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
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Editor: [Sir William Molesworth](#)

About This Title:

Vol. 2 of Hobbes' translation. Thucydides was one of the greatest of the ancient Greek historians because of his attention to accurate research. His account of the 5th century BC struggle between Athens and Sparta is one of the first works of history to combine political and ethical reflections with history writing.

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


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THE FIFTH BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES

THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS.

The former year's truce ended, Cleon warreth on the Chalcidic cities, and recovereth Torone.—Phæax is sent by the Athenians to move a war amongst the Sicilians.—Cleon and Brasidas, who were on both sides the principal maintainers of the war, are both slain at Amphipolis.—Presently after their death a peace is concluded: and after that again, a league between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians.—Divers of the Lacedæmonian confederates hereat discontented, seek the confederacy of the Argives. These make league, first with the Corinthians, Eleians, and Mantineans: then with the Lacedæmonians: and then again, by the artifice of Alcibiades, with the Athenians.—After this the Argives make war upon the Epidaurians: and the Lacedæmonians upon the Argives.—The Athenian captains and the Melians treat by way of dialogue touching the yielding of Melos: which the Athenians afterwards besiege and win.—These are the acts of almost six years more of the same war.

1. The summer following, the truce for a year, which was to last till the Pythian holidays¹, expired. During this truce, the Athenians removed the Delians out of Delos, because [though they were consecrated, yet] for a certain crime committed of old they esteemed them polluted persons¹: because also they thought there wanted this part to make perfect the purgation of the island; in the purging whereof, as I declared before², they thought they did well to take up the sepulchres of the dead. These Delians seated themselves afterwards, every one as he came, in Adramyttium in Asia, a town given unto them by Pharnaces.

year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 2. 3. The truce for a year expired.

year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 2. 3. The Delians removed out of Delos upon superstition.

The Delians seat themselves in Adramyttium.

Cleon goeth out with an army into the parts upon Thrace:

he assaulteth Torone.

year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 2. 3. Pasitelidas with the garrison of the town endeavoureth to defend it.

Cleon taketh Torone.

2. After the truce was expired, Cleon prevailed with the Athenians to be sent out with a fleet against the cities lying upon Thrace. He had with him of Athenians twelve hundred men of arms and three hundred horsemen; of confederates more; and thirty galleys. And first arriving at Scione, which was yet besieged, he took aboard some men of arms of those that kept the siege; and sailed into the haven of the Colophonians, not far distant from the city of Torone. And there having heard by fugitives that Brasidas was not in Torone, nor those within sufficient to give him battle, he marched with his army to the city, and sent ten of his galleys about into the haven. And first he came to the new wall, which Brasidas had raised about the city to take in the suburbs: making a breach in the old wall, that the whole might be one city. 3. And Pasitelidas, a Lacedæmonian, captain of the town, with the garrison there present came to the defence, and fought with the Athenians that assaulted it. But being oppressed, and the galleys which were before sent about being by this time come into the haven, Pasitelidas was afraid lest those galleys should take the town, unfurnished of defendants, before he could get back, and that the Athenians on the other side should win the wall, and he be intercepted between them both: and thereupon abandoned the wall, and ran back into the city. But the Athenians that were in the galleys having taken the town before he came, and the land-army following in after him without resistance and entering the city by the breach of the old wall, slew some of the Peloponnesians and Toronæans on the place, and some others, amongst whom was the captain Pasitelidas, they took alive. Brasidas was now coming with aid towards Torone: but advertised by the way that it was already lost, went back again; being about forty furlongs short of preventing it. Cleon and the Athenians erected two trophies, one at the haven, another at the wall. The women and children of the Toronæans, they made slaves; but the men of Torone and the Peloponnesians, and such Chalcideans as were amongst them, in all about seven hundred, they sent away prisoners to Athens. The Peloponnesians were afterwards at the making of the peace dismissed; the rest were redeemed by the Olynthians, by exchange of man for man.

Pasitelidas, a Lacedæmonian captain, taken alive.

Seven hundred men sent prisoners to Athens.

year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 2. 3. Panactum taken by the Bœotians.

About the same time the Bœotians took Panactum, a fort of the Athenians standing in their confines, by treason.

Cleon, after he had settled the garrison in Torone, went thence by sea about the mountain Athos [to make war] against Amphipolis.

Cleon goeth to Amphipolis.

Phæax sent ambassador to the Sicilians.

The Leontine commons driven out of the city by the Syracusians.

The Leontine nobility become Syracusians,

4. About the same time Phæax the son of Erasistratus, who with two others was sent ambassador into Italy and Sicily, departed from Athens with two galleys. For the Leontines, after the Athenians upon the making of the peace were gone out of Sicily, received many strangers into the freedom of their city: and the commons had a purpose also to have made division of the land¹. But the great men perceiving it, called in the Syracusians, and drave the commons out: and they wandered up and down, every one as he chanced; and the great men, upon conditions agreed on with the Syracusians, abandoning and deserting² that city, went to dwell with the privilege of free citizens in Syracuse. After this again, some of them upon dislike relinquished Syracuse, and seized on Phocææ, a certain place part of the city of the Leontines, and upon Bricinnia, a castle in the Leontine territory. Thither also came unto them most of the commons that had before been driven out: and settling themselves, made war from those places of strength. Upon intelligence hereof the Athenians sent Phæax thither, to persuade their confederates there, and, if they could, all the Sicilians jointly, to make war upon the Syracusians, that were now beginning to grow great; to try if they might thereby preserve the common people of the Leontines. Phæax arriving, prevailed with the Camarinæans and Agrigentines: but the business finding a stop at Gela, he went unto no more, as conceiving he should not be able to persuade them. So he returned through the cities of the Siculi unto Catana, having been at Bricinnia by the way and there encouraged them to hold out: and from Catana he set sail and departed. 5. In his voyage to Sicily, both going and coming, he dealt as he went by with sundry cities also of Italy, to enter into friendship with the Athenians. He also lighted on those Locrians, which¹ having dwelt once in Messana, were afterwards driven out again; being the same men, which after the peace in Sicily, upon a sedition in Messana, wherein one of the factions called in the Locrians, had been then sent to inhabit there, [and now were sent away again]: for the Locrians held Messana for a while. Phæax therefore chancing to meet with these as they were going to their own city, did them no hurt: because the Locrians had been in speech with him about an agreement with the Athenians. For when the Sicilians made a general peace, these only of all the confederates refused to make any peace at all with the Athenians. Nor indeed would they have done it now, but that they were constrained thereunto by the war they had with the Itoneans and Melæans, their own colonies and borderers. And Phæax after this returned to Athens.

and go to Syracuse to dwell.

The Leontines make war on the Syracusians.

year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 2. 3. Phæax moveth the Sicilians to war upon the Syracusians.

The Gelans stop the motion made by Phæax.

Phæax maketh peace with the Locrians.

year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 2. 3. Cleon maketh war on Amphipolis.

Galepsus taken by Cleon.

Brasidas sitteth down over against Cleon at Cerdylum

6. Cleon, who¹ was now gone from Torone and come about to Amphipolis, making Eion the seat of the war, assaulted the city of Stageirus, a colony of the Andrians; but could not take it: but Galepsus, a colony of the Thasians, he took by assault. And having sent ambassadors to Perdiccas, to will him to come to him with his forces according to the league, and other ambassadors into Thrace unto Polles, king of the Odomantians, to take up as many mercenary Thracians as he could; he lay still in Eion to expect their coming. Brasidas upon notice hereof, sat down over against him at Cerdylum. This is a place belonging to the Argilians, standing high and beyond the river, not far from Amphipolis; and from whence he might discern all that was about him. So that Cleon could not but be seen, if he should rise with his army to go against Amphipolis; which he expected he would do, and that in contempt of his small number he would go up with the forces he had then present. Withal he furnished himself with fifteen hundred mercenary Thracians, and took unto him all his Edonians, both horsemen and targetiers. He had also of Myrcinians and Chalcideans a thousand targetiers, besides them in Amphipolis. But for men of arms, his whole number was at the most² two thousand, and of Grecian horsemen three hundred. With fifteen hundred of these came Brasidas and sat down at Cerdylum: the rest stood ready ordered with Clearidas their captain, within Amphipolis.

The forces of Brasidas.

year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 3. Cleon goeth up to Amphipolis against his own mind.

7. Cleon for a while¹ lay still; but was afterwards forced to do as was expected by Brasidas. For the soldiers being angry with their stay there, and recounting with themselves what a command his would be, and with what ignorance and cowardice against what skill and boldness of the other, and how they came forth with him against their wills: he perceived their muttering, and being unwilling to offend them with so long a stay in one place, dislodged and led them forward. And he took the same course there, which having succeeded well before at Pylus gave him cause to think himself to have some judgment. For he thought not that any body would come forth to give him battle, and gave out he went up principally to see the place: and stayed for greater forces, not to secure him in case he should be compelled to fight, but that he might therewith environ the city on all sides at once, and in that manner take it by force. So he went up and set his army down on a strong hill before Amphipolis, standing himself to view the fens of the river Strymon and the situation of the city towards Thrace: and thought he could have retired again at his pleasure, without battle. For neither did any man appear upon the walls, nor come out of the gates: which were all fast shut. Insomuch as he thought he had committed an error in coming² without engines: because he thought he might by such means have won the city, as being without defendants. 8. Brasidas, as soon as he saw the Athenians remove, came down also from Cerdylum and put himself into Amphipolis. He would not suffer them to make any sally, nor to face the Athenians in order of battle, mistrusting his own forces, which he thought inferior, not in number (for they were in a manner equal) but in worth: (for such Athenians as were there were pure¹, and the Lemnians and Imbrians which were amongst them were of the very ablest): but prepared to set upon them by a wile. For if he should have showed to the enemy both his number and their armour, such as for the present they were forced

Cleon, not expecting a sally, vieweth the situation of the town.

year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 3. Brasidas putteth himself into Amphipolis.

A stratagem of Brasidas.

to use, he thought that thereby he should not so soon get the victory, as by keeping them out of sight and out of their contempt till the very point². Wherefore choosing to himself a hundred and fifty men of arms, and committing the charge of the rest to Clearidas, he resolved to set suddenly upon them before they should retire: as not expecting to take them so alone another time, if their succours chanced to arrive. And when he had called his soldiers together to encourage them and to make known unto them his design, he said as followeth:

9. “Men of Peloponnesus, as for your country, how by valour it hath ever retained her liberty, and that being Dorians you are now to fight against Ionians, of whom you were ever wont to get the victory, let it suffice that I have touched it thus briefly. But in what manner I intend to charge¹, that I am now to inform you of: lest the venturing by few at once, and not altogether, should seem to proceed from weakness, and so dishearten you. I do conjecture that it was in contempt of us, and as not expecting to be fought withal, that the enemy both came up to this place, and that they have now betaken themselves carelessly and out of order to view the country. But he that best observing such errors in his enemies, shall also to his strength give the onset, not always openly and in ranged battle, but as is best for his present advantage, shall for the most part attain his purpose. And these wiles carry with them the greatest glory of all, by which, deceiving most the enemy, a man doth most benefit his friends. Therefore whilst they are secure without preparation, and intend, for aught I see, to steal away rather than to stay: I say, in this their looseness of resolution, and before they put their minds in order, I for my part with those I have chosen will, if I can, before they get away fall in upon the midst of their army running. And you, Clearidas, afterwards, as soon as you shall see me to have charged and, as it is probable, to have put them into affright, take those that are with you, both Amphipolitans and all the rest of the confederates, and setting open the gates run out upon them, and with all possible speed come up to stroke of hand. For there is great hope this way to terrify them; seeing they which come after, are ever of more terror to the enemy than those that are already present and in fight. And be valiant, as is likely you should that are a Spartan: and you, confederates, follow manfully, and believe that the parts of a good soldier are willingness, sense of shame, and obedience to his leaders; and that this day you shall either gain yourselves liberty by your valour, and to be called confederates of the Lacedæmonians, or else not only to serve the Athenians yourselves, and at the best, if you be not led captives, nor put to death, to be in greater servitude than before¹, but also to be the hinderers of the liberty of the rest of the Grecians. But be not you cowards, seeing how great a matter is at stake: and I, for my part, will make it appear that I am not more ready to persuade another, than to put myself into action.”

the oration of brasidas to his soldiers.

year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 3. Oration of Brasidas.

year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 3. Oration of Brasidas.

Brasidas prepareth to assault the army of the Athenians.

year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 3. Cleon is

10. When Brasidas had thus said, he both prepared to go out himself, and also placed the rest that were with Clearidas before the gates called the Thracian gates, to issue forth afterwards as was appointed. Now Brasidas having been in sight when he came down from Cerdylum, and² again when he sacrificed in the city, by the temple of Pallas, which place might be seen from without; it was told Cleon [whilst Brasidas was ordering of his men] (for he was at this time gone off a little to look about him), that the whole army of the enemies was plainly to be discerned within the town, and that the feet of many men and horses, ready to come forth, might be discerned from under the gate. Hearing this, he came to the place: and when he saw it was true, being not minded to fight until his aids arrived, and yet making no other account but that his retreat would be discovered¹, he commanded at once to give the signal of retreat, and² that as they went the left wing should march foremost, which was the only means they had to withdraw towards Eion. But when he thought they were long about it, causing the right wing to wheel about and lay open their disarmed parts to the enemy, he led away the army himself. Brasidas at the same time, having spied his opportunity and that the army of the Athenians removed, said to those about him and the rest: “these men stay not for us; it is apparent by the wagging of their spears and of their heads: for where such motion is, they use not to stay for the charge of the enemy: therefore open me some body the gates appointed, and let us boldly and speedily sally forth upon them”. Then he went out himself at the gate towards the trench³, and which was the first gate of the long wall, which then was standing; and at high speed took the straight way, in which, as one passeth by the strongest part of the town⁴, there standeth now a trophy: and charging upon the midst of the Athenian army, which was terrified both with their own disarray and the valour of the man, forced them to fly. And Clearidas, as was appointed, having issued out by the Thracian gates, was withal coming upon them. And it fell out that the Athenians, by this unexpected and sudden attempt, were on both sides in confusion: and the left wing which was next to Eion, and which indeed was marching away before, was immediately broken off from the rest of the army and fled. When that was gone, Brasidas coming up to the right wing, was there wounded¹. The Athenians saw not when he fell: and they that were near took him up and carried him off. The right wing stood longer to it: and though Cleon himself presently fled, (as at first he intended not to stay), and was intercepted by a Myrcinian targetier and slain², yet his men of arms casting themselves into a circle on the [top of a little] hill, twice or thrice resisted the charge of Clearidas: and shrunk not at all, till begirt with the Myrcinian and Chalcidean horse and with the targetiers, they were put to flight by their darts. Thus the whole army of the Athenians, getting away with much ado over the hills and by several ways, all that were not slain upon the place or by the Chalcidean horse and targetiers, recovered Eion. The other side taking up Brasidas out of the battle, and¹ having so long kept him alive, brought him yet breathing into the city: and he knew that his side had gotten the victory, but expired shortly after. When Clearidas with the

admonished of a sally towards:

and leadeth his army back.

Brasidas taketh this opportunity for his sally.

year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 3.

Brasidas is wounded and falleth.

Cleon flieth, and is slain.

Brasidas his army getteth the victory.

year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 3. Brasidas liveth only so long as to know he had the victory.

rest of the army were returned from pursuit of the enemy, they rifled those that were slain, and erected a trophy.

11. After this the confederates, following the corpse of Brasidas all of them in their arms, buried him in the city² at the public charge; in the entrance of that which is now the market-place. And the Amphipolitans afterwards, having taken in his monument with a wall, killed³ unto him as to a hero, honoured him with games and anniversary sacrifice, and attributed their colony unto him as to the founder; pulling down the edifices of Agnon, and defacing whatsoever monument might maintain the memory of his foundation. This they did both for that they esteemed Brasidas for their preserver; and also because at this time, through fear of the Athenians, they courted the Lacedæmonians for a league. As for Agnon, because of their hostility with the Athenians, they thought it neither expedient for them to give him honours, nor that they would be acceptable unto him if they did. The dead bodies they rendered to the Athenians: of whom there were slain about six hundred, and but seven of the other side, by reason that it was no set battle, but fought upon such an occasion and precedent affright. After the dead were taken up, the Athenians went home by sea; and Clearidas and those with him stayed to settle the estate of Amphipolis.

