast’s Lexicon) is used pleonastically—‘do carry out.’ So τῶν ἐπιχειρησάντων νεωτεριζεῖν (v. 7. § 13) = τῶν νεωτερισάντων. And Plato’s Phaedrus, 265 E, μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν καταγγέλλαι μέρος μηδέν.

5. 20. ποιεῖ γὰρ τοὺς μὲν φιλάκας ὅιον φρουροῖς, τοὺς δὲ γεωργοὺς καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πολίτας.

1)* The emphasis is on τοὺς μὲν and τοὺς δὲ. ‘He makes one class to consist of the guardians, who are a sort of garrison, and he makes husbandmen, [or, ‘to these he opposes the husbandmen’] and the artisans and the rest of the citizens.’ 2) Bernays translates, ‘For he makes the guardians a sort of garrison and the husbandmen and the artisans and the others, citizens [held in check by the garrison],’ making a pause at τοὺς ἄλλους. Cp. Rep. iv. 419. But the opposition between φρουροῖς and πολίτας is harsh. For the φρουροί or φιλάκες had a special right to the name citizens, whereas the husbandmen, as is implied in §§ 23, 28, are hardly to be reckoned in the State at all. Cp. c. 6. §§ 2, 3. Yet it may be argued on the other hand, that Aristotle has only an imperfect recollection of Plato; that he ‘snatches’ at the word φρουροῦσις, and puts into the mouth of Socrates an objection which really proceeds from Adeimantus, though afterwards paradoxically admitted by Socrates himself. Nor is it possible to set any limits to the misinterpretations of Plato passing under the name of Aristotle. The first way of taking the passage is confirmed by c. 8. § 2 infra: ἐποίει γὰρ ἐν μὲν μέρος τεχνίτας, ἐν δὲ γεωργοῖς, τρίτον δὲ τὸ προπολεμοῦν καὶ τὰ ὀπλα ἔχον.

5. 23. ἄλλα γὰρ εἰτ’ ἀναγκαία ταῦθ’ ὁμοίως εἰτε μὴ, νῦν γ’ οὖδεν διάρκεσται.
Here, again, the antecedent to ταῦτα is to be gathered generally from the context, = ‘whether these communistic institutions are equally necessary for the inferior and for the superior classes,’ &c. Cp. note on i. 2. § 2.

νῦν γε.

‘As far, at least, as his book shows.’ Cp. supra c. 2. § 1.

καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐξομένων.

5. 23.

Sc. οὐδὲν διώρισται from the previous sentence. ‘And as to matters connected with these, what is to be their government, what their education, what their laws, nothing has been determined.’ A repetition of § 18. The emendation ἄρχομένων (Congreve) is unnecessary and out of place; for Aristotle has already disposed of the subject class in § 22, and at § 24 he returns to speak of the members of the state generally.

κἂν εἴ κοινὰι αἱ κτίσεις καὶ αἱ τῶν γεωργῶν γυναῖκες.

5. 24.

Sc. τῖς οἰκονομῆσαι; or more generally, ‘What then?’ Two cases are supposed: 1) what if wives are common and possessions private; and 2) what if possessions and wives are both common.

ἀτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν θηρίων ποιεῖσθαι τὴν παραβολήν, ὅτι δεῖ τὰ 5. 24.

αιτὰ ἐπιτηδεῦειν τὰς γυναίκας τοῖς ἀνδράσιν οἷς οἰκονομίας οὐδὲν μέτεστιν.

The language is not exact; ποιεῖσθαι τὴν παραβολήν = to argue from the comparison of the animals. οἷς: sc. τοῖς θηρίοις.

‘The rulers must always be the same; for they cannot change the metal or quality which is infused into their souls by nature.’ But then Plato supposes the whole ruling class to be guardians, divided only as young and old into warriors and counsellors (as in the state described in vii. 9. § 5); and he provides for exceptional merit by the transfer from one class to another. The actual governing class are men advanced in years (Rep. vii. 536 ff.), and Aristotle himself acknowledges (vii. 14. § 5) that the division of functions between young and old is natural, and that the young wait their turn and do not rebel against such an arrangement.

ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀφαιροῦμεν τῶν φυλάκων, ὄλην φησὶ δεῖν 5. 27.

εὐδαιμόνη ποιεῖ τὴν πολίν τῶν νομοβέττην. ἀδύνατον δὲ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὄλην, μὴ τῶν πλείστων ἢ μὴ πάνων μερῶν ἢ τινῶν ἐχόντων τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν.

This passage, like many others in the Politics, involves a miscon-
ception of Plato’s meaning. The literalism of Aristotle prevents
him from seeing that Plato does not really take away the happiness
of individuals in affirming that the happiness of the state must be
considered first. He takes it away that he may afterwards restore
a larger measure of it. He is only insisting that the doctrine of the
priority of the whole to the part, which Aristotle holds in common
with him (cp. Pol. i. 2. § 13), should be carried out in practice.
Compare also Rep. iv. 420 B, C, and Politics vii. 9. § 7, (τὸ μὲν
γὰρ ἐνδιάμοιραν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν μετὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἐνδιάμοιραν δὲ πόλιν οἷς
eis μέρος τι βλέψαντας δεὶ λέγειν αὐτῇ ἄλλ’ εἰς πάντας τοὺς πόλιτας) where
Aristotle appears to coincide with Plato in the doctrine which he
here repudiates.

5. 27. ἦνπερ τὸ ἄρτιον, κ.τ.λ.

Aristotle means to say that the even number may exist in the
whole though not always in the parts (cp. note on c. 3. § 3 supra);
but happiness must always exist in both.

6. 1–4. Socrates is here spoken of by implication (διὰ γὰρ δὲ περὶ τῆς
πολιτείας εἴρηκεν, § 4) as if he were the chief speaker in the Laws,
though he is not introduced at all. The Laws are quoted as
Plato’s in c. 7. § 4.

6. 1. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ περὶ διάγων πάμπαν διάφορες ὁ Ἐωκράτης.

The list which follows is a very inadequate summary of the
subjects contained in the Republic. Probably the metaphysical
and imaginative portions of the work appeared to Aristotle ποιητικαὶ
μεταφοραὶ (Met. c. 9. 991 a. 22) and alien from politics.

6. 2. τὸ δὲ εἰς τὸ προσολεμοῦν μέρος· τρίτον δὲ ἐκ τούτων τὸ βουλευόμενον καὶ
κυρίως τῆς πόλεως.

‘And a third class taken from the warriors,’ (τῶν προσολεμούντων).

6. 3. περὶ δὲ τῶν γεωργῶν καὶ τῶν τεχνιτῶν, πότερον οὐδεμᾶς ἢ μετέχουσι
τινὸς ἀρχῆς . . . οὐδὲν διάφορεν.

Yet Plato has expressly foretold, emphasizing his words by the
declaration of an oracle, ‘that when a man of brass or iron guards
the State it will then be destroyed’ (Rep. iii. 415, and supra c. 5.
§ 26), by which he clearly means that the third and fourth classes
are to be excluded from office. Nor would he have thought for
a moment of a shoemaker, or agricultural labourer, exercising
political rights. On the other hand, it is true to say that Plato
has nowhere defined the position of the lower classes: he has
thus evaded the question of slavery to which Aristotle was keenly
alive. He acknowledges the difficulty of this question in the Laws
v. 776 ff.

tois εξωθεν λόγοις.

I. e. with digressions, such as the attack upon the poets (Books
ii and iii), the theory of knowledge (v, vi, vii), the doctrine of
immortality (x). To Aristotle these appear irrelevant, though
naturally entering into Plato’s conception of the state, which
includes philosophy and religion as well as politics.

tων δὲ νόμων τὸ μὲν πλείστον μέρος νόμοι τυγχάνουσιν διότε, ὀλίγα δὲ 6. 4.
περὶ τῆς πολιτείας εἴρηκεν.

This statement is far from accurate. The truth is that in the
Laws of Plato a nearly equal space is given to the constitution and
to legislation; the latter half of the fifth book, the sixth, seventh,
eighth, and a portion of the twelfth book being devoted to the
constitution; the ninth, tenth, eleventh and the remainder of the
twelfth to legislation.

καὶ ταύτην βουλόμενος κωινοτέραν ποιεῖν τὰς πόλεις κατὰ μικρὸν 6. 4.
περιμέγει πάλιν πρὸς τὴν ἑτέραν πολιτείαν.

For a similar use of the word κωινοτέραν cp. c. 6. § 16, εἰ μὲν οὖν
ὡς κωινοτάτην ταύτην κατασκευάζει ταῖς πόλεσι τῶν ἄλλων πολιτείαν, κ.τ.λ.

ἑτέραν πολιτείαν, sc. the Republic. The idea of good, the rule of
philosophers, the second education in dialectic, the doctrine of
another life, are the chief speculative elements, as the community
of property, and of women and children, are the chief social or
practical elements, of the Republic which vanish in the Laws (Laws
v. 739). The spirit of the Republic is more ideal and poetical,
of the Laws more ethical and religious. Plato may be said to
‘bring round the Laws to the Republic’ in the assimilation of
male and female education, in the syssitia for women, in the assertion
of the priority of the soul to the body and of her fellowship
with the gods; in the final revelation of the unity of knowledge to
which he introduces his guardians at the end of the work (Laws xii. 965 ff.).

6. 5. τὴν μὲν χειλῶν.

Cp. note on c. 3. § 5, supra.

6. 6. τὸ μὲν ὁδὸν περιττῶν κ.τ.λ.

This and the noble passage in the Nic. Eth. i. 6. § 1 (προσάντως τῆς τουατης ζητήσεως γνωρίεσις διὰ τὸ φιλῶν ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἰδη. Δόξει θ' ἀν ἵσωσ βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δειν ἐπι σωτηρία γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ ὀικεία ἀναρεῖν, ἀλλὰς τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὅταν᾽ ἀμφοὶ γὰρ ἄντων φίλων ὅσιον προτιμῶν τὴν ἀληθείαν) are a sufficient confutation of the idle calumnies spread abroad in later times respecting the quarrels of Plato and Aristotle, which only reflect the odium philosophicum of their respective schools. Cp. note, i. 13. § 10.

8. 6. χώρας δείσει τοῖς τοσούτοις Βασιλείας κ.τ.λ.

A strange remark: Aristotle himself mentions, apparently without surprise, that according to the ancient tradition the Spartan citizens had once numbered ten thousand, and he has himself testified that the country could support thirty thousand hoplites and fifteen hundred cavalry (c. 9. §§ 16, 17). Nor were the 5000 or rather 5040 citizens to be maintained in idleness, for each of them had to cultivate his lot.

6. 7. δεῖ μὲν οὖν ἀποτίθεσθαι κατ᾽ εἰκῇ, μηδὲν μέντοι ἀδύνατον.

Even the best state, according to Aristotle, is limited by the number of citizens who can readily act together and by other conditions. These conditions he accuses Plato of having disregarded. Cp. vii. 4. § 2, and 4. § 11.

Plato would not have admitted the impracticability of his ideal state. It might be hard to realise, but was not impossible, Rep. v. 471-474. In the Laws he resigns his ideal, though with reluctance, and acknowledging the conditions of actual life, he allows that there must be a second-best and even a third-best sample of states; Laws v. 739.

6. 7. ἢ ἔν δὲ καλῶς ἔχει προσθεῖναι καὶ πρὸς τοὺς γείτνιωτας τόπους, εἰ δεῖ τὴν πολιν ἵνα βίον πολιτικὸν.

Compare vii. 6. § 7, εἰ γὰρ ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ἐξεταῖ βίον κ.τ.λ.
NOTES, BOOK II. 6.

[sc. ἡ πόλις]. The two passages mutually confirm each other and the comparison of them shows that neither here, with Muretus, nor in vii. 6. § 7, with Bekker (2nd edition), do we need to substitute πολεμικὸν for πολιτικὸν which in both passages is used to express International Relations. The addition of μὴ μονωτικὸν or μὴ μονώτερον in some MSS. after πολιτικὸν appears to be a gloss, probably suggested by vii. 2. § 16.

The same criticism—that a state must have a foreign as well as a domestic policy, is made once more on Phaleas in c. 7. § 14. Nations and cities can no more get rid of other nations and cities than man (except by going into the wilderness) can tear himself from the society of his fellows. Cp. Mazzini’s forcible saying, ‘Non-interference is political suicide.’

ei δὲ τις μὴ τούτων ἀποδέχεται βιον, μήτε τὸν ἰδίον μήτε τὸν κοινὸν τῆς 6. 8. πόλεως . . ἀπελθοῦσιν.

‘But if a person does not accept the life of action either for individuals or for states, still the country must be protected against her enemies.’ In modern language, ‘however much we may dislike war and the use of arms, there are cases in which the resistance to an enemy becomes a duty.’

ἀπελθοῦσιν, i.e. ‘lest they renew the attempt.’

καὶ τὸ πλήθος δὲ τῆς κτήσεως ὅρᾶν δεῖ, μήποτε βελτιων ἐτέρως διορίσαι 6. 8. τῷ σαφῶς μᾶλλον.

Literally, ‘Would it not be better to define the amount of property differently by defining it more clearly?’

ὡσπερ ἂν ei τις εἴπει ὅστε τῇν εὖ τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ καθόλου μᾶλλον. 6. 8.

It is doubtful whether these words are to be taken 1) as an illustration of the want of clearness in Plato’s definition, or 2) as a correction of it; e.g. 1) ‘this is only saying, “enough to enable a man to live well.”’ But this explanation seems to require that the following words τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶ καθόλου μᾶλλον should be translated ‘this however is too general’ (Bernays), giving a sense to μᾶλλον (=μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ) which is doubtful unless suggested by the context, as in Rep. iii. 410 E, Phaedo 63 D. 2)* ‘By the confused expression “Enough to live upon with temperance,” he means only “enough to live upon well or virtuously; for this is the more general idea.”’
6. 9. ἔξεις ἀφεται.
   The MSS. give ἀφεται, corrected by Bekker from a marginal note in a copy of the Aldine edition into ἀφεται. But the words ἔξεις ἀφεται are unmeaning. It is possible that ἔξεις may be the true reading and ἀφεται the gloss or vice versa. See note on text.

6. 10. ἀφεῖναι τὴν τεκνοποιίαν.
   Another inaccurate criticism. For Plato expressly provides that the overplus of population should be sent to colonies (Laws v. 740).

6. 11. δεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' οὖν ὠμοίως ἄκριβως ἔχειν περὶ τᾶς πάλεις τότε καὶ νῦν.
   'But this matter ought not to be regulated with the same strictness then and now,' i.e. it ought to be regulated with greater strictness in the imaginary state of the Laws than in existing states.

6. 12. τοῦτο δὲ τιθέναι τὸ πλῆθος ἀποβλέπωσα πρὸς τὰς τύχας, ἄν συμβαίνῃ τελευτάν τινάς τῶν γεννηθέντων, καὶ πρῶς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀτεκνίαν.
   τῶν ἄλλων, 'the sterility of others,' i.e. of others than those who have children, implied in the word γεννηθέντων,—'the death of some of the children and the sterility of some of the married couples.'

6. 13. Φείδων μὲν οὖν ὁ Κορίνθιος, ὃν νομοθέτης τῶν ἄρχαιοτάτων, τοὺς οἶκους Ἰσούς φήσῃ δεῖν διαμένειν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν, καὶ εἰ τὸ πρῶτον τοὺς κλήρους ἀνίσους ἐἰχον πάντες κατὰ μέγιστο.
   Ἰσοὺς and ἀνίσους are here used in slightly different senses, Ἰσοὺs referring to the numbers of the families, ἀνίσουs to the size of the lot. 'He thought that the number of the families should be the same, even although the original size of the lot was different.' That is to say he accepted the existing distribution of property among families, however disproportioned, and did not allow it to be afterwards altered.

Of Pheidon the Corinthian nothing is known; he has been identified with Pheidon the tyrant of Argos on the ground that Corinth lay in the Argive dominions (Müller, Dorians i. 7. § 15). But no evidence is adduced of this assertion. The word κορίνθιος may have been a slip: (cp. for a similar or worse error, infra c. 11.
NOTES, BOOK II. 6.

§§ 2, 15; v. 12. §§ 12, 14); but such a slip would be remarkable in a writer who has elsewhere called Pheidon tyrant of Argos, v. 10. § 6.

peri μὲν τῶν ... λεκτέων ὕστερον.

There is no adequate fulfilment of this promise to resume the question hereafter. But cp. vii. 5. § 1; 10. § 11; 16. § 15.

φησί γὰρ δέσιν κ.τ.λ.

Aristotle is finding fault with Plato’s vagueness:—‘He says nothing but that the governors and governed should be made of a different wool.’

tὴν πᾶσαν οὐσίαν ἑφίησε γίνεσθαι μείζων μέχρι πενταπλασίας.

Cp. Laws, v. 744 E, where the proprietor is allowed to acquire (κτάσθαι) four times the value of his original inheritance. If we add in the original inheritance which was not acquired, the limit of property will be fivefold. There is no reason for supposing any mistake in this statement (Susemihl) or in c. 7. § 4.

καὶ τὴν τῶν οἰκοπέδων δὲ διαίρεσιν δεῖ σκοπεῖν, μή ποτ’ οὐ συμφέρῃ πρὸς οἰκονομίαν.

One of the homesteads is to be in the city, another on the border (v. 745 E), the first to be the dwelling of the elders, the second of the son of the house (vi. 776 A). A plan similar to the one which he condemns is adopted by Aristotle in vii. 10. § 11: cp. note on text, in which the inconsistency of the two passages is pointed out.

ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ὀπλευσόντων ἐστίν.

The normal idea of a politeia is that it consists of the free citizens who carry arms and are its natural defenders. Cp. iii. 7. §§ 3, 4, ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύσηται, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολιτείων, πολιτείας συμβαίνει δ’ εὐλόγως: ἐνα μὲν γὰρ διαφέρειν κατ’ ἄρετίν ἢ ὀλίγους ἐνδέχεται, πλείους δ’ ἴδῃ καλεῖ τὸν ἡκριβώσθαι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἄρετίν, ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τὴν πολιτείαν αὕτη γὰρ ἐν πλῆθος γίγνεται διότι κατὰ τάς ἅπερ τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολεμοῦν, καὶ μετέχοις αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὀπλα, and see also Ib. c. 17. § 4; iv. 13. § 7; and Nic. Eth. viii. 10. 6.

tὴν γὰρ πρῶτην πολιτείαν.

The same as the ἑτέρα πολιτεία (§ 4), i.e. the Republic of Plato.
6. 17. Here the Spartan is spoken of as a mixed constitution; in iv. c. 9. § 7, as a combination of aristocracy and democracy. So un-critical writers of the last century extol the English constitution as comprehending the elements of every other. It was thought by other nations as well as by ourselves to be an ideal which Europe should copy. But so far from being the fulfilment of a perfect design, it was really the growth of accident; the merit lay not in any wisdom of our ancestors, but in the willingness of the people to conform to circumstances which was so wanting among the Spartans. . . With the criticisms of Aristotle on the Lacedaemonian constitution it is interesting to compare the very similar criticism of Plato in the Laws, iv. 712 D, E, and μὴ ἔσοντος γε, δὲ ξένης, τὴν ἐν Λακεδαίμοι πολιτείαν οὐκ ἔχω σοι φράξειν οὖτως, ἢτινα προσαγορεύειν αὐτὴν δεῖ καὶ γὰρ τυραννίδοις δοκεῖ μοι προσεοικέναι τὸ γὰρ τῶν ἑφόρων θαυμαστὸν ὡς τυραννικὸν ἐν αὐτῇ γέγονε· καὶ τῆς ἐνιότες μοι φαίνεται πασῶν τῶν πόλεως δημοκρατικῆς μάλιστα ἐσωκράτειν. τὸ δ’ αὖ μὴ φάναι ἀριστοκρατίαν αὐτὴν εἶναι παντάπασιν ἄρσον. καὶ μὴν δὴ Βασιλεία γε διὰ βίου τ’ ἔστω ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ ἀρχαιοτάτη πασῶν καὶ πρὸς πάντων ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν λεγομένη. ἐγὼ δὲ οὔτω τὰν ἐξαίρησιν ἂν ἐρωτησθήσῃ ὡς, ὅπερ εἰπον, οὐκ ἔχω διωρισάμενος εἰπεῖν τὸς τούτων ἐστὶ τῶν πολιτείων. Cp. Cic. de Rep. ii. 23.

6. 18. ἐν δὲ τοῖς νόμοις εἶρηται τούτως ὧς δέον συγκείσθαι τὴν ἄριστην πολιτείαν ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ τυραννίδος.

This is not really said, though in Laws (iv. 710ff.) Plato sketches an imaginary tyrant who is to mould the state to virtue.

6. 19. φέρειν ἀρχοντας.

φέρειν = 'to vote for,' used here as in Plato and Demosthenes with the accusative of the person.

6. 20. ἀριστεύει μὲν γὰρ πάντες ἐπάναγκες, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου τιμήματος, εἶτα πελεῖν τὸν ἑκ τοῦ δευτέρου, εἰτ’ ἐκ τῶν τρίτων. πελεῖν οὐ πάσης ἐπάναγκες ἢ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν τρίτων ἢ τετάρτων, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ τετάρτου τῶν τετάρτων μόνος ἐπάναγκες τοῖς πρώτοις καὶ τοῖς δευτέροις.

The general meaning is that the higher the qualification of the elected, the lower may be the qualification of the electors, or, vice versâ, the lower the qualification of the elected, the higher must be the qualification of the electors; they should balance one another.
NOTES, BOOK II. 6.

There remain, however, some difficulties in reconciling the text of the Politics with the statements of Plato.

What Plato says in the Laws (756) may be shortly stated as follows: 'For those who are to be elected out of the 1st and 2nd classes, all are compelled to vote and are liable to penalties if they abstain from voting: for those who are to be elected out of the 3rd class, only the three first classes are compelled to vote and are liable to penalties; for those who are to be elected out of the 4th class only the two first classes.

The text of the Politics as given by Bekker (which is that of all the MSS.) does not agree with the corresponding passage of Plato and in one place at least is corrupt.

1) The words ἐκ τοῦ τετάρτου τῶν τετάρτων can hardly be right if we are to get any sense out of the passage at all. Either τοῦ τετάρτου or τῶν τετάρτων must be omitted. Probably we should omit the latter, for τοῦ τετάρτου agrees best with τοῦ πρώτου τιμήματος and τοῦ δευτέρου anea, and τῶν τετάρτων may have crept into the text from the preceding τετάρτων. Either alternative is simpler than reading τετάρτων (for τετάρτων) as in 2nd Ald. edition.

But 2) if we are to make the passage agree with Plato, we should further omit τρίτων Ἡ before τετάρτων. Cp. Laws, 756 D, where nothing is said about the third class.

Finally, we must allow that Aristotle may not have remembered or may have misunderstood the words of Plato. Such a supposition cannot be thought far-fetched, when we consider the numerous passages in which he has done unintentional injustice to his master, Pol. i. 13. § 10; ii. 4. § 2; ii. 5. § 27; ii. 6. § 5, etc.

The words οὐ πᾶσιν ἐπάνωγκες, sc. αἰρέσθαι, do not imply that some of the class were compelled to vote. They are used as they are in Anal. Pr. ii. 15, 63, b 26 for the particular negative proposition, which is called by Aristotle indifferently τὸ οὐ παρὶ and τὸ οὐ τινὶ, from which of course we can logically infer nothing as to the particular affirmative.

ὁς μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐκ δημοκρατίας καὶ μοναρχίας δεῖ συνιστάναι τὴν τοιαύτην θ. 22.

πολιτείαν, ἐκ τούτων φανερῶν καὶ τῶν ύστερον μηδεμένων, ὅταν ἐπιβάλησεν περὶ τῆς τοιαύτης πολιτείας ἡ σκέψις.

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ἐκ τούτων. Whether the inference be true or false, it is difficult to elicit from the words which have preceded the grounds for maintaining that a polity should not be made up of democracy and monarchy. Strictly speaking they are only a more detailed statement of this proposition, not an argument in support of it.

In the passage which follows (οὗτων ἐπιβάλλη), Aristotle is looking forward to the discussion of what he calls πολιτεία, or 'constitutional government,' which like the constitution of the Laws, falls short of the ideal state, but is in advance of most existing forms.

τουτέστατα, ' a state similar to that in the Laws.'

8. 22. τῶν ὑστέρων ῥήθησομένων.

Mixed constitutions are treated of in iv. cc. 7–9, but the promise seems hardly to be fulfilled in that place.

8. 22. ἔχει δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν αἱρέσιν τῶν ἀρχόντων τὸ ἐκ αἱρετῶν αἱρετοῦς ἐπικύδωνον· εἰ γὰρ τινες συντήρησι βέλουσι καὶ μέτρου τὸ πλῆθος, δὲι κατὰ τὴν τούτων αἰμεθήσοντα βούλησιν.

Cp. Mill's Representative Government, chap. ix (Should there be two stages of election?), 'The comparatively small number of persons in whose hands, at last, the election of a member of parliament would reside, could not but afford additional facilities to intrigue.' The double election of representatives is thought to be a safeguard against democracy; it is really a source of danger and suspicion, and weakens the national interest in politics. It seems often to supersede itself. Thus the election of the President of the United States by Electoral Colleges has passed into a mere form of universal suffrage. The only case in which such elections succeed is where the electors have other important functions (like the American State Legislatures, to which the election of the Senate is entrusted), and therefore cannot be appointed under a pledge to vote for an individual.

For the indefinite use of ἐπικύδωνον cp. Thuc. i. 137, ἐπείδη ἐν τῷ ἀσφαλεὶ μὲν ἐμοὶ, ἑκείνῳ δὲ ἐν ἑπικυδώνῳ πάλιν ἡ ἀποκομιδὴ ἐγένετο.

7. 1. αἰ μὲν ἰδιωτῶν αἰ δὲ φιλοσόφων καὶ πολιτικῶν.

Ιδιώτης is opposed both to philosophers and statesmen, as in Plato to ἰδιωματικός (Laws 921 B) and to ποιητής (Phaedr. 258 D), and in Thucydides (ii. 48) to ἰατρός. 'Ιδιώτας ' such as Phales
and Hippodamus; 'philosophers' such as Pittacus or perhaps Pythagoras; 'statesmen' such as Solon or Lycurgus (cp. infra, c. 12. § 1).

διδό φαλέας ὁ Χαλκηδώνος τοὺς εἰσήγηκε πρῶτος.

7. 2.

A sentence apparently inconsequential but really a condensation of two propositions. 'Therefore Phaleas the Chalcedonian introduced this, sc. the regulation of property, he being the first to do it.'

Nothing is known of Phaleas from other sources. The manner in which Aristotle speaks of him in this passage (§ 2 φησι γάρ, § 8 εἶπον ἣν ὁ φαλέας, διέταξε γάρ) would lead us to the inference that he was not a legislator but the writer of a book; and this inference is further confirmed by c. 12. § 1, in which Aristotle (?) places first, and in a class by themselves, the private individuals who had treated of laws, apparently meaning Phaleas and Hippodamus. Whether Phaleas was earlier than Hippodamus is uncertain. It is true that Hippodamus is described as the first of those not statesmen who treated of 'the best state,' c. 8. § 1. But the stress may be laid on the words περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς ἀρίστης, 'Hippodamus was the first, not of political writers, but the first who treated of the perfect state' which would be consistent with the claim of Phaleas to be an earlier writer on the subject of politics in general.

We cannot argue with Grote (Pt. II. c. 6, vol. ii. p. 523) that because Phaleas was the first who wrote or speculated about the equal division of land, therefore the legislation of Lycurgus or the ancient Dorian institutions may not have anticipated him in fact.

κατοικιζομέναις, sc. ταῖς πόλεσι όρ πολιτείαις, an emphatic present, 7. 3. 'when in process of settlement.'

τῷ τάς προῖκας τοὺς μὲν πλουσίους διδόναι μὲν λαμβάνειν δὲ μὴ κ.τ.λ. 7. 3.

Cp. the Babylonian 'marriage-market' in Hdt. i. 196.

7. 5.

With this passage compare v. 12. § 17 where Aristotle criticizes rather captiously the remark of Plato 'that loss of fortune is a source of revolutions,' to which he replies that 'it is only dangerous when it affects the leaders of the state.'
7. 6. οἱον καὶ Σδλων ἐνομοθέτησεν κ.τ.λ.

Mr. Grote (iii. pt. ii. chap. 11, p. 179) thinks that these words refer only to the annulment of mortgages. But they clearly imply that Solon restricted or attempted to restrict the amount of land which might be held by individuals. Although there is no other evidence of this fact, the silence of antiquity cannot be taken as decisive against the statement of Aristotle, and is certainly no reason for explaining away the plain meaning of his words, whether he was correctly informed or not.

7. 7. ἢ τι δὲ τοὺς παλαιῶς κλήρους διασώζειν.

Dependent on νόμοι εἰσί, gathered from the preceding sentence. The preservation of the lot tended to maintain the equality of property; hence the transition from the one subject to the other.

7. 7. οὐ γὰρ ἢ τι συνέβαινεν ἀπὸ τῶν ὡμομένων τιμημάτων εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς βαδίζειν.

The meaning is as follows:—Originally the Leucadian citizens had a lot which was their qualification for office. They were afterwards allowed to sell this lot, and still retained the right of holding office, when they had lost their qualification.

7. 9. ἀλλὰ τὴν τε παιδείαν ήτις ἐσται δεὶ λέγειν, καὶ τὸ μίαν εἶναι καὶ τὴν αὐτήν οὔδὲν ὀφελοῦ.

So in modern times reflections are often made on the evils of education unless based on moral and religious principles. Yet it was a noble thought of an early thinker like Phaleas that there should be equal education for all.

καὶ τὸ μίαν κ.τ.λ. 'Moreover there is no point in saying that it is one and the same, for it may be bad.'

7. 10. τοῖς παρανόμοις δὲ περὶ ἑκάτερον οἱ μὲν γὰρ πολλοὶ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὰς κτήσεις ἀνισον, οἱ δὲ χαρίσθησε περὶ τῶν τιμῶν, ἐὰν ἐστι.

The opposition here intended is between the inequality of property by which the many are offended, and the equality of honour which offends the higher classes.

περὶ ἑκάτερον, sc. τὰς κτήσεις καὶ τὰς τιμὰς.
NOTES, BOOK II. 7.

οὐ τοίνυν διὰ ταύτης μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄν ἐπιθυμοῖεν, ἵνα χαίρωσι ταῖς ἀνευ 7. 12.
lαπτῶν ἠδονᾶς. Τί οὖν ἄκος τῶν τριῶν τούτων;

The words καὶ ἄν ἐπιθυμοῖεν, though rather weak, are found in all MSS. and are therefore probably genuine. They are omitted however by Bernays, and have been variously corrected, καὶ ἄνευ ἐπιθυμιῶν (Bojesen), sc. ἀδικήσουσιν, an ingenious conjecture; ἄν μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσιν (Schneider), too great a departure from the MSS.; ἀνεπιθύμητοι (also Bojesen), too rare a word.

The general meaning is plain: 'And therefore, i.e. not only to still pain, but also to gain pleasure, they will desire pleasures to which no pains are annexed.' The three motives are, 1) necessity, 2) desire of things not necessary, 3) desire of painless pleasures.

οἰκ ἄν ἐπιζητοῖεν εἰ μὴ παρὰ φιλοσοφίας ἄκος. 7. 12.
'They will look for a cure from philosophy and go no further.'

οἰων τυραννοῦσιν οἰχ ἵνα μὴ βιγώσιν. Διό καὶ αἱ τιμαι μεγάλαι. 7. 13.
Cp. the Story of Jason, who said πεινὴν ὅτε μὴ τυραννοὶ, iii. 4. § 9 and note. So Daniel Manin (quoted by Stahr) used to say of himself that 'he knew nothing except how to govern.' 'And as is the greatness of the crime, so is the honour given to the tyrannicide.'

dei de kaì proò toûs γειτνῶτας κ.τ.λ. 7. 14.

ἀλλ' οὔτως ὡς ἄν καὶ μὴ ἐχόντων τοσαῦτην οὐσίαν. 7. 16.
= ἀλλ' οὔτως ποιεῖν ὡς ἄν ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐχόντων τοσαῦτην οὐσίαν, the more general word ποιεῖν being understood from πολεμεῖν.

'That your enemies should act as they would do if you had not so great an amount of property,' i.e. that your wealth should be no temptation. Cp. Plat. Rep. iv. 422, where he argues that trained warriors will be always too much for wealthy citizens.

Eubulus, by birth a Bithynian, was the tyrant of Atarneus in 7. 17. Mysia, and was succeeded by Hermias his slave, whose niece or adopted daughter Aristotle is said to have married; Eubulus revolted from Persia, and was besieged by Autophradases, the Satrap of Lydia. See Strabo, xiii. 610, Suidas s. v. Ἀριστοτέλης.
7. 19. διοβελία.

The diobelia was the ordinary payment of two obols for attendance on the assembly and the courts, and also for theatrical entertainments. These payments seem in the later days of Athens, and even during the Peloponnesian war, to have amounted to three obols, and some of them to have been as high as a drachma. They were also made much more frequently than in 'the good old times.' Cp. Schol. in Aristoph. Vesp. 684, where it is said on the authority of Aristotle in [the] Politics that the sum given was originally three obols, but afterwards varied at different times: also cp. Lucian Dem. Encom. 36; Prooem. Dem. 1459, 27, a remarkable place; and other passages quoted by Boeckh, 'Public Economy,' Eng. Tr. vol. i. ed. i, pp. 296 ff.

7. 20. τῶν ὁμοίων ἀρχῆς κ.τ.λ.

If ἀρχῆ be retained, τῶν τοιούτων refers to some idea of reform vaguely implied in the previous sentences. ἀκη conj. Scaliger, ἀρκεῖ Coraes.

7. 23. ἀλλ' εἶπερ δὲ δημοσίους εἶναι, τοὺς τὰ κοινὰ ἐργαζομένους δὲ καθαίρει ἐν Ἕπιδάμαμφῃ τῇ, καὶ ὅσοι Διόφαντος ποτε κατεσκεύαζεν Ἀθήναι, τούτων ἔχειν τῶν τρόπων.

Bernays places a comma after εἶπερ, and omits the second δὲ, placing a καὶ before καθαίρει. 'But if this is so (i.e. if artisans are to be public slaves), those who are to be engaged in public works should be slaves.' Nearly the same meaning may be got from the text, *if we place a comma after εἶναι and remove the comma after ἐργαζομένουs: 'But if artisans are to be public slaves, those who are engaged in public works should form this class.'

tούτων ἔχειν τῶν τρόπων, sc. δημοσίους εἶναι. This Diophantus, or 'some one else of the same name, about whom nothing is known,' was Archon at Athens in the year 395.

8. 1. Stobaeus has preserved some fragments of a work περὶ πολιτείας, which bear the name of 'Hippodamus the Pythagorean' (Florileg. xliii. pp. 248–251, xcvi. p. 534, Mullach. Fragm. Philos. Graec. vol. ii. p. 11). But there can be little doubt that they are, as Schneider says, the pious fraud of some later writer. The
portions cited by Stobaeus will be enough to show the character of such performances. These fragments disagree in several points with the statements of Aristotle; such as the threefold division of the citizens into councillors, auxiliaries, and artisans (cp. the Republic of Plato), and the subdivision of each class into three other classes; the three principles of honesty, justice, utility, and the three instruments by which civil society is knit together, reason, habit, law. Of all this and of a good deal else, there is no trace in Aristotle, although the triplets are also found in Stobaeus. Considerable differences are not however inconsistent with the genuineness of the fragments. A more suspicious circumstance is the character of the philosophical distinctions, such as the opposition of καλόν, δίκαιον, and συμφέρον, which could hardly have existed before the time of Socrates, and a certain later tone of thought.

HIPPOMUS ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ.

'In my opinion the whole state is divided into three parts: one the "Good"—that is, those who govern the commonwealth by mind; another, those who rule by force; a third part, those who supply and furnish necessaries. The first class I call councillors; the second, "allies" or warriors; the third, artisans. To the two former classes belong those who lead a freeman’s life: to the latter those who work for their living. The councillors are the best, the artisans the worst, the warriors are in a mean. The councillors must rule, the artisans must be ruled, while the warriors must rule and be ruled in turn. For the councillors settle beforehand what is to be done: the warriors rule over the artisans, because they fight for the state, but in so far as they must be guided, they have to submit to rule.

'Each of these parts again has three divisions: of the councillors there are 1) the supreme council; 2) the magistrates; 3) the common councillors. The first has the presidency, and deliberates about all matters before they are carried to the assembly. The second comprises all those who are or have been magistrates. The third, the common councillors, are the mass of senators who receive the measures which the upper council have prepared, and vote upon and determine matters which come before
them for decision. In a word, the upper council refers matters to the common council, and the common council, through the general, to the assembly. In like manner there are three divisions of the warrior or military class: the officers, the fighters in the front ranks, and lastly the common herd of soldiers, who are the larger number. The officers are the class which furnishes generals and colonels and captains and the front rank of soldiers, and generally all those who have authority. The soldiers of the front rank are the whole class of the bravest, most spirited, and most courageous men; the common herd of soldiers are the remaining multitude. Again, of the class who work for their living, some are husbandmen and tillers of the ground; others mechanics, who supply tools and instruments for the needs of life; others traders and merchants, who export superfluous productions to foreign countries, and import necessaries into their own. The framework of the political community then is composed of such and so many parts; we will therefore proceed to speak of the harmony and unison of them.

'Now every political community exactly resembles a stringed instrument, in that it needs arrangement and harmony and touch and frequent practice. Of the character and number of the elements which form the arrangement of the state I have already spoken. The state is harmonized by these three things—reason (λόγος), moral habit, law, and by these three man is educated and becomes better. Reason gives instruction and implants impulses towards virtue. The law partly deters men from crime by the restraint of fear, partly attracts and invites them by rewards and gifts. Habits and pursuits form and mould the soul, and produce a character by constant action. All these three must have regard to the honourable and the expedient and the just; and each of the three must aim at them all if possible, or, if this is not possible, at one or two. So will reason and habit and law all be honourable and just and expedient; but the honourable must always be first esteemed; secondly, the just; thirdly, the expedient. And generally our aim should be to render the city by these qualities as far as possible harmonious, and deliver it from the love of quarrelling
and strife, and make it at unity with itself. This will come to pass if the passions of the youthful soul are trained by endurance in pleasures and pains and conformed to moderation;—if the amount of wealth is small, and the revenue derived from the cultivation of the soil;—if the virtuous fill the offices in which virtue is needed, the skilful those in which skill is needed, the rich those in which lavish expenditure and profusion are needed; and to all these, when they have filled in due manner their proper offices, due honour be assigned. Now the causes of virtue are three: fear, desire, shame. The law creates fear, moral habits, shame (for those who have been trained in right habits are ashamed to do wrong); reason implants desire. For it is a motive power, at once giving the reason and attracting the soul, especially when it is combined with exhortation. Wherefore also we must prepare for the souls of the young guilds and common meals, and places of living and meeting together, military as well as civil, and the elders must be harmonized with them, since the young want prudence and training, the old, cheerfulness and quiet enjoyment.’

Aristotle’s account of the character and attainments of Hippodamus may be compared with the passage in the Lesser Hippias of Plato (?) (368 A foll.), in which Hippias is described as acquainted with every conceivable art and science. The personal description of Hippodamus also bears an odd resemblance to the statement of Diogenes Laertius about Aristotle himself—τραυλὸς τὴν φωτὴν . . . ἄλλα καὶ ἰσχυοσκελής . . . ἄν, καὶ μικρόμματος, ἐσθητὶ τε ἐπισήμω χρώμενος καὶ δακτυλίως καὶ κουρᾶ (v. 1. § 2 init.).

The quantity of the name Hippodamus, though unimportant, is a somewhat difficult question. In Aristophanes (Knights 327) the α is long, yet if the name be a compound of δῆμος, it is hard to give any meaning to it. It has been thought that Aristophanes has altered the quantity for the sake of the joke.

Mention occurs of the ‘Ἱπποδάμειος ἄγορα at the Piraeus in Andoc. de Myst. § 45, p. 7, Xen. Hell. ii. 4. § 11, and Dem.(?) adv. Timoth. § 22, p. 1190. A tradition is preserved by Strabo (xiv. 653, ὡς φασίν), that the architect of the Piraeus was the architect of the
magnificent city of Rhodes. The scholiast on Knights 327 who supposes the Hippodamus of Aristophanes to be the person here mentioned, supposes him also to have designed the Piraeus at the time of the Persian War (κατὰ τὰ Μηδεία); but he had probably no special means of information and only ‘combined’ the two facts that Hippodamus was the architect of the Piraeus and that Themistocles was the original author of the proposal to improve the harbour. Hippodamus is also called ‘the Thurian’ in Hesychius. The city of Thurii was founded in 445 B.C. and Rhodes was built in 406 B.C. If therefore Hippodamus was a Thurian and also the builder of Rhodes he must have designed not the original works of the Piraeus, but the improvements made at a later date, such as was the middle wall in the age of Pericles, B.C. 444. This latter date is more in accordance with the half Sophist, half Pythagorean character which is attributed to Hippodamus. It is also more in accordance with the words of Aristotle in vii. 11. § 6, ἥ δὲ τῶν ἱδίων ὀικήσεων διάθεσις ἥδιων μὲν νομίζεται... ἀν εὕρητος ἡ καὶ κατὰ τῶν νεότερον καὶ τῶν Ἰπποδάμεων τρόπον, where it is implied that the Hippodamean plan of arranging cities in straight streets was comparatively recent. Cp. for the whole subject C. F. Hermann de Hippodamo Milesio.

8. 1. καὶ κόσμῳ πολιτείᾳ, ἐτὶ δὲ ἐσθῆτος ἐυτελοὺς κ.τ.λ.

There is no reason for suspecting corruption. The eccentricity of Hippodamus consisted in combining expensiveness and simplicity: ἐσθῆτος is dependent on some such word as χρήσει to be supplied from κόσμῳ.

8. 3. διήρει δ' εἰς τρία μέρη τὴν χώραν, τὴν μὲν ἱερὰν, τὴν δὲ δημοσίαν, τὴν δ' ἱδίαν.

The division of the land proposed in the Seventh Book (c. 10. § 11) is nearly similar to that of Hippodamus.

8. 4. δικαστήριον ἐν τῷ κύριον.

Plato in the Laws also establishes an appeal, vi. 767 C. ‘The final judgment shall rest with that court, which has been established for those who are unable to get rid of their suits either in the courts of the neighbours or of the tribes.’
NOTES, BOOK II. 8.

8. 5.

τὸς δὲ κρίσεις ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις κ.τ.λ.

See infra note on §§ 14, 15. Though the principle of Hippodamus is condemned by Aristotle as unsuited to the Athenian popular courts of law, it prevailed in the more advanced jurisprudence of the Romans in which the judges were allowed to give a sentence of n. l. or non liquet, whence the Scotch verdict of 'not proven.'

The ideas of Hippodamus certainly show great legislative ingenuity in an age when such a quality was extremely rare.

8. 6.

ὡς οὕτω τούτο παρ' ἄλλοις νευμαθημένον: ἵστι δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἁθῆναις ὁ νόμος νῦν καὶ ἐν ἑτέραις τῶν πόλεων.

Aristotle intends to say that Hippodamus proposed this law as a novelty of which he claimed the credit, whereas it already existed at Athens and elsewhere. The meaning is clear, though the form of the sentence is not perfectly logical: '*But this law actually exists in Athens at the present day,' and this is considered as sufficient proof that it existed at the time of Hippodamus. Or 2) without any opposition but with less point: 'And this law now exists at Athens.' Cp. Thuc. ii. 46.

8. 7.

toῖς δ' αἱρεθέντας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι κοινῶν καὶ ξενικῶν καὶ ὀρφανικῶν.

I. e. 'They were to watch over the public interests and over the interests of persons who had no legal status.'

Aristotle, after his rather onesided manner of attacking an opponent, raises several ἀποφθέγματα respecting the three classes of Hippodamus. 'How can the two inferior classes, who have no arms, maintain their independence? For many offices they are obviously unfitted: and if they have no share in the state how can they be loyal citizens? Granting that the artisans have a raison d'être, what place in the state can be claimed by the husbandmen and why should they have land of their own? If the soldiers cultivate their own lands, there will be no distinction between them and the husbandmen; this, however, is not the intention of the legislator: if there are separate cultivators of the public lands, then there are not three, but four classes. The husbandmen are practically slaves who will be at the mercy of the warriors; and if so, why should they elect the magistrates? They will have no attachment to the state and must be kept down by force.'
To these ἀπορίαι he finds no answer. He adds one or two more: 'How can the husbandmen produce enough for themselves and the warriors? And why, if they can, should there be any distinction between their lots and those of the soldiers?'

8. 12. γεωργήσει δύο οἰκίας.

Either οἰκία is here used like οίκος in the sense of 'property' or 'inheritance'; or γεωργήσει must be taken to mean 'maintains by agriculture.' (Cp. for a similar use of οἰκία Dem. de Falsâ Leg. καρπουμείη τὰς τῶν χρωμένων οἰκίας: and for another singular use of γεωργεῖν, i. 8. § 6, ὥσπερ γεωργίαν ζώσαν γεωργοῦστε.) If neither of these explanations is deemed satisfactory, we must suppose a corruption of the text, which may be corrected by reading εἰς δύο οἰκίας (Bernays), or δύον οἰκίαι. The old Latin translation 'ministrabit' has suggested the emendation ὑπουργήσει. This is no better, or rather worse, Greek than γεωργήσει in the sense given above.

8. 13. τοῦτο δ' ἐν μὲν τῇ διαίτῃ καὶ πλείοσιν ἐνδέχεται.

'This in an arbitration is possible, even although the judges are many.'


ὁ μὲν γὰρ clearly refers to the litigant, sc. ὀφειλόμενος οίτειαι. But in what follows, the words ἢ ὁ μὲν πλεῖον ὁ δὲ ἔλασσον may refer either 1) to the difference between the judges and the litigant or 2*) to the differences of the judges among themselves. In the first case ἢ ὁ μὲν πλεῖον ὁ δὲ ἔλασσον is a generalised statement of the words which have preceded, ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐκοσμεῖ μνᾶς, ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς κρίνει δέκα μνᾶς. But in the second case the words are restricted to ὁ δὲ δικαστῆς κρίνει δέκα μνᾶς, ἄλλος δὲ πίνει, ὁ δὲ τέτταρας. Anyhow there is a colloquial irregularity, the words ἄλλος δὲ πίνετε κ.τ.λ. having crept in out of place, as an illustration of the general principle ὁ μὲν πλεῖον κ.τ.λ. already stated.

8. 16. εὐόφθαλμον ἀκούσας μόνον.

A confusion of language: cp. εἰπρόσωπος (c. 5. § 11).

8. 16. ἔχει γὰρ συνοφαντιὰς.

That Hippodamus was speaking of political discoveries and not
of inventions in the arts, is clear from the context. Hippodamus’ error was derived from the analogy of the arts, § 18. We can easily understand the danger of rewarding discoveries such as were made in the conspiracy of the Hermæ at Athens or in the days of the Popish Plot in England. Aristotle admits that there have been and will be changes in government, but he advocates caution and insists that law should be based on custom.

8. 18.

8. 21.

Every art and science is also a power to make or become; hence the word δύναμις being the more general term is constantly associated with both τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη.

ζητοῦσι δ’ ἄλως οὔ τὸ πάτριον ἄλλα τὰ γαθῶν πάντες.

This statement goes beyond the truth. For the traditions of families or clans are very slow in giving way, as e.g. in the constitution of Lycurgus or Solon, to a sense of the common good. It is rarely and for a brief space that nations wake up to the feeling of their own nationality, or are touched by the enthusiasm of humanity.

8. 21.

δύοιος εἶναι καὶ τοὺς τυχόντας καὶ τοὺς ἀναίτους, ὡσπερ καὶ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν γηγενῶν.

δύοιος has been altered by Bernays into διέγοις but without reason. It may be taken 1) as = δύοιος τοῖς γηγενέσι, or, 2) δύοιος may be joined with καὶ τοὺς τυχόντας = ‘no better than simple or common persons.’ Cp. Hdt. vii. 50, γνώρισε ἐχέρωντο δύοιος καὶ σύ. Plat. Theaet. 154 A, ἄλλω τὰν ἀνθρώπῳ ἀρ’ δύοιον καὶ σοι φαίνεται ὑποϊον.

8. 22.

8. 23.

8. 22.

8. 23.

8. 22.

ὡσπερ γὰρ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας, καὶ τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν ἀδύνατον ἀκριβῶς πάντα γραφῆναι.

1)* If we take πάντα as subject, τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν may be the remote object of γραφῆναι, or the words may be governed by περὶ of which the force is continued from περὶ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας. Or 2) τὴν πολιτικὴν τάξιν may be the subject of γραφῆναι, in which case πάντα is to be taken adverbially.

οὐ γὰρ τοιοῦτον ὑφελήσεται κινήσας, ὅσον βλαβήσεται τοῖς ἄρχονσιν ἀπειδεῖν ἐθνεῖειν.

Cp. Thuc. iii. 37, μηδὲ γνωσόμεθα, ὅτι χείρος νόμοις ἀκινήτους χρωμένη πόλεις κρείσσων ἐστίν ἡ καλῶς ἐχουσιν ἀκύρως.
κινήσεις, sc. ο πολίτης gathered from the previous sentence.

8. 24, 25. ο γάρ νόμος ἵππην ουδεμιάν ἔχει πρὸς τὸ πείθεσθαι πλὴν παρὰ τὸ ἔθος, τοῦτο δ’ οὐ γίνεται εἰ μὴ διὰ χρώμον πλήθος, ὡστε τὸ μάλιστα μεταβάλλειν ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων νόμων εἰς ἐτέρους νόμους καυχός ἀσθενή ποιεῖν ἐστὶ τὴν τοῦ νόμου δύναμιν . . . ἔχει μεγάλην διαφοράν.


ἔχει μεγάλην διαφοράν, lit. 'makes a great difference.'

9. 1. In this chapter Aristotle tacitly assumes or perhaps acquiesces in the popular belief that Lycurgus is the author of all Spartan institutions. He was supposed to be the founder of the Spartan constitution, as Solon of the Athenian, or as King Alfred of the ancient English laws. The Ephorality is apparently attributed to him; yet elsewhere (v. 11. §§ 2, 3) Theopompus, a later king of Sparta, is said to have introduced this new power into the state.

9. 1. εἰ τι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν καὶ τὸν τρόπον ὑπεναντίως τῆς προκειμένης αὐτοῖς πολιτείας.

εἰ τι, sc. νενομοθέτηται: καὶ τὸν τρόπον following πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, προκειμένης αὐτοῖς, i.e. 1)* 'which is proposed to the citizens,' politeias understood from politeion supra ; or 2) 'which legislators set before themselves' referring to νομοθέται implied in νενομοθέτηται: sc. ἡ ὑπόθεσις τοῦ νομοθέτου at the end of this chapter (§ 33).

9. 2. τὴν τῶν ἀναγκαίων σχολὴν.

'Leisure or relief from the necessary cares of life.' The construction is singular and rare in prose, yet not really different from ἐν τῶι σχολῇ κακοῦ of Soph. Oed. Tyr. 1286. So Plat. Rep. ii. 370 C ὅταν εἰς ἐν, σχολὴ τῶι ἀλλῶν ἐγώ, πράτην.

9. 2. ἢ τε γὰρ Θεσπαλῶν πενεστεία πολλάκις ἐπέθετο τοῖς Θεσπαλοῖς, ὡμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς Δάκσων οἱ Εἰλωτεῖς ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐφεδρεύοντες τοῖς ἀτυχήμασι διατελούσιν.

Cp. Laws vi. 776 C, D: 'I am not surprised, Megillus, for the state of Helots among the Lacedaemonians is of all Hellenic forms of slavery the most controverted and disputed about, some approving
and some condemning it; there is less dispute about the slavery which exists among the Heracleots, who have subjugated the Mariandynians, and about the Thessalian Penestae.' Yet in this passage of Aristotle the Penestae are spoken of as constantly revolting from their masters.

*PERI DE TOUS KρΗTAS OUDΕN PΩ TOUOÛTON SUMPZÊBHEKEI* AITΩN δ' IΣΩS TΩ 9. 3. TAZS GEITNIΩSAS PΩLES, KAÏPHER PΟLEMOÛSAS ALLHΛAIS, MWĐERIΔN ENAI SÚMMARHON TOUS ΔΦΟΣΤΑΜΕΝΟUS DIΛA TΩ MΗ SUMPZEREOUI KAI AWTΛΑIS KΕΚΤΗΜΕΝΑIS PΕΡΙΟIKOUS TOUS DE LAKWON ΟΙ GEITNIΩNTEΣ EXBROI PΑÎTES HΣAN, ΑΡΓΕΙΩI KAI MΕΣΩΝIOI KAI 'ΑΡΚΛΔSES.

The argument is that in Crete, where all the states had their Perioeci or subject class, no attempt was ever made to raise a servile insurrection when they went to war, because such a measure would have been contrary to the interests of both parties. The Cretans were the inhabitants of an island and there were no out-siders to encourage revolt among the slaves (cp. c. 10. § 15, ALLA KATHAPER EΠΗΡΓΑI SWZETAI DIΛA TΩΝ TΩPOV). Probably also a sort of international custom prevailed among them, arising from their common necessity, of not raising the slaves in their wars with one another. The Argives and the other Peloponnesian states, when at war, were always receiving the insurgent Helots. But the Argive subject population, like the Cretan, were not equally ready to rise, and indeed were at times admitted to the governing body (cp. v. 3. § 7, KAI EN 'ARGEI TΩN EN TΗ ÍBΩMH ΑΠΟΛΟΜΕΝΩΝ ÊPΩ KLEOMΕΝΩV TΟV LAKWON HΝΑΓΚΑΣΘΕΝΑV ΠΑΡΑΔΕΞΑΣΘΑΙ TΩΝ PΕΡΙΟΙΚΩΝ TΩΝ). We may also remark that in c. 5. § 19 supra, Aristotle incidentally observes that the Cretan slaves were comparatively well treated, although forbidden gymnastics and the use of arms.

The word 'perioeci' appears to have been used in Crete to denote generally an inferior class, who were not, as at Sparta, distinguished from Helots or slaves. This is confirmed by c. 10. § 5, GEORGOUSI TE YAP TOIΣ MEΩN (SC. ΔΑΚΕΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΟΣ) ΕΧΩΝΕΤΕ, TOIΣ DE KΡΗΣΩI OΙ PΕΡΙΟΙΚΟΙ. But compare also Sosicrates [b.c. 200–128] preserved in Athenaeus (vi. c. 84. fin., p. 263), TΗΝ MEΩN KOUHΝ ΘΩΛΕΙΑΝ OΙ KΡΗΣΕΣ KALΟΙΣΙ ΜΝΟΙΑ, TΗΝ DE IDIAN ΑΦΡΑΙΩΤΑΣ, TOIΣ DE PΕΡΙΟΙΚΟΙΣ ΥΠΗΚΟΟΥΣ. The use of the term μνοια in Sosicrates is confirmed by the celebrated
Scolium of Hybrias the Cretan (Bergk 27), τοῦτο (sc. τῶν ξεφυαί) δεσπότας μνωίας κέκλημαι. Cp. also Athen. vi. 267, where the term μνωίας is said by Hermon to be applied to ‘well-born’ serfs: εὐγενεῖς αἰκίται.

καὶ αὕταίς κεκτημέναις περιοίκους. ‘Since they too have perioeci.’

9. 4. With these criticisms we may compare Aristotle’s proposal (vii. 9. § 8 and 10. §§ 13, 14) in the description of his own state, that the husbandmen should be either slaves or foreign perioeci.

9. 5. ὀσπερ γὰρ αἰκίας μέρος ἀνὴρ καὶ γυνὴ.

The singular μέρος is used by attraction with the singular ἀνήρ.

For the general subject, cp. Laws vi. 780 E ff.: ‘For in your country, Cleinias and Megillus, the common tables of men are a heaven-born and admirable institution, but you are mistaken in leaving the women unregulated by law. They have no similar institution of public tables in the light of day, and just that part of the human race which is by nature prone to secrecy and stealth on account of their weakness—I mean the female sex—has been left without regulation by the legislator, which is a great mistake. And, in consequence of this neglect, many things have grown lax among you, which might have been far better if they had been only regulated by law; for the neglect of regulations about women may not only be regarded as a neglect of half the entire matter, but in proportion as woman’s nature is inferior to that of men in capacity of virtue, in that proportion is she more important than the two halves put together.

Cp. also Rhet. i. 5, 136ι a. 10, δόσοις γὰρ τὰ κατὰ γυναικὰς φαιλὰ ὀσπερ Λακεδαιμονιῶν, σχεδον κατὰ τὸ ἡμισὺν οἷκ ιειδαιμονοῦσι: and supra i. 13. § 16; also Eur. Andr. 595,

οὐδ’ ἂν, εἰ βοῦλοιτό τις,
σώφρων γίνοιτο Σπαρτιατίδων κόρη.

9. 8. ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν.

Translated in the text, as by interpreters generally*, ‘in the days of their greatness,’ i.e. in the fourth century B.C, after the taking of Athens when Sparta had the hegemony of Hellas. But is not the passage rather to be explained ‘many things in their government were ordered by women’? (Schlosser). For why should
women be more powerful in the days of their greatness than in their degeneracy? To which it may be replied that the very greatness of the empire made the evil more conspicuous. According to the latter of the two explanations ἀρχής corresponds to ἀρχεῖν in what follows.

This use of the genitive is not uncommon: cp. ἐπὶ στραταῖς Arist. Wasps 557; τοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, sc. ὄντας, Dem. 309. 10.

For the conduct of the Spartan women in the invasion of θ. 10. Epaminondas: compare Xenophon, himself the eulogist of Sparta, Hell. vi. 5. § 28, τῶν δὲ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως αἱ μὲν γυναῖκες οὐδὲ τῶν καπνὸν ἀφάναι ἤρείχοντο, ἀπὸ οὐδέποτε ἐδοῦσαι πολεμίοις, and Plutarch, Ages. 31, who has preserved a similar tradition, οὐχ ἦτεν δὲ τούτων ἐλέησαν τῶν Ἀγγίσδαν οἱ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν θόρυβοι καὶ κραυγαί καὶ διαδρομαί τῶν πρεσβυτέρων δυσανασχετοῦτον τὰ γινόμενα, καὶ τῶν γυνακῶν οὐ δυναμών ἠστικάζειν, ἀλλὰ παντάπασιν ἐκφρόαν ωὐσῶν πρός τε τὴν κραυγήν καὶ τὸ πύρ τῶν πολεμίων.

χρήσιμοι μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἤσαν, ὥσπερ ἐν ἑτέραις πόλεσιν, θόρυβον δὲ θ. 10. παρέχουσι πλεῖον τῶν πολεμίων.

Either 1)* 'For, unlike the women in other cities, they were utterly useless'; or 2) 'For, like the women of other cities, they were utterly useless; and they caused more confusion than the enemy.'

The employment of the men on military service, which rendered θ. 11. it more easy for Lycurgus to bring them under his institutions, is supposed to have caused the disorder of the women which made it more difficult to control them. Yet we may fairly doubt whether this notion is anything more than a speculation of Aristotle or some of his predecessors (φασὶ μὲν), striving to account for a seemingly contradictory phenomenon. For there could have been no trustworthy tradition of the time before Lycurgus. It is observable that Aristotle, if his words are construed strictly, supposes Lycurgus to have lived after the time of the Messenian and Argive wars. Clinton, Fasti Hellenici, vol. i., p. 143 note w, considers the words καὶ Μεσσηνίους in § 11 to be an interpolation. But this assumption of interpolation is only due to the exigencies of chronology. The testimony of Aristotle may be summed up as follows: on the one
hand he favours the traditional date; for he connects the name of Charillus an ancient king with that of Lycurgus c. 10. § 2: and on the other hand it is very possible that he may not have known, or may not have remembered the date of the Messenian Wars.

Grote (p. 2, c. 6, p. 516, n. 3) defends the Spartan women against the charges of Aristotle and Plato (the ἕλολάκων) Laws vii. p. 806, reiterated by Plutarch (Ages. c. 31), and even supposes that 'their demonstration on that trying occasion (i.e. the invasion of Laconia) may have arisen quite as much from the agony of wounded honour as from fear.' Yet surely Aristotle writing not forty years afterwards, who is to a certain extent supported by the contemporary Xenophon (vi. 5, 28 see above), could hardly have been mistaken about a matter which was likely to have been notorious in Hellas.

9. 12. αὑταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αὑταὶ τῶν γυνομένων.

Sc. the women:* or 'these are the causes' (αὑταί by attraction for ταῦτα). The first way of taking the words gives more point to the clause which follows.

9. 12. τίνι δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν.

'We have not to consider whether we are to blame Lycurgus, or to blame the women; but whether such a state of things is right.'

9. 13. οὐ μόνον ἄπρεπειάν τινα ποιεῖν τής πολιτείας αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν.

αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν must agree with πολιτείαν understood in ἄπρεπειάν τινα ποιεῖν τής πολιτείας, these words being equivalent to ἄπρεπην ποιεῖν τήν πολιτείαν: or αὐτῆς, which appears to have been the reading of the old translator (ipsius), may be adopted instead of αὐτὴν.

9. 13. μετὰ γὰρ τὰ οὖν ῥήματα τοῖς περὶ τήν ἀνωμαλίαν τῆς κτήσεως ἐπι-μήσειν ἄν τις.

1) The mention of avarice, or 2) the mention of women naturally leads Aristotle to speak of the inequality of property. The connexion is either 1) that avarice tends to inequality or 2) that inequality is produced by the great number of heiresses.

9. 14. Plutarch (Agis, c. 5) apparently ascribes to the Ephor Epitadeus the law which enabled a Spartan to give or bequeath his property as he pleased. Either Aristotle has followed a different tradition.
or the legislator is only a figure of speech for the institution (cp. supra, note at beginning of chapter).

τῶν τ' ἐπικλήρων.


ἡ καὶ μετρίαν.

'Or even a moderate one.' καὶ is here qualifying. 'Better have no dowries or small ones, or you may even go so far as to have moderate ones.'

νῦν δὲ ἐξεστὶ δοῦναι τὴν ἑπικλήρων ὅτε ἂν βούληται.

νῦν, not 'now,' as opposed to some former time, but 'as the law stands.' See note on c. 5. § 23 supra. δοῦναι, sc. τινά.

'A man may give his heiress to any one whom he pleases': i.e. heiresses may be married by their relatives to rich men, and the evil of accumulating property in a few hands will thus be increased. Herodotus, vi. 57, says that the giving away of an heiress whom her father had not betrothed was a privilege of the kings of Sparta. There may have been a difference in the custom before and after the days of Epitadeus (cp. note on § 14), though this is not expressed by the particle νῦν.

οὖν δὲ χίλιοι τὸ πλῆθος ἦσαν, sc. ἐπὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἐμβολῆς, §§ 10, 16. 9. 16.

γένον δὲ διὰ τῶν ἐργῶν αὐτῶν δήλον ὅτι φαίλως αὐτοῖς εἰχε τὰ περὶ τὴν ταύτην.

τὰ περὶ τὴν τάξιν ταύτην, sc. their arrangements respecting property described in the previous sentence. For the use of ταύτην with a vague antecedent, cp. below ταύτην τὴν διάρθρωσιν: also i. 2. § 2.

μίαν πληγῆν.

The battle of Leuctra (b.c. 371) at which, according to Xenophon, Hellen. vi. 4. § 15, one thousand Lacedaemonians and four hundred out of seven hundred Spartans perished. The population of Sparta was gradually diminishing. In the time of Agis IV. reg. 240–248 b.c. according to Plutarch (Agis, c. 5), the Spartans were but 700, and only about 100 retained their lots.

ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν πρωτέρων βασιλέων μετεδίδοσαν τῆς πολείας. 9. 17.

Yet Herodotus (ix. 35) affirms that Tisamenus of Elis, the
prophet, and Hegias, were the only foreigners admitted to the rights of citizenship at Sparta. According to Plutarch, Dion was also made a Spartan citizen (Dio, c. 17).

9. 17. καὶ φασὶν εἶναι ποτὲ τῶς Σπαρταῖας καὶ μυρίους.

The ancient number of Spartan citizens is variously given: here at 10,000; in Herod. vii. 234, at 8,000; according to a tradition preserved by Plutarch (Lycurg. c. 8), there were 9,000 lots which are said to have been distributed partly by Lycurgus, partly by Polydorus, the colleague of the king Theopompus.

9. 18. ἵππειντιος δὲ καὶ ὁ περὶ τὴν τεκνοποιίαν νόμος πρὸς ταύτην τὴν διδράθωσιν.

At Sparta the accumulation of property in a few hands tended to disturb the equality of the lots. The encouragement of large families, though acting in an opposite way, had a similar effect. According to Aristotle, depopulation and overpopulation alike conspired to defeat the intention of Lycurgus. Yet it does not seem that the great inducements to have families were practically successful; perhaps because the Spartans intermarried too much.

Like Plato and Phaleas, the Spartan legislator is accused of neglecting population. (Cp. supra c. 6. §§ 12, 13, and c. 7. §§ 4–8.) It is clearly implied in the tone of the whole argument (against Mr. Grote, vol. ii. c. 6) that there was an original equality of property, but that it could not be maintained; cp. τὰς κτήσεις ἰσάζοντα, 6. § 10; τῆς χώρας οὕτω διηρημένης, 9. § 19; and so Plato, Laws 684 D.

9. 19. διὰ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὦνοι ἢσαν.

Cp. Thuc. i. 131, etc. where we are told that Pausanias trusted to escape by bribery, πιστεύων χρήματι διαλύσειν τὴν διαβολήν. Also Rhet. iii. 18. § 6, 1419 a. 31, Καὶ ὃς ὁ Λάκων εἰθυνόμενος τῆς ἐφορίας, ἐρωτόμενος εἰ δοκοῦσιν αὐτῷ δικαίως ἀπολογεῖαι ἄτεροι, ἔφη. 'Ο δὲ, ὦ νοὺς σὺ τούτους ταύτα ἔδοι;' Καὶ ὃς ἔφη. 'Οὐκοῦν δικαίως ἃν,' ἔφη καὶ σὺ ἀπόλου: 'Οὐ δήτα;' ἔφη, 'οἱ μὲν γὰρ χρήματα λαβόντες ταύτα ἔπραξαν, ἐγὼ δ' ὦ νοί, ἀλλὰ γνώμην.'

9. 20. καὶ νῦν δ' ἐν τοῖς Ἀνδρίωισ.

'Ανδρίωι is a proper name, probably referring to some matter in
which the Andrians were concerned. It is unlikely that Aristotle would have used the archaic word ἀνδρια for φιδίτια or συνφίτια. For this use of the word ἀνδρια cp. c. 10. § 5, καὶ τὸ γε ἀρχαῖον ἐκάλουν οἱ δισκώνεις ὥσι φιδίτια ἀλλ' ἀνδρια, καθάπερ οἱ Κρίτες, ἦ καὶ δὴ λον ὥσι ἵκεθεν εἰλήλθεν.

The event to which Aristotle refers is wholly unknown to us, though the strange expression which he uses indicates the great importance of it (ὅσον ἐφ' ἐαυτοῖς ὅλην τὴν πόλιν ἀπώλεσαν).

ὡσε καὶ ταύτῃ συνεπίβλαστεσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν. 9. 20.

'So that in this way, as well as by the venality of the Ephors, together with the royal office the whole constitution was injured.'

δὲ γὰρ τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν μελλονταν σώζεσθαι πάντα βούλεσθαι τὰ 9. 22.
μέρη τῆς πόλεως εἶναι καὶ διαμένειν ταῦτα.

The nominatives which occur in the next sentence, οἱ μὲν οὖν βασιλεῖς, οἱ δὲ καλὸι κάγαθοι, κ.τ.λ. show that the corresponding words τὰ μέρη τῆς πόλεως are the subject of βούλεσθαι=δὲ πάντα τὰ μέρη τῆς πόλεως βούλεσθαι τὴν πολιτείαν σώζεσθαι καὶ διαμένειν ταῦτα.

taútà is to be taken adverbially with διαμένειν=κατὰ ταῦτα.

ἀθλον γὰρ ἡ ἀρχὴ αὕτη τῆς ἁρτῆς ἐστίν. 9. 22.