The honour done to Brasidas after his death.

year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 3.

12. About the same time of the summer now ending, Ramphias, Autocharidas, and Epicydidas, Lacedæmonians, were leading a supply towards the parts upon Thrace of nine hundred men of arms: and when they were come to Heracleia in Trachinia, they stayed there to amend such things as they thought amiss. Whilst they stayed, this battle was fought: and the summer ended.

Supplies going to Brasidas stay by the way at Heracleia.

The end of the tenth summer.

13. The next winter, they that were with Ramphias went presently forward, as far as [the hill] Pierium in Thessaly. But the Thessalians forbidding them to go on, and Brasidas, to whom they were carrying this army, being dead, they returned homewards: conceiving that the opportunity now served not, both because the Athenians were upon this overthrow gone away, and for that they themselves were unable to perform any of those designs which the other had intended. But the principal cause of their return was this: that they knew at their coming forth, that the Lacedæmonians had their minds more set upon a peace than war. 14. Presently after the battle of Amphipolis and return of Rhamphias out of Thessaly, it fell out that neither side did any act of war, but were inclined rather to a peace: the Athenians for the blow they had received at Delium, and this other a little after at Amphipolis; and because they had no longer that confident hope in their strength, on which they relied when formerly they refused the peace, as having conceived upon their present success that they should have had the upper hand; also they stood in fear of their own confederates, lest emboldened by these losses of theirs they should more and more revolt; and repented that they made not the peace after

The supplies going to Brasidas, hearing of his death, return to Lacedæmon.

year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 3. The Athenians and Lacedæmonians incline to peace.

The causes why the Athenians desired peace.

The causes why the Lacedæmonians desired peace.

year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 3.

their happy success at Pylus, when occasion was offered to have done it honourably: and the Lacedæmonians on the other side did desire peace, because the war had not proceeded as they expected; for they had thought they should in a few years have warred down the power of Athens, by wasting their territory; and because they were fallen into that calamity in the island, the like whereof had never happened unto Sparta before¹; because also their country was continually ravaged by those of Pylus and Cythera, and their Helotes continually fled to the enemy; and because they feared lest those which remained, trusting in them that were run away, should in this estate of theirs raise some innovation, as at other times before they had done. Withal it happened, that the thirty years' peace¹ with the Argives was now upon the point of expiring; and the Argives would not renew it without restitution made them of Cynuria: so that to war against the Argives and the Athenians, both at once, seemed impossible. They suspected also that some of the cities of Peloponnesus would revolt to the Argives: as indeed it came afterwards to pass.

15. These things considered, it was by both parts thought good to conclude a peace; but especially by the Lacedæmonians, for the desire they had to recover their men taken in the island. For the Spartans that were amongst them, were both of the prime men² of the city, and their kinsmen. And therefore they began to treat presently after they were taken: but the Athenians, by reason of their prosperity, would not lay down the war at that time on equal terms. But after their defeat at Delium, the Lacedæmonians, knowing they would be apter now to accept it, made that truce for a year, during which they were to meet and consult about a longer time.

16. But when also this other overthrow happened to the Athenians at Amphipolis, and that both Cleon and Brasidas were slain: the which on either side were most opposite to the peace; the one, for that he had good success and honour in the war; the other, because in quiet times his evil actions would more appear and his calumniation be the less believed¹: those two that in the two states aspired most to be chief, Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, and Nicias the son of Niceratus, who in military charges had been the most fortunate of his time, did most of all other desire to have the peace go forward. Nicias, because he was desirous, having² hitherto never been overthrown, to carry his good fortune through, and to give both himself and the city rest from their troubles for the present; and for the future to leave a name, that in all his time he had never made the commonwealth miscarry; which he thought might be done by standing out of danger, and by putting himself as little as he might into the hands of fortune; and to stand out of danger is the benefit of peace. Pleistoanax had the same desire, because of the imputation laid upon him about his return from exile by his enemies, that suggested unto the Lacedæmonians upon every loss they received, that the same befel them for having, contrary to the law, repealed his banishment. For they charged him further, that he and his brother Aristocles had suborned the prophetess of Delphi, to answer the deputies¹ of the Lacedæmonians, when they came

year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 3. Cleon and Brasidas opposers of the peace for several ends.

Pleistoanax and Nicias persuaders to peace.

Nicias his ends in seeking peace.

The reason why Pleistoanax desired the peace.

year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 3.

year x. A. C. 422. Ol. 89. 3.

Pleistoanax banished for withdrawing his army out of Attica.

thither, most commonly with this: “that they should bring back the seed of the semigod, the son of Jupiter, out of a strange country into his own: and that if they did not, they should plough their land with a silver plough”: and so at length to have made the Lacedæmonians nineteen years after, with such dances and sacrifices as they who were the first founders of Lacedæmon had ordained to be used at the enthroning of their kings, to fetch him home again; who lived in the meantime in exile in the mountain Lycæum, in a house whereof the one half was part of the temple of Jupiter, for fear of the Lacedæmonians, as being suspected to have taken a bribe to withdraw his army out of Attica. 17. Being troubled with these imputations, and considering with himself, there being no occasion of calamity in time of peace, and the Lacedæmonians thereby recovering their men, that he also should cease to be obnoxious to the calumniations of his enemies; whereas in war, such as had charge could not but be quarrelled upon their losses: he was therefore forward to have the peace concluded.

And this winter they fell to treaty, and withal the Lacedæmonians braved them with a preparation already making against the spring,¹ sending to the cities about for that purpose, as if they meant to fortify in Attica: to the end that the Athenians might give them the better ear. When after many meetings and many demands on either side, it was at last agreed that peace should be concluded, each part rendering what they had taken in the war, save that the Athenians should hold Nisæa: (for when they [likewise] demanded Plataea, and the Thebans answered that it was neither taken by force nor by treason, but rendered voluntarily, the Athenians said that they also had Nisæa in the same manner): the Lacedæmonians calling together their confederates; and all but the Bœotians, Corinthians, Eleians, and Megareans, (for these disliked it), giving their votes for the ending of the war; they concluded the peace, and confirmed it to the Athenians with sacrifice, and swore it, and the Athenians again unto them, upon these articles:

The Lacedæmonians desiring the peace, make show of war.

Peace concluded

year x. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. The Bœotians, Corinthians, Eleians, and Megareans, refuse to be comprehended.

18. “The Athenians, and Lacedæmonians, and their confederates, have made peace, and sworn it city by city, as followeth:

the articles of the peace between the athenians and the lacedæmonians.

“Touching the public temples, it shall be lawful to whomsoever will, to sacrifice in them, and to have access unto them, and to ask counsel of the oracles in the same, and to send their deputies unto them, according to the custom of his country, securely both by sea and land.

“The whole place consecrate and temple of Apollo in Delphi, and Delphi itself, shall be governed by their own law, taxed by their own state, and judged by their own judges, both city and territory, according to the institution of the place¹.

year x. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. Articles of the peace between the

“ The peace shall endure between the Athenians with their confederates, and the Lacedæmonians with their confederates, for fifty years, both by sea and land, without fraud and without harmdoing.

Athenians and the Lacedæmonians.

“It shall not be lawful to bear arms with intention of hurt, neither for the Lacedæmonians and their confederates against the Athenians, nor for the Athenians and their confederates against the Lacedæmonians, by any art or machination whatsoever: if any controversy shall arise between them, the same shall be decided by law and by oath, in such manner as they shall agree on.

“The Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall render Amphipolis to the Athenians: the inhabitants of whatsoever city the Lacedæmonians shall render unto the Athenians, shall be at liberty to go forth whither they will with bag and baggage.

“ Those cities which paid the tribute taxed in the time of Aristides,¹ continuing to pay it, shall be governed by their own laws. And now that the peace is concluded, it shall be unlawful for the Athenians or their confederates to bear arms against them, or to do them any hurt, as long as they shall pay the said tribute: the cities are these: Argilus, Stageirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, Spartolus; and they shall be confederates of neither side, neither of the Lacedæmonians nor of the Athenians; but if the Athenians can persuade these cities unto it, then it shall be lawful for the Athenians to have them for confederates, having gotten their consent.

year x. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. Articles of the peace between the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians.

“The Mecybernæans, Sanæans, and Singæans, shall inhabit their own cities on the same conditions with the Olynthians and Acanthians.

“The Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall render Panactum unto the Athenians.

“ And the Athenians shall render to the Lacedæmonians Coryphasium, Cythera, Methone, Pteleum, and Atalante: they shall likewise deliver whatsoever Lacedæmonians are in the prison of Athens, or in any prison of what place soever in the Athenian dominion: and dismiss all the Peloponnesians besieged in Scione, and all¹ that Brasidas did there put in, and whatsoever confederates of the Lacedæmonians are in prison, either at Athens or in the Athenian state.

year x. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. Articles of the peace between the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians.

“And the Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall deliver whomsoever they have in their hands of the Athenians or their confederates, in the same manner.

year x. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. Articles of the peace between the

“Touching the Scionæans, Toronæans, and Sermyleans, and whatsoever other city belonging to the Athenians, the Athenians shall do with them what they think fit.

Athenians and the Lacedæmonians.

“The Athenians shall take an oath to the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, city by city; and that oath shall be the greatest¹ that in each city is in use. The thing that they shall swear shall be this: *I stand to these articles and to this peace, truly and sincerely.* And the Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall take the same oath to the Athenians. This oath they shall on both sides every year renew, and shall erect pillars [inscribed with this peace] at Olympia, Pythia², and in the Isthmus; at Athens, within the citadel; and at Lacedæmon, in the Amyclæum.

“And if anything be on either side forgotten, or shall be thought fit upon good deliberation to be changed; it shall be lawful for them to do it, in such manner as the Lacedæmonians and Athenians shall think fit, jointly.

19. “This peace shall take beginning from the 24th of the month Artemisium, Pleistolas being ephore at Sparta, and the 15th of Elaphebolium, after the account of Athens, Alcæus being archon.¹

“They that took the oath and sacrificed, were these. Of the Lacedæmonians: Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daidus, Ischagoras, Philocaridas, Zeuxidas, Anthippus, Tellis, Alcinidas, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus. Of the Athenians these: Lampon, Isthmionicus, Nicias, Laches, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasyclus, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, Demosthenes.”

year x. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3.

20. This peace was made in the very end of winter, and the spring then beginning, presently after the City Bacchanals, and [full] ten years and some few days over², after the first invasion of Attica and the beginning of this war. But now for the certainty hereof, let a man consider the times themselves: and not trust to the account of the names of such as in the several places bare chief offices, or for some honour to themselves had their names ascribed for marks to the actions foregoing. For it is not exactly known who was in the beginning of his office, or who in the midst, or how he was, when anything fell out. But if one reckon the same by summers and winters, according as they are written³, he shall find by the two half years which make the whole, that this first war was of ten summers and as many winters continuance.

The true way of accounting the years of this war.

year x. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. The Lacedæmonians begin to perform the articles, and presently deliver their prisoners.

21. The Lacedæmonians (for it fell unto them by lot to begin the restitution) both dismissed presently those prisoners they had then in their hands, and also sent ambassadors, Ischagoras, Menas, and Philocharidas, into the parts upon Thrace, with command to Clearidas to deliver up Amphipolis to the Athenians, and requiring the rest of their confederates there to accept of the peace in such manner as was for every of them accorded. But they would not do it, because they thought it was not for their advantage: and Clearidas also, to gratify the Chalcideans, surrendered not the city, alleging that he could not do it whether they would or not. And coming away soon after with those ambassadors to Lacedæmon, both to purge himself, if he should be accused by those with Ischagoras for disobeying the state's command, and also to try if the peace might by any means be shaken¹: when he found it firm, he himself being sent back by the Lacedæmonians with command principally to surrender the place, and if he could not do that, then to draw thence all the Peloponnesians that were in it, immediately took his journey. 22. But the confederates chanced to be present themselves in Lacedæmon: and the Lacedæmonians required such of them as formerly refused, that they would accept the peace. But they, upon the same pretence on which they had rejected it before, said, that unless it were more reasonable they would not accept it. And the Lacedæmonians, seeing they refused, dismissed them, and by themselves entered with the Athenians into a league¹: because they imagined that the Argives would not renew their peace, (because they had refused it before when Ampelidas and Lichas went to Argos, and held them for no dangerous enemies without the Athenians): and also conceived, that by this means the rest of Peloponnesus would not stir; for if they could, they would turn to the Athenians. Wherefore the ambassadors of Athens being then present, and conference had, they agreed; and the oath and league was concluded on in the terms following:

The Amphipolitans refuse to render themselves under the Athenians.

Clearidas endeavoureth to dissolve the peace.

year x. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. The Lacedæmonians make league with the Athenians.

23. "The Lacedæmonians shall be confederates with the Athenians for fifty years.

the articles of the league between the lacedæmonians and the athenians.

"If any enemy invade the territory of the Lacedæmonians and do the Lacedæmonians any harm, the Athenians shall aid the Lacedæmonians against them in the strongest manner they can possibly: but if the enemy, after he hath spoiled the country, shall be gone away, then that city shall be held as enemy both to the Lacedæmonians and to the Athenians, and shall be warred upon by them both; and both cities shall again lay down the war jointly: and this is to be done justly, readily, and sincerely.

"And if any enemy shall invade the territories of the Athenians, and do the Athenians any harm, then the Lacedæmonians shall aid the Athenians against them in the strongest manner they can possibly: but if the enemy, after he hath spoiled the country, shall be gone away, then shall that city be held for enemy both to the Lacedæmonians and to the Athenians, and shall be warred upon by both; and both the cities shall again lay down the war together: and this to be done justly, readily, and sincerely.

“If their slaves shall rebel, the Athenians shall assist the Lacedæmonians with all their strength possible.

year x. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. Articles of the league between the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians.

“These things shall be sworn unto by the same men on either side that swore the peace, and shall be every year renewed by the Lacedæmonians [at their] coming to the Bacchanals at Athens; and by the Athenians [at their] going to the Hyacinthian feast at Lacedæmon; and either side shall erect a pillar, [inscribed with this league], one at Lacedæmon, near unto Apollo in the Amyclæum, another at Athens, near Minerva in the citadel.

“If it shall seem good to the Lacedæmonians and Athenians to add or take away anything touching the league, it shall be lawful for them to do it jointly.”

“24. Of the Lacedæmonians took the oath, these: Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daidus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Anthippus, Alcinadas, Tellis, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus. Of the Athenians: Lampon, Isthmionicus, Laches, Nicias, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Hagnon, Myrtilus, Thrasyclus, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, and Demosthenes.”

This league was made not long after the peace: and the Athenians delivered to the Lacedæmonians the men they had taken in the island; and by this time began the summer of the eleventh year. And 1 hitherto hath been written these ten years, which this first war continued without intermission.

The Athenians deliver the prisoners taken at Pylus.

year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3.

25. After the peace and league made between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, after the ten years' war, Pleistolas being ephore at Lacedæmon and Alcæus archon of Athens; though there were peace to those that had accepted it; yet the Corinthians and some cities of Peloponnesus endeavoured to overthrow what was done, and presently arose another stir by the confederates against Lacedæmon. And the Lacedæmonians also after a while became suspect unto the Athenians, for not performing somewhat agreed on in the articles. And for six years and ten months 1 they abstained from entering into each other's territories with their arms: but the peace being weak, they did each other abroad what harm they could; and in the end were forced to dissolve the peace made after those ten years, and fell again into open war.

The Lacedæmonians slack in performance of the articles of the peace.

From the beginning to this end of the war, twenty-seven years.

year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. The time of this peace not to be esteemed peace.