Nearly the same words occur in Demosthenes, c. Lept. § 119, p. 489, where speaking of the γεροντία, he says, ἐκεί μὲν γὰρ ἐστι τῆς ἁρτῆς ἀθλον τῆς πολιτείας κυρίος γενέσθαι μετὰ τῶν ὑμοίων.

παδαριώδης γὰρ ἐστι λίαν. 9. 23.

It is not known how the Ephors were elected. Possibly in the same way as the γέωργες (vide note on § 27 infra), which Aristotle likewise calls παδαριώδης. Plato, Laws iii. 692 A, says that the Ephorality is ἔγγυς τῆς κληρωτῆς δυνάμεως, by which he seems to mean that the election to the Ephorality was almost as indiscriminate as if it had been by lot.

As in the funeral oration of Pericles, the Spartan discipline is 9. 24.
everywhere described as one of unnatural constraint. There was no public opinion about right and wrong which regulated the lives of men. Hence, when the constraint of law was removed and they were no longer ἀρχόμενοι but ἀρχαῖοι, the citizens of Sparta seem
to have lost their character and to have fallen into every sort of corruption and immorality. The love of money and the propensity to secret luxury were kindred elements in the Spartan nature.

9. 25. τῶν τρόπων δὲ τούτων πεπαιδευμένων ἃστε καὶ τῶν νομοθέτην αὐτῶν ἀπιστεῶν ὡς οὐκ ἀγαθοὶ ἀνθρώπων, οὐκ ἀσφαλές.

'But when men are so educated that the legislator himself cannot trust them, and implies that they are not good men, there is a danger.' The remark is resumed and justified in § 30 (ὅτι δ' ὁ νομοθέτης, κ.τ.λ.), by the general suspicion of their citizens which the Spartan government always showed, and also (§ 26) by the circumstance that the Gerontes were placed under the control of the Ephors.

οὐκ ἀσφαλές, sc. τὸ κυρίου αὐτοῖς εἶναι μεγάλων.


The discussion about the Ephors and Gerontes is a sort of dialogue, in which objections are stated and answers given, but the two sides of the argument are not distinctly opposed.

9. 27. ἐτι δὲ καὶ τήν αἴρεσιν ἢν ποιοῦσα τῶν γερόντων, κατὰ τῇ κρίσιν ἐστὶ παιδαριώδης κ.τ.λ.

For the mode of the election cp. Plut. Lycurg. c. 26: 'The election took place after this fashion: When the assembly had met, certain persons selected for the purpose were shut up in a building near at hand, so that they could not see or be seen, but could only hear the shouting of the assembly. For, as with other matters (cp. Thuc. i. 87, κρίνοντι γὰρ βοᾷ καὶ οὐ ψῆφῳ), the Lacedaemonians decided by acclamation between the competitors. One by one the candidates were brought in, according to an order fixed by lot, and walked, without speaking, through the assembly. The persons who were shut up marked on tablets the greatness of the shout given in each case, not knowing for whom it was being given, but only that this was the first or the second or the third in order of the candidates. He was elected who was received with the loudest and longest acclamations.'

9. 27. δεῖ γὰρ καὶ βουλόμενον καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἄρχειν τῶν ἄξιων τῆς ἄρχης.

NOTES, BOOK II. 9. 87

In ὅπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν ἀλήθινον πολιτείαν ὁ νομοθέτης φαίνεται ποιῶν 9. 28. φιλοτίμους γὰρ κατασκευάζων τοὺς πολίτας τούτοις κέχρηται πρὸς τὴν αἰρέσιν τῶν γερώντων.

According to the view of Aristotle and of Plato nobody should seek to rule, but everybody if he is wanted should be compelled to rule. Yet this is rather a counsel of perfection than a principle of practical politics. And it seems hardly fair to condemn the work of Lycurgus, because like every other Greek state, Sparta had elections and candidatures.

διόπερ ἐξέπεμπον συμψεσθενᾶς τοὺς ἕθρούς. 9. 30.

συμψεσθενᾶς does not refer to the kings, but is an illustration of the same jealousy which made the Spartans consider the dissensions of the kings to be the salvation of their state. διόπερ = 'by reason of a like suspicion.'

It has been argued that Aristotle in this section is criticising the kings only. And we might translate (with Bernays and others) 'they sent enemies as colleagues of the king,' e.g. in such cases as that of Agis (Thuc. v. 63). But these could hardly be described as συμψεσθεναί, any more than the Ephors who, according to Xenophon (de Rep. Lac. c. 13. § 5), were the companions of the king—not his active counsellors, but spectators or controllers of his actions.

Ancient historians are apt to invent causes for the facts which tradition has handed down. Cp. note on c. 9. § 11 supra; also v. 11. § 2; Herod. v. 69; Thuc. i. 11, &c. It may be easily believed that there were frequent παραψεσθείαι among Spartans, but that these were the result of a deeply-laid policy is the fancy of later writers. Still less can we suppose the double royalty which clearly originated in the ancient history of Sparta to be the work of the legislator. Compare the Laws (iii. 691 D) of Plato (who probably first suggested the notion of a special design), 'A god who watched over Sparta gave you two families of kings instead of one and thus brought you within the limits of moderation.'

9. 31.

Either 1) the gathering for meals; or 2) the contribution, as in Hdt. i. 64.
9. 32. Βουλεταί μὲν γὰρ δημοκρατικὸν εἶναι τὸ κατασκεύασμα τῶν συσσιτίων.

It may be admitted that the common meals had a sort of leveling or equalizing tendency; but this could hardly have been the original intention of them, whether they were first instituted at Sparta by Lycurgus or not (cp. vii. 10. § 2 ff.). They are more naturally connected with the life of a camp (§ 11) and the brotherhood of arms. They may also be the survival of a patriarchal life.

9. 33. The remark that the office of admiral was a second royalty appears to be justified chiefly by the personal greatness of Ly- sander. Teleutias the brother of Agesilaus was also a distinguished man. It cannot be supposed that Eurybiades or Cnemus or Alcidas or Astyochus were formidable rivals to the king.

9. 35. τοῦτον δὲ ἀμάρτημα οὐκ ἔλατον· νομίζουσι μὲν γὰρ γίνεσθαι τὰγαθὰ τὰ περιμάκητα δὲ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον ἡ κακία· καὶ τούτο μὲν καλῶς, ὅτι μέντοι ταύτα κρείττω τῆς ἀρετῆς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, οὐ καλῶς.

'The Spartans were right in thinking that the goods of life are to be acquired by virtue, but not right in thinking that they are better than virtue' (cp. vii. c. 2. and c. 14). The 'not less error' is that they degrade the end into a means; they not only prefer military virtue to every other, but the goods for which they are striving to the virtue by which they are obtained.

9. 37. τὸν μὲν γὰρ πολὺ πεποίηκεν ἄχρηματον, τοὺς δὲ ἰδιώτας φιλοχρημάτων.

It is quite true that many Spartans, Pausanias, Pleistonax, Astyochus, Cleandridas, Glyippus and others were guilty of taking bribes. But it is hard to see how their crime is attributable to the legislator. Not the institutions of Lycurgus, but the failure of them was the real source of the evil.

The love of money to whatever cause attributable was held to be characteristic of Sparta in antiquity. The saying χρήματα χρήματι ἀνήρ is placed by Alcaeus (Fr. 50) in the mouth of a Spartan, and the oracle ἄ φιλοχρημάτα Σπάρταν ὀλεὶ ἀλλο δὲ οὐδέν is quoted in the Aristotelian Πολιτεία fr. Rei. Lac. 1559 b. 28.

10. 1. πάρεγγος μὲν ἐστὶ ταύτης.

Polyb. vi. 45 denies the resemblance between Crete and Lacedaemon, 'Επὶ δὲ τὴν τῶν Κρητῶν μεταξάντες (πολιτείαν) ἀξιον ἐπιστήσαι
NOTES, BOOK II. 10.

κατὰ δὲν τρόπους πόσ οἱ λογίωστοι τῶν ἀρχαῖων συγγραφέων "Εφορος, Σεισοφών, Καλλισθένης, Πλάτων, πρώτοις μὲν ὁμοῖοι εἰναι φασί καὶ τὴν αὕτην τῇ Δακεθαμοινίᾳ, δεύτερον δ' ἐπαινεῖν ὑπάρχουσαν ἀποφαίνουσιν. Ἡν οἰδὲτερον ἀληθὲς εἰναι μοι δοκεῖ. He contrasts the two states in several particulars; 1) the equal distribution of land in Sparta did not exist in Crete; 2) the greed of wealth which existed in Crete is said, strangely enough, to have been unknown at Sparta; 3) the hereditary monarchy of Sparta is contrasted with the life tenure of the γέροντες; 4) the harmony which prevailed at Sparta is contrasted with the rebellions and civil wars of Crete.

τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ἦττον γλαφυρῶς.

Compare what is said of Charondas in c. 12. § II, τῇ ἄξι μεγεία τῶν νόμων ἐστὶ γλαφυρώτερος καὶ τῶν νῦν νομοθετῶν.

According to this view the Spartan institutions are not Dorian but Pre-Dorian, having been established originally by Minos; received from him by the Lacedaemonian colony of Lyctus in Crete, and borrowed from the Lyctians by Lycurgus.

διὸ καὶ νῦν οἱ περίοικοι τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων χρώνται αὐτοῖς, ὡς κατασκευάσαντο Μίνω πρῶτον τὴν τάξιν τῶν νόμων.

The connexion is as follows:—The Lacedaemonian Laws are borrowed from the Cretan. Among the Lyctians, a colony of the Lacedaemonians who settled in Crete and whom Lycurgus is said to have visited, these laws were already in existence, and he adopted them. And even at this day, the laws of Minos are still in force among the subject population or aborigines of Crete. διὸ is unemphatic; the logical form outruns the meaning.

Either the laws of Minos had ceased to be enforced among the freemen of Crete or the freemen of Crete had themselves changed (Bernays); and therefore any vestiges of the original law were only to be found among the ancient population. Thus communistic usages may be observed among the peasants of India and Russia, which have disappeared in the higher classes. Yet Aristotle also speaks of the common meals in Crete as still continuing. Does he refer only to the survival of them among the Perioeci? By Dosiades (b.c.? the Cretan Syssitia are described as still exist-
Aristotle supposes that Lycurgus went to Crete before he gave laws to Sparta. According to other accounts his travels, like those of Solon, were subsequent to his legislation.

Ephorus, the contemporary of Aristotle [see fragment quoted in Strabo x. 486], argues at length that the Spartan Institutions originally existed in Crete but that they were perfected in Sparta, and that they deteriorated in Cnossus and other Cretan cities; both writers agree in the general view that the Cretan institutions are older than the Spartan and in several other particulars, e.g. that the Lyctians were a Lacedaemonian colony, that the common meals were called Ἀνδρια or Ἀνδρεία, that the Cretan institutions had decayed in their great towns but survived among the Perioeci; and also in the similarity of offices at Lacedaemon and Crete. The great resemblance between this account and that of Aristotle seems to indicate a common unknown source.

The existence of the same institutions in Sparta and Crete and the greater antiquity of the Cretan Minos may have led to the belief in their Cretan origin. Others deemed such an opinion unworthy of Sparta and argued plausibly that the greater could not have been derived from the less; Strabo l.c.

10. 3. Δοκεῖ δ’ ἡ νῆσος καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν πεσοκέιναι καὶ κεῖσθαι καλῶς.

Aristotle, like Herodotus, Thucydides, Aeschylus, is not indisposed to a geographical digression; cp. vii. 10. §§ 3–5.

It may be observed that the remark is not perfectly consistent with §§ 15, 16. The ‘silver streak’ and ‘the empire of the sea’ are the symbols of two different policies.

10. 4. Διὸ καὶ τῆς ἑβαλάσσης ἀρχῆς κατέσχεν ὁ Μλως.
Cp. Herod. iii. 122, Thuc. i. 4.

10. 5. γεωργοῦσι τε γὰρ τοῖς μὲν εἶλοτες τοῖς δὲ Κρήτει οἱ περίοικοι.

But if Sosicrates, a writer of the second century B.C., quoted by Athenaeus vi. 84 is to be trusted, Aristotle is here at fault in his use of terms; τὴν μὲν κοινὴν δοιλείαν οἱ Κρήτες καλοῦσι μνοῖαν, τὴν δὲ ἰδίαν ἀφαμιώτας, τοὺς δὲ περιοίκους ὑπηκόους: see c. 9. § 3.
NOTES, BOOK II. 10.

§ 2. ἢ καὶ ὁμοῦ ὅτι ἐκείθεν ἐκῆλθεν.

These words may be compared with the passage in Book vii. 10. § 2. ἀρχαῖα δέ ἵπποι εἶναι καὶ τῶν συσφικτῶν ἡ τάξις, τὰ μὲν περὶ Κρήτην γενόμενα περὶ τὴν Μίνω βασιλείαν, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἰταλικήν πολλὰ παλαιότερα τούτων. In both passages Aristotle says that the common meals came from Crete to Sparta.

οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐφοροὶ τὴν αὐτῆν ἔχοντι δύναμιν τοῖς ἐν τῇ Κρήτῃ καλουμένοις 10. 6. κόσμοι.

The office of the Cosmi is identified by Aristotle with that of the Ephors. But the resemblance between them is very slight. The fact that at Sparta there were kings, while in Crete the kingly power, if it ever existed at all, had long been abolished, makes an essential difference. The Ephors were democratic, the Cosmi were oligarchical officers. And although both the Ephors and the Cosmi were an executive body, yet the Ephors, unlike the Cosmi, never acquired the military command, which was retained by the Spartan kings. Aristotle observes that the Cosmi were chosen out of certain families, the Ephors out of all the Spartans, a circumstance to which he ascribes the popularity of the latter institution.

όσε καλοῦσιν οἱ Κρήτους βουλή.

Yet we are told that the term βουλή was generally used to signify ‘the council in a democracy.’ Cp. iv. 15. § 11 and vi. 8. § 17, also v. 1. § 10, [at Epidamnus] ἀντὶ τῶν φυλαρχῶν βουλήν ἐποίησεν. In the Cretan use of the term βουλὴ there may be a survival of the Homeric meaning of the word.

βασιλεία δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ἤν.

Probably an inference from the legendary fame of Minos. No other king of Crete is mentioned.

Dosiades, quoted by Ath. iv. c. 22. p. 143, gives the following account of the Cretan Syssitia: ‘The Lyctians collect the materials for their common meals in the following manner: Every one brings a tenth of the produce of the soil into the guild (εταφία) to which he belongs, and to this [are added] the revenues of the city, which the municipal authorities distribute to the several households. Further, each of the slaves contributes a poll-tax of an
Aeginetan stater. All the citizens are divided among these guilds which they call andreia. A woman takes care of the syssitia with three or four of the common people to help in waiting; and each of these has two attendants, called καλοφόροι, to carry wood for him. Everywhere in Crete there are two buildings for the syssitia, one called the andreion, the other, which is used for the reception of strangers, the dormitory (κοιμητήριον). And first of all they set out two tables in the room for the syssitia, called "strangers' tables," at which any strangers who are present take their place. Next to these come the tables for the rest. An equal portion is set before every man: the children receive a half portion of meat, but touch nothing else. On every table a large vessel is set full of diluted wine: from this all who sit at that table drink in common; and when the meal is finished another cup is put on. The children too drink in common from another bowl. The elders may, if they like, drink more. The best of the viands are taken by the woman who superintends the syssitia in the sight of all, and placed before those who have distinguished themselves in war or council. After dinner their habit is first of all to consult about state affairs, and then to recount their deeds in battle and tell the praise of their heroes. Thus they teach the youth to be valiant.'

10. 8. ἀτι' ἐκ κοινοῦ τρέφεσθαι πάντας, καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παιδώς καὶ ἄνδρας.

ἐκ κοινοῦ, 'out of a common stock'; not necessarily at common tables. The syssitia or common meals of women are said by Aristotle in chap. 12 to be an invention of Plato in the Laws, and if so they could hardly have existed at Crete. Nor is there any allusion to them in the fragment of Dosiades (supra). The name ἄνδρα or ἄνδρεία also affords a presumption against the admission of women to the public tables. But if the words ἐκ κοινοῦ are interpreted as above, there is no reason that with Oncken (Staatslehre der Arist. ii. 386) we should suppose the words γυναῖκας καὶ παιδῶς on this ground to be spurious; nor is such a mode of textual criticism legitimate.

10. 9. πρὸς δὲ τὴν ὀλυγοστίαν.

The connexion appears to be as follows: 'And as there were so many mouths to feed,' the legislator had many devices for
encouraging moderation in food, which he thought a good thing, as well as for keeping down population.

τὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀρρεναὶς ποιήσας ὁμιλίαν, περὶ ἂς εἰ φαύλωσ· ἡ μὴ φαύλωσ· 10. 9. ἔτερος ἐστι τοῦ διασκέψασαν καιρὸς.

If these words refer to this work, the promise contained in them is unfulfilled. Nothing is said on the subject in Book vii. c. 16, when the question of population is discussed. The promise, however, is somewhat generally expressed; like the end of c. 8. § 25 supra, Διὸ νῦν μὲν ἀφωμέν ταῦτη τὴν σκέψιν, ἄλλως γὰρ ἐστι καιρῶν.

ἐνταῦθα δ’ οὐκ ἔξ ἀπάντων αἰροῦντα τοὺς κόσμους ἄλλ’ ἐκ τινῶν γενόν, καὶ 10.10-12. τοὺς γέροντας ἐκ τῶν κεκοσμηκότων. περὶ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἄν τις εἴπει λόγους καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Δακεδαίμονι γινομένων. τὸ γὰρ ἀνπείδουν, καὶ τὸ διὰ βίου μεῖζον ἐστὶ γέρας τίς ἄξιας αὐτοῖς. ... τὸ δ’ ἡσυχάζειν, κ.τ.λ.

περὶ δὲν. Do these words refer to* the γέροντες (Susemihl, Bernays) or to the κόσμου (Stahr)? The connexion would lead us to suppose the latter; for what precedes and what follows can only be explained on this supposition. Yet the Cosmi appear not to have held office for life (cp. γέροντας ἐκ τῶν κεκοσμηκότων), perhaps only for a year (Polyb. vi. 46), though nothing short of a revolution could get rid of them; see infra, § 14. It is better to suppose that Aristotle has "gone off upon a word" as at c. 9. § 30, and is here speaking of the γέροντες, but returns to his original subject at τὸ δ’ ἡσυχάζειν. περὶ δὲν and γινομένως have also been taken as neuters: 'about which things,' i.e. the mode of electing: but this explanation does not agree with the next words, which relate, not to the mode of election, but to the irresponsibility of the office.

καὶ τὸ μὴ κατὰ γράμματα ἄρξειν, ἄλλ’ αὐτογράμμας ἐπισφαλές. 10. 11.

Cp. c. 9. § 23 where similar words are applied not, as here, to the Cosmi and elders, but to the Ephors. Another more general censure is passed on the γέροντες, § 25.

οὐδὲ γὰρ λήμματος τι τοῖς κόσμοις ὁσπερ τοῖς ἔφοροις, πόρρω γὰ ἀπο- 10. 12. κούσων ἐν ὑπὲρ τῶν διαφθεροῦσιν.

Yet to say that the Cosmi could not be bribed because they lived in an island appears to be rather far-fetched. Probably Aristotle is thinking of the bribery of Hellenes by foreign powers,
and for this there was little opportunity because the Cretans were isolated from the world.

10. 13.  οὐ γὰρ ἀσφαλῆς ὁ κανών.

The expression is not quite accurate, for the caprice of an individual cannot be called a κανών. He means that to make the caprice of man a rule is unsafe.


The words ἢν καθιστῶι πολλάκις which follow and the preceding ἐκβαλλοντι συστάτες τινὲς show that the expression τῷ τῆς ἀκοσμίας τῶν δυνατῶν means not the insubordination of the notables, but the temporary abrogation of the office of Cosmi by their violence, or, possibly, their defiance of its authority.

10. 15.  ἐστὶ δὲ ἐπικίνδυνος οὕτως ἔχουσα πόλις τῶν βουλομένων ἐπιτίθεσθαι καί δυναμένων.

Translated in the English text: 'A city is in a dangerous condition, when those who are willing are also able to attack her.' More correctly, 'A city which may at any time fall into anarchy (οὕτως ἔχουσα) is in a dangerous condition when those who are willing are also able to attack her.'

10. 16.  Διὸ καὶ τῷ τῶν περιοίκων μὲνει.

'And this is also a reason why the condition of the Perioeci remains unchanged.'

10. 16.  οὔτε γὰρ ἀξωτερικὴς ἀρχῆς κοινωνία.

Either 1*) have no foreign domains; or 2) have no relation to any foreign power. The language is not quite clear or accurate; for although a nation may possess foreign dominions it cannot 'share' in them. The Cretans were not members either of the Delian or of the Lacedaemonian confederacy.

10. 16.  νεωσί τε πόλεως ἐξεικός διαβεβήκεν εἰς τὴν νῆσον.

The date of this event is said to be B.C. 343 when Phalaecus, the Phocian leader, accompanied by his mercenaries, crossed into Crete and took service with the inhabitants of Cnossus against those of Lyctus over whom he gained a victory, but shortly after-
wards perished (Diod. xvi. 62, 63). This however is rather a civil than a 'foreign war.' Others refer the words to the war in the time of Agis II. (B.C. 330), or to the Cretan rising against Alexander. neoseti τε refers to σώζεται διὰ τῶν τόπων, 'Quite lately [her isolation did not save her.] foreign mercenaries brought war into the island.'

καὶ πολλὰ περιττῶς πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους.

11. 1.

'And in many respects their government is remarkable when compared with those of other nations' or 'with the others of whom I have been speaking.' For the use of περιττῶς, cp. c. 6. § 6.

αἶται γὰρ αἱ πολιτείαι τρεῖς ἄλλαξι τε σύνεγγυς πῶς εἰσί.

11. 1.

Yet the differences are far more striking than the resemblances, which seem to be only 'the common tables,' the analogous office of kings at Sparta and Carthage, and the council of Elders. The real similarity to one another of any of these institutions may be doubted (see note on § 3 infra): while the entire difference in spirit is not noticed by Aristotle. The Semitic trading aristocracy has little in common with the Hellenic military aristocracy; the prosperity of Carthage with the poverty and backwardness of Crete. But in the beginnings of reflection mankind saw resemblances more readily than differences. Hence they were led to identify religions, philosophies, political institutions which were really unlike though they bore the impress of a common human nature.

σημεῖον ὅποι πολιτείας συντεταγμένης.

11. 2.

'And the proof that they were an organized state' or 'that they had a regular constitution.' The insertion of εὗ before συντεταγ-μένης (Schneider) is unnecessary. Cp. supra ii. 9. § 22.

τὸν δὴν ἔχουσαν agrees with some word such as πόλιν understood 11. 2. from πολιτείαν—'the city with its democracy.' There is no need to change ἔχουσαν into ἐκώντα (Bernays) or ἔκωσιν (Spengel).

μὴ στᾶσιν γεγενήσθαι.

11. 2.

For the inconsistency of these words with another statement of Aristotle (v. 12. § 12) that 'the Carthaginians changed from a tyranny into an aristocracy,' which is also irreconcilable with the further statement in v. 12. § 14, that they never had a revolution, see note in loco.
11. 3. ἐχει δὲ παραπλήσια τῇ Δακωνικῇ πολιτείᾳ τὰ μὲν συσςίτια τῶν ἐπαιρίων τοὺς θεοῦτος, τὴν δὲ τῶν ἐκατόν καὶ τεττάρων ἀρχήν τοῖς ἐφόροις . . . τοῖς δὲ βασιλείς καὶ τὴν γερουσίαν ἀνάλογον τοῖς ἑκάτεροι βασιλεύει καὶ γέρουσι. Yet there could hardly have been much resemblance between the common tables of guilds or societies in the great commercial city of Carthage, and the ‘camp life’ of the Spartan syssitia; or between the five ephors of Sparta and the hundred and four councilors of Carthage: or between kings who were generals and elected for life at Sparta and the so called kings or suffetes who seem to have been elected annually and were not military suffeters at Carthage, but are distinguished from them, infra § 9.

11. 3. οὐ χείρον.
Is to be taken as an adverb agreeing with the sentence, ‘and this is an improvement.’

11. 4. καὶ βέλτιστον δὲ τοῖς βασιλεῖς μήτε κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι γένος, μηδὲ τούτο τὸ τυχὼν, εἰ τε διαφέρων ἐκ τούτων αἱρετοὺς μᾶλλον ἤ καθ’ ἡλικίαν.
The true meaning of this rather perplexed passage is probably that given in the English text which may be gathered from the words as they stand. With διαφέρων supply τὸ γένος ἐστὶ. The correction of Bernays, τυχὼν, εἰς δὲ γερουσίαν ἐκ πλουσίων αἱρετοῖς is too great a departure from the MSS. Lesser corrections, εἰ δὲ, ἀλλ’ εἰ τι, εἰτι have some foundation in the Latin Version, but are unnecessary. εἰ τε is to be read as two words and answers to μήτε, as διαφέρουν does to μηδὲ τούτο τὸ τυχὼν. ‘It is a great advantage that the kings are not all of the same family and that their family is no ordinary one, and if there be an extraordinary family, that the kings are elected out of it and not appointed by seniority.’

11. 4. μεγάλων γὰρ κύρων καθεστῶτες, ὅν εὐτελεῖς ὡσι, μεγάλα βλαπτοσυν καὶ ἔτλασαν ἐνδὺ τὴν πόλιν τὴν τῶν Δακωνικῶν.
He elsewhere speaks of the Spartan monarchy in a somewhat different spirit (iii. 14. § 3, 15. § 1 ff.). The praise here given to the elective Monarchy or Consulate of the Carthaginians at the expense of the Spartan kingship is considerably modified by the fact mentioned in § 10, that they not unfrequently sold the highest offices for money.
The constitution of Carthage was an aristocracy in the lower sense, and like Aristotle's own πολιτεία, a combination of oligarchy and democracy (iv. 8. § 9, v. 7. §§ 5-7). While acknowledging that wealth should be an element in the constitution, because it is the condition of leisure, Aristotle objects to the sale of places and the other abuses which arose out of it at Carthage. The Carthaginian constitution is expressly called an 'aristocracy' in iv. 7. § 4, because it has regard to virtue as well as to wealth and numbers; and once more (in v. 12. § 14) a democracy in which, as in other democracies, trade was not prohibited. According to Aristotle the people had the power 1) of debating questions laid before them; 2) of deciding between the kings and nobles when they disagreed about the introduction of measures, but 3) they had not the power of initiation.

ἐν ταῖς ἐτέραις πολιτείαις.

τὸ δὲ τὰς πενταρχίας κ.τ.λ.

Of these pentarchies, or of the manner in which they held office before and after the regular term of their magistracy had expired, nothing is known. We may conjecture that they were divisions or committees of the γερουσία. Their position may be illustrated by that of the Cretan Cosmi, who became members of the γερουσία when their term of office had expired (cp. c. 10. § 10).

 Possibly the same which he had previously (§ 3) called the magistracy of 104. The magistracy here spoken of is termed μεγίστη ἀρχή, the other is said to consist of great officers who are compared with the Ephors. If the two institutions are assumed to be the same, we might adduce for an example of a like inaccuracy in number, a passage, c. 6. § 5, where the citizens in Plato's Laws who number 5040 are called the 5000.
But it is not certain that they can be identified. According to Livy and Justin the ordo judicium consisted of 100. ‘Centum ex numero senatorum judices deliguntur.’ Justin xix. 2. (Cp. Livy xxxiii. 46.) They were appointed about the year B.C. 450, to counteract the house of Mago, and are spoken of as a new institution. These facts rather lead to the inference that the 100 are not the same with the magistracy of 104, which was probably more ancient. But in our almost entire ignorance of early Carthaginian history the question becomes unimportant.

11. 7. καὶ τὸ τὰς δίκας ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχείων δικαίωσθαι πάσας [ἀριστοκρατικῶν], καὶ μὴ ἄλλας ἐπὶ ἄλλως, καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι.

Either 1)* καθάπερ ἐν Λακεδαίμονι refers to the immediately preceding clause, μὴ ἄλλας ἐπὶ ἄλλως:—or 2), to the words δίκας ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρχείων δικαίωσθαι πάσας, in which case καὶ . . . ἄλλως must be taken as an explanatory parenthesis.

According to the first view, Aristotle is opposing Carthage and Lacedaemon. In Carthage all cases are tried by the same board or college of magistrates (or by the magistrates collectively), whereas in Lacedaemon some magistrates try one case and some another. The former is the more aristocratical, the second the more oligarchical mode of proceeding: the regular skilled tribunal at Carthage is contrasted with the casual judgments of individuals at Lacedaemon. The difficulty in this way of taking the passage is that we should expect ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀρχείων, unless the words καὶ μὴ ἄλλας ἐπὶ ἄλλως be regarded as suggesting αὐτῶν by antithesis.

According to the second view, Aristotle, as in iii. 1. § 10, is comparing the general points of resemblance in Carthage and Lacedaemon. ‘Both at Carthage and Lacedaemon cases are tried by regular boards of magistrates, and not by different persons, some by one and some by another.’ The difference between the professional judges of the Carthaginians and the casual magistrates of the Spartans is noted in iii. 1. § 10, but here passed over in silence. The Carthaginian and Lacedaemonian arrangements may thus be considered as both aristocratic and oligarchic,—aristocratic because limiting judicial functions to regular magistrates; oligarchic, because confining them to a few. They are
both contrasted with the judicial institutions of a democracy. The
difficulty in this way of construing the passage is not the paren-
thesis, which is common in Aristotle, but the use of ἄλλων vaguely
for ‘different persons,’ and not, as the preceding words ὑπὸ τῶν
ἀρχέων would lead us to expect, for ‘different magistracies,’ or
‘boards of magistrates.’

In neither way of taking the passage is there any real contra-
diction to the statement of iii. 1. § 10. The words of the latter
are as follows: ‘For in some states the people are not acknow-
ledged, nor have they any regular assembly; but only extra-
ordinary ones; suits are distributed in turn among the magistrates;
at Lacedaemon, for instance, suits about contracts are decided,
some by one Ephor and some by another; while the elders are
judges of homicide, and other causes probably fall to some other
magistracy. A similar principle prevails at Carthage; there certain
magistrates decide all causes.’

For the sale of great offices at Carthage, see Polyb. vi. 56. § 4, 11. 9.
παρὰ μὲν Καρχηδόνιοι δώρα φανερός διδότας λαμβάνοντι τὰς ἀρχὰς· παρὰ
dὲ ῾Ρωμαίοις δάναις ἐστι περὶ τοῦτο πρόστιμον.

dεἷ δὲ νομίζειν ἀμάρτημα νομοθέτου τὴν παρέκβασιν εἶναι τῆν ἄριστοκρα-
τίας ταύτην κ.τ.λ.

The error consists in making wealth a qualification for office;
the legislator should from the first have given a competency to the
governing class, and then there would have been no need to
appoint men magistrates who were qualified by wealth only. Even
if the better classes generally are not to be protected against
poverty, such a provision must be made for the rulers as will
ensure them leisure. See infra § 12, βέλτιον δὲ ἐι καὶ προείρη τὴν
ἀνορίαν τῶν ἐπιείκων ὁ νομοθέτης κ.τ.λ.

ἐὶ δὲ δεῖ βλέπειν καὶ πρὸς ἐντορίαν χάρων σχολῆς, φαύλου τὸ τὰς μεγίστας 11. 10.
ἀνηθᾶς εἶναι τῶν ἄρχεων, τὴν τε βασιλείαν καὶ τὴν στρατηγίαν.

Of this, as of many other passages in the Politics, the meaning
can only be inferred from the context. In the Carthaginian con-
stitution the element of wealth superseded merit. But whether
there was a regular traffic in offices, as the words τὰς μεγίστας
would seem to imply, or merely a common practice of corruption, as in England in the last century, Aristotle does not clearly inform us. Cp. Plat. Rep. viii. 544 D, ἡ τῶν ἄλλην ἑξετάζειν τοιαύτης ἡτοι καὶ ἐν εἰδεῖ διαφανεῖ τιλε κεῖται; δυναστεία γὰρ καὶ ἄνθρωπαι βασιλεία καὶ τοιαύτα τινες πολιτείας μεταξύ τι τούτων πού εἰσιν, εὕρεται δὲ ἄν τις αὐτάς οὐκ ἐλάττουσι περί τοῦτοι θαμβάρον δὲ τοῦ Ἐλληνα.

11.12. δικτιον δ᾽ εἶ καὶ προεῖτο τῷ ἀπορίαν τῶν ἐπισκόπων ὁ νομοθέτης.
The MSS. vary between ἀπορίαν and εὐπορίαν without much difference of meaning: 'Even if the legislator were to give up the question of the poverty' [or 'wealth'] of the better class.' A similar confusion of ἀπορος and εὐπορος occurs elsewhere: iii. 17. § 4, ἀπόρος and εὐπόρος: v. 1. § 14, ἀποροι and εὑπόροι: v. 3. § 8, ἀπόροι and εὐπόροι: vi. 2. § 9, ἀπόροι and εὐπόροι.

κοινότερον, 'more popular,' because more persons hold office.
kαθάπερ εὐπομεν, cp. § 13.
ἐκαστόν τῶν αὐτῶν, i.e. because each thing remains the same.
The insertion of ἐνοτὸ before τῶν, suggested by the Old Translation ab eisdem, is unnecessary. τῶν αὐτῶν, 'where the duties are the same.'
κάλλιον ἀποτελεῖται, i.e. if many share in the government each individual can be confined to the same duties, a division of labour to which frequent reference is made in Aristotle. (Cp. ii. 2. §§ 5, 6; iv. 15. §§ 7, 8; vi. 2. § 8, and Plat. Rep. ii. 374 A, iii. 397 E.) And there is more political intelligence where everybody is both ruler and subject.

11.15. ἐκφεύγοντι τῷ πλούτεων. See note on text.
So England has been often said to have escaped a revolution during this century by the help of colonization: nor is there 'any more profitable affair of business in which an old country can be engaged' (Mill). That Aristotle was not averse to assisting the poor out of the revenues of the state when any political advantage could be gained, or any permanent good effected for them, we infer from vi. 5. §§ 8, 9.
Though the government of the Carthaginians is in good repute (§ 1), Aristotle regards this reputation as not wholly deserved, their stability being due to the power of sending out colonies which their wealth gave them; but this is only a happy accident. In a similar spirit he has remarked that the permanency of the Cretan government is due to their insular position (c. 10. § 15).

The later reflection on the accidental character of the stability which he attributes to Carthage is not quite in harmony with the statement of § 2, in which he cites the lastingness of the government as a proof of the goodness of the constitution.

Grote in his eleventh chapter (vol. iii. p. 167, ed. 1847) says that, according to Aristotle, Solon only gave the people the power to elect their magistrates and hold them to accountability. What is said in §§ 2 and 3 he considers not to be the opinion of Aristotle himself, but of those upon whom he is commenting. This is true of § 2: but not of § 3, which contains Aristotle’s criticism on the opinion expressed in § 2. Thus we have the authority of Aristotle (at least of the writer of this chapter) for attributing the institution of the δικαστήρια to Solon (cp. Schömann’s Athenian Constitution, transl. by Bosanquet, pp. 36 ff.). The popular juries are said to be a democratic institution (τὸν δὲ δῆμον καταστήσας, τὰ δικαστήρια ποιήσας ἐκ πάντων); but it is obvious that, so long as the jurors were unpaid, the mass of the people could make no great use of their privileges. The character of the democracy was therefore far from being of an extreme kind; cp. iv. 6. §§ 5, 6 and 13. §§ 5, 6, vi. 2. §§ 6, 7.

The sum of Aristotle’s (?) judgment upon Solon (§ 3) is that he did create the democracy by founding the dicasteries, but that he was not responsible for the extreme form of it which was afterwards established by Ephialtes, Pericles, and their followers.

The writer of this passage clearly intended to class Pericles among the demagogues. He judges him in the same depreciatory spirit as Plato in the Gorgias, pp. 515, 516.
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12. 5. ἐπεὶ Σόλων γε ἔοικε τὴν ἀναγκαστικὴν ἀποδιδώνα τῷ δήμῳ δύναμιν.

12. 6. τὰς δ' ἀρχὰς ἐκ τῶν γνωρίμων καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων κατέστησε πάσας, ἐκ τῶν πέντεσκοσιομεδίων καὶ ζευγίτων καὶ τρίτου τέλους τῆς καλομένης ἰππάδος· τὸ δὲ τέταρτον θητικόν, οἷς οὐδεμίας ἀρχῆς μετήν.

The arrangement of the classes here is somewhat disorderly, the second class or Knights being placed third in the series. That Aristotle should have supposed the Hippeis to have formed the third class is incredible; but it is difficult to say what amount of error is possible in a later writer. See an absurd mistake in Suidas and Photius about ἰππαῖς and ἰππάς (Boeckh, P. E. ii. 260) under ἰππάς, which in Photius s. v. is called a fifth class; while in the next entry four Athenian classes are cited in the usual order with a reference to Aristotle (?) de Rep. Atheniensium, and an addition 'that ἰππάδες belong to ἰππαῖς' (?)

12. 6. νομοθέτησθαι δ' ἐγένοντο Ζάλευκος τε Δοκρόις τοῖς ἐπίζευγροις, καὶ Χαρών-

担当 ὁ Κάταναιὸς τοῖς αὐτοῦ πολίταις.

Strabo (vi. 260), quoting Ephorus, says that Zaleucus made one great innovation, in taking away from the dicasts, and inserting in the law, the power of fixing the penalty after sentence was given.

Aristotle attributes greater precision to Charondas than to modern legislators. But early laws have a greater appearance of precision because society is simpler, and there are fewer of them.

12. 7. Θάλης.

Thales, called also Thaletas, probably the Cretan poet who is said by Ephorus apud Strabonem, x. p. 481, to have been the friend of Lycurgus; and also to have introduced the Cretan rhythm into vocal music. Mentioned in Plut. de Musica, pp. 1135, 1146. Clinton supposes him to have flourished from 690 to 660 B.C. But chronology cannot be framed out of disjointed statements of Plutarch and Pausanias.

12. 7. Δυκούργον καὶ Ζαλευκοῦ.

A greater anachronism respecting Lycurgus is found in the fragments of Ephorus (Strabo x. 482, ἐνυχώντα δ', ὡς φασί τινες, καὶ
NOTES, BOOK II. 12. 103

Ὀμήρῳ διατίθεται ἐν Χίῳ, quoted by Oncken, Staatslehre des Aristoteles, ii. p. 346).

ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Φιλόλαος ὁ Κορίνθιος.

The δὲ is not opposed to μὲν at the end of the last sentence, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν λέγουσιν κ.τ.λ., but is a resumption of the δὲ at the beginning of the previous sentence, πειρώνται δὲ. The story, if any reason is required for the introduction of it, may be intended to explain how Philolaus a Corinthian gave laws for Thebes.

Of Onomacritus, Philolaus, Androdamas, nothing more is known: 12. 11.
of Zaleucus not much more. A good saying attributed to him has been preserved in Stobaeus xlv. p. 304, Ζάλευκος, ὁ τῶν λακρῶν νομοθέτης, τοὺς νόμους ἐφῄσε τοῖς ἀραχνίοις ὁμοίους εἶναι ἄσπερ γὰρ εἰς ἐκείνα ἐὰν μὲν ἐμπέσῃ μνῆμα ἢ κόσμῳ, κατέχεται, ἐὰν δὲ σφῆσθαι ἢ μελετηθεῖν, διαρρήξατα ἀφύπταται, οὕτω καὶ εἰς τοὺς νόμους ἐὰν μὲν ἐμπέσῃ πένης, συνέχεται ἐὰν δὲ πλούσιος ἢ δυνατὸς λέγειν, διαρρήξαται ἀποτρέχει, an apophthegm which in Aristotle’s phraseology (i. 11. § 10) may be truly said ‘to be of general application.’ Stobaeus has also preserved (xlv. p. 289) numerous laws which are attributed to Charondas and Zaleucus. They are full of excellent religious sentiments, but are evidently of a late Neo-Pythagorean origin. The same remark applies still more strongly to the citations in Diodorus xii. c. 12 ff.

Πλάτωνος δ’ ἢ τε τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παιδῶν καὶ τῆς οὐσίας κοινότης καὶ 12. 12.
tά συστήτα τῶν γυναικῶν, ἕτε δ’ ὁ περὶ τὴν μέθην νόμος, τὸ τούτον νασίηται συμποσιαρχεῖν, καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἀσκησιν ὡς ἀμφιδέξεις γίνονται κατὰ τὴν μελέτην, ὅσ δέον μὴ τὴν μὲν χρήσιμον εἶναι τοῖς χερῶν τὴν δὲ ἄχρηστον.

The reference to Plato’s communism in contrast with Phaleas’ proposal of equality is not unnatural; but the allusion to three unconnected, two of them very trivial, points in the ‘Laws,’ is strange, and looks like the addition of a later hand. This whole chapter has been often suspected. It consists of miscellaneous jottings not worked up, some of them on matters already discussed. But mere irregularity and feebleness are no sufficient ground for doubting the genuineness of any passage in the sense in which
genuineness may be ascribed to the greater part of the Politics. The chapter may be regarded either as an imperfect recapitulation or as notes for the continuation of the subject. The story of Philolaus, and the discussion respecting Solon, are characteristic of Aristotle.

καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς ἄσκησιν. The change of construction arises from the insertion of the clause ὁ περὶ τὴν μέθην νόμος. The accusative may be explained as the accusative of the remote object after ἄμφιδεξιοι γίνονται, or may be taken with περὶ.

It may be remarked that Aristotle looks on the ἄμφιδεξιος as an exception to nature (cp. Nic. Eth. v. 7. § 4, φύσει γὰρ ἡ δεξία κρείττων κατὰ ἐνδέχεται τινας ἄμφιδεξιους γενέσθαι), whereas in Plato (Laws 794 D, E) the ordinary use of the right hand only is regarded as a limitation of nature.

12. 13. Δράκοντος δὲ νόμοι.

BOOK III.

τὸ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντε. 1. 1.

The particle δὲ after τὸ was probably omitted when the treatise was divided into books.

τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ καὶ τοῦ νομοθέτου 1. 1.

are a resumption of the opening words τὸ περὶ πολιτείας ἐπισκοποῦντε. ‘The legislator or statesman is wholly engaged in enquiries about the state. But the state is made up of citizens, and therefore he must begin by asking who is a citizen.’ The clause τοῦ δὲ πολιτικοῦ . . . περὶ πόλις is a repetition and confirmation of the previous sentence, τὸ περὶ πολιτείας . . . ἡ πόλις, the enquirer being more definitely described as the legislator or statesman.

οὖν οἱ τῶν δικαίων μετέχοντες οὕτως ὡστε καὶ δίκην ὑπέχειν καὶ δικά- 1. 4.

ζέσθαι.

καὶ is closely connected with οἱ τῶν δικαίων μετέχοντες. ‘Nor those who share in legal rights, so that as a part of their legal rights they are sued and sue, as plaintiffs and defendants.’

καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα τούτων ὑπάρχει. 1. 4.

These words are omitted in the old translation and in several Greek MSS. and are bracketed by Susemihl (1st ed.). If retained, they either 1) refer to the remote antecedent μέτοικοι above, ‘for the metics have these rights, and yet are not citizens,’ whereupon follows the correction, ‘although in many places metics do not possess even these rights in a perfect form.’ Or 2*) they are only a formal restatement of the words immediately preceding (for a similar restatement, which is bracketed by Bekker, see iv. 6. § 3), and are therefore omitted in the translation. Other instances of such pleonastic repetitions occur elsewhere, e.g. infra c. 6. § 4, where
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tou zin even ev autov is repeated in katav to zin autov monon: also iv. 1. § 1, kai gar toitoi tis xenomantikis estin, and v. 1. § 1.

Aristotle argues that the right of suing and being sued does not make a citizen, for a such a right is conferred by treaty on citizens of other states: (cp. Thuc. i. 77, kai elasoumenoi gar ev tais xenobolaias prod todes xinomakous dikais kai par’ hemi autous ev tois omoious nomois poihsantes tas krisies philodikein dokoumen). b) The metics have this right, which, as he proceeds to remark, in many places is only granted them at second-hand through the medium of a patron.

1. 5. oix aplous de laian.

Laian qualifies and at the same time emphasises aplous: ‘But not quite absolutely.’

1. 5. etei kai peri tov atimov k.t.l.

I.e. doubts may be raised about the rights to citizenship of exiles and deprived citizens, but they may also be solved by the expedient of adding some qualifying epithet.

1. 7. avonumov gar to koinon eti dikastov kai ekklasiastov.

‘This is a merely verbal dispute arising out of the want of a word; for had there been a common name comprehending both dicast and ecclesiast it would have implied an office.’ Cp. Laws, vi. 767 A: ‘Now the establishment of courts of justice may be regarded as a choice of magistrates; for every magistrate must also be a judge of something, and the judge, though he be not a magistrate, is a very important magistrate when he is determining a suit.’

1. 8. de de mou lambanein omi twn pragmaton ev ois ta upokeimeva diaferete tov eidei, kai to oin auton esti praton to de deuterov to de ekumevon, h to parapan oidea estin, h to uota, to koinon, h glauchros.

ta upokeimeva. 1*) ‘the underlying notions’ or ‘the notions to which the things in question are referred,’ i.e. in this passage, as the connexion shows, ‘the forms of the constitution on which the idea of the citizen depends’ (see Bonitz s. v.). 2) upokeimeva is taken by Bernays to mean the individuals contained under a class, and he translates ‘where things which fall under one conception are different in kind.’ But it is hard to see how things which are
different in kind can fall under one class or conception, and the
meaning, even if possible, is at variance with the immediate
context which treats not of citizens but of constitutions.

τὰς δὲ πολιτείας ὁρῶμεν εἰδεὶ διαφεροῦσα ἄλληλων, καὶ τὰς μὲν ὑστέρας 1. 9.
τὰς δὲ πρωτέρας οὕσας.

The logical distinction of prior and posterior is applied by
Aristotle to states, and so leads to the erroneous inference that
the perfect form of the state has little or nothing in common with
the imperfect. So in Nic. Eth. i. 6. § 2, ‘there are no common
ideas of things prior and posterior.’ The logical conceptions of
prior and posterior have almost ceased to exist in modern meta-
physics; they are faintly represented to us by the expressions
‘a priori’ and ‘a posteriori,’ or ‘prior in the order of thought,’
which are a feeble echo of them; from being differences in kind,
they are becoming differences of degree, owing to the increasing
sense of the continuity or development of all things.

διότερ ὁ λεγεῖς ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ μάλιστ’ ἐστὶ πολιτείᾳ.

Yet not so truly as in Aristotle’s own polity hereafter to be
described, in which all the citizens are equal (cp. infra, c. 13. § 12).
Democracy is elsewhere called a perversion (infra, c. 7. § 5), but he
here uses the term carelessly, and in a better sense, for that sort of
democracy which is akin to the μέση πολιτεία.

κατὰ μέρος.

Generally ‘in turn,’ but the examples show that the phrase must
here mean ‘by sections’ or ‘by different bodies or magistracies.’

τῶν αὐτῶν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ Καρχηδόνας πάσας γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τινες κρίνουσι 1. 11.
τὰς δίκας.

τῶν αὐτῶν, i.e. because in both these cases the administration of
justice is taken out of the hands of the people and entrusted to the
magistrates, either the same or different magistrates.
The oligarchies or aristocracies of Carthage and Sparta are here
contrasted, not with each other, but with democracy. A minor
difference between them is also hinted at: at Carthage there were
regular magistrates to whom all causes were referred; at Lacedae-
mon causes were distributed among different magistrates. See note on ii. 11. § 7.

1. 11. ἀλλ’ ἔχει γὰρ διόρθωσιν ὁ τοῦ πολίτου διορισμός.
   The particle γὰρ implies an objection which is not expressed. ‘But how, if our definition is correct, can the Lacedaemonians, Carthaginians, and others like them be citizens; for they have no judicial or deliberative assemblies.’ To which Aristotle answers, ‘But I will correct the definition so as to include them.’ Finding ἀξίωμας ἀρχὴ to be a definition of citizenship inapplicable to any state but a democracy, he substitutes a new one, ‘admissibility to office, either deliberative or judicial.’

1. 12. ταύτης τῆς πόλεως.
   Namely, of that state in which the assembly or law-court exists.

2. 1. πολιτικῶς.
   ‘Popularly’ or ‘enough for the purposes of politics.’ Cp. Plat. Rep. 430 C. So νομικῶς (viii. 7. § 3), ‘enough for the purposes of law.’
   For παχιός Camerarius and Bernays needlessly read παχύς.

2. 2. Γοργίας μὲν οὖν ὁ Δεοστίνος, τὰ μὲν ἰσως ἀπορῶν τὰ δ’ εἰρωνευόμενοι, ἔφη, καθάπερ ἀλμόνες εἶναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ἀλμοποιῶν πεποιημένους, οὕτω καὶ Λαρισσαῖος τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν δημιουργῶν πεποιημένους εἶναι γὰρ τινος λαρισσοποιοῦς.
   ἀπορῶν. ‘In doubt about the question who is a citizen?’
   δημιουργῶν. Properly the name of a magistrate in some Dorian states. The word is used here with a double pun, as meaning not only ‘magistrates,’ but 1) ‘makers of the people,’ 2) ‘artisans.’ The magistrates, like artisans, are said to make or manufacture the citizens because they admit them to the rights of citizenship.

There is also a further pun upon the word Λαρισσαῖος, which probably meant kettles, or was used as a characteristic epithet of kettles derived from their place of manufacture:—

‘Artisans make kettles.
Magistrates make citizens.’

The sentence may be translated as follows:—‘Gorgias, very
likely because he was in a difficulty, but partly out of irony, said that, as mortars are made by the mortar-makers, so are the Larissians manufactured by their 'artisan-magistrates; for some of them were makers of kettles' (Δάρισσαι οί Δαρισσαίοι).

For the term εἰρωνευτέμενος, applied to Gorgias, compare Rhet. iii. 7, 1408 b. 20, ἣ μετὰ εἰρωνείας, ὅπερ Γοργίας ἐποίει: and for Δάρισσαι compare Τάναγρα Ταναγρίς, a kettle, (Hesych., Pollux); also an epigram of Leonides of Tarentum (Anth. vi. 305):—

Δαβροσύνα τάδε δώρα, φιλευλείχῳ τε Δαφνυμῷ
θήκατο δεισόζου* Δωρίως κεφαλά,
tῶς Δαρισσαίως θυγατέρος ἐψηθήρας,
καὶ χύτρως καὶ τὰν εὐρυχάθη κύλικα,
καὶ τὰν εὐχάλκων εὐγναμπτὸν τε κρεάγραν,
καὶ κυνήτην, καὶ τὰν ἐγνόδων τορύναν.
Δαβροσύνα, σὺ δὲ ταῦτα κακοῦ κακὰ δωρητήρος
δεξαμένα, νεύσατε μὴ ποικο σφυροσύνων.

*δεισόζου = stinking; cp. Suidas, s.v. δεισαλέος: —δεισαλέος, κοπρώδης.
δείσα γὰρ ἢ κόπρος.

ζένους καὶ δούλους μετοίκους. (See note on text.) 2. 3.

Mr. Grote, c. 31. vol. iv. 170. n., would keep the words as they stand, taking μετοίκους with both ζένους and δούλους. He quotes Aristoph. Knights 347 (ἐπεὶ δικίδιων εἶτας εὖ κατὰ ζένους μετοίκου), and infers from the juxtaposition of the words δούλους μετοίκους, that they mean, 'slaves who, like metics, were allowed to live by themselves, though belonging to a master.' That is to say μέτοικοι are spoken of in a general as well as in a technical sense. According to Xen. de Vect. 2. § 3, all kinds of barbarians were metics. Cp. for the general subject, Polit. vi. 4. § 18, where measures, like those which Cleisthenes the Athenian passed when he wanted to extend the power of the democracy, are said to have been adopted at Cyrene. Such a reconstruction of classes also took place at Sicyon under Cleisthenes the tyrant, who gave insulting names to the old Dorian tribes (Herod. v. 68).

τὸ δ' ἀμφυσβήτημα πρὸς τοῦτον ἐστιν οὐ τίς πολίτης, ἀλλὰ πότερον 2. 4.

ἀδίκως ἢ δίκαιως. καίτοι καὶ τούτῳ τις ἐτί προσαπορήσειεν κ.τ.λ.

Aristotle means to say that what is true in fact may be false in
principle. These two senses of the words ‘true’ and ‘false’ were confused by sophistical thinkers. See Plat. Euthyd. 284, ff.

2. 5. ὁς τοιαῦτα ἄρχης refers to τινὶ, sc. ἀριστος, supra 1. § 7, ‘an office such as we spoke of.’

3. 1. δῆλον ὅτι πολίτας μὲν εἶναι φατέων καὶ τούτους, περὶ δὲ τοῦ δικαίως ἢ μὴ δικαίως συνάπτει πρὸς τὴν εἰρήμενην πρότερον ἀμφισβητησιν.

A doubt is raised whether the ἀδίκως πολιτεύων is truly a πολίτης. The answer is that the ἀδίκως ἄρχων is truly an ἄρχων. But the πολίτης is by definition an ἄρχων, and therefore the ἀδίκως πολίτης may be rightly called a πολίτης.

καὶ τούτους, sc. τοὺς ἀμφισβητουμένους (§ 4), ‘these as well as the legitimate citizens.’

πρὸς τὴν εἰρήμενην πρότερον ἀμφισβητησιν is the question touched upon in c. 1. § 1, and resumed in the words which follow. The controversy concerning the de jure citizen runs up into the controversy respecting the de jure state, which is now to be discussed.

3. 1, 2. ὅταν ἔξ ὀλιγαρχία ἢ τυραννίδος γένηται δημοκρατία. τότε γὰρ οὕτε τὰ συμβάλλαι ένοι βούλονται διαλέειν.

A question which has often arisen both in ancient and modern times, and in many forms. Shall the new government accept the debts and other liabilities of its predecessor, e.g. after the expulsion of the thirty tyrants, or the English or French Revolution or Restoration? Shall the Northern States of America honour the paper of the Southern? Shall the offerings of the Cypselids at Delphi bear the name of Cypselus or of the Corinthian state? Or a street in Paris be called after Louis Philippe, Napoleon III, or the French nation?

3. 2. εἶπερ οὖν καὶ δημοκρατουμέναι τινες κατὰ τῶν τρόπον τούτων, ὁμοίως τῆς πόλεως φατέων εἶναι τάντας τὰς τῆς πολιτείας τάντας πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐκ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ τῆς τυραννίδος.

The mere fact that a government is based on violence does not necessarily render invalid the obligations contracted by it; at any rate the argument would apply to democracy as well as to any other form of government. Cp. Demosth. πρὸς Λεπτήν, p. 460, where it is mentioned that the thirty tyrants borrowed money of the Lacedæ-
monians, which, after a discussion, was repaid by the democracy out of the public funds, and not by confiscation of the property of the oligarchs. Cp. also Isocr. Areopag. vii. 153, where the same story is repeated.

3. 3.

E.g. the case of the Athenian κληροίκος, who, while possessing land in other places, remained citizens of Athens; or of migrations in which a whole state was transferred; or possibly a dispersion like that of the Arcadian cities which were afterwards reunited by Epaminondas. Yet, ii. 1. § 2, ὁ τόπος εἰς ὁ τῆς μᾶς πόλεως.

3. 4.

τολλαχῶς γὰρ τῆς πόλεως λεγομένης ἐστὶ πως εὐμάρεια τῆς τοιαύτης.

3. 5.

‘When difficulties are raised about the identity of the state, you may solve many of them quite easily by saying that the word “state” is used in different senses.’

3. 4.

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων κατοικοῦσιν,
sc. ἡ ἀπορία ἐστὶν, supplied from τῆς ἀπορίας τοιαύτης.

τοιαύτη δ’ ἵσως ἐστὶ καὶ Βαβυλῶν.

3. 5.

‘Such as Peloponnesus would be, if included within a wall,’—further illustrated by ἦς γ’ ἐαλωκνίας κ.τ.λ.

3. 5.

3. 6.

Κρησίμως ἡ σκέψις' 3. 6.

Cp. Herod. i. 191: ‘The Babylonians say that, when the further parts of the city had been taken by Cyrus, those in the centre knew nothing of the capture, but were holding a festival.’ Also Jeremiah li. 31: ‘One post shall run to meet another, and one messenger to meet another to show the king of Babylon that his city is taken at one end.’

3. 5.

πέρι γὰρ μεγίστου τῆς πόλεως, τὸ τε πόσον καὶ πότερον ἔθνος ἐν ἡ πλείω συμφέρει, δεὶ μὴ λανθάνει τῶν πολιτικῶν.

The subject is resumed in Book vii. 4. § 4, ἐστὶ δὲ πολιτικῆς ἀρχῆς πρώτον τὸ τε πλῆθος τῶν ἀνθρώπων, πόσους τε καὶ ποίους τινὰς ἐπάρχει δεὶ φύσει, καὶ κατὰ τὴν χώραν ὡσαύτως, διὰ τὴν εἶναι καὶ ποιάν
In the words τῶν πολιτικῶν Aristotle identifies himself with the statesman or politician of whom he is speaking.


3. 6, 7. ἄλλα τῶν αὐτῶν κατακομβῶν τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων, πάτερον ἦν ὦ τὸ γένος ταύτα τῶν κατακομβῶν, τὴν αὐτήν εἶναι φατέον πόλιν, καίπερ ἢ ἐκ τῶν μὲν φθειρομένων τῶν δὲ γενομένων, ὅσπερ καὶ ποταμός ἐισώμεν πάλιν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ κρήνας τὰς αὐτάς, καίπερ ἡτοι τοῦ μὲν ἐπιγυμνόμενον κάματος, τοῦ ὑπεξίμου, ἡ τοῦτο μὲν ἀνθρώπους φατέον εἶναι τούτων αὐτοῖς διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἐτέραν; ἐστὶν γὰρ ἡ πολιωνία τῆς ἡ πόλις κ.τ.λ.

From the digression into which he has fallen respecting the size of the state, Aristotle returns to the original question, What makes the identity of the state? He answers in an alternative: Shall we say that the identity of the state depends upon the race, although the individuals of the race die and are born—like a river which remains the same although the waters come and go? Or is not the truer view that the form or idea of the state makes the state the same or different, whether the race remain or not? This latter alternative he accepts, illustrating his meaning by the simile of a chorus (§ 7), which may be Tragic or Comic, although the members of it are the same; and of musical harmony (§ 8) in which the same notes are combined in different modes.

This is the conclusion which Aristotle intends to draw from the words εἰπερ γὰρ ἐστὶ κοινωνία τῆς ἡ πόλις κ.τ.λ., and is clearly the general drift of the passage. But the alternatives ἄλλα τῶν... ἐτέραν create an obscurity, because Aristotle begins by opposing the continuance of the race to the transitoriness of the individuals who are always going and coming, when he is really intending to oppose the idea of the state to both of them, §§ 7, 9.

διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην αἰτίαν. 'For the same reason as the rivers,' i.e. because there is an unbroken succession of citizens as of waters.

The argument is neither clearly expressed nor altogether satisfactory. For 1) the identity of a state consists in many things, such as race, religion, language, as well as government, and therefore cannot be precisely defined; 2) it is always changing for better or
for worse; 3) whether the identity is preserved or not is a question of degree; a state may be more or less the same, like the English constitution, and yet be continuous in the course of ages. Aristotle would have done better to have solved this question by having recourse once more to the different senses of the word πόλις (§ 4). Cp. iv. 5. § 3; v. 1. § 8.

ἐπερ γὰρ ἐστι κοινωνία τις ἡ πόλις, ἐστι δὲ κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας, 3. 7.
γνωμένης ἐτέρας τῷ εἰδεί καὶ διαφεροῦσης τῆς πολιτείας ἀναγκαίον εἶναι δίδειν ἀν καὶ τῆν πόλιν εἶναι μὴ τῆν αὐτήν.

For a state being a community, and a community of citizens being a community in a constitution, ἐστι δὲ κοινωνία πολιτῶν κοινωνία πολιτείας, when the form of this community changes, the state also changes': or, if this construction is deemed harsh πολιτείας, may be thought to have crept in from the next line, and may be omitted as in the English text.

The particle γὰρ implies assent to the second alternative (supra).

'The sailor besides his special duties has a general duty, which 4. 1, 2.
is the safety of the ship; the citizen has also a general duty, which is the salvation of the state—the nature of this duty will vary according to the character of the state. And besides the general duty citizens, like sailors, will have special duties and functions in the state, as in the ship.'

οὐ μὴν ἄλλα καὶ κατ’ ἄλλον τρόπον ἔστι διαποροῦντας ἐπελθεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν 4. 4.
λόγων περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας.

The last words are an explanation of κατ’ ἄλλον τρόπον.

Two conceptions of the state are continually recurring in the Politics of Aristotle, first the ideal state, in which the best has a right to rule and all the citizens are good men: secondly, the constitutional state, which approaches more nearly to actual fact (ii. 2. § 6; vii. 14. §§ 2–5). In the first, the good man and the good citizen, or rather the good ruler, are said to coincide; in the second, they have a good deal in common, but still the virtue of the citizen is relative to the government under which he lives, and the occupation in which he is engaged.

These two points of view are apt to cross (ἐπαλλάττειν in Aristotle's own language), and they appear to be here confused.
4. 5. εἰ γὰρ ἀδύνατον εἰς ὑπάντων σπουδαίων ὑπῆρχε εἰναι πόλιν, δεῖ δ’ ἐκατον
tὸ καθ’ αὐτὸν ἔργον εἰς ποιεῖν, τούτῳ δ’ ἀπ’ ἀρετὴς· ἐπεὶ δ’ ἀδύνατον ὅμως
εἶναι πάντας τοὺς πολίτας, οὐκ ἄν ἐνι μία ἀρετῇ πολίτῃ καὶ ἄνδρος ἄγαθῳ.
tὴν μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σπουδαίον πολίτου δεῖ πᾶσιν ἰπάρχειν (οὗτοι γὰρ ἀριστήρ
ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν πόλιν), τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἄνδρος τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ ἀδύνατον, εἰ μὴ
πάντας ἀναγκαίοις ἄγαθοὺς εἶναι τοὺς ἐν τῇ σπουδαίᾳ πόλει πολίτας.

The argument is that the perfect state is not composed only of
perfectly good men; for such absolute goodness is incompatible
with the different occupations or natural qualities of different
citizens, or their duties toward the government under which they
live. All the citizens are not the same, and therefore the one
perfect virtue of the good man cannot be attained equally by all of
them. But they may all have a common interest in the salvation of
society, which is the virtue of a good citizen. The Pythagorean
doctrine of the unity of virtue still lingers in the philosophy of
Aristotle. (Compare Ethics ii. 5, § 14, ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς, παντο-
δαπῶς δὲ κακοὶ.)

4. 6. καὶ οἰκία εἰς ἄνδρός καὶ γυναικός καὶ κτῆσις εἰς δεισπότων καὶ δοῦλον.

κτῆσις is here omitted by Bernays, because the slave is a part of
the οἰκία: but it may be observed that in i. 4. § 1, κτῆσις is a sub-
division of the οἰκία under which the slave is included.

4. 7. φημέν δὴ τὸν ἀρχοντα τὸν σπουδαίον ἄγαθον εἶναι καὶ φρόνιμον, τὸν
de πολιτικὸν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φρόνιμον.

Cp. Nic. Eth. vi. 5, § 5, where Pericles is spoken of as a type of
the φρόνιμος: and vi. 8. § 1, where πολιτικὴ is described as a species
of φρόνιμος.

4. 7, 8. ἀλλ’ ἄρα ἦσται τινὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πολίτου τε σπουδαίον καὶ ἄνδρός
σπουδαίοι; φημέν δὴ τὸν ἀρχοντα τὸν σπουδαίον ἄγαθον εἶναι καὶ φρόνιμον,
tὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φρόνιμον. καὶ τὴν παιδείαν δ’ εὐθὺς ἔτεραν
εἶναι λέγοντα τινὲς τοῦ ἀρχοντας, ὡσπερ καὶ φαινόντας οἱ τῶν βασιλέων οἱ
ὑπειρκὴ καὶ πολεμικὴν παιδευόμενοι.

Aristotle having determined that the good citizen is not always a
good man, now proceeds to ask the question whether some good
citizens are not good men? Yes, the ruler must be a good and
wise man; and the difference between him and other citizens is
partly proved by the fact that he has a different education.
kai tην παιδείαν ὧ' εἰθύς κ.τ.λ. 'Some persons say that, if we go no further than education, even this should be different.' So in § 6 above, εἰθύς ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος. Cp. i. 5, § 2; Met. iii. 2, 1004 a. 5, ὑπάρχει γάρ εἰθύς γένη ἔχοντα τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ ὅν.

μὴ μοι τὰ κόμψ.

The whole fragment, which appears to contain a piece of advice addressed to young princes, is given by Nauck, Eurip. Aeol. Fr. 16:—

λαμπροῖ δὲ ἐν αἷμαῖς 'Ἀρεος ἐν τε συλλόγοις,
μὴ μοι τὰ κομψὰ ποικίλοι γενοίσατο,
ἀλλ' ὅν πολεῖ δεῖ, μεγάλα σουλεύσαι δεῖ.

Two points strike us about quotations from the poets which occur in Aristotle: 1) The familiarity with the words which they imply in the reader; for they are often cited in half lines only, which would be unintelligible unless the context was present to the mind. We are reminded that the Greek like some of our English youth were in the habit of committing to memory entire poets (Plat. Laws vii. 810 E). 2) The remoteness and ingenuity of the application. For a similar far fetched quotation, cp. infra c. 5. § 9.

ei δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρετὴ ἄρχωντος τε ἄγαθοῦ καὶ ἄνδρος ἄγαθοῦ, πολίτης δὲ ἐστὶ 4. 9.
καὶ ὁ ἄρχωμενος, οὗ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀπλῶς ἂν εἴῃ πολίτου καὶ ἄνδρος, τυχὸς μέντοι πολίτου.

'If the good man and the good ruler are to be identified, and the subject is also a citizen, then the virtue of the good man is not coextensive with the virtue of all good citizens, but only with that of a certain citizen,' i.e. the citizen of a perfect state who is also a ruler, and therefore has a sphere for the employment of his energies, cp. Nic. Eth. vi. 8. § 4.

οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρχωντος καὶ πολίτου, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἱσως ἵλσων ἐφ' ἐνεή, 4. 9.
"οτε μὴ τυραννοὶ, ὡς οὐκ ἐπιστάμενος ἰδιώτης εἶναι.

Another illustration of the difference in the nature of the ruler and of the citizen is contained in the saying of Jason, 1) 'that he had no choice between starvation and tyranny, for he had never learned how to live in a private station'; or 2)* 'that he felt a sensation like hunger when not a tyrant; for he was too proud to
live in a private station.' The two interpretations differ according to the shade of meaning given to πεινῶ and ἐπιστάμενος.

The Jason here referred to is Jason of Pherae, the Tagus of Thessaly.

Another saying of Jason is quoted in Rhet. i. 12, 1373 a. 26, 'δεῖν ἀδίκειν ἕνα, ὅπως δύνηται καὶ δίκαια πολλα ποιεῖν.'

4. IO. εἷς οὖν τὴν μὲν τού ἀγαθοῦ ἀνδρὸς τίθεμεν ἀρχικήν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ πολίτου ἀμφῶς, οὐκ ἄν εἰς ἀμφῶ ἐπαινετὰ ὀμοῖος.

1) Aristotle here lights upon a paradox, which he cannot resist mentioning, but does not pursue further. 'If the virtue of the good man is of a ruling character, but the virtue of the citizen includes ruling and being ruled, their virtues cannot [from this point of view] be equally praiseworthy, [for the good man has one virtue only, the citizen two].'

2) Or the meaning may be, 'that the virtue of the good man being the virtue of ruling is higher than that of the citizen who only rules at times, or who obeys as well as rules.'

The words οὐκ ἄν εἰς ἀμφῶ ἐπαινετὰ ὀμοῖος according to the first way = 'the citizen is more to be praised than the good man': according to the second, 'the virtue of the two, i.e. of ruler and citizen, are not equally praiseworthy'; in other words, the virtue of the good man is the higher of the two.

The whole passage is perplexed, not from any corruption of the text, but from the love of casuistry and a want of clearness in distinguishing the two sides of the argument.

4. II. ἐπεὶ οὖν ποτὲ δοκεῖ ἄμφοτερα, καὶ οὖ ταῦτά δεῖν τὸν ἀρχοντα μαυθάνειν καὶ τῶν ἀρχόμενον, τὸν δὲ πολίτην ἀμφότερ' ἐπιστασθαι καὶ μετέχειν ἀμφῶς, τούτωσιν δὲν κατίδοι τις.

Aristotle seems to mean that the citizen acquires a knowledge of the duties of both ruler and ruled, which are different. Since the ruler and the ruled must learn both, and the two things are distinct, and the citizen must know both and have a part in both, the inference is obvious. But what is this obvious inference we are uncertain:—either, 1) that some kind of previous subjection is an advantage to the ruler; or 2) that the citizen who knows both at once is to be preferred to the ἀρχον and ἀρχόμενον, taken separately.
The sentence is awkwardly expressed and is perhaps corrupt. The change of ἀμφότερα into ἄμφω ἔτερα (Bernays) would give much the same meaning with rather less difficulty; ("since the two must learn different things, and the ruler and the ruled are not required to learn the same things"), because τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρχόμενον have not then to be taken in two senses, collective and distributive. It might be argued in-favour of Bernays' emendation that ἀμφότερα may have crept in from the ἀμφότερα in the next line; and against it that the two words ἄμφω ἔτερα, the one having a collective, the other a distributive sense, are not happily combined.

§ 11 seems to be intended as a summing up of §§ 8–10. The thread of the argument is resumed at the words ταύτην γὰρ λέγομεν in § 14.

ἐστι γὰρ ἀρχή δεσποτικὴ κ.τ.λ. 4. 11.

is a digression introduced for the sake of distinguishing the ἀρχή δεσποτική to which the preceding remarks do not apply, from the ἀρχή πολιτική to which they do.

ἐστι γὰρ refers back to τῶν ἀρχῶν, 'We are speaking of the ruler who is also a subject; for we must remember that there is a rule of the master over his slave with which we are not here concerned.'

δικό παρ’ ἐνιος οὗ μετέχου οἱ δημιουργοί τὸ παλαιὸν ἀρχῶν, πρῶν δήμον 4. 12. γενέθηκα τὸν ἐσχατον.

δικό, referring to ἀνδραποδόδες and the various kinds of menial duties in which the artisan class were employed, 'Because of their servile and degraded character.'

τῶν ἀρχόμενων οὔτως. 4. 13.

I.e. those who (like household servants) are subject to the rule of a master.

εἰ μὴ ποτε χρείας χάριν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν, οὗ γὰρ ἔτι κ.τ.λ. 4. 13.

* 'For if men practise menial duties, not only for the supply of their own occasional wants, but habitually' (indicated by ποτέ), 'there is no longer any difference between master and slave,' i.e. the natural distinction of classes is effaced. It has been proposed to read τότε μέν, τότε δὲ, instead of τῶν μέν, τῶν δὲ, 'for then the case no longer occurs of a man being at one time master and at
another time servant’—an arbitrary emendation (Riese, Susemihl) which gives a poor sense.


4. 16. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ἄγαθον ἄμφω.
At first Aristotle appeared to draw an artificial line between the good citizen and the good man; but he now shifts his point of view. The good man may be supposed to have all virtue; he must therefore have the virtues both of the ruler and subject, although the virtue of the ruler is of a peculiar character, and the virtue of the subject, if he be a freeman, takes many forms. So the virtue of a man and of a woman differ in degree and even in kind, yet both are included in the idea of virtue.

4. 17. καὶ γυνὴ λάλος, εἰ οὖτω κοσμίᾳ εἰς ὄσπερ ὁ ἄνηρ ὁ ἄγαθος.
Compare for the ideal of womanly virtue, Thuc. ii. 45, τῆς τε γὰρ ὕπαρχουσις φύσεως μὴ χειροσι γενέσθαι ἐμῶν μεγάλη ἡ δόξα, καὶ ἦς ἄν ἐπὶ ἐλάχιστον ἅρτης περὶ ἡ ψόγου ἐν τοῖς ἄρσεις κλεῖς τῇ.

4. 18. ἄρχομενον δὲ γε οὐκ Ἠσὶν ἅρτη φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἀληθῆς ὀσπερ αὐλοποιὸς γὰρ ὁ ἄρχομενος, ὧ δ΄ ἄρχων αὐλητὴς ὁ χρώμενος.
Cp. Plat. Rep. x. 601 D, E, where the distinction is drawn between the ποιητής who has only πίστις ὀρθή and the χρώμενος who has ἐπιστήμη, and where there is the same illustration from the difference between the αὐλοποιῶς and the αὐλητής, and Cratylus 388 ff. also Nic. Eth. vi. 10. § 2, ‘ἡ μεν γὰρ φρόνησις ἐπιστακτικὴ ἔστω . . . ἡ δὲ σύνεσις κριτικὴ μόνων.’

5. The discussion which follows is not unconnected with the preceding. For if, as has been assumed, a freeman or citizen is one who commands as well as obeys, then it would seem that the artisan or mean person, even though not a slave, must be excluded.

5. 1. οὗτος γὰρ πολίτης.
Sc. ὁ ἔχων τὴν τοιαύτην ἅρτην. See note on English text.
NOTES, BOOK III. 5.

η διά γε τούτον τὸν λόγον οὐδὲν φήσομεν συμβαίνειν ἄτοπον; οὐδὲ γάρ 5. 2. οἱ δούλωι τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδέν, οὐδ' οἱ ἀπελεύθεροι.

‘But if the artisan is not included in the number of citizens where is he to be placed? He is not a metic, nor a stranger. Yet no real difficulty is involved in his exclusion any more than in that of slaves or freedmen.’

διά γε τούτον τὸν λόγον—so far as this objection goes, viz. the implied objection that he has no place in the state.

tῶν εἰρημένων refers to οὐδὲ μέτοικος οὐδὲ ξένος.

ἐξ ἑποθίσῃσιν.

‘On the supposition that they grow up to be men.’

καί γάρ ἀναγκαῖων.

‘But in respect to servile occupations’; either an anacoluthon resumed in τὰ τοιαῦτα, or governed by the idea of ἔργον contained in λειτουργοῦσες.

The point is how to determine the position of the artisan or mean person. There is no difficulty in seeing that some who live in states are not citizens, but how is the mechanic to be distinguished from the slave? The answer is that the slave ministers to a single master, artisans and serfs belong to the state.

φανερῶς δ' ἐνετείθησιν μικρῶν ἐπισκεψαμένοις πῶς ἔχει περὶ αὐτῶν' αὐτὸ γάρ 5. 4. φανερὸν τὸ λείπθεν ποτει δήλων. ἐπὶ γάρ Κ.Τ.Λ.

‘What has been said at once (φανερῷ) makes the matter clear.’

It has been said that the best form of state will not admit the artisan class to citizenship (§ 3), and that the citizen will vary with the state (supra c. 1. § 9), a remark which he repeats in what follows.

‘For there are many forms of states; virtue is the characteristic of aristocracy, wealth of oligarchy. Now although the mechanic or skilled artisan cannot have virtue, he may have wealth, and therefore he may be a citizen of some states, but not of others.’

περὶ αὐτῶν, sc. about the lower class.

ἐν Θῆβαις δὲ νόμος ἦν τῶν δέκα ἐτῶν μη ἀπεικημένου τῆς ἁγορᾶς μὴ 5. 7. μετέχειν ἀρχῆς.

Cp. infra vi. 7. § 4, where the fact respecting Thebes is repeated.

It is clearly for the common interest and for the security of the
state, that the passage from one class to another should be as easy as possible under all forms of government. Such a power of extending, and including other classes is necessary to the very existence of an oligarchy or of an aristocracy, or even of a constitutional government. And the avenue by which the lower naturally pass into the higher is personal merit or fitness which ought to overcome circumstances and not beat helplessly against the bars of a prison. The gold which the god has implanted in a person of an inferior class should be allowed to find its place (Plat. Rep. iii. 415), even if we cannot degrade the brass or lead in the higher. The higher class too have governing qualities which pass into the lower, and they themselves receive new life and new ideas from the association.

5. 7, 8. προσεφέλκεται καὶ τῶν ἔτων ὁ νόμος ὥς ὁ μὴν ἀλλά κ.τ.λ.

ἔτων is partitive: 'The law goes so far as in addition to include some of the stranger class. Nevertheless, when there are citizens more than enough the law which extended, again contracts, the right.' For restrictions of population see Plat. Laws v. 740.

5. 8. τοὺς ἀπὸ γυναικῶν.

I. e. whose mothers were free women and their fathers not slaves (for this case has been already provided for in the words ἐκ δούλων), but strangers or resident aliens.

5. 8. τέλος δὲ μονὸν τοὺς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν αὐτῶν.

The MSS. read αὐτῶν: Schneider, following Perizonius, has changed αὐτῶν into ἀστών, and the emendation is adopted by Bekker in both editions: but 1) the word ἀστῶν is of very rare occurrence in Aristotle; 2) it would be in awkward proximity to πολίτης: and 3) the change is unnecessary. Lit. 'they make only those of them (αὐτῶν) citizens, who are children of citizens both on the father's and mother's side.' αὐτῶν, though not exactly needed, is idiomatic.

5. 9. ὡς εἰ τῷ ἀντίμητον μετανάστην.

Quoted also in Rhet. ii. 2, 1378 b. 33. Compare for a similar application of Homer bk. i. 2. § 9. Aristotle has given a new turn to the meaning of ἀντίμητος = τιμῶν μὴ μετέχων. But there is nothing singular in this; for quotations are constantly cited in new senses.
NOTES, BOOK III. 6. 121

ἀλλ’ ὅπως τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπικεκρυμένον ἐστίν, ἀπάθης χάριν τῶν συνο- 5. 9. κοῦτων ἐστίν.

τὸ τοιοῦτον = τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τῶν τιμῶν, i.e. the exclusion from office of certain classes is concealed in order to deceive the excluded persons. The reference is not to such cases as that of the 5000 at Athens, whose names were concealed for a political purpose (Thuc. viii. 92); but more probably to such deceptions as those of which Aristotle speaks in iv. 12. § 6 and c. 13 whereby the poor, though nominally citizens, were really deprived of their privileges because they had no leisure to exercise them. The intention was to trick them, but they were not dissatisfied; for they did not find out the trick. The English translation is defective, and should have run, 'the object is that the privileged class may deceive their fellow-citizens.'

Another way of explaining the passage is to place an emphasis on τῶν συνοικούντων, which is taken in the sense of 'fellow-colonists': 'the intention is to attract settlers by deceiving them into the belief that they will become citizens, when the rights of citizenship are really withheld from them.' (For examples of fraud practised by colonists on strangers or fellow settlers, see v. 3. §§ 11-13.) But the words refer to states generally and not merely to colonies.

κάκεινος.

Sc. οὐ ἄνηρ ἀγαθὸς καὶ πολίτης σπουδαῖος ὄν. In his later edition Bekker reads κάκεινος, a correction of one MS. All the rest, and the old translator, read κάκεινος. With either reading the meaning of the passage is much the same. 'Even where the virtues of the good man and the good citizen coincide (i.e. in the perfect state), it is not the virtue of every citizen which is the same as that of the good man, but only that of the statesman and ruler.' κάκεινος = καὶ οὐ ἄνηρ ἀγαθὸς κ.τ.λ.: κάκεινος = εὖ οὐ ἄνηρ ἀγαθὸς κ.τ.λ.

ἐστι δὲ πολιτεία . . πολιτείαν ἑτέρων εἶναι τοῖτων. 6. 1, 2.

Lit. 'The state [πολιτεία] is the ordering of the powers of a state, and especially of the supreme power. The government [πολιτεύμα] is this supreme power, and the state or constitution (ἡ πολιτεία subj.) is what the government is. In democracies, for example, the people are the ruling power, in oligarchies the few. Accordingly
we say that they differ in their constitutions. The three words πολιτευμα, πολιτεία, πόλεις have three primary gradations of meaning: 1) πολιτευμα = the government, i.e. the persons through whom the government acts; πολιτεία = the government administering and being administered, i.e. the state or constitution; πόλεις = the whole state including the government. But these senses pass into one another.

6.3. καθ' οὖσαν ἐπιβάλλει μέρος ἐκάστῳ τοῦ ζήν καλῶς.

μέρος is to be taken with καθ' οὖσαν, the genitive τοῦ ζήν καλῶς is partitive. ἐπιβάλλει, sc. ἐκάστῳ τὸ ζήν καλῶς or impersonally. For the meaning of this word cp. note on ii. 3. § 4.

6.4. συνέρχονται δὲ καὶ τοῦ ζήν ἔνεκεν αὐτοῦ (ὁσός γὰρ ἐνεστὶ τι τοῦ καλοῦ μόρων), καὶ συνήχουσι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ζήν αὐτὸ μόνον, ἃν μὴ τοῖς χαλεποῖς κατὰ τῶν βιῶν ὑπερβαλλή λαόν.

Cp. Plat. Polit. 301 E, 302 A: 'And when the foundation of politics is in the letter only and in custom, and knowledge is divorced from action, can we wonder, Socrates, at the miseries that there are, and always will be, in States? Any other art, built on such a foundation, would be utterly undermined,—there can be no doubt of that. Ought we not rather to wonder at the strength of the political bond? For States have endured all this, time out of mind, and yet some of them still remain and are not overthrown, though many of them, like ships foundering at sea, are perishing and have perished and will hereafter perish, through the incapacity of their pilots and crews, who have the worst sort of ignorance of the highest truths,—I mean to say, that they are wholly unacquainted with politics, of which, above all other sciences, they believe themselves to have acquired the most perfect knowledge.'


6.8. ἐταν δὲ τούτων εἰς γένηται καὶ αὐτός.

αὐτός refers inaccurately either to the trainer or to the pilot.

6.9. τὸ αὐτοῦ ἄγαθων.

The reflexive refers to the principal subject ἀξιώματε: but is
NOTES, BOOK III. 7.

changed into the singular by the introduction of τινά. Translated into the first person the sentence would run, 'Some one should now look after my interest as I looked after his when in office.' For the 'disinterestedness' of traders cp. Plat. Rep. i. pp. 345, 346.

νῦν δὲ.

Answering to πρῶτερον μὲν above. 'The natural principle that men should rule and be ruled in turn was once the practice; but now from corrupt motives, they insist on ruling perpetually.'

ἡ γὰρ οὐ πολίτας φατέων εἶναι τοὺς μετέχοντας, ἢ δὲι κοινωνεῖν τοῦ συμ-7. 2.

φέροντος.

The meaning of γὰρ is as follows: 'Since there are perverted, as well as true states, there are states of which the members are not to be called citizens; or, if they were, they would partake of the common good.' For, as has been said at the beginning of the treatise, πᾶσαν πόλιν ὀρθομέν κοινωνίαν τινά οὖσαν καὶ πᾶσαν κοινωνίαν ἑναν τίνος ἑνεκεν συνεστηκών. And the true forms of government are those which regard the good of the governed.

ἀριστοκρατίαν, ἢ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀριστοὺς ἄρχειν, ἢ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἀριστον. 7. 3.

Of course in reality the first of the two etymologies is the true one, but Aristotle, like Plato in the Cratylus, regards the relation which the component parts of words bear to one another as variable. He is fond of etymological meanings and sometimes forces the etymology to suit the meaning, e.g. σωφροσύνη, ὡς σώζουσα τὴν φράσην, Nic. Eth. vi. 5. § 5; ἡθικὴ from ἑθός, Nic. Eth. ii. 1. § 1; δίκαιον ὡς δίχα ἔστιν, Nic. Eth. v. 4. § 9; μακάριον ἀπὸ τοῦ χαίρειν, Nic. Eth. vii. 11. § 2; τιμοκρατία. . . ἡ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων πολιτεία, Nic. Eth. viii. 10. § 1.

The first of the two explanations of ἀριστοκρατία is more in accordance not only with the principles of etymology but with the facts of history, if we take ἀριστοτεύ in the sense in which the word would have been understood by Alcaeus or Theognis: the second answers best to Aristotle's ideal state.

πολιτεία.

In Ethics viii. 10. § 1 this is identified with τιμοκρατία = ἡ ἀπὸ τιμη-
μάτων πολιτεία, a government based upon a property qualification (ἡν τιμοκρατικὴν λέγειν οἰκεῖον φαίνεται, πολιτείαν δ᾽ αὐτὴν εἰώθασιν οἱ πλείστοι
καλείν). No example of the word τιμοκρατία occurs in the Politics. It is used by Plato in another sense—the government of honour (ή φιλό-
τιμος πολιτεία, Rep. viii. 545 B).

πολιτεία originally meaning, as in Thucydides, any form of
government, a sense which is continued in Aristotle, has also like
our own word 'constitution' a second and specific sense, apparently
coming into use in the age of Aristotle, though not invented by
him. Cp. iv. 7. § 1, πέμπτη ἰ' ἐστίν ἡ προσαγωγεύεται τὸ κοινὸν ὅσον
πασῶν (πολιτείαν γὰρ καλοῦσιν), ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ πολλάκις γίνεσθαι λανθάνει
τοῖς πειραμένοις ἀφίθην πας τῶν πολιτείων εἶδος, καὶ χρώνται ταῖς τέταρτοις
μόνον, ὡσπερ Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις: also ii. 6. § 16.

8. The subject of this chapter is again referred to in iv. c. 4. The
discussion which follows affords a curious example of the manner
in which Aristotle after passing through a maze of casuistry at
length arrives at the conclusions of common sense.

8. 6. διὸ καὶ οὐ συμβαίνει τὰς ῥήθειας αἰτίας γίνεσθαι διαφοράς.

The MSS. have διαφοράς ('That the already mentioned differ-
ences are the true causes,' a reading which gives a somewhat
unusual sense to αἰτίας). The old translator has 'differentiae' in
the genitive. Better to take διαφοράς as a genitive, making αἰτίας
the predicate, and repeating the word with ῥήθειας. 'And thus
the so-called causes of difference are not real causes.' Bernays
inserts πολιτείας after ῥήθειας without authority, and appears to
translate the passage rather freely: 'And they cannot therefore
create any form of constitution which can be specifically named.'

The argument is intended to show that the essential differ-
ences between oligarchy and democracy are not made by the
governing body being few or many (τὰς ῥήθειας αἰτίας), but by
poverty and wealth. It is an accident that the rich are few, and
the poor many.

9. 1. καὶ ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πάσιν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἱσοῖς.

'And so it is; not however for all, but only for the equal.' Cp.
Cic. de Rep. i. c. 34, 'Cum par habetur honos summis et infimis .
ipsa aequitas iniquissima est.' Burke, French Revol. (vol. v. p. 106.
ed. 1815), 'Everything ought to be open, but not indifferently to
every man.'
NOTES, BOOK III. 9. 125

τὸ δ’ αἰτιὸν ὅτι περὶ αὐτῶν ἡ κρίσις.

Men think themselves to be as good or better than others, and therefore claim equal or greater political rights; e.g. they claim to exercise the franchise without considering whether they are fit or not. They can never see that they are inferior, and that therefore it may be just for them to have less than others: cp. below § 3.

ἐπεί... διήρηται τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων ἐπὶ τε τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ οἷς.

Lit. 'Since justice is distributed in the same manner (i.e. equally) over things and over persons,' τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων is to be taken not with διήρηται, but with the words which follow = ὁμοίωσ.

τὴν δὲ οἷς ἀμφισβητοῦσι.

τὴν δὲ, sc. ἵστοτα is accusative after ἀμφισβητοῦσι.

οἷς as above τὸ οἷς, the technical word for persons, lit. 'in relation to the whom.' Cp. Nic. Eth. v. 3. §§ 6, 7.

οὐ γὰρ εἰναι δίκαιον ἵστον μετέχειν τῶν ἑκατὼν μμῶν τὸν εἰσενέκατον μίαν. μίαν τῷ δόντι τὸ λοιπὸν πᾶν, οὕτε τῶν ἀρχῆς οὕτε τῶν ἐπιγινόμενων.

Either 1) τῶν ἀρχῆς is in apposition with τῶν ἑκατὼν μμῶν or with some more general word, such as χρημάτων, understood; or 2) the words may = τῶν ἀρχῆς εἰσενέκατον τινὰ i.e. either any of those who originally contributed, or any subsequent generation of contributors. Cp. Burke, Ref. on F. R. (vol. v. p. 121, ed. 1815), 'In these partnerships all men have equal rights, but not to equal things. He that has but five shillings in the partnership has as good a right to it as he that has five hundred pounds has to his larger proportion. But he has not a right to an equal dividend in the product of the joint stock.'

either δὲ μητε τοῦ ζημ ἑκατόν οὐκεκτὶ κ.τ.λ.

either δὲ introduces the opposite side of the question. 'If a good life is the object, then the oligarch is wrong' (cp. above, § 5, ὁσθ' ὁ τῶν ἀνθρωπίκων λόγος δὸξειν ἐν ἵστειν), but the apodosis is lost in what follows. For a similar anacolouthon cp. infra c. 12. § 1.

καὶ γὰρ ἀν δοῦλοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ἦν πόλις.

Nic. Eth. x. 6. § 8, εἰδαμονίας δ’ οὐδεὶς ἀνθρωπόδοφος μεταδίδοσιν εἰ μὴ καὶ βίον.

οἷς ἔστι σύμβολα πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

9. 2. 9. 3. 9. 5. 9. 6. 9. 6.
Cp. above, c. 1. § 4, τοὺς ἀπὸ συμβάλλων κοινωνοῦν.

9. 8. μὴ λόγου χάριν

is either 1)* taken with περὶ ἁρετῆς ἐπιμελές εἶναι, or 2) is an explanation of ὃς ἀληθῶς, which it pleonastically emphasizes.

9. 8. γίνεται γὰρ ἡ κοινωνία.

'For otherwise the state becomes' or 'would be.'

9. 8. συμμαχία τῶν ἄλλων τόπω διαφέρουσα μόνον τῶν ἄποθεν συμμάχων.

The construction is unsymmetrical, passing, as elsewhere, from the abstract to the concrete. 'A city is an alliance differing from any other allies [= alliances], who are at a distance, in place only. Or τῶν ἄλλων may be taken with συμμαχίων, τῶν ἄποθεν συμμάχων being epexegetical=other alliances of which the members live apart.

9. 8. Δικάφρων ὁ σοφιστής.

An obscure rhetorician who is censured in the Rhetoric (iii. c. 3. §§ 1–3) for frigidity of style. It is also said that when set to make an encomium on the lyre he attacked some other thesis (Soph. Ench. c. 15, 174 b. 32), or, according to Alexander Aphrodisiensis, he began with the earthly lyre, and went on to speak of the constellation Lyra. Lycophron seems to have held the doctrine that 'the state is only a machine for the protection of life and property.' Cp. Rhet. i. 15, 1376 b. 10, αὐτὸς ὁ νόμος συνθήκη τῆς ἐντύν.

The opposite view is maintained in Burke, French Revolution (vol. v. ed. 1815, p. 184): 'The state ought not to be considered nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the partners. It is to be looked upon with other reverence, because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature.'

9. 11. εἰ γὰρ καὶ συνελθούσεν οὕτω κοινωνοῦντες, ἐκαστὸς μὲντοι χρῶτο τῇ ἰδίᾳ

οἰκίᾳ ὡσπερ πόλει καὶ σφίνων αὐτοῖς ὃς ἐπιμαχίας οὕσης βοηθοῦντες ἐπὶ

tois ἀδικουότας μόνον, οὐδ' οὕτως ἄν εἶναι δοξεὶ πόλις τοῖς ἄκριβῶς βεβοιο-

τεν, εἰπερ ὅμοιως ὁμολογεῖν συνελθόντες καὶ χωρίς.
NOTES, BOOK III. 10.

As a confederacy is not a city, so a number of individuals uniting in the same manner in which cities form a confederacy, would not be a city, unless they changed their manner of life after the union.’ The main distinction which Aristotle draws between the confederacy, in which many cities are united by a treaty, and the single city is that the object of the one is negative, of the other positive,—the one regards the citizens in some particular aspect, e.g. with a view to the prevention of piracy or the encouragement of commerce; the other takes in their whole life and education.

χρῆτο τῇ ἱδίᾳ οἰκίᾳ ἄσπερ πῶλει. I. e. ‘If every man were lord in his own house or castle, and only made a treaty with his neighbours like the cities in a federation,’ in other words, if the inhabitants of the common city had no social relations.

βοσθοῦντες is parallel with κοινωνοῦντες, and in apposition with the nominative to συνέλθοιεν.

καὶ διηγώγαι τοῦ συζύγου.

Nearly—τρόποι τοῦ συζύγου, ‘pleasant modes of common life,’ or more freely ‘enjoyments of society,’ not ‘relaxations for the sake of society,’ a construction not admissible in prose.

ἔχει δὲ ἀπορίαν κ.τ.λ.

The argument of this chapter consists of a series of ἀπορίας which may be raised against the claims of any one person or class to have the supreme power. The ἀπορίας are restated somewhat less sharply in the next chapter. They are indirectly, but not distinctly or completely, answered in the latter part of c. 13.

ἔδοξε γὰρ νῦν διὰ τῷ κυρίῳ δικαίως.

It is difficult to account for this sudden outburst of vivacity. Compare infra c. 11. § 5, ἵσως δὲ νῦν διὰ δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἐνών ἀδύνατον: cp. Xen. Mem. v. 1. 4, ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ διὰ τόδε ἀξίων μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι: Dem. de Chersones. §§ 9, 17; Polyb. vi. 3. § 6, πότερον ὡς μόνος ταύτας ἡ καὶ νῦν ἰδίστας ἡμῖν εἰσηγοῦνται πολιτείαν; and the use of Hercule in Tacit. Ann. i. 3.

The whole passage is a kind of suppressed dialogue in which two opposite opinions are abruptly brought face to face. No conclusion is drawn; the only inference being really the impossible one that all forms of government are equally baseless, because they are not
based on justice, and therefore in all of them abuse of power is possible.

10. 2. πάλιν τε πάντων ληφθέντων κ.τ.λ.

ληφθέντων has been explained, either 1) as neut. or 2) masc. Either 1)* 'when everything, i.e. when all the property of the rich has been exhausted;' for this meaning of the word cp. iv. 4. § 8; or 2) 'when all the citizens are taken together,' but this is a doubtful use of ληφθέντων and does not give a good sense.

The passage is a reductio ad absurdum of the previous argument: 'When the many poor have taken all the property of the few rich, and the majority go on subdividing among themselves, the property of the minority will become smaller and smaller, and the state will be ruined.'

Or, expressing the same idea in numbers, let us suppose a state of 1000 citizens. If a mere numerical majority constitutes rightful sovereignty, 600 citizens may resolve,—and rightly, according to the hypothesis,—to confiscate the goods of the remaining 400, and divide them among themselves. Thus 400 will cease to be citizens. Of the remaining 600, 400 may go on to divide the property of the others, and thus the state becomes reduced to 400 and so on, till it disappears altogether.

It may be remarked that in all schemes for the division of property, the wealth which has been created under a system of accumulation is supposed to continue when the motives for accumulation have ceased. The poor are not fitted to govern the rich. But neither are the rich fitted to govern the poor. The truth is that no class in the state can be trusted with the interests of any other.

10. 2. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐχ ἦ γ' ἀρετὴ φθέιρει τὸ ἔχων αὐτήν.

For the virtue of anything is that quality by which it fulfils its own proper ἔργον. Cp. Plat. Rep. x. 608 E.

10. 5. ἄν οὖν ἦ νόμος μὲν ὀλιγαρχικὸς δὲ ἡ δημοκρατικὸς, τί διοίσει περὶ τῶν ἑπορμημένων;

'Even if we assume the law to rule and not the few or many, where is the difference? For the law may only represent the pre-
judices or interests of oligarchy or democracy.' Compare infra c. 11. §§ 20, 21.

δόξευν δὲ λύεσθαι καὶ των ἔχειν ἄπορίαν, τάχα δὲ καὶν ἀλήθειαν. 11. 1.

This passage has been thought corrupt. Two conjectures have been proposed, 1) εἰσφορίαν for ἄπορίαν (but the sense which would be given to εἰσφορία is not natural or idiomatic), and 2) the omission of λύεσθαι or λύεσθαι καὶ, the latter words being thought to be suggested by the mention of ἄπορίαν, or to be a corruption of ἀλήθειαν. There is a want of order in the thought, but the same disorder occurs in a parallel expression (c. 12. § 2), ἔχει γὰρ τοῦτ' ἄπορίαν καὶ φιλοσοφίαν πολιτικὴν. The text may therefore be accepted.

ὡσπερ καὶ τῶν μὴ καλῶν τοῦς καλοῦς (διαφέρειν) φασί καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα 11. 4.

διὰ τέχνης τῶν ἀλῆθειῶν, τῷ συνήχθαι τὰ διεσπαρμένα χωρίς εἰς ἐν, ἐπεὶ κεχωρισμένων γε κάλλιον ἔχειν τοῦ γεγραμμένου τούθε μὲν τὸν ὁφθαλμόν, ἐτέρου δὲ τινος ἕτερον μόριον.

The combination of qualities in the multitude is compared to the combination of qualities in the individual: e.g. in a statue or picture of which the features taken separately may be far excelled by others, but when combined make a better portrait, because they are adapted to one another. (Cp. Plat. Rep. iv. 420 C, D, ff.) Thus the multitude may be supposed to have a generalized excellence, and to be superior as a whole. This rather doubtful principle is not of universal application [§ 5]. We must presuppose the many to be good citizens and good men (infra c. 15. § 9).

Contrast the opposite view of Plato (Rep. vi. 493 A, B), in which he describes the multitude under the figure of a great beast, a view which is modified by his apology for them in Rep. vi. 498–500.

Compare the saying of Goethe: 'Nothing can be more certain than that this great Public, which is so honoured and so despised, is almost always in a state of self-delusion about details, but never or hardly ever about the broad truth (das Ganze).'

Yet we may also make the opposite reflection, that a few wise men when they meet and act together are apt to fall short of the average intelligence of mankind: a Ministry of All the Talents may have less sense than any man in it—a coalition may never coalesce—

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individuality may be too much for unity; or unity may only be enforced by the strong will of a single person.

11. 5. ἵσως δὲ νὴ Ἔια δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ἐνίων ἀδύνατον. ὃ γὰρ αὐτὸς κἀν ἐπὶ τῶν θηρίων ἄρμόσεει λάγος. καίτοι τῷ διαφέροντι ἐννοεῖ τῶν θηρίων;

'Assuredly,' retorts the opponent, or Aristotle himself, struck by an objection which had not previously occurred to him, 'this principle cannot be true of all men. For it would be a reductio ad absurdum to say that it was true of beasts, and some men are no better than beasts.'

Admitting the objection Aristotle still maintains that his doctrine of 'collective wisdom' is true of some men, though not of all. He proceeds to argue that deliberative and judicial functions may be safely granted to the many, and cannot be safely denied to them; but that it would be dangerous to entrust them with high office.

11. 7. διὰ τε γὰρ ἀδίκιαν καὶ δι' ἀφροσύνην τὰ μὲν ἀδίκειν ἄν τὰ δ' ἀμαρτάνειν αὐτῶς.

The sentence is an anacoluthon; it has been forgotten that no words such as εἰκὸς ἐστιν or ἀνάγκη have preceded, and that they cannot be easily gathered from the context.

11. 9. ἔχουσι συνελθόντες ἰκανὴν αἰσθήσιν.

Cp. Nic. Eth. vi. 10. § 2, where the distinction is drawn between σύνεσις (= αἰσθήσις in this passage), which is κριτικὴ μόνον, and φρονήσις, which is ἐπιτακτική. And with both places, cp. Thuc. ii. 40, where Pericles, speaking in the name of the Athenian democracy, says, ἦτοι κρινομέν γε ἐν ἐνδυμασίμεθα ὅρθως τὰ πράγματα.

11. 10, 11. Aristotle is now stating the other side of the argument:—'The physician is a better judge than he who is not a physician. And it must be remarked that under the term "physician" is included 1) the higher sort of physician, 2) the apothecary, and 3) the intelligent amateur whether he practises medicine or not. In all of these there exists a knowledge which is not to be found in the many. Apply this principle to the art of politics. Even in the choice of magistrates the well-informed man, whether he be a statesman or
not, is better able to judge than the multitude.’ This argument is then refuted in what follows, § 14.

The context is rendered difficult by the correction of the word ‘artist,’ for which Aristotle substitutes ‘one who has knowledge’ (§§ 11, 12). For the distinction between the δημιουργός and the αρχηγοτητικός ἰατρός cp. Plat. Laws iv. 720, where the doctor, who attends the slaves, is humorously distinguished from the doctor who attends freemen. And for the notion of the ἰδιώτης ἰατρός (ὁ πεπαιδευμένος περὶ τὴν τέχνην) cp. Politicus 259 A, ‘εἰ τῷ τις τῶν δημοσιευόντων ἰατρῶν ἰκανὸς ἐξεμπληκτέων ἰδιωτέων αὐτός, ἢ τὸν ἀναγκαίων αὐτῷ προσαγορεύεσθαι τούτοις τῆς τέχνης ταύτην ὅπερ δι᾽ συμβουλεύει;’

Aristotle proceeds to argue that there is a judgment of common sense equal, if not superior to that of the artist himself, which is possessed by the many.

Without pretending that the voice of the people is the voice of God, it may be truly said of them, 1) that they are free from the hypercriticism which besets the individual; 2) that they form conclusions on simple grounds; 3) that their moral principles are generally sound; 4) that they are often animated by noble impulses, and are capable of great sacrifices; 5) that they retain their human and national feeling. The intelligent populace at Athens, though changeable as the wind (Thuc. ii. 65; Demosth. 383, ὁ μὲν δῆμος . . . . . . ὅστερ ἐν ταλάντῃ πνεύμα ἀκατάβαλτον) and subject to fits of panic and fanatical fury (Thuc. vi. 27), were also capable of entertaining generous thoughts (Id. iii. 49), and of showing a wise moderation (Id. viii. 97), and in nearly every respect were superior to their oligarchical contemporaries, far less cunning and cruel (Id. iv. 80), and far more willing to make sacrifices (Id. i. 74) for the public interest.

The more general question which is here suggested by Aristotle, § 11, ‘whether the amateur or the artist is the better judge of a work of art or literature’ is also worthy of attention. It is probable that either is a better judge than the other, but of different merits or excellences. The artist e.g. may be expected to be the best judge of points in which a minute knowledge of detail is required; the amateur has the truer sense of proportion because he compares
many works of art and is not under the dominion of a single style. He judges by a wider range and is therefore less likely to fall into eccentricity or exclusiveness.

See infra at the beginning of c. 12.

11. 18. ὀλίγοις μεγάλας ἀρχὰς ἀρχόντων.

Aristotle seems here to have fallen into the error of confounding the collective wealth of the state with the wealth of individuals. The former is the wealth of a great number of persons which may be unequally distributed and in infinitesimally small portions among the masses, thus affording no presumption of respectability or education; whereas the wealth of the individual is the guarantee of some at least of the qualities which are required in the good citizen. Cp. infra c. 13. §§ 4, 10.

11. 19. ή δὲ πρώτη λεξιθέεισα ἀπορία κ.τ.λ.

That is to say the certainty that any single individual or class, if dominant, will infringe upon the rights of others renders it indispensable that the law should be above them all. Cp. c. 10. § 1.

12. According to Bernays (Transl. of Pol. I–III. p. 172) c. 12 and 13 are a second sketch of the same discussion which has been commenced in c. 9–11 and is continued in c. 16 and 17. But though in what follows there is some repetition of what has preceded, e.g. c. 12. §§ 1, 2 and c. 13. § 2 compared with c. 9. §§ 1, 2. c. 13. § 1 and c. 9. §§ 14, 15, and c. 13. § 10 with c. 11. § 2 ff., the resemblances are not sufficient to justify this statement. In c. 13 new elements are introduced, e.g. the discussion on ostracism: and the end of c. 11 in which the supremacy of law is asserted (§ 20) has no immediate connexion with c. 14 in which the forms of monarchy are considered; while the transition from the end of c. 13, in which the claim of the one best man to be a monarch is discussed, is not unnatural.

12. 1. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν πάσαις κ.τ.λ.

Again, as in c. 9. § 6, the apodosis appears to be lost in the length of the sentence. It is also possible to gather it from the words πάλιν δ' ἴσωτης κ.τ.λ. (§ 2). The process of reasoning will then
be as follows: 'Seeing that the end of the state is "justice" which is the common good, etc., and is also equality between equals, of whom or what is this equality or inequality?'

 doeî de pásin . . tois kата philosoðíavan lágous.

Compare Topics i. 14, 105 b. 30, πρὸς μὲν οὖν φιλοσοφίαν κατ’

alétheían peri aítōn pragmateutíon, diakukikós de prós diáxou.

ei γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τί μέγεθος, καὶ ὅλως ἢν τὸ μέγεθος ἐπὶ μᾶλλον εἰη καὶ 12. 6.

πρὸς πλοιτον καὶ πρὸς ἔλευθερίαν. ᾧστ’ εἰ πλεῖον ὀδι διαφέρει κατὰ μέγεθος

ἡ ὧδι κατ’ ἀρετὴν, καὶ πλεῖον ὑπερέχει ὅλως ἀρετῆς μέγεθος, εἰ ἢν συμβολὴ

πάντα: τοσοῦτο γὰρ μέγεθος εἰ κρείττον τοσοῦτε, τοσοῦτε δὴν ὥς ἵσον.

That is to say, If different qualities can be compared in the concrete, they can be compared in the abstract, and degrees of difference can be compared even when two things differ in kind. If a tall man can be compared with a virtuous, then virtue can be compared with height, and all degrees of height and virtue can be compared. But this is impossible, for they have no common measure. Qualities can only be compared when they have a common relation, such as virtue and wealth have to the state.

ei γὰρ μᾶλλον, ἐὰν if we begin by saying that size in the concrete can be compared with wealth and freedom then we cannot avoid saying the same of size in the abstract: which is absurd.'

The bearing of this argument on the general discussion is as follows: Aristotle is explaining the nature of political equality which can only exist between similar or commensurable qualities and therefore between persons who possess such qualities: in the case of the state for example only between qualities or persons which are essential to the state, not between such as are indifferent, not between flute-playing and virtue, but between virtue and wealth.

12. 9.

ánwv τῶν προτέρων . . ánwv de toútoin.

1) freedom and wealth . . 2) justice and valour.

ánágyh pásas einai tás toimáta politeías paradébasais.

In a certain sense even the government of virtue is a perversion, if we could suppose the virtuous to govern for their own interests and to disregard those of others (cp. infra §§ 10, 20). At any rate virtue is not the only element required in a state.
18. 2. ἢ δὲ χώρα κοινῶν.

'The common or inclusive element of the state,' 'an element in which all are concerned'; or, if the phrase be modernized, 'the land is a great public interest.'

The word is here used nearly as in τὸ κοινῶν = 'public' or 'common': elsewhere in the sense of 'comprehensive,' 'general,' (Nic. Eth. ii. 2. § 2); applicable to the larger or more inclusive class, the more popular constitution (supra ii. 6. § 4), the more generally useful branch of knowledge (Rhet. i. 1, 1354 b. 29).

13. 5. καθ' ἐκάστην μὲν οὖν πολιτείαν τῶν εἰρημένων ἀναμφίβολος ἡ κρίσις τίνας ἄρχειν δεῖ: τόις γὰρ κυρίως διαφέρουσιν ἄλληλων, οἷον ἡ μὲν τῷ διὰ πλουσίων ἡ δὲ τῷ διὰ τῶν σπουδαίων ἀνδρῶν εἶναι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστη τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπων. ἄλλ' ὡς σκοποῦμεν, ὅταν περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τούθ' ὑπάρχῃ χρόνων, πῶς διοικησίων.

'There is no difficulty in determining who are to be the governing body in an oligarchy or aristocracy or democracy; for the nature of these is really implied in the name. The difficulty arises only when the few and the many and the virtuous are living together in the same city: how are their respective claims to be determined? For any of them, carried out consistently, involves an absurdity.'

13. 6. εἰ δὴ τὸν ὀμιλοῦν εἰεν ὀλύγοι πάμπαι οἱ τὴν ὀρετὴν ἔχοντες, τῶν δὲ διελεῖν τῶν τρόπων;

'How are we to decide between them; or how are we to arrange the state having regard both to virtues and number?' For διελεῖν see ii. 2. § 1: also τῶν τρόπων νεώμενται, iv. 1. § 10.

13. 6. ἡ τὸ ὀλύγοι πρὸς τὸ ἔργον δεῖ σκοπεῖν, εἰ δυνατοὶ διοικεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἡ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πληθὸς ὁμόων, εἰς τὸν ἑπετὶ ἔσται εἰς πόλιν εἰς αὐτῶν;

'Must we consider their fewness relatively to their duties, and whether they are able to govern a state, or numerous enough to form a state of themselves?'

τὸ ὀλύγοι = 'the idea of the few,' like τὸ ὠκ supra c. 9. § 2.

πρὸς τὸ ἔργον may be taken either with δεῖ σκοπεῖν, or with τὸ ὀλύγοι. τοσοῦτοι is dependent on εἰ, understood from εἰ δυνατοὶ = ἡ δεῖ σκοπεῖν εἰ τοσοῦτοι τὸ πλῆθος εἰς.
NOTES, BOOK III. 13.

ιδί καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀπορίαν, ἥν ἔτησον καὶ προβάλλουσί τινες, εἰδέλειται 13.11,12. ταύτων τὸν τρόπον ἀπαντῶν. ἀπορούσι γὰρ τινές πότερον τῷ νομοθέτῃ νομοθέτῃ, θεωροῦν δὲ τίς ἐπούσι τοὺς ὑδροτόπους νόμους, πρὸς τὸ τῶν βελτιώνων συμφέρον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῶν πλείουν, ὅταν συμβαίνῃ τῷ λεχθέν. τὸ δ’ ὁρθὸν ληστῶν ἴσως· τὸ δ’ ἰσως ὁρθῶν πρὸς τὸ τῆς πέλεως ὅλης συμφέρον καὶ πρὸς τὸ κουνὸν τὸ τῶν πολιτῶν.

Aristotle here raises the question whether the laws shall be enacted for the good of all or of a privileged class when several classes exist together in a state. He answers that the laws must be equal, and this equal right, or law, means the principle which conduces to the good of the whole state.

1) ὅταν συμβαίνῃ τῷ λεχθέν refers immediately to § 10, which suggests the co-existence of classes in a state, and to § 4, which contains a more formal statement to the same effect.

2) Bernays alters the punctuation by enclosing ἀπορούσι . . . πλείουν in a parenthesis explanatory of τὴν ἀπορίαν. This gives a sufficient sense; but a short clause at the end of a sentence following a long parenthesis is not in the manner of Aristotle. He also refers ὅταν συμβαίνῃ τῷ λεχθέν to the words τὸ πλήθος εἶναι βιλτιον κ.τ.λ., not ‘when all the elements co-exist,’ but ‘when the whole people is better and richer than the few.’

ὁστε μὴ συμβλητην εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετήν πάντων μηδέ τὴν δύναμιν 13. 13. αἰτῶν τὴν πολιτικὴν πρὸς τὴν ἑκέινων.

The virtue here spoken of seems to be the virtue of the kind attributed by Thucydides viii. 68 to Antiphon, viz. political ability, and the characters who are ‘out of all proportion to other men’ are the master spirits of the world, who make events rather than are made by them, and win, whether with many or with few, such as Themistocles, Pericles, Alexander the great, Caesar, and in modern times a Marlborough, Mirabeau, Napoleon I, Bismarck.

οὐ γὰρ ἐδέλειν αὐτὸν ἄγειν τὴν ἀργώ.

The legend is preserved by Apollodorus (i. 9. § 19). According to him the ship Argo, speaking with a human voice, refused to take on board Hercules, φθεγξαμεῖν μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν τὸ τούτων βάρος. This agrees with the text of the Politics if the word ἄγειν is taken to mean ‘convey,’ ‘take on board,’ as in Soph. Phil. 901,
ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

ἀστε μή μ' ἀγεν ναύτην ἔτι. Stahr translates wrongly: 'Hercules would not row with his comrades, because he was so far superior to them in strength.'

13. 16. τήν Περιόνδρον Θρασύβουλῳ συμβουλίαν κ.τ.λ.

Cp. Herod. v. 92, who reverses the characters, the advice being given not by Periander to Thrasybulus, but by Thrasybulus to Periander; and Livy i. 54: also Shakes. Rich. II. act iii. sc. 4:—

'Go thou, and, like an executioner,
Cut off the heads of too fast-growing sprays
That look too lofty in our commonwealth.'

13. 16. διὸ καὶ τοῦς ψέγοντας τὴν τυραννίδα καὶ τὴν Περιόνδρον Θρασύβουλῳ συμβουλίαν οἷς ἀπλῶς αὐτῶν ὄρθως ἐπιτιμᾶν.

Because all governments rest on the principle of self-preservation, and at times extreme measures must be allowed.

13. 18. ὣ ὀστρακισμὸς τὴν αὐτήν ἐχει δύναμιν . . τῷ κολούειν.

In this passage there is a doubt about the reading, and also about the construction. Several MSS. read τῷ κολούειν = 'have the same effect in respect of putting down the chief citizens.'

If we retain the reading of Bekker's text, it is doubtful whether τῷ κολούειν (1) is to be taken after τὴν αὐτήν (Bernays), or 2) is the dative of the instrument. To the first way of explaining the words it may be objected that τῷ κολούειν must then be referred to the particular instance of the counsel of Periander, whereas ostracism has been just asserted to be general, and to represent the policy of oligarchy and democracy as well as of tyranny. 'It has the same effect with the "lopping off" the chief citizens.'

13.18-23. It can hardly be supposed that the legislator who instituted ostracism had any definite idea of banishing the one 'best man' who was too much for the state. The practice seems to have arisen out of the necessities of party warfare, and may be regarded as an attempt to give stability to the ever-changing politics of a Greek state. It certainly existed as early as the time of Cleisthenes, and is said to have been employed against the adherents of Peisistratus. Every year on a fixed day the people were asked if
they would have recourse to it or not. If they approved, a day was appointed on which the vote was taken. To ostracise any citizen not less than 6000 citizens must vote against him. We may readily believe, as Aristotle tells us (§ 23), that 'instead of looking to the public good, they used ostracism for factious purposes.' Aristides, according to the well-known legend, was banished because the people were tired of his virtues. Themistocles, the saviour of Hellas, was also ostracised (Thuc. i. 137). The last occasion on which the power was exercised at Athens was against Hyperbolus, who was ostracised by the combined influence of Nicias and Alcibiades. Other states in which the practice prevailed were Argos (v. 3. § 3), Megara, Syracuse, Miletus, Ephesus.

οἶν Ἁθηναίοι μὲν περὶ Σαμίου καὶ Χίου καὶ Λεσβίους. 13. 19.

For the Samians, cp. Thuc. i. 116; for the Chians, Thuc. iv. 51; for the Lesbians, Thuc. iii. 10.

ὁστε διὰ τούτο μὲν οὐδὲν καλῶς τοὺς μονάρχους συμφωνεῖν ταῖς πόλεσιν, 13. 22.
eἰ τῆς οἰκείας ἀρχῆς ὡφελίμου ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐσῆ ὁ τούτῳ δρῶσιν.

1)*, 'as far as the application of this principle of compulsion is concerned, there is nothing to prevent agreement between kings and their subjects, for all governments must have recourse to a similar policy' (cp. note on § 16). τούτῳ δρῶσιν refers to the whole passage: sc. if they use compulsion for the benefit of the whole state.

Or 2), 'there is nothing to make the policy of kings differ from that of free states.' It is an objection, though not a fatal one, to this way of taking the passage that ταῖς πόλεσιν then occurs in two successive lines in different senses.

κατὰ τὰς ὁμολογουμένας ὑπεροχὰς. 13. 22.

The meaning is that where the superiority of a king or government is acknowledged, there is a political justification for getting a rival out of the way.

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ’ ἀρχεῖν γε τοῦ τοιούτου’ παραπλήσιον γὰρ κἂν ἐι τοῦ Δίως 13. 25.

ἀρχεῖν ἀξιότερον, μερίζοντες τὰς ἀρχὰς.

See note on text. 'Nay, more; a man superior to others is like
a god, and to claim rule over him would be like claiming to rule over Zeus.' The words μεριζομεν τις ἀρχὰς may refer either 1)* to the Gods or 2) to men; either 1)* 'as if in making a division of the empire of the Gods' according to the old legend, they, i.e. the gods, should claim to rule over Zeus; or 2) more generally, 'as if when persons were distributing offices they should give Zeus an inferior place.' Cp. Plat. Rep. x. 607 C, ὁ τῶν Δία σοφῶν δοχος κρατῶν, Nic. Eth. vi. 13. § 8, ὁμοιω κἀν εἶ τις τήν πολιτικὴν φαίη ἀρχειν τῶν θεῶν, and Herod. v. 49, τῷ Δίω πλούτου πέρι ἑρίζετε: also Plat. Polit. 301 D, 303 B.

Bernays translates μεριζομεν 'upon the principle of rotation of offices,' but no such use of μεριζεω occurs.

14. 4. κτείναι γὰρ οὐ κύριος, εἰ μὴ ἐν τινι βασιλείᾳ, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄρχαιων ἐν ταῖς πολεμικαῖς ἐξόδοις ἐν χειρὸς νόμῳ.

οὐ κύριος, sc. ὁ βασιλεύς, supplied from ἡ βασιλεία. We have a choice of difficulties in the interpretation of the words which follow. Either 1) ἐν τινι βασιλείᾳ must be explained 'in a certain exercise of the royal office,' i.e. when the king is in command of the army. This way of taking the passage gives a good sense and the fact is correct; but such a meaning cannot be extracted from the Greek. Or 2), 'for a king has no power to inflict death, unless under a certain form of monarchy'; Aristotle, writing in a fragmentary manner, has reverted from the kings of Sparta to monarchy in general. Or 3)*, possibly the words ἐν τινι βασιλείᾳ, bracketed by Bekker, are a clumsy gloss which has crept into the text, intended to show that the remark did not apply to every monarchy, but only to the Spartan. The conjecture of Mr. Bywater, who substitutes ἐνεκα δειλίας for ἐν τινι βασιλείᾳ, though supported by the citation from Homer, is too far removed from the letters of the MSS; and there is no proof that the Spartan kings had the power of putting a soldier to death for cowardice.

ἐν χειρῶς νόμῳ is often translated 'by martial law.' But the comparison of passages in Herodotus (e.g. ix. 48) and Polybius (iv. 58. § 9, etc.) shows that the word νόμος is only pleonastic, and that ἐν χειρῶς νόμῳ = ἐν χερσίν, 'hand to hand,' or 'by a sudden blow.'
NOTES, BOOK III. 14.

14. 5.

II. ii. 391–393. These lines which are rightly assigned here to Agamemnon are put into the mouth of Hector in Nic. Eth. iii. 8. § 4.

τὰρ γὰρ ἐμὸi θάνατος.

These words are not found either in this or any other passage of our Homer, though there is something like them in Iliad, xv. 348:—

ὅν δ’ ἄν ἐγὼν ἀπάνευθε νεὼν ἐτέρωθι νοῆσαι,

αὐτῷ οἱ θάνατοι μητίσομαι κ.τ.λ.

The error is probably due, as in Nic. Eth. ii. 9. § 3 and iii. 8. § 4, to a confused recollection of two or more verses. For a similar confusion of two lines of Homer cp. Plat. Rep. 389 E.

14. 6.

ζευναι δ’ αὐτά τὴν δύναμιν πᾶσαι παραπληγίας τυραννικῆς εἰσὶ δ’ ὄμως κατὰ νόμον καὶ πατρικαὶ.

The MSS. vary greatly: The Milan MS. reads τυραννίσας καὶ κατά, instead of τυραννικῆς εἰσὶ δ’ ὄμως. So Paris 1, 2, but omitting καὶ: other MSS. preserve traces of the same reading. Others read παραπληγίας τυραννικῆς. Out of these Bekker has extracted the Text, in which however ὄμως seems to be unnecessary and to rest on insufficient authority. Susemihl reads τυραννίσας εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ κ.τ.λ.

For the distinguishing characteristics of nations, see Book vii. 14. 6. 7. §§ 1–4.

καὶ ἡ φυλακὴ δὲ βασιλικὴ καὶ όν τυραννικὴ διὰ τὴν αὕτην αἰτίαν οἱ 14. 7.

γὰρ πολίτας φυλάττουσιν ὅπλοις τοὺς βασιλείας, τοὺς δὲ τυράννους ἕξικον.

διὰ τὴν αὕτην αἰτίαν. ‘Because the form of government is legal.’

The omission of the article before ἕξικον emphasizes the opposition between οἱ πολίται and ἕξικον—‘their own citizens’ are contrasted with ‘any mercenary body.’

14. 10.

tὸν κακοπάτριδα.

Either on analogy of εὐπάτρις,* ‘the base born,’ or possibly ‘the injurer of his country,’ like κακόδουλος, ‘the maltreater of his slaves.’

διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοὺς πρώτους γενέσθαι τοῦ πλῆθους εὐφέργεται κατὰ τέχνας ἢ 14. 12.

πόλεμον, ἢ διὰ τὸ συναγαγεῖν ἢ πορίσαι χώραν, εὐγένετο βασιλείας ἕκτων

καὶ τοῖς παραλαμβάνουσι πάτριοι.

Cp. v. 10. §§ 7–9, where royalty is said to be based on merit;
and i. 2. § 6, where it is assumed to have arisen from the Patriarchal relation: and for what follows vi. 8. § 20, where the ministers of Public Sacrifices are called Kings or Archons.

14. 13. ὅσον ὃ ἄξιον εἰπεῖν εἶναι βασιλείαν κ.τ.λ.

The kings who became priests retained only the shadow of royalty; but where they held military command beyond the borders, the name might be applied with greater propriety.

15. 2. ὡστε τὸ σκέμμα σχεδὸν περί δυούν ἐστὶν, ἐν μὲν πότερον συμφέρει ταῖς πόλεσι στρατηγοῦν ἁίδου εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτον ἡ κατὰ γένος ἡ κατὰ μέρος, ἢ ὁ συμφέρει ἐν δὲ πότερον ἐνα συμφέρει κύριον εἶναι πάντων, ἢ ὁ συμφέρει κατὰ μέρος, not 'by rotation in a fixed order,' (as in iv. 14. § 4) but more simply, 'by a succession of one citizen to another.' It is implied, though not expressed, that they are chosen by vote: cp. supra c. 14. § 5, ἐν μὲν οὖν τούτῳ εἶδος βασιλείας, στρατηγία διὰ βιών τούτων δ' αἰ μὲν κατὰ γένος εἰσίν, αἱ δ' αἱ ἀρεταί.

Three MSS. read καθ' ἀρετήν instead of κατὰ μέρος. It is more likely that καθ' ἀρετήν is a gloss on κατὰ μέρος, than the reverse.

15. 2. τὸ μὲν οὖν περὶ τῆς τουαίτης στρατηγίας ἐπισκοπεῖν νόμων ἔχει μᾶλλον εἶδος ἡ πολιτείας.

'Is a legal, rather than a constitutional question,' 'is to be regarded as a matter of administration.' εἶδος νόμων μᾶλλον ἡ πολιτείας is an abridgment of εἶδος τοῦ ἐπισκοπεῖν περὶ τῶν νόμων μᾶλλον ἡ πολιτείας. εἶδος (like φύσις i. 8. § 10, νόμος iii. 14. § 4) is pleonastic as in i. 4. § 2, ὡ γὰρ ὑπηρέτης ἐν ὄργανον εἰδεὶ ἐστίν, 'has the form or character of an instrument.'

15 2. ἄστι ἀφείσθω τὴν πρώτην.

After reducing the different forms of a monarchy to two, he now rejects one of them,—namely, the Lacedaemonian, because the Lacedaemonian kings were only generals for life, and such an office as this might equally exist under any form of government. This is a strange notion; for although the kings of Sparta were not generally distinguished, it can hardly be said with truth that Archidamus or Agesilaus were no more than military commanders.

ἀφείσθω, sc. τοῦτο τὸ εἶδος.

τὴν πρώτην is to be taken adverbially in the sense of 'to begin with' or 'at once': so τὴν ταχίστην, (Dem.). The phrase also occurs
This passage is closely connected with a similar discussion in 15. 3 ff. Plato's Politicus 293–295, where the comparative advantages of the wise man and the law are similarly discussed, and the illustration from the physician's art is also introduced. Cp. also Rhet. i. 1354 a. 28, where Aristotle argues, besides other reasons, that the law is superior to the judge, because the judge decides on the spur of the moment.

metà την τετρήμερον,
sc. ἡμέραν = metà την τετάρτην ἡμέραν. The MSS. vary between τρήμερον and τετρήμερον.

ἀλλ' ἵσως ἂν φαίη τις ōs avtì τούτων σουβλεύση σου περὶ τῶν καθ' ἐκαστα 15. 5, 6. κάλλιον. ὅτι μὲν τοῖνυν ἄνιγκη νομοθέτην αὐτόν εἶναι, δῆλον, καὶ κείσαι νόμων, ἀλλὰ μὴ κυρίους ἡ παρεκβαίνουσιν, ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν γ' ἄλλων εἶναι δὲi κυρίους.

αὐτῶν, sc. τῶν σουβλεύσεων, incorrectly translated in the text 'a king:' better, 'whether you call him king or not' there must be a legislator who will advise for the best about particulars.

ἀλλὰ μὴ κυρίους ἡ παρεκβαίνουσιν is a qualification of what has preceded:—'although they have no authority when they err,' i.e. there must be laws and there must be cases which the laws do not touch, or do not rightly determine. This is one of the many passages in Aristotle's Politics in which two sides of a question are introduced without being distinguished. The argument would have been clearer if the words ἀλλὰ μὴ . . . δὲi κυρίους had been omitted. Aristotle concedes to the opponent that there must be a correction of the law by the judgment of individuals. In fact both parties agree 1) that there must be laws made by the legislator; 2) that there must be exceptional cases. But there arises a further question: Are these exceptional cases to be judged of by one or by all?

The supposition contained in the words ἀλλ' ἵσως . . . κάλλιον is repeated in a more qualified form in the sentence following, ὅτι μὲν τοῖνυν . . . κυρίους.
15. 7. ἀλλ’ ἔστιν ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλῶν, δόσπερ ἐστὶνσις συμφορητός καλλίων μᾶς καὶ ἀπλῆς. διὰ τούτῳ καὶ κρίνει ἀμείνων διχος πολλά ἡ ἐς ωσισιῶν.

Compare the saying ‘that the House of Commons has more good sense or good taste than any one man in it;’ and again, Burke, ‘Besides the characters of the individuals that compose it, this house has a collective character of its own.’

15. 8. ἐκεί δὲ ἔργον ἀμα πάντας ἀρχισθήναι καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν.

It is true no doubt that the passions of the multitude may sometimes balance one another. But it is also true that a whole multitude may be inflamed by sympathy with each other, and carried away by a groundless suspicion, as in the panic after the mutilation of the Hermæ, or the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginoma, or the English Popish Plot, or the witch hunting mania at Salem in Massachusetts, or the French reign of Terror; and commonly in religious persecutions.

15. 10. αἰρετώτερον ἄν εἰς ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀριστοκρατία βασιλείας, καὶ μετὰ δυνάμεως καὶ χωρίς δυνάμεως οὔσης τῆς ἀρχῆς, ἄν ἦ λαβείν πλέον ὅμοιος.

That is to say aristocracy, or the rule of several good men, is better than the rule of one—we may leave out the question of power, if only it be possible to find the many equals who will constitute this ‘aristocracy of virtue.’ In other words, the superiority of the aristocracy, who are many, to the king, who is one, does not simply consist in greater strength.

ὁμοίοις, ‘equal in virtue to one another,’ an idea which is to be gathered from the mention of ἀριστοκρατία in the preceding clause, and explained in the words which follow, πολλοῖς ὅμοιοις πρὸς ἄρετή, § 11.

15. 12. ἐνετείθειν ποθεν εὐλογον γενέσθαι τὰς ὀλιγαρχίας.

Yet in v. 12. § 14 he repudiates the notion of Plato that the state changes into oligarchy, because the ruling class are lovers of money. Royalty, aristocracy, oligarchy, tyranny, democracy—the order of succession in this passage—may be compared with that of Plato (Rep. viii. and ix)—the perfect state, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, tyranny. The order in which constitutions succeed to one another is discussed in Nic. Eth. viii. 10.
NOTES, BOOK III. 16.

ἔπει δὲ καὶ μείζον εἶναι συμβέβηκε τὰς πόλεις, ἵνα ὁ δὲ μίθον ἔτι 15. 13. γίγνεσθαι πολιτείαν ἑτέρων παρὰ δημοκρατίαν.

Here as elsewhere iv. 6. § 5, he accepts democracy not as a good but as a necessity, which arises as soon as wealth begins to flow and tradesmen ‘circulate’ in the agora, vi. 4. § 13; and the numbers of the people become disproportioned to the numbers of the governing class.

ἔμως ἀναγκαῖον ἵππαρχειν αὐτῷ δύναμιν, ἃ φυλάξει τοὺς νόμους. 15. 15.

Compare what was said above c. 13. § 22, ὅστε διὰ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ. that ‘there need be no disagreement between a king and his subjects, because he is sometimes obliged to use force to them.’ Or, according to the other mode of interpreting the passage, ‘there is no difference between a king and a free state because’ &c.

διδόναι τοσούτους. 15. 16.

Either 1) with emphasis ‘so many and no more’; or better 2) with reference to the previous words εἶναι δὲ τοσαύτη τὴν ἴσχυν ὅστε ἐκάστου μὲν καὶ ἐνῶ καὶ συμπλεωτῶν κρεῖττω, τοῦ δὲ πλῆθους ἤττω, ‘so many as would not make him dangerous.’

Nearly the whole of this chapter is a series of ἀπορίαι; as in c. 16. 15, Aristotle states, without clearly distinguishing, them.

Yet the στρατηγὸς ἄδιος, who in time of peace is deprived of 16. 1. functions, and on the battle-field has arbitrary power, is not really the same with ὁ κατὰ νόμον βασιλεύς.

περὶ Ὀποιου ἐκ τα κατὰ τι μέρος (sc. τῆς διοικήσεως) ἐλάττων (sc. τῆς 16. 1. ἐπιδίκησεως).

‘With a somewhat more limited power than at Epidamnus.’

δοκεῖ δὲ τισιν. 16. 2.

Either the construction may be an anacoluthon, or δὲ after δοκεῖ may mark the apodosis.

διώτερ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἄρχειν ἡ ἄρχεσθαι δίκαιον. καὶ τὸ ἀνὰ μέρος τοῖνυν 16. 3. ὁδαίτω. τοῦτο δὲ ἤδη νόμος.

καὶ τὸ ἀνὰ μέρος καὶ τὸ ἀνὰ μέρος ἄρχειν ὁδαίτως δ.καίον.

Aristotle, taking the view of an opponent of the παρβασιλεία,
asserts that equals are entitled to an equal share in the government; there is justice in their ruling and justice in their being ruled: and therefore in their all equally ruling by turns. ‘And here law steps in; for the order of their rule is determined by law.’

16. 4. 5. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὃσα γε μὴ δοκεῖ δύναις διορίζειν ὁ νόμος, οὐδὲ ἄνθρωπος ἂν δύνατο γνωρίζειν. ἀλλ’ εἰτηδεὶς παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος ἐφίστησε τὰ λοιπὰ τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ γνώμῃ κρίνει καὶ διοικεῖ τοὺς ἄρχουτας. ἦτε δ’ ἐπανορθοῦσαν διδώσαν, ὃ τι ἄν δόξῃ πειραμένοις ἀμείων εἶναι τῶν κειμένων.

ἀλλὰ μὴν κ.τ.λ. ‘But surely if there are cases which the law cannot determine, then neither can an individual judge of them.’

tὰ λοιπὰ, what remains over and above law.

The connexion of the whole passage is as follows: Instead of one man ruling with absolute power, the law should rule, and there should be ministers and interpreters of the law. To this it is answered that the interpreter of the law is no more able to decide causes than the law itself. To this again the retort is made, that the law trains up persons who supply what is wanting in the law itself, to the best of their judgment.

16. 5. ὃ μὲν οὖν τῶν νόμων κελεύων ἄρχειν δοκεῖ κελεύων ἄρχειν τὸν θεὸν καὶ τῶν νοῶν μόνους, ὃ δ’ ἄνθρωπον κελεύων προστίθησι καὶ θηρίον.

This is a reflection on the περιβασιλεῖα. The rule of law is the rule of God and Reason: in the rule of the absolute king an element of the beast is included.

The reading of τῶν νοῶν (instead of τῶν νόμων), which has the greater MS. authority, gives no satisfactory sense because it transposes the natural order of ideas. It has been therefore rejected. Schneider and Bekker, 2nd Edit., who are followed in the text, retain τῶν νόμων in the beginning of the clause and read τῶν θεῶν καὶ τῶν νοῶν μόνους, a very ingenious and probable emendation, partly derived from a correction νοῶν which is found in the margin of two or three MSS. instead of θεῶν.

16. 8. ὥστε δήλον ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον ἔπτυντες τὸ μέσον ἔπτομεν. ὃ γὰρ νόμος τὸ μέσον.

‘And so, because men cannot judge in their own case, but are impelled this way and that, they have recourse to the mean, which is the law.’
The defects of written law are supplied not only by the judgments of individuals but by tradition and precedent. In any comparison of the judgments of law and of individuals, these have to be reckoned to the credit of law. And in early times this unwritten law is more sacred and important than written. Hence arises an additional argument against the superiority of the individual to the law. For the importance of unwritten law cp. Thuc. ii. 37, τὸν τε ἐκ ἀρχῶν ἀκροάσθε καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν ὅσοι τε ἐπ’ ὁφελείᾳ τῶν ἀδικουμένων κείμεται καὶ ὅσοι ἄγραφοι ὅστε αἰσχύνην ὁμολογουμένην φέρουσιν, and Rhet. i. 10, 1368 b. 7, λέγω δὲ ὅσον μὲν καθ’ ὅν γεγραμμένον πολιτεύονται, κοινῶν δὲ ὅσα ἄγραφα παρὰ πᾶσιν ὁμολογεῖσθαι δοκεῖ.

16. 9.

Referring to the words which have preceded—κατὰ τὸ πλείονα εἶναι τοὺς ἑπ’ αὐτοῦ καθισταμένους ἄρχοντας.

In the whole of this passage Aristotle is pleading the cause of 16. 9–13. the law against absolute monarchy. He shows that the law is not liable to corruption, that its deficiencies are supplied by individuals, that it trains up judges who decide not arbitrarily but according to a rule, that many good men are better than one. But the monarch too must have his ministers; he will surround himself by his friends, and they will have ideas like his own. Thus the two approximate to a certain extent. In either case the rulers must be many and not one. But if so it is better to have the trained subordinates of the law than the favorites of a despot.

16. 13.

Even in the παμβασιλεία there is an element of equality. ὁμόιος either 1) ‘equally with himself’; or 2) with a slight play of words ‘after the manner of equals.’

17. 2.

To be taken after ἀμείνων ‘better in a certain manner, i.e. the imaginary and rather absurd case, to which he returns in § 5, of the vol. II.'
virtue of the individual being more than equal to the collective virtue of the community.

17. 4. ἐν δὲ πέρυκε [καὶ ἐν] ἐγγίνεσθαι πλήθος πολέμικῶν.

The reading of Bekker, καὶ ἐν, which is wanting in the best MSS. and is omitted by Bernays, may have arisen out of the termination of πέρυκεν. If they are retained the meaning will be 'in which there is likewise a single' or 'compact body, defined by their all carrying arms' (ii. 6. § 16, etc.) as other forms of government by virtue, wealth, etc.

17. 4. κατὰ νόμον τῶν κατ’ αξίαν διανέμοντα τοῖς εὐπόροις τὰς ἀρχὰς.

The citizens of a polity are here called εὐπόροι, 'respectable' or 'upper class,' though a comparatively low qualification is required of them (iv. 3. § 1; 9. § 3). They are 'the hoplites' (ii. 6. § 16) who are also elsewhere called εὐπόροι (vi. 7. § 1). τοῖς εὐπόροις is found in the better MSS.: al. ἀπόροις.

17. 6. οὐ μάνων . . . ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον λεξθέν.

'He has a right to rule not only on the general ground which is put forward by all governments, but also upon the principle which we maintain, that he is superior in virtue.'