26. This also hath the same Thucydides of Athens written from point to point, by summers and winters, as everything came to pass, until such time as the Lacedæmonians and their confederates had made an end of the Athenian dominion, and had taken their long walls and Pieræus. To which time from the beginning of the war, it is in all twenty–seven years. As for the composition between, if any man shall think it not to be accounted with the war, he shall think amiss. For let him look into the actions that passed as they are distinctly set down¹; and he shall find that that deserveth not to be taken for a peace, in which they neither rendered all, nor accepted all, according to the articles. Besides, in the Mantinean and Epidaurian wars, and in other actions, it was on both sides infringed: moreover, the confederates on the borders of Thrace continued in hostility as before: and the Bœotians had but a truce from one ten days to another. So that with the first ten years' war, and with this doubtful cessation, and the war that followed after it, a man shall find, counting by the times, that it came to just so many years and some few days: and that those who built upon the prediction of the oracles, have² this number only to agree. And I remember yet, that from the very beginning of this war and so on till the end, it was uttered by many that it should be of thrice nine years' continuance. And³ for the time thereof I lived in my strength, and applied my mind to gain an accurate knowledge of the same. It happened also that I was banished my country for twenty years, after my charge at Amphipolis: whereby being present at⁴ the affairs of both, and especially of the Lacedæmonians by reason of my exile, I could at leisure the better learn the truth of all that passed. The quarrels therefore, and perturbations of the peace, after those ten years, and that which followed, according as from time to time the war was carried, I will now pursue.¹

The number of years which the whole war lasted.

Thucydides, for his ill success at Amphipolis, banished Athens for twenty years.

27. After the concluding of the fifty years' peace and the league which followed, and when those ambassadors which were sent for out of the rest of Peloponnesus to accept the said peace were departed from Lacedæmon, the Corinthians (the rest going all to their own cities) turning first to Argos², entered into treaty with some of the Argive magistrates to this purpose:—that the Lacedæmonians having made a peace and league with the Athenians, their hitherto mortal enemies, tending not to the benefit, but to the enslaving of Peloponnesus, it behoved them³ to consider of a course for the safety of the same: and to make a decree, that any city of the Grecians that would, and were a free city, and admitted the like and equal trials of judgment with theirs, might make a league with the Argives for the one mutually to aid the other: and to assign them a few men with absolute authority from the state, to treat with: and that it should not be motioned to the people, to the end, that if the multitude would not agree to it, it might be unknown that ever they had made such a motion:—affirming, that many would come into this confederacy upon hatred to the Lacedæmonians. And the Corinthians, when they had made this overture, went home.

year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. The Corinthians contrive with the Argives to make a league in Peloponnesus without the Lacedæmonians.

year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. Twelve men

28. These men of Argos having heard them, and reported their proposition both to the magistrates and to the people, the Argives ordered the same accordingly: and elected twelve men, with whom it should be lawful for any Grecian to make the league that would, except the Lacedæmonians and Athenians, with neither of which they were to enter into any league without the consent of the Argive people. And this the Argives did the more willingly admit, as well for that they saw the Lacedæmonians would make war upon them; (for the truce between them was now upon expiring); as also because they hoped to have the principality¹ of Peloponnesus. For about this time Lacedæmon had but a bad report, and was in contempt for the losses it had received. And the Argives in all points were in good estate, as not having concurred in the Attic war, but rather been at peace with both, and thereby gotten in their revenue². Thus the Argives received into league all such Grecians as came unto them.

chosen at Argos to treat about a league.

29. First of all therefore, came in the Mantineans and their confederates: which they did for fear of the Lacedæmonians. For a part of Arcadia, during the war of Athens, was come under the obedience of the Mantineans; over which they thought the Lacedæmonians, now they were at rest, would not permit them any longer to command: and therefore they willingly joined with the Argives, as being, they thought, a great city, ever enemy to the Lacedæmonians, and governed as their own by democracy¹. When the Mantineans had revolted, the rest of Peloponnesus began also to mutter amongst themselves, that it was fit for them to do the like: conceiving that there was somewhat in it more than they knew, that made the Mantineans to turn; and were also angry with the Lacedæmonians, amongst many other causes, for that it was written in the articles of the Attic peace, *that it should be lawful to add unto or take away from the same, whatsoever should seem good to the two cities of the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians*. For this was the article that the most troubled the Peloponnesians, and put them into a jealousy that the Lacedæmonians might have a purpose, joining with the Athenians, to bring them into subjection: for in justice, the power of changing the articles ought to have been ascribed to all the confederates in general. Whereupon, many fearing such an intention, applied themselves to the Argives, every one severally striving to come into their league.

year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. The rest of Peloponnesus incline to the same league.

year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3.

The article of adding and altering misliked.

The Lacedæmonians expostulate with the Corinthians about this league with Argos.

year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3.

The apology of the Corinthians, for their refusing the peace.

30. The Lacedæmonians perceiving this stir to begin in Peloponnesus, and that the Corinthians were both the contrivers of it, and entered themselves also into the league with Argos, sent ambassadors unto Corinth, with intention to prevent the sequel of it: and accused them, both for the whole design, and for their own revolt in particular, which they intended to make from them to the league of the Argives; saying that they should therein infringe their oath, and that they had already done unjustly, to refuse the peace made with the Athenians; forasmuch as it is an article of their league¹, that what the major part of the confederates should conclude, unless it were hindered by some god or hero, the same was to stand good. But the Corinthians, those confederates which had refused the peace as well as they being now at Corinth, (for they had sent for them before), in their answer to the Lacedæmonians did not openly allege the wrongs they had received; as that the Athenians had not restored Solium nor Anactorium², nor anything else they had in this war lost: but pretended not to betray those of Thrace³; for that they had in particular taken an oath to them, both when together with Potidæa they first revolted, and also another afterwards. And therefore, they said, they did not break the oath of their league by rejecting the peace with Athens. For having sworn unto them by the gods, they should in betraying them offend the gods. And whereas it is said, *unless some god or hero hinder it*, this appeareth to be a divine hindrance. Thus they answered for their old oath. Then, for their league with the Argives, they gave this answer: that when they had advised with their friends, they would do afterwards what should be just. And so the ambassadors of Lacedæmon went home. At the same time were present also in Corinth the ambassadors of Argos, to invite the Corinthians to their league, and that without delay. But the Corinthians appointed them to come again at their next sitting. 31. Presently after this came unto them an ambassage also from the Eleians: and first they made a league with the Corinthians; and going thence to Argos, made a league with the Argives, according to the declaration before mentioned¹. The Eleians had a quarrel with the Lacedæmonians concerning Lepreum. For the Lepreates having heretofore warred on certain of the Arcadians, and for their aid called the Eleians into their confederacy with condition to give the moiety of the land² [to be won from them], when the war was ended, the Eleians gave unto the Lepreates the whole land to be enjoyed by themselves, with an imposition thereon of a talent to be paid to Jupiter Olympian: which they continued to pay till the beginning of the Athenian war. But afterwards upon pretence of that war giving over the payment, the Eleians would have forced them to it again. The Lepreates for help having recourse to the Lacedæmonians: and the cause being referred to their decision, the Eleians afterwards, upon suspicion that the Lacedæmonians would not do them right, renounced the reference, and wasted the territory of the Lepreates. The Lacedæmonians nevertheless gave sentence, that the Lepreates should be at liberty to pay it or not³, and that the Eleians did the injury: and because the Eleians had not stood to the reference, the Lacedæmonians put into Lepreum a garrison of men at arms. The Eleians taking this as if the Lacedæmonians had received their revolted city, and producing the article of their league, “that what every one possessed when they entered into the Attic war, the same they should

Their answer touching their league with Argos.

year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. The Eleians make a league first with Corinth, then with Argos.

Quarrel of the Eleians against the Lacedæmonians.

year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3.

The Corinthians and the towns upon Thrace enter into the league with Argos.

possess when they gave it over”¹ ; revolted to the Argives as wronged, and entered league with them as is before related. After these came presently into the Argive league the Corinthians, and the Chalcideans upon Thrace. The Bœotians also and Megareans threatened as much² : but because they thought the Argive democracy would not be so commodious for them, who were governed according to the government of the Lacedæmonians, by oligarchy, they stirred no further in it.

32. About the same time of this summer the Athenians expugned Scione, slew all that were within it at man’s estate³ , made slaves of the women and children, and gave their territory to the Plataeans. They also replanted the Delians in Delos, both in consideration of the defeats they had received after their expulsion, and also because the oracle at Delphi had commanded it. The Phoceans and Locrians also began a war at that time against each other.

The Athenians recover Scione.

The Delians replanted in Delos.

Phocis and Locris in war.

And the Corinthians and Argives, being now leagued, went to Tegea to cause it to revolt from the Lacedæmonians, conceiving it to be an important piece¹ [of Peloponnesus], and making account, if they gained it to their side, they should easily obtain the whole. But when the Tegeates refused to become enemies to the Lacedæmonians, the Corinthians, who till then had been very forward, grew less violent: and were afraid that no more of the rest would come in. Nevertheless they went to the Bœotians, and solicited them to enter into league with them and the Argives, and to do as they did. And the Corinthians further desired the Bœotians to go along with them to Athens, and to procure for them the like ten days’ truce, to that which was made between the Athenians and Bœotians presently after the making of the fifty years’ peace, on the same terms as the Bœotians had it: and if the Athenians refused, then to renounce theirs, and make no more truces hereafter without the Corinthians. The Corinthians having made this request, the Bœotians willed them, touching the league with the Argives, to stay a while longer, and went with them to Athens, but obtained not the ten days’ truce: the Athenians answering, that if the Corinthians were confederates with the Lacedæmonians, they had a peace already. Nevertheless the Bœotians would not relinquish their ten days’ truce, though the Corinthians both required the same, and affirmed that it was so before agreed on. Yet the Athenians granted the Corinthians a cessation of arms, but without solemn ratification¹ .

The Corinthians seek to turn the cities of Pelopon–

year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. nesus and other confederates from the Lacedæmonians to the Argives.

The Corinthians seek the ten days’ truce with Athens, as the Bœotians had it.

The Bœotians take time to answer concerning a league with Argos.

year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. 4. The Athenians deny the ten days’ truce to the Corinthians.

33. The same summer the Lacedæmonians with their whole power, under the conduct of Pleistoanax the son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedæmonians, made war upon the Parrhasians of Arcadia, subjects of the Mantineans; partly as called in by occasion of sedition, and partly because they intended, if they could, to demolish a fortification which the Mantineans had built and kept with a garrison in Cypsela, in

The Lacedæmonians demolish the fort of Cypsela.

the territory of the Parrhasians towards² Sciritis of Laconia. The Lacedæmonians therefore wasted the territory of the Parrhasians. And the Mantineans, leaving their own city to the custody of the Argives, came forth to aid³ the Parrhasians their confederates: but being unable to defend both the fort of Cypsela and the cities of the Parrhasians too, they went home again. And the Lacedæmonians, when they had set the Parrhasians at liberty, and demolished the fortification, went home likewise.

34. The same summer, when those soldiers which went out with Brasidas, and of which Clearidas after the making of the peace had the charge, were returned from the parts upon Thrace: the Lacedæmonians made a decree, that those Helotes which had fought under Brasidas should receive their liberty, and inhabit where they thought good¹. But not long after they placed them, together with such others as had been newly enfranchised², in Lepreum; a city standing in the confines between Laconia and the Eleians, with whom they were now at variance. Fearing also lest those citizens of their own, which had been taken in the island and had delivered up their arms to the Athenians, should upon apprehension of disgrace for that calamity, if they remained capable of honours, make some innovation in the state, they disabled them³ [though] some of them were¹ in office already. And their disablement was this: “that they should neither bear office, nor be capable to buy and sell”. Yet in time they were again restored to their former honours.

The Lacedæmonians put a garrison into Lepreum of men newly enfranchised.

year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 3. 4.

The Lacedæmonians disable those that were taken in Sphacteria to bear office or to make bargain.

year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 4.

The Dictideans take Thyssus from the Athenians.

Jealousy between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians.

Amphipolis not yet rendered, nor the peace accepted in the parts about Thrace, nor by the Bœotians and Corinthians.

The Athenians refuse to render Pylus.

year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 4. The apology of the Lacedæmonians for not performing the articles.

35. The same summer also the Dictideans² took Thyssus, a town in Mount Athos, and confederate of the Athenians. This whole summer there was continual commerce between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians: nevertheless they began, both the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians, to have each other in suspicion immediately after the peace, in respect of the places not yet mutually surrendered. For the Lacedæmonians, to whose lot it fell to make restitution first, had not rendered Amphipolis and the other cities, nor had caused the peace to be accepted by the confederates upon Thrace, nor by the Bœotians nor Corinthians: though they had ever professed, that in case they refused they would join with the Athenians to bring them to it by force; and had prefixed a time, (though not by writing), within the which such as entered not into this peace were to be held as enemies unto both. The Athenians therefore, when they saw none of this really performed, suspected that they had no sincere intention, and thereupon refused to render Pylus when they required it: nay, they repented that they had delivered up the prisoners they took in the island; and detained the rest of the towns³ they then held, till the Lacedæmonians should have performed the conditions on their part also. The Lacedæmonians to this alleged, “that they had done what they were able to do; for they had delivered the Athenian prisoners that were in their hands, and had withdrawn their soldiers from the parts upon Thrace, and whatsoever else was in their own power to perform: but Amphipolis, they said, was not in their power to surrender: that they would endeavour to bring the Bœotians and Corinthians to accept the peace, and to get Panactum restored, and all the Athenian prisoners in Bœotia to be sent home: and therefore desired them to make restitution of Pylus, or, if not so, at least to draw out of it the Messenians and Helotes, as they for their part had drawn their garrisons out of the towns upon Thrace; and if they thought good, to keep it with a garrison of Athenians”. After divers and long conferences had this summer, they so far prevailed with the Athenians at the last, as they drew thence all the Messenians and Helotes, and all other Laconian fugitives: and placed them in Cranii, a city of Cephallenia. So for this summer there was peace, and free passage from one to another.

The Athenians draw the Messenians and Helotes out of Pylus.

The end of the eleventh summer

36. In the beginning of winter, (for now there were other ephores in office; not those in whose time the peace was made, but some of them that opposed it), ambassadors being come from the confederates, and the Athenian, Bœotian, and Corinthian ambassadors being [already] there, and having had much conference together but concluded nothing, Cleobulus and Xenares, ephores that most desired the dissolution of the peace, when the rest of the ambassadors were gone home, entered into private conference with the Bœotians and Corinthians, exhorting them to run both the same course: and advised the Bœotians to endeavour first to make a league themselves with the Argives, and then to get the Argives together with themselves into a league with the Lacedæmonians: for that they might by this means avoid the necessity of accepting the peace with Athens: for the Lacedæmonians would more regard the friendship and league of the Argives, than¹ the enmity and dissolution of the peace with the Athenians: for they knew the Lacedæmonians had ever desired to have Argos their friend upon any reasonable conditions; because they knew that their war without Peloponnesus would thereby be

The Lacedæmonian ephores endeavour to dissolve the peace.

year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 4. A proposition of a league between the Lacedæmonians, Argives, Bœotians, and Corinthians.

a great deal the easier. Wherefore they entreated the Bœotians to put Panactum into the hands of the Lacedæmonians: to the end, that if they could get Pylus for it in exchange, they might make war against the Athenians the more commodiously.