17. 7. ἀρχεσθαι κατὰ μέρος' οὐ γὰρ πέρυκε τὸ μέρος ὑπερέχειν τοῦ παντὸς, τὸ δὲ τριλικαίτην ὑπερβολὴν ἔχωντε τοῦτο αύξασθηκεν.

'This miraculous being cannot be asked to be a subject in turn or in part, for he is a whole, and the whole cannot be ruled by the part.' The double meaning of μέρος is lost in English. The idealization of the whole or the identification of the perfect man with a whole of virtue is strange. Cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 10. § 2. τοῦτο = τὸ εἶναι πάν.

18. 1. ἀρχεσθαι δυναμένων.

Bekker's insertion of καὶ ἀρχεῖν after ἀρχεσθαι (ed. sec.) is unnecessary. The idea is already implied in the previous words. Under any of the three forms of government, the virtue of obedience is required in some, of command in others.

18. 1. ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρώτοις ἐδείχθη λόγοι ὅτι τὴν αὑτὴν ἀναγκαῖον ἀνδρός ἀρετὴν εἶναι καὶ πολίτου τῆς πόλεως τῆς ἀρίστης.
The views of Aristotle respecting the relation of the good citizen to the good man may be drawn out as follows:—

1) The good citizen is not the same with the good man in an ordinary state, because his virtue is relative to the constitution (c. 4. § 3).

2) But in the perfect state he is the same: and this appears to be upon the whole the principal conclusion (c. 18. § 1, and iv. 7. § 2).

3) Yet even in the perfect state the citizens cannot all conform to a single type of perfection; for they have special duties to perform and special virtues by which they perform them (c. 4. §§ 5, 6).

4) It is therefore the good ruler who is really to be identified with the good man (§ 7; also i. 13. § 8, where the subject is introduced for the first time).

5) And still a 'grain of a scruple may be made'; for if the good ruler be merely a ruler, the private citizen who knows both how to rule and how to obey will have more complete virtue.

6) And therefore in the perfect state the citizens should rule and be ruled by turns (§ 11), cp. vii. c. 9.

This seems to be the result of many scattered and rather indistinct observations made from different points of view and not arranged in a clear logical order.

ἀνισαγη δὴ τὰν μελλοντα περὶ αὐτῆς ποιῆσαι τὴν προσήκονσαν σκέψιν. 18. 2.

These words are removed from the end of this book by Bekker, who in his Second Edition adopts the altered arrangement of the books. See Essay on the Structure of Aristotle’s Writings.
BOOK IV.

1. 2–6. The statesman has four problems to consider,

1) What is the best or ideal state?
2) What state is best suited to a particular people?
3) How any given state, even though inferior to what it might be, may be created or preserved?
4) What is the best state for average men?
   1) is the best possible; 2) the best relatively to circumstances;
   3) neither the best possible nor the best under the circumstances, but any constitution in which men are willing to acquiesce, even though ill-provided and ill-administered—such are to be found in the world and must therefore enter into the consideration of the statesman; 4) the best for mankind in general.

1. 2. ταύτην ἐστὶ τὴν δύναμιν.

The MSS. vary between ἐστι and ἐστὶ: ἐστὶ has rather the greater MSS. authority, but ἐστὶ is required for the construction, and the recurrence of ἐστὶ which was the first word of the sentence at the end of it is unpleasing.

1. 4. ἀχορήγητον τε εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἁναγκαίων.

Explained in the text, with Susemihl, *4 not possessing the outward means necessary for the best state,’ but the words ‘for the best state,’ are not found in the Greek. Better ‘not possessing the common necessaries or simple requisites of life,’ a hard but not impossible condition, e.g. in a remote colony. Cp. c. 11. § 21. πολλάκις ὀφθης ἄλλης πολιτείας αἰρετωτέρας ἐνίος οὐθὲν καλύτερη συμφέρειν ἔτεραν μᾶλλον εἶναι πολιτείαν, which is similar but not the same with this passage. For ἀχορήγητον, cp. κεχορηγημένοι in § 1, and δεσμέων πολλῆς χορηγίας in § 6.
Although the language is inaccurate (for the Lacedaemonian is an existing constitution), the meaning is plain. 'They put aside their own constitution and praise the Lacedaemonian or some other.'

χρή δὲ τοιαύτην εἰσηγείσαθαι τάξιν ἡν ῥᾴδιως ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχοῦσων καὶ 1. 7. πεποίησονται καὶ δυνήσονται κοινωνεῖν, ὥς ἦστιν οὐκ ἔλαττον ἔργον τὸ ἑπανορθῶσαι πολιτείαν ἢ κατασκευάζειν εἰς ἀρχῆς, ὡσπερ καὶ τὸ μεταμασθάνειν τοῦ μανθάνειν εἰς ἀρχῆς.

'The legislator should introduce an order of government into which the citizens will readily fall, and in which they will be able to co-operate; for the reformation of a state is as difficult as the original establishment of one and cannot be effected by the legislator alone, or without the assistance of the people.'

ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχοῦσων (sc. πολιτείων) may be taken either with τάξιν or with κοινωνεῖν, either we ought to introduce 1) 'from among existing constitutions'; or 2) 'in passing out of existing constitutions that form,' &c.; cp. in next sentence ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις πολιτείαις βοηθεῖν.

κοινωνεῖν is the reading of the majority of MSS. Some have κινεῖν. The emendation κικεῖν [Susemihl], taken from 'consequi' in the old Latin translation, is an unnecessary conjecture; nor does the word occur commonly, if at all, in Aristotle; κανουν is open to the objection of introducing a special when a general word is required. But no change is really needed.

ὡς ἦστιν οὐκ ἔλαττον ἔργον κ.τ.λ. The connexion of these words is difficult: Aristotle seems to mean that the legislator should select a constitution suited to the wants of the people: for however good in itself, if unsuited to them, they will not work it, and he will have as great or greater difficulty in adapting it than he would originally have had in making one for which they were fitted.

Δὲ πρὸς ταῖς εἰρημένοις καὶ ταῖς ὑπαρχοῦσαις πολιτείαις δεῖ δύνασθαι 1. 7. βοηθεῖν.

We may paraphrase as follows: Therefore, i.e. because it is difficult to introduce anything new in addition to what has been said [about the highest and other forms of government by the unsatisfactory political writers mentioned in § 5], we ought also to
be able to maintain existing constitutions, [which they would get rid of].

1. 7. *καθάπερ ἐλέξθη καὶ πρῶτον.*

There is nothing in what has preceded, which precisely answers to this formal reference. § 4 may perhaps be meant.

1. 8. *νῦν δὲ μίαν δημοκρατίαν οἴσαντα τινὲς εἶναι καὶ μίαν δηλιγαρχίαν.*

This is true of Plato, who is probably intended under this general form. For the anonymous reference to him cp. i. 1. § 2, ὅσοι μίν οἴσανται κ.τ.λ., and c. 2. § 3 infra.

1. 8. *συντίθενται ποσαχῶς.*

That is to say, either 1) the different ways in which the judicial and other elements of states are combined; or 2) the different ways in which the spirit of one constitution may be tempered by that of another: for the latter cp. infra c. 5. §§ 3, 4; c. 9. §§ 4–9.

1. 10. *καὶ τὸ τέλος ἐκάστης τῆς κοινωνίας ἐστὶν.*

'And what is the end of each individual form of society?' i.e. whether or not the good of the governed (cp. iii. c. 6).

ἐκάστης, with the article following, is emphatic.

κοινωνία is the state under a more general aspect.

1. 10. *νῦμοι δὲ κεχωρισμένοι τῶν δηλούντων τὴν πολιτείαν.*

Either 1)* the words τῶν δηλούντων are governed by κεχωρισμένοι, 'are separated from those things which show the nature of the constitution'; i.e. they are rules of administration and may be the same under different constitutions; but see infra § 11. Or 2), the genitive is partitive: 'Laws are distinct and belong to that class of things which show the nature of the constitution.'

1. 11. *τὰς διαφορὰς ἀναγκαίον καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἔχειν τῆς πολιτείας ἐκάστης καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν νῦμων θέσεις.*

Either 1), 'we must know the differences of states (sc. πολιτείων) and the number of differences in each state, with a view to legislation; or 2)*, referring τῆς πολιτείας ἐκάστης only to διαφοράς, and supplying πολιτείων with ἀριθμὸν, 'the difference of each state and the number of states;' or 3), τὸν ἀριθμὸν means 'the order of classification' (Susemihl; cp. iii. 1. § 9, where the defective (corrupt)
states are said to be ‘posterior’ to the good states). This gives a
good sense, but is with difficulty elicited from the words.

ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ μεθόδῳ.
Cp. infra c. 8. § 1, where the words ἐν τοῖς κατ’ ἄρχην refer to iii.
c. 7. See Essay on the Structure of Aristotle’s Writings.

περὶ μὲν ἀριστοκρατίας καὶ βασιλείας ἔρηται (τὰ γὰρ περὶ τῆς ἄριστης
πολιτείας θεωρηται ταῦτο καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐστιν εἰπεῖν τῶν ὀνομάτων).

He seems to mean that in discussing the ideal state he has
already discussed Aristocracy and Royalty. But the discussion
on the ideal state has either been lost, or was never written, unless,
as some think, it is the account of the state preserved in Book vii.

Other allusions to the same discussion occur in what follows:
c. 3. § 4, ἐτε πρὸς τοὺς κατὰ πλοῦτον διαφόρας ἐστίν ἡ μὲν κατὰ γένος ἡ
dὲ κατ’ ἄρετήν, καὶ εἰ τι δὴ τοιοῦτον ἐτερον ἔρηται πόλεως εἶναι μέρος ἐν
tοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀριστοκρατίαν, a passage which is supposed to refer to
vii. i.e. iv. c. 8 and 9, by those who change the order of the books
(Susemihl, &c.). But in this latter passage the allusion to the
perfect state is very slight, and the point of view appears to be
different; for no hint is given that it is to be identified with royalty
or aristocracy. Whether the words of the text have a reference, as
Schlosser supposes, to the end of Book iii. c. 14–18, where Arist-
otle discusses the relation of the one best man to the many good,
is equally doubtful. A reference to the discussion of aristocracy in
some former part of the work also occurs infra c. 7. § 2, ἀριστοκρατίαν
μὲν οὖν καλῶς ἔχει καλεῖν περὶ ἡς διήλθομεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις.

βούλεται γὰρ ἐκατέρα κατ’ ἄρετήν συνεστάναι κεχορηγημένην.

“For royalty and aristocracy, like the best state, rest on a
principle of virtue, provided with external means.”

πότε δὲ βασιλείαν νομίζειν.

Not ‘when we are to consider a constitution to be a royalty,’ for
there is no question about this, but νομίζειν is taken in the other
sense of ‘having,’ ‘using,’ ‘having as an institution,’ like ulla in
Latin. For this use of the word cp. νομίζειν ἐκλησίαν, iii. 1. § 10;
and for the matter cp. iii. 17. §§ 4–8.
2. 2. τὴν ὁμοιον ἀναγκαῖον ἡ τοῦνομα μόνον ἔχειν οὐκ οὖσαν, ἣ διὰ πολλὴν ὑπεροχὴν εἶναι τὴν τοῦ βασιλεύοντος, ὡστε τὴν τυραννίδα χειρίσθην οὖσαν πλεῖστον ἀπέχειν πολιτείας, δεύτερον δὲ τὴν ὀλεγαρχίαν (ἡ γὰρ ἁρμοκρατία διέστηκεν ἀπὸ ταύτης πολὺ τῆς πολιτείας).

Royalty and tyranny both depend upon the individual will of the king or tyrant: hence it is argued that if royalty is the best, tyranny must be the worst of governments, because one is the pre-eminence of good, the other of evil. Aristotle, who is over-mastered by the idea of opposites, naturally infers that the very worst must be the opposite of the very best.

πολιτείας. We might expect αὐτῆς, or τῆς ἁρίστης to be added; but Aristotle substitutes the more general πολιτεία here, as elsewhere, used in a good sense. Compare infra c. 8. § 2, τελευταῖον δὲ περὶ τυραννίδος εὐλογοῦ ἐστὶν ποιήσασθαι μνείαν διὰ τὸ πασῶν ἡκατα ταύτην εἶναι πολιτείαν, ἥμων δὲ τὴν μέθοδον εἶναι περὶ πολιτείας: also for the general meaning, Plat. Polit. 301 D, Rep. ix. 576 D, etc.

In the phrase ταύτης τῆς πολιτείας the word refers to ὀλεγαρχίαν.

2. 3. ἡδὴ μὲν οὖν τις ἀπεφήνατο καὶ τῶν πρότερον οὕτως.

The difference between Plato (Polit. 303) and Aristotle, which is dwelt upon so emphatically, is only verbal: the latter objecting to call that good in any sense, which may also be evil, a somewhat pedantic use of language, which is not uniformly maintained by Aristotle himself. Cp. vi. 4. § 1, δημοκρατίων οὐσῶν τεττάρων βελτίστη ἡ πρώτη τάξει.

καὶ τῶν πρότερον is a strange form of citation from Plato which would seem more appropriate to a later generation than to Aristotle. See Essay on the Criticism of Plato in Aristotle.

2. 4–6. The programme corresponds fairly, but not very accurately, with the subjects which follow. At chap. 14, before discussing the causes of ruin and preservation in states, having analysed in general outline the various types of oligarchy, democracy, polity, tyranny, Aristotle introduces a discussion respecting the powers and offices which exist in a single state: but of this new beginning which interrupts the sequence of his plan he says nothing here.

3. 1. The diversity of governments has been already discussed, but not in detail, in bk. iii. c. 6–8.
NOTES, BOOK IV. 3.

3. 4. ἐπὶ πρὸς ταῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον διαφοραῖς ἐστὶν ἢ μὲν κατὰ γένος ἢ δὲ κατ' ἀρετήν, κἂν εἴ τι δὴ τοιοῦτον ἔτερον εἴρηται πόλεως εἶναι μέρος ἐν τῶι περὶ τῆν ἀριστοκρατίαν.

The parts of the state are spoken of in vii. 8. § 7. The opening sentence of book vii. itself also professes to speak of aristocracy. But the writer goes on to treat rather of the ἑποθέσεις or material conditions of the best state, than of the best state itself. These references are vague; if they were really the passages here cited, we should have to suppose that the seventh book preceded the fourth. But they are not precise enough to be adduced as an argument in favour of the changed order.

καὶ γὰρ ταῦτ’ εἰδεὶς διαφέρει τὰ μέρη σφῶν αὑτῶν. 3. 5.

'As the parts of states differ from one another (σφῶν αὑτῶν), so must states differ from one another.' Compare the curious comparison infra c. 4. §§ 8, 9.

3. 5. πολιτεία μὲν γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἄρχων τάξις ἐστι, ταύτην δὲ διανέμονται πάντες ἡ τῶν ἄρχων ἱσότητα κοινήν, λέγω δ’ οἶνον τῶν ἀπόρων ἢ τῶν εὐπόρων, ἢ κοινὴν τῶν ἀμφοῖν.

The last words, κοινὴν τῶν ἀμφοῖν, which are obscure and do not cohere very well with διόνυμην, are bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd edition. But there is no reason for doubting their genuineness. Aristotle means to say that governments subsist according to the powers of those who share in them; or according to equality, whether that equality be an equality of the rich among themselves, or of the poor among themselves, or an equality of proportion which embraces both rich and poor: cp. infra c. 4. § 2. The words οἶνον τῶν ἀπόρων ἢ τῶν εὐπόρων may be an explanation of κατὰ τὴν διόνυμην τῶν μετεχόντων, which comes in out of place, and ἢ κοινὴν τῶν ἀμφοῖν, as in the English text, may be an explanation of ἱσότητα κοινῆν.

κατὰ τῶν αὑτῶν ἱσότητα κοινῆν, 'More power may be given to the poor as being the more numerous class, or to the rich as being the more wealthy; or power may be given upon some principle of compensation which includes both;' as e.g. in a constitutional government. In this way of explaining the passage the difficulty
in the words ἡ κοινὴ τῶν ἀμφοτέρων, which has led Bekker to bracket them, is avoided.

3. 7. For the winds compare Meteorologica ii. 4, 361 a. 4 ff., a passage in which Aristotle argues that north and south are the chief winds because wind is produced by evaporation and the evaporation is caused by the movement of the sun to the north or south. Also for the two principal forms of government cp. Plato’s Laws iii. 693 C: according to Plato they are democracy and monarchy.

3. 8. ἀληθιστερον δὲ καὶ βέλτιον ὄς ἡμεῖς διειλομεν, δυοὶ ἡ μιᾶς οὐσίας τῆς καλῶς συνεστηκίας τὰς ἀλλὰς εἶναι παρεκβάσεις, τὰς μὲν τῆς εὐ κεκραμένης ἀρμονίας, τὰς δὲ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας.

Aristotle having compared the different forms of states with the different sorts of harmonies, now blends the two in one sentence and corrects the opinion previously expressed by him: ‘There are not two opposite kinds of harmonies and states, but one or at the most two, δυοὶ ἡ μιᾶς (the two states are royalty and aristocracy), which are not opposed but of which all the rest are perversions.' From this transcendental point of view polity or constitutional government itself becomes a perversion; but in c. 8. § 1 it is said not to be a perversion, though sometimes reckoned in that class.

4. 4. ὥσπερ ἐν Αἴθωνια φασί τινες.

According to Herod. iii. 20, the Ethiopians are the tallest and most beautiful of mankind: and they elect the tallest and strongest of themselves to be their kings.

4. 5. ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ πλείονα μάρια καὶ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῆς δημαρχίας εἰσίν κ.τ.λ.

It is argued that neither freedom alone, nor numbers alone are a sufficient note of democracy, nor farness of rulers, nor wealth of oligarchy: neither a few freemen, as at Apollonia, nor many rich men, as at Colophon, constitute a democracy. But there must be many poor in a democracy and few rich in an oligarchy. A slight obscurity in the passage arises from the illustrations referring only to democracy and not to oligarchy. Cp. iii. cc. 7, 8; infra c. 8. § 7.

Aristotle would not approve a classification of states such as that of Sir G. C. Lewis and the school of Austin, who define the sovereign power according to the number of persons who exercise
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it (cp. G. C. Lewis' 'Political Terms,' Edit. 1877, p. 50). An opposite view is held by Maine, who argues truly 'that there is more in actual sovereignty than force' (Early Institutions, p. 358 ff.). Aristotle insists that the character of a government depends more on the quality than on the quantity of the sovereign power.

τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Λιδούς.

Possibly the war with Gyges mentioned in Herod. i. 14. The Colophonians like the other Ionians (Herod. i. 142) appear to have been the subjects of Croesus at the time of his overthrow. A testimony to their wealth and luxury is furnished by Xenophanes apud Athenaeum xii. c. 31.526 C, who says that a thousand citizens arrayed in purple robes would meet in the agora of Colophon.

"Οτι μὲν οὐν πολιτείαν πλείους, καὶ δὲ ἥν αἰτίαν, εἰρήται· διότι δὲ πλείους 4. 7. τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ τίνες καὶ διὰ τι, λέγομεν ἀρχὴν λαβώντες τὴν εἰρημένην πρῶτον· ὁμολογοῖμεν γὰρ οὐχ ἐν μέροι ἀλλὰ πλεῖον πᾶσαι ἔχειν πόλιν.

It is remarkable that Aristotle should revert to the parts of states which he professes to have already determined when speaking of aristocracy (cp. c. 3. § 4). His reason for returning to them is that he is going to make a new sub-division of states based upon the differences of their parts or members.

πλείους τῶν εἰρημένων. As he says, infra § 20, "Οτι μὲν οὐν εἰσὶ πολιτείαι πλείους καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας εἰρήται πρῶτον· δι᾽ ὧν ἐστὶ καὶ δημοκρατίας εἰδὴ πλείω καὶ ὁλογραφίας λέγομεν. Compare Book vii. 8. § 9.

The illustration from animals may be worked out as follows. 4. 8.

Suppose the different kinds of teeth were $a$, $a'$, $a''$, etc., the different kinds of claws, feet, etc. were $b$, $b'$, $b''$, $c$, $c'$, $c''$, and so on with the other organs which are important in determining the character of an animal. Then, according to Aristotle, the different combinations of these will give the different species. Thus:

\[a', b, c''\], will be one species,
\[a, b', c'\], another and so on.

So with constitutions:

If we combine γεωργία, having some political power and coming occasionally to the assembly, with disfranchised βασιλεύς, and a politically active wealthy class, the result will be an oligarchy or
very moderate democracy: or if we combine politically active γεωργοί, βάναυσοι, βήτες with a feeble or declining oligarchy, the result will be an extreme democracy: and so on.

It is hardly necessary to remark that the illustration taken from the animals is the reverse of the fact. The differences in animals are not made by the combination of different types, but by the adaptation of one type to different circumstances. Nor is there in the constitution of states any such infinite variety of combinations as the illustration from the animals would lead us to suppose; (one kind of husbandmen with another of serfs and so on). Nor does Aristotle attempt to follow out in detail the idea which this image suggests.

4. 9–17. The eight or more classes cannot be clearly discriminated. The sixth class is wanting, but seems to be represented by the judicial and deliberative classes in § 14, yet both reappear as a ninth class in § 17. Aristotle is arguing that Plato’s enumeration of the elements of a state is imperfect—there must be soldiers to protect the citizens, there must be judges to decide their disputes, there must be statesmen to guide them (although it is possible that the same persons may belong to more than one class). ‘Then at any rate there must be soldiers’ (§ 15). This rather lame conclusion seems to be only a repetition of a part of the premises. At this point the writer looses the thread of his discourse and, omitting the sixth, passes on from the fifth class τὸ προσόλειμενον in § 10 to a seventh class of rich men (§ 15), and to an eighth class of magistrates (§ 16). A somewhat different enumeration of the classes, consisting in all of six, is made in vii. 8. §§ 7–9.

4. 11–14. διότερ ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ κ.τ.λ.

The criticism of Aristotle on Plato (Rep. ii. 369) in this passage, to use an expression of his own, is παιδαριώδης λίαν. Plato, who was a poet as well as a philosopher, in a fanciful manner builds up the state; Aristotle, taking the pleasant fiction literally and detaching a few words from their context, accuses Plato of making necessity, and not the good, the first principle of the state, as if the entire aim of the work were not the search after justice. There is also an ambiguity in the word ἀναγκαῖα of which Aristotle
here takes advantage. Plato means by the ἀναγκαστάτη πόλις, ‘the barest idea of a state’ or ‘the state in its lowest terms.’ But when Aristotle says judges are ‘more necessary’ than the providers of the means of life, he means ‘contribute more to the end or highest realization of the state.’ The remarks on Plato are worthless, yet they afford a curious example of the weakness of ancient criticism, arising, as in many other places, from want of imagination. But apart from the criticism the distinction here drawn between the higher and lower parts, the ‘soul’ and ‘body’ of the state, is important. Cp. vii. 9. § 10, where Aristotle introduces a similar distinction between the μέρη of the πόλις and the mere conditions (ὡν οὐκ ἄνευ) of it. ‘Husbandmen, craftsman, and labourers of all kinds are necessary to the existence of states, but the parts of the state are the warriors and counsellors.’

ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ. 4. 11.

Here evidently the title of the book.

ἳσον τε δεομένην σκυτέων τε καὶ γεωργῶν. 4. 12.

Equally with τὸ καλὸν.

ὀπερ ἐστὶ συνέσεως πολιτικῆς ἔργον. 4. 14.

ὀπερ grammatically refers to τὸ βουλευόμενον, suggested by τὸ βουλευόμενον.

ὡς’ ἐπερ καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐκείνα. 4. 15.

ταῦτα = τὰ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, gathered from τὰ τοιαύτα in § 14.

ἐκεῖνα = τὰ εἰς τὴν ἀναγκαίως χρήσων συντείνοντα. If the higher and the lower elements of a state are both necessary parts of it, then the warriors (who may in some cases also be husbandmen) are necessary parts: Aristotle is answering Plato, § 13, who in the first enumeration of the citizens had omitted the warriors.

ταῦτην τὴν λειτουργίαν, 4. 16.

sc. τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς.

πολλοῖς. 4. 18.

1) ‘To many’ or ‘in many cases’ opposed to πάντες in what follows; or 2*) πολλοῖς may be taken with δοκεῖ, the meaning being ‘many (differing from Plato) think, etc.;’ the appeal is to the common sense which Plato is supposed to contradict.
4. 18. ἀντιποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς πάντες.

The connexion is as follows:—' Different qualifications often coexist or are thought to coexist in the same persons; and indeed virtue is a qualification for office to which all men lay claim. But no man can be rich and poor at the same time.'

4. 20. ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶ πολιτείαι πλείους, καὶ διὰ τινὰς αἰτίας, ἐξηρταὶ πρῶτον is a repetition with a slight verbal alteration (διὰ τινὰς αἰτίας for δὲ ἢν αἰτίαι) of the first words of § 7.

4. 20. ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

I. e. from what has been said respecting differences in the parts of states (supra §§ 7, 8). Yet the curious argument from the parts of animals is an illustration only; the actual differences of states have not been worked out in detail.

4. 21. κἂν εἰ τι τοιοῦτον ἑτέρου πλῆθους εἴδος.

Susemihl (note 1199) objects that there are no others and so the freedmen must be meant. But surely in this phrase Aristotle is merely adding a saving clause=‘and the like.’ Cp. Nic. Eth. i. 7. § 21, τῶν ἄρχῶν αἱ μὲν ἐπαγωγῇ θεωροῦνται αἱ δ' αἰσθήσει αἱ δ' ἑθικῶς τυφλαὶ καὶ ἄλλαι δ' ἄλλως, where the last words only generalize the preceding.

4. 22. τῶν δὲ γνωρίμων.

Sc. εἰδη, here used inaccurately for differences or different kinds of εἰδη.

4. 22. τὰ τούτως λεγόμενα κατὰ τὴν αὐτήν διαφορὰν.

τούτως, dative after τὴν αὐτήν, and refers to πλοῖος, εὐγένεια, κ.τ.λ. Lit. ‘ the things which are spoken of according to the same principle of difference with these,’ or ‘ similar differences having a relation to these,’ e. g. the habits and occupations of the notables.

4. 22. τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον ὑπάρχειν τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους.

If the reading ὑπάρχειν is retained, the emphasis is on the words μηδὲν μᾶλλον which must be taken closely with it, ‘ that the poor shall be no more’—which is a feeble way of saying, shall have no more power—‘ than the rich’; or ‘ shall have no priority,’ which gives a rather curious sense to ὑπάρχειν. A doubt about the propriety of
the expression has led to two changes in the text. 1) ἵπτερέχειν (Susemihl) for which there is slight MS. authority, P1, P4; and Aretino’s transl. 2) ἀρχεῖν an emendation of Victorius adopted by Coraes, Schneider, Stahr, and supposed to be confirmed by a parallel passage in vi. 2. § 9; see note on English Text. 3) The Old Translation ‘nihil magis existere egenis vel divitibus’ seems to favour ἵπταρχειν τοῖς ἀπόροις ἢ τοῖς εὐπόροις.

δημοκρατίαν εἶναι ταύτην.

tαύτην is slightly inaccurate—‘the state in which this occurs.’

ἐν μὲν οὖν εἶδος κ.τ.λ.

Five forms of democracy are reckoned: but the first of these is really a description of democracy in general, not of any particular form. The words in § 24 ἄλλο δὲ seem to have been introduced by mistake. The five forms are thus reduced to four, as in c. 6 the five forms of oligarchy given in c. 5 appear as four.

ἐτερον εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ μετέχειν ἀπαντας τοῖς πολίταις ὅσοι ἂν—

νυπεύθυνοι, ἀρχεῖν δὲ τῶν νόμων. Ἐτερον δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ πᾶσι μεταίναι τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἐὰν μόνον ἦ τὸ πολίτης, ἀρχεῖν δὲ τῶν νόμων.

The words ὅσοι ἄνυπευθυνοι agree with τοῖς ἄνυπευθυνοι κατὰ τὸ γένος, as the ἔαν ἦ τὸ πολίτης does with the ὅσοι ἂν ἔλευθεροι ὅσι in the recapitulation of the passage which follows (c. 6. § 4). In both cases all citizens are eligible and the law is supreme: but in the first of the two the rights of citizenship have been scrutinized; in the second, all reputed freemen are admitted to them without enquiry. The latter case may be illustrated by the state of Athenian citizenship before the investigation made by Pericles; the former by the stricter citizenship required after the change. The meaning of the word ἄνυπευθυνοι is shown by the parallel passage (c. 6. § 3, ἄνυπευθυνοι κατὰ τὸ γένος) to be, ‘not proved to be disqualified by birth.’

"Ομηρος δὲ ποιάν λέγει οὐκ ἄγαθον εἶναι πολυκορανήν, πούτερον ταύτην ἦ 4. 27.

ὅταν πλείους ὅσιν οἱ ἀρχοντες ὡς ἐκαστος, ἀδηλον.

It would be a poetical or historical anachronism to suppose that Homer in the words cited intended one of the senses which Aristotle seems to think possible. The collective action of states as distinguished from that of individuals is the conception, not of a
poet, but of a philosopher. No modern reader would imagine that Homer is seeking to enforce any other lesson than the necessity of having one and not many leaders, especially on the field of battle. This anti-popular text is adapted to the argument.

4. 31. τῶν δὲ καθ’ ἐκαστα τὰς ἄρχας καὶ τήν πολιτείαν κρίνειν.

For use of gen. after κρίνειν cp. Plat. Rep. 576 D, Laws i. 646 D, τήν πολιτείαν (πολιτεία here = πολιτεύμα) is contrasted as 'the collective government' with αἱ ἄρχαι, 'the individual magistrates.' Yet in the context, both preceding and following, the word has the more general meaning of a 'form of government' or 'constitution.'

5. 1. ὅν μὲν οὖν ἐκ πάντων τούτων.

τούτων, 'out of all the qualified persons,' all those referred to in the two previous sentences τῶν ἐξόντων τιμήματα τηλικαία ὡστε κ.τ.λ. or τῶν ἐξόντων μακρὰ τιμήματα.

In what follows the δυναστία is the exclusive hereditary oligarchy, ruling without law.

5. 2. For the forms of these hereditary oligarchies and the dangers to which they are exposed, cp. v. 6. § 3. We may remark that, though the most common, they are not included in Aristotle's definition of oligarchy (iii. c. 8).

5. 4. τὰ πρῶτα μικρὰ πλεονεκτοῦντες παρ' ἄλληλον.

Not accurate, for the meaning is, not that the two encroach on one another, but that the dominant party encroaches on the other.

The form of a constitution is here supposed to be at variance with its spirit and practice. Thus England might be said to be a monarchy once aristocratically, now democratically administered; France a republic in which some of the methods of imperialism survive (cp. note on c. 1. § 8); while in Prussia the spirit of absolute monarchy carries on a not unequal contest with representative government.

6. 3. διὸ πάση τοῖς κτωμένοις ἔξεστι μετέχειν.

Omitted by Π² (i.e. the MSS. of the second family except Π') and Aretino's translation, bracketed by Bekker in both editions, is a repetition or pleonasm of the previous thought, though not on that
account necessarily to be reckoned spurious. Cp. iii. 1. § 4 and note.

6. 3.

διὰ τήν ἑξομένην αἰρεσιν.

The principle of election which follows next in order' (cp. c. 4. § 24, ἐτέρον ἐλθον). This use of the word ἑξομένη is supported by iii. 11. § 15, ἀλλὰ δὲ ἐστὶν (ἀπορία) ἑξομένη ταύτης, and vi. 8. § 4, εἰτέρα δὲ ἐπιμελεία ταύτης ἑξομένη καὶ σύνεγγυς, and several other passages. The other interpretation of ἑξομένη, given in a note to the English text, 'proper to it' is scarcely defensible by examples and is probably wrong. The first form of democracy required a small property qualification, the second admitted all citizens who could prove their birth. The third admitted reputed citizens without proof of birth; though in both the latter cases the exercise of the right was limited by the opportunities of leisure. For the laxity of states in this matter, cp. iii. 5. §§ 7, 8.

6. 4.

diá τὸ μῆ εἶναι πρόσοδον.

The public revenues could not be distributed, for there were none to distribute, cp. infra § 8. The want of pay prevented the people from attending the assembly.

6. 5.

diá τῆν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ πλῆθους.

Either 1*') 'on account of the preponderance of their numbers,' or 2) more definitely 'on account of the preponderance of the multitude;' (cp. c. 12. § 1 and iii. 15. § 13). The numbers of the people give the power and the revenues of the state provide pay.

καὶ διὰ τὸ πλῆθος εἶναι τῶν μετεχόντων τοῦ πολιτείματος ἀνάγκη μὴ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀλλὰ τῶν νόμον εἶναι κύριον.

The more numerous the members of the oligarchy, and the greater the difficulty of finding the means of living, the less possibility is there of the government of a few and therefore the greater need of law; cp. infra § 9.

6. 8.

μὴ δὲ οὕτως ὀλίγην δοτε τρέφεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως, ἀνάγκη τῶν νόμων ἄξιων αὐτῶν ἀρχείων.

'When numerous, and of a middle condition, neither living in careless leisure nor supported by the state, they are driven to maintain in their case (αὐτῶς) the rule of law.'

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6. 9. πλείω δὲ,
sc. οὐσίαν ἔχουσι.

6. 9. τὸν νόμον τίθενται τοιούτον.
Sc. they make the law oligarchical.

6. 10. εἶν δ’ ἐπιτείνωσι.
‘But when they stretch (the oligarchical principle) further.’

7. 1. ὀσπερ Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις.
Either 1)* in his works on Politics, meaning especially the
Republic (as in v. 12. § 7, ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ) and Politicus; or 2) in
his treatment of the various forms of government, i.e. in Books
viii. and ix. of the Republic. The latter explanation is less idio-
matic. Without referring to the Republic or the Politicus, the
statement is inaccurate; for if the perfect state be included, the
number of constitutions is in the Republic five, in the Politicus
(302) seven.

7. 2. ἀριστοκρατιάν μὲν ὡς καλός ἔχει καλεῖν περὶ ἣς διήθθηκεν ἐν τοῖς πρώ-
tοις λόγοις· τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἄριστων ἄπλοσ καθ’ ἄρετῆν πολιτείαν, καὶ μὴ πρὸς
ὑπόθεσιν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἄνδρῶν, μόνην δίκαιον προσαγορεύειν ἀριστοκρατίαν.
The discussion is apparently the same to which he has already
referred in iv. 2. § 1: the particle γὰρ seems to imply that he
had in that discussion spoken of aristocracy as the government of
the truly good. The passage most nearly corresponding to the
allusion is iii. 4. § 4 ff., in which Aristotle treats of the relation
of the good ruler to the good man.

7. καλοῦσαι ἀριστοκρατίαι.
According to a strict use of terms aristocracy is only the govern-
ment of the best; in popular language it is applied to the union of
wealth and merit, but is not the same either with oligarchy or with
constitutional government.

7. 4. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μὴ ποιομέναις κοινῆς ἐπιμέλειαι ἄρετῆς εἰσὶν ὄμως τῶν
οἱ εὐδοκιμοῦσιν καὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ἐπιεικεῖς.
Cp. Plat. Laws xii. 951: ‘There are always in the world a few
inspired men whose acquaintance is beyond price, and who spring
up quite as much in ill-ordered as in well-ordered cities.’
Elsewhere (ii. 11. § 9) the constitution of Carthage is spoken of as a perversion of aristocracy because combining wealth and virtue; here it is called in a laxer sense an aristocracy because it combines wealth, virtue and numbers. That Sparta with all its secrecy (τής πολιτείας τὸ κρυπτόν, Thuc. v. 68) might be termed a democracy and, with all its corruption and infamy, had a sort of virtue (τὸ πιστὸν τῆς πολιτείας, Id. i. 68) is the view, not wholly indefensible, of Aristotle, who regards the Spartan constitution under many aspects, cp. ii. 9. §§ 20, 22, and infra c. 9. § 5, but chiefly as consisting of two elements, numbers and virtue.

καὶ ἐν αἷς εἰς τὰ δύο μόνον, οἷον ἦ Δακεδαμονίων εἰς ἀρετὴν τε καὶ 7. 4. δῆμον, καὶ ἐστὶ μίξις τῶν δύο τούτων, δημοκρατίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς.

The want of symmetry in the expression εἰς ἀρετὴν τε καὶ δήμον, followed by δημοκρατίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς, instead of δήμου τε καὶ ἀρετῆς, probably arises out of a desire to avoid tautology.

ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὴν πρώτην τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ταῦτα δύο 7. 5. εἶναι καὶ τρίτον ὅσα τῆς καλομένης πολιτείας ῥέσουσι πρὸς τὴν ὑλεγραφίαν μᾶλλον.

There are three imperfect kinds of aristocracy beside the perfect state (ἡ πρώτη, ἡ ἀριστή πολιτεία): 1) the governments, such as that of Carthage, in which regard is paid to virtue as well as to numbers and wealth; 2) those in which, as at Sparta, the constitution is based on virtue and numbers; 3) the forms of constitutional government (πολιτεία) which incline to oligarchy, i.e. in which the governing body is small.

ἐνάντια ὁτὶ οὖν ὁκ οὖν ὁτὲ ταύτην παρέκβασιν οὖτε τὰς ἀρτι 8. 1. ἴμβειας ἀριστοκρατίας, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἄλλης πάσα διημαρτήκαι τῆς ὁρθοτάτης πολιτείας, ἐπείτα καταριθμοῦσι μετὰ τούτων, ἐκεί τ’ αὐτῶν αὐταὶ παρέκβασεσ, ὥσπερ ἐν τούς καὶ ἁρχὴν ἐπομεν. ἄντων refers to τούτων, sc. τῶν παρεκβεβηκιων or διημαρτηκιων πολιτειων, and this to the singular παρέκβασιν. ὥσπερ ἐν τούς καὶ ἁρχὴν ἐπομεν. Sc. iii. 7. § 5.

8. 2.

'Now that we understand what democracy and oligarchy are, it is easier to see what the combination of them will be.'
8. 3. διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἀκολουθεῖν παθεῖαν καὶ εὐγνώμειαν τοῖς εὐπορωτέροις.

Men tend to identify nobility with wealth (cp. infra § 8), not unreasonably, for wealth gives leisure, and in the second generation commonly education. For εὐγνώμεια, see Rhet. i. 5, 1360 b. 31.

8. 5. δοκεῖ δὲ εἶναι τῶν ἀδικῶν τὸ μὴ εὐνομεῖσθαι τὴν ἀριστοκρατομένην πόλιν, ἀλλὰ πολιορκημένην.

The words ἀλλὰ πολιορκημένην (omitted in the translation) are read by all the MSS. (and supported by W. de Moerbeke), and therefore though pleonastic are unlikely to be a gloss. If retained we must 1) supply εὐνομεῖσθαι from τὸ μὴ εὐνομεῖσθαι, ‘A state cannot be ill governed by good men, or well governed by evil men.’ 2) We may alter the order of words by placing μὴ before ἀριστοκρατομένην, instead of before εὐνομεῖσθαι (Thurat, Susem.). Or 3), with Bekker (2nd ed.), we may insert μὴ before πολιορκημένην. Or 4) alter πολιορκημένην into πολιορκητείον, answering to εὐνομεῖσθαι.

8. 6. διὸ μὲν μὲν εὐνομίαν . . . τὸ πείθεσθαι τοῖς κειμένοις νόμοις.

Cp. Thuc. iii. 37, where Cleon says, πάντων δὲ δεινότατον εἰ βέβαιον ἡμῶν μηδὲν καθεστήσει λοῦ ἀν δίξη πέρι, μηδὲ γνωσόμεθα ὅτι χείρος νόμοις ἀκυντοῖς χρωμένη πόλις κρείσσαν ἐστὶν ἢ καλὸς ἔχουσιν ἀκύροις.

8. 6. τούτῳ δ’ εἶπεξέται δικίως κ.τ.λ.

Refers back to the words τὸ καλὸς κείσθαι τοῖς νόμοις οἷς ἐμμενοῦσα, the clause ἐστὶ γὰρ . . . κειμένοις being a parenthesis.

8. 6. ἡ γὰρ τοῖς ἀρίστοις κ.τ.λ.

Sc. ἐστι πείθεσθαι.

8. 8. ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεις τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος καλεῖται.

Sc. πολιτεία. Preserving the play of words and supplying πολιτεία with καλεῖται from τῆς πολιτείας, we may translate, ‘in most cities the form of the constitution is called constitutional.’ But are there ‘many’ such governments? Cp. supra c. 7. § 1; infra c. 11. § 19. For the answer to this question see Essay on the μέινταṃ πολιτεία, &c.

8. 8. μόνον γὰρ ἡ μὲν.

‘It is called by a neutral name, e.g. a constitution or commonwealth, for it is a mixture which aims only at uniting the freedom
of the poor and the wealth of the rich; ἐλευθερίας answering to ἀπόρων as πλούτου to εὐπώρων.

As in some other summaries of Aristotle the first division seems 9. 1–4. to be a general description of those which follow. (Cp. supra note on c. 4. § 24.) We cannot distinguish between 1 and 3, unless in one of them we suppose Aristotle to have in his mind a syncrétism of two general principles of government (see § 6), in the other an eclectic union of elements taken from different governments.

σύμβολον.

Something cut in two and capable of being put together, so that the parts fitted into one another; a die or coin or ring thus divided, which friends used as a token when desirous of renewing hospitality on behalf of themselves or others, and which was also used in buying or selling. See Schol. on Eur. Med. 613, οἱ ἐπιζεινούμενοι, ἀστράγαλον κατάτμιστες, βάτερον μὲν αὐτῶι κατείχον μέρος, βάτερον δὲ κατελισταν τοίς ὑποδεξαμένοις ἵνα εἰ δέοι πάλιν αὐτῶι ἢ τοὺς ἐκείνους ἐπιζεινοῦσαι πρὸς ἅλλους, ἐπαγόμενοι το ἡμαυν ἀστραγάλου, ἀνευόντο τίνι ξενίν. and cp. Plat. Symp. 191 D, ἀνθρώπου χύμβολον ἀτε τετρημένου... ἢ εἴς ἐνὸς δύο.

9. 2.

ἡ γὰρ ἁμφότερα ληπτέοι ἡν ἐκάτεροι νομοθετούσιν κ.τ.λ.

‘For either they must take the legislation of both.’ These words are resumed in εἰς μὲν οὖν οὖν τοῦ ἑυθείσθω τρόπος and followed by ἐτέροι δὲ in instead of repeating ἤ.

The first case is a union of extremes, the second a mean taken between them; the third seems to be only another example of the first.

ἐμφαίνεται γὰρ ἐκάτερον ἐν αὐτῷ τῶν ἄκρων.

9. 6.

From the democratical aspect a polity or timocracy has the appearance of an oligarchy or aristocracy; from the oligarchical aspect, of a democracy. Aristotle cites as an example of this many-sidedness the constitution of Lacedaemon, which he himself elsewhere (c. 7. § 4) calls an aristocracy, but which in this passage he acknowledges to have many features both of a democracy and of an oligarchy. Cp. Nic. Eth. ii. 7. § 8, ἐπιδικάζοντων οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας.
9. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ γέρωτας αἰροῦντα, τῆς δὲ ἐφορείας μετέχουσιν.
I.e. ‘The people choose the elders, but are not eligible themselves; and they share in the Ephorality.’ Whether they elected the Ephors is nowhere expressly said. We are only told that the mode of election was extremely childish (ii. 9. § 23).

10. ἐπειδὴ καὶ ταύτῃ τίθεμεν τῶν πολιτείων τι μέρος.
Tyrranny is not and is not a form of polity, in the sense in which the word ‘polity’ is used by Aristotle. Cp. c. 8. § 2, τέλευταίον δὲ περὶ τυραννίδος εὐλογόν ἐστιν ποιήσασθαι μνείαν διὰ τὸ πασῶν ἡμιστα ταύτῃ εἶναι πολιτείᾳ, ἡμῖν δὲ τὴν μέθοδον εἶναι περὶ πολιτείας.

10. περὶ μὲν οὖν βασιλείας διωρίσαμεν εν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις, εν οἷς περὶ τῆς μάλιστα λεγομένης βασιλείας ἐποιοῦμεθα τὴν σκέψιν.
Either ‘royalty’ commonly so called,’ or ‘the most truly called royalty,’ which would seem to be the παμβασιλεία. Cp. iii. c. 16.

10. τίνα καὶ πόθεν δεὶ κυβιστάναι, καὶ πῶς.
Two slightly different senses are here combined in δεὶ, 1) ‘what we ought to establish,’ and 2), incorrectly, ‘how or by what means we may or must establish it.’

10. τυραννίδος δὲ εἰδὴ δύο μὲν διελομεν εν οἷς περὶ βασιλείας ἐπεσκοποῦμεν.
Sc. iii. 14. §§ 6–10. The two forms of tyranny there mentioned are the hereditary monarchy of barbarians, and the Aesymnetia of ancient Hellas. The barbarian monarchs are here called elected sovereigns, though before spoken of as hereditary (iii. 14. § 6), and contrasted with the elected Aesymnetes of ancient Hellas, with whom they are here compared.

10. διὰ τὸ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπαλλάττειν πως αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν.
Not ‘because their powers in a manner change into one another, and pass into royalty;’ for the words ‘change into one another’ would not be a reason why they should be spoken of in connexion with royalty, but ‘because the power of either of these forms of tyranny easily passes likewise into royalty;’ likewise i.e. besides being forms of tyranny. For the use of ἐπαλλάττειν, cp. vi. 1. § 3; and i. 6. § 3.

10. τοσοῦτα διὰ τὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας.
εἰρημένας, sc. in the previous sentences. ‘There is more than
one kind of tyranny, because the tyrant may rule either with or without law, and over voluntary or involuntary subjects.'

Aristotle now proceeds to speak of the best average constitution 11. to which he alluded in c. 1. § 5.

τὸν μέσον ἀναγκαίων βιών εἶναι βελτιστόν, τῆς ἐκάστος ἐνδεχομένης 11. 3. τεχνῶν μεσότητος.

The gen. μεσότητος is a resumption of μέσον, and depends on βιών. Here, as in Nic. Eth. ii. 6. § 7, the mean is admitted to be relative.

tαύτα δὲ ἄμφοτέρα. Βλαβερά ταῖς πόλεσιν. 11. 5.

ἄμφοτέρα, sc. either 1) *‘their rogueries and their unwillingness to perform public duties, whether military or civil,’ or 2) simply ‘their dislike both of civil and military duties.’ It is possible also that ταύτα ἄμφοτέρα may refer to the μεγαλοπόνηροι and μικροπόνηροι, in which case the words ἤτι . . . ἄρχουσι are either inserted or misplaced.

The φιλαρχοὶ at Athens were the cavalry officers under the ἰππαρχοὶ. See Liddell and Scott. The term is also sometimes used to denote civil magistrates, as in v. 1. § 11 to describe the oligarchical rulers of Epidamnus. βουλαρχεῖν literally = ‘to be a chief of the senate.’ The word very rarely occurs, and can here only have a generalized meaning. William de Moerbeke, apparently finding in some Greek MS. φιλαρχοῦσι, translates by an obvious mistake, ‘minime amant principes et volunt esse principes.’ For the association of political inactivity with the idea of crime, cp. Solon’s law forbidding neutrality in a sedition (Plut. Solon 20), τῶν δ’ ἄλλων αὐτοῦ νόμων ἠδος μὲν μᾶλλον καὶ παράδοξος ὁ κελεύων ἄτιμον εἶναι τὸν ἐν στάσει μηθετέρας μερίδος γενόμενον: and Pericles in Thuc. ii. 40, μόνῳ γὰρ τὸν τε μηδὲν τῶνδε μετέχοντα οὐκ ἀπέφυγεν ἄλλ’ ἄχρειον νομίζομεν.

οἱ δὲ καθ’ ὑπερβολὴν ἐν ἐνδείᾳ τούτων ταπεινὸς λαῖν. 11. 6.

τοῦτος, sc. τῶν εὐτυχισμάτων κ.τ.λ. supra.

ἄρχεσθαι μὲν οὕσεσι ἄρχῃ. 11. 7.

Dative of the manner; ‘to be ruled in any fashion.’
11. 8. ὡσι' ἀναγκαῖον ἄριστα πολιτεύεσθαι ταύτην τὴν πόλιν ἐστὶν ἐξ ὧν φανεῖν φύσει τὴν σύστασιν εἶναι τῆς πόλεως.

'So that a city having [like and equal] citizens, who in our view are the natural components of it, will of necessity be best administered.' ταύτην, sc. τὴν ἐξ ἰσων καὶ ὅμοιων . . . ἐξ ὧν κ.π.λ.

11. 9. πολλὰ μέσοις ἄριστα.

'Many things are best to those who are in the mean;' or as we might say in modern phraseology, 'The middle class have many advantages.' Cp. Eur. Suppl. 238–245:—

τρεῖς γὰρ πολιτῶν μερίδες· οἱ μὲν ὄλθων ἀνωφελείς τε πλειόνω τ' ἐρῶν' άει·
oi δ' οὐκ ἔχοντες καὶ σπανίζοντες βίον,
δεινοί, νέμοντες τῷ φθόνῳ πλείον μέρος,
eis toûs ἔχοντας κεῖτρ' ἀφαίρως κακά,
γλώσσαις ποτηρῶν προστατῶν φηλούμενοι
τρεῖς δὲ μοιρῶν ἡ 'ν μέσον σωζεῖ πόλεις,
κόσμοι φυλάσσουσα ὅτιν' ἀν τάξιν πόλεις.

(Quoted by Oncken, ii. 225, note 1.)

11. 15. Σώλων τε γὰρ ἡ τοῦτον (ὅθελι δ' ἐκ τῆς ποιήσεως).

The passage referred to may be that quoted by Plutarch v. Solonis, c. 3,

πολλοὶ γὰρ πλουτεύσι κακοῖ, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πένονται,

ἀλλ' ἤμείς αὐτοῖς οὐ διαμειψόμεθα

tῆς ἀρετῆς τῶν πλοῦτων.

In classing Solon with the middle rank Aristotle appears to be thinking only of the tradition of his poverty and of the moderation inculcated in his poems. He has ignored or forgotten the tradition of his descent from Codrus.

11. 15. οὐ γὰρ ἦν βασιλεῖς.

The feebleness of the argument is striking; because Lycurgus, who was the guardian and is said also to have been the uncle of the king, was not a king, he is here assumed to be of the middle class! Cp. Plut. Cleom. 10, perhaps following this passage, νῦν δὲ τῆς ἀνάγκης ἔχειν συγκόλοισαν τῶν Δυκαλίων, ὡς οὕτε βασιλεῦσι ὡν, οὕτ' ἄρχον, ἱδιώτης δὲ βασιλεύειν ἐπιχειροῦ ἐν τοῖς ὕπολοις προήλθεν εἰς ἁγιοῦν ὡστε δεήσαντα τὸν βασιλέα Ἀρίσταρχον ἐπὶ βομών κατασφυγεῖν. Yet Plutarch
is inconsistent with himself; for he also says (Lyc. 3) that Lycurgus reigned for eight months, and resigned the royal office when the infant Charilaus was born.

"Ετί δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐν ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων τῆς 'Ελλάδος πρῶς τὴν παρ’ ι. 18, 19.

αὐτῶν ἑκάτεροι πολιτείαι ἀποβλέπουντες οἱ μὲν δημοκρατίας ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν καθίσταν, οἱ δὲ διληγαρχίας, οὐ πρῶς τὸ τῶν πόλεων συμφέρον ακοποῦντες ἀλλὰ πρῶς τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῶν. διότι δὲ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας ἡ μηδέποτε τὴν μέσην γίνεσθαι πολιτείαιν ἡ διληγαρχία καὶ παρ' ὀλίγοις.

Cp. Thuc. i. 19, 76, 99, 144, iii. 82 and elsewhere.

τῶν ἐν ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων. Either of the leading states, opposed to en taís pôleis the states of Hellas generally.

eis γὰρ ἀνὴρ συνεπείδηθα μόνος τῶν πρῶτοιν [ἐφ’ ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων] ι. 19.

taútn ἀποδοῦναι τὴν τάξιν.

The variety of opinions entertained by commentators respecting the person here alluded to, who has been supposed to be Lycurgus (Zeller), Theopompus (Sepulveda), Solon (Schlosser), Pittacus (Goettling), Phaleas (St. Hilaire), Gelo (Camerarius), the king Pausanias II (Congreve), Epaminondas (Eaton), Alexander the Great (Zeller formerly), seems to prove that we know nothing for certain about him. Of the various claimants Solon is the most probable. He is regarded by Aristotle (ii. 12. §§ 1–6) as a sort of conservative democrat, the founder of a balanced polity, whom he contrasts with Pericles and the later Athenian demagogues (cp. Solon Frag. 5, δήμοι μὲν γὰρ ἰδωκα τόσον κράτος ἄστον ἐπαρκεί). The omission of the name, and the words τῶν πρῶτον, tend to show that a well known and traditional legislator is meant. Yet it might be argued also that the phrase τῶν ἐφ’ ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων seems to describe some one holding the position of Lysander or Philip of Macedon in Hellas, rather than the legislator of any single city.

If ‘one man’ only gave this form of constitution to Hellas it must have been rare indeed or rather imaginary, cp. supra c. 7. § 1, διὰ τὸ μὴ πολλὰκις γίνεσθαι λαυβάνει. But how is this to be reconciled with c. 8. § 8?

ἐφ’ ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένων, ‘the leading men.’ For ἐπὶ cp. oi épi tois práphmason. (Dem.) But are not the words a copyist’s repetition of τῶν ἐν ἡγεμονίᾳ γενομένωι above?
11. 20. τις μὲν οὖν δρίστη πολιτεία, καὶ διὰ τιν' αἰτίαν.
Here, as limited in § 1, δρίστη ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι.
diὰ τιν’ αἰτίαν, i.e. the moderation and stability of the state. Cp. v. 1. § 16 where it is implied that the safety of democracy is due to its approximation to the μίσχον πολιτεία.

11. 21. λέγω δὲ τὸ πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν, ὅτι πολλάκις οὖσας ἄλλης πολιτείας αἱρετικέτερες εἰσὶν οὕτων κωλύσεις συμφέρειν ἐπέραν μᾶλλον εἶναι πολιτείαν.
'It may often happen that some constitution may be preferable [in itself] and some other better suited to the peculiar circumstances of some state.'
πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν here (as in c. 1. § 4) means any supposed or given constitution, which may not be the best possible under the circumstances, but is the one to be preferred, in some states of society.

12. 2. εὐδέχεται δὲ τὸ μὲν πολλοῖς ὑπάρχειν ἐτέρῳ μέρει τῆς πόλεως, εἴ δὲ ἑνεχθῆκε μερῶν ἡ πόλις.

'Namely to one of those parts which make up the state'; the clause εἴ δὲ ἑνεχθῆκε μερῶν ἡ πόλις is explanatory of ἐρέα μέρει ἐτέρῳ τῶν μερῶν.

12. 3. ὅπου ὑπερέχει τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων πλῆθος τῆς ἐλπιζόμενην ἀναλογίαν.

'When the poor exceed in number the [due] proportion implied in the last words.'

12. 3. καὶ τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τῶν αὐτῶν τρόπον ἐκαστὸν εἶδος κατὰ τὴν ὑπερεχὴ τοῦ ὀλιγαρχικοῦ πλῆθους.

'And in like manner (not only oligarchy in general, but) each sort of oligarchy varies according to the predominance of each sort of oligarchical population (sc. ὃ ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ).

12. 5. πάνταχον δὲ πιστότατος ὁ διαυτής, διαυτής δὲ ὁ μέσος.

The middle class are the arbiters between the extremes of oligarchy and democracy. When Aristotle calls the arbiter ὁ μέσος, this is probably meant in the same sense in which δικαστής is said to be a mean because it fixes a mean. Cp. Nic. Eth. v. 5. § 17, ἡ δὲ δικαστικὴ μεσότης ἐστὶν οὕ τον αὐτὸν τρόπον ταῖς πρότεροι ἀρεταῖς, ἀλλ' ὁτι μέσου ἐστίν, and v. 4. § 7, Διὸ καὶ ὅταν ἀμφισβητῶσιν.
NOTES, BOOK IV. 13.

N. 12. 6. 
Aristotle gives no reason for this statement. He may have thought that the designs of an oligarchy are more deeply laid and corrupting, while the fickleness of the multitude is in some degree a corrective to itself. The oligarchies of Hellas were certainly worse than the democracies: the greatest dishonesty of which the Athenians were guilty in the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. iv. 23) is far less hateful than the perfidy of the Spartans narrated Id. iv. 80. The cruelty of the four hundred or of the thirty tyrants strikingly contrasts on both occasions with the moderation of the democracy which overthrew them.

It is a curious question, which we have not the means of answering, whether all these artifices (σοφίσματα) are historical facts or only inventions of Aristotle, by which he imagines that the democracy or oligarchy might weaken the opposite party. Some of them, such as the pay to the people, we know to have been used at Athens: but there is no historical proof, except what may be gathered from this passage, that the richer members of an oligarchical community were ever compelled under a penalty to take part in the assembly, or in the law courts. Cp. infra p. 178 note: also c. 15. § 14–18.

13. 2.
Yet the penalty had been relatively as well as absolutely greater or smaller, or the rich would have had no more reason for going than the poor for abstaining. The meaning is not that Charondas inflicted a larger fine on the rich and a proportionally small one on the poor for absence from the assembly; but generally that he adapted his fines to the circumstances of offenders.

13. 8.
The connexion is as follows: 'The qualification must be such
as will place the government in the hands of a majority [and then there will be no danger]: for the poor, even though they are not admitted to office, will be quiet enough if they are not outraged.'

13. 9. ἐν Μαλιεύσι δὲ ἡ μὲν πολιτεία ἤν ἐκ τούτων κ.τ.λ.

'Among the Malians the governing or larger body was elected from those who were past service, the magistrates from those on actual service'; the past tense (ἤν) has been thought to imply that the government had changed possibly in consequence of Philip and Alexander's conquests: compare a similar use of the past, v. 1. § 11 respecting the government of Epidamnus, and note.

13. 10. ὡστ' ἐν τοῖς ἐπείσιν εἶναι τὴν ἵσχυν.

Yet the tendency of some of the Greek states to the use of cavalry was as much due to the suitability of large regions, such as Thessaly, for the breeding and support of horses, as to the form of government. Nor can the remark be true of Greek oligarchies in general, considering how ill suited the greater part of Hellas was to the training or use of horses. Cp. supra c. 3. § 3, a passage in which Aristotle has made a similar observation.

13. 11. ἀσ νῦν καλοίμεν πολιτείας, οἱ πρῶτοι ἐκάλουν δημοκρατίας.

I.e. what appeared to the older Greeks to be a large governing class was to the later Greeks a small or moderate one.

13. 11. κατὰ τὴν σύνταξιν μᾶλλον ὑπέμενον τὸ ἀρχεσθαι.

1*) Some word like ἀσθενεῖς has to be supplied from ὀλίγοι ἀντι τὸ πλῆθος before κατὰ τὴν σύνταξιν; or 2) κατὰ τὴν σύνταξιν may be taken after ὑπέμενον, 'and also through a (want of) organization, they were more willing to endure the dominion of others.'

14. 1. Πάλιν δὲ καὶ κουὴ καὶ χωρίς περὶ ἐκάστης λέγομεν περὶ τῶν ἐφεξῆς, λαβόντες ὑπὶ τὴν προσήκουσαν αὐτῶν.

From a consideration of the differences between states, and the causes of them, Aristotle in his accustomed manner, proceeding from the whole to the parts, passes on to consider the mode in which different powers are constituted in states, cc. 14–16. He will hereafter show how the wholes are affected by the parts.
NOTES, BOOK IV. 14.

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A somewhat similar discussion occurs in bk. vi. c. 8. See note on vi. 1. § 1.

ἐστι δὲ τῶν τριῶν τούτων (sc. μορίων) ἐν μὲν τι τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ 14. 2.
tῶν κοινῶν, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς (τούτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἃς δεὶ καὶ τίνων
ἐναι κυρίας, καὶ πολίων των δὲ γίνεσθαι τὴν αὑρεσίν αὐτῶν), τρίτον δὲ τι τὸ
dικαίον.

Aristotle divides the state, much as we should do, into three parts, 1) the legislative, (which has in certain cases power over in-
dividuals; see infra § 3) : 2) the administrative or executive : 3) the
judicial. The words τούτο δὲ ἐστὶν seem to refer back to δεὶ θεορεῖν
tὸν νομοθέτην. But if so there is a verbal irregularity. For the
duties and modes of appointment to offices are not a part of the
state, but questions relating to a part of the state.

τι not interrogative, to be taken closely with ἐν and with τρίτον.

Nothing more is known about Telecles. From the manner in 14. 4.
which he is spoken of he appears to have been an author rather
than a legislator. ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τοῦ Τῆλεκλέους is said like ἐν τῇ
πολιτείᾳ τοῦ Πλάτωνος, ii. 1. § 3, iv. 4. § 11.

ἔως ἄν διέλθῃ.

Some word implying the right of succession to office has to be
supplied, e.g. ἥ ἀρχὴ from τὰς ἀρχὰς. The same phrase occurs infra
c. 15. § 17.

14. 4.

συνέναι δὲ μόνον

is governed by εἰς μὲν τρόπος above.

14. 4.

ἄλλος δὲ τρόπος κ.τ.λ.

A reduplication of the preceding, although there may also be a
shade of distinction in the greater stress which is laid upon voting
and scrutinies. Here, as in other places (c. 4. §§ 22–24 ; c. 6.
§§ 3, 4), we have a difficulty in discriminating Aristotle's differences.
There is only an incomplete order in the catalogue of democracies.
First of all comes the most moderate, in which the assembly plays
a very subordinate part, then two more which are almost indis-
tinguishable, lastly the most extreme.

14. 6.
14. 6. ὅτα δ’ ἄλλα τᾶς ἀρχὰς διοικεῖν αἱρετὰς σοφᾶς, ὅσας ἐνδέχεται τοιαύτα ἐστὶν ὅσα ἀρχεῖν ἀναγκαῖον τοὺς ἐπιστημένους.

The words ὅσας ἐνδέχεται can only mean ‘as many elective offices as can be allowed to exist in a democracy consistently with the democratic principle of electing the magistrates by lot.’ The excepted magistracies will be those in which special skill or knowledge is required. Cp. vi. 2. § 5, τὸ κληρωτικὸς εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ πᾶσας ἢ ὅσαι μὴ ἐμπειρίας δεόνται καὶ τίχνης. Sussemihl has introduced κληρωτικὰς ὅπως ἐνδέχεται κληρωτικὸς εἶναι τοιαύτα ἐστὶν referring to αἱρετὰς. But the change has no MS. authority, and though ingenious is unnecessary.

14. 8. fin. ὅταν δὲ μὴ πάντες τοῦ βουλευόσαυτι μετέχωσιν ἄλλ’ αἱρετοί, κατὰ νόμον δὲ ἀρχασιν ὅσπερ καὶ πρότερον, ὀλιγαρχίκον.

Opposed to the milder πολιτικὴ ὀλιγαρχία in the previous sentence, and repeated with greater emphasis in the words which follow ὀλιγαρχίκων ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν τίχνην ταύτην (§ 9). μὴ πάντες, i.e. ‘not all [who possess the required qualification].’ Yet these latter words, which are necessary to the sense, are wanting in the text.

14. 8–10. Compare for several verbal resemblances, supra c. 5.

14. 10. τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἀρχαντες, καὶ οὕτω ς αἱρετοὶ ἡ κληρωτοὶ.

For in an aristocracy or oligarchy, as in a democracy, a magistrate might be elected by lot, but only out of a select class.

14. 10. ἀριστοκρατία μὲν ἡ πολιτεία.

Aristocracy is elsewhere said to include numbers, wealth, and virtue; here the aristocratical element seems to reside in the magistrates who have superior merit, and control the whole administration of the state except war, peace, and the taking of scrutinies.

Compare c. 7. § 3; c. 8. §§ 3, 9, in which the near connexion between aristocracy and polity is pointed out.

14. 11. διήρθηται μὲν οὖν τὸ βουλευόμενον πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας τούτων τὸν τρόπον, καὶ διοικεῖ ἐκάστη πολιτεία κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον διορισμόν.

κατὰ τὸν εἰρημένον διορισμόν, i.e. each constitution will be variously administered according to some one of the principles on which
the governing body is elected, e.g. out of some, or out of all; and as acting either according to law, or without law, etc.

Διωκέται has been changed into διώκετε and διωκείται, for which latter there is perhaps the authority of Moerbeke, who reads διώκετον. But no change is needed. For use of διωκεῖν, cp. v. 10. § 36.


Aristotle remembering the short life of the extreme democracy which is above law, proposes various ways of strengthening or moderating it; he would have the notables take part in the assembly; and he would enforce their attendance by the imposition of penalties analogous to the fines which the oligarchy inflict on judges for neglect of their duties. (Cp. v. cc. 8, 9 on the preserving principles of state.)

Of the advantage of combining the few with the many there can be no question: but will the upper classes ever be induced to take an active part in a democracy? They have not done so in France or America; may we hope that they will in England?

ἀποκληροῦν τῶν πλείους.

I.e. he on whom the lot fell was not included, but excluded until the numbers were sufficiently reduced.

ἀποστάνεται δὲ καὶ πρεσβευταί.

'Even ambassadors, whom we might be more inclined to call magistrates, and who are elected by lot, are ἑτερον τε παρὰ τὰς πολιτικὰς ἀρχὰς.'

15. 3.

(sc. ἐπιμελεῖται implied in ἐπιμελεῖται.

ἀλλὰ ταύτα διαφέρει πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις οὐδὲν ὡς εἶπεν' οὐ γὰρ πω 15. 4.

κρίσις γέγονεν ἀμφισβητοῦσιν περὶ τοῦ ὅνυματος. ἐχεῖ δὲ τιν' ἄλλην διανοητικὴν πραγματείαν.

'Verbal questions, such as the definition of an office, are of no practical importance, although some intellectual interest may attach to them.' ἄλλην is redundant.

15. 5.

μᾶλλον ἢν τις ἀπορήσειε.

I.e. rather than dispute about the name.
15. 6. βελτιων ἐκαστον ἔργον τυγχάνει τῇς ἐπιμελείας μονοπραγματοῦσης ἥ
poluprargmatoûsas.

15. 9. καὶ πότερον κατὰ τὸ πράγμα δεῖ διαμεῖν ἥ κατὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, λέγω δὲ
οἶν ἕνα τῆς ἐυκοσμίας, ἥ παιδων ἄλλον καὶ γυναικῶν.

Two offices are mentioned in the latter part of the sentence: cp. infra § 13, παιδονόμος καὶ γυναικονόμος: and vi. 8. § 22, ἰδίᾳ δὲ ταῖς σχολαστικωτέραις καὶ μᾶλλον εὐημερούσαις πόλεσιν ... γυναικονομία
... παιδονομία κ.τ.λ.

15. 10. ἔτεραι ἐν ἑτέραις, οἷον ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἀριστοκρατίαις ἐκ πεπαθημάτων.

‘Differing,’ i.e. in the character of those from whom the election is made. Though the word ἔτεραι is inaccurate, the meaning is the same as that of ἐτέρων, which Susemihl, on very slight authority, has introduced into the text.

15. 10. πότερον διαφέρει ... ἡ τυγχάνουσι μὲν τινες οὗται καὶ κατ’ αὐτὰς τὰς
διαφορὰς τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἵττι δ’ ὡς τομον συμφέρουσιν αἱ αὐταί.

The alternative πότερον διαφέρει κ.τ.λ. is repeated and expanded. ‘Are offices the same in different states, or not the same? Are they the same, but elected out of different classes in aristocracy, monarchy, oligarchy, democracy? Or do the offices differ naturally according to the actual differences in forms of government, the same offices being sometimes found to agree and sometimes to disagree with different forms of government, and having a lesser power in some states and a greater in others? For example, has the president of the assembly, in whatever way appointed, the same functions at Sparta and at Athens? Are not probuli suited to an oligarchy, a censor of boys and women to an aristocracy, a council to a democracy? And will they be equally suited to other forms, or may not their powers require to be extended or narrowed?’

According to this explanation the natural order of the words is somewhat inverted, for τῶν ἀρχῶν is taken with τινες: and with κατ’
aυτὰς τὰς διαφορὰς has to be supplied τῶν πολιτειῶν from κατὰ τὰς
πολιτείας supra. We may also supply πολιτείας with τινες, and translate ‘may not some states essentially derive their character from offices.’ But the abrupt transition to a new subject (ἀρχαί)
in the next clause shows this way of taking the passage to be inadmissible.

Bekker (2nd Edit.) after Victorius reads διαφοραί for τὰς διαφοράς.

ὅτι ἦ τῶν προβούλων αὐτὴ γὰρ οὐ δημοκρατικὴ.

προβούλω, as he says vi. § 17, are oligarchical officers, because they alone have the initiative, and, therefore, the people cannot of themselves make any change in the constitution; supra c. 14. § 14.

ἐστὶ δὴ αἱ διαφοραί κ.τ.λ.

The meaning of the text may be illustrated by the following scheme:

οἱ τρεῖς ὅροι.

i. τίνες οἱ καθιστάντες τὰς ἀρχὰς.
   a) ἡ πάντες.
   b) ἡ τινὲς.
   c) ἡ τὰς μὲν πάντες, τὰς δὲ τινὲς.

ai treis diaforai.

ii. ἢ πᾶντον.
   a) ἡ ἐκ πάντων.
   b) ἡ ἐκ τινῶν ἀφωμισμένων.
   c) ἡ τὰς μὲν ἐκ πάντων, τὰς δὲ ἐκ τινῶν.

al treis diaforai.

iii. τίνα τρόπον.
   a) ἡ αἱρέσει.
   b) ἡ κλήρῳ.
   c) ἡ τὰς μὲν αἱρέσει, τὰς δὲ κλήρῳ.

al treis diaforai.

οἱ δώδεκα τρόποι.

1. πάντες ἐκ πάντων αἱρέσει.
2. πάντες ἐκ πάντων κλήρῳ.
3. πάντες ἐκ τινῶν αἱρέσει.
4. πάντες ἐκ τινῶν κλήρῳ.

ai tesaires tropou

Ai.tines ek panton airisei.
B. tines ek panton klhrw.
C. tines ek tinvwn airisei.
D. tines ek tinvwn klhrw.

ai tesaires tropou

a. tais mwn archas pantes, tais
dei tines ek panton airisei.
b. tais mwn pantes, tais dei tines
ek panton klhrw.
g. tais mwn pantes, tais dei tines
ek tinvwn airisei.
d. tais mwn pantes, tais dei tines
ek tinvwn klhrw.

All, or some, or all and some, elect out of all, or some, or out of all and some, by vote or by lot; or by vote and by lot.
The three modes give rise to twelve possible varieties:

All elect by vote out of all,
   by lot out of all,
   by vote out of some,
   by lot out of some;

Some elect by vote out of all,
   by lot out of all,
   by vote out of some,
   by lot out of some;

All and some elect by vote out of all,
   by lot out of all,
   by vote out of some,
   by lot out of some;

and to the two further combinations (οἱ δὲ συνδυασμοὶ): partly by vote and partly by lot, partly out of all and partly out of some.

It is not to be supposed that, even in such a ‘bazaar of constitutions’ (Plat. Rep. viii. 557 D) as Hellas furnished, all these different forms of government were really to be found. Aristotle derives them not from his experience of history, but out of the abundance of his logic.

15. 15. ἄστερ ἐν Μεγάραις.

Cp. v. 3. § 5 and 5. § 4, where the overthrow of the Megarian democracy is attributed to the corruption and oppression practised by demagogues; also Thuc. iv. 74 (though it is not certain whether Aristotle is speaking of the return of the exiles there mentioned or of some earlier or later one); and Arist. Poet. c. 3. § 5. 1448 a. 32, where he refers to an ancient democracy existing in Megara, of which the recent establishment is deplored by Theognis, line 53 ff., Bergk. There was an alliance between Athens and Megara in 458 (Thuc. i. 103, 114), which terminated at the battle of Coronea 447; probably during the alliance, but not afterwards, Megara was governed by a democracy. In the eighth year of the Peloponnesian War the oligarchs were in exile, but were restored by the influence of Brasidas. In the year b.c. 375 the democracy had been re-established: Diod. xv. 40.
The vote is considered less democratic than the lot: both are admissible in a democracy, but it is essential to its very nature that all should elect. If any limitation takes place the government becomes an aristocracy or a polity, which alike tend to oligarchy in so far as they reduce the number of electors or of persons who are eligible, though differing in other respects. When some only appoint, in whatever manner, out of all, or all out of some, and the elections do not take place all at once (ἀμα, i.e. when the governing body retire by rotation), we have a constitutional government, which inclines to an aristocracy when the two opposite principles of ‘some out of some’ and ‘some out of all’ are combined. The high oligarchical doctrine is ‘some out of some, by vote or by lot or by both,’ the lot being employed in an oligarchy, as in a democracy, to exclude favour or merit. Cp. v. 3. § 9.

If genuine, is used in a pregnant sense—καθιστασθα, the construction being changed from the active, which is resumed in the clause which follows, to the neuter or passive. Though the word appears to disturb the sentence, it is found in all the MSS.

διαγραφικότερον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐκ ἄμφοι, 15. 20.

ἐκ ἄμφοι seems naturally to mean τὸς μὲν ἐκ πάντων, τὸς δὲ ἐκ τῶν, cp. § 19 fin. But if so the same words which here describe the oligarchical government, are applied in the next sentence to the polity or constitutional government which inclines to aristocracy. Nor can any reason be given why the election ‘out of all and out of some’ should be ‘more oligarchical’ than the election out of some. Another way of taking the words is to explain ἐκ ἄμφοι as a double election. But in this passage ἐκ is always used to introduce the persons out of whom the election is made; and therefore ἐκ ἄμφοι could not = ἄμφοι. Some corruption of the text is probable; the numerous repetitions are likely to have confused the eye of the copyist. τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἄμφοι is the ingenious and probably true emendation of Mr. Evelyn Abbott. If the principle of ‘some out of some’ is maintained, the election in both ways, i.e. by vote out of persons elected by lot, or by lot out of persons
elected by vote, would clearly be more oligarchical than the simple election by vote or by lot.

15. 21. \(\mu \eta\ \gamma e\nu\omega\mu e\nu o\nu \delta' \omicron\omega\iota\sigma\mu\iota\varsigma,\)
   sc. \(\alpha\lambda\iota\gamma\alpha\rphi\eta\kappa\iota\varsigma,\) These words which are translated in the text 'though not equally oligarchical if taken by lot' would be better rendered 'and equally oligarchical if not appointed by lot' (Stahr); that is to say, whether appointed by vote or by lot they would equally retain their oligarchical character, if some were chosen out of some. \(\mu \eta\) must be taken with \(\gamma e\nu\omega\mu e\nu o\nu\).

15. 21. \(t\iota\nu\alpha\varsigma \epsilon k\ \tau\iota\nu\omega\nu \alpha\mu\phi\omicron\iota\).
   'In both ways,' sc. \(\kappa\lambda\iota\rho\iota\phi\varsigma\ kai\ \alpha\iota\rho\epsilon\sigma\iota\).

15. 22. \(t\iota\nu\ a\de\ \tau\iota\si\ \sigma\mu\mu\phi\iota\feta\iota\ kai\ \tau\iota\omicron\ \de\iota\ \gamma\iota\nu\e\nu\sigma\theta\ai\ \tau\alpha\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\sigma\tau\alpha\varsigma\iota\varsigma\ \alpha\mu\a e\tau\a s\ \delta\nu\n\alpha\mu\mu\ae\iota\ \tau\iota\nu\ \a\rho\chi\o\nu\ \tau\iota\nu\eps e\iota\in,\ \varsigma\tau\a e\ \fau\nu\e\rho\oi\).
   Neither the reading nor the meaning of this passage is quite certain. Some MSS. and the old translation omit* kai before \(\tau\iota\nu\), thus referring \(\tau\iota\nu\eps e\iota\in\) to \(\delta\nu\n\alpha\mu\mu\ae\iota\). If with Bekker and several MSS. we retain kai before \(\tau\iota\nu\eps e\iota\in\), the words may receive different interpretations. Either 1), 'how to establish them and what their powers and their nature are will be manifest,' i.e. need no explanation; or 2), 'we shall know how to establish them and their nature when we know their powers.'

16. 3. \(t\o\ \epsilon\nu\ \Phi\rho\e\nu\a\tau\tau\omicron\iota\ \delta\iota\kappa\alpha\sigma\tau\eta\iota\rho\iota\nu\).
   Nothing certain is known about this court; it is here spoken of only as a matter of tradition. The cases of which it took cognizance were rare, and therefore it is not strange that the court which tried them should have become obsolete. According to Pausanias (i. 28. § 12) Phreattys was a spot in the Piraeus near the sea, whither banished persons, against whom some fresh accusation was brought after their banishment, went to defend themselves out of a ship before judges who were on the land. This explanation is repeated by several of the scholiasts; but Aristotle, with much greater probability, supposes the banished man to offer himself for trial of the original offence. So in Plat. Laws ix. 866 D, a law is proposed, probably founded on some ancient custom, that the banished homicide, if wrecked upon his
native shore, should sit with his feet in the sea, until he found an opportunity of sailing.

ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἀφείσθω καὶ τῶν φονικῶν καὶ τῶν ξεινικῶν, περὶ δὲ 16. 5. τῶν πολιτικῶν λέγομεν, περὶ δὲν μὴ γινομένων καλῶς διαστάσεις γίνονται καὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν αἱ κυρίεις.

This sentence appears to be out of place; for no special mention occurs of political causes in what follows; but the writer at once returns to his former subject, and treats the appointment of judges on the same principles which he has applied to the appointment of other magistrates. It is possible that they connect with the beginning of Book v, and that the rest of the chapter is only a repetition in an altered form of c. 15. §§ 17–22.

οἱ τρόποι τέταρτος.

The scheme on which judges are appointed, though abridged, is the same as that on which magistrates are appointed; and the various modes correspond in like manner to different forms of government.

The judicial institutions of a country reflect the political, but with a difference. The legislature is active, the courts of law are passive; they do not move until they are set in motion, they deal with particular cases which are brought before them by others; and through these only do they rise to general principles. They do not make laws, but interpret them; nor can they set aside a law unless by appealing to a higher law. They are the conservative element of the state, rooted in habit and precedent and tradition.

But there is also a certain analogy between the political and judicial institutions of a country. In a free state the law must be supreme, and the courts of law must exercise an independent authority; they must be open and public, and they must include a popular element. They represent the better mind of the nation, speaking through certain fixed forms; and they exercise indirectly a considerable influence upon legislation. They have their place also in the education of the people: for they, above all other instructors, teach the lesson of justice and impartiality and truth. As good actions produce good habits in the individual, so the
laws of a state grow and strengthen and attain consistency by the decisions of courts.

That Aristotle was not ignorant of the connexion between the judicial and political institutions of a people is shown by his remark that 'Solon established the democracy when he constituted the dicasteries out of the whole people' (ii. 12. § 2).
BOOK V.

The first sentence implies that we are approaching the end of 1. 1. the treatise; but see Essay on the Structure of the Aristotelian Writings.

ἐτι δὲ σωθρίαι τῖνες καὶ κοινῆ καὶ χωρίς ἐκάστης εἰσίν, ἐτι δὲ διὰ τίνων 1. 1. ἄν μᾶλλον σῶζοντο τῶν πολιτείων ἐκάστης.

The latter of these two clauses is bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd edition as being a mere repetition of the preceding. If spurious it is probably a duplicate incorporated from some other ancient form of the text, not a gloss. But Aristotle often draws over-subtle logical distinctions, and in striving after completeness he may easily have written σωθρίαι τίνες and διὰ τίνων ἄν σῶζομα, with little or no difference of meaning between them.

dei de πρῶτον ἵπποιδεῖν τὴν ἄρχήν.

The last words may be either 1) taken adverbially; or 2)* may be the accusative after ἵπποιδεῖν. 1) 'We must in the first place begin by conceiving,' or 2)* 'we must in the first place conceive our starting point to be.'

το δίκαιον καὶ τὸ καθ’ ἀναλογίαν ἴσον.

In Bekker's 2nd edition καὶ is altered to ἴσοι without MSS. authority. The sense thus obtained would coincide with the conception of justice in the Nic. Eth. v. 3. § 8.

But the same thought is less accurately expressed by the text. The καὶ here, as elsewhere in Aristotle, may be taken in the sense of id est. Cp. Nic. Eth. i. 6. § 2, τὸ δὲ καθ’ αὐτὸ καὶ ἦν οὖσα χρὴ τοῦ πρῶτον τῇ φώσει τοῦ πρός τι: Metaph. iv. 14, 1020 b. 3, τὰ ἀκίνητα καὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ where τὰ ἀκίνητα = τὰ μαθηματικά. And it may be further argued that the more general form of words is better suited to this
passage. For Aristotle is here expressing not his own opinion but the consensus of mankind. And although the democrat in some sense acknowledges proportional equality, he would hardly go so far as to say that justice is identical with it. The reading of the MSS. is therefore preferable.

In Book iii. cc. 9 and 12 it has been assumed that justice and proportionate equality, not mere class interests, are the principles on which the state is based and which give a right to citizenship. Aristotle proceeds to show how the neglect or misconception of these principles leads to the overthrow of states.

1. 4. οἱ δ' ὁσ ἀνισοί ὑνες πλεονεκτεῖν ἔτοι τὸ γὰρ πλέον ἀνισον.

The last words are an explanation of πλεονεκτεῖν. Cp. Nic. Eth. v. 2. § 9, τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλέον ἀπὰν ἀνισον, τὸ δὲ ἀνισον οὐ πᾶν πλέον.

1. 5. ἡμαρτημέναι δὲ ἀπλῶς εἰσὶ.

Spengel reads ἡμαρτημέναι δὲ τοῦ ἀπλῶς, though there is no trace of variation in the MSS. Nearly the same meaning may be elicited from the text as it stands: 'They are perversions, when regarded simply,' i.e. 'by an absolute standard of justice'; that is to say, their justice is relative to aristocracy, oligarchy or democracy, and hence becomes a cause of revolution.

1. 8. Διὸ καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ γίγνονται διχῶς.

The commentators are puzzled to find a connexion for these words, which the various reading δικαιος shows to have been an ancient difficulty. Either 1) the particle δι is attributable to the superabundance of logical expression and therefore is not to be strictly construed; or to the condensation of two clauses into one, the word δικαίος referring to what follows: 'Hence arise changes; and in two ways.' Or 2) we must gather, however obscurely indicated, out of what has preceded some distinction corresponding to that between changes of forms of government and changes of persons and parties under the same form of government. Love of equality may perhaps be thought to lead to a change of the constitution; impatience of inequality to a change of persons and offices. But this connexion of ideas, if intended, is not clearly stated. It would be rash, after the manner of some editors (Con-
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ring, Susemihl, etc.), in a book like Aristotle's Politics to infer a ‘lacuna’ between the words στάσεων εἰσὶν and ὅθεν στασιάζοντος from the want of connexion.

ὤσπερ ἐν Δακεδαίμονι φασι Λύσανδρόν τινες ἐπιχειρήσατι καταλύσαι τῇν 1. 10. βασιλείαν.

Cp. Plut. Lys. 24–26 for an account (partly taken from Ephorus and wearing rather an improbable appearance) of the manner in which Lysander by the aid of oracles and religious imposture conspired to overturn the monarchy of Sparta and to throw open the office of king to the whole family of the Heraclidae, of which he was himself a member; or, according to another statement, to all the Spartans.

Παυσανίας τὸν βασιλέα.

He was not king, though of the royal family; cp. Thuc. i. 132, ἄνδρα γένους τε τοῦ βασιλείου ἄντα καὶ ἐν τῷ παρὰ την ἤχοντα (Πλεισταρχον γὰρ τὸν Δεσπίδον ἄντα βασιλέα καὶ νέον ἐτὶ ἀνεψιός ὄν ἐπετρόπευν). The same mistake is repeated in vii. 14. § 20.

καὶ ἐν 'Επιδάμνῳ δὲ μετέβαλεν ἡ πολιτεία κατὰ μάριον ἀντὶ γὰρ τῶν 1. 10, 11. φυλάρχων βουλῆν ἐποίησαν. εἰς δὲ τὴν Ἡλιαίαν ἐπάναγκις ἐστιν ἐτὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι βασιλέων τὰς ἀρχὰς, ὅταν ἐπιφημίζεται ἀρχὴ τις. Ὀλυμπιακοῦ δὲ καὶ οὗ ἄρχων ὁ εἰς ἕν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταύτῃ.

The revolution at Epidamnus was only partial. The change of φυλάρχων into a βουλή made the state less oligarchical. Cp. vi. 8. § 17, καλεῖται δὲ [τὸ κύριον τῆς πολιτείας] ἐνθα μὲν πρόξυνοι ... ὅπως δὲ πλῆθος ἐστι βουλή μᾶλλον. But according to an ancient custom in the governing body the magistrates (τὰς ἀρχὰς = τοὺς ἄρχοντας) were required to go to the Heliaeae at every election—this relic of oligarchy survived in the democracy. A like oligarchical spirit was indicated in the appointment of ‘the single magistrate’ (cp. iii. 16. § 1).

It is also possible to take the words in another way, connecting τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι with εἰς τὴν Ἡλιαίαν instead of with τὰς ἀρχὰς.

'It was compulsory that the magistrates should attend the assembly of the ruling classes, when a certain magistracy took a vote re-
quiring it. Which of the two modes of translating the passage is correct, we can only guess, as we have no independent knowledge of the procedure mentioned. The latter is the mode of taking them adopted by Müller (Dorians, iii. 9. § 6); but the use of ἡμιᾶς simply in the sense of an assembly, and not as a proper name, and therefore its construction with τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτείματι is doubtful.

τῶν ἐν τῷ πολιτείματι. Either 1)* the ruling class; or better 2) the governing body. The two meanings cannot always be clearly distinguished. Cp. c. 6. § 11; iv. 6. § 9 and v. 4. § 2. Compare also iii. 7. § 2, ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ πολιτείμα συμμαίνει ταύτων, πολιτείμα δ’ ἔστι τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων, and infra v. 8. § 5, τοῖς ἔξω τῆς πολιτείας καὶ τοῖς ἐν τῷ πολιτείματι, which show that the two meanings of πολιτείμα, as of πολιτεία, like the two senses of the English word ‘government’ or ‘state,’ pass into one another. The genitive is partitive.

ὁ ἀρχων ὁ εἰς ἕν. ἕν is omitted in several MSS. and is not confirmed by iii. 16. § 1, (. . . πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν ἕνα κύριον τῆς διοικήσεως· τοιαύτῃ γὰρ ἀρχῇ τίς ἔστι καὶ περὶ Ἐπιδαμνοῦ) where Aristotle speaks of the single Archon at Epidamnus, not in the past, but in the present tense. Yet it is not impossible that he may have spoken of an office which had recently existed at Epidamnus, first, in the present, and afterwards, more correctly, in the past tense.

1. 11. πανταχοῦ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἄνισον ἡ στάσις· οὐ μὴν τοῖς ἄνισοις ὑπάρχει ἀνάλογον ἀδίοιο γὰρ βασιλεία ἄνισος, εὰν ἐν ἦν ἵδεις ἑλως γὰρ τὸ ἴσον ζητούντες σταυριάζουσιν.

οὐ μὴν . . . ἵδεις is a parenthetical explanation of the word ἄνισον.
1) ‘Certainly to unequals there is no proportion.’ According to this way of taking the passage ἀνάλογον is the nom. to ὑπάρχει.
2) Others supply τὸ ἄνισον from the preceding sentence (sc. ὑπάρχει ἀνάλογον). *I mean the inequality in which there is no proportion.’ This is illustrated by an example. 3) Others again connect ἀνάλογον with τοῖς ἄνισοις. ‘Not that real inequality exists among those who are only proportionately unequal.’ According to any explanation the connexion is harsh: and therefore there is some reason for suspecting that a marginal note has crept into the text.

1. 13. The punctuation of Bekker, who places a comma after το κατ’
The antecedent of ταύτα is wealth and poverty, latent in δῆμος and ὀλιγαρχία. The conj. τάναντια, adopted by Bekker following Lambinus in his 2nd Edition, is unnecessary.

'But there are in many places a large class of poor.' Some MSS. read ἔποροι, some omit πολλοὶ, and it has been contended by Stahr that ἔποροι δὲ καὶ ἔποροι πολλαχοῖ is the true reading. But the text, which is the reading of several Greek MSS. and is confirmed by Moerbeke, is better.

ὁ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν.

ὁ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν. is here used for the oligarchical party, τοῖς ὀλίγους, parallel to δῆμος in the previous clause, although in the preceding sentence the same word means a form of government—an example of Aristotle's transitional and uncertain use of language.

This reflection is hardly justified by modern experience either of the Italian Republics, which swarmed with factions and conspiracies, or of France in the first French revolution, or of England under the Commonwealth, or of Switzerland in the war of the Sonderbund, or of N. America in the war of North and South, or of the S. American Republics. Differences of character, climate, religion, race, affect democracies as well as other forms of government.
1. 16. ἤτι δὲ ἢ ἐκ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ δῆμου ἢ τῶν ὀλίγων, ἡπερ ἐστὶν ἀσφαλεστάτη τῶν τοιούτων πολιτείων.

Aristotle is giving a further reason why democracy is safer than oligarchy, because it more nearly approximates to the μέση πολιτεία, which is the safest of all such forms of government, [i.e. of all except the perfect one]. Cp. iv. 11. § 14.

ἡπερ refers to ἢ ἐκ τῶν μέσων πολιτεία. τοιούτων = the imperfect forms.

An obscurity arises from the inversion of the subject. The sentence = δῆμος ἐγγυτέρω τῆς τῶν μέσων πολιτείας ἢ τῶν ὀλίγων ἢ τῆς τῶν μέσων πολιτείας. The meaning would be improved if, as in some MSS., ἢ before τῶν ὀλίγων was omitted.

2. 1. The πῶς ἔχοντες, τίνων ἄρχει, τίνες ἀρχαί τῶν στάσεων are the material, final and efficient causes of revolutions.

2. 2. περὶ ἢς ἢδη τυγχάνομεν εἰρηκότες.

Sc. in what he has said about ἵσον and ἄνισον in the previous chapter.

2. 4. αἱ δ’ αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαί τῶν κυνήσεων, οἷον αὐτοὶ τε διατίθενται τῶν εἰρημένων τρόπων καὶ περὶ τῶν λεχθέντων, ἢτι μὲν ὡς τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐπτα τυγχάνουσιν οὕτω, ἢτι δ’ ὡς πλείους.

The seven causes are κέρδος, τιμή, ὑγιεινό, φόβος, ἑπεροχή, καταφρόνησις, αὐξήσις παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογον. Or, according to another way of reckoning (ἀλλοι τρόποι), other elements, partly the same, and partly different, are added, viz. ἐρμήθεα, ὀληγωρία, μικρότης, ἀνομοιότης.

As often happens both in the Politics (cp. bk. iv. c. 1) and in the Ethics (cp. vii. cc. 1–10) of Aristotle, the order in which the cases are at first enumerated is not the order in which they are afterwards discussed; the latter is as follows: ὑγιεινό, κέρδος, τιμή, ἑπεροχή, φόβος, καταφρόνησις: the rest retain their original place.

περὶ τῶν λεχθέντων. To be taken closely with τῶν εἰρημένων τρόπων, 'in the manner which I have described, and about the things which I have described,' sc. κέρδος and τιμή to which τοῖς εἰρημένοις (§ 5) also refers.

2. 5. ἄλλ’ οὖν ὡςαύτως,

sc. ὡςαύτως ταῦτα. They are the same and not the same. 'The
love of gain seeks gain for itself, the love of honour is jealous of honour bestowed upon others.

2. 6.

διὰ μικρότητα,

sc. τῆς κυψέλους. Cp. below, c. 3. § 10, ἕτε διὰ τὸ παρὰ μικρόν λέγον δὲ παρὰ μικρῶν, ὅτι πολλάκις λαθοῦνει μεγάλη γινομένη μετάβασις τῶν νομίμων, ὅταν παραρῶσαι τὸ μικρὸν κ.τ.λ. for the explanation of the term.

3. 4.

συνέστησαν οἱ γυνάρμοι ἐπὶ τῶν δήμων διὰ τὰς ἐπιφερομένας δίκες.

This and the revolution in Rhodes mentioned below (§ 5) appear to be the same with that of which a more minute but somewhat obscure account is given in c. 5. § 2—mentioned here as illustrating fear and contempt; in c. 5, as showing that revolutions arise from the evil behaviour of demagogues in democracies; two accounts of the same event taken from different points of view, but not inconsistent with each other. Rhodes was transferred from the alliance of Athens to Sparta in 412, and remained the ally of Sparta until after the battle of Cnidos in the year 394 B.C. when the people, assisted by the Athenians, drove out the notables who were afterwards restored by the help of Teleutias the Lacedaemonian B.C. 390. Diod. Sic. xiv. 97; Xen. Hell. iv. 8. Whether this latter revolution can be identified with the ἐπανάστασις mentioned by Aristotle is uncertain.

διὰ τὰς ἐπιφερομένας δίκες. Cp. infra c. 5. § 2, where the suits against the rich at Rhodes appear to have been brought by private individuals; also Thuc. iii. 70.

ἐὸν καὶ ἐν Ὑβαίας μετὰ τῆς ἐν Οἰνοφύταις μάχης πολιτευόμενων ἡ 3. 5.

δημοκρατία διεφθάρη.

Yet the destruction of the democracy seems hardly consistent with the preponderance which the Athenians retained in Boeotia during the nine years following the battle of Oenophyta (456), at the end of which time, and not until after they had won the battle of Coronea (447), all the Boeotians regained their independence. (Thuc. i. 112.) Compare as bearing on Aristotle's knowledge of Theban history, infra c. 6. § 15, and note.

ἡ Μεγαρῶν [δημοκρατία διεφθάρη] δι' ἀταξίαν καὶ ἄναρχιαν ἤτηθεντον. 3. 5.

Probably the same event mentioned infra c. 5. § 4, but apparently
not the same with the revolution in Megara, mentioned in Thuc. iv. 74, which occurred after, and in consequence of, the retirement of the Athenians (B.C. 424); possibly the same with the occasion mentioned in iv. 15. § 15, when the government was narrowed to the returned exiles and their supporters. See on iv. 15. § 15.

3. 5. ἐν Συρακούσαις πρὸ τῆς Γέλωνος τυραννίδος, sc. ἡ δημοκρατία διεφθάρη. According to the narrative of Herod. vii. 155, the γαμάροι were driven out by the Syracusan populace, and returned under the protection of Gelon, to whose superior force the Syracusans opened their gates. The destruction of the democracy may therefore be said to have been caused by the violent conduct of the people towards the landowners. But if so, the contradiction which Mr. Grote finds between the statements of Herodotus and Aristotle admits of a reconcilement. See note on c. 43, vol. v. 286, original edit. He thinks that for Gelo we should substitute Dionysius, and observes that the frequent confusion of the two names was noted by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Antiq. Rom. vii. c. 1. p. 1314.

3. 7. ἐν Τάραντ ηττηθέντων.

Called by Herodotus (vii. 170) 'the greatest slaughter of Greeks within his knowledge.' Diodorus, 'the Sicilian,' (xi. 52. § 5), apparently in ignorance of the geography of Italy, says that the Iapygian victors pursued the Rhegians into the town of Rhegium (a distance of about 200 miles), and entered with them!

3. 7. δημοκρατία ἐγένετο ἐκ πολιτείας.

Cp. vi. 5. §§ 10, 11, where the Tarentines are described in the present tense as being under a sort of πολιτεία or moderate democracy, to which they probably reverted at some time later than that referred to in the text. In the Syracusan expedition they were hostile to the Athenians (Thuc. vi. 44), and are therefore not likely at that time to have been a democracy.

3. 7. καὶ ἐν "Ἀργείς τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀθήνῃ ἄπολομένων ὑπὸ Κλεομένου τοῦ Λάκωνος ἡμερικάσθηναν παραδέξασθαι τῶν περιοίκων τινῶν.

The meaning of the name Hebdomé was unknown to the Greeks themselves. The victory of Cleomenes over the Argives is men-
tioned in Herodotus (vi. 76–83), Pausanias (iii. 4), and in Plutarch (De Mulierum Virtutibus, iv. 245 D). In the narrative of the latter various plays on the number seven occur, which probably originated in the word ἔθδομη. The number of the dead slain by Cleomenes is said to have been 7777: the battle is said to have been fought on the seventh day of the month (ἔθδομη ἑσσεύμου μηνός, Ib.); or during a truce of seven days which Cleomenes violated by attacking the Argives during the night, he arguing that the seven days did not include the nights, or, perhaps with better reason, that vengeance on an enemy was deemed preferable to justice both by Gods and men (Apophth. Lacon. 223 B). The word may have been the name of the wood mentioned in the accounts of Herodotus and Pausanias (loc. cit.) or of some other place* called after the number seven; but more likely of a festival held on the seventh day, which gave its name to the battle.

ἀπολομένων ὑπὸ Κλεομένου κ. τ. λ. Read in the English text: 'the Argives, after their army had been cut to pieces.'

καὶ ἐν Ἀθηναῖς ἀνυχοῦστων πεζῶν οἱ γνώριμοι ἐλάττωσε ἐγένοιτο διὰ τὸ ἐκ 3. 7. καταλόγου στρατεύσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀκαυνικῶν πόλεων.

The καταλόγου ὑπερτῶν mentioned in Thuc. vi. 43, καὶ τούτων Ἀθηναίων μὲν αὐτῶν ἦσαν πεντακόσιοι μὲν καὶ χίλιοι ἐκ καταλόγου, and elsewhere, Xen. Mem. iii. 4. § 1, in which the θῆτες, or lowest of the four classes, were not included.

ἐκ καταλόγου. Every one was obliged to take his turn in the order of the roll, and no substitutes were allowed, because the number of soldiers willing to offer themselves was not sufficient.

ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀκαυνικῶν πόλεων. As in the Syracusan expedition, to which the word ἀνυχοῦστων chiefly refers. Cp. Thuc. vii. 27.

πλείων γάρ τῶν ἀπώρων γινομένων.

Most of the extant MSS. are in favour of εἰπόρων. But ἀπώρων, which is the reading of the old translator, is not wholly indefensible. The meaning may be that power falls into the hands of the few, either when the poor become more numerous, or when properties increase; the extremes of want and of wealth coexisting in the same state. The two cases are really opposite aspects of the same phenomenon, 'when the citizens become more and more
divided into rich and poor.' The argument from the more difficult reading is in favour of ἀπόφων.

3. 9. ἐν Ὀρείῳ.

A later name of Hestiaea in Euboea, or rather (Strabo x. p. 446) of an Athenian city established in the time of Pericles, on the same site, to maintain control over Euboea. After the fall of Athens it passed into the hands of Sparta and received an oligarchical constitution, reverting to Athens in the year 377. Probably at this time κατελύθη ἡ ἀλιγαρχία. For another reference to Hestiaea, which never entirely lost its old name (Pausan. vii. p. 592), see c. 4. § 4.

3. 10. τέλος ἰ' οὐδενὸς ἱρχον.

οὐδενὸς is taken in the text as the genitive of value. If this way of explaining the word is rejected as unidiomatic, or rather, not likely to be employed when according to the more familiar idiom οὐδενὸς would be governed by ἱρχον, we may adopt the emendation of Bekker's 2nd Edition, ἀπ' οὐδενὸς.

3. 11. οἶον Τροιζνίος Ἀχαιοὶ συνήκησαν Σύβαριν, εἶτα πλεῖστος οἱ Ἀχαιοὶ γενό- μενοι ἔξειμαλον τοῖς Τροιζνίοις· ὅθεν τὸ άγος συνέβη τοῖς Συβαρίταις.

The foundation of Sybaris (b.c. 720) is recorded in Strabo vi. p. 263, but nothing is said of the joint occupation of the place by the Troezenians: nor of the curse. The fall of Sybaris is attributed to a very different cause in a gossiping story told by Athenaeus xii. p. 520, of a Sybarite having beaten his slave at the altar to which he fled for refuge. A rather fabulous account of the war between Sybaris and Croton, in which Milo the athlete figures as a sort of Heracles, is given by Diod. Sic. xii. 9.

3. 12. καὶ ἐν Θουρίῳ Συβαρίται τοῖς συνωκήσασιν.

Sc. ἑστασίσασαν or some similar word gathered from the preceding sentence. For a more detailed though not very trustworthy narrative of the event referred to, see Diod. Sic. xi. 90; xii. 10, 11. Thurii being founded on the site of Sybaris, the Sybarites who joined in the colony naturally looked upon the country as their own.

3. 12. Ζαγκλαίων δὲ Σαμίων ὑποδεξάμενοι ἔξέπεσον καὶ αὐτοῖ.

This, which is one of the blackest stories in Greek history, is narrated at length by Herodotus vi. 23. The Zancleans had
invited Hippocrates tyrant of Gela to assist them against Anaxilaus tyrant of Rhegium, but were betrayed by him and delivered over to the Samians.

Συνακοῦσαν μετὰ τὰ τυραννικὰ τοὺς ἔχουσαν καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους πολίτας 3. 13. ποιησάμενοι ἑστασίασαν καὶ εἰς μάχην ἠλθον.

Another instance of the danger of incorporating foreigners in a state. The foreigners in this case were the mercenaries of Hiero and Gelo. After the expulsion of Thrasybulus they were allowed to remain in the city, but deprived of political privileges. The narrative of their revolt, of their seizure of Acradina and Ortygia, and of the troubles which followed the attempt to drive them out in the ill-fated island of Sicily, is to be found in Diod. xi. 72 ff.

καὶ Ἀμφιπολίται δεξάμενοι Χαλκιδέων ἀποίκων ἐξέσησον ἢπο τούτων οἱ 3. 13. πλέοντα αὐτῶν.

αὐτῶν is to be taken with οἱ πλέοντα, which is in partitive apposition with Ἀμφιπολίται. The event referred to cannot be shown to have any connexion with the revolt of Amphipolis during the Peloponnesian War (Thuc. iv. 105). Nor do we know of any other event which corresponds with the account given either here or in c. 6. § 8 where the revolution is spoken of ‘as an insurrection against an oligarchy, made by the aid of Chalcidians’ who had settled in the place. But an oligarchy could not have existed under the control of Athens; nor would a democracy be likely to have joined the Peloponnesian confederacy.

στασιάζοντες δ' ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις κ.τ.λ.

3. 14.

‘There are other differences besides those of race which divide cities. There may be two cities in one (c. 12. § 15), both in oligarchies and democracies.’ This general reflection is introduced awkwardly amid the special causes of revolutions in states. But a similar confusion of general and particular occurs in several other passages; e.g. iv. 4. § 22 ff.

καθάπερ ἐφηται πρῶτερον.

Probably c. 1. §§ 3, 4.
3. 15. Κολοφώνιοι καὶ Νοτιεῖς.
That the Colophonians and Notians were torn by dissensions may be gathered from Thucydides iii. 34.

3. 15. μᾶλλον δημοτικοὶ οἱ τῶν Πειραιῶν οἰκούντες τῶν τὸ ἀστυ.
The great power of the democracy at Athens dated from the battle of Salamis; and as the sailors were the lowest class of citizens, naturally the Piraeus was its head-quarters. Liberty was saved by the fleet in the days of the Four Hundred; and when driven out of Athens by the thirty took refuge at the Piraeus, from which it returned victorious.

4. 1. γίνονται μὲν οὖν οἱ στάσεις οὐ περὶ μικρῶν ἀλλ' ἐκ μικρῶν.
Do not wars or revolutions always or almost always arise from a combination of large public and political causes with small personal and private reasons? Some spark sets fire to materials previously prepared. If Herodotus overestimates the personal and private causes of great events, does not Thucydides underestimate them, explaining everything on great principles and ignoring the trifles of politics to which Aristotle here directs attention? The course of ancient or of modern history taken as a whole appears to be the onward movement of some majestic though unseen power; when regarded in detail, it seems to depend on a series of accidents. The Greek was a lover of anecdotes; and for him this gossip about trifles had a far greater interest than the reflections of Thucydides upon the course of human events. (See Introduction, vol. i. p. xcii.)

4. 1. μετέβαλε γὰρ ἡ πολιτεία κ.τ.λ.
The same story is told with additions and embellishments by Plutarch 'Praecepta gerendae reipublicae' p. 825 C.

4. 2. ὅθεν προσλαμβάνουσε τοὺς ἐν τῷ πολιτεύματι διεστασίασαν πάντας.
Here as infra c. 6. § 8 the word διεστασίασαν may be causal and active, 'they took the members of the government to their respective sides and so split all the people into factions.' (Cp. καταστασίασας-θαι v. 6. § 14). Or as in the English text (taking διεστασίως, like στασιώς, as a neuter) 'they then drew all the members of the ruling class into their quarrel and made a revolution.'
The argument is that the beginning is half the whole, according to the old proverb, and therefore that an error at the beginning is equivalent to half the whole amount of error. The proverb is again cited, Nic. Ethics i. 7. § 20.

καὶ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐκ κηδείας γενομένης διαφοράς ἀρχὴ πασῶν ἐγένετο τῶν 4. 5. στάσεων τῶν ὑστέρων.

This narrative, like the story of the Syracusan affair, is told, but in a more romantic manner, in the passage of Plutarch quoted above (Praec. geren. reip. p. 825 B) and also by Aelian, Var. Hist. xi. 5. The narrative of Plutarch contains the names of the persons concerned, Crates and Orgilaus, and is therefore probably taken not from Aristotle but from some other source. τῶν στάσεων κ.τ.λ., the sacred war to which another origin is assigned infra in § 7. See Essay on Contributions of Aristotle to History.

καὶ περὶ Μιτυλήνην δὲ ἐξ ἐπικλήρων στάσεως γεγομένης πολλῶν ἐγένετο 4. 6. αρχὴ κακῶν καὶ τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς Ἀθηναίους, ἐν ὧν Πάχης ἔλαβε τὴν πόλιν αὐτῶν Ἥμιοιροι γὰρ τῶν εὐπόρων τῶν καταληπτόντος δύο θυγατέρας, ὁ περιωσθεὶς καὶ ὁ λαβὼν τοῖς νίσσον αὐτοῦ Δόξανθρος ἤρξη τῆς στάσεως καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις παρώτυνε, πρόξενοι δὲν τῆς πόλεως.

No mention of Doxander occurs nor is there any hint of this story in Thucydides (iii. 2 ff.). The revolt of Mitylene is ascribed in his narrative entirely to political causes, and was long premeditated. The only point of coincidence between the two accounts is the mention of the proxenus, who is said in Thucydides to have given information to the Athenians. They are not, however, necessarily inconsistent: for Aristotle may be speaking of the slight occasion, Thucydides of the deeper cause. Nor can any argument be drawn from the silence of the latter. He may have known the tale, but may not have thought fit to mention it, any more than he has recorded the singular episode of the suicide of Paches in the public court on his return home, recorded by Plutarch iv. 8 (Niclas 6). There is also an omission in the account of Aristotle which is supplied by Thucydides. For the proxenos who gave information to the Athenians is afterwards said to have
repented, and to have gone on an embassy to Athens petitioning for peace (Thucyd. iii. 4). Such stories as this about Doxander have been common in modern as well as in ancient history; they are very likely to be invented, but may sometimes be true.

4. 7. Mnason, according to Timaeus, was the friend of Aristotle (Athenaeus vi. p. 264).

4. 8. ἡ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλή εἴδοκμήθησα εἰν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς.

According to Plut. Themistocles c. 10 Aristotle narrated that 'at the time [of the battle of Salamis] when the Athenians had no public resources the council of the Areopagus gave to each sailor a sum of eight drachmas and thus enabled the triremes to be manned.' Whether such a statement was really to be found in Aristotelian writings, perhaps in the Politics to which it is commonly ascribed, or whether Plutarch is confusing the more general statement of Aristotle contained in this passage with information which he had derived from some other source, is uncertain.

4. 8. συντονωτέραν ποιήσαι τὴν πολιτείαν.

Cp. iv. 3. § 8, ἀλγαρικάς μὲν τὰς συντονωτέρας καὶ δεσποτικαῖς, τὰς δὲ ἁρεινένας καὶ μαλακᾶς δημοκράτεις, sc. πολιτείας. σύντονος means the more highly pitched note given by the greater tension of the string, and hence the stricter and more rigid form of government.

4. 8. ὁ ναυτικὸς ὕλος γενόμενος αἴτιος τῆς περὶ Σαλαμίνα νίκης καὶ διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἱγμονίας διὰ τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν δύναμιν, τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἰσχυροτέραν ἐπιστημεῖν.

διὰ ταύτης, sc. τῆς νίκης, 'by means of this victory.'

τῆς ἱγμονίας, sc. αἴτιος γενόμενος. διὰ τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν δύναμιν follows τῆς ἱγμονίας.

Plut. Arist. 22 says that after the battle of Salamis Aristides extended the right of voting to the fourth class. He had already mentioned in c. 13 that many of the higher classes had fallen into poverty; they would therefore have been degraded but for this extension. The merits and sufferings of all classes in the war were a natural justification of such a measure. The nobility and the common people vied with one another in their defence of
Hellas against the invader. No element lay deeper in the Hellenic character than the sense of superiority which all Hellenes acquired in the struggle with Persia.

περὶ τὴν ἐν Μαντιναίᾳ μάχην.

4. 9.

I. e. the first battle of Mantinea (419 B.C. described by Thuc. v. 70–74) in which, though the Argive army was defeated, the 1000 chosen Argives (doubtless belonging to the noble families) remained unconquered, and cut their way through the enemy. There is nothing in the account of Thucydides inconsistent with this statement, though he naturally dwells more on the influence of Lacedaemon in effecting the change of government (Ib. 81).

ἐν Συρακούσαις ὁ δήμος αὐτος γενόμενος τῆς νίκης τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρῶς 4. 9.

Ἀθηναίους ἐκ πολιτείας εἰς δημοκρατίαν μετέβαλεν.

These words are not in perfect accord with the statement of Thucydides that the Athenians were unable to cope with the Syracusans because they had a form of government like their own, Thuc. vii. 55; but they agree with Diod. xiii. 34 fin., who says that the extreme form of democracy was introduced at Syracuse by Dicelo after the overthrow of the Athenians. Nor is Thucydides quite consistent with himself; for the overthrow of the Athenian expedition was effected by the aristocratic leader Hermocrates and by the aid of Corinthians and Lacedaemonians. (See Essay on Contributions of Aristotle to History.)

καὶ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ.

4. 9.

See note on English text. Ambracia is said to have been founded by Gorgus, who is described by Antonin. Liberalis (i. 4. 19 ed. Westermann) as the brother of Cypselus (cp. Neanthes apud Diog. Laert. i. 98, who says that the two Perianders were ἄνεψαυτὸς ἀλλήλοις): by Scymnus (454) he is called his son. Periander is supposed by Müller (i. 8. § 3) to have been the son of Gorgus; but this is conjecture. Whether there was any real connexion, or whether the stories of relationship arise only out of an accidental similarity of names, it is impossible to determine.

οἱ δυνάμεως αὐτοῖς.

4. 10.

'Who are the causes of the power of a state:' cp. supra,
§ 9. ὁ δῆμος αὑτὸς γενόμενος τῆς νίκης. The elements of strength are also the elements of danger.

4. 13. ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἐξαπατήσαντες . . . ἄρχουσιν αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.
I. e. when fraud is succeeded by force or the old fraud by a new one. To take an example from Modern History, as the presidency of Louis Napoleon was succeeded by the coup d'état, and ended in the plébiscite by which he was made Emperor of the French; or as in ancient history the tyranny of Gelo and Hiero was acquiesced in after a time by their Syracusan subjects.

4. 13. οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν τετρακοσίων τῶν δήμων ἐξηπάτησαν, φάσκοντες τὸν βασιλεία χρῆμα τα παρέξειν.
Cp. Thuc. viii. 53, where Peisander demonstrates to the Athenian assembly that their only hope lay in the alliance of the Persian king.

4. 13. Φευσάμενοι.
Having once told the lie, which, it is inferred, was detected.

5. 2. καὶ ἐν Ῥώδι: μισθοφοραί τε γὰρ οἱ δημαγωγοὶ ἐπάριζον, καὶ ἐκώλυν ἀποδιδόνα τὰ δισεκατομμύρια τῶν τριπλάριχοι: οἱ δὲ διὰ τὰς ἐπιφερομένας δίκας ἱππαγόστησαν συντάγματε κατάλυσα τῶν δήμων.
‘The demagogues gained influence over the assembly by procuring pay for them: [probably they obtained the money for this purpose by not paying the trierarchs]. These were sued by their sailors or other creditors, and, not having been paid themselves, were unable to pay others; so in self-defence they overthrew the government.’ Such appears to be the meaning of this passage, a little amplified, on which no light is thrown from other sources.

The revolution here mentioned would seem to be the same as that which has been already referred to, supra, c. 3. § 4. The words διὰ τὰς ἐπιφερομένας δίκας occur in both passages.

5. 3. κατελύθη δὲ καὶ ἐν Ἡρακλεία ὁ δῆμος.
Probably the Heraclea of Pontus founded by the Megarians in B.C. 559. The poems of Theognis imply that already in the sixth century B.C. a democratic party existed in the mother-city. Nine
places bear the name of Heraclea. The Heraclea in Pontus is the most important of them and may be presumed to be meant when there is no further description as here or in c. 6. §§ 2, 3.

ἡ ἐν Μεγάροις κατελύθη δημοκρατία.  
Cр. supra с. 3. § 5.

ἡ τὰς προσώπους ταῖς λειτουργίαις.  
Some word containing the idea of diminishing has to be supplied from ἀναδιάστους ποιούτες.

Demagogues like Cleon, Lysicles, Eucrates, Hyperbolus, Cleophon, were of a different type from Peisistratus or Periander, and equally different from Hiero and Gelo or Dionysius the First.

Three reasons are given for the frequent attempts to establish tyrannies in early Greek history—1) there were great magistracies in ancient states; 2) the people were scattered and therefore incapable of resistance; 3) the demagogues were trusted by them, because they were supposed to be the enemies of the rich.

Πεισίστρατος στασιάζας πρὸς τοὺς πεδικτούς.

According to the narrative of Herodotus, i. 59 ff., Attica was at this time divided into factions, that of the inhabitants of the plain led by Lycurgus, and of the sea coast by Megacles, to which was added a third faction of the inhabitants of the highlands whom Peisistratus used as his instruments. He was restored to the tyranny by a combination of his own adherents and those of Megacles against the inhabitants of the plain.

Θεαγηνῆς ἐν Μεγάροις.

Theagenes is mentioned in Thuc. i. 126 as the father-in-law of Cylon the conspirator; and in Arist. Rhet. i. 2, 1357 b. 33, as an example of a tyrant who like Peisistratus had asked for a guard.

Διονύσιος κατήγορῶν Δαφναίου.

Cр. Diod. Sic. (xiii. 86, 91, 92) who narrates how Daphnaeus, having been elected general by the Syracusans, failed to relieve Agrigentum and on the motion of Dionysius was deposed from his command.
5. 10. ἐκ τῆς πατρίας δημοκρατίας.

The same phrase is used in ii. 12. § 2 where Solon is said to have established ἡ πατρία δημοκρατία, the ancient or traditional democracy, 'the good old democracy,' as opposed to the later and extreme form.

5. II. ἄκος δὲ τοῦ ἡ μὴ γίνεσθαι ἡ τοῦ γίνεσθαι ἕτοι τὸ τὰς φυλὰς φέρει τῶν ἀρχων, ἀλλὰ μὴ πάντα τῶν δήμων.

τοῦ μὴ γίνεσθαι, sc. κύριον τὸν δήμον τῶν νόμων = 'a remedy against the people becoming master.' That is to say, when the magistrates were elected by the tribal divisions the power of the people was not so great as when they voted all together.

When the larger units of government or representation are broken up into very small ones, local interests are likely to be preferred to the general good, and local candidates for office take the place of better men—a nation ceases to be inspired by great political ideas, and cannot effectually act against other nations. On the other hand, if England, or France, or the United States were represented in the national council only as a whole, what would be the result? Aristotle might have replied that a state is not a state in which 30,000,000 of people are united under a single government, or are represented in a single assembly, having no other connecting links; nor yet when they are subdivided into parishes; cp. vii. 4. § 11.

These are extremes by which a principle may be illustrated, but no one would think of accepting either alternative. The question which Aristotle here touches has a modern and recent interest to us, and may be put in another form: 'What should be the area of a constituency?' Some considerations which have to be kept in view are the following: 1) The facilities of locomotion and communication; 2) The habit or tradition of acting together among the natives of a country or district; 3) The question of minorities—should the aim of a constitution be to strengthen the government, or to give a perfectly fair representation of all parties, opinions, places? 4) The greater opportunity of a political career afforded by more numerous elections and smaller bodies of electors; and, on the other hand, 5) The greater independence of the representatives of large constituencies; and 6) The advantages or disadvan-
tages of local knowledge and of local interests have to be placed in the scale. We may conclude that in so far as the political life of a country is affected by the area of representation, it should not be so extended as to interfere with the power of common action; nor so localized that the members of the national assembly cease any longer to think in the first place of great national interests.

According to c. 1. § 16, εν μεν γὰρ τοῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ἐγκύνισται δῶ, ἣ τε πρὸς ἀλλήλους στάσεις καὶ ἐπὶ ἡ πρὸς τῶν δήμων there are two modes of revolutions in oligarchies,—1) That arising from dissensions among the oligarchs themselves; 2) that arising from dissensions between the oligarchs and the people. The order of the two is reversed in this passage. The first which is here the second is generalized into 'that arising from those outside the governing body' (ἡ ἡ ἄλλων, § 2), under which four cases are included (see Introduction). Τὸ ἐνα μὲν (§ 1) corresponds grammatically μάλιστα δὲ, which introduces one of the cases of στάσεως arising ἡ ἄλλων although the leader comes ἡ αὐτής τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας. The other mode of revolution from within is discussed at the end of § 5 κυνοῦσα δὲ κ.τ.λ., with which the second main division begins.

ἐν Νάξῳ Λύγδαμις.

For a silly story about a bargain over some fish which is said to have been the origin of the revolt led by Lygdamis at Naxos, see Athenaeus viii. 348 who derives it from the Ναζίων πολιτεία in the so-called 'Polities' of Aristotle.

ἔχει δὲ καὶ ἡ ἡ ἄλλων ἁρχῇ στάσεως διαφορᾶς.

Goetting will interpret ἄλλων as=ἄλλων ἡ τοῦ πλῆθους which is harsh. The conjectures αὐτῶν and ἄλληλον seem, at first sight, to simplify the passage, as everything from μάλιστα δὲ in § 1 onwards would then apply to the same mode of στάσεως (ἡ ἡ αὐτῶν): but Aristotle in § 2 expressly distinguishes the ἐπιστείρα who are not in the government from the oligarchs, and therefore a revolution begun by them could not be described as arising ἡ ἄλληλον or ἡ αὐτῶν.
6. 2. ὁδὼν ἐν Μασσαλίᾳ.

In vi. 7. § 4 Massalia is described by Aristotle, speaking probably of a later period, as having enlarged the narrow oligarchy by the admission of new citizens. The oligarchy thus became more like a πολιτεία (πολιτικωτέρα ἐγένετο ἡ ὀλιγαρχία).

6. 3. The difference was settled, not by throwing open the government to a lower class, but by the admission in greater numbers of members of the same families.

6. 5. τῶν ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ.

Here the members of the governing body, see note on c. 1. § 10.

6. 6. ἐν τοῖς τριάκοντα Ἀθηναίοις οἱ περὶ Χαρικλέα ἴσχυσαν τοὺς τριάκοντα δημαγωγοῦντες, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τετρακοσίοις οἱ περὶ Φρύνιχον.

From Xenophon's Hellenics ii. 3 we might be led to infer that Critias was the leading spirit of the thirty, but in Lysias contra Eratosthenem § 56, p. 125, we find that the name of Charicles precedes that of Critias among the leaders of the more extreme party. Charicles and Critias are also named together among the νομοθέται whom the thirty appointed in Xen. Mem. i. 2. § 31.

It is singular that the leadership of a party in the 400 should be ascribed to Phrynichus who was late in joining the attempt (Thuc. viii. 68) and was soon assassinated (c. 92). He was however a man of great ability and is said by Thucydides to have shown extraordinary energy when he once took part.

6. 6. καὶ ἐν ὀσίαις ὀλιγαρχίαις οἷς ύποι αἱροῦνται τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐξ δυν οἱ ἀρχοντες εἰσιν.

The people will always be able to elect those members of the oligarchy who favour their interests. The representative depends upon his constituents, and must do their bidding. The remark of Aristotle is true, and admits of several applications. Yet the opposite reflection is almost equally true, that the popular representative easily catches the 'esprit de corps' of the society in which he mingles, and of the order or assembly to which he is admitted.

6. 6. ὀπερ ἐν Ὦρμυδῷ συνέβαινεν.

We cannot be certain whether these words illustrate οἱ ὀπλίται ἡ ὁ δῆμος or οὐ δῆμος only. That the membership of a club should
have been the qualification for an office of which the election was in the hands of the people is remarkable (see note on § 13 infra).

καὶ ὅποιον τὰ δικαστήρια μὴ ἐκ τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἐστὶν’ δημαγωγοῦντες γὰρ 6. 7. πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις μεταβάλλουσι τὴν πολιτείαν.

Compare ii. 12. § 3, where Solon is said to have established the democracy by appointing the courts of law from the whole people.

γίνονται δὲ μεταβολαὶ τῆς δικαιορθίας καὶ ὅταν ἄναλώσωσι τὰ ίδια ζῶντες 6. 8. ἀσέλγως.

So Plat. Rep. viii. 555 D. Compare also infra c. 12. § 17.

Hipparchus, the father of Dion, was the chief supporter of 6. 8. Dionysius (Plut. Dio c. 3), who married his daughter.

Καὶ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ ὁ τὴν πράξειν τὴν πρὸς Χάριτα πράξεις ἐνεχείρησε μετα— 6. 9. βαλείν τὴν πολιτείαν.

Probably the well-known general Chares who flourished between 367–333 is here intended. He was a man who, in spite of his disreputable character, contrived by corruption to maintain a great influence over the Athenian people in the decline of their glory.

Of the transaction here referred to nothing more is known.

διὰ τοιαύτην αἰτίαν, 6. 9.

sc. διὰ τὸ ἀναλώσαι τὰ ίδια τοὺς εὐπόρους ζῶντας ἀσέλγως.

οὔτε μὲν οὖν ἐπιχειροῦσι τι κυνικ., οὔτε δὲ κλέπτουσι τὰ κοινά: οὔθεν πρὸς 6. 9. αὐτῶς συμπαραστασθεὶς ἢ αὐτῶς ἢ οἱ πρὸς τούτους μαχόμενοι κλέπτουσας.

αὐτῶς—‘the government, or the other oligarchs, from whom the theft is made.’

αὐτῶς—‘the thieves or peculators.’ The revolution arises in two ways, from the attack either of the thieves upon the government, or of the government upon the thieves.

ὁμοίαν τῇ τῶν ἐν Λακεδαίμονι γερόντων. 6. 11.

I.e. the election of the Elean elders, besides being an election out of certain families (δυναστευτικὴν), resembled that of the Laconian elders who were chosen but ‘in a ridiculous fashion’ by the whole people. See ii. 9. § 27.
6. 12. Timoophanes was a Corinthian general, who was about to become, or for a short time became, tyrant of Corinth. He was slain either by the hand (Diod. xvi. 65), or at the instigation, of his brother Timoleon (Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 4).

6. 13. τῶν περὶ Σίμων.

σάμων is found in all the Greek MSS. and in the old Latin translator. It shews at any rate the faithfulness with which they copied an unmeaning reading. Σίμων which is adopted by Bekker in both editions is an ingenious conjecture of Schlosser. Simus, if he be the person mentioned in Demosthenes (de Cor. p. 241), was a Larissaean who betrayed Thessaly to king Philip.

6. 13. ἐν Ἀθήναις ἐπὶ τῶν ἐταριῶν δὲν ἦν μιὰ ἡ Ἰφιάδου.

The name of Iphiades occurs in Demosthenes (in Aristocratem, p. 679), where it is said that his son was, or ought to have been, given up as a hostage to the Athenians by the town, not of Abydos but of Sestos. It will be remembered that at Abydos (supra c. 6. § 6) some of the magistrates were elected by the people from a political club. The manner in which he is spoken of would lead us to suppose that Iphiades was tyrant of Abydos, and that by the help of his club he had overthrown the oligarchy.

6. 14. Of the great Euboean cities Chalcis and Eretria, as of so many other Hellenic states which were famous in the days before the Persian War, little is known. We are told in bk. iv. 3. § 3 that the Chalcidians used cavalry against their opponents, and there is an allusion in Thuc. i. 15 to the ancient war between Chalcis and Eretria which 'divided all Hellas,' again mentioned by Herod. v. 99.

6. 15. τῶν δ' ἐν Ὑπάπαι κατ' Ἀρχίῳ.

The only Archias of Thebes known to us was an oligarch, who betrayed the citadel of Thebes to the Spartans, and was afterwards himself slain by Pelopidas and his fellow conspirators. An oligarchical revolution could not therefore be said to have arisen out of his punishment. Yet the uncertainty of the details of Greek history in the age of Aristotle should make us hesitate in assuming a second person of the name. The mention of Heraclea in juxtaposition
with Thebes may suggest that this is the Heraclea not in Pontus, but in Trachis. Cp. note on c. 5. § 3.

εὐφλοεικηγησαν αὑτοὺς.

Const. preg.=φιλωνεικούντες ἐδίωκον. The infinitive δεθημι helps the construction of αὑτοὺς, 'They carried their party spirit against them so far.'

διὰ τὸ ἄγαν δεσποτικὰς εἶναι τᾶς ὀλιγαρχίας . . . ἡ ἐν Χώρ ὀλιγαρχία.

The Chians in the later years of the Peloponnesian War were governed by an oligarchy: cp. Thuc. viii. 14. The island was recovered by Athens under the Second Empire, but again revolted in the year 458. The population is said to have been largely composed of merchant-seamen, supra, iv. 4. § 21.

πολλὰς γὰρ τὸ ταξθὲν πρῶτον τίμιμα . . . τῶν μέσως

is an accusativus pendens; 'Often when there has been a certain qualification fixed at first . . . the same property increases to many times the original value,' etc.

οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταξίδων ὀλίγων.

The exclusiveness of aristocracy and oligarchy is equally the ruin of both, though arising in the one case from the fewness of men of virtue and good manners, in the other from the fowness of men of wealth and birth.

Παρθενίαι (ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων γὰρ ἤσαν).

According to the legend the Partheniae were the progeny of Spartan women and of certain slaves or citizens of Sparta called ἐπευαικτοῖς. They had in some way incurred the reproach of illegitimacy or inferiority. The fertile imagination of ancient writers, who were clearly as ignorant as ourselves, has devised several explanations of the name: they were the children of Spartans who remained at home during the Messenian war and were made Helots (Antiochus of Syracuse, fr. 14 Müller Fr. Hist. Gr. vol. i. p. 184); or of Helots who married the widows of those who had fallen in the war (Theop. fr. 190 Müller i. p. 310); or of the youngest of the army who had not taken the oath to remain until
the war was finished (Ephor. fr. 33 Müller i. p. 247), and were sent home to beget children.

7.2. Ἀλεσάνδρος.
For the narrative of the later life of Lysander and of his attempt to open the Spartan monarchy to all the Heraclidae of whom he himself was one, and of his overthrow by Agesilaus whose claim to the kingdom he had previously supported, see Plutarch’s Life of Lysander, 24–26.

7.3. Κωνάδων ὁ τὴν ἑπ’ Ἀγησιλάῳ συντήσας ἐπίθεσεν ἐπὶ τοὺς Σπαρτιάτας.
For a very curious account of the conspiracy of Cinadon, to which he was instigated by a desire to become one of the Spartan peers, see Xen. Hell. iii. 3. §§ 4–11.

ἐπ’ Ἀγησιλάῳ if genuine must mean ‘against Agesilaus’ and (less directly) against the Spartans.

7.4. δῆλον δὲ καὶ τούτῳ ἐκ τῆς Τυρταίου ποιήσεως τῆς καλομεῖνης Εὐνομίας.
See Bergk Frag. 2–7, p. 316.

7.4. Hanno is mentioned by Justin, xxi. 4. He is said to have lived in the time of Dionysius the younger about the year 346 and to have attempted to poison the senate and raise an insurrection among the slaves. Being detected and taken he was crucified with his family.

7.5. ταῦτα γὰρ ἀλ πολιτεῖαι τε πειράνται μιγώναι καὶ αἱ πολλαὶ τῶν καλομεῖνων ἀριστοκρατίων.

ταῦτα refers to τὰ δῶ, democracy and oligarchy. The great difficulty is the combination of the many and the few; not of virtue with either, except from the circumstance that it so rarely exists: cp. iv. 7. §§ 3, 4, and c. 8. § 8.

7.6. διαφέρουσι γὰρ τῶν ὀνομαζομένων πολιτείων αἱ ἀριστοκρατία τούτῳ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰσὶν αἱ μὲν ἡπτον αἱ δὲ μᾶλλον μόνοι αὐτῶν. τὰς γὰρ ἄστηκον ἀκληνύσας μᾶλλον πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν ἀριστοκρατίας καλοῦσαν, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος πολιτείας.

τούτῳ and διὰ τοῦτο have been taken as follows: 1)* ‘Aristocracies differ from what are termed polities in the number of elements
which they combine (supra § 5), and the nature of the combination makes some of them more and some less stable.' The words which follow return to διαφέρονται: 'there are such differences; for those of them which incline more to oligarchy are called aristocracies, those which incline to democracy, polities.'

2) τότε and διὰ τούτο may be thought to refer rather to what follows than to what precedes. 'Aristocracies differ from polities in that polities include numbers, and because of this difference some of them are less and some of them more stable, some inclining more to oligarchy or the government of a few, others to polity, which is the government of a larger number.'

Susemihl takes the whole passage nearly in the same manner: 3) 'Aristocracies differ from the so-called polities in this respect (i.e. in having the three elements of δῆμος, πλοῦτος, ἀρετή instead of the first two only), and for this reason, the former of these two kinds of governments (αὐτῶν) are less stable and the latter more so. For those which incline rather to oligarchy are called aristocracies, and those which incline to democracy are called polities; and for this reason they are safer than the others: for the greater number have more influence, and because they have equality they are more content.' Polity has only two elements, while aristocracy has three. The δῆμος being one-half of the polity but only one-third of the aristocracy are better pleased with the existing government and therefore less disposed to revolution.

This way of explaining the passage gives an excellent sense. But the words αἱ μὲν ἢ τους, αἱ δὲ μᾶλλον, are partitive of αὐτῶν, which refers to αἱ ἄριστοκρατίαι and cannot therefore be applied αἱ μὲν μᾶλλον μόνιμαι to timocracies αἱ δὲ ἢ τους μόνιμοι to aristocracies. The passage is ill written and inaccurately worded, though the general meaning is tolerably clear, namely, that there is often an ill mingling of constitutions, which in various degrees seek to unite numbers and wealth, and that of the two, numbers are the safer basis.

συνέξη δὲ τὸ εἰρημένον ἐν Θουρίοις.

7. 9.

Sc. the tendency of the constitution towards the prevailing element spoken of in § 7, as at Thurii from aristocracy towards oligarchy, followed by a reaction to democracy.
7.9. ἐὰν μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀπὸ πλείονος τιμήματος εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς εἰς ἐκατόν μετέβη καὶ εἰς ἀρχεία πλείο, διὰ δὲ τὸ τὴν χώραν ὅλην τοὺς γραφίμους συγκτῆσασθαι παρὰ τῶν νόμων.

Lit. 'For because the qualification for office was high and also because the whole country was monopolized by the notables contrary to law, the qualification was reduced and the number of offices increased.' Either the apodosis which is attached to the first member of the sentence belongs also to the second; or a clause answering to the second has been forgotten. The revolution at Thurii was a change from aristocracy or polity to democracy. The government had grown narrow and oligarchical, and the governing class had contrived to get the land into their own hands. But the people rose against the oligarchy, lowered the qualification, increased the number of offices, and got back the land. Two reasons are given for the rising of the people, 1) the increase of the qualification for office, and 2) the monopoly of land which had passed into the hands of the notables.

For εἰς ἀρχεία πλείω, cp. ii. 11. § 14, ὁσθ' ἐπούν μὴ μικρὰ πόλις, πολιτικότερον πλείονα μετέχειν τῶν ἀρχῶν, καὶ δημοτικότερον κοινότερον τε γὰρ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, καὶ κάλλιον ἠκατον ἀποτελεῖται τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ δόταιν.
Aristocracies are in fact more oligarchical than aristocratical, and 'the few' are always grasping at wealth. Cp. infra, c. 8. § 16.

The mother of Dionysius the younger was Doris a Locrian woman, and when expelled from Syracuse he was received by the citizens of Locri in a most friendly manner, but he afterwards availed himself of their good will to impose a garrison on the town. They ultimately drove out his garrison [Diodorus xiv. 44, Justin xxi. 2 and 3].

But why not? Aristotle seems to mean that no well-governed city would have allowed one of its citizens to marry into the family of a tyrant or would have entered into relation with him in consequence: or perhaps that in a democracy or well ordered aristocracy the marriage of a single citizen could not have become a great political event.

We may paraphrase this rather singular expression, 'In the days when the Greek world was divided between the Athenians and Lacedaemonians.'
sibus fuit, quamquam armis pollerent, nisi quod victos pro alieni-
genis arcebant? At conditor nostri Romulus tantum sapientia
valuit, ut plerisque populos eodem die hostes, dein cives habuerit,
and the real speech of Claudius (given by Orelli and Nipperdey in
their editions).

8. 6. ἐστι γὰρ ὁσπερ ἡμοι ἡδη οἱ ὁμοι, διὸ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐγγίγονται δημα-
γοι τολλάκις, ὁσπερ εἰρηται πρότερον.

ἡδη, sc. ὅταν πλείους ἡσι.

ὁσπερ εἰρηται πρότερον refers only to the clause, διὸ καὶ . . . τολ-
lάκις as will be seen from the comparison of c. 6, § 6 (demagogues
in an oligarchy) where nothing is said about equals in an aristocracy
becoming a democracy.

8. 9. πρὶν παρειληφέναι καὶ αὐτοῖς.

The construction is πρὶν τὰς φιλονεικίας παρειληφέναι καὶ αὐτοῖς (sc.
tοὺς ἡσι), ὁσπερ τοὺς ἄλλους.

αὐτοῖς may be either the subject or the object of παρειληφέναι,
with a slightly different meaning. Either * before the spirit of con-
tention has also carried away or absorbed them,' or, 'before they
too have caught the spirit of contention.'

8. 10. τοῦ τιμήματος τοῦ κοινοῦ τὸ πλήθος.

i.e. the amount of the whole rateable property. The object is
to preserve the same number of qualified persons, when the wealth
of a city has increased or diminished.

8. 10. συμφέρει τοῦ τιμήματος ἐπίσκοπεῖν τοῦ κοινοῦ τὸ πλήθος πρὸς τὸ παρε-
thον κατὰ τούτον τὸν χρόνον, ἐν ὅσιοι μὲν πολεμίς τιμώνται κατ’ ἑναυτὸν,
k.t.l.

The words κατὰ τούτον τὸν χρόνον, though somewhat pleonastic,
have a sufficiently good sense. The government is to compare
the present with the past value of property at that time, i.e. with
the property serving as a qualification at the time when the
change is occurring (ἐσπορίας νομίσματος γεγονότης). The words
are placed after κατ’ ἑναυτὸν by Susemihl following the authority of
William of Moerbeek, but the meaning is thus over emphasized.

With κατ’ ἑναυτὸν repeat κατ’ ἑναυτὸν ἐπίσκοπεῖν k.t.l.
ἐν δῆμῳ καὶ ἄλγαρχίᾳ καὶ μοναρχίᾳ καὶ πάση πολιτείᾳ. 8. 12.
καὶ μοναρχίᾳ is omitted by Bekker in his second edition, but is
found in the best MSS. The advice given is at least as applicable
to kings as to other rulers of states. πάση πολιτείᾳ = not ‘every
constitutional government’ but in a more general sense ‘every
form of government.’ (See note on text.)

tὰς παραστάσεις αὐτῶν.
8. 12.
= τοῖς παραστάσισ, ‘their followers’ or ‘followings.’

tοῖς ζώντας ἄσυμφορος πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν.
8. 13.
As an example of a life unsuited to the state of which they are
citizens may be cited the case of the Spartan Ephors, ii. 9. § 24.

tοῦτον δ’ ἀκος τὸ ἄεὶ τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις μορίοις ἐγχειρίζειν τὰς πρᾶξεις καὶ 8. 14.
tὰς ἀρχὰς.
In this favourite remedy of ‘conservation by antagonism,’ which
is really only an ‘unstable equilibrium,’ Aristotle does not seem to
see how much of the force of the state is lost.