37. The Bœotians and Corinthians being dismissed² by Xenares and Cleobulus, and all the other Lacedæmonians of that faction, with these points to be delivered to their commonwealths, went to their several cities. And two men of Argos, of principal authority in that city, having waited for and met with them by the way, entered into a treaty with them about a league between the Argives and the Bœotians, as there was between them and the Corinthians and the Eleians and Mantineans already: “for they thought, if it succeeded, they might [the more] easily have either war or peace, (forasmuch as the cause would now be common), either with the Lacedæmonians or whomsoever else it should be needful”. When the Bœotian ambassadors heard this, they were well pleased. For as it chanced, the Argives requested the same things of them, that they by their friends in Lacedæmon had been sent to procure of the Argives. These men therefore of Argos, when they saw that the Bœotians accepted of the motion, promised to send ambassadors to the Bœotians about it; and so departed. When the Bœotians were come home, they related there¹ what they had heard both at Lacedæmon and by the way from the Argives. The governors of Bœotia were glad thereof; and much more forward in it now than formerly they had been; seeing that not only their friends in Lacedæmon desired, but the Argives themselves hastened to have done the self-same thing. Not long after this the ambassadors came to them from Argos, to solicit the dispatch of the business before propounded: but the governors of Bœotia commended [only] the proposition, and dismissed them with promise to send ambassadors about the league to Argos. 38. In the meantime the governors of Bœotia thought fit, that an oath should first be taken by themselves, and by the ambassadors from Corinth, Megara, and the confederates upon Thrace², to give mutual assistance upon any occasion to them that should require it, and neither to make war nor peace without the common consent: and next that the Bœotians and Megareans (for these two ran the same course) should make a league with the Argives. But before this oath was [to be] taken, the governors of Bœotia communicated the business to the four Bœotian councils, in the which the whole authority of the state consisteth¹: and withal presented their advice, that any city that would, might join with them in the like oath for mutual assistance. But they that were of these councils approved not the proposition; because they feared to offend the Lacedæmonians, in being sworn to the Corinthians that had revolted from their confederacy. For the governors of Bœotia had not reported unto them what had passed at Lacedæmon, how Cleobulus and Xenares, the ephores, and their friends there, had advised them to enter first into league with the Argives and Corinthians, and then afterwards to make the same league with the Lacedæmonians: for they thought that the councils, though this had never been told them, would have decreed it no otherwise than they upon premeditation should advise. So the business

The Argives propound a league to the Bœotians and Corinthians:

year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 4.

and promise to send ambassadors into Bœotia to that purpose.

The Bœotians propound an oath between themselves, the Corinthians, Chalcideans, and Megareans, of mutual assistance.

year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 4.

The Argive league with the Bœotians falleth off.

year xi. A. C. 421. Ol. 89. 4.

was checked: and the ambassadors from Corinth and from the cities upon Thrace departed without effect. And the governors of Bœotia, that were before minded, if they had gotten this done, to have leagued¹ themselves also with the Argives, made no mention of the Argives in the councils at all, nor sent the ambassadors to Argos, as they had before promised: but a kind of carelessness and delay possessed the whole business.

39. The same winter the Olynthians took Meczyberne², held with a garrison of the Athenians, by assault.

A. C. 421. 0. Ol. 89. 4. Meczyberne taken from the Athenians by assault.

After this the Lacedæmonians, (for the conferences between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians about restitution reciprocal continued still), hoping that if the Athenians should obtain from the Bœotians Panactum, that then they also should recover Pylus, sent ambassadors to the Bœotians, with request that Panactum and the Athenian prisoners might be put into the hands of the Lacedæmonians, that they might get Pylus restored in exchange.

year xi. A. C. 421. 0. Ol. 89. 4. The Lacedæmonians enter into a league with the Bœotians, knowing it to be against justice.

But the Bœotians answered, that unless the Lacedæmonians would make a particular league with them as they had done with the Athenians, they would not do it. The Lacedæmonians, though they knew they should therein wrong the Athenians; for that it was said in the articles, that neither party should make either league or war without the other's consent; yet such was their desire to get Panactum to exchange it for Pylus, and withal they that longed to break the peace with Athens were so eager in it¹, that at last they concluded a league with the Bœotians, winter then ending and the spring approaching: and Panactum was presently pulled down to the ground². So ended the eleventh year of this war.

A. C. 420. Ol. 89. 4.

40. In the spring following, the Argives, when they saw that the ambassadors which the Bœotians promised to send unto them came not, and that Panactum was razed, and that also there was a private league made between the Bœotians and the Lacedæmonians, were afraid lest they should on all hands be abandoned, and that the confederates would all go to the Lacedæmonians. For they apprehended that the Bœotians had been induced both to raze Panactum, and also to enter into the Athenians peace, by the Lacedæmonians; and that the Athenians were privy to the same: so that now they had no means to make league with the Athenians neither; whereas before they made account, that if their truce with the Lacedæmonians continued not, they might upon these differences have joined themselves to the Athenians. The Argives being therefore at a stand, and fearing to have war all at once with the Lacedæmonians, Tegeats, Bœotians, and Athenians, [as] having formerly refused the truce with the Lacedæmonians, and imagined to themselves the principality of all Peloponnesus, they sent ambassadors with as much speed as might be, Eustrophus and Æson, persons as they thought most acceptable unto them, with this cogitation, that by compounding with the Lacedæmonians as well as for their present estate they might, howsoever the

year xii. The Argives seek peace with the Lacedæmonians.

year xii. A. C. 420. Ol. 89. 4.

The territory of Cynuria, ground of the quarrels between Lacedæmon and Greece.

year xii. A. C. 420. Ol. 89. 4.

An odd condition of a truce.

year xii. A. C. 420. Ol. 89. 4.

world went¹, they should at least live at quiet. 41. When these ambassadors were there, they fell to treat of the articles upon which the agreement should be made. And at first the Argives desired to have the matter referred, either to some private man or to some city, concerning the territory of Cynuria²: about which they have always differed, as lying on the borders of them both; (it containeth the cities of Thyrea and Anthena, and is possessed by the Lacedæmonians). But afterwards, the Lacedæmonians not suffering mention to be made of that, but that if they would have the truce go on as it did before, they might, the Argive ambassadors got them to yield to this: “that for the present an accord should be made for fifty years; but withal, that it should be lawful nevertheless, if one challenged the other thereunto, both for Lacedæmon and Argos to try their titles to this territory by battle, so that there were in neither city a plague nor a war to excuse them”: as once before they had done, when, as both sides thought, they had the victory: “and that it should not be lawful for one part to follow the chace of the other, further than to the bounds either of Lacedæmon or Argos.” And though this seemed to the Lacedæmonians at first to be but a foolish proposition, yet afterwards, because they desired by all means to have friendship with the Argives, they agreed unto it, and put into writing what they required. Howsoever, before the Lacedæmonians would make any full conclusion of the same, they willed them to return first to Argos, and to make the people acquainted with it; and then, if it were accepted, to return at the Hyacinthian feast and swear it. So these departed.

42. Whilst the Argives were treating about this, the Lacedæmonian ambassadors, Andromedes and Phædimus and Antimenidas, commissioners for receiving of Panactum and the prisoners from the Bœotians to render them to the Athenians, found that Panactum was demolished¹, and that their pretext was this: that there had been anciently an oath, by occasion of difference between the Athenians and them, that neither part should inhabit the place solely, but jointly both. But for the Athenian prisoners, as many as the Bœotians had, they that were with Andromedes received, convoyed, and delivered them unto the Athenians: and withal told them of the razing of Panactum, alleging it as rendered, in that no enemy of Athens should dwell in it hereafter. But when this was told them, the Athenians made it a heinous matter: for that they conceived that the Lacedæmonians had done them wrong, both in the matter of Panactum, which was pulled down and should have been rendered standing; and because also they had heard of the private league made with the Bœotians, whereas they had promised to join with the Athenians in compelling such to accept of the peace as had refused it. Withal they weighed whatsoever other points the Lacedæmonians had been short in, touching the performance of the articles; and thought themselves abused: so that they answered the Lacedæmonian ambassadors roughly, and dismissed them.

The Lacedæmonian ambassadors require Pylus in exchange for Panactum.

year xii. A. C. 420. Ol. 89. 4. The Athenians take in evil part, both the razing of Panactum, and the league made with the Bœotians.

The Argives make league with Athens by means of Alcibiades.

43. This difference arising between the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians, it was presently wrought upon by such also of Athens as desired to have the peace dissolved. Amongst the rest was Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, a man, though young in years, yet in the dignity of his ancestors honoured as much as any man of what city soever¹. Who was of opinion, that it was better to join with the Argives; not only for the matter itself, but also out of stomach labouring to cross the Lacedæmonians: because they had made the peace by the means of Nicias and Laches, without him; whom for his youth they had neglected, and not honoured as for the ancient hospitality between his house and them had been requisite: which his father¹ had indeed renounced, but he himself, by good offices done to those prisoners which were brought from the island, had a purpose to have renewed. But supposing himself on all hands disparaged, he both opposed the peace at first; alleging that the Lacedæmonians would not be constant, and that they had made the peace only to get the Argives by that means away from them, and afterwards to invade the Athenians again when they should be destitute of their friends²: and also as soon as this difference was on foot, he sent presently to Argos of himself, willing them with all speed to come to Athens, as being thereunto invited, and to bring with them the Eleians and Mantineans to enter with the Athenians into a league, the opportunity now serving³, and promising that he would help them all he could.

The cause why Alcibiades desireth to break with the Lacedæmonians.

year xii. A. C. 420.
Ol. 89. 4.

Alcibiades sendeth for the Argives to Athens to make a league.

44. The Argives having heard the message, and knowing⁴ that the Athenians had made no league with the Bœotians, and that they were at great quarrel with the Lacedæmonians, neglected the ambassadors they had then in Lacedæmon, whom they had sent about the truce, and applied themselves to the Athenians, with this thought: that if they should have war, they should by this means be backed with a city that had been their ancient friend, governed like their own by democracy, and of greatest power by sea. Whereupon they presently sent ambassadors to Athens to make a league: and together with theirs went also the ambassadors of the Eleians and Mantineans. Thither also with all speed came the Lacedæmonian ambassadors, Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius, persons accounted most gracious with the Athenians; for fear, lest in their passion they should make a league with the Argives, and withal to require the restitution of Pylus for Panactum; and to excuse themselves concerning their league with the Bœotians, as not made for any harm intended to the Athenians.

year xii. A. C. 420.
Ol. 89. 4.

The Lacedæmonian ambassadors come in haste to Athens, to prevent their league with the Argives.

Alcibiades persuadeth the Lacedæmonian ambassadors to deny before the people that they had power to conclude.

year xii. A. C. 420.
Ol. 89. 4. Alcibiades

45. Now speaking of these things before the council, and how that they were come thither with full power to make agreement concerning all controversies betwixt them, they put Alcibiades into fear: lest, if they should say the same before the people, the multitude would be drawn unto their side, and so the Argive league fall off. But Alcibiades deviseth against them this plot. He persuaded the Lacedæmonians not to confess their plenary power before the people: and giveth them his faith, that then Pylus should be rendered, (for he said he would persuade the Athenians to it as much as he now opposed it), and that the rest of their differences should be compounded. This he did to alienate them from Nicias: and that by accusing them before the people as men that had no true meaning nor ever spake one and the same thing, he might bring on the league with the Argives, Eleians, and Mantineans. And it came to pass accordingly. For when they came before the people, and to the question, whether they had full power of concluding, had, contrary to what they had said in council, answered *No*, the Athenians would no longer endure them; but gave ear to Alcibiades, that exclaimed against the Lacedæmonians far more now than ever: and were ready then presently to have the Argives and those others with them brought in, and to make the league: but an earthquake happening before anything was concluded, the assembly was adjourned.

inveigheth against the Lacedæmonians.

46. In the next day's meeting, Nicias, though the Lacedæmonians had been abused, and he himself also deceived, touching their coming with full power to conclude; yet he persisted to affirm, that it was their best course to be friends with the

Nicias endeavoureth to have the peace go on with the Lacedæmonians.

Lacedæmonians, and to defer the Argives' business till they had sent to the Lacedæmonians again to be assured of their intention: saying, that it was honour unto themselves, and dishonour to the Lacedæmonians to have the war put off. For, for themselves, being in estate of prosperity, it was best to preserve their good fortune as long as they might: whereas to the other side, who were in evil estate, it should be in place of gain to put things as soon as they could to the hazard. So he persuaded them to send ambassadors, whereof himself was one: to require the

Nicias is sent ambassador to Lacedæmon to get satisfaction about performance of the articles.

year xii. A. C. 420. Ol. 89. 4.

Lacedæmonians, if they meant sincerely, to render Panactum standing, and also Amphipolis; and if the Bœotians would not accept of the peace, then to undo their league with them; according to the article, that the one should not make league with any without the consent of the other. They willed him to say further; "that they themselves also, if they had had the will to do wrong, had ere this made a league with the Argives, who were present then at Athens for the same purpose." And whatsoever they had to accuse the Lacedæmonians of besides, they instructed Nicias in it: and sent him and the other his fellow-ambassadors away. When they were arrived, and had delivered what they had in charge, and this last of all; "that the Athenians would make league with the Argives, unless the Lacedæmonians would renounce their league with the Bœotians, if the Bœotians accepted not the peace": the Lacedæmonians denied to renounce their league with the Bœotians; for Xenares the ephore, and the rest of that faction, carried it: but at the request of Nicias they renewed their former oath¹. For Nicias was afraid he should return with nothing done, and be carped at (as after also it fell out) as author of the Lacedæmonian peace.

At his return, when the Athenians understood that nothing was effected at Lacedæmon, they grew presently into choler: and apprehending injury, (the Argives and their confederates being there present, brought in by Alcibiades), they made a peace and a league with them in these words:

47. “The Athenians and Argives and Mantineans and Eleians, for themselves and for the confederates commanded by every of them, have made an accord² for one hundred years, without fraud or damage, both by sea and land. It shall not be lawful for the Argives nor Eleians nor Mantineans, nor their confederates, to bear arms against the Athenians, or the confederates under the command of the Athenians, or¹ their confederates, by any fraud or machination whatsoever.

the articles of the league between the athenians and the argives.

“ And the Athenians, Argives, and² Mantineans, have made league with each other for one hundred years on these terms:

year xii. A. C. 420. Ol. 89. 4. The articles of the league between the Athenians and the Argives.

“If any enemy shall invade the territory of the Athenians, then the Argives, Eleians, and Mantineans shall go unto Athens to assist them, according as the Athenians shall send them word to do, in the best manner they possibly can. But if the enemy after he have spoiled the territory, shall be gone back, then their city shall be held as an enemy to the Argives, Eleians, Mantineans, and Athenians, and war shall be made against it by all those cities: and it shall not be lawful for any of those cities to give over the war, without the consent of all the rest.

“And if an enemy shall invade the territory, either of the Argives, or of the Eleians, or of the Mantineans, then the Athenians shall come unto Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, to assist them, in such sort as those cities shall send them word to do, in the best manner they possibly can. But if the enemy after he hath wasted their territory, shall be gone back; then their city shall be held as an enemy both to the Athenians, and also to the Argives, Eleians, and Mantineans, and war shall be made against it by all those cities; and it shall not be lawful for any of them to give over the war against that city, without the consent of all the rest.

“There shall no armed men be suffered to pass through the dominions either of themselves, or of any the confederates under their several commands, to¹ make war in any place whatsoever, unless by the suffrage of all the cities, Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, their passage be allowed.

year xii. A. C. 420. Ol. 89. 4. The articles of the league between the Athenians and the Argives.

“To such as come to assist any of the other cities, that city which sendeth them, shall give maintenance for thirty days after they shall arrive in the city that sent for them; and the like at their going away: but if they will use the army for a longer time, then the city that sent for them shall find them maintenance, at the rate of three oboles of Ægina a day for a man of arms² , and of a drachma of Ægina for a horseman.

“The city which sendeth for the aids, shall have the leading and command of them, whilst the war is in their own territory: but if it shall seem good unto these cities to make a war in common, then all the cities shall equally participate of the command.

“ The Athenians shall swear unto the articles, both for themselves and for their confederates: and the Argives, Eleians, and Mantineans, and the confederates of these, shall every one swear unto them city by city. And their oath shall be the greatest that by custom of the several cities is used, and with most perfect hosts¹ , and in these words: *I will stand to this league according to the articles thereof, justly, innocently, and sincerely, and not transgress the same by any art or machination whatsoever.*

year xii. A. C. 420.
Ol. 89. 4. The articles of the league between the Athenians and the Argives.

“This oath shall be taken at Athens by the senate and the officers of the commons² ; and administered by the Prytanes. At Argos it shall be taken by the senate and the council of eighty, and by the Artynæ; and administered by the council of eighty. At Mantinea it shall be taken by the procurators of the people³ , and by the senate, and by the rest of the magistrates; and administered by the theori and by the tribunes of the soldiers. At Elis it shall be taken by the procurators of the people, and by the officers of the treasury⁴ , and by the council of six hundred; and administered by the procurators of the people, and by the keepers of the law.

year xii. A. C. 420.
Ol. 89. 4. The articles of the league between the Athenians and the Argives.