μοναχῶς δὲ καὶ ἐνδεχεται ἢμα εἶναι δημοκρατίαν καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαν, εἰ 8. 17.
tοῦτο κατασχενάσεις τις.

tοῦτο, sc. τὸ μὴ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν κερδαίνειν, to be gathered from the
previous sentence.

ἀντίγραφα κατὰ φρατρίας καὶ λόχους καὶ φυλᾶς τιθέσθωσαν. 8. 19.
λόχου are military divisions to which in some states civil divisions
appear to have corresponded. Cp. Xen. Hier. c. 9. § 5, διέρρημαι
μὲν γὰρ ἀπασαι αἱ πόλεις αἱ μὲν κατὰ φυλὰς αἱ δὲ κατὰ μοίρας αἱ δὲ κατὰ
λόχους καὶ ἀρχιντες ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ μέρει ἐφεστήκασιν. The accounts
apparently are to be deposited at the bureaus or centres of such
divisions.

μὴ μόνον τὰς κτήσεις μὴ ποιεῖν ἀναδότους, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ τοὺς καρποὺς, 8. 20.
ὅ ἐν ἐνιαίς τῶν πολιτειῶν λανθάνει γεγόμενον.
As might be done by taxes or state services exclusively imposed
on the rich, or by a tax of which the rate increased in proportion
to the amount assessed. Infra c. 11. § 10, Aristotle tells us how
Dionysius contrived in five years to bring the whole property of his subjects into his treasury. Cp. also vi. 5. § 5.

8. 20. κἂν τις ὑβρίστῃ τῶν εὐπόρων εἰς τούτους, μείζω τὰ ἐπιτίμα ἑαυτῷ ἦν ἑνίκη ἀφων.

The construction is ἑνίκη τις ὑβρίστῃ τῶν, ἀφων, αὐτῶν; but whether ἀφων, αὐτῶν refers 1) to οἱ ἐπιτίμοι or 2) to τούτους, i.e. τοὺς ἀπόρους, is not clear.

8. 20. μηδὲ πλείωνον ἢ μᾶς τῶν αὐτῶν κληρονομεῖν.

Cp. Mill, Pol. Econ. Bk. v. c. 9. § 1, where he urges, much in the spirit of Aristotle and Plato, 'that no one person should be permitted to acquire by inheritance more than the amount of a moderate independence.'

9. 1. τρία δὲ των χρῆ ἔχειν κ.τ.λ.

In this passage, which has the appearance of a digression, Aristotle is still speaking of the preservatives of the state.

See the summing up, § 5.

Cp. Rhet. ii. 1, 1378 a. 6, τοῦ μὲν οὖν αὐτοῦς εἶναι πιστοῖς τοῖς λέγονται τρία ἐστὶ τὰ αὕτα τοσαῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶ δι' ἄλλας τῶν ἀποδείξεων. ἐστὶ δὲ ταύτα φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετή καὶ εὐνοια: also Thuc. ii. 60, where Pericles claims εὐνοια, φρόνησις, ἀρετή as the proper qualities of a statesman: καίτοι ἐμοὶ ταυτάτῳ ἀνδρὶ ὅργιωσθείς ὅσον οὐδεὶς οὖσι τόσον εἶναι γνώναι τε τὰ δεόντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι ταύτα φιλόσοφος τε καὶ χρηματω κρισίσων.

9. 1. δύναμιν τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς.

= 'administrative capacity,' 'power to do the duties of the office.'

9. 2. πῶς χρῆ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν διαίρεσιν.

In this passage (cp. infra πῶς δεὶ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν αἱρεσίν) the words αἱρεσίς and διαίρεσις are used almost indifferently, the latter adding to the idea of choice or selection another shade of meaning 'discrimination or separation from others,' — 'how we are to discriminate in the choice.'

9. 4. ἢ δὲ ἐνδέχεται κ.τ.λ.

Dependent on some more general idea to be supplied from
‘May not the reason be that those who have these two qualities are possibly wanting in self control?’

9.5.

We need not suppose any allusion to a lost part of the Politics, or to a special treatise called ‘οἱ νόμοι.’ The meaning is that ‘enactments in the laws of states which are supposed to be for their good are preservative of states.’ τοῖς νόμοις = ‘their laws,’ the article referring to πολιτείαις which follows.

9.7.

οἱ δὲ οἴδεμεν ταύτην εἶναι μιὰν ἀρετήν.

The preceding sentence.

Those who consider that rigid adherence to the principles of the existing constitution, whether democracy or oligarchy, is the only object worthy of a statesman, carry their theory to an extreme. They forget that ‘happy inconsistencies’ may be better than extremes. The Opportunist may do greater service to the Republic than the Intransigent.

9.7.

καθάπερ ῥέσ.

Cp. Rhet. i. 4, 1360 a. 23, λέγω δὲ τὸ ὑπὸ οἰκείων φθείρεσθαι, ὅτι ἔξω τῆς βελτίστης πολιτείας αἵ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι καὶ ἀνείμεναι καὶ ἐπιστευόμεναι φθείρωνται, ὅσον δημοκρατία οὐ μόνον ἀνείμενη ἀσθενεῖτα ἔνεστι τῷ τίλῳ ἤξει ἐκ οἰκετράξιν, ἄλλα καὶ ἐπιστευόμενη σφόδρα, ὀσπερ καὶ ἡ γραπτός καὶ ἡ συμπότησις οὐ μόνον ἀνείμενα ἐρχεται ἐις τὸ μέσον, ἄλλα καὶ σφόδρα γρατά γενόμενα ἡ συμά οὗτο διατίθεται ὡς τῷ μηδὲ μυκτῆρα δοκεῖν εἶναι.

9.7.

dio tην ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν τῶν ἐναντίων.

‘On account of the excess (cp. above εἶναι ἐπιστείνη) and of the defect of the opposite qualities.’

9.8.

συμβαίνει δὴ τούτο καὶ περὶ τᾶς ἄλλας πολιτείας.

ἄλλας is used adverbially, as in Plato and Thucydides, in the sense of ‘likewise.’ Cp. Nic. Eth. ii. 4. § 3. πρὸς τὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχειν, where ἄλλας = ‘which we are comparing with the virtues,’ and Pol. vii. 10. § 10, διοικεῖν τὴν ἄλλην οἰκίαν.

9.8.

ὥστε ἔχειν.

ὥστε is bracketed by Bekker (2nd edition) without reason; it is
found in all the MSS. and in point of Greek is unobjectionable; cp. ἐστὶν ἡμῖν ii. 1, 412 b. 25. § 1 1, ἐστὶ δὲ οὐ τὸ ἀποθέμενον τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ δυνάμει οὐ ψυχεῖ τὸ ἔχων.

9. 9. φείδοντες τοὺς καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν νόμους.

Sc. τὸν εὐθέατον ηὐ τὸ πλῆθος. ‘So that when they destroy either party by laws carried to excess [or possibly ‘by laws based on superior power’] they destroy the state.’

9. 11. μέγαστον δὲ πάντων... τὸ παιδεύεσθαι πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας.

Cp. Rep. iv. 423 E, ταύτα... πάντα φαύλα, εἶν τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν μέγα φυλάττοσι, μᾶλλον δ’ αὐτὶ μεγάλον ἰκανόν. τί τούτο; ἐφι. τὴν παιδείαν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, καὶ τροφὴν.

9. 11. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἔνιαις ὑμνοῦσι ‘καὶ τῷ δήμῳ κακῶνους ἐσομαι καὶ βουλεύσω δ’ τι ἐν ἔχω κακῶν.’

The habit of taking a formal oath of hostility may be illustrated by an Inscription containing an agreement between certain Cretan cities:—

ὁμώοιο... τεθεὶς πάντας καὶ πάσας, μὴ μὰν ἐγὼ ποια τοῖς Λυττίωις καλῶς φρονησειν μῆτε τέχνα μῆτε μαχαίρα μῆτε ἐν νυκτὶ μῆτε πείδ’ ἀμέραν καὶ σπειρῶ ο’ τι καὶ δύναμι κακῶν τῷ πόλει τά τῶν Λυττίων.

The inscription is given in Vischer’s Kleine Schriften, vol. ii. p. 106.

9. 11. χρῆ δὲ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνειν καὶ ὑποκρίνεσθαι τοιναυτίων.

‘To have the notion and act the part of one who does no wrong, not necessarily implying a mere profession or simulation, as c. 11. § 19 infra, ἀλλὰ τούτο μὲν ὀσπέρ ὑπάθειν δεῖ μὲν, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα τὰ μὲν ποιεῖ τὰ δὲ δοκεῖ ὑποκρινόμενον τῶν βασιλικῶν καλῶς.

9. 13. νῦν δ’ ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὁλιγαρχίαις οἱ τῶν ἀρχοντῶν υἱοὶ τροφῶσιν κ.τ.λ.


9. 15. ‘εἰς δ’ χρῆσον.’

Probably ἐστὶ is to be supplied. The words do not agree with any known passage of Euripides.
πρὸς βοηθείαν τὴν ἄπο τοῦ δήμου.

' The assistance which arises from i.e. is necessitated by the people.' Such we must infer to be the meaning from the parallel clause ἐν τοῖς γνωρίμων which follows.

tοῖς ἐπιεικέσι.

' The good' in the party sense, i.e. the higher classes like the ὑγαθοὶ of Theognis 32 Bergk and elsewhere.

Besides the three accounts of the origin of monarchy given in 10. 3. i. 2. § 6 (the patriarchal); and iii. 14. § 12 and infra §§ 7, 8 (election for merit), and iv. 13. § 11 (the weakness of the middle and lower classes), we have here a fourth in which the royal authority is said to have been introduced for the protection of the aristocracy against the people.

Supra, c. 5. § 8, Aristotle speaks of tyrannies arising out of the need which democracies felt of a protector of the people against the rich before they became great (διὰ τὸ μὴ μεγάλας εἶναι τὰς πόλεις); here, when they were already 'increased in power,' (ἡδή τῶν πολεων ἡξημέων). But the discrepancy is verbal. For the terms greatness and littleness might be used of the same states at different periods of Greek history.

οἱ δήμοι.

Not 'the democracies,' but 'the peoples in different states.'

Pheidon, a legitimate king of Argos, tenth or sixth in descent 10. 6. from Temenus, called by Herodotus (vi. 127) a tyrant, who gave the Peloponnesians weights and measures. He is said to have driven out the Elean judges, and to have usurped authority over the Olympic games. According to Ephorus fr. 15, Müller i. p. 236, he recovered the whole lot of Temenus and attempted to reduce all the cities once subject to Heracles. He was at length overthrown by the Eleans and Lacedaemonians.

Phalaris, according to Arist. Rhet. ii. 20. § 5, 1393 b. 8 ff., was 10. 6. elected by his Himerian fellow citizens general and dictator of Himera. It was on this occasion that Stesichorus told the story
of the Horse and his Rider. Phalaris has been generally called tyrant of Agrigentum, and it is possible that his power having begun in the one city may have extended to the other.

Panaetius is mentioned in c. 12. § 18 as having changed the government of Leontini from an oligarchy into a tyranny.

For Cypselus, who came into power as the representative of the people against the oligarchy of the Bacchiadae from which he was himself sprung, see Herod. v. 92.

10. 8. ὄσπερ Κόδρος.

In the common tradition Codrus is supposed to have saved his country in a war with the Dorians by the voluntary sacrifice of his own life; here Aristotle implies that he delivered Athens from slavery by his military services.

10. 8. ἔλευθερώσαντες ὄσπερ Κύρος,

who delivered the Persians from the Medes. See infra, § 24.

10. 8. κτίσαντες χώραν.

'Who have settled a country.'

κτίζειν χώραν is said like κτίζειν πώλειν, with a slight enlargement of the meaning of the word.

10. 8. ὄσπερ οἱ Ἀκαδαιμονίων βασιλεῖς.

Referring, probably, not to the Lacedaemonian kings generally, who cannot be said to have added, except in the Messenian Wars, to the territory of Sparta, but to the original founders of the monarchy.

10. 8. Μακεδώνων.

Such as Perdicas I., Alexander I. (Herod. viii. 137 ff.), Arche- laus (Thuc. ii. 100), Philip the father of Alexander the Great and others.

10. 8. Μολοστῶν.

Cp. infra, c. 11. § 2, where the moderation of the Molossian monarchy is eulogized.

NOTES, BOOK V. 10.

βασιλεὺς ὁ μὴ αὐτάρκης καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἁγαθοῖς ὑπερέχων ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος οἴκεται, ὃ ὁ ωφέλιμα οὐν αὐτῷ μὲν ὁὐκ ἀν σκοποῖ τοῖς δὲ ἀρχόμενοι:—in which the ideal conception of royalty maintained in the Politics also appears.

tὸ Περιάνδρου πρὸς Θρασύβουλον σμβουλευμα.
See note on iii. 13. § 16.

ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀρμόδιος.

Sc. ἐπίθετο, to be supplied from τῶν ἑπιθετῶν, or from ἑπιθετέντα (supra, § 14). Cp. Thuc. i. 20, vi. 54–58. The account of Aristotle agrees in the main with that of Thucydides, but there is no mention of the critical question raised by the latter, viz. whether Hippias or Hipparchus was the elder son of Peisistratus. The Peisistratidae are loosely spoken of as the authors of the insult, and the punishment inflicted is assumed to be the punishment of a tyrant. But the language of Aristotle is not sufficiently precise to be adduced on either side of the question.

ἐπιθετέεσαν δὲ καὶ Περιάνδρῳ τῷ ἐν Ἀμβρακίᾳ τυράννῳ.

Mentioned above, c. 4. § 9, where, not inconsistently with the account here given, he is said to have been attacked by conspirators, although the conspirators failed in attaining their object, for the people took the government.

ἥ Ἀμύντου τοῦ μικροῦ.

Probably Amyntas the Second who flourished in the generation which followed the Peloponnesian War and succeeded after a struggle to the Macedonian throne b.c. 394, from which however he was deposed but afterwards restored by the help of the Spartans.

Derdas the prince of Elymia his kinsman, and at one time his ally, is probably the conspirator here mentioned.

ἥ δὲ Φίλιππος ὑπὸ Παυσανίου.

The only direct allusion to Philip which is found in Aristotle except Rhet. ii. 23, 1397 b. 31, καὶ πάλιν πρὸς τὸ Ἐθναῖον διείναι Φίλιππον εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν, ὅτι εἰ πρὶν βοηθήσαται εἰς Φωκείαν ἥξου, ὑπέσχοντο
The murder of Philip by Pausanias occurred at the marriage of his daughter with Alexander of Epirus B.C. 336. The mention of the circumstance shows that this passage, if not the whole of the Politics, must have been composed later than the date of this event.

The story here referred to is narrated more fully by Diodorus (xvi. 93). According to his rather incredible narrative Attalus was the uncle of Cleopatra whom Philip married in 337 B.C., and he had a friend also named Pausanias of whom the assassin Pausanias was jealous. Pausanias the friend of Attalus being abused and insulted by his namesake, sought death in battle, and Attalus, to revenge the supposed insult to his friend, invited the other Pausanias to a banquet and outraged him. When Philip could not or would not punish Attalus, Pausanias turned his anger against the king. Nearly the same story is told by Justin ix. 6. and Plutarch Alex. c. 10.

10. 16. καὶ ἡ τοῦ εἰνοίκου Εὐαγόρα τῷ Κυπρίῳ.

Sc. ἡ ἐπίθεσις. Εὐαγόρα is governed by the ἐπὶ in ἐπίθεσις. The story is differently told by Theopompus (Fragm. i11, Müller i. p. 295). According to his account the eunuch Thrasydaeus got Evagoras and his sons into his power by inducing them to make assignations with a young maiden, who was the daughter of Nicocreon, a revolted subject of Evagoras. According to Diodorus (xv. 47) the name of the eunuch who conspired was Nicocles; but the name is probably a confusion with the son of Evagoras who succeeded him. Isocrates in his ‘Evagoras’ throws a veil over the whole story. Thus our four authorities all disagree with one another.

10. 17. Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, reigned in Macedonia 413–399, and had two wives,—the name of the second was Cleopatra, the name of the first is not mentioned. He seems to have thought that he would prevent quarrels in his two families if he married a son and daughter out of each of them to one another. For Archelaus see Thuc. ii. 100 and Plat. Gorg. 470, 471; for Arrhabaeus (or
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Arribaeus) the enemy of Perdiccas, as he was afterwards the enemy of Archelaus, see Thuc. iv. 79. Of Sirra, which appears to be the name of a woman, nothing more is known. The occurrence of the name in this passage has suggested a very ingenious emendation in the words of Strabo, bk. viii. c. 7. p. 327, ἡ Φιλίππου μῆτρα τοῦ Αμιντοῦ Ἑρμῖκης ἱερὰ δὲ θυγάτηρ where read Εὐρυδίκη Σίφρα δὲ θυγάτηρ. (Dindorf.)

10. 18.

Cotys was assassinated in 358 B.C. by the brothers Heraclides and Parrhon called also Python, Dem. c. Aristocr. p. 659. According to Plut. Adv. Coloten 32 and Diog. Laert. iii. 31 they had been disciples of Plato.

10. 19.

πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ εἰς τὸ σῶμα αἰκασθήναι πληγαῖς ὁρμηθέντες οἱ μὲν διεβιβαζον οἱ δέ ἐνεχείρησαν ὡς ὑβρισθέντες, καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ βασιλείας δυναστείας.

The first καὶ means that attempts were also made in consequence of personal ill-treatment of another sort, and the second καὶ that they were made not only upon tyrants, but upon magistrates and royal personages. See also note on Text.

In this passage, though speaking primarily of tyrannies, Aristotle digresses into monarchies generally and oligarchies.

ἐνεχείρησαν, sc. διαφθείρειν.

10. 19.

Πεθαλίδας.

It was Penthilus, the son of Orestes, who according to Strabo, bk. ix. p. 403, xiii. p. 582, and Pausanias iii. 2. p. 207 recolonized Lesbos. The Penthaliana derived their name from him.

10. 20.

ὁ δὲ Εὐριπίδης ἔκαλεσανεν εἰπόστος τι αὐτοῦ εἰς δυσῳδίαν τοῦ στόματος.

This story, which casts a rather unfavourable light on the character of Euripides, is alluded to in Stobaeus, Serm. 39. p. 237, Εὐριπίδης ὁ ἐνεβιβαζόμενος αὐτῷ τιμὸς ὅτι τὸ σῶμα δυσῳδεῖ ἢν, πολλὰ γὰρ, ἐπεὶν αὐτῷ, ἀποφῆμα ἐγκατεσκόπη, i.e. Some one said to Euripides, ‘Your breath smells.’ ‘Yes,’ he replied, ‘for many things which might not be spoken have been decomposed in my mouth.’

ὁσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὰς μοναρχίας.

We must supply περὶ in thought before μοναρχίας. It is inserted

10. 21.
in the margin of P5. ‘As well in monarchies as in more popular forms of government.’

10. 21. οὖρ Ζέρβην 'Αρταπάνης φοβούμενος τὴν διαβολὴν τήν περὶ Δαρείων, ἐγκρέμασεν οὐ κελεύσαντος Ζέρβην, ἄλλο οἶμένος συγγρώσεσθαι ὡς ἀμημονοῦστα διὰ τὸ δειπνεῖν.

The Xerxes here referred to is Xerxes the First, cp. Ctesias Fragmenta, Περσικά § 29 (edit. Didot p. 51), ’Αρταπάνος (sic) δὲ μέγα παρὰ Ζέρβη δυνάμενος, μετ’ Ἀσσαμίτην τοῦ εὐνοίχου καὶ αὐτοῦ μέγα δυνάμενον βουλεύσαται ἄνελεῖν Ζέρβην, καὶ ἀναφεύγοις, καὶ πείθουσαν Ἀρτοξέρβην (sic) τὸν νιῶν ὡς Δαρειαίος (sic) αὐτὸν ὁ ἔτερος παῖς ἄνελε. Καὶ παραγίνεται Δαρειαῖος ἀγόμενος ὑπὸ ’Αρταπάνου εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν Ἀρτοξέρβου πολλὰ βοῶν καὶ ἀπαρνοῦμενος ὡς οὐκ εἴη φοινῖς τὸν πατρὸς’ καὶ ἀποθνῄσκει. According to Diod. xi. 69, Artabanus an Hyrcanian, having by a false accusation got rid of one of the sons of Xerxes, shortly afterwards attacked the other son Artaxerxes who succeeded him, but he was discovered and put to death. Both these stories, which are substantially the same, are so different from the narrative of Aristotle that it is better not to try and reconcile them by such expedients as the placing οὐ before ἐκρέμασε. The purport of Aristotle’s rather obscure words seems to be as follows: Artapanes had hanged Darius the son of Xerxes who was supposed to have conspired against his father; he had not been told to hang him or he had been told not to hang him (for οὐ κελεύσαντος may mean either); but he had hoped that Xerxes in his cups would forget what precisely happened.

Ctesias is several times quoted by Aristotle in the Historia Animalium but always with expressions of distrust, ii. 1. 501 a. 25, iii. 22. 523 a. 26, viii. 28. 606 a. 8; also De Gen. An. ii. 2. 736 a. 2.

10. 22. Σαρδανάπαλον.

A rather mythical person apparently the same with the Assurbanipal of the Assyrian inscriptions, a mighty hunter and great conqueror, who became to the Greeks and through them to the civilized world the type of oriental luxury. The story of his effeminacy is taken by Diodorus (ii. 23–27) from Ctesias and is again referred to by Aristotle in Nic. Eth. i. 5. § 3.
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10. 22.

For another example of a similar manner of treating old legends, see i. 11. § 8.

10. 23.

Διονυσίω τῷ ἵστερῷ Δίων ἐπέθηκε.
See infra §§ 28 and 32.

10. 24.

ὁσπερ οἱ στρατηγοῦντες τοὺς μονάρχους, οἶαν Κίρος Ἀστυάγη.

Aristotle in this passage follows a legend, differing from that of Herodotus who selected the tradition about Cyrus' life (i. 95 ff.) and death (i. 214) which seemed to him the most probable. In Aristotle's version Cyrus, not Harpagus, was represented as the general of Astyages. Of a misconception entertained by Herodotus, Aristotle speaks with some severity in his Historia Animalium, iii. 22, 523 a. 17.

10. 24.

Σέοθης ὁ Θρᾶξ.
A friend and acquaintance of Xenophon who recovered his small kingdom by the help of some of the ten thousand. He is mentioned in Anab. vii. 3, Hell. iii. 2. § 2, iv. 8. § 26.

10. 25.

οἶον Ἀριοβαρζάνη Μιθριδάτης.
According to Corn. Nepos Datames, c. 11, Mithridates the son of Ariobarzanes, a revolted satrap of Pontus, attacked not Ariobarzanes but Datames the celebrated satrap of Caria. It does not therefore become less probable that he may also have attacked his own father; and the latter fact is confirmed by the allusion of Xenophon, Cyrop. viii. 8. 4, ὁσπερ Μιθριδάτης τῶν πατέρα Ἀριοβαρζάνη προδοὺς.

10. 28.

οῖς ἀκολουθεῖν δεῖ τὴν Δίωνος ὑπόληψιν.
'There should be ever present with them the resolution of Dion.'

10. 28.

ικανῶν αὐτῷ.
Sc. Ὄν.

10. 30.

Διὸ λακεδαιμόνων πλείστας κατέλυσαν τυραννίδας.

Διὸ, 'because one form of government naturally hates another.'
Cp. Thuc. i. 18, ἐπειδὴ δε ὧ δε τῷ Ἀθηναίων τύραννοι καὶ ὧ δε τῇ ἄλλῃ
'Ελλάδος ἐπὶ πολὺ καὶ πρῶν τυραννευθείσης οἱ πλείστοι καὶ τελευταῖοι, πλὴν τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ, ὑπὸ Δακεδαμιοῦν κατελήθησαν: and Hdt. v. 92 about the Lacedaemonian hatred to tyranny.

10. 30. καὶ Συρακούσιοι.

This period of liberty and prosperity lasted for sixty years, 466–406, from the overthrow of Thrasybulus to the usurpation of Dionysius. But more is known of Sicily in the days of the tyrants than of the time when the island was comparatively free.

10. 31. καὶ νῦν ἡ τῶν περὶ Διονύσιον.

The final expulsion of Dionysius the younger by Timoleon occurred b.c. 343; but it is the first expulsion by Dion to which Aristotle is here referring, b.c. 356, as the Politics were written not earlier than 336 (see supra note on § 16). We have thus a measure of the latitude with which Aristotle uses the expression καὶ νῦν 'quite lately' which recurs in ii. 9. § 20, καὶ νῦν ἐν τοῖς Ἀνδρίων.

10. 31. οἱ δὲ συστάντες αὐτῶν.

Either 1) the same persons who are called οἰκείοι συστάντες, or some part of them, οἱ συστάντες being taken substantively = οἱ συστασιῶται. Or 2) αὐτῶν may be understood of the whole people as if πολίται had preceded; συστάντες would then refer to another band of conspirators who were not of the family. Bekker in his second edition has inserted κατ' before αὐτῶν without MS. authority. Susemihl suggests μετά. Neither emendation is satisfactory.

The reign of Thrasybulus, if indeed he reigned at all except in the name of his nephew, as seems to be implied in this passage, lasted only eleven months; see infra c. 12. § 6. According to Diodorus (xi. 67, 68), who says nothing of a son of Gelo, he immediately succeeded Hiero, but soon provoked the Syracusans by his cruelty and rapacity to expel him.

10. 32. Διονύσιον δὲ Δίων στρατεύσας, κηδεστής ὃν καὶ προσλαβὼν τῶν δήμων, ἐκέιὼν ἐκβάλων διεφθάρη.

This is a reminiscence of § 28. The emphasis is on ἐκβάλων. Aristotle is speaking of cases in which tyrants were destroyed by
members of their own family. He means to say that Dion drove out Dionysius who was his kinsman, although he himself perished more than twelve months afterwards when the revolution was completed. Or, 'Dion did indeed perish (as I have already implied), but not until he had driven out his kinsman Dionysius.'

αλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ μύσος,
sc. χρήται τῷ λογισμῷ which is supplied from the preceding sentence.

ὁσας αἵτις εἰρήκαμεν τῇς τε ὀλιγαρχίας,
sc. τῆς φθορᾶς τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας, understood from the general meaning of the preceding passage.

ὅν γέγρωντο δὴ ἔτι βασιλείαν νῦν.
Cp. iii. 14. § 13, a passage in which the gradual decline of royalty is described.

αλλ' ἂν περ γέγρωντα, μοναρχίαι καὶ τυραννίδες μᾶλλον.

The objection to the καὶ (which is found in all the MSS.) is that μοναρχία is elsewhere the generic word (cp. supra §§ 1, 2), including βασιλεία and τυραννίς. If we accept the reading of the MSS., some general idea, 'wherever there are such forms of government' must be supplied with γέγρωνται from βασιλεία. 'There are no royalties nowadays: but if there are any,' or rather 'instead of them mere monarchies and tyrannies.' Here 'monarchies' is taken in some specific bad or neutral sense opposed to βασιλεία. But a variation in a technical use of language which he was endeavouring to fix, but was not always capable of himself observing, is not a serious objection to a reading found in Aristotle's Politics.

ῥᾳδία γὰρ ἕγινεν ἡ κατάλυσις.

'For their overthrow was easily effected.' The imperfect graphically represents the historical fact.

ἡ περὶ Μολοττῶν βασιλεία.
Cp. supra, c. 10. § 8.
11.2. Theopompus is said by Tyrtaeus to have terminated the first Messenian War, Fr. 3 Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Graeci:

'Ημετέρω βασιλῇ θεοίς φίλω Θεοσφήμῳ,
διὰ δὲ Μεσσήμην εἴλομεν εὐρύχορον,
Μεσσήμην ἁγαθὴν μὲν ἄροιν, ἁγαθὴν δὲ φυτεῦειν,
ἀμφ’ αὐτῇ δ’ ἐμάχοντ’ ἐννεακάθεκ’ ἐτῆ
ναλεμέως, αἰεὶ ταλασίφρων θυμῶν ἔχοντες
αἰχμητὰ πατέρων ἡμετέρων πατέρως
ἐκοστῷ δ’ οἱ μὲν κατὰ πίονα ἔργα λιπώντες,
φεύγον ἵθωμαιν ἐκ μεγάλων ὀρέων.

According to Plutarch, Lyc. 7, he increased the power of the Ephors, but he also made the μῆτρα more stringent which forbade the people to amend or modify proposals submitted to them.

In this passage the institution of the Ephors is attributed to Theopompus, but in ii. c. 9 it seems to be assumed that Lycurgus is the author of all the Spartan institutions: see note in loc.

11.5. ἢ γὰρ γνώσις πᾶσιν ποιεῖ μᾶλλον πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

Cp. Thuc. viii. 66 where the difficulty of overthrowing the 400 is attributed to the uncertainty of the citizens as to who were or were not included in the conspiracy.

11.6. καὶ τὸ τοὺς ἐπιθημούντας ἐδεί φανερῶς εἶναι καὶ διαστρίβειν περὶ θύρας.

ἐπιθημούντας is translated by William de Moerbeke without any authority ‘praefectos populi,’ apparently an etymological guess.

περὶ θύρας. Either *‘at his gate’ or ‘at their own gates.’ In whichever way the words are taken, the general meaning is the same, viz. that the people are not to hide but to show themselves.

11.8. καὶ τὸ πέντης ποιεῖν τοὺς ἀρχομένους, τυραννικῶς, ὅπως ἢ τε φυλακῆ τρέφηται.

1) * Reading ἢ τε with Bekker’s second edition after Victorius: ‘Also he should impoverish his subjects that he may find money for the support of his guards.’ Yet the mode of expression is indirect and awkward. If 2) we retain μῆτρα with the MSS. we must translate either ‘that he may not have to keep soldiers,’ for his subjects will keep them for him; or, ‘so that a guard need not
be kept,' because he will be in no danger on account of the depressed state of his subjects. Neither explanation is satisfactory; there is a balance of difficulties.

άναβηματα τῶν Κυψελίδων κ.τ.λ.

See Herod. i. 14.

Florence in the fifteenth century, and Paris in the nineteenth, witness to a similar policy.

tῶν περί Σάμων ἔργα Πολυκράτεια.

Lit. and ' among ' or ' of the buildings of Samos the works of Polycrates.' Among these splendid works an artificial mountain containing a tunnel forming an aqueduct, a mole in front of the harbour, and the greatest temple known, are commemorated in Herod. iii. 60, but he does not expressly attribute them to Polycrates.

cαί ἡ εἰσφορὰ τῶν τελῶν, οἷον ἐν Συρακούσαις ἐν πέντε γὰρ ἔτεσιν ἐπὶ... 11. 10.

Διονυσίου τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπάταν εἰσενηχέανα συνίβαυναι.

Compare a story equally incredible told of Cypselus in the pseudo-Aristotelian Oeconomics ii. 1346 a. 32: 'Cypselus the Corinthian made a vow that if he ever became lord of the city he would consecrate to Zeus the whole wealth of the citizens, so he bade them register themselves, and when they were registered he took from them a tithe of their property and told them to go on working with the remainder. Each year he did the like; the result was that at the end of ten years he got into his possession all which he had consecrated; the Corinthians meanwhile had gained other property.'

There are several similar legends respecting Dionysius himself recorded in the Oeconomics, such as the story of his collecting the women's ornaments, and after consecrating them to Demeter lending them to himself, 1349 a. 14; or of his taking the money of the orphans and using it while they were under age, ib. b. 15; or of his imposition of a new cattle-tax, after he had induced his subjects to purchase cattle by the abolition of the tax, ib. b. 6. The fertile imagination of the Greeks was a good deal occupied with inventions about the tyrants; the examples given throw a light upon the character of such narratives.

VOL. II.
11. 10. βουλομένων μὲν πάντων, δυναμένων δὲ μάλιστα τούτων.  
Cp. note on text.

11. 11. καὶ γὰρ ὁ δῆμος εἶναι βούλεται μόναρχος.  
i.e. 'for they are both alike.'

11. 13. ἦλω γὰρ ὁ Ἑλως, ὡσπερ ἡ παρομία.  
Sc. ἐκκρούεται, 'one nail is knocked out by another' = one rogue is got rid of by another. That is to say: 'The tyrant finds in rogues handy and useful instruments.' Such appears to be the application of the proverb in this passage. Yet the common meaning of it given in collections of proverbs is that 'one evil is mended by another.' Cp. Lucian, Pro Lapsu inter Salutandum, § 7, μυρία δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἐκ τε ποιητῶν καὶ συγγραφέων καὶ φιλοσόφων καταδείκται σοι ἔχων, προσμένων τὸ ὕγιανεν, τούτο μὲν παρατήρομαι, ὡς μὴ ἐσ ἀπειροκαλίαν τινὰ μειρακιώθη ἐκπέμι μοι τὸ σύγγραμμα καὶ κυνονείωμεν ἄλλο κόπια ἐκκρούει τῶν ἥλων.

11. 13. αὐτῶν γὰρ εἶναι μόνων ἀξιῶν τωστὸν ὁ τύραννος.  
Compare the saying attributed to the Russian Emperor Paul, 'Il n'y a pas de considérable ici que la personne à laquelle je parle, et pendant le temps que je lui parle.' Wallace's Russia, p. 280, ed. 8.

Sc. ὁ τύραννος; or οἰδίν may be the nominative to ἐλλείπει.

11. 16. εἰς οὓς μὲν οὖν ὃρους ... φρονώσων.  
The end of § 16 is bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd Edition (after Schneider). It is only a repetition of what goes before, the three aims of the tyrant being stated in a different order.  
The 1st in § 15 = 3rd in § 16.  
2nd = 1st  
3rd = 2nd  
The parallel words are either a summary or a duplicate.  
But there is no reason for excluding either of the two passages any more than for excluding the repetitions in Homer. Both versions can hardly be supposed to have come from the hand of Aristotle, but they belong to a text which we cannot go behind.
NOTES, BOOK V. 11.

11. 17.

\(\delta\ 'ετερος σχεδον \varepsilon\ 'εναντίας \varepsilon\ 'εκ το\(\varepsilon\) ειρημένως τη\(\nu\) ἐπιμέλειαν.\)

Literally, 'the other manner of preserving a tyranny takes pains,' i.e. works, 'from an opposite direction.'

\(\epsilonν\) φυλάττοντα μόνον τη\(\nu\) δύναμιν . . . τούτο μὲν ὁσπερ ὑπόθεσιν δει 11. 18, 19. μένει, τὰ \(\delta\) ἄλλα τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν τὰ \(\delta\) δοκεῖν ἑποκρινόμενον τὸ βασιλικὸν καλὸς.

Compare Machiavelli, who in his 'Prince' goes much farther than Aristotle in preaching the doctrine of 'doing evil that good may come' and of 'keeping up appearances' and of 'fear to be preferred to love.' 'Let it be the Prince's chief care to maintain his authority; the means he employs, be they what they may, will for this purpose always appear honourable and meet applause; for the vulgar are ever caught by appearances and judge only by the event.' (c. 18, Bohn's Translation, p. 461.) Again 'A prince ought to be very sparing of his own or of his subjects' property.' . . . 'To support the reputation of liberality, he will often be reduced to the necessity of levying taxes on his subjects and adopting every species of fiscal resource, which cannot fail to make him odious.' (c. 16. pp. 454, 455.) And for much of what follows, infra §§ 20, 25: 'He should make it a rule above all things never to utter anything which does not breathe of kindness, justice, good faith and piety; this last quality it is most important for him to appear to possess, for men judge more from appearances than from reality.' (ib.) Again, cp. §§ 22, 23 with Machiavelli c. 19. p. 462: 'Nothing in my opinion renders a prince so odious as the violation of the rights of property and disregard to the honour of married women. Subjects will live contentedly enough under a prince who neither invades their property nor their honour, and then he will only have to contend against the pretensions of a few ambitious persons whom he can easily find means to restrain. A prince whose conduct is light, inconstant, pusillanimous, irresolute and effeminate is sure to be despised—these defects he ought to shun as he would so many rocks and endeavour to display a character for courage, gravity, energy and magnificence in all his actions.' Like Aristotle he advises that princes should practise economy and not overcharge the people with taxes; they should give festivals and shows at
certain periods of the year and 'should remember to support their station with becoming dignity,' p. 476. Cp. Hallam, Mid. Ages i. 66, 'The sting of taxation is wastefulness. What high-spirited man could see without indignation the earnings of his labour yielded ungrudgingly to the public defence become the spoil of parasites and speculators?' (quoted by Congreve).


11. 22. The moderation here described in everything but ambition was shown by the elder Dionysius as he is pictured by Cornelius Nepos De Regibus c. 2: 'Dionysius prior... et manu fortis et belli peritus fuit, et, id quod in tyranno non facile reperitur, minime libidinosus, non luxuriosus, non avarus, nullius rei denique cupidus, nisi singularis perpetuique imperii, ob eamque rem crudelis. Nam dum id studuit munire, nullius pepercit vitae, quem ejus insidiatorem putaret.'

The second Dionysius would furnish a tyrant of the opposite type (§ 23), if we may believe the writer of the Aristotelian Polity of Syracuse, 'Ἀριστοτήλης δὲ ἐν τῇ Συρακοσίων πολιτείᾳ καὶ συνεχῶς φησίν αὐτῶν [Διονύσιων τῶν νεώτερον] ἔσθ' ὅτε ἐπὶ ἡμέρας ἑνενήκοντα μεθύειν δὲ καὶ ἀμβλωπότερον γενόσθαι τὰς ψυχές. (Arist. Berl. Ed. 1568, b. 19.)

11. 23. φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ἄλλοις βούλοντι τούτῳ ποιοῦντες.

These words curiously illustrate the love of ostentation inherent in the Greek character.

11. 24. κατασκευάζειν γὰρ δὲ καὶ κοσμεῖν τὴν πόλιν.

Like Polycrates at Samos, Gelo at Syracuse, Cypselus and Periander at Corinth, Theron at Agrigentum, Peisistratus at Athens.

11. 28. κολάσεως.

Bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd edition after Schneider. Certainly the word is not appropriate if taken with ἠλικίαω, but ἔβρεως may be supplied with τῆς εἰς τὴν ἠλικίαν from the preceding.

11. 30. διαφθείραντες.

Sc. τῶν τύραννων.
χαλεπών θυμῷ μάχεσθαι.

Quoted in Nic. Eth. ii. 3. § 10, ἐτὶ χαλεπώτερον ἡδονῆ μάχεσθαι ἡ
θυμῷ, καθάπερ φησίν Ἡράκλειτος.

For the arts of the tyrant cp. Machiavelli’s ‘Prince’ quoted
above, especially chaps. 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 23.

μάλιστα μὲν ἀμφοτέρους ὑπολαμβάνειν δεὶ σώζεσθαι διὰ τὴν ὀρχήν.

The consciousness that no other government could hold the
balance between irreconcilable parties seems to have been the
main support of recent French Imperialism.

ἐτὶ δ’ αὐτῶν διακείσθαι κατὰ τὸ ἱθος όσοι καλῶς πρὸς ἀμετάν ἢ ἡμίχρηστον

ὅτα, καὶ μὴ ποιητῶν ἄλλ’ ἡμιπόθητον.

Cp. Machiavelli, Prince, c. 15. p. 453, in a still more subtle style
of reflection: ‘It would doubtless be happy for a prince to unite in
himself every species of good quality, but as our nature does not
allow of so great a perfection a prince should have prudence
enough to avoid those defects and vices which may occasion his
ruin.’ And again: ‘He should not shrink from encountering some
blame on account of vices which are important to the support of
his states; for there are some things having the appearance of
virtues which would prove the ruin of a prince, should he put
them in practice, and others upon which, though seemingly bad and
vicious, his actual welfare and security entirely depend.’

Hdt. vi. 126 gives the Sicilian tyrants as 1) Andreas, 2) Myron, 12. 1.
3) Aristonymus, 4) Cleisthenes. According to Pausanias x. 7. § 3.
p. 814 Cleisthenes is said to have won a victory in the Pythian
games b.c. 582. Grote (vol. iii. c. 9. p. 43) says ‘there is some
confusion about the names of Orthogoras and Andreas. It has
been supposed with some probability that the same person is
designated under both names: for the two names do not seem to
occur in the same author.’ Orthogoras, ‘speaker for the right,’
may have been a surname or second name of Andreas. Infra
§ 12, Aristotle supposes the tyranny to have passed directly from
Myron to Cleisthenes.

Πεισίστρατον ὑπομεῖναι ποτὲ προσκληθῶν δίκην ἐλε Ἄρεων πάγων. 12. 2.

According to Plutarch in the life of Solon c. 31 he is said to
have gone to the Court of the Areopagus intending to defend himself against a charge of homicide, but his accuser did not appear.

12. 3. Cypselidae.

The addition in this passage appears to be incorrect.

Cypselus 30 years.
Periander 44 "
Psammetichus 3 "

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From these numbers how does Aristotle get a total 73½ years?

Sylburg would change τρία καὶ ἔδωμενκοντα into ἐπτὰ καὶ ἔδωμενκοντα. Giphanius would omit καὶ τέταρα after τετρακόκοντα. Susemuhl would change τέταρα into ἔμισυν, which would give exactly the sum wanted. Goettling has a very farfetched and groundless supposition that the reign of Psammetichus was omitted by Aristotle in the addition, because he was only a commander of mercenaries and not of Cypselid blood. It might also be suggested that some of the reigns overlap in consequence of a tyrant adopting his successor as colleague. But a mistake either of Aristotle or his copyists is more likely.

All the MSS. read τέταρα or τέσσαρα.

12. 5. τριάκοντα καὶ πέντε.

Hdt. v. 65 makes the Peisistratidae rule Athens 36 years.

Peisistratus seized the sovereignty in 560 B.C. and died in 527; he reigned 17 years out of the 33. Hippias reigned 14 years before the death of Hipparchus (514), and in the year 510, four years afterwards, he was expelled. 17 + 14 + 4 = 35.

The whole period 560–510 is 50 years, 35 of actual rule. In the calculation of Herodotus there is a year more. From Thuc. vi. 54 we learn that even at Athens not 100 years after the event, there were erroneous ideas about the expulsion of the Peisistratidae.

12. 6. Here the addition is correct. 7 + 10 + 1 = 18, although the time assigned to Hiero’s reign does not agree with the statement of Diodorus (xi. 66) that he reigned 11 years. But why does
Aristotle omit Dionysius, whose tyranny lasted longer, and therefore afforded a better example? Dionysius I b.c. 405–367, Dionysius II 367–356, and again 346–344, besides the shorter reigns of Dion and others, in all about 60 years.

i. d. i o s.

i.e. in any way specially applicable to that form of government.

We may observe that Aristotle criticises the Platonic number as if it had a serious meaning: yet he omits τρις αὑξηθέναι, words which are an essential part of the calculation, after δύο ἄρμονίαις παρέχεται. (See Rep. viii. 546 C.)

diά τε τοῦ χρόνου.

Sc. τι ἂν ἰδιος εἶη μεταβολή to be supplied from the preceding sentence. ‘And in what is any special change made by time?’ i.e. What has time alone to do with the changes of states?

With τὰ μῆ ἀρχάμενα supply τι or διά τι from τι ἂν εἰη above; cp. 12. 9. διὰ τίνι αἰτίαιν (infra § 10). ‘And why should things which do not begin together change together?’

διὰ τίνι αἰτίαιν ἐκ ταύτης εἰς τὴν Δικαιοκρίν. μεταβάλλει;

Aristotle unfairly criticizes Plato’s order as if it were meant to be an order in time. The same objection might be taken to his own use of the phrases μεταβάλλειν and μεταβαίνειν in Nic. Eth. viii. 10, where he talks as if states always ‘passed over’ into their opposites—the ‘passing over’ is logical, a natural connexion of ideas, not always historical.

ἔτι δὲ τυραννίδος οὐ λέγει σοῦ ἐἰ ἔσται μεταβολή, οὐτ’ ἐι μὴ ἔσται, 12. 11. διὰ τίνι αἰτίαιν, καὶ εἰς ποιὰν πολιτείαν.

1) **: He never says whether tyranny is or is not liable to revolutions, and if it is, what is the cause of them and into what form it changes—a condensed sentence in which καί is omitted before διὰ τίν’ αἰτίαιν. εἰς ποιὰν πολιτείαν, sc. ἔσται μεταβολή.

2) It is also possible and perhaps better, with Bekker in his second edition, to place a comma after the second οὖτε: οὖτ’, εἰ μὴ ἔσται, διὰ τίν’ αἰτίαιν. (It will be remembered that tyranny is the last
development of the Platonic cycle, and it is natural to ask 'Why does not the cycle continue or return into itself?' The meaning may then be paraphrased as follows: 'He never says whether (as might be expected) tyranny, like other forms of government, experiences a change, or if not, what is the explanation of this inconsistency?'

12. 12. ἦ Χαριλάου.

According to Heraclides Ponticus (fr. 2 Müller) Charillus, as the name is also spelt in ii. 10. § 2, or Charilus, as here, made himself tyrant during the absence of Lycurgus, who on his return to Sparta restored or introduced good order. The change which he then effected in the constitution of Sparta is called by Aristotle, who appears to follow the same tradition, a change from tyranny to aristocracy.

12. 12. ἐν Καρχηδῶν.

Sc. τυράννες μετέβαλεν εἰς ἀριστοκρατίαν. Yet he says in Book ii. c. 11. § 2—'that Carthage has never had a sedition worth speaking of, nor been under a tyrant,' and a similar statement occurs in this chapter (§ 14). Cp. also vi. 5. § 9, τοιοῦτον δὲ των τρόπων Καρχηδονίων πολιτευόμενοι φίλον κέκτηται τὸν δῆμον ἀεὶ γὰρ τῶν ἐκκείμενοι τοῦ δήμου πρὸς τὰς περιεχίδας ποιούσιν εὐπόρους κ.τ.λ. To avoid this apparent contradiction St. Hilaire conjectures Χαλκηδῶν, a useless emendation of which there can be neither proof nor disproof; for we know nothing of the history of Chalcedon and not much of the history of Carthage.

It might be argued that the text as it stands may refer to a time in the history of Carthage before the establishment of the aristocratical constitution described in Bk. ii. c. 11, as he says in this very passage of Lacedaemon, § 12, that it passed from tyranny into aristocracy. But such a violent supposition is hardly to be assumed in order to save Aristotle's consistency. In § 14 infra, he calls Carthage a democracy. In ii. 11. § 5, he talks of it as having a democratic element.

12. 15. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι δύο πόλεις εἶναι τὴν ὀλιγαρχικὴν, πλουσίων καὶ πενητῶν.
Here as elsewhere Aristotle is really objecting to a figure of speech, Plat. Rep. iv. 422 E; viii. 551 D. It may be certainly said of a state which is governed by an oligarchy, with much more truth than of a timocracy or democracy, that it consists of two cities.

ζώμενου. The addition makes no change in the sense.

μεταβαλλοσίν οὐθὲν μᾶλλον οὐδέποτε εἰς δήμου ἢ εἰς ἄλλην πολιτείαν. 12. 18.

Yet in iii. 15. § 12, Aristotle says that oligarchies passed into tyrannies and these into democracies.
BOOK VI.

The greater part of Book vi. has been already anticipated in iv. There are also several repetitions of Book v. A few sentences may be paralleled out of ii. and iii. (See English Text.) The whole is only a different redaction of the same or nearly the same materials which have been already used; not much is added. The varieties of democracy and oligarchy and the causes of their preservation or destruction are treated over again, but in a shorter form. The management of the poor is worked out in greater detail: the comparison of the military and civil constitution of a state is also more precise and exact. The magistrates required in states are regarded from a different point of view: in iv. they are considered chiefly with reference to the mode of electing them and their effect on the constitution; in vi. they are enumerated and described, and the officers necessary to all states are distinguished from those which are only needed in certain states. There are several passages in which a previous treatment of the same subjects is recognized (1. § 1, § 5, § 8, § 10; 4. § 1, § 15; 5. § 2; 8. § 1). The references seem to have been inserted with a view of combining the two treatments in a single work.

1. 2. ἄμα τε περὶ ἐκεῖνον εἶ τι λοιπὸν

seems to indicate the supplementary character of this part of the work. 1) 'As well as any omission of those matters (ἐκεῖνον) which have just been mentioned,' i.e. the offices, law-courts, etc.; or 2*) ἐκεῖνον may refer to the forms of constitutions [πολιτείαν].

1. 4–6. Bekker in his 2nd edition inserts περὶ τὸ before βουλευόμενον in § 4, and ἐπεί before δεῖ in § 6 without any authority, both apparently in order to make the language smoother and more regular. But this is not a good reason for altering the text of Aristotle.
NOTES, BOOK VI. 2. 235

αὕτη δὲ ἐστὶν ἢν καλοῦσι τινες ὀλιγαρχίαν,

'which they call oligarchy,' is perhaps only an example of unmeaning pleonasm like the expression ὁ καλούμενος ἀὑρ, Meteor. i. 3, 339 b. 3; τὴν τοῦ καλομένου γάλακτος φύσιν, Pol. i. 8. § 10. But it is also possible that Aristotle here uses the term in the wider sense in which he has previously spoken of oligarchy and democracy as the two principal forms of government under which the rest are included (iv. 3. § 6). Cp. note on iv. 8. § 1.

τῇ δ᾽ ἀπαντᾷ ταὐτα.

'All the democratic elements of which he has spoken generally and is going to speak more particularly,' i.e. election by lot, elections of all out of all, no property qualification, payment of the citizens (etc., see infra c. 2. § 5), 'may exist in the same state.'

ὡς ἐν μόνη τῇ πολιτείᾳ ταὐτῇ μετέχοντα ἐλευθερίας.

metéchontas, accusative absolute, or a second accusative after λέγειν εἰλθασιν, the subject and object being nearly the same.

tοῦτ᾽ εἶναι καὶ τέλος, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον.

'That is also the end, and that is the just principle.'

ἐπερ τοῦ δουλοῦ ὄντος τὸ ἔργον.

The MSS. vary between δουλεύοντος and δουλοῦ ὄντος. Supply ἐστι or some weaker word than ἔργον.

συμβάλλεται ταύτῃ πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθερίαν τὴν κατὰ τὸ ἔσον.

'The impatience of control passes into the love of equality; mankind are unwilling to be ruled and therefore they rule and are ruled in turn. Thus the two characteristics of freedom meet or coincide.'

tὸ δικαίων πάντας καὶ ἐκ πάντων.

The old translator takes this as if he read ἢ ἐκ. But we may retain καὶ, regarding ἐκ πάντων as explanatory of the manner in which the whole people exercised their judicial functions by the election of smaller bodies out of their own number.
2. 5. τὸ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν κυρίαν εἶναι πάντων, ἄρχὴν δὲ μηδεμίαν μηδὲνός ἦ ὁτι ὀλιγόστων ἦ τῶν μεγάστων κυρίαν.

The passage as it stands in the MSS. [ἡ ὁτι ὀλιγόστων ἦ τῶν μεγάστων κυρίαν] gives no suitable meaning. It is possible to correct it 1*) by placing the words ἦ τῶν μεγάστων after πάντων, or 2) by inserting μη before τῶν μεγάστων [Lambinus].

2. 6. ἄρχὼν

is used in the generic sense to include the ἀρίστος ἄρχη of iii. 1. § 7.

2. 6. μεθόδῳ τῇ πρὸ ταύτης.

Sc. iv. 6. § 5 and c. 15. § 13.

2. 7. τῶν ἄρχων ὡς ἀνάγκη συσσωτείν μετ' ἄλληλων.

i.e. the chief magistrates whom the law required to take their meals together. This, which is a regulation prescribed by Aristotle in vii. 12. § 2, may be inferred to have been the general custom.

2. 7. ἦτι ἐπειδὴ ὀλιγαρχία καὶ γένει καὶ πλοῦτῳ καὶ παιδείᾳ ὀρίζεται κ.τ.λ.

The term oligarchy is here used nearly in the sense of aristocracy. Education cannot be said to be characteristic of oligarchy in the strict sense of the word. Cp. iv. 8. § 3. 'The term aristocracy is applied to those forms of government which incline towards oligarchy, because birth and education are commonly the accompaniments of wealth.'

2. 8. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄρχων τὸ μηδεμίαν αἰδίων εἶναι.

Sc. δημοτικῶν δοκεῖ εἶναι. For the general power of the ancient magistrates cp. iii. 16. § 1; v. 1. §§ 10, 11; c. 10. § 5.

2. 8. εἷς ἄρχαίας μεταβολῆς.

These words are translated in the text "has survived some ancient change"; they may also mean, though the expression is somewhat inaccurate, 'have survived from the old state before the change.' For an example of such a 'survival' compare the custom at Epidamnus of the magistrates going into the assembly at elections, v. 1. § 10.
tā μὲν οὖν κοινὰ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις ταῦτα ἐστίν. 2. 9.

tαύτα, i.e. 'election out of all, all over each, each over all, some payment for services, poverty, mean birth are in various degrees characteristic of all democracies.'

τὸ μηθὲν μᾶλλον ἀρχεῖν τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους 2. 9.
is the reading of all the MSS. except one, and is supported by Moerbeck. The phrase is peculiar: 'that the poor should no more have power than the rich'—we might expect rather 'that the rich should no more have power than the poor.' But Aristotle is speaking of democracy in the previous passage. It has been suggested that we should transpose the words; for the confusion of εὐπόροι and ἀπόροι (ii. 11. § 12, iii. 17. § 4, and v. 3. § 8) is common, and renders such a transposition not improbable. But a sufficiently good meaning is elicited from the text as it stands.

Τὸ δὲ μετὰ τούτῳ ἀπορεῖται πῶς ἔξουσι τὸ ἱσον, πότερον δεῖ τὰ τιμήματα 3. 1.
dieleiv xilios tα των πεντακοσίων καὶ των χιλίων ἱσον δύνασθαι τοῖς πεντακοσίοις, ἢ οἷς οὕτω δεῖ τιθέναι τὴν κατὰ τούτο ἱσότητα, ἀλλὰ διελεῖν μὲν οὕτως, ἐπειτὰ εἰκ τῶν πεντακοσίων ἱσοὺς λαβώντα καὶ εἰκ τῶν χιλίων, τούτους κυρίους εἶναι τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων.

The meaning of the first case (πότερον δεῖ τὰ τιμήματα κ.τ.λ.) is that the five hundred men of property should have as many votes as the thousand; of the second case that the proportion between the rich and the poor being maintained (500 = 1000), the electors instead of voting directly should choose representatives in equal numbers and transfer to them all the electoral and judicial power.

χιλίως is the dative after διελεῖν: 'to distribute to or among the thousand the qualification of the 500.' The clause which follows (καί...πεντακοσίοις) is explanatory and illustrates the meaning. The qualification of the 500 is to be distributed among the 1000, and so the 1000 are equal to the 500. Others take the words with ἱσον δύνασθαι, placing a comma at διελεῖν, 'and arrange the qualifications so that the votes of the 500 should be equal to those of the 1000, and the 1000 equal to the 500.' According to this
way of taking the passage, τὰ τιμήματα τῶν πεντακοσίων is not parallel with χιλίων, sc. πολίταις, for which we should have expected τοῖς τῶν χιλίων. The irregularity is not continued in the next clause.

 диελεῖν μὲν οὖτως. 'We ought to distribute the qualification in this proportion, i.e. so that 1000 shall have together as much as 500 have together; and carry out the principle by electing an equal number of representatives from both.' In the previous case Aristotle supposes a direct election, in this an election through representatives.

The word διαπίστευω in this passage is doubtful. If genuine, it probably means the distribution of the citizens in classes or courts, like διελεῖν in the previous sentence (ἀλλὰ διελεῖν μὲν οὖτως κ.τ.λ.).

3. 4. λέγουσι γὰρ ὅσο τι ἄν δοξῇ τοῖς πλείοσι τῶν πολιτῶν, τούτ' εἶναι δεῖ κύριον κ.τ.λ.

'It is commonly said that the majority must prevail, but in the majority the elements both of wealth and numbers have to be included. Suppose for example there are ten rich and twenty poor, six rich are of one opinion, fifteen poor of another. Five poor vote with the six rich, and four rich with the fifteen poor. When both are added up, then of whichever side the qualification exceeds, that is supreme.'

In the instance given, assuming the qualification of the poor to be half that of the rich then the votes of the side on which

the poor have a majority = 4 × 2 + 15 = 23,
the rich have a majority = 6 × 2 + 5 = 17,

Majority of poor . . . 6

The precise arithmetical expression which is given to an imaginary problem is rather curious. It is also remarkable that the formula which is used seems applicable to timocracy rather than to democracy, which is now being discussed. But here as elsewhere Aristotle is always trying to escape from democracy pure and simple.

3. 5. ὁποτέρων οὖν τὸ τίμημα ὑπερτείνει συναρεθμομένων ἀμφότερων ἑκάτεροις, τούτῳ κύριον.

ἐκάτεροις is the dative after ὑπερτείνει and a pleonastic explanation of ὁποτέρων.
NOTES, BOOK VI. 4. 239

λέγω δέ πρώτην ὁσπερ ἂν τις διελθον τοὺς δήμους βελτιστος γὰρ δήμος 4. 1.
ὁ γεωργικὸς ἐστιν, ὡστε καὶ ποιεῖν ἐνδέχεται δημοκρατίαν, ὅπου ζῆ τὸ
πλῆθος ἀπὸ γεωργίας ἢ νομῆς.

ὁσπερ ἂν τις κ.τ.λ. is the explanation of πρώτην, 'I call it the first,
meaning that which comes first in the classification of demo-
cracies,' because it is the best and most natural, implied in βελτιστος
γὰρ δήμος.

ποιεῖν ἐνδέχεται δημοκρατίαν. The commentators require the add-
dition of βελτιστὸν which may be supplied from βελτιστος. Or
Aristotle may mean, that you can have a democracy (though not
commonly found to exist) among a rustic population, for that is
the very best material of a democracy.

ἀπὸ γεωργίας ἢ νομῆς. Aristotle is here speaking not of nomadic
tribes 'cultivating their living farm' (i. 8. § 6), who are far from
being the most peaceable of mortals, not of an exclusively pastoral
life at all (cp. § 11 infra), but of the tending of cattle as one of the
ordinary pursuits of an agricultural population.

dιὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὴ πολλὴν οὐσίαν ἔχειν ἄσχολος, ὡστε μὴ πολλάκις 4. 2.
ἐκλήσια-being διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν τάναγκαλα πρὸς τοῖς ἔργοις διατρίβουσι καὶ
tῶν ἄλλοτριῶν οὐκ ἐπιθυμοῦσιν.

It may appear strange that their being poor should be a reason
why people do not desire the property of others. But though
a little paradoxical the meaning is clear. Aristotle is describing a
population which having little or no independent means, is ab-
sorbed in labour, and can only obtain through their labour the
necessaries of life; they are patient as well as industrious, and too
busy to covet the property of others.

καὶ μὴ μετέχωσι τῆς αἱρέσεως τῶν ἄρχων ἀλλὰ τινες αἱρετοὶ κατὰ μέρος 4. 4.
ἐκ πάντων, ὁσπερ ἐν Μαντουείᾳ.

These words probably mean that a body of representatives
elected the magistrates, this body consisting of persons elected in
turn, or by sections out of all the citizens. A similar principle
was adopted in the constitution of Telecles the Milesian (iv. 14.
§ 4), in which the citizens were to deliberate by turns, as here they
elect by turns.
4. 5. καὶ δεῖ νομίζειν καὶ τοῦτ’ εἶναι σχῆμα τι δημοκρατίας, ὥσπερ ἐν Μαντι-νείᾳ ποτ’ ἦν.

So iv. 9. § 7, πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐγχειροῦσι λέγειν ὃς δημοκρατίας οἴοσ [τῆς Λακεδαιμονίας πολιτείας] διὰ τὸ δημοκρατικὰ πολλὰ τὴν τάξιν ἔχειν. Mantinea is to be counted as a democracy ‘after a fashion,’ at a certain period of her history, because the electors to offices, although themselves a small body only, were elected by all, and because the whole people had the right of deliberating. Schneider thinks that the names of the magistrates mentioned in the treaty made between Athens, Argos, Mantinea and Elis, b.c. 420 (Thuc. v. 47), likewise indicate a democratic form of government. But this is fanciful. That Mantinea was at that time a democracy may be more safely inferred from the alliance which she formed with Athens and Argos. Aristotle’s cautious language would lead us to suppose that the government of Mantinea, though not strictly speaking a democracy, wore the appearance of one, and was a form of government which he himself greatly admired, being in name a democracy but in reality administered by its chief citizens.

4. 5. 6. The chief magistrates are to be a select class possessing a high qualification, but they will be controlled by the whole people. Thus the democratic constitution is supposed to be happily balanced. But it may be questioned whether a democracy which has a supreme power in the assembly would be willing to elect its magistrates from a privileged class. It may equally be doubted, whether a great people like the Athenians would have submitted to the checks and artifices by which democracy is bridled. Such theories of government look well in books, but they are ‘paper-constitutions’ only. They may sometimes be realized in fact when events have prepared the way for them; but cannot be imposed as the behests of political philosophy on a reluctant people merely with a view to their good.

4. 5. διὸ δὴ καὶ συμφέρον ἐστὶν τῇ πρῶτῃ ῥήτεισι δημοκρατίᾳ.

διὸ refers to what has preceded. ‘And because of the general contentment which is thereby secured, it is advantageous to this rural form of democracy to be allowed to elect officers and review and judge’: a thought which is illustrated in what follows, § 6.
 Lit. 'and they are blameless,' 'do no wrong,' or taken in connection with the preceding words, as in the translation, *'are prevented from doing wrong.' An example of a condensed sentence in which two thoughts are compressed into one.

πρὸς δὲ τὸ κατασκευάζειν γεωργῶν τῶν δήμων τῶν τε νόμων τινές τῶν 4. 8.

παρὰ τούς πολλοὺς κειμένων τὸ ἀρχαῖον χρήσιμον πάντες, ἢ τὸ ὅλως μὴ ἔχειαν κεκτηθαν πλείω γῆν μέτρου τινός ἢ ἀπὸ τινος τόπου πρὸς τὸ ἀστυ καὶ τὴν πόλιν.

ἀπὸ τινος τόπου, 'beginning from a certain place,' reckoned in relation to the town. *If reckoning inwards, we must supply μὴ from μὴ ἔχειαν; if outwards, the force of μὴ is not continued.

'The law provided that no one should possess more than a certain quantity of land; or, if he did, it was not to be within a certain distance of the city; or, regarded from another point of view, it was to be beyond a certain distance from the city.' In other words he was not to monopolize the valuable portions of the land (cp. Plato's Laws, v. 739 foll.), which were to be distributed among as many of the citizens as possible.

ἀστυ the city is more precisely defined by πόλει, the Acropolis, as at Athens, cp. Thuc. ii. 15.

τοι δε καὶ ὄν λέγουσιν 'Οξύλου νόμον εἶναι τοιοῦτον τι δυνάμενος, το μὴ 4. 9.

δανιζεσ εἰς τι μέρος τῆς ὑπαρχούσης ἐκάστῳ γῆς.

That is to say, a certain portion of the land could not be pledged, and was therefore always clear of incumbrances. In ancient as well as in modern times there were agricultural troubles; and many plans were devised for securing the peasant proprietor against the money-lender.

νῦν δὲ δει διορθοῦν καὶ τῷ 'Αφυταίων νόμῳ' πρὸς γὰρ δὲ λέγομεν ἐστὶ 4. 9, 10.

χρήσιμος. ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ, καίστερ ὄντες πολλοὶ κεκτημένου δὲ γῆν δλίγης, ὁμος πάντες γεωργοῦσιν τιμῶναι γὰρ ὅχ ὀξας τὰς κτήσεις, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τῇλι-

κατὰ μόρα διαμοιρώντες ὅστ' ἔχειν ὑπερβάλλειν ταῖς τιμήσει καὶ τους

πάντας.

διορθοῦν. 'Now, when through the want of an enactment such as

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that which is ascribed to Oxyrus the evil has already sprung up, we should correct it by the law of the Aphytaeans.'

The object aimed at was to maintain or to preserve a large number of small proprietors who were freemen. This was effected at Aphytis by dividing the lots into small portions, each of which gave a qualification for citizenship, so that every one, however poor, was included: e.g. suppose a citizen of Aphytis to have possessed fifty acres, and that forty of these were seized by the usurer, still the remaining ten were sufficient to preserve his rights of citizenship. Or, more generally, 'though the properties were often larger, the portion of land required for a qualification was small.'

The meaning of ἐπερθῆλεν is doubtful. It has been thought to mean that 'even the small proprietors exceeded in number some other class, i.e. the rich or the inhabitants of the town,' or* better 'they exceeded the amount required.'

Aphytis was a city in Pallene, which, according to Heraclides Ponticus, fr. 39, Müller, vol. ii. p. 223, bore an excellent character for honesty among Hellenic cities. Δικαίως καὶ σωφρόνως βιώσων καὶ ἀλλοτρίων οἳ διγγάνουσιν ἀνεφγμένων τῶν θυρῶν. Then follows the story of the stranger who bought wine and entrusted it to no one, but on returning after a voyage found it in the same place.

4. 11. τὰ πρὸς τὰς πολεμικὰς πρᾶξεις.

Not to be taken after γεγομεναμένοι; nor is it necessary with some editors to bracket τὰ. Translate, 'and as regards military actions, their mode of life is an excellent training for them.' Compare Alexander's speech to his army, made a few months before his death, 323 B.C., recorded by Arrian, Exped. Alexandri, vii. 9, in which he contrasts the Oriental luxury of his Macedonian soldiers with their former life as mountain shepherds.

The pastoral democracies of the Swiss mountains have been among the most lasting democracies in the world, and they have also furnished some of the best soldiers.

4. 15. ἐπομένως δὲι παρεκβαίνσιν,

sc. τὰς ἄλλας. 'The other sorts must deviate in a corresponding order.'
N OTES, BOOK VI. 4.

ἐπομένως, i.e. 'in an order corresponding to their goodness or badness,' gathered from βελτίστην καὶ πρώτην.

χείρων ἀπὶ πλῆθος χαρίζειν.

4. 15.

'At each stage we shall exclude a population worse in kind than at the preceding stage.' Thus the first and best kind of democracy excludes the class of τεχείται (and a fortiori of course all below them). The second excludes the δῆτες, and so on till at last nobody remains to be excluded. For the analogous process in oligarchy, cp. infra c. 6. §§ 2, 3.

α ἄ δε φθείρειν συμβαίνει καὶ ταύτην καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας, εἰρηται πρώ- 4. 15. τερον πάλιστά σχεδόν.

Either the stress is to be laid upon καὶ ταύτην, to which the words καὶ τὰς ἄλλας are subordinated, for other states have not been spoken of, 'Most of the causes which are wont to destroy this like other states, have been already mentioned.' Or, if the emphasis on καὶ τὰς ἄλλας πολιτείας is retained, the reference is to the causes of the destruction of states in bk. v.

α δὲ ... εἰρηται. The connexion is, 'But I need not speak of the causes which destroy states; for they have been already spoken of.'

For the absolute use of μᾶλλον cp. Plat. Phaedo 63 D, φησὶ γὰρ ἥμαρναι στενά μᾶλλον τοὺς διαλεγόμενους.

ἐπιν γάρ οἰκεῖον τούτο τῷ ταυτότῳ δίμω μᾶλλον. 4. 16.

The last word qualifies οἰκεῖον: 'For all this admission of citizens is rather natural than alien to a democracy of this kind.'

ὅπερ συνέβη τῆς στάσεως αἵτιον γενέσθαι περὶ Κυρίην. 4. 17.

ὅπερ = the violence of the democracy which was established after the overthrow of the royal power (Herod. iv. 161), about 460 or 450 B.C., and was extended at a somewhat later period in the history of Cyrene.

κλεισθένης.