“This oath shall be renewed by the Athenians, who shall go to Elis, and to Mantinea, and to Argos, thirty days before the Olympian games; and by the Argives, Eleians, and Mantineans, who shall come to Athens, ten days before the Panathenæan holydays¹ .

“The articles of this league and peace and the oath shall be inscribed in a pillar of stone by the Athenians in the citadel: by the Argives in their market-place within the precincts of the temple of Apollo: and by the Mantineans in their market-place within the precinct of the temple of Jupiter. And at the Olympian games now at hand, there shall be jointly erected by them all, a brazen pillar in Olympia [with the same inscription].

“If it shall seem good to any of these cities to add anything to these articles; whatsoever shall be determined by them all in common council, the same shall stand good.”

48. Thus was the league and the peace concluded: and that which was made before between the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians, was notwithstanding by neither side renounced. But the Corinthians, although they were the confederates of the Argives, yet would they not enter into this league: nay, though there were made a league before this between [them and] the Argives, Eleians, and Mantineans, that where one, there all, should have war or peace, yet they refused to swear to it; but said

The Corinthians still refuse the peace with Athens, and incline again to the Lacedæmonians.

year xii. A. C. 420.
Ol. 89. 4.

that their league defensive was enough, whereby they were bound to defend each other, but not to take part one with another in invading. So the Corinthians fell off from their confederates, and inclined again to the Lacedæmonians.

49. This summer were celebrated the Olympian games; in which Androsthenes, an Arcadian, was the first victor in the exercise called Pancratium¹. And the Lacedæmonians were by the Eleians prohibited the temple there; so as they might neither sacrifice, nor contend for the prizes amongst the rest: for that they had not paid the fine set upon them, according to an Olympic law, by the Eleians; that laid to their charge, that they had put soldiers into the fort of Phyrcon, and into Lepreum, in the time of the Olympic truce². The fine amounted unto two thousand minæ, which was two minæ for every man of arms, according to the law. But the Lacedæmonians, by their ambassadors which they sent thither, made answer, that they had been unjustly condemned; alleging that the truce was not published in Lacedæmon when their soldiers were sent out. To this the Eleians said again, that the truce was already begun amongst themselves; who used to publish it first in their own dominion: and thereupon, whilst they lay still and expected no such matter, as in time of truce, the Lacedæmonians did them the injury unawares. The Lacedæmonians hereunto replied, that it was not necessary to proceed to the publishing of the truce in Lacedæmon at all, if they thought themselves wronged already: but rather, if they thought themselves not wronged yet, then to do it by way of prevention, that they should not arm against them afterwards¹. The Eleians stood stiffly in their first argument, that they would never be persuaded but injury had been done them: but were nevertheless contented, if they would render Lepreum, both to remit their own part of the money, and also to pay that part for them which was due unto the god.

The Olympian games

Ol. 90. 1.

The Lacedæmonians forbidden the exercises: and why.

year xii. A. C. 420. Ol. 90. 1. Contention between the Lacedæmonians and Eleians before the Grecians at Olympia, about a mulct set upon the Lacedæmonians by the Eleians, for breaking the Olympic truce.

50. When this would not be agreed unto, they then required this: not that they should render Lepreum, unless they would; but that then they should come to the altar of Jupiter Olympian, seeing they desired to have free use of the temple, and there before the Grecians to take an oath to pay the fine at least hereafter. But when the Lacedæmonians refused that also, they were excluded the temple, the sacrifices, and the games; and sacrificed at home: but the rest of the Grecians, except the Lepreates, were all admitted to be spectators. Nevertheless, the Eleians fearing lest they would come and sacrifice there by force, kept a guard there of their youngest men in arms: to whom were added Argives and Mantineans, of either city one thousand, and certain Athenian horsemen, who were then at Argos waiting the celebration of the feast. For a great fear possessed all the assembly, lest the Lacedæmonians should come upon them with an army: and the rather, because Lichas the son of Arcesilaus, a Lacedæmonian, had been whipped by the serjeants upon the race: for that when his chariot had gotten the prize, after proclamation made that the chariot of the Bœotian state had won it, (because he himself was not admitted

year xii. A. C. 420. Ol. 90. 1.

Lichas a Lacedæmonian whipped upon the Olympic race.

year xii. A. C. 420. Ol. 90. 1.

to run¹), he came forth into the race and crowned his charioteer, to make it known that the chariot was his own. This added much unto their fear, and they verily expected some accident to follow. Nevertheless the Lacedæmonians stirred not: and the feast passed over.

After the Olympian games, the Argives and their confederates went to Corinth, to get the Corinthians into their league. And the Lacedæmonian ambassadors chanced to be there also: and after much conference, and nothing concluded, upon occasion of an earthquake they brake off the conference, and returned every one to his own city. And so this summer ended.

year xii. A. C. 420.
Ol. 90. 1. The twelfth
summer.

51. The next winter, the men of Heracleia in Trachinia fought a battle against the Ænianians, Dolopians, Melians, and certain Thessalians. For the neighbour cities were enemies to this city, as built to the prejudice only of them; and both opposed the same from the time it was first founded, annoying it what they could; and also in this battle overcame them, and slew Xenares a Lacedæmonian, their commander, with some others, Heracleots. Thus ended this winter, and the twelfth year of this war.

52. In the very beginning of the next summer, the Bœotians took Heracleia, miserably afflicted¹, into their own hands, and put Hegesippidas, a Lacedæmonian, out of it for his evil government. They took it, because they feared, lest whilst the Lacedæmonians were troubled about Peloponnesus, it should have been taken in by the Athenians. Nevertheless the Lacedæmonians were offended with them for doing it. The same summer Alcibiades the son of Clinias, being general of the Athenians, by the practice² of the Argives and their confederates, went into Peloponnesus, and having with him a few men at arms and archers of Athens, and some of the confederates which he took up there, as he passed through the country with his army, both ordered such affairs by the way concerning the league as was fit; and coming to the Patreans, persuaded them to build their walls down to the sea-side, and purposed to raise another wall himself towards Rhium in Achaia. But the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and such others as this wall would have prejudiced, came forth and hindered him.

year xiii. A. C. 419.
Ol. 90. 1.

year xiii. A. C. 419.
Ol. 90. 1.

53. The same summer fell out a war between the Epidaurians and the Argives; the pretext thereof was about a beast for sacrifice, which the Epidaurians ought to have sent in consideration of their pastures to Apollo Pythius, and had not done it: the Argives being the principal owners of the temple¹. But Alcibiades and the Argives had indeed determined to take in the city, though without pretence at all; both that the Corinthians might not stir, and also that they might bring the Athenian succours from Ægina into those parts, a nearer way than by compassing the promontory of Scyllæum. And therefore the Argives prepared, as of themselves, to exact the sacrifice by invasion.

War between the
Epidaurians and
Argives.

year xiii. A. C. 419.
Ol. 90. 1.

54. About the same time also the Lacedæmonians, with their whole forces, came forth as far as Leuctra, in the confines of their own territory towards Lycæum, under the conduct of Agis, the son of Archidamus, their king. No man knew against what place they intended the war; no not the cities themselves, out of which they were levied¹. But when in the sacrifices which they made for their passage the tokens observed were unlucky, they went home again; and sent word about to their confederates, (being now the month Carneius), to prepare themselves after the next feast of the new moon, (kept by the Dorians), to be again upon their march. The Argives, who set forth the twenty–sixth day of the month before Carneius, though they celebrated the same day, yet all the time they continued invading and wasting Epidauria². And the Epidaurians called in their confederates to help them: whereof some excused themselves upon the quality of the month; and others came but to the confines of Epidauria, and there stayed.

year xiii. A. C. 419.
Ol. 90. 1.

55. Whilst the Argives were in Epidauria, the ambassadors of divers cities, solicited by the Athenians, met together at Mantinea, where in a conference amongst them Euphamidas of Corinth said: “that their actions agreed not with their words; forasmuch as whilst they were sitting there to treat of a peace, the Epidaurians with their confederates and the Argives stood armed, in the meantime, against each other in order of battle: that it was therefore fit, that somebody should go first unto the armies from either side¹, and dissolve them; and then come again and dispute of peace”. This advice being approved, they departed, and withdrew the Argives from Epidauria. And meeting afterwards again in the same place, they could not for all that agree: and the Argives again invaded and wasted Epidauria.

A. C. 419. Ol. 90. 2.
Ambassadors meet
about peace, but
cannot agree.

The Lacedæmonians also drew forth their army against Caryæ: but then again their sacrifice for passage being not to their mind, they returned. And the Argives, when they had spoiled about the third part of Epidauria, went home likewise. They had the assistance of one thousand men of arms of Athens, and Alcibiades their commander: but these hearing that the Lacedæmonians were in the field², and seeing now there was no longer need of them, departed. And so ended this summer.

The end of the
thirteenth summer.

56. The next winter the Lacedæmonians, unknown to the Athenians, put three hundred garrison soldiers under the command of Agesippidas into Epidaurus by sea. For which cause the Argives came and expostulated with the Athenians, that whereas it was written in the articles of the league, that no enemy should be suffered to pass through either of their dominions, yet had they suffered the Lacedæmonians to pass by sea: and said they had wrong, unless the Athenians would again put the Messenians and Helotes into Pylus against the Lacedæmonians. Hereupon the Athenians, at the persuasion of Alcibiades, wrote upon the Laconian pillar¹, [under the inscription of the peace], that the Lacedæmonians had violated their oath: and they drew the Helotes out of Cranii, and put them again into Pylus, to infest the territory with driving off booties; but did no more.

year xiii. A. C. 419. 8.
Ol. 90. 2. The Argives
acknowledge the sea
on their own coast to
be of the dominion of
Athens.

A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 2.

All this winter, though there was war between the Argives and Epidaurians, yet was there no set battle: but only ambushes and skirmishes, wherein were slain on both sides such as it chanced. But in the end of winter, and the spring now at hand, the Argives came to Epidaurus with ladders, as destitute of men by reason of the war², thinking to have won it by assault: but returned again with their labour lost. And so ended this winter; and the thirteenth year of this war.

year xiii. A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 2.

57. In the middle of the next summer, the Lacedæmonians seeing that the Epidaurians their confederates were tired, and that of the rest of the cities of Peloponnesus, some had already revolted, and others were but in evil terms; and apprehending that if they¹ prevented it not, the mischief would spread still further: put themselves into the field with all their own forces, both of themselves and their Helotes, to make war against Argos, under the conduct of Agis, the son of Archidamus, their king. The Tegeats went also with them, and of the rest of Arcadia all that were in the Lacedæmonian league. But the rest of their confederates, both within Peloponnesus and without, were to meet² together at Phlius: that is to say, of the Bœotians five thousand men of arms and as many light-armed, five hundred horse, and to every horseman another man on foot³, [which holding the horse's mane ran by with equal speed]: of Corinthians two thousand men of arms, and of the rest more or less as they were: but the Phliasiens, because the army was assembled in their own territory, put forth their whole power.

year xiv. A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 2. 3.

Preparation of the Lacedæmonians against Argos.

58. The Argives, having had notice both formerly⁴ of the preparation of the Lacedæmonians, and afterward of their marching on to join with the rest at Phlius, brought their army likewise into the field. They had with them the aids of the Mantineans and their confederates, and three thousand men of arms of the Eleians: and marching forward, met the Lacedæmonians at Methydrium, a town of Arcadia, each side seizing on a hill. And the Argives prepared to give battle to the Lacedæmonians, whilst they were single. But Agis, dislodging his army by night, marched on to Phlius to the rest of the confederates, unseen. Upon knowledge hereof, the Argives betimes in the morning retired first to Argos, and afterwards to the forest of Nemea¹, by which they thought the Lacedæmonians and their confederates would fall in. But Agis came not the way which they expected: but with the Lacedæmonians, Arcadians, and Epidaurians, whom he acquainted with his purpose, took another more difficult way to pass, and came down into the Argive plains. The Corinthians also, and Pellenians and Phliasiens, marched another troublesome way². [Only] the Bœotians, Megareans, and Sicyonians were appointed to come down by the way of the forest of Nemea³, in which the Argives were encamped; to the end that if the Argives should turn head against the Lacedæmonians, these might set upon them at the back with their horse. Thus

year xiv. A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 2. 3.

The Lacedæmonians and their confederates meet at Phlius.

The Argives go to meet them at the forest of Nemea.

The Lacedæmonians come into the plains before Argos.

year xiv. A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 2. 3.

The Argives enclosed between the Lacedæmonians and the Bœotians: and the Lacedæmonians enclosed between the army of the Argives and their city.

ordered, Agis entered into the plains, and spoiled Saminthus and some other towns thereabouts. 59. Which when the Argives understood, they came out of the forest⁴ somewhat after break of day to oppose them; and lighting among the Phliasians and Corinthians, slew some few of the Phliasians, but had more slain of their own by the Corinthians, though not many. The Bœotians, Megareans, and Sicyonians, marched forward¹ towards Nemea, and found that the Argives were departed: for when they came down and saw their country wasted, they put themselves into order of battle. And the Lacedæmonians on the other side did the same; and the Argives stood intercepted in the midst of their enemies. For in the plain between them and the city, stood the Lacedæmonians and those with them; above them, were the Corinthians, Phliasians, and Pellenians; and towards Nemea, were the Bœotians, Sicyonians, and Megareans. And horsemen they had none: for the Athenians alone of all their confederates were not yet come.

Now the generality of the army of the Argives and their confederates did not think the danger present so great as indeed it was; but rather that the advantage in the battle would be their own: and that the Lacedæmonians were intercepted, not only in the Argives' territory, but also hard by the city. But two men of Argos, Thrasyllus, one of the five commanders of the army, and Alciphron, entertainer² of the Lacedæmonians, when the armies were even ready to join, went unto Agis, and dealt with him to have the battle put off: forasmuch as the Argives were content and ready both to propound and accept of equal arbitrators, in whatsoever the Lacedæmonians should charge them withal; and in the meantime to have peace with them solemnly confirmed.

Propositions of peace made by two private men of Argos:

60. This these Argives said of themselves, without the command of the generality. And Agis, of himself likewise, accepting their proposition without deliberation had with the major part, and having communicated it only to some one or more of those that had charge in the army¹, made truce with them for four months; in which space they were to perform the things agreed upon betwixt them: and then presently he withdrew his army without giving account to any of the rest of the league why he did so. The Lacedæmonians and the confederates followed Agis, according to the law², as being their general; but among themselves taxed him exceedingly: for that having a very fair occasion of battle, the Argives being inclosed on all sides both by their horse and foot, he yet went his way doing nothing worthy the great preparation they had made. For this was, in very truth, the fairest army that ever the Grecians had in the field unto this day. But it was most to be seen, when they were all together in the forest of Nemea³: where the Lacedæmonians were with their whole forces, besides the Arcadians, Bœotians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Phliasians, and Megareans; and these all chosen men of their several cities, and such as were thought a match, not only for the league of the Argives, but for such another added to it. The army thus¹ offended with Agis, departed; and were dissolved every man to his home.

year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 2. 3. and accepted by Agis, without the knowledge of the rest of the commanders.

Agis withdraweth his army, and is censured for it by the confederates.

year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 2. 3.

The Argives were much more offended with those of their city, which without the consent of the multitude had made the truce: they also supposing, that the Lacedæmonians had escaped their hands in such an advantage as they never had the like before; in that the battle was to have been fought under the city walls, and with the assistance of many and good confederates. And in their return they began to stone Thrasyllus at the Charadrum; the place where the soldiers, before they enter into the city from warfare, use to have their military causes heard². But he flying to the altar saved himself: nevertheless they confiscated his goods.

Thrasyllus punished for propounding the peace.

61. After this, the Athenians coming in with the aid of one thousand men of arms and three hundred horse under the conduct of Laches and Nicostratus, the Argives (for they were afraid for all this to break the truce with the Lacedæmonians) willed them to be gone again: and when they desired to treat, would not present them to the people till such time as the Mantineans and Eleians, who were not yet gone, forced them unto it by their importunity. Then the Athenians, in the presence of Alcibiades that was ambassador there, spake unto the Argives and their confederates; saying “that the truce was unduly made without the assent of the rest of their confederates, and that now (for they were come time enough) they ought to fall again to the war”: and did by their words so prevail with the confederates, that they all, save the Argives, presently marched against Orchomenus of Arcadia. And these, though satisfied, stayed behind at first¹, but afterwards they also went; and sitting down before Orchomenus, jointly² besieged and assaulted the same; desiring to take it in as well for other causes, as chiefly for that the hostages which the Arcadians had given to the Lacedæmonians were there in custody. The Orchomenians, fearing the weakness of their walls, and the greatness of the army, and lest they should perish before any relief could arrive, yielded up the town on conditions: “to be received into the league, give hostages for themselves, and to surrender the hostages held there by the Lacedæmonians into the hands of the Mantineans”. 62. The confederates after this, having gotten Orchomenus, sat in council about what town they should proceed against next. The Eleians gave advice to go against Lepreum: but the Mantineans against Tegea³. And the Argives and Athenians concurred in opinion with the Mantineans. But the Eleians, taking it in evil part that they did not decree to go against Lepreum, went home. But the rest prepared themselves at Mantinea to go against Tegea, which also some within had a purpose to put into their hands.

The Athenians instigate the Argives to break the truce.

year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 3.

The Argives break the truce, and besiege Orchomenus.

Orchomenus yielded.

The Argives go next against

year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 3. Tegea: which displeaseth the Eleians, and they go home.

63. The Lacedæmonians, after their return from Argos with their four months’ truce, severely questioned Agis, for that upon so fair an opportunity as they never had before, he subdued not Argos to the state: for so many and so good confederates would hardly be gotten together again at one time. But when also the news came of the taking of Orchomenus, then was their indignation much greater: and they presently resolved, contrary to their own custom, in their passion, to raze his

The Lacedæmonians question their king for suffering the Argives to go off unfoughten.

house, and fine him in the sum of ten thousand drachmes¹. But he besought them that they would do neither of these things yet: and promised that, leading out the army again, he would by some valiant action cancel those accusations; or, if not, they might proceed afterwards to do with him whatsoever they thought good. So they forbore both the fine and the razing of his house: but made a decree for that present, such as had never been before: that ten Spartans should be elected and joined with him as councillors, without whom it should not be lawful for him to lead the army into the field².

64. In the meantime came news from their side in Tegea; that, unless they came presently with aid, the Tegeans would revolt to the Argives and their confederates; and that they wanted little of being revolted already. Upon this, the Lacedæmonians with speed levied all their forces, both of themselves and their Helotes, in such number as they had never done before, and marched unto Oresteium in Mænalia: and appointed the Arcadians, such as were of their league, to assemble and follow them at the heels to Tegea. The Lacedæmonians being come entire to Oresteium, from thence sent back the sixth part of their army, in which they put both the youngest and the eldest sort, for the custody of the city; and with the rest marched on to Tegea: and not long after arrived also their confederates of Arcadia. They also sent to Corinth, and to the Bæotians, Phocéans, and Locrians, to come with their aids with all speed to Mantinea. But these had too short a warning; nor was it easy for them, unless they came all together and stayed for one another, to come through the enemy's country, which lay between and barred them of passage. Nevertheless, they made what haste they could. And the Lacedæmonians, taking with them their Arcadian confederates present, entered into the territory of Mantinea; and pitching their camp by the temple of Hercules, wasted the territory about.

year xiv. A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3. The Lacedæmonians put their army into the field to rescue Tegea.

The Lacedæmonians waste the territory of Mantinea.

65. The Argives and their confederates, as soon as they came in sight, seized on a certain place fortified by nature and of hard access, and put themselves into battle array. And the Lacedæmonians marched presently towards them; and came up within a stone or a dart's cast. But then one of the ancient men of the army cried out unto Agis, (seeing him to go on¹ against a place of that strength), that he went about to amend one fault with another: signifying, that he intended to make amends for his former retreat from Argos, which he was questioned for, with his now unseasonable forwardness. But he, whether it were upon that increpation, or some other sudden apprehension of his own², presently withdrew his army before the fight began; and marching unto the territory of Tegea, turned the course of the water into the territory of Mantinea³: touching which water, because into what part soever it had his course it did much harm to the country, the Mantineans and Tegeans were at wars. Now his drift was, by the turning of that water to provoke those Argives and their confederates which kept the hill, when they should hear of it, to come down and oppose them; that so they might fight with them in the plain. And by that time he had stayed about the water a day, he

year xiv. A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3.

year xiv. A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3.

The Argives come down from their advantage to seek the enemy.

year xiv. A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3. The Lacedæmonians put themselves in order hastily.

had diverted the stream. The Argives and their confederates were at first amazed at this their sudden retreat from so near them: and knew not what to make of it. But when after the retreat they returned no more in sight, and that they themselves, lying still on the place, did not pursue them: then began they anew to accuse their commanders, both for suffering the Lacedæmonians to depart formerly, when they had them inclosed at so fair an advantage before Argos; and now again, for not pursuing them when they ran away, but giving them leave to save themselves, and betraying the army. The commanders for the present were much troubled hereat: but afterwards they drew down the army from the hill, and coming forth into the plain, encamped as to go against the enemy. 66. The next day, the Argives and their confederates put themselves into such order as, if occasion served [1](#), they meant to fight in: and the Lacedæmonians returning from the water to the temple of Hercules, the same place where they had formerly encamped, perceived the enemies to be all of them in order of battle hard by them, come down already from the hill. Certainly the Lacedæmonians were more affrighted at this time, than ever they had been to their remembrance before. For the time they had to prepare themselves, was exceedingly short: and such was their diligence that every man fell immediately into his own rank [1](#), Agis the king commanding all according to the law. For whilst the king hath the army in the field, all things are commanded by him: and he signifieth what is to be done to the polemarchi, they to the lochagi, these to the pentecontateres, and these again to the enomotarchi; who lastly make it known, every one to his own enomotia. In this manner, when they would have anything to be done, their commands pass through the army, and are quickly executed. For almost all the Lacedæmonian army, save a very few, are captains of captains [2](#): and the care of what is to be put in execution lieth upon many.

67. Now their left wing consisted of the Sciritæ [3](#), which amongst the Lacedæmonians have ever alone that place. Next to these were placed the Brasideian soldiers lately come out of Thrace, and with them those that had been newly made free [4](#). After them in order the rest of the Lacedæmonians, band after band; and by them Arcadians, first the Heræans, after these the Mænalians. In the right wing were the Tegeats, and a few Lacedæmonians in the point of the same wing. And upon the outside of either wing, the horsemen. So stood the Lacedæmonians. Opposite to them, in the right wing stood the Mantineans; because it was upon their own territory; and with them such Arcadians as were of their league. Then the thousand chosen Argives [1](#), which the city had for a long time caused to be trained for the wars at the public charge: and next to them the rest of the Argives. After these, the Cleonæans and Orneates, their confederates. And lastly, the Athenians, with the horsemen (which were also theirs) had the left wing. 68. This was the order and preparation of both the armies. The army of the Lacedæmonians appeared to be the greater. But what the number was, either of the particulars of either side or in general, I could not exactly write. For the number of the Lacedæmonians, agreeable to the secrecy of that state, was unknown; and of the other side, for the ostentation usual with all men touching the number of themselves, was unbeliev'd. Nevertheless, the number of the Lacedæmonians may be attained by computing thus. Besides the Sciritæ, which were six hundred, there fought in all seven regiments, in every regiment were four

year xiv. A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3.

The order of the battle
of the Argives.

year xiv. A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3.

companies, in each company were four enomotia¹, and of every enomotia there stood in front four: but they were not ranged all alike in file, but as the captains of bands thought it necessary; but the army in general was so ordered, as to be eight men in depth. And the first rank of the whole, besides the Sciritæ, consisted of four hundred and forty-eight soldiers.

69. Now when they were ready to join, the commanders made their hortatives, every one to those that were under his own command. To the Mantineans it was said, “that they were to fight for their territory, and concerning their liberty and servitude; that the former¹ might not be taken from them, and that they might not again taste of the latter.” The Argives were admonished, “that whereas anciently they had the leading of Peloponnesus², and in it an equal share, they should not now suffer themselves to be deprived of it for ever; and that withal, they should now revenge the many injuries of a city, their neighbour and enemy.” To the Athenians, it was remembered, “how honourable a thing it would be for them, in company of so many and good confederates, to be inferior to none of them; and that if they had once vanquished the Lacedæmonians in Peloponnesus, their own dominion would become both the more assured, and the larger by it; and that no other would invade their territory hereafter.” Thus much was said to the Argives and their confederates. But the Lacedæmonians encouraged one another, both of themselves, and also by the manner of their discipline in the wars³; taking encouragement, being valiant men, by the commemoration of what they already knew; as being well acquainted, that a long actual experience conferred more to their safety than any short verbal exhortation, though never so well delivered. 70. After this followed the battle. The Argives and their confederates marched to the charge with great violence and fury. But the Lacedæmonians slowly and with many flutes, according to their military discipline; not as a point of religion, but that, marching evenly and by measure, their ranks might not be distracted; as the greatest¹ armies, when they march in the face of the enemy, use to be.

year xiv. A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3. The hortative to the Argives and their confederates.

The Lacedæmonians encourage one another.

year xiv. A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3.

The fight.

71. Whilst they were yet marching up, Agis the king thought of this course. All armies do thus. In the conflict they extend their right wing, so as it cometh in upon the flank of the left wing of the enemy: and this happeneth, for that every one, through fear, seeketh all he can to cover his unarmed side with the shield of him that standeth next to him on his right hand; conceiving, that to be so locked together is their best defence. The beginning hereof, is in the leader of the first file on the right hand: who ever striving to shift his unarmed side from the enemy, the rest upon like fear follow after. And at this time, the Mantineans in the right wing had far encompassed the Sciritæ: and the Lacedæmonians on the other side, and the Tegeats, were come in yet further upon the flank of the Athenians, by as much as they had the greater army. Wherefore Agis, fearing lest his left wing should be encompassed, and supposing the Mantineans to be come in far, signified unto the Sciritæ and Brasideians to draw out

year xiv. A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3.

The Lacedæmonians have the disadvantage for order, but advantage of valour

year xiv. A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3.

The Lacedæmonians have the victory.

part of their bands, and therewith to equalise their left wing to the right wing of the Mantineans¹; and into the void space, he commanded to come up Hipponoidas and Aristocles, two colonels², with their bands out of the right wing, and to fall in there and make up the breach: conceiving that more than enough would still be remaining in their right wing, and that the left wing opposed to the Mantineans would be the stronger. 72. But it happened, (for he commanded it in the very onset and on the sudden), both that Aristocles and Hipponoidas refused to go to the place commanded; (for which they were afterwards banished Sparta, as thought to have disobeyed out of cowardice); and that the enemy had in the meantime also charged: and when those which he commanded to go to the place of the Sciritæ went not, they could no more reunite themselves nor close again the empty space³. But the Lacedæmonians, though they had the worst at this time in every point for skill, yet in valour they manifestly showed themselves superior. For after the fight was once begun, notwithstanding that the right wing of the Mantineans did put to flight the Sciritæ and Brasideians, and that the Mantineans together with their confederates and those thousand chosen men of Argos, falling upon them in flank by the breach not yet closed up, killed many of the Lacedæmonians, and put to flight and chased them to their carriages, slaying also certain of the elder sort left there for a guard; so as in this part the Lacedæmonians were overcome: yet with the rest of the army, and especially the middle battle where Agis was himself, and those which are called *the three hundred horsemen*¹ about him, they charged upon the eldest of the Argives, and upon those which are named *the five cohorts*², and upon the Cleonæans and Orneates, and certain Athenians arranged amongst them; and put them all to flight: in such sort as many of them never struck stroke, but as soon as the Lacedæmonians charged gave ground presently; and some for fear to be overtaken³ were trodden under foot.

73. As soon as the army of the Argives and their confederates had in this part given ground, they began also to break on either side. The right wing of the Lacedæmonians and Tegeats had now with their surplusage of number hemmed the Athenians in, so as they had the danger on all hands; being within the circle, pent up, and without it, already vanquished⁴. And they had been the

year xiv. A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3.

The Lacedæmonians
pursue not the enemy
far.

most distressed part of all the army, had not their horsemen come in to help them. Withal it fell out that Agis, when he perceived the left wing of his own army to labour, namely, that which was opposed to the Mantineans and to those thousand Argives, commanded the whole army to go and relieve the part overcome. By which means the Athenians and such of the Argives as, together with them, were overlaid, whilst the army passed by and declined them, saved themselves at leisure. And the Mantineans with their confederates, and those chosen Argives, had no more mind now of pressing upon their enemies: but seeing their side was overcome and the Lacedæmonians approaching them, presently turned their backs. Of the Mantineans the greatest part¹ were slain; but of those chosen Argives, the most were saved; by reason the flight and going off was neither hasty nor long. For the Lacedæmonians fight long and constantly, till they have made the enemy to turn his back: but that done, they follow him not far.

74. Thus, or near thus, went the battle; the greatest that had been of a long time between Grecians and Grecians; and of two the most famous cities. The Lacedæmonians laying together the arms of their slain enemies, presently erected a trophy, and rifled their dead bodies². Their own dead they took up, and carried them to Tegea, where they were also buried: and delivered to the enemy theirs under truce. Of the Argives, and Orneates, and Cleonæans were slain seven hundred: of the Mantineans, two hundred: and of the Athenians with the Æginetæ, likewise two hundred, and both the captains. The confederates of the Lacedæmonians were never pressed, and therefore their loss was not worth mentioning: and of the Lacedæmonians themselves, it is hard to know the certainty; but it is said, there were slain three hundred.

year xiv. A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3. Number of
the dead.

75. When it was certain they would fight¹, Pleistoanax the other king of the Lacedæmonians, and with him both old and young, came out of the city to have aided the army: and came forth as far as Tegea, but being advertised of the victory they returned. And the Lacedæmonians sent out to turn back also those confederates of theirs, which were coming to them from Corinth and from without the isthmus. And then they also went home themselves; and having dismissed their confederates, (for now were the Carneian holidays), celebrated that feast. Thus in this one battle they wiped off their disgrace with the Grecians: for they had been taxed both with cowardice for the blow they received in the island, and with imprudence and slackness on other occasions. But after this, their miscarriage was imputed to fortune, and for their minds they were esteemed to have been² ever the same they had been.

The Lacedæmonians
recover their
reputation.

The day before this battle it chanced also that the Epidaurians with their whole power invaded the territory of Argos, as being emptied much of men: and whilst the Argives were abroad, killed many of those that were left behind to defend it¹. Also three thousand men of Elis and a thousand Athenians, besides those which had been sent before, being come after the battle to aid the Mantineans, marched presently all to Epidaurus; and lay before it all the while the Lacedæmonians were celebrating the Carneian holidays: and assigning to every one his part, began to take in the city with a wall. But the rest gave over: only the Athenians quickly finished a fortification, (which was their task), wherein stood the temple of Juno². In it amongst them all they left a garrison; and went home every one to his own city. And so this summer ended.

year xiv. A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3. The
Epidaurians enter the
territory of Argos.

The Athenians build a
fort before Epidaurus

The end of the twelfth
summer.

76. In the beginning of the winter following, the Lacedæmonians, presently after the end of the Carneian holidays, drew out their army into the field: and being come to Tegea, sent certain propositions of agreement before to Argos. There were, before this time, many citizens in Argos well affected to the Lacedæmonians, and that desired the deposing of the Argive people: and now after the battle they were better able by much to persuade the people to composition than they formerly were. And their design was, first, to get a peace

Peace concluded
between the Argives
and Lacedæmonians.

year xiv. A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3.

made with the Lacedæmonians, and after that a league; and then at last to set upon the commons.

There went thither Lichas the son of Archesilaus, entertainer¹ of the Argives in Lacedæmon, and brought to Argos two propositions: one of war, if the war were to proceed; another of peace, if they were to have peace². And after much contradiction, (for Alcibiades was also there), the Lacedæmonian faction, that boldly now discovered themselves, prevailed with the Argives to accept the proposition of peace; which was this.

77. “It seemeth good to the council³ of the Lacedæmonians to accord with the Argives on these articles:

the articles.