Cp. Hdt. v. 69, ὡς γάρ δὴ τῶν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον πρῶτον ἀπωσμένον τούτε πάστα (al. lect. πάνω) πρὸς τὴν ἐωτοῦ μοίραν προσεβήκατο, τὰς φυλὰς μετευνόμασε καὶ ἐποίησε πλείνας εξ ἐλασσόνων. δέκα τε δὴ φυλάρ-
χους ἀντὶ τεσσάρων ἐποίησε, δέκα δὲ καὶ τοὺς δῆμους κατένεμε ἐστὶ τὰς
φυλὰς.


The breaking up old divisions in an army and a state is not
a mere change of names, but of traditions, customs, personal re-
lations—to the ancients even of gods. The division of France into
departments, the reorganisation of Italy and Germany, or, to take
a minor instance, the recent redistribution of the English regiments,
are modern examples of the manner in which such changes affect
the habits of men or offend their prejudices.

5. 1. ἐστὶ δὲ ἔργον . . . μέγατων ἔργον.

The repetition of ἔργον is awkward; but the general style of the
Politics is not sufficiently accurate to justify us in omitting the word in
either place.

5. 2. διὸ δεῖ, περὶ δὲν τεθεωρηται πρότερον, τίνες σωτηρίας καὶ φθοραὶ τῶν
πολιτειῶν, ἐκ τούτων πειράζεται κατασκευάζειν τὴν ἀσφάλειαν.

δῶ because of the instability of states; the words περὶ δὲν τεθεω-
ρηται πρότερον are either omitted or altered by those who change the
order of the books.

The clause τίνες σωτηρίας is the explanation of περὶ δὲν, and is
resumed in ἐκ τούτων.

5. 3. καὶ φερόντων πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν.

These words are an explanation of τῶν καταδικαζομένων, ‘of those
who are condemned, and so bring money into the public treasury,’
not voluntarily, but by the penalties which they incur.


dώσεις ἐμοὶ καλὴν δίκην,
ἰπομένος τοῖς ἐσφοραῖς.
ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐστὶν πλουσίους
σπεύσω σ’ ὅπως ἄν ἐγγραφῆς.

5. 5. δεῖ ποιεῖν ὁλίγας ἐκκολασίας.


5. 8. ἀθρόα χρῆ διαμέμεν τοῖς ἀπόροις, μάλιστα μέν, εἶ τις δύναται τὸσοῦτον
ἀθροίζων ὅσον εἰς γνώσιν κτῆσιν.
ἄθρωα, 'in lump sums,' opposed to the piecemeal method of doing out money which he had been describing above.

εἰ τις, indefinite 'if we can only collect.'

δύναται, sc. ἄθρωα διανέμειν. The MSS. vary between ἄθροίζων and συνάθροίζων. Bekker's emendation ἄθροίζευ is unnecessary.

ἐν δὲ τούτῳ.

'In the meantime,' i.e. until the poor have all received their share they should be assisted by the rich, who should pay them for attending the assembly.

ἀφιεμένους τῶν ματαιῶν λειτουργίων.

They being excused from those services which are useless. Cp. v. 8. § 20.

For Tarentum, see Müller's Doriens (iii. 9. § 14), who sug-

5. 10.

gests without any proof that the words κοινὰ ποιοῦτες τὰ κτήματα refer only to the ager publicus. Compare ii. 5. § 8, where Aristotle describes the Lacedaemonians as using one another's horses and dogs in common.

ἐστὶ δὲ τούτῳ ποιήσαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς μερίζοντας, τοὺς μὲν κληρω- 5. 11.
tοὺς τοὺς δ' αἴρετοις.

See note on text.

ἀρχής is a genitive of respect, assisted by μερίζειν. 'Either there may be two sets of offices, filled up the one by lot and the other by vote, or the same office may be filled up sometimes by lot and sometimes by vote.'

τοὺς μὲν κληρωτοῖς, sc. ἀρχοντας. Either the accusative immediately follows ποιήσαι, or is in apposition with τούτο; or some word like καθιστάντας is to be supplied from μερίζοντας.

The people of Tarentum elected to some of their offices by vote and to some by lot; the same result might have been attained if they had divided each office, and filled up the vacancies alternately by vote and by lot.

6. 1.

With δεί, κατασκευάζειν from the previous sentence, or some similar word suitable to the construction, has to be supplied.
6.1. τὴν μὲν εὔκρατον μᾶλλον τῶν διλαγματίων καὶ πρῶτην.

With these words have to be supplied, though not therefore to be inserted in the text (Lambinus), πρῶς τὴν βελτίστην δημοκρατίαν καὶ πρῶτην from the beginning of chap. 4.

6.2. ἡ δεῖ.

ἡ = ἢ. 'And in this.'

6.2. μετέχειν ἑξείναι,

sc. δεῖ.

6.2. τοσοῦτον εἰσαγομένου τοῦ δήμου πλῆθος,

'The people being introduced in such numbers.' An accusative of measure. (Matth. G. G. 421. § 5.)

6.4. ὡσπερ γὰρ τὰ μὲν σώματα εὐ διακειμένα πρὸς ἴγιειν καὶ πλοῦτα τὰ πρὸς ναυτιλίαν καλῶς ἔχοντα τοῖς πλοῖσι πτωτήρισιν ἐπιδέχεται πλείονος ἀμαρτίας.

καλῶς ἔχοντα is taken in a double construction with τὰ πρὸς ναυτιλίαν and with πλοῖσι πτωτήρισι. Either (1)* 'well furnished with sailors for navigation,' or (2) 'well furnished in respect of naval equipments for their sailors.' τοῖς πλοῖσι πτωτήρισι may also be construed with ἐπιδέχεται, 'allow of more errors in their sailors.' (1) is confirmed by the words which follow πλοῖσι πτωτήρισι τετυχόκτονοι φαίλων.

7.1. ἑπεὶ δὲ τέταρτα μὲν ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ.

Interpreters correctly remark that the four kinds of military force have no connexion with the four classes of the people.

7.1. ἑνταῦθα μὲν εὐφυῶς ἔχει κ.τ.λ.

'There nature favours the establishment of an oligarchy which will be strong,' or 'we may naturally expect to establish an oligarchy.'

7.1. ὅπου δ’ ὀπλίτην.

Sc. εἴναι συμβίβασθη understood from the previous words though with a slight change of meaning in the word εἴναι. It is not necessary to read 1) ὀπλίτην with Bekker (in his second edition), or 2) ὀπλιτικήν with Susemihl (on the authority of one MS. which reads ὀπλιτικῶν and the old translator who gives 'armativam').
The oligarchy find themselves outnumbered and overmatched \(7.2, 3\). by the light-armed troops. The remedy for this evil is to combine a light-armed force of their own with their cavalry and heavy-armed.

\[\nu\nu\ \mu\v\nu\ \iota\iota\nu\ \tau\omega\iota\tau\iota\nu\ \pi\o\l\i\nu\ \pi\l\i\b\o\s\ \i\s\t\i\nu,\ \iota\iota\nu\ \d\i\a\s\t\o\z\i\i\s,\ \pi\o\l\l\a\k\i\s\ \b\i\ \d\g\o\n\i\z\o\n\z\i\i\z\i\z\ \chi\e\i\r\o.\]

The change in the nominatives is observable, 'When the two parties (\(\pi\l\i\b\o\s\ \k\a\ \e\u\p\o\r\o\i\)) fall out, the rich (\(\e\u\p\o\r\o\i\)) are often worsted in the struggle.'

\[\f\a\r\m\a\k\o\n\ \s\t\r\a\r\a\t\i\g\a\w.\]

'A remedy such as military commanders employ.'

\[\t\a\u\t\i\y\ \d\i\ \e\p\i\k\r\a\t\o\u\z\i\i\z.\]

The antecedent of \(\t\a\u\t\i\y\), 'in this way,' is not clear. It appears to mean (as we gather from the context) 'by their superior flexibility'—sc. \(\d\i\a\ \t\o\ \p\s\i\l\i\h\nu\ \t\i\u\ \d\o\n\a\m\a\m\ \e\i\n\a.\)

\[\i\k\k\e\k\r\i\m\i\v\i\n\o\s\ \d\i\ \e\k\p\i\d\o\u\ \a\b\l\h\a\t\a\s\ \e\i\n\a\ \a\i\u\t\o\u\ \t\o\n\ \e\r\g\o\w.\]

Lit. 'and that persons selected out of boys [thus trained] should themselves become actual light-armed warriors.' The opposition of \(\i\k\k\e\k\r\i\m\i\v\i\n\o\s\ \d\i\ \e\t\i\ \m\e\n\ \o\u\t\a\s\ \n\i\u\s\) implies that the persons selected had passed the stage of youth. For \(\a\b\l\h\a\t\a\s\ \t\o\n\ \e\r\g\o\w\) cp. Plat. Rep. viii. 543 B, \(\a\b\l\h\a\t\a\s\ \p\o\l\e\m\o\u.\)

\[\e\i\ \M\a\s\s\a\l\i\a.\]

See note on v. 6. § 2.

\[\k\a\a\a\s\k\e\v\a\z\i\e\w\ \t\i\ \t\o\n\ \k\o\i\w\o\w.\]

should be taken generally of some permanent work, to erect some public building or monument.

\[\t\a\ \l\h\i\m\m\a\a\ \g\a\r\ \z\e\t\o\u\s\i\n\ o\i\ \z\i\t\o\n\ \h\ \t\i\u\ \t\i\m\h\n.\]

Cp. Eth. viii. 16. § 3, \o\ \g\a\r\ \e\t\i\n\ \d\a\m\a\ \z\r\m\a\t\i\z\e\z\s\b\a\i\ \i\k\ \t\o\n\ \k\o\i\w\o\w\ \k\a\ \t\i\m\a\s\b\a\i.\]

The plan of this book, which is for the most part a repetition \(8.\) of Book iv., here abruptly breaks down. For though democracy
and oligarchy are fully discussed, nothing is said of other forms of government, notwithstanding the intention expressed at the beginning of the book, c. 1. § 2, of considering ‘the modes of organisation proper to each form of government.’

8. 3. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἔπιμελεία τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἡ περὶ τὴν ἀγοράν, ἐφ’ ἦ γὰρ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐν τῷ ἑφορώσαν περὶ τα τὰ συμβολαία καὶ τὴν εἰκοσίαν.

τῶν ἀναγκαίων, sc. 1) ἐπιμελείων; or *2) ἀρχῶν, cp. supra § 1, τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀρχῶν.

8. 8. μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἐχομένη μὲν ἀναγκαιοτάτη δὲ σχεδὸν καὶ χαλεπωτάτη τῶν ἀρχῶν εστίν ἡ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τῶν καταδικασθέντων καὶ τῶν προτιμεμένων κατὰ τὰς ἐγγραφάς.

πράξεις is here used generally to include execution of sentences passed on criminals, and exaction of debts from public debtors.

τῶν προτιμεμένων appears to mean those whose names, having been first entered on the register as defaulters or criminals (κατὰ τὰς ἐγγραφάς), are publicly posted up. Cp. infra § 10, περὶ τὰς προβαίνεις τῶν ἀναγγελμάτων: and Plato Laws 784 D where the incorrigible are to be written up (ἀναγγελματί) and deprived of citizenship.

8. 9. καὶ πράξεων μὴ γιγνομένων.

sc. κοινωνείων ἀδύνατον ἀλληλοις.

8. 10. ἔτι δ’ ἐνα πράπτεσθαι καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ταῖς τε ἀλλας καὶ τὰς τῶν νέων μᾶλλον τὰς νέας, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐνεστῶτων ἑτέρας καταδικασάση ἑτέραν εἶναι τὴν πραπτομένην, δὴν ἀστυνόμους τὰς παρὰ τῶν ἀγορανόμους, τὰς δὲ παρὰ τῶν ἑτέρων.

‘Moreover, in some cases, the magistrates too should execute the sentence; and there should be fresh magistrates to execute the sentences on fresh offences; but in the case of old or existing offences (τῶν ἐνεστῶτων opposed to τῶν νέων) one magistrate should condemn, another should exact the penalty; for example, the wardens of the city should exact the fines imposed by the wardens of the agora.’

With τὰς τῶν νέων and τὰς τῶν ἐνεστῶτων supply δίκας.
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tò δὲ περὶ πάντων τοὺς αὐτών πολεμίους πάσων.
Sc. ποιεὶ understood from ἀπέχθειαν ἔχει διπλῆν.

διὸ βέλτιον καὶ ταύτην χωρίζειν, καὶ τὸ σόφισμα ζητεῖν καὶ περὶ ταύτην.

τὸ σόφισμα, ‘the suitable or appropriate device.’ The correction τι σόφισμα, which is supported by the expression εἰν μὴ τι σοφίζωνται (ii. 5. § 19), is unnecessary and feeble. Such an idiomatic use of the article is not unknown in English: e.g. ‘to find out the way’ or ‘the proper way of making the office less unpopular.’

καὶ περὶ ταύτην, sc. τὴν φυλάττουσαν. ‘About this as well as the last case,’ i.e. the case of the jailor and the executioner, as well as of the judge and the executioner.

ταύτα δ'/ εἰεν αὖ τε περὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τῆς πόλεως, καὶ ὡσαί τάττουσαν τὸ πολεμικὰν χρείασ.

The optative here would seem to require ἄν, which is inserted by Bekker in his second edition, or εἰεν may be altered into εἰσ.

τὸ δὲ πάν ἐν τι τούτων ἐστίν εἰδος ἐπιμελείας πολεμικῶν.

The order of the words is τὸ δὲ πάν εἰδος τούτων ἐστίν ἐν τι εἰδος ἐπιμελείας πολεμικῶν. Bekker, in his 2nd edition (after Lambinus), reads ἐπιμελεία, a change which is unnecessary.

καὶ προσευθυνοῦσαν.

‘And which in addition audits them.’

ἡ γὰρ αὐτῇ πολλάκις ἔχει τὸ τέλος καὶ τὴν εἰσφοράν.

The connexion proves that the latter words can only mean ‘the final ratification and the introduction of measures.’

ἐξομείγῃ δὲ ταύτης ἡ πρὸς τὰς θυσίας ἀφορισμένη τὰς κοινὰς πάσας, ὡσαὶ τοῖς ἱερεύσιν αὐτοδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς κοινῆς ἐστίας ἔχουσι τὴν τιμήν.

Either 1)* the words ἐκείνως ὡσοῦ, or 2) ai θυσίαν must be supplied before ἔχουσι.

Aristotle is opposing the priests, who perform the ordinary sacrifices assigned to them by law, to the great officers of state, who offer sacrifice at the public hearth of the city.
8. 20. καλοῦσι δ’ οἱ μὲν ἀρχοντας κ.τ.λ.

8. 21. ἐπιλογισμοῦ.
    Audits by the officers called λογισταὶ (cp. § 16). But it is hard to distinguish them from ἐξετάσεις since Aristotle (supra § 16) says that λογισταὶ and ἐξετασταὶ are only different names for the same officers.
BOOK VII.

Bernays (Die Dialoge des Aristoteles, p. 69 ff.) has drawn attention to the peculiar style of the opening chapters (1, 2, 3) of this book, which he supposes to be taken from some Aristotelian dialogue. (See Essay on Structure of Aristotelian Writings.) The passage is certainly remarkable for a flow and eloquence which are not common in Aristotle. But though rare, there are other traces of grace and elevation of style to be discovered in the Politics: e.g. in the discussion about education (viii. c. 3-5), where the writer seems to derive inspiration from his subject; in the introduction to the criticism on the forms of government ii. c. 1; parts of ii. c. 5, especially § 11, are easy and flowing; the descriptions of the middle class citizen iv. c. 11; of the tyrant v. c. 11; and of the city vii. cc. 11, 12, are graphic and striking. There are also several passages in the Nicomachean Ethics as well as many fine expressions in which beauty of style shines through the logical analysis, e.g. Eth. i. 10. § 14; c. 10. § 12, ἔμως δὲ καὶ . . μεγαλόφυσος; ix. 4. §§ 3-6: x. 8. §§ 7, 8. If we could suppose these passages to be a fair sample of any complete writing of Aristotle, we could better understand why his style was so highly praised by Cicero (Acad. ii. 38), and other writers.

ἀδηλον γάρ ὅντος τούτου καὶ τήν ἀρίστην ἀναγκαῖον ἀδηλον εἶναι 1. 1. πολιτείαν.

'For the best life may be expected to show us the best state.'

ἀριστα γάρ πράττειν προσήκει τούς ἀριστα πολιτευομένους ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρ- 1. 1. ξύντων αὐτοῦ, ἐὰν μὴ τί γέγραται παράλογον.

ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων is to be taken closely with πολιτευομένου. Not 'they lead the best life, as far as their conditions of life admit, who are governed in the best manner:' but 'they lead the best
life who have the best form of government possible under their
conditions of life.'

The qualification εκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, though not mentioned in
the first sentence, naturally occurs to the mind of Aristotle, who
thinks of life under the conditions of life. Cp. infra § 13, νῦν οἱ
ὑποκείσθω τοσοῦτον, ὅτι βίος μὲν ἄρωσις, καὶ χορις ἐκάστῳ καὶ
κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὁ μὲν ἀρετής κεχωρισμένης ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὅστε μετέχειν τῶν καὶ
ἀρετὴν πράξεων.

Aristotle adds a further qualification εἰσὶν μὴ τι γίγνηται παράλογως:
as we might say without much meaning and almost as a faconn
de parler, 'under ordinary circumstances.'

1. 2. 3. νομίσαται οὖν ἰκανὸς πολλὰ λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν εἰς τοὺς ἐξωτερικοὺς
λόγους περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς, καὶ νῦν χρηστέων αὐτοῖς, ὁς ἀληθῶς γὰρ
πρὸς γε μίαν διαίρεσιν οὐδεὶς ἀμφιβαθμένους ἄν ὡς οὗ τριῶν οὐσῶν μερί-
δων, τῶν τε ἐκτός καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι καὶ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, πάντα ταῦτα
ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μακαρίωσι δεί.

καὶ τῶν is partitive, 'enough has been said among, or in, the
things which have been said.'

ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις. 'Popular writings in general,' whether
those of Aristotle or of others, containing opinions or distinctions
which were generally accepted. The threefold division of goods,
into goods of the body, goods of the soul, and external goods,
here said to be found in the ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοι, is again mentioned in
Rhet. i. 5. § 4, 1360 a. 25, and would seem to have been a received
notion not peculiar to Aristotle. Cp. Nic. Eth. i. 8. § 2, νεμεμ-
μένων δὴ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τριχῆ, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐκτὸς λεγομένων, τῶν δὲ περὶ
ψυχῆν καὶ σώμα, τὰ περὶ ψυχῆν κυριώτατα λέγομεν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθά τὰς
dὲ πράξεις καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς ψυχικὰς περὶ ψυχῆν τίθεμεν. ὡστε καλῶς
ἄν λέγοιτο κατὰ γε ταύτην τήν δοξαν παλαιῶν οὐδαν καὶ ὁμολογουμένην ὕπο
τῶν φιλοσοφοῦστων. The λόγοι ἐξωτερικοὶ are alluded to in the same
manner and nearly in the same words by Aristotle, Nic. Eth. i. 13.
§ 9. They are opposed to λόγοι κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν Eud. Eth. 1217
b. 22.

τριῶν οὐσῶν μερίδων, sc. τῶν ἁγαθῶν, which is somewhat strangely
omitted. The clause which follows τῶν τε ἐκτὸς κ.τ.λ., is either
dependent on these words, or in apposition with them.
The virtues here mentioned are the four cardinal virtues of Plato (Rep. iv. 428), who calls φρόνησις by the term σοφία, making no such distinction between σοφία and φρόνησις as Aristotle afterwards introduced (Nic. Eth. vi.).

τοῖς φιλτάτοις φίλους.

φίλους is bracketed by Bekker in his second edition. But why object to the pleonasm in a rhetorical passage?

ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν λεγόμενα ὅσπερ πάντες ἐν συγχωρήσειν, διαφέρονται δ’ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ καὶ ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς.

ὅσπερ is bracketed* by Bekker in his second edition, but without reason. If retained it may either be construed with ἐν συγχωρήσειν, ‘as all would agree in these things the moment they are uttered, so on the other hand they differ’ etc.; or ὅσπερ may be a qualification of πάντες, ‘in a manner every one’ (Schlosser, Bonitz s.v.).

διαφέρονται δ’ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ καὶ ταῖς ὑπεροχαῖς.

Cp. infra § 8, κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν ἥπερ εἶληφε διάστασιν.

‘Virtue can never be in excess, and he who has the most virtue 1.5–13. is the best of men and the happiest; for happiness consists in virtue provided with sufficient means or instruments of good action; and this principle applies equally to individuals and to states, and is the foundation both of ethics and of politics.’

The proof that external goods are inferior to the goods of the 1.6, 7. soul is twofold:

1) διὰ τῶν ἔργων, from the fact that the former are acquired by the latter and not νῦν versá.

2) κατὰ τῶν λόγων σκοπομένων, from reason, i.e. the nature of things, because external goods, being an instrument, have a limit; of the goods of the soul there is no limit.

On the antithesis of facts and reason and the connexion between them in Aristotle, cp. note on i. 5. § 1.

τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν ἐκαστον ἄγαθων, δοσφερ ἐν ὑπερβάλλη, τοποῦτο τοι. τοι. 1.7. μᾶλλον χρήσιμον εἶναι.
Yet this is only true of the goods of the soul in their most general sense; a man cannot have too much justice, or wisdom, or intelligence, but he may have too much memory or too much imagination, and perhaps even too much courage or liberality. He cannot have too much of the highest, but he may have too much of the lower intellectual and moral qualities. Cp. Ethics ii. 6. § 17 where Aristotle, after defining virtue as a μετρότης, is careful to explain that it is also an ἀκρότης.

1. 8. ἄλος τε δὴ λος ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν φήσομεν τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρίστην ἐκάστου πράγματος πρὸς ἄλλην κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν: ἦπερ εἶληφε διάστασιν δὲν φαμὲν αὐτὰς εἶναι διαθέσεις ταύτας.

The general meaning of this passage is simple enough. ‘If one thing is superior to another, the best state of that thing is superior to the best state of the other.’ But an awkwardness is caused by the insertion of διάστασιν, after the relative ἦπερ in apposition with ὑπεροχὴν. ‘According to the excess or interval which exists between the different states of things.’ The subject of εἶληφε is the antecedent of δὲν, i. e. πράγματα, supplied from ἐκάστου πράγματος.

Beckler, following the old translation ‘sortita est,’ reads εἰληφε for εἶληφε in his second edition. The change makes no real difference in the sense.

1. 9. ἔτι δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ένεκεν ταύτα πέρυκεν αἴρετα καὶ δεί πάντας αἴρεσθαι τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσας, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκεῖσθαι ένεκεν τῆς ψυχῆς.

Cp. Matth. xvi. 26, ι τι γὰρ ὀφεληθύστατο ἀνθρωπος εἰν τῶν κόσμων ἑλον κερδήσῃ τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ ζημιωθῇ;

1. 10. μάρτυρι τοῦ θεοῦ χρωμένοις.


1. 11. εὐχάρειον θ’ ἐστι καὶ τῶν αυτῶν λόγων δεόμενον καὶ πολὺν εὐδαιμονα τὴν ἀρίστην εἶναι καὶ πράττουσαν καλῶς.
The words πράττουσαν καλῶς may be taken either with εὐδαιμονα or with τὴν ἀριστην. Either 1) the happy state is that which is (morally) best, and which does rightly; or 2) the happy state and that which does rightly is the best; or 3) (and this though not the only allowable rendering of the passage probably has the most point) 'the best state and that which acts rightly is happy,' as God has been said to be happy in the previous sentence. The last words πράττουσαν καλῶς are ambiguous, including both our own 'doing well,' and 'faring well.' The argument is that as God is happy in his own nature so the state can be happy only so far as it partakes of virtue or wisdom.

ἀνδρία δὲ πόλεως καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ φρόνησις τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει δύναμιν καὶ 1. 12. μορφὴν. ὃν μετασχῶ ἔκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων λέγεται δίκαιος καὶ φρόνιμος καὶ σοφρον.

τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν, sc. ἐκείνοις, to be supplied before ὃν μετασχῶν, 'with that power or force which each man partakes of when he is called just and temperate and wise.' Cp. for construction supra § 8.

Bekker, in his second edition (after Coraes), inserts καὶ σοφροσύνη after φρόνησις, and ἀνδρείος καὶ before δίκαιος to make the passage symmetrical; but there is no reason to expect this exact symmetry.

ἐτέρας γὰρ ἐστὶν ἔργον σχολῆς ταύτα. 1. 13.

Lit. 'For this is the business of another time of leisure,' or 'of another time when we shall be at leisure,' or*, 'of another discussion.' Yet he returns to the subject at the beginning of the next chapter. The word σχολῆ is translated 'discussion' in this passage by Stahr, and so explained in Liddell and Scott's Lexicon. It is found in this sense in the Laws of Plato, 820 C, and perhaps in Arist. Polit. v. 11. § 5.

ἐπὶ τῆς νῦν μεθόδου. 1. 14.

'Enquiry,' rather than 'treatise.' No reference is made in the Politics to the whole work as a book.

It has been already said, c. i. § 11, not exactly that the happiness 2. 1. of the state is the same as that of the individual, but that they can
be shown to be the same by the same kind of arguments; and
again, § 13, the best life for both is declared to be the life of
virtue, furnished sufficiently with the means of performing virtuous
actions; and in § 14 he proposes to defer matters of controversy
for the present. But at the beginning of the second chapter, as if
he were dissatisfied with his conclusion, he resumes the question,
which has been already in a manner briefly determined, and as if
he had forgotten the intention to defer it. There appears to be a
latent incongruity even in this rhetorical passage.

It has been thought by Susemihl that c. 1, § 11, ἐχόμενον δ' ἐστὶ καὶ
tῶν αὐτῶν λόγων δεχόμενον κ.τ.λ. is another form of what follows, and
that if c. 1, §§ 11, 12 be omitted the connexion of c. 1 and c. 2
would be restored. But the similarity of §§ 11, 12 in c. 1 with c. 2
is not very close; and the difference of style in the two chapters
remains as striking as ever.

The analogy of the individual and the state is drawn out at
length in the Republic of Plato, iv. 435 ff.

2. 3. εἰτε πάσιν ὄντος αἱρετῶν κοινωνεῖν πόλεως εἰτε καὶ τισὶ μὲν μὴ τοῖς δὲ
πλείονοις.

‘Whether it be a democracy or a timocracy.’ The remark is
parenthetical, and is not further expanded.

2. 4. ἐπεί δὲ τῆς πολιτικῆς διανοίας καὶ θεωρίας τοῦτο ἐστὶν ἔργον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ
περὶ ἐκαστον αἱρετῶν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ταύτην προηγήμεθα νῦν τὴν σκέψιν, ἔκεινο
μὲν πάρεργον ἂν εἰπ̄ τοῦτο δ' ἔργον τῆς μεθαύων ταύτης.

ταύτην, sc. σκέψιν πολιτικῆς supplied from πολιτικῆς.

ἐκεῖνο, sc. the question, ‘which is the more eligible life?’

tοῦτο, sc. the question, ‘which is the best state?’ Cp. Nic. Eth.
i. 2. § 8.

2. 5. ἀμφισβητεῖται . . . πότερον ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ πρακτικὸς βίος αἱρετῶς ἢ μάλ-
λον ὁ πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀπολελυμένοις, αὐν θεωρητικὸς τις.

Cp. Nic. Eth. x. 7, where the relative value of the two kinds of
life is fully discussed.

2. 6. ἀνάγκη γὰρ τῶν τε εὖ φρονοῦντα πρὸς τῶν βελτίων σκοπῶν συντάττεσθαι
καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐκαστον καὶ κοινῇ τὴν πολιτείαν.

Yet Aristotle does not show how the two lives of action and
contemplation are to be transferred to the sphere of politics, the parallel which he sets over against them in this passage being only the life of the tyrant and the life of the private individual. At § 16 he opposes the state in activity to the state in isolation; and this is perhaps the half-expressed contrast which is floating before his mind.

νομίζουσι δ' οἱ μὲν τὸ τῶν πέλας ἄρχειν δεσποτικῶς μὲν γεγραμένον μετ’ 2. 7. ἀδικίας τινὸς εἶναι τῆς μεγίστης, πολιτικῶς δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀδικον οὐκ ἔχειν, ἐμπόδιον δὲ ἔχειν τῇ περὶ αὐτῶν εὐημερίᾳ.

ἐμπόδιον δὲ ἔχειν, 'to contain an impediment.' The article may be supplied, if necessary from τὸ μὲν ἀδικον.

ἀσπερ ἐν Λακεδαιμον καὶ Κρήτη πρὸς τῶν πολέμους συντεταξαί σχέδων 2. 9.

ἡ τε παιδεία καὶ τὸ τῶν νόμων πλῆθος.

Cp. Plato's Laws, bk. i. 630 ff., where the principle that the laws of nations should have some higher object than success in war is energetically maintained, and for the approval of these sentiments by Aristotle, supra, ii. 9. § 34.

καθάπερ ἐν Καρχηδόνι φασὶ τῶν ἐκ τῶν κρίκων κόσμου λαμβάνειν. 2. 10.

It may be instructive and is certainly amusing to remark that William de Moerbeek either reading κρίνων from κρίνον, 'a lily,' or confusing κρίνων and κρίκων, translated 'lilia.'

ἐν δὲ Σκύθαις οὐκ ἔχειν πίνειν ἐν ἐστῇ τινὶ σκύφων περιπερόμενον τῷ 2. 11.

μυθίαν ἀπεκταγότι πολέμων.

Cp. Hdt. iv. 66, where it is said that once in every year the governor of each district mixes a bowl of wine from which those only may drink who have captured enemies.

The accusative σκύφων περιπερόμενον may be regarded as an accusative absolute, assisted by the verb of cognate signification, 'when the cup was brought round.'

Here is a beginning of national and international morality. The 2. 12–18. question whether the contemplative or the practical life is the superior was discussed in Nic. Eth. x. c. 7, but entirely with reference to the individual. In this passage an analogous question is raised con-

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cerning the state. May not an individual find within himself the best kind of action?—May not the state, though isolated and self-centred, lead a true political life? These two questions to us appear distinct; but they are very closely connected in the mind of Aristotle, to whom the individual is the image of the state.

The isolated life of the state is suggested as a possibility by Aristotle. But he is quite aware that all states have relations to their neighbours which they cannot afford to neglect. Cp. ii. 6. § 7; c. 7. § 14.

2. 15. ἄλλα τὸ πρὸς τούτο θηρευτὸν.
   Cp. in i. 7. § 5, οἶον ἡ δικαία, and infra c. 14. § 21.

3. 3, 4. καὶ τοὺς ἂν ὑπολάβοι τις τούτων οὖτω διωρισμένων ὅτι τὸ κύριον εἶναι πάντων ἀριστον ὦτῳ γὰρ ἀπὸ πλείστων καὶ καλλίστων κύριον εἰς πράξεως. ὅστε ὃν δὲ τὸν δυνάμενον ἀρχεῖν παρίεναι τῷ πλησίου, ἄλλα μᾶλλον ἀφαιρισθαί, καὶ μήτε πατέρα παῖδων μήτε παῖδας πατρὸς μὴ δόλως φίλου φίλου μηδένα ὑπολογεῖν μηδὲ πρὸς τούτο φροντίζειν τὸ γὰρ ἀριστον αἰρετώτατον.
   'It is argued by some that power gives the opportunity for virtue, and if so, the attainment of power will be the attainment of virtue. But power in the higher sense implies the qualities which enable a man to make the true use of it, and these he will not gain but lose by violating the equality which nature prescribes.' Compare the notion of Thrasymachus (Plat. Rep.i.) that justice is the interest of the superior and supra, note on i. 6. § 3; also the thesis maintained by Callicles (Gorgias 484 ff.) that the tyrant is wisest and best and the refutation of this notion by Socrates.

πρὸς τούτο, sc. πρὸς τὸ ὑπολογεῖν παιδῶν, κ.τ.λ.

3. 5. μὴ διαφέροντι τοσοῦτον ὅσον ἄρη γυναικὸς ἡ πατὴρ τέκνων ἡ δεσπότης δοῦλων.

These family relations are chosen as types of government answering to various kinds of rule, aristocratical, royal, tyrannical (cp. Nic. Eth. viii. 10).

Aristotle means to say that a man is harmed by ruling over others unless he have a right to rule; but this right can be given only by a natural superiority.
Either 1) 'For equals to share in the honourable is just,' or 2)*

'For to equals the honourable and the just consists in all having a
turn.'

3. 9.

καὶ τοῦτο = οὐκ ἀπρακτέων; or rather some positive idea which is to
be elicited from these words. 'There may be in a state internal
as well as external activity.'

3. 10.

'Like the state the individual may be isolated, yet he may have
many thoughts and powers energizing within him.'

σχολὴ γὰρ ἄν ὁ θεὸς ἔχει καλῶς καὶ πᾶς ὁ κόσμος οἰς οὐκ εἶσθιν ἐξωτερικὰ

3. 10.

τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

There is no reason for bracketing these words as Bekker has
done in his second edition; = 'mankind generally.' Cp. supra
c. 2. § 17, where πόλεις are joined with γένος ἀνθρώπων.

4. 1.

'About these general questions.'

4. 1.

'Other than the best.' These words seem most naturally to
refer to Books iv, v, and vi, and are therefore inconsistent with
the altered order of the books. It is impossible to believe with
Hildenbrand and Teichmüller that Book ii., in which Aristotle
treats not of different forms of government, but of certain theoretical
or historical constitutions, furnishes a sufficient antecedent for these
words. (See Sussehml's note, 749, vol. ii. p. 180.)

4. 1.

Compare iv. 1. § 3, ὅστε δὴ λοιπὸν ὅτι καὶ πολιτείαν τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμης
τῆς ἀρίστης θεωρήσαι τὸς ἐστι, καὶ ποία τις ἄν οὖσα μᾶλιστ' εὖ κατ' εἰκῆν,
4. 3. τὴν οἰκείαν ὀλην.
=τὰς ἑποθέσεις, the conditions mentioned in § 1.

4. 5. ἦστε γάρ τι καὶ πόλεως ἔργον, ὡστε τὴν δυναμενὴν τοῦτο μᾶλλον ἀποτελεῖν, ταύτην οὐχὶν εἶναι μεγίστην, οἷον Ἰπποκράτην οὖκ ἄνθρωπον ἄλλο ιατρὸν εἶναι μείζω φύσειν ἀν τις τῶν διαφέροντος κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ σώματος.

'That city is the greatest, not which is numerically largest, but which is best adapted to its end; just as Hippocrates is greater, not as a man but as a physician, than somebody else who is taller.'

The great city must have the qualities suited to a city, just as the great Hippocrates must have the qualities, not of a tall man, but of a physician. It is the accident of a city that it is populous, just as it is the accident of Hippocrates that he is tall.

4. 8. 9. ὁ δὲ λίαν ἐπερχάλλων ἀριθμὸς οὐ δύναται μετέχειν τάξεως' θεῖας γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο δυνάμεως ἔργον, ἦτις καὶ τόδε συνέχει τὸ πάντω ἔπει τὸ γε καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἰσοθε γίνεσθαι. διὸ καὶ πόλιν ἢ μετὰ μεγάθους ὁ λεχθεὶς ὀρός ἑπάρχει, ταύτην εἶναι καλλίστην ἀναγκαίον.

The connexion is as follows: 'The divine power which holds together the universe can alone give order to infinity. For beauty consists in number and magnitude; wherefore that city in which magnitude is combined with the principle of order is to be deemed the fairest.'

In this and similar passages we may note mingling with Pythagorean fancies, a true sense that proportion is the first principle of beauty. Cp. Metaph. xii. 8. § 26, 1074 b. 1, παραδέδοται δε παρὰ τῶν ἀρχαίων καὶ παμπαλαίων ἐν μὲνον σχήματι καταλελειμένα τῶς ἔστερον ὅτι θεοὶ τέ εἰσιν οὗτοι καὶ περιέχει τὸ θεῖο τὴν ὀλην φύσιν τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μυθικῶς ἤδη προσήκεται πρὸς τὴν πειθῶ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν εἰς τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὸ συμφέρον χρῆσιν.

τοῦτο refers to τάξεως, but is neuter because it is attracted by ἔργον.

ὁ λεχθεὶς ὀρός, 'the above-mentioned principle,' sc. εἰσταῖα.


\[ \text{NOTES, BOOK VII. 4.} \]

\[ \text{dió próthn mév èinai pólin ànagkaión tìn ék tosoitou pléous ó prótov 4. 11. pléosos autarkeis prós to éd ònò éstì kàtà tìn politeicn koinwían.} \]

\[ \text{doi refers not to the clause immediately preceding but to the} \]

\[ \text{principal idea of the sentence, contained in the words órhoías ðe kai} \]

\[ \text{pòlis, hè mév ðè olígon lìan ouk autárikhs k.t.l. Cp. Nic. Eth. ix. 10.} \]

\[ \text{§ 3, oúte ãgr ðè dikà ànárhoíwn génoti àn pólis, ou't ðè dikà muropwv òtì} \]

\[ \text{pòlis èstì.} \]

\[ \text{pròthn and prótov. 'We then first have a state when we first} \]

\[ \text{have a sufficient number.' prótov may be either adjective or} \]

\[ \text{adverb.} \]

\[ \text{kàtà tìn politeicn koinwían. 'A good life according to the require-} \]

\[ \text{ments of the political community,' i.e. the life of a freeman and} \]

\[ \text{citizen.} \]

\[ \text{èinai meiòw pólin.} \]

\[ \text{meiòa is unnecessarily bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd edition.} \]

\[ \text{The point is as follows: 'There may be also a greater city than} \]

\[ \text{is required by the limit of self sufficiency, but this increase is not} \]

\[ \text{unlimited.' He has said above (§ 4) 'that the more numerous} \]

\[ \text{city is not necessarily the greater,' but in this case it is or may be.} \]

\[ \text{eisì ãgr aì próziçes tìs póleos tòn mév ãrchiástov, tòv ðì ãrchoiènov. 4. 12.} \]

\[ \text{The próziçes, or actions of a state, are the actions of two classes} \]

\[ \text{which act upon each other, the governors and the governed. Cp.} \]

\[ \text{i. 5. § 3, ðòv ðè ìv ãrchiæ to ðì ãrχetai èstì tì tòuτov ërgov.} \]

\[ \text{ánagkaiów γνωρίζειν ἀλλήλουσ. 4. 13.} \]

\[ \text{Cp. Plat. Laws v. 738 D, ð, ðè meiòv ouvèv pólei ãγαθων ò γνωρίμων} \]

\[ \text{autòv (sc. tòv πολίτωv) autòv èinai. 'Ovou ãgr μì φως ἀλλήλωv èstìv} \]

\[ \text{ἀλλήλων ἐν τοῖς πρόποις ἀλλὰ σκότος, ou't ðè tìmès tìs ãξias ou't ãrχωv} \]

\[ \text{ou't ðikès pòtè tìs ðè tìs προσηκούσης ὀρθῶv τυγχάνωv.} \]

\[ \text{ðhlon tòuν òs oûvòs èstì póleos ðòos ãrmatov, hè megístì tòv plévous 4. 14.} \]

\[ \text{¿pròbhlh prós autàrkéian ðèis euvóstovvov.} \]

\[ \text{This is a condensed sentence, meaning 'the largest number} \]

\[ \text{which can be seen at once, and at the same time suffices for the} \]

\[ \text{purposes of life.' Aristotle wishes to combine μεγάθos tì with} \]

\[ \text{éwrnìa. Cp. Poet. 7, 1451 a. 3, ðòvte ðèi kathìpèr ìpì tòv σωμàtvwv} \]

\[ \text{και ìpì tòv ðèov ñèxov ñèxìv mév μégeðos, tòuτo ðè euvóstovvov èinai.} \]
5. 2. ἐλκοντας,
like the English word 'draw,' is used neutrally, 'those who
draw or pull to either extreme.'

5. 3, 4. The paragraph—τὸ δὲ εἴδος . . . εὐπαρακόμιστον—is ill arranged:
it may be analysed as follows: 'The city should be difficult
of access to enemies, and easy of egress to the citizens; the whole
territory should be seen at a glance (for a country which is easily
seen is easily protected): it should be well situated both in regard
to sea and land. Herein are contained two principles: 1) the one
already mentioned, about inaccessibility to enemies and convenience
to friends: to which may be added 2) a second principle, that the
situation should be adapted to commerce.'

The words δεῖ γὰρ . . . ἀπάντων are a repetition of the words τὸ
δὲ εὐσύνοπτον τὸ εἰβοβήθητον εἶναι τὴν χώραν ἐστίν.

5. 4. εἰς μὲν ὁ λεχθεὶς ὤρος,
sc. περὶ τοῦ εἴδους τῆς χώρας.

5. 4. ἔτι δὲ τῆς περὶ ξύλα ὑλῆς, κἂν εἰ τινα ἄλλην ἐργασίαν ἢ χώρα τυγχάνα
κεκτημένη τοιαύτην, εὐπαρακόμιστον.

τῆς ὑλῆς dependent on εὐπαρακόμιστον = εἰ ἐξουσιαν πρὸς τὴν κομβῆν:
tῆς περὶ ξύλα ὑλῆς either 1) wood (ὑλη) which is used as timber,
or 2) timber which is used as material (ὑλη).

6. The echo of these antimaritime prejudices is heard in Cicero,
who discusses the subject at length in his De Republica, Book
ii. cc. 3 and 4.

6. 1. καὶ τὴν πολυανθρωπίαν,
sc. ἀσύμφορον εἶναι φασιν.

6. 2. ὅτι μὲν οὖν, εἰ ταῦτα μὴ συμβαίνει, κ.τ.λ.

'That however, if we could get rid of these evils, there would be
an advantage in a city being connected with the sea is obvious.'

6. 4. αὐτῆ γὰρ ἐμπορικῆ, ἄλλ' οὐ τοῖς ἄλλοις δεῖ εἶναι τὴν πόλιν.

'Like the individual (i. 9. § 14) the city may receive what she
absolutely needs, but is not to import and export without limit.'
Aristotle would restrain foreign trade as much as possible, not because he aims at exclusiveness, but because he dislikes the moneymaking and commercial spirit.

ἐτεὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν ὄρμοιν πολλαῖς ὑπάρχον καὶ χόραις καὶ πόλεισιν ἐπίνεια 6. 5. καὶ λιμένας εὐθυνὸς κείμενα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ὥστε μῖτε τὸ αὐτὸ τέμεων ἀποτέ μῖτε πόρρω λιαν, ἄλλα κρατεῖσθαι τείχεα καὶ τοιοῦτοι ἀλλοιο ἔρμασι, φανερῶν ὥσ ἐξ οἷν ἁγαθὸν τι συμβαινει γέγονεθαι διὰ τῆς κοινωνίας αὐτῶν, ὑπάρχης τῇ πόλει τοῦτο τὸ ἁγαθὸν, εἰ δὲ τι βλαβηρόν, φυλάσσονται μᾶριον τοὺς νόμους φράζοντας καὶ διαρίζοντας τίνας οὗ δεῖ καὶ τίνας ἐπιμένεσθαι δεῖ πρὸς ἄλλης

In this passage ὑπάρχον the reading of the MSS. has been altered into 1) ὑπάρχων by Schneider and by Bekker in his 2nd Edition; and also 2) into ὑπάρχουσα, in the latter case with the omission of καί. The alteration, though probable, is not necessary; for ἐπιστροφῶν may be supplied with ὑπάρχον from the preceding sentence, the plural words ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμένας being taken in apposition as an exegesis. 'But now-a-days there are many cities and places in which such a mart exists, [containing] docks and harbours conveniently situated in relation to the city; and as is obvious, whatever evil there may be is avoided and the good secured, when they are placed at a moderate distance, but commanded by walls and similar fortifications.'

The inland position of the ancient Greek cities, as Thucydides (i. 7) remarks, was due to the prevalence of piracy. Their ports were added later, as the Piraeus at Athens, Nisaea at Megara, Cenchreae and Lechaem at Corinth, Cyllene at Elis, Gythium at Sparta, Nauplia at Argos, Siphae at Thespiae, Notium at Colophon, etc.

κρατεῖσθαι = to be controlled or held in check by.

εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἡγεμονικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ξησαται βιον. 6. 7.

ἡγεμονικὸν, like Athens or Sparta in the days of their greatness, v. 7. § 14. The alteration of πολιτικὸν into πολεμικὸν in Bekker’s 2nd edition is quite unnecessary. For πολιτικὸς βιος, applied to a city, cp. ii. 6. § 7, εἰ δεὶ τὴν πόλιν ξην βιον πολιτικὸν.

πολλὰς γὰρ ἑκπληροῖς τριήρεις [οὶ Ἦρακλεώται]. 6. 8.

6. 9. καὶ πόλεων.
πόλεων, if genuine, is a difficult word. It may be taken in the sense of 'ports like the Piraeus';* or closely connected with λιμένοι of 'cities in relation to their harbours,' cp. supra, c. 5. § 3. But neither of these explanations is satisfactory. The word has been bracketed by Bekker in his second edition and is probably corrupt. The conjectural emendations ἐπινεῖον (Coraes), ἐμπορίον (Schmidt), περιπόλιον (Broughton) are not fortunate; πλοίοι might also be suggested (cp. supra, § 6). But it is more probable that some words have been accidentally transposed and that we should read περὶ μὲν οὖν χώρας καὶ πόλεων [οἱ πόλεως] καὶ λιμένων κ.τ.λ. Οὐ, περὶ μὲν οὖν πόλεων [οἱ πόλεως] καὶ χώρας κ.τ.λ.

7. 2. τὰ μὲν ἐν τοίς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἔθνη καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην.
According to Aristotle it would seem that Europe includes the colder, that is, the Northern parts of Europe and excludes Hellas. The words καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Εὐρώπην are explanatory of τὰ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ἔθνη. Compare the Hymn to Apollo I. 250:

ἡμὲν ὅσοι Πελοπόννησον πείρασιν ἔχουσιν,

ἡδ' ὅσοι Εὐρώπην τε καὶ ἀμφίρρυται κατὰ νῆσους,

in which a similar notion of Europe is implied.

Plato too was no stranger to speculations about race. Cp. Laws v. 747 D, μηδὲ τούθ' ἡμᾶς λανθανέτω περὶ τῶν, ὥσ οὐκ εἰσίν ἄλλοι τινὲς διαφέροντες ἄλλοι τῶν πρὸς τὸ γεννᾶν ἀνθρώπους ἀμείνοις καὶ χείροις: and Rep. iv. 435 E, τὸ θυμοειδὲς ... οἶον οἱ κατὰ τὴν Θράκην τε καὶ Σκιθίκην καὶ σχεδόν τι κατὰ τὸν ἄνω τόπον, ἢ τὸ φιλομαθές, ὃ δὴ περὶ τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν μαλατ' ἀν τις αἰτιάσαι τόπον, ἢ τὸ φιλοχρίματον, ὃ περὶ τούς τε Φοινικαὶ εἶναι καὶ τοὺς κατὰ Αἰγύπτον φαίνεται τις ἅν οὐχ ἡκιστα. Cp. also Herod. ix. 122, φιλέειν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν μαλακῶν χώρων μαλακοὺς ἄνδρας γίνεσθαι: οὗ γὰρ τοῦ τῆς αὐτῆς γῆς εἶναι καρπῶν το θομαστῶν φύει καὶ ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς τὰ πολέμως: and iii. 106, ἡ Ἑλλάς τὰς ὄρας πολλῶν τι κόλλησα κεκρημένας ἔχει. So Plat. Tim. 24 C, ἢ θεός ... ἐκλεξαμενὴ τῶν τόπων ἐν φόρες γεγείσαθε (viz. Hellas), τὴν οἰκρασίαν τῶν ὀρῶν ἐν αὐτῷ κατιδοῦσα, ὅτι φρονιμωτάτους ἄνδρας οἶσοι.

7. 3. μᾶς τυχάνον πολιτείας.
Could Hellas have been united in a federation, she might have governed the world. But the individuality of Greek cities was too
strong to allow of such a union, and the country was too much divided by natural barriers. The cities on the coast might be coerced into an Athenian Empire, but could not be fused into a political whole. Cp. Herod. ix. 2, where the Thebans say to Mardonius that the Greeks if united would be a match for the whole world,—κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἱσχυρὸν Ἑλληνας ὁμοφρονεόντας, οὖπερ καὶ πάρος ταῦτα ἐγώνσκον, χαλεπὰ εἶναι περιγίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπασι ἄνθρωποι.

φασὶ τινες δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς φίλαξι, τὸ φιλητικὸς μὲν εἶναι κ.τ.λ. 7.5.

This, like some of Aristotle’s other criticisms on Plato, is chiefly interesting as shewing the difficulty which he found in understanding the play of language which is characteristic of Plato. [See Essay on Aristotle’s Criticisms of Plato.] The passage referred to is Rep. ii. 375 E, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς συνήθεις τε καὶ γνωρίμους ὡς οἶν τε πραστάτους εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἀγνώτας τούναντίον, where we may observe that the word φιλητικὸς is not used by Plato.

7.5.

ὁ θυμὸς.

‘Passion’ = the depth or force of character which makes a good lover or a good hater. Compare Theognis, l. 1091 Bergk—

ἀργαλεός μοι θυμός ἔχει περὶ σῆς φιλότητος,
οὔτε γὰρ ἐχθαίρειν οὔτε φιλεῖν δύναμαι.

But in the Topics ii. 7, 113 b. i Aristotle raises the question whether φιλία resides in τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν and not in τὸ θυμωδεῖς. Like our word passion, θυμὸς has both a wider and narrower use, and is employed by Aristotle here in a more philosophical, but in the Topics in a more popular sense.

Aristotle truly remarks that anger is felt, not against strangers, 7.5–8. but against friends who have wronged or slighted us. Cp. Rhet. ii. c. 2, 1379 b. 2, καὶ [ἀργαλεόται] μᾶλλον τοῖς φίλοις ἢ τοῖς μὴ φίλοις: and Psalm xlii. 9, ‘Yea, even mine own familiar friend, whom I trusted, who did also eat of my bread, hath lifted up his heel against me.’

οὐ γὰρ δὴ περὶ φίλων ἀπάγχεο. 7.6.

The reading of the MSS. which is repudiated in the translation is not indefensible, though, in the absence of context, it is im-
possible to interpret it with certainty: 'For were they not friends about whom thou wast plagued or grieved?' cp. again from Psalm lv. 12: 'It is not an open enemy that hath done me this dishonour, for then I could have borne it.' A mot attributed to a well-known statesman who had been anonymously attacked in a newspaper is to the point, 'It must have been by a friend,' he said, 'an enemy would not have been so bitter.' The verse is very probably taken from the well-known poem of Archilochus in Trochaic verse beginning θυμε θύμι άρηχανοινοι κηδειαν κυκώμεναι, of which a fragment is preserved (Bergk 60): the metre might be restored either by omitting δή, which may have been added by Aristotle, or by inserting αυν before δή.

The translators William de Moerbek and Aretino render ἀπώγχεο 'a lanceis,' as if they had read or imagined they read ἀπ' ἐχέων.

7. 7. οὔδε εἰσίν οἱ μεγαλόφυσκοι τήν φύσιν ἀγριοι, πλὴν πρὸς τοὺς ἀδίκοκυτας.

Yet the μεγαλόφυσκοι described in Nic. Eth. iv. 3. is rather unapproachable by his neighbours.

7. 9. οὐ γὰρ τήν αὐτήν ἀκρίβειαν δεί ζητεῖν διὰ τέ των λόγων καὶ τῶν γεγο-μένων διὰ τῆς αλήθειας.

Cp. below c. 12. § 9. Aristotle is opposing political theories to facts, as in the Ethics he contrasts the moral certainty of Ethics (Nic. Eth. i. 3. § 4) with the absolute certainty of mathematics, though the ἀκρίβεια in the two cases is different, meaning in the one the necessity and a priori truth of mathematics, in the other exactness of detail.

8. 1. ἐπεὶ δ’ ἠσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνεστῶτων οὐ ταῦτα ἐστὶ μόρα τῆς ἀληθείας, ὥστε ἄνευ τὸ ὀλον όκ ἄν εἴη, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ πόλεως μέρη θετέων ὁσα ταύς πόλεωιν ἀναγκαῖον ἐπάρχειν, οὐδὲ ἀληθικὰ κοινω-νίας οὐδεμίας, ἐξ ἡς ἐν τι τὸ γένος.

In this rather complex sentence Aristotle is distinguishing between the conditions and the parts of the whole. The words ὅν ἄνευ τὸ ὀλον όκ ἄν εἴη answer to ὁσα ταύς πόλεωιν ἀναγκαῖον ἐπάρχειν in the application to the state.

The editions vary between ταύτα and ταὐτά. ταύτα is confirmed by the words of § 6, πόλει ταὐτ' ἐστὶν ὅν ἄνευ πόλιος οὐκ ἄν εἴη. If we
read ταύτα it will be convenient to supply ἐκεῖνος with δὲν ἄνευ, if ταύτα, ἐκεῖνα.

ἐξ ἂν ἐν τῷ γένος, i.e. 'out of which is formed,' or 'which forms a lower class having a unity;' 'which in its nature is a whole, and not a mere aggregate,' ἐν τῷ γένος = ἐν τί ἐστι τῷ γένος.

'The end has nothing in common with the means; the final 8.3. cause with the conditions.' Just as in iii. 1. § 9 things prior and posterior are said to have no quality in common with each other. Of course the modern philosopher makes the opposite reflection, 'that the end is inseparable from the means,' or, 'is only the sum of the means'; that causes are indistinguishable from condition; and equally indistinguishable from effects; 'that no line can be drawn between à priori and à posteriori truth.' The common understanding, like ancient philosophy, rebels against this higher view, because it can point to numberless visible instances in which the end is separable from the means, the effect from the causes. Both lines of reflection are constantly returning upon us, and the opposition between them gives rise to many metaphysical problems. It is the old difficulty, as old as the opposition of ideas to phenomena, of finding the similarity where there is difference or contrast.

ὁρμάνῳ τε παντὶ πρὸς τὸ γεγράμενον έργον καὶ τοῖς δημιουργοῖς. 8. 3.

Governed by οὖθεν κοινάν ἐστι. 'The builder and his tools have nothing in common with the work; so property has nothing in common with the State.'

The connexion of this passage in which means and ends, parts 8. 5-6. and conditions are curiously combined appears to be as follows: 'Now happiness is imparted in various degrees to states, making them to be what they are according to the degree of happiness which they attain. But we must also ascertain what are the conditions of states, for in these we shall find their parts.' He seems to mean that through what is outward only we can arrive at the true elements of the state; and that happiness, which is the end of the state, is not to be confounded with the conditions of it. The argument is interrupted by the seemingly irrelevant remark that the
character of states is given to them by the degrees of happiness which they attain. Here as in other passages (cp. c. 9. § 2 infra), when speaking of the perfect state, he occasionally goes back to the imperfect forms.

8. 5. ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρήσις.

Cp. the more complete statement of the Nic. Eth. i. 7. §§ 14–16, ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ ἀρετῆς ἀρίστην ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ.

8. 6. ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ πόσα ταύτ' ἐστίν δὲν ἄνευ πόλις οὐκ ἄν εἶ.

'Besides considering the highest good of the state or the idea of the state in its highest terms (gathered from the previous section) we must also consider the indispensable conditions of it, and among them we shall find its parts.' All the parts are conditions of a state, not all the conditions are parts; e.g. the θήτες are a condition but not a part; τὸ βουλευόμενον both a condition and a part.

8. 7. πέμπτον δὲ καὶ πρῶτον.

'First,' i.e. in honour, not in necessity, for that place he assigns to the sixth class. Spengel would omit καὶ πρῶτον. But how could the insertion of such a clause ever be explained, unless it had been put in by the piety of a Greek monk?

ἡν καλούσιν ἱερατείαν, 'which they call ritual.' The formula ἡν καλούσιν seems to imply some technical or uncommon use of the word, which occurs nowhere else in classical Greek, cp. ἡν καλούσι τινες ἀλαρχίαν, vi. 1. § 6.

8. 7. ἐκεῖν τὸ τῶν ἀριθμῶν.

The last words are pleonastic, 'sixth in numerical succession.'

8. 9. The conjecture of Lambinus τῶν δικαίων taken from τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ τῶν δικαίων above, § 7, has been adopted in the text. But the reading of the MSS. τῶν ἀναγκαίων, 'of necessary matters of life,' is really defensible and is confirmed by the word ἀναγκαίων in § 7. ἀναγκαίων may also refer to punishments: see infra c. 13. § 6.

9. 1, 2. οὐκ ἐν πάσῃ δὲ τούτῳ πολιτείᾳ.

'This question, however, does not arise in every state, for it is
already decided. In democracies all share in all, while in oli-
garchies only some share in some employments or functions. But we are speaking of the ideal state in which the question remains to be considered.

καθ’ αυτόν γὰρ εἶπομεν.

This passage can hardly refer to ii. 1. § 2, for there Aristotle is speaking of the distribution of property: here of the distribution of functions in the state. The reference is rather to iv. c. 4 and c. 14; see supra c. 4. § 1.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν σκοποῦντες περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας . . . εἰρηται 9. 3. πρῶτερον.

The connexion is as follows: ‘But in the best state, with which we are now concerned, all cannot participate in all, for the trader, the artisan and the husbandman have no leisure for education, neither are they capable of political functions.’

εἰρηται πρῶτερον in c. 8, § 5 supra. It is noticeable that Aristotle in describing the perfect state no longer, as in a democracy (cp. vi. c. 4.), regards the husbandmen as the best material out of which to form citizens.

tοὺς μέλλοντας ἔσεσθαι, 9. 4.

sc. πολιτας, (ἐν τῇ κάλλιστα πολιτευομένη πόλει § 3), ‘citizens of the best state.’

πρῶτερον ἑτερα καὶ ταῦτα θετεών. 9. 4.

Bekker in his second edition inserts ἑτερας after ἑτερα unneces-
sarily. Without it we may translate: ‘Are these also to be distinct, or are both to be given to the same persons?’

Compare Book ii. 5. § 26. 9. 5.

ἄλλα μὴν καὶ τὰς κτήσεις δεῖ εἶναι περὶ τούτων. 9. 7.

The use of περὶ is singular: the force of the preposition may be paraphrased as follows: ‘they too should have a near interest in property,’ an indirect way of expressing what is more distinctly said infra § 8 τὰς κτήσεις εἶναι τούτων.
9. 8. ἐπερ ἄναγκαίον εἶναι τοὺς γεωργοὺς δούλους ἢ βαρβάρους.

The necessity seems to arise from the impossibility of the husbandman having the leisure which a citizen requires for mental cultivation and the fulfilment of political duties, cp. § 4.

9. 10. καὶ κεκόρισται δὴ τοῦτων ἐκάστων, τὸ μὲν ἄει, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος.

τοῦτων, i.e. not merely the ὀπλιτικῶν and βουλευτικῶν; to these must be added the γεωργοί, τεχνίται, and τὸ θητικὸν, in all five. The two first interchange with each other, but never with the three last.

The division between the mere conditions of the state (viz. the γεωργοί, τεχνίται and τὸ θητικὸν) and the parts of it (τὸ ὀπλιτικὸν καὶ βουλευτικὸν) is permanent. The division between τὸ ὀπλιτικὸν, τὸ τῶν ἱερέων γένους and τὸ βουλευτικὸν is transitory or κατὰ μέρος, i.e. the same persons may belong in turn, or at different stages of life, to all three classes.

10. 1. ἔοικε δ' οὖν οἶδ' ἐνεστὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι γνώριμον τοῖς περὶ πολιτείαις φιλοσοφοῦσιν, ὅτι δὲι διωριθήθαι χωρίς κατὰ γένη τῆς πόλεως.

This chapter has been regarded, and perhaps with reason, as a criticism of Plato, Aristotle being desirous of disproving by historical facts the claim of Plato to originality in instituting the system of caste and of common meals.

10. 2. τὰ μὲν περὶ Κρήτην γενόμενα κ.τ.λ.

In apposition with τῶν συστητῶν ἢ τάξεις, 'the custom in Crete going back to the reign of Minos.'

10. 3-5. 'The name Italy was originally confined to the district between the Lametic and Scylletic Gulfs' (Golfo di Eufemia and Golfo di Squillace), 'and was derived from Italus, an ancient king of the Oenotrians' (called by Thucydides vi. 2 a Sicel king) 'who inhabited these regions. The people to the north-west towards Tyrrenhia were called Ausones and those to the north-east in the district called Siritis' (on the shore of the Tarentine gulf) 'Chones.'

The mention of Italy (taken in this narrower sense) leads the writer to particularise its different regions; but nothing is said about how far the custom of common meals may have extended.
and the west point by the two gulfs. The reason is imperfectly expressed: ‘You may call this the boundary because the distance is so small between the two gulfs.’ It is in fact about 20 miles.

It has been asked, ‘What does Aristotle purpose in this digression?’ There is a fallacy in requiring that every part of an ancient work should have a distinct purpose. Aristotle, like Aeschylus, Herodotus, Thucydides, ‘breaks out’ into the favourite subject of geography, and his conceptions of it, as might be expected in the beginning of such studies, are not perfectly accurate or distinct.

It is evident that common meals played a great part in the political organisation of Hellas and the south of Italy. But, according to Susemihl, no other writer mentions their existence in Italy.

Σφίτων is the reading of most MSS., σφητην of two only. The MSS. of the old translator appear all to give syrtem. Σφίτων is conjectured by Heyne, who compares Arist. Fragm. Ποιλετεία 542, εις την Σφίτων δε κατακοινῖτε . . . ως φησι Τίμαιος και 'Αριστοτέλης, εις τρυφήν εξώκειαν ουχ ήσσον Σοβαρτόν, Athen. xii. 523 C. Hence Goëtting’s conjecture Σφίτης the district of Siris. Of any district of Italy or Syrtis there is no mention elsewhere.

η μεν οὖν τῶν συνστιτῶν τάξις εντείθεν γέγονε πρώτον, ο δὲ χωρασμός ο 10. 6.
κατά γενός τοῦ πολιτικοῦ πλῆθους εξ Ἀγκυροῦ πολὺ γὰρ ἐπερεύει τῶν χρῶν τῆς Μίνω βασιλείαν ἡ Σεσώστριος,

is translated in the English text: ‘From this part of the world originally came the institution of common tables; the separation into castes [which was much older] from Egypt, for the reign of Sesostri is of far greater antiquity than that of Minos.' It is also possible to supply the ellipse differently: ‘The separation into castes came [not from Italy or Crete, but] from Egypt.' The sentence is then parallel with the other statements. Common tables existed in Crete and in Italy: the latter were the older, and therefore are called ‘the origin of the institution’ (§§ 2, 4); similarly, caste existed in Crete and in Egypt; in the latter
country its origin dates further back than in the former, for 
Sesostris is older than Minos, and therefore it is said to have 
originated there.

10. 7. σχεδον μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δεῖ νομίζειν εὑρησθαι πολλάκις ἐν τῷ πολλῷ 
χρόνῳ.
A favourite reflection of Aristotle’s. See note on text for parallel 
passages.

10. 8. ὁτι δὲ πάντα ἀρχαία.
‘All political institutions are ancient; for they are found in 
Egypt which is the most ancient of all countries.’ Cp. Plat. Laws 
ii. 657. ‘Their (i.e. the Egyptian) works of art are painted or 
moulded in the same forms which they had ten thousand years 
ago; this is literally true, and no exaggeration.’ For further 
references see note on text. That this sameness was the weak-
ness of Egypt, and that the life of Hellas was progress, seems not 
to have occurred either to Aristotle or Plato.

10. 8. τοῖς μὲν εἰρημένοις
is the reading of the MSS., altered in the text after Lambinus 
into εἰρημένοις, a change which seems to be required by the want of 
a suitable antecedent and by the parallelism of παράλειπομένα. Cp. 
supra, σχεδον μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δεὶ νομίζειν εὑρησθαι πολλάκις, and 
ii. 5. § 16.

10. 10. ἕστερον ἔρουμεν.
This promise is not fulfilled. In c. 12. § I the common meals 
are only mentioned in passing; no reason is given in support of 
the institution.

10. 11. τῷ πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυνεῖτονας πολέμους ὁμοοπτικῶτερον.
A lesson learned from the experience of Athens during the 
Peloponnesian War. The Acharnians whose lands lay on the 
borders, seeing them ravaged, wished to attack the invaders rashly 
(Thuc. ii. 21), and afterwards when they had lost their possessions 
as Archidamus thought likely (Thuc. ii. 20 ἐστερημένους τῶν σφε-
tίρων οὐχ ὁμοίως πραθίμους ἔσεσθαι ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων κυνεῖνειν, 

στάσιν δὲ ἐνέσεσθαι), and as Aristophanes in his ‘Acharnians’ seems to imply, were wanting to make peace.

For reference to Plato and criticism on him see note on text. 10. 11.

δεύτερον δὲ βαρβάρους περιοίκους.

Compare above c. 9. § 8, ἀναγκαίον εἶναι τοὺς γεωργούς δούλους ἢ βαρβάρους ἢ περιοίκους, a comparison which has led to the insertion of ἢ before περιοίκους in this passage, or to the omission of it in c. 9. The text of the MSS. is probably right in both passages. ‘If we could have the very best thing, the husbandmen should be slaves; or if slaves cannot be had, then perioeci of alien stock.’

αὐτὸς δὲ πρὸς αὐτὴν εἶναι τὴν βέσιν εὐχεσθαι δεῖ κατατυγχάνειν πρὸς 11. 1.

τέταρα βλέποντας.

The order of the words is as follows—δεῖ εὐχεσθαι κατατυγχάνειν [τού] τὴν βέσιν εἶναι.

The four points to be attended to appear to be as follows: 1) healthy and airy situation, open to the winds (cp. § 4, infra): 2) good water: 3) convenience for administration (πρὸς πολιτικὰς πράξεις): 4) adaptation to military requirements (πρὸς πολεμικὰς πράξεις).

Cp. Xen. Oecon. 9. 4, καὶ σύμπασαν δὲ τὴν οἰκίαν ἐπέθεσα αὐτὴ, ὅτι πρὸς μεσημβρίαν ἀναπέστησα, ὅτε εὐθὺς εἶναι, ὅτι χειμώνας μὲν εὐθὺς ἔστι, τοῦ δὲ θέρους εὐκίος.

Vitruvius i. 6 tells us how the inhabitants of Mitylene suffered from the situation of their town: ‘Oppidum magnificenter est aedificatum et eleanter; sed positum non prudenter. In quâ civitate auster cum flat homines aegrotant, cum eurus, tussiunt, cum septentrio, restituuntur in sanitate, sed in angiportis et plateis non possunt consistere propter vehementiam frigoris.’ (Quoted by Eaton.)

δεύτερον δὲ κατὰ βορέαν.

κατὰ βορέαν = ‘facing the same way that the North wind does,’ (cp. κατὰ βορέαν) i.e. sheltered from the North wind. Cp. Plat. Crit. 118 A, B, ὃ δὲ τὸπος οὗτος ὅλης τῆς νήσου πρὸς νῦτον ἔτεραπτο, ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρκτῶν κατάβορρος.
δεύτερον may either be taken as *an alternative, or as introducing
a second condition of healthfulness, so that a South Eastern aspect
is what is recommended; i.e. a situation which is open to the
healthy East winds and affords shelter from the North wind.

11. 3. τούτο γ' εὐρηται

is the reading of all the MSS. The conjecture of Lambinus,
εὐρήθαι, adopted by Bekker in his second edition, is unnecessary.
τούτο γ' εὐρηται = 'a remedy has been found for this,' i.e. 'a
remedy may be found.' The language is not quite symmetrical,
but this is no reason for altering it.

11. 3. ἵπποιχυς ὅμπριος ὕδασιν.

Five MSS. read ὅμπριος, a possible reading, 'rain cisterns for
water' instead of 'cisterns for rain water.'

11. 4. ἐν τε τοιούτῳ καὶ πρὸς τοιοῦτον.

'In the situation described, and looking to the quarter de-
scribed.'

11. 5. τοιούτων ναμίτων.

The reading of the best MSS. and the old translator, 'such
streams as I have spoken of above,' that is to say, 'good streams'
(ἐγνεών § 4).

11. 5. ἀκρόπολις ὀλιγαρχικῶν καὶ μοναρχικῶν, ἀριστοκρατικῶν . . . ἵσχυροι τόποι
πλείους.