“The Argives shall redeliver unto the Orchomenians their children, and unto the Mænaliens their men, and unto the Lacedæmonians those men that are at Mantinea⁴: they shall withdraw their soldiers⁵ from Epidaurus, and raze the fortification there.

“And if the Athenians depart not from Epidaurus [likewise], they shall be held as enemies both to the Argives and to the Lacedæmonians, and also to the confederates of them both.

“ If the Lacedæmonians have any men¹ of theirs in custody, they shall deliver them every one to his own city.

year xiv. A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3. The
Articles.

“And for so much as concerneth the god, the Argives shall accept composition with the Epidaurians, upon an oath which they shall swear, touching that controversy; and the Argives shall give the form of that oath².

“All the cities of Peloponnesus, both small and great, shall be free according to their patrial laws.

“If any without Peloponnesus shall enter into it to do it harm, the Argives shall come forth to defend the same, in such sort as in a common council shall by the Peloponnesians be thought reasonable³.

“The confederates of the Lacedæmonians without Peloponnesus, shall have the same conditions which the confederates of the Argives and of the Lacedæmonians have; every one holding his own.

“This composition is to hold from the time, that they shall both parts have showed the same to their confederates, and obtained their consent⁴.

“ And if it shall seem good to either part to add or alter anything, their confederates shall be sent unto, and made acquainted therewith¹.”

year xiv. A. C. 418.
Ol. 90. 3.

78. These propositions the Argives accepted at first; and the army of the Lacedæmonians returned from Tegea to their own city. But shortly after, when they had commerce together, the same men went further; and so wrought, that the Argives

renouncing their league with the Mantineans, Eleians, and Athenians, made league and alliance with the Lacedæmonians in this form.

79. “It seemeth good to the Lacedæmonians and Argives to make league and alliance for fifty years on these articles:

the league between the argives and lacedæmonians.

“That either side shall allow unto the other equal and like trials of judgment, after the form used in their cities.

“That the rest of the cities of Peloponnesus (this league and alliance comprehending also them) shall be free both from the laws and payments of any other city than their own; holding what they have, and affording equal and like trials of judgment according to the form used in their several cities².

“That every of the cities confederate with the Lacedæmonians, without Peloponnesus, shall be in the same condition with the Lacedæmonians: and the confederates of the Argives, in the same with the Argives: every one holding his own.

“That if at any time there shall need an expedition to be taken in common, the Lacedæmonians and the Argives shall consult thereof, and decree as shall stand most with equity towards the confederates. And that if any controversy arise between any of the cities, either within or without Peloponnesus, about limits or other matter, they also shall decide it.

year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 3. The league between the Argives and Lacedæmonians.

“That if any confederate city be at contention with another, it shall have recourse to that city which they both shall think most indifferent: but the particular men of any one city shall be judged according to the law of the same.”

80. Thus was the peace and league concluded: and whatsoever one had taken from the other in the war, or whatsoever one had against another otherwise, was all acquitted. Now¹, when they were together settling their business, they ordered that the Argives should neither admit herald nor ambassage from the Athenians till they were gone out of Peloponnesus, and had quit the fortification: nor should make peace or war with any without consent of the rest. And amongst other things which they did in this heat, they sent ambassadors from both their cities to the towns lying upon Thrace and unto Perdiccas: whom they also persuaded to swear himself of the same league. Yet he revolted not from the Athenians presently, but intended it: because he saw the Argives had done so; and was himself also anciently descended out of Argos¹. They likewise renewed their old oath with the Chalcideans; and took another besides it. The Argives sent ambassadors also to Athens, requiring them to abandon the fortification² they had made against Epidaurus. And the Athenians considering that the soldiers they had in it were few in respect to the many others that were with them in the same, sent Demosthenes to fetch them away. He,

The Argives and Lacedæmonians make an order that the Athenians shall quit the fort.

They solicit the towns upon Thrace to revolt from the Athenians.

year xiv. A. C. 418. Ol. 90. 3.

Demosthenes being sent to fetch their soldiers from the fort, delivereth the same by a wile to the Epidaurians.

when he was come, and had exhibited for a pretence a certain exercise of naked men without the fort, when the rest of the garrison were gone forth to see it, made fast the gates: and afterwards having renewed the league with the Epidaurians, the Athenians by themselves put the fort into their hands.

81. After the revolt of the Argives from the league, the Mantineans also, though they withstood it at first, yet being too weak without the Argives, made their peace with the Lacedæmonians; and laid down their command over the other cities³. And the Lacedæmonians and Argives with a thousand men of either city having joined their arms, the Lacedæmonians first, with their single power, reduced the government of Sicyon to a smaller number; and then they both together dissolved the democracy at Argos. And the oligarchy was established conformable to the state of Lacedæmon.

A. C. 417. Ol. 90. 3. The Mantineans forsake the league of Athens.

year xiv. A. C. 417. Ol. 90. 3. Sicyon and Argos reduced to oligarchies.

These things passed in the end of winter, and near the spring. And so ended the fourteenth year of this war.

82. The next summer the Dictideans¹ seated in Mount Athos, revolted from the Athenians to the Chalcideans.

year xv. The Dictideans revolt from Athens: Achaia oligarchized: Argos relapseth into a democracy

And the Lacedæmonians ordered the state of Achaia after their own form, which before was otherwise. But the Argives, after they had by little and little assembled themselves and recovered heart, taking the time when the Lacedæmonians were celebrating their exercises of *the naked youth*², assaulted *the few*; and in a battle fought within the city, the commons had the victory; and some they slew, others they drave into exile. The Lacedæmonians, though those of their faction in Argos sent for them, went not a long time after: yet at last they adjourned the exercises, and came forth with intention of giving them aid. But hearing by the way at Tegea, that *the few* were overcome, they could not be entreated by such as had escaped thence, to go on: but returning, went on with the celebration of their exercises. But afterwards, when there came ambassadors unto them, both from the Argives¹ in the city, and from them that were driven out, there being present also their confederates, and much alleged on either side: they concluded at last, that those in the city had done the wrong, and decreed to go against Argos with their army; but many delays passed, and much time was spent between. In the meantime the common people of Argos, fearing the Lacedæmonians, and regaining the league with Athens, as conceiving the same would turn to their very great advantage, raise long walls from their city down to the sea-shore: to the end, that if they were shut up by land, they might yet with the help of the Athenians bring things necessary into the city by sea. And with this their building, some other cities of Peloponnesus were also acquainted². And the Argives universally, themselves and wives and servants, wrought at the wall: and had workmen and hewers of stone from Athens³. So this summer ended.

year xv. A. C. 417. Ol. 90. 4.

The Argives come again to the league of Athens, and with long walls take in a way from their city to the sea.

The end of the fifteenth summer.

83. The next winter the Lacedæmonians, understanding that they were fortifying, came to Argos with their army, they and their confederates all but the Corinthians: and some practice they had beside within the city itself of Argos. The army was commanded by Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians. But those things which were practising in Argos and supposed to have been already mature, did not then succeed. Nevertheless they took the walls that were then in building, and razed them to the ground: and then, after they had taken Hysiæ, a town in the Argive territory, and slain all the freemen in it, they went home, and were dissolved every one to his own city. After this, the Argives went with an army into Phlasiæ: which when they had wasted, they went back. They did it, because the men of Phlius had received their outlaws: for there the greatest part of them dwelt.

The Lacedæmonian army comes to Argos, and razeth the walls which they were building.

year xv. A. C. 417.
Ol. 90. 4.

They take Hysiæ, a town in Argeia.

The Argives spoil the territory of Phlasiæ.

The same winter the Athenians shut up Perdiccas in Macedonia [from the use of the sea]¹: objecting, that he had sworn the league of the Argives and Lacedæmonians; and that when they had prepared an army, under the command of Nicias the son of Niceratus, to go against the Chalcideans upon Thrace and against Amphipolis, he had broken the league made betwixt them and him, and by his departure² was the principal cause of the dissolution of that army; and was therefore an enemy. And so this winter ended, and the fifteenth year of this war.

The Athenians quarrel Perdiccas, and bar him the use of the sea.

84. The next summer went Alcibiades to Argos with twenty galleys; and took thence the suspected Argives, and such as seemed to savour of the Lacedæmonian faction, to the number of three hundred; and put them into the nearest of the islands subject to the Athenian state.

year xvi. Alcibiades fetcheth away three hundred citizens of Argos for Lacedæmonism.

The Athenians made war also against the isle of Melos, with thirty galleys of their own, six of Chios, and two of Lesbos. Wherein were of their own, twelve hundredmen of arms, three hundred archers, and twenty archers on horseback: and of their confederates and islanders, about fifteen hundred men of arms. The Melians are a colony of the Lacedæmonians¹, and therefore refused to be subject, as the rest of the islands were, unto the Athenians; but rested at the first neutral; and afterwards, when the Athenians put them to it by wasting of their land, they entered into open war.

year xvi. A. C. 416.
Ol. 90. 4. The Athenians war against the island of Melos.

Now the Athenian commanders, Cleomedes the son of Lycomedes, and Tisias the son of Tisimachus, being encamped upon their land with these forces, before they would hurt the same sent ambassadors to deal with them first by way of conference. These ambassadors the Melians refused to bring before the multitude; but commanded them to deliver their message before the magistrates and the few: and they accordingly said as followeth:

85. *Athenians*. “Since we may not speak to the multitude, for fear lest when they hear our persuasive and unanswerable arguments all at once in a continued oration, they should chance to be seduced; (for we know that this is the scope of your bringing us to audience before *the few*); make surer yet that point, you that sit here: answer¹ you also to every particular, not in a set speech, but presently interrupting us, whensoever anything shall be said by us which shall seem unto you to be otherwise. And first answer us, whether you like this motion or not?”

dialogue between the
athenians and
melians.

year xvi. A. C. 416.
Ol. 90. 4. Dialogue
between the
Athenians and
Melians.

86. Whereunto the council of the Melians answered: “The equity of a leisurely debate is not to be found fault withal; but this preparation of war, not future but already here present, seemeth not to agree with the same. For we see that you are come to be judges of the conference: and that the issue of it, if we be superior in argument² and therefore yield not, is likely to bring us war; and if we yield, servitude.”

87. *Ath*. “Nay, if you be come together to reckon up suspicions of what may be, or to any other purpose than to take advice upon what is present and before your eyes, how to save your city from destruction, let us give over. But if this be the point, let us speak to it.”

88. *Mel*. “It is reason, and pardonable for men in our cases, to turn both their words and thoughts upon divers things. Howsoever, this consultation being held only upon the point of our safety, we are content, if you think good, to go on with the course you have propounded.”

89. *Ath*. “As we therefore will not, for our parts, with fair pretences; as, that having defeated the Medes, our reign is therefore lawful, or, that we come against you for injury done; make a long discourse without being believed: so would we have you also not expect to prevail by saying, either that you therefore took not our parts because you were a colony of the Lacedæmonians, or that you have done us no injury. But out of those things which we both of us do really think, let us go through with that which is feasible; both you and we knowing, that in human disputation justice is then only agreed on when the necessity is equal¹; whereas they that have odds of power exact as much as they can, and the weak yield to such conditions as they can get.”

year xvi. A. C. 416.
Ol. 90. 4. Dialogue
between the
Athenians and
Melians.

90. *Mel*. “Well then, (seeing you put the point of profit in the place of justice), we hold it profitable for ourselves, not to overthrow a general profit to all men, which is this: that men in danger, if they plead reason and equity, nay, though somewhat without the strict compass of justice, yet it ought ever to do them good². And the same most of all concerneth you: forasmuch as you shall else give an example unto others of the greatest revenge that can be taken, if you chance to miscarry.”

year xvi. A. C. 416.
Ol. 90. 4. Dialogue
between the
Athenians and
Melians.

91. *Ath.* “As for us, though our dominion should cease, yet we fear not the sequel. For not they that command, as do the Lacedæmonians, are cruel to those that are vanquished by them; (yet we have nothing to do now with the Lacedæmonians); but such as having been in subjection, have assaulted those that commanded them and gotten the victory¹. But let the danger of that be to ourselves. In the meantime we tell you this: that we are here now both to enlarge² our own dominion, and also to confer about the saving of your city. For we would have dominion over you without oppressing you, and preserve you to the profit of us both.”

92. *Mel.* “But how can it be profitable for us to serve; though it be so for you to command?”

93. *Ath.* “Because you by obeying, shall save yourselves from extremity; and we not destroying you, shall reap profit by you.”

94. *Mel.* “But will you not accept, that we remain quiet and be your friends, (whereas before we were your enemies), and take part with neither?”

95. *Ath.* “No. For your enmity doth not so much hurt us, as your friendship will be an argument of our weakness, and your hatred of our power, amongst those we have rule over.”

96. *Mel.* “Why? Do your subjects measure equity so, as to put those that never had to do with you, and themselves, who for the most part have been your own colonies, and some of them after revolt conquered, into one and the same consideration?”

year xvi. A. C. 416.
Ol. 90. 4. Dialogue
between the
Athenians and
Melians.

97. *Ath.* “Why not? For they think they have reason on their side, both the one sort and the other; and that such as are subdued, are subdued by force, and such as are forborne, are so through our fear¹. So that by subduing you, besides the extending of our dominion over so many more subjects, we shall assure it the more over those we had before; especially being masters of the sea, and you islanders, and weaker (except you can get the victory) than others whom we have subdued already².”

98. *Mel.* “Do you think then, that there is no assurance in that which we propounded³? For here again, (since driving us from the plea of equity you persuade us to submit to your profit), when we have shewed you what is good for us, we must endeavour to draw you to the same, as far forth as it shall be good for you also. As many therefore as now are neutral, what do you but make them your enemies, when, beholding these your proceedings, they look that hereafter you will also turn your arms upon them? And what is this, but to make greater the enemies you have already, and to make others your enemies, each against their wills, that would not else have been so?”

year xvi. A. C. 416.
Ol. 90. 4. Dialogue
between the
Athenians and
Melians.

99. *Ath.* “We do not think that they shall be ever the more our enemies, who inhabiting anywhere in the continent, will be long ere they so much as keep guard

upon their liberty against us. But islanders unsubdued, as you be, or islanders offended with the necessity of subjection which they are already in: these may indeed, by unadvised courses, put both themselves and us into apparent danger.”

100. *Mel.* “If you then to retain your command, and your vassals to get loose from you, will undergo the utmost of danger: would it not in us¹, that be already free, be great baseness and cowardice, if we should not encounter anything whatsoever rather than suffer ourselves to be brought into bondage?”

101. *Ath.* “No; if you advise rightly. For you have not in hand a match of valour upon equal terms, wherein to forfeit your honour; but rather a consultation upon your safety, that you resist not such as be so far your overmatches.”

102. *Mel.* “But we know that, in matter of war, the event is sometimes otherwise² than according to the difference of number in sides: and that if we yield presently, all our hope is lost; whereas if we hold out, we have yet a hope to keep ourselves up.”

103. *Ath.* “Hope, the comfort of danger, when such use it as have to spare, though it hurt them, yet it destroys them not. But to such as set their rest¹ upon it, (for it is a thing by nature prodigal), it at once by failing maketh itself known; and known, leaveth no place for future caution². Which let not be your own case, you that are but weak, and have no more but this one stake. Nor be you like unto many men: who though they may presently save themselves by human means, will yet, when upon pressure of the enemy their most apparent hopes fail them, betake themselves to blind ones; as *divination, oracles*, and other such things which with hopes destroy men.”

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Ol. 90. 4. Dialogue
between the
Athenians and
Melians.

104. *Mel.* “We think it, you well know, a hard matter for us to combat your power and fortune, unless we might do it on equal terms. Nevertheless we believe that, for fortune, we shall be nothing inferior; as having the gods on our side, because we stand innocent against men unjust: and for power, what is wanting in us will be supplied by our league with the Lacedæmonians, who are of necessity obliged, if for no other cause, yet for consanguinity’s sake and for their own honour, to defend us. So that we are confident, not altogether so much without reason as you think.”