It may be asked: 'Why should a single fortress be adapted to
a monarchy, or oligarchy, several strongholds to an aristocracy?'
Probably because in the former case the government is more
concentrated. A small governing class, if they are to maintain
their power against the people, must draw together. An aristo-
cracy has only to defend itself against foreign enemies, and is
therefore better dispersed.

11. 7. ἀν τις οὕτω κατασκευάζῃ, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς γεωργίαις ἄς καλοῦσι τινὲς τῶν
ἀμπελῶν συστάδας.

The last word is explained by Hesychius (under ἔστάδες) as
αἱ πυκναί ἄμπελοι, ἄμεινον δὲ τὰς εἰκῆ καὶ μὴ κατὰ στοίχον πεφυτευμένας
\( \delta κόνευ, \text{i.e.} \ 1) *\) vines planted thickly or in clumps, or \( 2) \) vines planted irregularly. If we adopt the first of these interpretations and take the image literally, Aristotle is suggesting that the city should be built partly in regular streets, but here and there in blocks which would have the character of strong places. If we take the second, he would seem to mean that the city should be built in part irregularly, with a view to confusing or perplexing an enemy after he had entered it.

\( \text{oι \( μή \) ϕάσκοντες δείν \( \εχευ \) (τειχη).} \)

\( \text{11. 8.} \)

Cp. Laws vi. 778 D ff, \( \piερι \ \delta' \ \tauειχων, \ \delta \ \Μεγάλη, \ \epsilonγωγ' \ \ιν \ \tauη \ \Σπάρτη \ \ζυμφερομυν \ \tauο \ \καθειδευ \ \εαιν \ \ιν \ \τη \ \γη \ \κατακείμενα \ \tauα \ \τειχη.} \)

The absence of walls in Sparta suggested to Plato the poetical fancy that the walls of cities should be left to slumber in the ground: it may reasonably be conjectured that the position of Sparta and the military character of her citizens rendered artificial defences unnecessary.

\( \epsilonλεγχομεναι \ \εργο \ \τας \ \εκεινως \ καλλωπισαμενας.} \)

\( \text{11. 8.} \)

The disasters of Leuctra (b.c. 371) and of Mantinea (b.c. 362) had done a great deal to diminish the admiration for Sparta. (Cp. ii. 9. § 10 and infra c. 14. § 16.) Yet the allusion is hardly to the point, for Sparta was never taken by an enemy: Epaminondas after the battle of Leuctra refrained from attacking it, Xen. Hell. vi. 5.

\( \epsilonστι \ \δε' \ \προς \ \μεν \ \tauοις \ \ομοιοις \ \και \ \μη \ \πολο \ \τω \ \πληθει \ \διαφεροντας \ \ου \ \text{11. 9.} \)

\( \kαλον \ \το \ \πειρασθαι \ \σωζεσθαι \ \δια \ \της \ \των \ \τειχων \ \ερυμαινοτητος.} \)

The somewhat romantic notion with which may be compared the further refinement of § 11, infra; also the saying of Archidamus, the son of Agesilaus, when he saw catapults brought from Sicily, which in other words and under other circumstances has no doubt often been ejaculated by the African or New Zealand savage, \( \omegaπολωλευ \ \ανδρως \ \δρετα. \) (Plut. Apophth. Lac. 219 A.)

\( \πολεμικωτατην. \)

\( \text{11. 9.} \)

Either ‘the most truly warlike in character’ or ‘the best defence of the warrior.’ Both meanings may be included.
ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS.

11. 10. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ταῖς οἰκήσεωι ταῖς ἰδίαις μὴ περιβάλλειν τοῖχους.

Private houses as well as cities, especially in the country, might in many cases need the protection of walls.

ὁμοίως δὲ, sc. ἔχει.

12. 1. αὐτά,

sc. τὰ τείχη, i.e. the position of the walls; or more generally, 'the consideration of these circumstances.'

12. 2. ἄρχειον.

The MSS. vary between ἀρχῶν, ἄρχαιον, ἄρχειον.

12. 3. εἰ ὁ τοιοῦτος ὁ τόπος ὡστε ἐπιφάνειαν τε ἔχει πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς θέσην ἰκανός καὶ πρὸς τὰ γενετῆσα μέρη τῆς πόλεως ἐρμηνευέσθαι.

Lit. 'This place should be of a sort which has conspicuousness, suitable to the position of virtue, and towering aloft over the neighbouring parts of the city.'

Thomas Aquinas, who wrote a Commentary on the Politics, if we may judge from his Latin 'bene se habentem ad apparentiam virtutis,' seems to have read θέσην τε ἔχει πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιφάνειαν. (Susemihl.) But the words are better as they are found in the Greek MSS.

The habitation of virtue is to be like that of the Gods who have their temples in the Acropolis. Cp. Vitruv. i. 7 'Aedibus vero sacris quorum deorum maxime in tutela civitas videtur esse, unde moenium maxima pars conspicuitur areae distribuantur' (quoted by Schneider); and Burke, French Revolution, p. 107, 'The temple of honour ought to be seated on an eminence.'

12. 4, 5. εἰ ὁ ἄνευχαρις ὁ τόπος, εἰ καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια τῶν πρεσβυτέρων ἔχου τὴν τάξιν ἐνταῦθα. πρέπει γὰρ διηρήσαει κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας καὶ τοῖς τῶν κόσμων, καὶ παρὰ τοῖς νεωτέροις ἀρχοντάς τοὺς διατρίβειν, τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους παρὰ τοῖς ἄρχονται ἡ γὰρ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς τῶν ἀρχόντων παρουσία μάλιστα ἐμποιεῖ τὴν ἀληθινὴν αἰδοῖ καὶ τῶν τῶν ἔλευθερων φόβον.

The opposition of μὲν and δὲ before νεωτέροις and πρεσβυτέρους seems to imply that the youth are to perform under the eye of certain magistrates, and the elders under the eye of the magistrates
as a body. The distinction appears to be in the one case, that some of the magistrates are to go to the gymnasion, in the other the exercises are to take place in or near the public buildings appropriated to the magistrates. Everywhere the presence of the authorities is required. * Some of the rulers are to be present (διατρίβειν) at the exercises of the younger men, but the elders are to perform their exercises with the rulers.' Here either another verb has to be supplied with παρὰ τοῖς ἄρχονσι or the word διατρίβειν is to be taken in a slightly different sense. Or 2) we may translate, 'and the elders shall be placed at the side of the magistrates.' This, however, disregards μὲν and δὲ and seems not to cohere with the words διηρήθησατ κατὰ τὰς ἡλικίας: for thus no mention is made of the gymnastics of the elders. 3) The most natural way of taking the Greek words (τοὺς δὲ . . . ἄρχονσι) that 'the magistrates shall perform their gymnastic exercises before the elders,' (St. Hilaire) gives a very poor sense. The clause ἦ γὰρ ἐν ὄθενεμοις κ.τ.λ., shows clearly that the principal point is the requirement of the presence of the magistrates at all gymnastic exercises.

The word κόσμον is difficult. It may be taken in the sense of 'institution,' which is in some degree supported by the use of κόσμος τῆς πολιτείας for 'the order or constitution of the state,' (Περὶ Κόσμου 6. 399 b. 18). Or* τοῦτον τῶν κόσμων may be the accusative after διηρήθησατ and may be taken with Adolph Stahr in the sense of 'this embellishment of the state:' [dieser Schmuck der Stadt]. In this case it is better to make διηρήθησατ impersonal, κόσμον being the indirect accusative following it. καὶ τοῦτον, this institution too, i.e. as well as the offices of state which in c. 9 are divided between old and young.

τὴν δὲ τῶν ἄνων κ.τ.λ. 12. 6.
Cp. supra, c. 5. § 4.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ πλήθος διαιρεῖται τῆς πόλεως εἰς ἱερεῖς, εἰς ἄρχοντας. 12. 6.

The enumeration is incomplete, because Aristotle has only occasion to speak of priests and magistrates. The places assigned to their common tables, like those of the soldiers and the guardians of the country, are to be situated conveniently for their employ-
ments. The baldness of the expression suggests the possibility that something may have dropped out. The first words ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ πλῆθος appear to be a repetition of ἐπεὶ δὲ δὲ τὸ μὲν πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν at the beginning of the Chapter. πλῆθος is used for the citizens generally, not as opposed to the upper classes.

12. 6. περὶ τὴν τῶν ἱερῶν οἰκοδομημάτων ἐχειν τὴν τάξιν.
‘To have their proper place.’ Cp. § 8, τὴν εἰρθείπην τάξιν. τὴν . . . οἰκοδομημάτων, sc. τάξιν, is to be supplied.

12. 7. τὴν καλουμένην ἀστυνομίαν.
The qualifying καλουμένην, if not a mere pleonasm, seems to indicate the more uncommon or technical expression. Cp. note on c. 8. § 7 supra, and on vi. 1. § 6.

12. 8. The MSS. vary between νευμηδεθαὶ and μεμυηθαὶ. P has compounded them into νευμηδεθαὶ. Bekker in his second edition has adopted μεμυηθαὶ. Cp. vi. 2. § 7, where certain magistrates are required by law to take their meals together.

13. 1. περὶ πολιτείας αὐτῆς.
Hitherto Aristotle has been speaking only of the conditions of the best state, which are its ἰδια (supra c. 4. §§ 1–3). Now he is going on to speak of the πολιτεία itself, which is the εἶδος of a πόλις (cp. iii. 3. §§ 7–9).

Chapters 13, 14, 15 form a transition to the subject of education, which is begun in c. 16, and is continued in Book viii. But it cannot be said that Aristotle fulfils the promise of discussing the ‘constitution’ of the best state. He describes the life of his citizens from birth to boyhood, but says nothing about their judicial or political duties.

13. 2. ἐκκείται καλὸς.
‘Stands out well,’ or ‘distinctly.’ For the thought, cp. Eud. Eth. ii. 11, 1227 b. 20, ἦστε γὰρ τῶν μὲν σκοπόν ὅρθων εἶναι, ἐν δὲ τῶν πρὸς τῶν σκοπῶν διαμαρτάνειν.

13. 3. In this passage, of which the connexion is obscure, Aristotle seems to say that the good man is superior to the ordinary con-
ditions of existence, and so to a certain extent, but to a certain extent only (ἐκλάττονος τοῖς ἀμενοὶ διακείμενοι), the legislator may make his citizens superior to external conditions. Cp. Nic. Eth. i. cc. 9–12.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ προκείμενον ἐστὶ τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἰδεῖν, αὐτὴ δὲ ἐστὶ καθ' 13. 4. ὁ ἀριστεύσαν πόλιν, ἀριστεύσα δὲ ἐν πολιτείᾳ καθ' ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ μᾶλλον ἐνδέχεται τὴν πόλιν, δὴ δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν δεῖ, τι ἐστι, μὴ λαξάνειν.

The connexion is as follows: 'In various ways men mistake the nature of happiness, but we recognise it to be the great object of a state, and therefore we should ascertain its nature.'

φαμέν δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἥθικοις, εἰ τι τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων ὑφέλος. 13. 5.

It is difficult to say why Aristotle should speak thus doubtfully or depreciatingly of a principle which lies at the basis both of his ethical and political philosophy. Is the expression to be attributed only to the Greek love of qualifying language?

καὶ ταύτην οὐκ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀλλ' ἀπλῶς. 13. 5.

These words are not found in the Nicomachean Ethics (see references in note on text), and therefore may be supposed to be added by Aristotle as an explanation.

λέγω δὲ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως. 13. 5, 6.

'Happiness is an absolute good, whereas punishments are only good under certain conditions;' they are evils which prevent greater evils. The negative and the positive senses of the word 'just,'—just punishments, just actions,—needed to be distinguished in the beginning of philosophy.

οἶν τὰ περὶ τὰς δικαίας πράξεις αἱ δικαιαι τιμορίαι καὶ κολάσεις ἀπ' 13. 6. ἀρετὴς μὲν εἰσιν, ἄναγκαιαι δὲ, καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἄναγκαιον ἔχουσιν (αἱρέτω- τερον μὲν γὰρ μηθὲν διέσχων τῶν τοιούτων μήτε τὸν ἄνδρα μήτε τὴν πόλιν), αἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τᾶς τιμᾶς καὶ τὰς εὐπορίας ἀπλῶς εἰσὶ καλλίστοι πράξεις.

'They have their rightness, not as ends, but as means or conditions of something else which is an end.' For the use of ἄναγκαιαι, cp. Nic. Eth. x. 6. § 2, τῶν δὲ ἐνεργείων αἱ μὲν εἰσιν ἄναγκαιαι καὶ δὲ ἐτερα αἱρεται, αἱ δὲ καθ' αὐτὰς.
Under the common notion of ἀναγκαία and ἐκ ὑποθέσεως, by a play of words, Aristotle appears to comprehend not only the external goods which are the conditions of individual life, but the penalties imposed by law, which are the conditions of the existence of states.

αἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὰς τιμὰς πράξεις, sc. φέρουσαι, τείνουσαι οἱ γνώμεναι.

13. 7. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔτερον κακοῦ τινὸς αἰρεσίς ἐστιν.

'The one is a voluntary choice of an evil,' i.e. for the sake of removing some other evil. For example, punishment puts an end to crime.

The conjecture ἀναρεσίς, which is adopted by Schneider, Coraes, Bekker (2nd edition), and Susemihl, is unnecessary.

13. 7. χρήσαστο δὲ ἂν τὸ σπουδάσιον ἀνὴρ καὶ πενήλα καὶ νόσῳ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τύχαις ταῖς φαύλαις καλῶς ἄλλα τὸ μακάριον εὑ ἐν τοῖς ἐναρτίοις ἐστίν.

Compare Nic. Eth. i. 10, especially the noble words in § 12. ὁμοὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλαμπτεὶ τὸ καλόν, ἔπειδαι φέρῃ τις εὐκόλου πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλας ἀνυχίας μὴ δὲ ἀναγεγείρῃ ἄλλα γεννάδας ὁν καὶ μεγαλόψυχος.

13. 8. δήλων δὲ ὅτι καὶ τὰς χρήσεις ἀναγκαίας σπουδάσιος καὶ καλὰς εἶναι ταύτας ἀπλῶς. διὸ καὶ νομίζοναι ἄνθρωποι τῆς εὐθαιμονίας αὕτη τὰ ἐκτὸς εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὡσπερ εἰ τοῦ κεθαρίζειν λαμπρῶν καὶ καλῶς αἰτιώτῳ τὴν λύραν μᾶλλον τῆς τέχνης.

'The good man will make a use of external goods which is absolutely good. And because (διὸ) this use of external goods is good in him, men think that external goods are the causes of happiness, which is just as if we were to attribute the melody to the lyre and not to the player.'

ἀιτιώτο, sc. τις, gathered from ἄνθρωποι. τις occurs in one MS. (P3) and is inserted by Bekker in his 2nd edition.

13. 9. διὸ κατ’ εὐχήν εὐχόμεθα τὴν τῆς πόλεως σύστασιν ὃν ἡ τυχή κυρία.

1) 'Since therefore some things must be presupposed (διό), our prayer and desire is that our city may be so constituted as to have the goods of fortune,' sc. εἶναι ἐκ ἑκείνων ὃν, etc.; or 2) 'we desire that her constitution in respect of the goods of fortune may answer to our prayer,' making κατ’ εὐχήν, sc. εἶναι, the predicate, ὃν, sc. ἐν
‘κείνος δὲν; or 3) ‘we ask if we could only have our prayer,’ or ‘though it be only an ideal,’ as above, κατ’ εἰκῆν, iv. 11. § 1, πολιτείαν τὴν κατ’ εἰκῆν γινομένην.

καὶ γὰρ εἰ πάντας ἐνδέχεται σπουδαίους εἶναι, μὴ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν δὲ τῶν 13. 10. πολιτῶν, οὕτως αἱρετότερον, ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν καὶ τῷ πάντας.

He seems to mean that although there might be some common idea of virtue which the citizens attained collectively, such as patriotism, yet it would be better that each individual should be virtuous, for each implies all. Compare, i. 3. § 2, τὸ γὰρ πάντες διστῶν, κ.τ.λ., where he distinguishes ‘each’ from ‘all.’

ἐναὶ τε οὐδὲν ἄφελος φῶναι: τὰ γὰρ ἔθη μεταβαλέν ποιεῖ, κ.τ.λ. 13. 11.

Lit. ’Some qualities there is no use in having by nature; for habit alters them; and through nature,’ or ‘such is their nature that, they are swayed by habit both towards good and towards evil.’ To us the reasoning of this passage appears singular. Yet probably what Aristotle means to say is, that moral qualities, if given by nature, would cease to be moral, and in so far as they are moral would cease to be natural. Nature in this passage is used for ‘instinct,’ or ‘natural impulse.’ From another point of view (Nic. Eth. ii. 1. § 2) he shows, using the term φῶνει in a somewhat different sense, that things which are purely natural cannot be altered by habit; but that nature supplies the conditions under which habits may be cultivated. Cp. also infra, c. 15. § 7.


‘Are rulers and subjects to differ at different times, or to be the same always?’

tοῖς ἀρχομένοις. 14. 2.

1) *Dative of reference: ‘In relation to their subjects,’ or, 2) with a more obvious construction, but with a feeble sense, τοῖς ἀρχομένοις may be taken after φανερῶν, ‘so that the superiority of the governors is manifest to their subjects.’

Σκύλαζ.

The same who is mentioned in Herodotus (iv. 44) as sailing down the Indus by order of Darius Hystaspes. Whether the
writings passing under his name with which Aristotle was acquainted were genuine or not we cannot say. The short summary of the geography of the habitable world which has come down to us under the name of Scylax contains allusions to events later than the time of Herodotus, and is therefore certainly either spurious or interpolated.

14.4. πάντες οί κατὰ τὴν χώραν.

Not country as opposed to town—‘the country people combine with the malcontents of the town’; but, ‘all the inhabitants minus the rulers,’ i.e. the perioeci, metics, or any others, who, though personally free, had no political rights, make common cause with the subject classes and desire revolution.

14.5. ἡ γὰρ φύσις δεδωκε τὴν αἱρεσιν, ποιήσασα αὐτῷ τῷ γένει ταύτων τὸ μὲν νεώτερον τὸ δὲ πρεσβύτερον, δῶν τοῖς μὲν ἀρχεσθαι πρίτη, τοῖς δὲ ἄρχειν.

Lit. ‘For nature herself has given the principle of choice when she created in the very race the same element, i.e. the same human beings, partly young and partly old, of whom the one are fitted to obey, the others to command.’

αὐτῷ τῷ γένει ταύτων. The word αὐτῷ has less MS. authority than αὑτό, and is omitted altogether in one MS. and in Aretino’s translation. Αὑτό may be translated: ‘In the human race nature has created the very same thing, making a distinction of old and young, corresponding to that of rulers and subjects.’ The correction τῶν αὐτῶν for αὐτῷ is unnecessary.

14.8. ἐπεὶ δὲ πολῖτου καὶ ἀρχοντος τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρετὴν εἶναι φαινεν καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου ἀνδρός.

i.e. in the best state which he is here discussing.

14.11. ὁμοῖως οὖν ἀνάγκη διηρήσθαι καὶ τοῦτο τὸ μέρος δῆλον ὅτι, καὶ τὰς πράξεις δ' ἀνάλογον ἐρωτεύειν ἔχειν, καὶ δεῖ τὰς τοῦ φύσει βελτίων αἵρεται τέρας εἶναι τοῖς δυναμίωσι τυγχάνειν ἢ παστῶν ἢ τῶν δυνῶν.

ὁμοῖως . . . ἔχειν. ‘And as there must be a division of the soul, in like manner there must be a division of the actions of the soul’; ὁμοῖως answers to ἀνάλογον ἔχειν, and is to be taken closely with καὶ τὰς πράξεις.

tούτο τὸ μέρος, sc. τὸ λόγον ἔχειν.
NOTES, BOOK VII. 14.

ἡ πασῶν ἡ τοῦ δυοῦ, sc. τῶν πράξεων. 'The simple action of the highest principle is better than the mixed action of all or of two, that is the union of the higher with the lower, or the practical and speculative reason combined (τῶν δυοῦν). ' Aristotle is here speaking of that life of mind which in the Ethics he conceives to have a separate existence (ἡ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ [sc. εὐθεια] κεχωρισμένη Nic. Eth. x. 8. § 3). But we are unable to understand how this pure mind condescends to take a part in human things—the analogous difficulty in Aristotle to the relation of τὰ νοούμενα and τὰ φαινόμενα in Plato. We know that within the sphere of practice thought and reflection must always be reappearing if the legislator is endowed with them. But Aristotle nowhere explains how the speculative, either in private or public life, is related to the practical, or what is the higher training which fits the citizen for either.

ἔπαινοιτε γὰρ τὴν Λακεδαίμονιον πολιτείαν ἐγκατα τοῦ νομοθέτου τῶν 14. 16. σκοπῶν, ὅτι πάντα πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ πρὸς πόλεμον ἐνομοθέτησεν· ἀ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἐστὶν εὐθειακα καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐξελήγεται νῦν.

Cp. Thuc. ii. 39, καὶ ἐν ταῖς παιδείαις ὁ μὲν ἐπιτομὴ ἀσκήσεω (sc. οἱ Ἀκαδαίμοιοι) εὐθὺς νέοι ὄντες τὸ ἀνθρώπον μετέρχομαι, ἢμεῖς δὲ ἀνεμένους διαπώμενοι οὐδὲν ἁρὰν ἐπὶ τοῖς ισοπάλεις κυνόνων χαρακτήσαμεν.

καὶ τοῖς ἔργοις ἐξελήγεται νῦν. Alluding to Leuctra and Mantinea. Cp. c. ii. § 8, about walls, and ii. 9. § 10, about the women.

οὕτω καὶ Ὁβέρων.

Who Thibron was is unknown. But we have an example of a treatise such as he might have written in the 'de Republica Lacedemoniorum,' attributed to Xenophon. Was he more likely to have been a Spartan, or only an admirer of Sparta, like the Philolacon in other states of Hellas? The name is Lacedaemonian. The words τῶν ἄλλων ἐκαστος τῶν γραφῶν περὶ πολιτειας αὐτῶν remind us how large a literature of political philosophy must have existed in the time of Aristotle, although we are apt to imagine him the first writer on such subjects. Cp. ii. 1. § 1; c. 7. § 1; c. 12. § 1.

ἔτι δὲ τοῦτο γελοῖον, εἰ μένοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις αὐτοῦ, καὶ μηδενὸς ἐμποδί- 14. 18. ζωτοσ πρὸς τὸ χρῆσθαι τοῖς νόμοις, ἀποθετῆκας τὸ ἥν καλῶς.
'If their greatness depended on their laws, it is ridiculous to suppose that they can have retained their laws and lost their happiness.'

14. 19. ὅτι κρατεῖν ἥσκησεν ἐπὶ τὸ τῶν πείλας ἄρχειν.

'If states are trained in virtue only that they may rule over their neighbours, the same principle will impel individuals to usurp the government in their own states.'

14. 20. Παυσανίας τῷ βασιλεῖ.

See note on v. 1. § 10.

14. 21. ταύτα γὰρ ἄριστα καὶ ἔδρα καὶ κοινὴ τῶν νοµοβέτην ἐμποιεῖν δεὶ ταύτα ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἄνθρωπον.

There is a slight flaw in the text, which may be corrected (with Susemihl) by adding τέ after τῶν.

14. 22. τὴν γὰρ βασίλειαν ἀφιών, ἀσπέρ ὁ σίδηρος, εἰρήνην ἀγοντες.

Cp. Soph. Aj. 650 (Dindorf):—

καὶ γὰρ γὰρ, ὅς τὰ δεῖν ἐκαρτέρουν τότε,

βασιλείας σίδηρον ὅς, ἐδηλώθην στόμα

πρὸς τῆς κάθε ἑξής γυναικίς.

15. In the Nic. Eth. x. 7, Aristotle dwells at length on the thesis that the true happiness of man is to be sought in leisure and contemplation. But we have a difficulty in realizing his meaning. For we naturally ask how is the leisure to be employed? and on what is contemplation to feed? To these questions his writings supply no answer. We have no difficulty in understanding that by a philosopher the mind and the use of the mind is deemed higher than the body and its functions, or that the intellectual is to be preferred to the moral, or that the life of a gentleman is to be passed in liberal occupations, not in trade or servile toil. But when we attempt to go further we can only discern a negative idealism; we are put off with words such as θεωρία, οὐσία, and the like, which absorbed the minds of that generation, but which to us appear to have no context or meaning.

But if in the sphere of the individual the idea of contemplative leisure is feeble and uncertain, much more shadowy is the meaning
of the word when applied to the state. We can see that peace is to be preferred to war; that the Athenians 'provided for their weary spirits many relaxations from toil' (Thuc. ii. 38); that 'they could fix their minds upon the greatness of Athens until they became filled with the love of her' (ib. 43); that into education an element of philosophy should enter; that sleep is sweet to weary mortals; that to the Greek leisure was a necessity of the higher life. But we fail to perceive how the leisure of a state, the interest of a spectacle, the tranquillity of wealth is better than some great struggle for freedom; or how the sons of those who fought at Thermopylae and Salamis were more fortunate than their fathers. Aristotle himself seems to acknowledge that greater virtues of some kind would be required in 'the islands of the blest' than in the ordinary life of man. The contemplative end which he imagines is not suited to the human character and is nearly unmeaning. To us there appears to be more truth in the sentiment, which has been repeated in many forms, that 'the search after knowledge is a greater blessing to man than the attainment of it.'

\[
de\textit{ei }\gamma\acute{a}r\ \pi\omega\lambda\lambda:\ \tau\omicron\nu\ \\acute{\alpha}n\acute{a}g\acute{a}k\acute{a}i\omicron\nu\ \upsilon\acute{a}p\acute{r}\acute{e}k\acute{e}i\nu,\ \acute{\sigma}p\acute{o}\acute{w} \acute{\epsilon}\acute{h}\acute{\eta} \\
\textit{The virtues of leisure imply the virtues of business, for business supplies the means of leisure.}
\]

\[
\omicron\ \mu\acute{e}n\ \gamma\acute{a}r\ \pi\omega\lambda\epsilon\omicron\nu\ \\acute{\alpha}n\acute{a}g\acute{a}k\acute{a}\acute{e}z\acute{e}i\ \\acute{d}\acute{i}k\acute{a}i\omicron\nu\ \epsilon\nu\acute{i}n\ \kappa\acute{a}i\ \sigma\omega\phi\rho\rho\omicron\nu\epsilon\omicron\nu.
\]

Cp. Tennyson's Maud I. vi.-xiii. :

'Why do they prate of the blessings of peace? . . . . . . . . . . .

Peace in her vineyard—yes!—but a company forges the wine.'

Yet there is corruption in war as well as in peace, now as of old, in furnishing the commissariat of an army, in making appointments, in conferring distinctions, sometimes followed by a fearful retribution.

\[
\acute{e}k\acute{e}i\omicron\nu\ \mu\acute{e}n\ \gamma\acute{a}r\ \omicron\nu\ \tau\acute{a}t\nu\ \\delta\iota\acute{a}f\acute{e}r\omicron\nu\omicron\nu\ \\tau\omicron\nu\nu\ \\omicron\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu, \tau\acute{o}\ \\mu\acute{h} \nu\omicron\acute{m}i\acute{z}\omicron\nu\ \tau\acute{a}t\nu\ \tau\omicron\omicron\nu\ 15. 6.

\\\omicron\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu\ \mu\acute{e}g\acute{m}\acute{a}st\omicron\nu\ \\tau\omicron\nu\nu\ \\acute{\alpha}\acute{g}\acute{a}\omicron\nu\omicron\nu, \\omicron\lambda\lambda\omicron\nu \tau\acute{o}\ \\gamma\acute{e}n\acute{e}\acute{s}\omicron\acute{th}\omicron\acute{a}i\ \tau\acute{a}t\nu\ \mu\acute{a}l\lambda\omicron\nu\ \di\acute{a}\ \\tau\omicron\nu\nu\ \\acute{a}r\acute{e}t\acute{h}\acute{e}.

'The Lacedaemonians agree with the rest of mankind that the good life is the end, but they differ in supposing the end to be obtained by military virtue alone.'
Cp. (though a different point of view from that which is here taken) ii. §§ 34, 35: ‘Although the Lacedaemonians truly think that the goods for which they contend are to be acquired by virtue rather than by vice, they err in supposing that these goods are to be preferred to the virtue which gains them.’

15. 6. ἐπεὶ δὲ μείζω τε ἁγαθὰ ταύτα, καὶ τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν τὴν τούτων ἢ τὴν τῶν ἄρετῶν, καὶ οτι δὲ αὐτῆν, φανερῶν ἐκ τούτων, πῶς δὲ καὶ διὰ τινῶν ἔσται, τούτῳ δὴ θεωρητέον.

The construction of the sentence is as follows: ἐπεὶ δὲ φανερῶν ἐκ τούτων μείζω [εἴναι] τὰ ἁγαθὰ ταύτα καὶ τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν τὴν τούτων ἢ τὴν τῶν ἄρετῶν [sc. ἕθεικαν ἢ πολεμικῶν χρῆσιν understood from ἀπόλαυσιν] καὶ οτι [αἱ ἄρεται] εἰσὶ δὲ αὐτῆν [sc. τὴν τούτων ἀπόλαυσιν].

Πῶς δὲ introduces the apodosis which is resumed in τούτῳ δὴ θεωρητέον.

ἄρετῶν goes back to διὰ τινων ἄρετῆς in the previous sentence.

15. 7. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ δημαρτηκέναι καὶ τὸν λόγον τῆς βελτίωτης ὑποθέσεως, καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ὑμων ἢξθαι.

The meaning of ἢξθαι is simply ‘trained;’ whether for good or evil depends on the sense given to ὑμων. Either 1)* ‘in the same i.e. a mistaken way’; or 2) ‘all the same’ = ‘nevertheless.’ The first is most in accordance with the context δημαρτηκέναι καὶ τὸν λόγον.
The καὶ is needlessly bracketed by Bekker in his 2nd edition.
‘For even reason (which we might least expect to err) is not infallible.’

15. 8. φανερῶν δὴ τοῦτῳ γε πρῶτων μὲν, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὡς ἡ γένεσις ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ τέλος ἀπὸ τινῶν ἀρχῆς ἄλλων τέλους: ὁ δὲ λόγος ἡμῶν καὶ ὁ νοῦς τῆς φύσεως τέλος.

1) *The connexion is as follows: ‘We have to consider whether men are to be trained by reason or by habit: Thus much is clear—that there is a succession of means and ends: every birth having a beginning and every end having a beginning in some other end; and the end of nature being reason and intelligence.’ That is to say: ‘In every birth there are previous elements and in like manner in the end or intellectual perfection of human nature other antecedents, such as education, are implied, which from other points of view are themselves ends.’
2) According to Susemihl the words are to be taken as follows: ‘It is clear that generation implies some antecedent principle and the end which springs from an antecedent principle is in turn relative to a further end.’ According to this way of taking the passage γένεσις in the 1st clause is equivalent to τέλος in the 2nd. Generation has an antecedent principle of which it is the end. The end which thus springs from an antecedent principle has a further end, namely, intelligence and reason. But two objections may be offered to this way of translating the words. a) τινός has no meaning. b) The less natural construction is adopted instead of the more natural. For ἄλλον τέλους would naturally depend upon the words which immediately precede, ἀπὸ τινός ἀρχῆς.

3) Once more, Mr. Postgate proposes to take the passage as follows: ‘So much then is evident—first here, as in other cases, coming into existence is the beginning of all, and what is the end, viewed from a certain beginning, is itself directed towards a further end.’ To this interpretation it may be objected that ἀπὸ ἀρχῆς is taken in a different sense from ἀπὸ τινός ἀρχῆς and that τῶν τέλους, as in the preceding explanation, is construed unnaturally.

See infra note on § 9.

τῶν χρησμῶν.

The oracle ‘μὴ τέμνε νέαν ἄλοκα’ which is found in the margin of two MSS. is probably made up from the context. Out of these words Göttling has constructed a hexamer ἄλλα νέας, Τροίζην, ἄλοκας μὴ τέμνε βαβείας. The equivocation may either consist in the double meaning of νέας ‘fallow ground’ (in Attic used for νεάς) and νέας ‘the young maiden;’ or the disputed point may have been only whether the oracle was to be taken literally or metaphorically.

dιὸ τὰς μὲν ἀρμόστει περὶ τὴν τῶν ὄκτωκαϊδεκα ἐτῶν ἠλικίαν συζευγώναι, 16. 9.

τοὺς δὲ ἐπτὰ καὶ τρίκοντα, ἡ μικρὸν.

The words ἡ μικρὸν probably mean ‘thereabouts’ or ‘nearby,’ like μικρῶ; or some word such as πλεῖον may have dropped out.

The disparity of age between the man and woman appears to be great; but as Aristotle extends the term for the women from 18 to 50, and for the men from 35 to 70 years, the time allowed
for cohabitation in either would nearly coincide, i.e. 35 and 32 years. There is therefore no reason for doubting the reading.

The relative ages to us appear singular. Malthus, On Population vol. i. p. 237, remarks that this regulation 'must of course condemn a great number of women to celibacy, as there never can be so many men of thirty-seven as there are women of eighteen.' But the real and great disparity is between the total number of women after eighteen and the total number of men after thirty-five.

Plato in the Republic (v. 460) makes the interval less. He assigns twenty to forty as the marriageable age for women: for men, from the time 'when they have passed the greatest speed of life' (twenty-five?) to fifty-five. In the Laws (iv. 721) the citizens are required to marry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five; but in another passage (772 D, E) between twenty-five and thirty-five.

In the History of Animals (Aristotle?) the age proper for marriage in men is limited to sixty, or at the utmost seventy; in women to forty, or at the utmost fifty.

16. 10. ἐτὶ δὲ ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων τοῖς μὲν ἁρχομένης ἐσται τῆς ἁκμῆς, εἰάν γίγνεται κατὰ λόγον εἴθες ἡ γένεσις, τοῖς δὲ ἡδή καταλελυμένης τῆς ἡλικίας πρὸς τῶν ἔθιομίκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμῶν.

According to this way of reckoning Aristotle seems to consider the prime of life to be thirty-five. The father having begun to keep house at thirty-five years of age would at seventy give up to the son, who might be expected to begin family life over again at thirty-five.

In speaking of the succession of children to their parents Aristotle takes account only of the fathers.

16. 10. τοῖς δὲ περὶ τὴν ὥραν χρόνους, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ χρῶται καλῶς καὶ νῦν, ὀρίσαντες χειμῶνος τὴν συναυλίαν ποιεῖσθαι ταῖτηρ.

Sc. δὲ οὖν τοὺς ποιῶν, taking δὲ from the previous sentence. The better MSS. read δὲ χρῆσθαι after χρόνους, but this is unnecessary, and the repetition of χρῶται after χρῆσθαι is unpleasant.

συναυλίαν, 'cohabitation' probably from αὐλή not from αὐλός.
καὶ αὐτοὺς ἔδη.

i.e. ‘themselves when they come to be parents as well as the writers on these subjects.’


διὰ δὲ πλῆθος τέκνων, εἰὼν ἡ τάξει τῶν ἐθῶν κωλύη, μηδὲν ἀποτίθεσθαι 16. 15. τῶν γεγομένων ὁμορρηγὰ γὰρ δὴ τῆς τεκνοποίησι τὸ πλῆθος. εἰὼν δὲ τις γίγνηται παρὰ ταύτα συνδυασθέντων, πρὶν αἰσθησιν ἐγγενεσθαι καὶ ᾠν, ἐμποιεῖσθαι δὲ τὴν ἀμβλουσιν.

‘But when there are too many children (for we have settled that there is to be a limit of population), they must not be exposed merely for this reason. If, however, it should happen that a couple exceed the number allowed by law, then abortion must be practised before sense and life have begun.’

ὁμορρηγὰ γὰρ δὴ . . . τὸ πλῆθος gives the reason for introducing the previous remark. ‘I speak of this because population has been limited.’ Cp. ii. 7. § 5, where Aristotle says that the legislator who fixes the amount of property should also fix the limit of population; and ii. 6. § 10, where he censures Plato for supposing that population will be kept down even if nothing is done to secure this object: and Rep. v. 461, where abortion and exposure are allowed, or in certain cases enforced; also a curious and interesting passage quoted from Musonius a Stoic philosopher (about 60 a.D.), by Stobaeus § 15. p. 450, in which he denounces abortion and similar practices as offences against Zeus the god of kindred.

Respecting the seven ages, see infra, note on c. 17. § 15; and 16. 17. for the regulations of Aristotle respecting marriage, the time after marriage, procreation and nursing of children and their early education, cp. Laws vii. 788–794.

οἰσθαί.

sc. δεῖ. To be gathered from the previous paragraph.

tὰς δὲ διατάσεις τῶν παιδῶν καὶ κλαυθμοὺς οὐκ ὄρθως ἀπαγορεύουσιν οἱ 17. 6. κωλύοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις συμφέρουσι γὰρ πρὸς αὐξήσιν.

vol. ii.
This is another misrepresentation of Plato, who only says that when children are silent they are pleased, and that they ought to have as little pain as possible in early childhood lest they grow up morose in character. ('When anything is brought to the infant and he is silent, then he is supposed to be pleased, but when he weeps and cries out, then he is not pleased. For tears and cries are the inauspicious signs by which children show what they love and hate.' Laws vii. 792 A). Yet the words εν τοις νόμος sufficiently show that Plato is the writer to whom Aristotle is referring.

tūs διασάεις, 'the passions or struggles,' a neutral word to be interpreted by καλαυμοί which follows.

17. 7. εἰλογον οὖν ἀπελαύνειν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκονσμάτων καὶ τῶν ἀραμάτων ἀνελευ-θερίαν καὶ τηλικούτων ὑστας.

A thought enlarged upon by Plato Rep. ii. 377 ff.

Bekker in his 1st edition has unnecessarily altered ἀνελευθερίαν, the reading of the majority of the MSS., into ἀνελευθερίας. In his 2nd edition he has substituted ἀνελευθηρίων, which has some MS. authority. Neither alteration is necessary; τηλικότων ὑστας may be taken as an accusative of the remotest object. ἀπελαύνειν has been altered by Susenmihl into ἀπολαβεῖν, a change which is partly grounded on a various reading ἀπολαύειν, and partly on the 'absumere' of the old translator.

καὶ τηλικούτων ὑστας. 1)* 'Even when they are at this early age,' i.e. although they are so young, care must be taken about what they see and hear; or 2) καὶ may be emphatic, 'especially at this early age when they cannot take care of themselves.'

17. 10. ἐπιμελέσ μὲν οὖν ἔστω τοῖς ἄρχοσι μηθὲν μὴ τὸ ἄγαλμα μητὲ γραφὴν εἰνὲν τοιούτων πράξεων μήπως, εἰ μὴ παρὰ τοῦς θεούς τοιούτως οἷς καὶ τῶν τωθασμῶν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος: πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὁρίζων ὁ νόμος τοῖς ἔχουσιν ἡλικίαν πλέον προῆκουσαν καὶ ἐπὲρ αὐτῶν καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν τιμαλβείν τοῖς θεοῖς.

οἷς καὶ τῶν τωθασμῶν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος. Such as the Phallic improvisation at the Dionysiac festival of which Aristophanes furnishes an imitation in the Acharnians 263 ff.

The words πρὸς δὲ τούτοις introduce a second exception: 'in-
decency may be allowed in the temples of certain Gods;’ ἔνα w ὑπὸ τοῦτος, ‘and also to persons of full age whom the law allows to worship in such temples.’ Cp. once more Plat. Rep. ii. 378: ‘The doings of Cronus, and the sufferings which his son in turn inflicted upon him, even if they were true, ought certainly not to be lightly told to young and simple persons; if possible, they had better be buried in silence. But if there is an absolute necessity for their mention, a chosen few might hear them in a mystery, and in order to reduce the number of hearers they should sacrifice not a common [Eleusinian] pig, but some huge and un procurable victim.’

17. 13.

A great Athenian actor and performer of Sophocles who took the part of Antigone: Aeschines was his triagonist who played Creon. Dem. Fal. Leg. 418. He is mentioned in the Rhetoric of Aristotle ii. 23. 1400 b. 16, iii. 13. 1414 b. 13.

οἱ γὰρ ταῖς ἐξομάτισι διαφορές τὰς ἡλικίας ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λέγουσιν οὐ 17. 15. καλῶς, δεὶ δὲ τῇ διαφορᾷ τῆς φύσεως ἐπακολουθεῖν.

It is uncertain whether we should read *οὐ καλῶς or οὐ κακῶς in this passage. The authority of the MSS. and the immediate context confirm the former. On the other hand οὐ κακῶς is the more idiomatic expression, and is not irreconcilable with the context:—‘Those who divide the ages of men by seven are not far wrong, and yet we should rather observe the divisions made by nature;’ or, ‘and we should observe the divisions made by nature, i.e. the divisions into sevens’ (Bergk 25). This is also confirmed by the passage in c. 16. § 17, αὐτῇ [sc. ἡ τῆς διανοίας ἤκμη] δ’ ἐστίν ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις ἡπτερ τῶν παντῶν τινές εἰρήκασιν οἱ μετροῦντες ταῖς ἐξομάτισι τῆς ἡλικίας, περὶ τῶν χρόνων τῶν πεντῆ-κορτα ἐτῶν.

It may be observed too that Aristotle himself in this passage divides ages by sevens—seven, fourteen (puberty), twenty-one.

The ‘sevens’ of Aristotle agree with the ‘sevens’ of Solon (?) in the years which he assigns to marriage (35) and to the highest development of the mind (49 or 50):—

Παῖς μὲν ἄνηδος ἔως ἐπὶ τῆς ἵνας ἥρκος ὄδφος τονον ἕν ἐπτ’ ἐτεσιν.

U 2
τοὺς δ' ἐτέρους ὅτε δὴ τελέσῃ θεὸς ἔπτε ἑυαυτοῦς,
ηθής ἐκφαίνει σήματα γεινομένης.
τῇ τριτάτῃ δὲ γένειον ἀξιομένων ἔτε γυνῶν
λαχνοῦται, χροίνη ἀνδρὸς ἀμειβομένης.
τῇ δὲ τετάρτῃ πᾶς τις ἐν ἐξιδομάδι μέγ' ἀριστος
ἰσχύω, ἤν τ' ἀνδρες σήματ' ἔχουσ' ἀρετής.
πέμπτῃ δ' ἀριστο, ἀνδρα γάμον μεμνημένον εἶναι
καὶ παιδίων ζητεῖν εἰσοπίσσω γενεήν.
τῇ δ' ἐκτῇ περὶ πάντα καταρτύεται νόος ἀνδρός,
οὸδ' ἐρείν ἔθ' ὁμώς ἔργ' ἀπάλαμα θελεί,
ἐπτα δὲ νοῦν καὶ γλώσσαν ἐν ἐξιδομάσιν μέγ' ἀριστος
ὀκτὼ τ'. ἀμφιστέρων τέσσαρα καὶ δέκτι ἐτη.
τῇ δ' ἐνίκη ἐτε μὲν δύναται, μαλακώτερα δ' αὐτοῦ
πρὸς μεγάλην ἀρετὴν γλώσσα τε καὶ σοφίαν.¹
τῇ δεκάτῃ δ' ὅτε δὴ τελέσῃ θεὸς ἔπτε ἑυαυτοῦς,
οὐκ δὲ ἀναφόρει ἐνω μοῖραν ἔχοι βασιλευ.


¹ al. lect. σώμα τε καὶ δύναμι.
BOOK VIII.

1. 2.

Here Susemihl has adopted παιδεύσθαι after Aretino's translation. But πολιτεύσθαι the reading of the Greek MSS. is also confirmed by William de Moerbek, 'politzare,' and is more in accordance with the context: 'For the life of the citizen should conform to the state, because the state is of one character, and this unity in the end of the state necessitates unity in the education of the citizens.'

φανερῶν ὅτι καὶ τὴν παιδείαν μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντων 1. 3. καὶ ταύτης τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν εἶναι κοινὴν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἑδίαν.

Cp. Nic. Eth. x. 9. § 14, κράτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ γίγνεσθαι κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ ὀρθὴν, where he goes on to show that public education can be best enforced, but that, since it is generally neglected, we must have recourse to private education, which moreover will take into account the peculiarities of the individual case; also that the education of individuals must be based upon general principles, and these are to be gathered from the science or art of legislation.

ἐπαινέσει εἴ τίς καὶ τούτο Λακεδαιμονίους· καὶ γὰρ πλέιστην ποιοῖται 1. 4. σπουδὴν περὶ τοὺς παιδας καὶ κοινὴ ταύτην.

Aristotle appears to praise the Lacedaemonians, not for the quality of their education (cp. infra c. 4), but for the circumstance that it was established by law. According to Isocrates Panath. 276 d, the Spartans fell so far below the general standard of education in Hellas, that they did not even know their letters, τοσοῦτον ἀπολελειμμένοι τῆς κοινῆς παιδείας καὶ φιλοσοφίας εἰσὶν ὡστ' οὐδὲ γράμματα μαθῶνοιν: and according to Plato, or rather according to the author of the Platonic Hippias Major (285 C), 'not many of them could count.'
καὶ τοῦτο. καὶ is found in all the MSS., and was the reading of Moerbeck. There is no difficulty in explaining it: 'One may praise the Lacedaemonians for this also,' as he has already praised their common use of property in ii. 5. § 7. Cp. Nic. Eth. x. 9. § 13, ἐν μάνῃ δὲ τῇ Λακεδαιμονίων πόλει μετ' ὀλίγων ὁ νομοθέτης ἐπιμελεῖαν δοκεῖ πεποίηται τροφῆς τε καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων.

2. 1. νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητεῖται περὶ τῶν ἔργων.
   'We are agreed about the necessity of a state education, but we differ about the subjects of education' or 'about the things to be done in education;' cp. infra § 3, τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἔργων καὶ τῶν ἀνελευθέρων.

2. 2. ἐκ δὲ τῆς ἐμποδών παιδείας.
   'The customary education' or 'the education which meets us in life'—without any idea of obstruction.

2. 2. ταραχῶδης ἡ σκέψις.
   'It is impossible to consider the theory of education apart from the prevalent custom; and it would be equally impossible even if we could frame a perfect theory to carry it out in practice.'

2. 2. τὰ περιττὰ.
   Lit. 'things in excess,' i.e. not included in the ordinary training either for life or virtue, in modern language 'the higher knowledge.'
   For the use of the word cp. ii. 6. § 6; Nic. Eth. vi. 7. § 4.

2. 2. κρητάς τως.
   Cp. for the use of the word De Anima i. 405 b. 8, πᾶντα τὰ σταθεῖα κρητήν ἐληφε πλὴρ τῆς γῆς, 'All these views have found approvers.'

2. 6. καταβεβλημέναι,
   'laid down and so established:' cp. c. 3. § 11, καταβεβλημέναι παιδεύματα. Cp. supra, ἡ ἐμποδών παιδεία.

2. 6. ἐπαρμενοτικῶν,
   'are of a double character,' partly liberal, partly illiberal.

3. 1. ἦστι δὲ τέταρτα κ.τ.λ.
   μονακῇ is here separated from γράμματα, which in Plato's Republic are included under it.
We may remark the form of sentence: ‘There are four;’ but the fourth is introduced with a qualification, τέταρτον ἐνω.

αὕτη γὰρ ἄρχὴ πάντων.

Not φύσις but ἡ σχολὴ, as is shown by the clause which follows, ἵνα καὶ πάλιν εἰπὼμεν περὶ αὐτῆς referring to vii. 15. §§ 1, 2, and perhaps to Nic. Eth. x. 6.

δῶς.

Either, 1) ‘the general question must be asked;’ or 2) *taking δῶς in an emphatic sense, ‘the question must be surely’ or ‘absolutely asked.’ In what follows §§ 3–6, Aristotle passes on to discuss the more general subjects of refreshments or relaxations, and returns to music in § 7.

But δῶς is only a conjecture of Victorius. All the MSS. read τέλος, except one (P’), which reads τελεταῖον. (Cp. the old trans. ‘finaliter.’) The reading τέλος gives a sufficient but not a very good sense (‘lastly’), nor can any objection be made to it on the ground that the word occurs in the following line with a different meaning. For such false echoes are not uncommon. Cp. συνάγειν, used in two senses, iv. 15. § 8, note.

τὴν ἐν τῇ διαγωγῇ σχολήν.

Cp. infra § 8, τὴν ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγῆν. The two expressions are nearly equivalent: 1) ‘the leisure occupied in διαγωγή;’ 2) ‘the διαγωγή of leisure.’ It is hard to find any satisfactory phrase in English to express what Aristotle throughout this book terms διαγωγή. The first sense of the word is that employment of leisure which becomes a gentleman (cp. πότερον παιδείαν ἢ παιδιάν ἢ διαγωγήν. εἰλάγως δ’ εἰς πάντα τάσσεται καὶ φαίνεται μετέχειν. ἢ τε γὰρ παιδιά χάριν ἀνάπαυσις ἐστὶ, τὴν δ’ ἀνάπαυσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑδείαν εἶναι (τῆς γὰρ διὰ τῶν πάνων λύπης λατρεία τις ἐστιν): καὶ τὴν διαγωγὴν ὀμολογομένως δεὶ μὴ μοῦν ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν ἄλλα καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν infra c. 5. §§ 9, 10). Further it is joined with φρόνησις (c. 5. § 4. init. πρὸς διαγωγήν συμβάλλεται τι καὶ φρόνησιν) and therefore seems to mean the rational or intellectual employment and enjoyment of leisure. It is always distinguished from παιδιά and ἀνάπαυσις ‘amusement’ and ‘relaxation,’ which are properly, not ends, but only means to renewed exertion (cp.
Nic. Eth. x. 6. § 6); and so means to means, whereas διαγωγή and σχολή are ends in themselves. The idea of 'culture,' implying a use of the intellect, not for the sake of any further end, but for itself, would so far correspond to διαγωγή.

3. 8. ἢν γὰρ οἶνται διαγωγὴν εἶναι τῶν ἑλευθέρων, ἐν τάιή τάττουσιν.

ἐν τάιή, sc. τῇ ἐν τῇ σχολῇ διαγωγῇ.

τάττουσιν, sc. αὐτῆν or music. 'They reckon music in that class of intellectual enjoyments which they suppose to be peculiar to freemen.'

3. 8. ἀλλ' οἶνον μὲν ἐστὶ καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαίτα θαλείν.

The line is not found in our Homer. There is no doubt that in the original θαλείν is to be taken with δαίτα; but it is probably quoted by Aristotle in reference to the Muse Thalia: and καλεῖν θελήν is said in the same way as καλέουσιν ἀδόν in the following quotation.

3. 11. ἡ γὰρ μουσικὴ τούτο ποιεῖ δήλον.

i.e. 'the fact that the ancients included music in education proves thus much, that they considered it a noble part of education';—they would not have included what was purely utilitarian.

4. 1. οἶ δὲ Λάκωνες ταύτην μὲν οὐχ ἡμαρτον τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, θηριώδεις δ' ἀπεργάζονται τοῖς πόνοις, ὡς τούτο πρὸς ἄνδρια μάλιστα συμφέρον.

'The Lacedaemonians do not run into the error of spoiling the frames of their children, but they spoil their characters.'

4. 2. εἰ τε καὶ πρὸς ταύτην, οὔδὲ τοῦτο ἐξευρίσκονται οὔτε γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐφοίτοις οὕτω ἐπὶ τῶν ἑθῶν ὁρῶμεν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἀκολουθοῦσαν τοῖς ἀγριωτάτοις, ἀλλὰ μάλλον τοῖς ἡμεροτάτοις καὶ λεοντόδεεσιν ἠθετου.

'And even if they train with a view to courage they do not attain to it; for courage is not to be found in brutal but in mild and lionlike natures, whether (the comparison is made) of animals or of barbarians.' Cp. Plat. Rep. ii. 375 and Aristotle's Criticism on this passage in the Politics vii. 7. §§ 5–8.

4. 3. τῶν ἑπειρωτικῶν ἑθῶν.

Not 'of Epirus,' which would be wholly disconnected from the
Pontus and could hardly have been described as in this state of savagery, nor as in the translation ‘there are other inland tribes,’ for the Achaeans are not inland tribes (unless indeed the tribes ‘about the Pontus’ are called continental with reference to the Mediterranean), but more accurately ‘other tribes on the mainland.’ For another mention of these cannibals in Aristotle, cp. Nic. Eth. vii. 5. § 2.

\[ \mu \eta \pi r\delta \varsigma \acute{a} \sigma k\alpha o\nu t\varsigma. \]

Said for \( \pi r\delta \varsigma \mu \eta \acute{a} \sigma k\alpha o\nu t\varsigma. \) But the fall of Sparta was not really due to the improvements of the other Hellenes in gymnastics; though the equal or superior military discipline of Macedon at last overpowered them.

The fall and decay of Sparta is a political lesson which greatly impresses Aristotle, cp. notes on vii. 11. § 8 and c. 14. § 16 ff.

So in modern times the superiority of nations has often been due to their superior organization. Those who organize first will be first victorious until others become in their turn better trained and prepared. By organization Frederick the Great crushed Austria, as she was afterwards crushed once more in 1866; again the military organization both of Prussia and Austria crumbled before Napoleon at Jena, as the French organization was in turn overpowered by the new military development of Germany in 1870. The Germans have still to prove, \( \epsilon i t e \tau \rho \tau o\nu s \nu e o\nu s \gamma \mu \nu \alpha \zeta e i n \tau o \nu \pi \tau \rho \omicron \omega \tau o\nu \tau \acute{o}t\omicron \delta i \acute{e}f\omicron r\omicron \nu, \epsilon i t e \tau \rho \ \mu \omicron \nu o\nu s \mu \eta \pi r\delta \varsigma \acute{a} \sigma k\alpha o\nu t\varsigma \acute{a} \sigma k\epsilon i \nu s. \)

\[ \dot{o}c \ f\rho a\i\nu \ \acute{o} \ \lambda \omicron \gamma o\nu s. \]

Cp. Plato (e.g. Phaedo 87 A, Soph. 238 B) for a similar personification of the argument.

A warning against overstraining of the faculties in youth which may be applied to the young student of modern times as well as to the young Olympic victor.

\[ \kappa a t a l a m b \acute{a} n e i n \ \tau \omicron \ \acute{h} \acute{i} k \acute{i} \acute{a} \upsilon . \]

‘To occupy,’ ‘engage,’ ‘employ.’

\[ \acute{i} n a \ \acute{\omega} \acute{\sigma} p e r \ \acute{e} n d \acute{o} s i m o n \ \gamma \acute{i} \nu \tau \acute{a} t \tau o\nu s \ \lambda \omicron \gamma o\nu s. \]

A musical term and therefore appropriately used in speaking of
music = 'the keynote,' 'that what we have to say may be a sort of keynote to any future discussion of the subject.' Cp. Arist. Rhet. iii. 14. § 1, 1414 b. 22, καὶ γὰρ οἱ αὐθεντικοί, ὃ τι ἀν ἐν ἐχωσιν αὐθεντικὸ τὸ τοῦ προαναφέραντες συνήχοι τῷ ἐνδοσίμῳ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς λόγοις δεὶ οὕτω γράφειν.

5. 2–4. Aristotle suggests three reasons which might be given for the cultivation of music:

1) παιδιᾶς καὶ ἀναστάτως ἐνεκα, like sleep, wine, dancing (cp. Nic. Eth. x. 6. § 6), amusement and relaxation being the means to renewed exertion.

2) Because of its influence on character. Hence its value in education (παιδεία).

3) πρὸς διαγωγήν καὶ φρόνησιν, as an end.

In c. 7. § 3 he speaks of music as being used for a) παιδεία, b) κάθαρσις, c) διαγωγή; a) corresponds to 2) of c. 5 (πρὸς τὴν παιδείαν), c) to 3).

This leaves b) κάθαρσις to correspond to the use of music as a relaxation, and would seem to show that Aristotle gave the lower meaning to κάθαρσις (i.e. 'purification' rather than 'purification'). Cp. c. 3. § 4, φαρμακίας χόρων, and c. 7. § 4, ὁσπέρ ιατρείαι τυχῶν καὶ καθάρσεως. See note on c. 7. § 3.

5. 2. καὶ ἄμα παύει μέριμναν, ὡς φησὶν Ἐυριπίδης.

Goettling and Bekker (in his second edition), against the authority of the MSS. of the Politics, have altered ἄμα παύει into ἀναστάτως, an unnecessary change, and unsupported by the MSS. of Euripides, which cannot be quoted on either side; for the citation, like many others in Aristotle, is inaccurate. The words referred to occur in Eur. Bacch. 380:—

δὲ [Βρόμος] τὰ δ' ἔχει,

θιασόντει τε χοροῖς

μετὰ τ' αὐλοῦ γέλασαι,

ἀποσαῦσαι τε μερίμνας.

5. 3. τάς τονοὺς αὐτήν.

Sc. εἰς παιδιῶν καὶ ἀνίπτασιν understood from the words preceding.

5. 3. Reading ὕπνοι for ὤψ, gathered from ὕπνοι καὶ μέθης supra, with
NOTES, BOOK VIII. 5.

Bekker's 2nd edition, but against the authority of all the MSS. and of William de Moerbek.

αλλα μην ουδε διαγωγην τε παισιν άρμοτει και τας ήλικιας οποδιδοιναι 5. 4.
tais toiautais.

The particle τε is not easily explained. It may be suggested either that 1) it should be omitted, or 2) should be changed into τι or τοις, or 3) that και φρόνησιν should be added after it from the corresponding words in § 4, ἡ πρῶς διαγωγὴν τι συμβάλλεται και φρόνησιν.

οιδενι γαρ ατελει προσηκει τελος. 5. 4.

A singular and almost verbal fancy. 'The imperfect is opposed to the perfect, and therefore the immature youth is not intended for reason and contemplation.' Yet the meaning of τελος is obscure, cp. infra §§ 12, 13, ἐπει δ' ἐν μὲν τῷ τέλει συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὀλγάκες γίνεσθαι.

§§ 5–8 are a series of ἀπορία which take the form of a sup-
pressed dialogue. 1) But a child may learn music with a view to a time when he will be grown up; 2) But why should he learn himself? 3) He will not appreciate unless he does; 4) Then why should he not learn cookery? 5) And how will his morals be improved by playing himself rather than by hearing others perform? Yet infra c. 6 these cobwebs are dashed aside; and it is acknowledged that the truer and deeper effect of music can only be produced on the mind by actual practice.

ἐστερ ποι Λάκωνες· ἐκεῖνοι γαρ οὐ μανθάνοντες ὄμως δύνανται κρίνειν 5. 7.
ὁρθως, ὥς φασί, τα χρηστα καὶ τα μῆ χρηστὰ τῶν μελῶν.

Cp. what Plato says of the 'timocratic man,' in Rep. viii. 548 E, αὐθαδέστερον τε δει αὐτὸν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἶναι καὶ ὑπομονοσύνετον, φιλόμουσον δε' καὶ φιλήκουν μὲν, ῥητορικὸν δ' οὐδαμῶς.

οὐ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἄδει καὶ κιβαριζει τοῖς πουηταῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ βαναϊσσου 5. 8.
καλοίμεν τοὺς τοιούτους.

In II. i. 603 it is Apollo, not Zeus, who plays to the assembly of the gods.

ἔχει γὰρ ίσως ἡδωρὴν τινα και τὸ τέλος, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν· ζητοῦτες 5. 13.
There is a finality about pleasure, which leads to a confusion with happiness. Like the greater end of life it comes after toil; it is sensible to the eye or feeling; it is the anticipation of what we know not what: no account can be given of it. ταύτην, sc. οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν, 'the higher pleasure;' ἐκείνην, 'the lower pleasure.'

5. 14. δὲ ἣν μὲν οὖν αὐτῶν κ.τ.λ.
Cp. Nic. Eth. vii. 13. § 6, ἀλλ' ἐπεί οὖς ἡ αὐτή οὐτὲ φύσις οὐθ' ἐξις ἡ ἀρίστη οὐτ' ἐστιν οὔτε δοκεῖ, οἰθ' ἠδονή διόκουσα τὴν αὐτὴν πάντες, ἠδονή μέντοι πάντες. Ἡςος δὲ καὶ διόκουσιν οὖς ἵνα οὖνται οὐθ' ἵν' ἢν φοίειν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτὴν πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θείων; ἀλλ' εἰλήφατι τὴν τοῦ ὁμόμορος κληρονομίαν αἱ σωματικαὶ ἠδοναὶ διὰ τὸ πλειστάκις τε παραβάλλειν εἰς αὐτὰς καὶ πάντας μετέχειν αὐτῶν: διὰ τὸ μόνας οὖν γνωρίμους εἶναι ταύτας μόνας οὖνται εἶναι.

5. 14. οὐ διὰ ταύτην μόνην,
sc. ἥτοιοισιν.

5. 17. έτι δὲ ἀκροώμενοι τῶν μμήσεων γίγνονται πάντες συμπαθεῖς, καὶ χωρίς τῶν μυθῶν καὶ τῶν μελῶν αὐτῶν.
i. e. 'any imitation, whether accompanied by rhythm or song or not, creates sympathetic feeling.'

5. 18. παρὰ τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις.
'Near to or not far removed from their true natures.'

5. 20. συμβεβηκέν δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν ὁμόωμα τοῖς ἡθείς, οἷον ἐν τοῖς ἄπτοις καὶ τοῖς γευστοῖς, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ὀρατοῖς ἥρμαι' σχήματα γὰρ ἐστὶ τοιαύτα, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μικρὸν, καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθή-
σεως κοινοῦσιν.
'As to the senses [other than the sense of hearing], objects of sight alone furnish representations of ethical character; (for figures are 1) objects of sight, or 2 *) are of an ethical character; but to a certain extent only, and this intellectual element (though feeble) is common to all.'

The obscurity of the passage has led to the insertion of οὐ before πάντες: but the construction is then abrupt and the meaning
thus obtained, ‘all do not participate in the sense of figure,’ would be a strange statement.

ἐτι δ’ οὖν ἐστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν, ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μάλλον.

5. 20.

‘Yet such figures and colours (which have been previously called representations) are not really representations but more truly signs and indications.’

οὐ μὴν ἀλλ’ ὅσον διαφέρει καὶ περὶ τῆς τούτων θεωρίαν, δεὶ μὴ τὰ 5. 21.

Παῦσωνος θεωρεῖν τοὺς νέους, ἀλλὰ τὰ Πολυγνώτου καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλος τῶν
gραφέων ἢ τῶν ἄγαλματοποιῶν ἦστιν ἡλικῶς.

Cp. Poetics 2. 1448 a. 5, Πολυγνώτος μὲν γὰρ κρείττους, Παῦσων δὲ
χείρους, Διονύσιος δὲ ὁμοίους ἐίκαζεν.

ἐν δὲ τῶν μέλεων αὐτοῖς.

5. 21.

‘But though hardly discernible in painting we have the very expression of the feeling in music.’

καὶ τοῖς μυθικῶς εἴναι.

5. 25.

Bekker in his 2nd edition has inserted πρὸς τὴν ψύχην before εἴναι. Cp. a reading which is confirmed by one MS. of the old translator, ‘cognatio ad animam.’ Aretino’s translation suggests ἡμῖν, but the same sense can be got out of the Greek as it stands, ἡμῖν (or πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν) being supplied from τὴν φύσιν τὴν τηλεικὰτην
or οἱ νέοι in the previous sentence.

For the doctrine that the soul is a harmony, cp. Plat. Phaedo 86, 92–95; Timaeus 35, 36.

ἀπεργάζεσθαι τὸ λεχθὲν,
sc. τὸ ποιεῖν βαναύσουσις.

6. 6.

πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρῆσεις ἡδῆ, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαθήσεις ὑπερευ.

6. 6.

Though there is no variation in the MSS., or in the old translator, there seems to be a corruption in this passage. Susemihl transposes χρῆσεις and μαθήσεις. Goetling omits both. If retained in their present order, they must be translated as in the text, and may be supposed to mean that practice precedes theory. In the Republic practical life precedes philosophical leisure, and at the end of the Ethics (x. 9. § 20) Aristotle says that the sophist
having no experience of politics cannot teach them (cp. Plat. Tim. 19 D).

But a fatal objection to this way of interpreting the passage is the word μαθησις, which elsewhere in this chapter, and even in the next sentence, means ‘early education,’ not ‘mature philosophical speculation.’

6. 7. Compare Plat. Rep. ii. 411. In the Laws vii. 810 he limits the time allowed for the study of music to three years.

6. 10. τῷ λόγῳ.
‘Speech,’ as in bk. i. 2. § 10.

6. 11. The singular outburst of intellectual life at Athens, which we may well believe to have arisen after the Persian War, belongs to a period of Greek history known to us only from the very short summary of Athenian history contained in a few pages of Thucydides. It was the age of Pindar and Simonides and Phrynichus and Aeschylus, of Heraclitus and Parmenides, of Protagoras and Gorgias.

6. 12. Ἐκφαντίδη.
A very ancient comic poet who flourished in the generation before Aristophanes.

6. 15. ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν τε ὑγίνων κ.τ.λ.
This, like many other sentences beginning with ἐπεί, is an anacoluthon, of which the real apodosis is to be found in the words διὸ ὅτε οὐ τῶν ἐλευθέρων κρίνομεν εἶναι τὴν ἑργασίαν ἀλλὰ θητεκτέραν.

7. 1. ἦ τρίτων δὲι τινὰ ἑτέρων.
Three alternatives are given: 1) Shall we use all the harmonies and rhythms in education? 2) Shall we make the same distinctions about them in education which are made in other uses of them? Or 3) Shall we make some other distinction?

τρίτων δέι has been suspected. τρίτων is certainly not symmetrical because it introduces not a third case but a subdivision of the second case. Yet other divisions in Aristotle are unsymmetrical (cp. supra c. 3. § 1 and vii. §§ 1–4).
νομικώς.

'After the manner of a law,' i. e. ἐν τῷ ἄρχου explained by the words which follow.

τὰ μὲν ἡθικὰ τὰ δὲ πρακτικὰ τὰ δὲ ἐνθουσιαστικὰ τιθέντες.

These distinctions are but feebly represented by modern styles; the first is in some degree analogous to sacred music, the second to military music, and the third to the music of the dance.

πρὸς ἄλλο μέρος,
sc. τῆς ψυχῆς or *τῶν μελῶν.

τί δὲ λέγομεν τὴν κάθαρσιν, νῦν μὲν ἀπλῶς, πάλιν δὲ ἐν τοῖς περὶ 7. 3.

ποιητικὴς ἔροιμεν σαφέστερον.

This promise is very imperfectly fulfilled in the short allusion to κάθαρσις in Poet. c. 6.

dιό ταῖς μὲν τοιαύταις ἀρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις μέλεις θετῶν τοὺς τὴν 7. 6.

θεατρικὴν μουσικὴν μεταχειριζόμενους ἀγωνιστάς.

'Therefore it is for such harmonies and for such melodies that we must establish the competitions of musical performers,' i. e. we must leave such strains of art to regular performers.

παρακεχρωσμένα.

παρακρῶσεις are explained to mean 'deviations from the received scale in music.'

ὁ δὲ ἐν τῇ πολειτείᾳ Σωκράτης οὐ καλῶς τὴν φρυγικὰ μόνην καταλείπει 7. 9.

μετὰ τῆς δωριστί, καὶ ταῦτα ἀποδοκιμάσας τῶν ὄργανων τῶν αἰθέων.

This criticism of Plato appears to be just.

καὶ διώτι Φιλόξενος ἐγχειρήσας ἐν τῇ δωριστί ποιήσαι διδύμαιδον τοῦς 7. 11.

μύθους.

The emendation Μύθους (adopted by Bekker in his 2nd edition) is unnecessary. The words may also mean 'to compose a dithyramb called the "Fables."' Whether fables could be written in a dithyrambic form or not, the difficulty which Philoxenus experienced was of another kind: what he found hopeless was the
attempt to compose dithyrambic poetry adapted to the severe Dorian music.

7. 15. δῆλον ὅτι τούτους ὅρους τρεῖς

is abruptly expressed and possibly something may be omitted. The general meaning is 'that if there be a harmony suited to the young it must be tested by the three principles of education; the mean, the possible, the becoming.'

7. 15. Without assuming that Aristotle wrote a complete treatise on the subject of education, in which he includes gymnastic, music, drawing, and literature (cp. c. 3. § 1), it is hard to imagine that, if the work had received from his hands its present form, he would have broken off in this abrupt manner.
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