105. *Ath.* “As for the favour of the gods, we expect to have it as well as you: for we neither do, nor require anything contrary to what mankind hath decreed, either concerning the worship of the gods, or concerning themselves. For of the gods we think according to the common opinion; and of men, that for certain by necessity of nature they will every where reign over such as they be too strong for¹. Neither did we make this law, nor are we the first that use it made: but as we found it, and shall leave it to posterity for ever, so also we use it: knowing that you likewise, and others that should have the same power which we have, would do the same. So that forasmuch as toucheth the favour of the gods, we have in reason no fear of being inferior. And as for the opinion you have of the Lacedæmonians, in that you believe they will help you for their own honour: we bless your innocent

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Ol. 90. 4. Dialogue
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Athenians and
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minds, but affect not your folly. For the Lacedæmonians, though in respect of themselves and the constitutions of their own country they are wont for the most part to be generous; yet in respect of others, though much might be alleged, yet the shortest way one might say it all thus: that most apparently of all men, they hold for *honourable* that which pleaseth, and for *just* that which profiteth. And such an opinion maketh nothing for your now absurd means of safety.”

106. *Mel.* “Nay, for this same opinion of theirs, we now the rather believe¹ that they will not betray their own colony, the Melians; and thereby become perfidious to such of the Grecians as be their friends, and beneficial to such as be their enemies.”

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107. *Ath.* “You think not then, that what is profitable must be also safe, and that which is just and honourable must be performed with danger; which commonly the Lacedæmonians are least willing of all men to undergo [for others].”

108. *Mel.* “But we suppose that they will undertake danger for us, rather than for any other; and that they think that we will be more assured unto them, than unto any other: because for action, we lie near to Peloponnesus², and for affection, are more faithful than others for our nearness of kin.”

109. *Ath.* “The security of such as are at wars, consisteth not in the good will of those that are called³ to their aid, but in the power of those means they excel in. And this the Lacedæmonians themselves use to consider more than any; and therefore, out of diffidence in their own forces, they take many of their confederates with them, though to an expedition but against their neighbours. Wherefore it is not likely, we being masters of the sea, that they will ever pass over into an island.”

110. *Mel.* “Yea, but they may have others to send: and the Cretic sea is wide, wherein to take another is harder for him that is master of it, than it is for him that will steal by, to save himself. And if this course fail, they may turn their arms against your own territory, or those of your confederates not invaded by Brasidas. And then you shall have to trouble yourselves, no more about a territory that you have nothing to do withal, but about your own and your confederates¹.”

year xvi. A. C. 416.
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between the
Athenians and
Melians.

111. *Ath.* “Let² them take which course of these they will, that you also may find by experience, and not be ignorant, that the Athenians never yet gave over siege for fear of any diversion upon others. But we observe that, whereas you said you would consult of your safety, you have not yet in all this discourse said anything, which a man relying on could hope to be preserved by: the strongest arguments you use are but future hopes; and your present power is too short to defend you against the forces already arranged against you. You shall therefore take very absurd counsel, unless excluding us you make amongst yourselves some more discreet conclusion: for [when you are by yourselves], you will no more

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set your thoughts upon shame; which, when dishonour and danger stand before men's eyes, for the most part undoeth them³. For many, when they have foreseen into what dangers they were entering, have nevertheless been so overcome by that forcible word, *dishonour*, that that which is but called dishonour, hath caused them to fall willingly into immedicable calamities; and so to draw upon themselves really, by their own madness, a greater dishonour than could have befallen them by fortune. Which you, if you deliberate wisely, will take heed of; and not think shame to submit to a most potent city, and that upon so reasonable conditions, as of league and of enjoying your own under tribute: and seeing choice is given you of war or safety, do¹ not out of peevishness take the worse. For such do take the best course, who though they give no way to their equals, yet do fairly accommodate to their superiors; and towards their inferiors use moderation. Consider of it therefore, whilst we stand off; and have often in your mind, that you deliberate of your country; which is to be happy² or miserable in and by this one consultation."

112. So the Athenians went aside from the conference; and the Melians, after they had decreed³ the very same things which before they had spoken, made answer unto them in this manner: "Men of Athens, our resolution is no other than what you have heard before; nor will we, in a small portion of time, overthrow that liberty, in which our city hath remained for the space of seven hundred years since it was first founded. But trusting to the fortune by which the gods have preserved it hitherto, and unto the help of men, that is⁴, of the Lacedæmonians, we will do our best to maintain the same. But this we offer: to be your friends; enemies to neither side; and you to depart out of our land, after agreement¹ such as we shall both think fit."

year xvi. A. C. 416.
Ol. 90. 4. Dialogue
between the
Athenians and
Melians.

113. Thus the Melians answered. To which the Athenians, the conference being already broken off, replied thus: "You are the only men, as it seemeth to us, by this consultation, that think future things more certain than things seen; and behold things doubtful, through desire to have them true, as if they were already come to pass. As you attribute and trust the most unto the Lacedæmonians, and to fortune and hopes, so will you be the most deceived". 114. This said, the Athenian ambassadors departed to their camp. And the commanders, seeing that the Melians stood out, fell presently to the war: and dividing the work among the several cities, encompassed the city of the Melians with a wall. The Athenians afterwards left some forces of their own and of their confederates, for a guard both by sea and land: and with the greatest part of their army went home. The rest that were left, besieged the place.

The Athenians and
Melians agree not.

The city of Melos
besieged.

The Argives lose
eighty men by an
ambushment of the
Phliasiens.

The Athenians in
Pylus infest Laconia.

115. About the same time the Argives, making a road² into Phliasia, lost about eighty of their men, by ambush laid for them by the men of Phlius and the outlaws of their own city. And the Athenians that lay in Pylus, fetched in thither a great booty from the Lacedæmonians. Notwithstanding which, the Lacedæmonians did not war³ upon them, [as] renouncing the peace: but gave leave by edict¹ only, to any of their people that would to take booties reciprocally in the territory of the Athenians. The Corinthians also made war upon the Athenians: but it was for certain controversies of their own: and the rest of Peloponnesus stirred not.

year xvi. A. C. 416.
Ol. 91. 1. The
Corinthians war on
the Athenians.

The Melians also took that part of the wall of the Athenians by an assault in the night, which looked towards the market-place²: and having slain the men that guarded it, brought into the town both corn and other provision, whatsoever they could buy for money³: and so returned and lay still. And the Athenians from thenceforth kept a better watch. And so this summer ended.

The Melians relieve
their town.

The end of the
fifteenth summer

116. The winter following, the Lacedæmonians being about to enter with their army into the territory of the Argives, when they perceived that the sacrifices which they made on the border for their passage were not acceptable, returned. And the Argives, having some of their own city in suspicion in regard of this design of the Lacedæmonians, apprehended some of them; and some escaped.

About the same time the Melians took another part of the wall of the Athenians; they that kept the siege being then not many. But this done, there came afterwards some fresh forces from Athens, under the conduct of Philocrates the son of Demeas. And the town being now strongly besieged, there being also within some that practised to have it given up, they yielded themselves to the discretion of the Athenians: who slew all the men of military age, made slaves of the women and children¹; and inhabited the place with a colony sent thither afterwards of five hundred men of their own.

year xvi. A. C. 416.
Ol. 91. 1.

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THE SIXTH BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.

THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS.

Sicily described.—The causes and pretences of the Sicilian war: with the consultation and preparation for the same.—Alcibiades, one of the generals of the army, accused of defacing the images of Mercury, is suffered for that present to depart with the army.—The Athenian army cometh to Rhegium: thence to Catana.—From thence Alcibiades is sent for home to make answer to his accusations: and by the way escaping, goeth to Lacedæmon.—Nicias encampeth near Syracuse: and having overcome the army of the Syracusians in battle, returneth to Catana.—The Syracusians procure aids amongst the rest of the Sicilians.—Alcibiades instigateth and instructeth the Lacedæmonians against his country.—Nicias returneth from Catana to Syracuse: and encamping in Epipolæ, besiegeth the city: and beginneth to enclose them with a double wall, which was almost brought to perfection in the beginning of the eighteenth year of this war.

1. The same winter the Athenians, with greater forces than they had before sent out with Laches and Eurymedon, resolved to go again into Sicily; and if they could, wholly to subdue it: being for the most part ignorant both of the greatness of the island, and of the multitude of people, as well Greeks as barbarians, that inhabited the same; and that they undertook a war not much less than the war against the Peloponnesians. For the compass of Sicily is little less than eight days' sail for a ship; and though so great, is yet divided with no more than twenty furlongs, sea measure¹, from the continent.

year xvi. A. C. 416.
Ol. 91. 1. The Athenians resolve to invade Sicily.

year xvi. A. C. 416.
Ol. 91. 1. The greatness of Sicily and the inhabitants.

2. It was inhabited in old time, thus; and these were the nations that held it. The most ancient inhabitants in a part thereof, are said to have been the Cyclopes and Læstrigones: of whose stock, and whence they came or to what place they removed, I have nothing to say. Let that suffice which the poets have spoken, and which every particular man hath learned of them. After them, the first that appear to have dwelt therein, are the Sicanians, as they say themselves; nay, before the other, as being the natural breed of the island. But the truth is, they were Iberians; and driven away by the Ligyans from the banks of Sicanus², a river on which they were seated in Iberia. And the island from them came to be called Sicania, which was before Trinacria. And these [two] inhabit yet in the western parts of Sicily. After the taking of Ilium certain Trojans, escaping the hands of the Grecians, landed with small boats in Sicily: and having planted themselves on the borders of the Sicanians, both the nations in one were called Elymi; and their cities were Eryx and Egesta¹. Hard by these came and dwelled also certain Phoceans, who coming from Troy, were by tempest carried first into Afric, and thence into Sicily. But the Siculi

Cyclopes and Læstrigones.

Sicanians.

Sicania, Trinacria.

Trojans.

Siculi.

passed out of Italy, (for there they inhabited), flying from the Opici, having, as is most likely and as it is reported, observed the strait, and with a fore wind gotten over in boats which they made suddenly on the occasion, or perhaps by some other means.

There is at this day a people in Italy called Siculi. And Italy itself got that name after the same manner, from a king of Arcadia called Italus. Of these a great army crossing into Sicily, overthrew the Sicanians in battle, and drave them into the south and west parts of the same; and instead of Sicania, caused the island to be called *Sicilia*: and held and inhabited the best of the land for near three hundred years after their going over, and before any of the Grecians came thither. And till now they possess the midland and north parts of the island.

Also the Phœnicians inhabited the coast of Sicily on all sides, having taken possession of certain promontories and little islands adjacent, for trade's sake with the Sicilians. But after that many Grecians were come in by sea, the Phœnicians abandoned most of their former habitations: and uniting themselves dwelt in Motya and Soloeis and Panormus, upon the borders of the Elymi; as relying upon their league with the Elymi, and because also from thence lay the shortest cut over unto Carthage. These were the barbarians, and thus they inhabited Sicily.

Phœnicians.

3. Now for Grecians, first a colony of Chalcideans, under Thucles their conductor, going from Eubœa, built Naxos, and the altar of Apollo *Archegetes*, now standing without the city: upon which the ambassadors employed to the oracles, as often as they launch from Sicily, are accustomed to offer their first

Chalcideans. About A. C. 759. Ol. 5. 2.

sacrifice. The next year Archias, a man of the Herculean family, carried a colony from Corinth, and became founder of Syracuse: where first he drave the Siculi out of that island in which the inner part of the city now standeth; not now environed wholly with the sea, as it was then. And in process of time, when the city also that is without was taken in with a wall, it became a populous city. In the fifth year after the building of Syracuse, Thucles and the Chalcideans, going from Naxos, built Leontium, expelling thence the Siculi; and after that Catana: but they that went to Catana, chose Euarchus for their founder.

Corinthians.

Megareans.

A. C. 728. Ol. 13. 1.

A. C. 628. Ol. 38. 1.

A. C. 713. Ol. 16. 4.
Rhodians and
Cretans.

Zanc first built by
pirates of Cume.

Eubœans.

4. About the same time in Sicily arrived also Lamis, with a colony from Megara; and first built a certain town called Trotilus, upon the river Pantacius; where for a while after he governed the estate of his colony in common with the Chalcideans of Leontium. But afterwards, when he was by them thrust out, and had builded Thapsus, he died; and the rest going from Thapsus, under the conduct of Hyblon, a king of the Siculi, built Megara, called Megara-Hyblæa¹. And after they had there inhabited two hundred and forty-five years, they were by Gelon, a tyrant of Syracuse, put out both of the city and territory. But before they were driven thence, namely one hundred years after they had built it, they sent out Pammilus and built the city of Selinus. This Pammilus came to them from Megara, their own metropolitan city: and so together with them founded Selinus. Gela was built in the forty-fifth year after Syracuse, by Antiphemus, that brought a colony out of Rhodes, and by Entymus, that did the like out of Crete, jointly. This city was named after the name of the river Gela; and the place where now the city standeth, and which at first they walled in, was called Lindii². And the laws which they established were the Doric. About one hundred and eight years after their own foundation, they of Gela built the city of Acragante, calling the city after the name of the river: and for their conductors chose Aristonous and Pystilus, and gave unto them the laws of Gela. Zancle was first built by pirates that came from Cume, a Chalcidean city in Opicia¹: but afterwards there came a multitude, and helped to people it, out of Chalcis and the rest of Eubœa; and their conductors were Perieres and Cratæmenes; one of Cume, the other of Chalcis. And the name of the city was at first *Zancle*, so named by the Sicilians because it hath the form of a sickle; and the Sicilians call a sickle *zanclon*. But these inhabitants were afterwards chased thence by the Samians and other people of Ionia²; that in their flight from the Medes, fell upon Sicily. After this, Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, drave out the Samians; and peopling the city with a mixed people of them and his own, instead of Zancle called the place by the name of his own country from whence he was anciently descended, Messina³.

Samians and other Ionians.

5. After Zancle was built Himera, by Eucleides, Simus, and Sacon; the most of which colony were Chalcideans; but there were also amongst them certain outlaws of Syracuse, the vanquished part of a sedition, called the Myletidæ. Their language grew to a mean between the Chalcidean and Doric: but the laws of the Chalcidean prevailed. Acræ and Casmænæ were built by the Syracusians: Acræ, twenty years after Syracuse; and Casmænæ, almost twenty after Acræ. Camarina was at first built by the Syracusians, very near the hundred and thirty-fifth year of their own city; Dascon and Menecolus being the conductors. But the Camarinæans having been by the Syracusians driven from their seat by war for revolt, Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, in process of time, taking of the Syracusians that territory for ransom of certain Syracusian prisoners, became their founder, and placed them in Camarina again. After this again, having been driven thence by Gelon, they were planted the third time in the same city¹.

Acræ, Casmænæ.

Camarina.

A. C. 483. Ol. 74. 2.

A. C. 461. Ol. 79. 4.

The cause and pretence of the Athenians to invade it.

6. These were the nations, Greeks and barbarians, that inhabited Sicily. And though it were thus great, yet the Athenians longed very much to send an army against it, out of a desire to bring it all under their subjection; which was the true motive; but as having withal this fair pretext, of aiding their kindred and new confederates². But principally they were instigated to it by the ambassadors of Egesta, who were at Athens and earnestly pressed them thereto. For bordering on the territory of the Selinuntians, they had begun a war about certain things concerning marriage, and about a piece of ground that lay doubtfully between them. And the Selinuntians having leagued themselves with the Syracusians, infested¹ them with war both by sea and by land. Insomuch as the Egestæans, putting the Athenians in mind of their former league with the Leontines made by Laches, prayed them to send a fleet thither in their aid; alleging, amongst many other things, this as principal: that if the Syracusians, who had driven the Leontines from their seat, should pass without revenge taken on them, and so proceed, by consuming the rest of the allies of the Athenians there, to get the whole power of Sicily into their hands, it would be dangerous lest hereafter some time or other, being Dorians, they should with great forces aid the Dorians for affinity, and being a colony of the Peloponnesians join with the Peloponnesians that sent them out, to pull down the Athenian empire: that it were wisdom, therefore, with those confederates they yet retain, to make head against the Syracusians; and the rather, because for the defraying of the war the Egestæans would furnish money sufficient of themselves. Which things when the Athenians had often heard in their assemblies from the mouths of the Egestæan ambassadors and of their advocates and patrons, they decreed to send ambassadors to Egesta; to see first, whether there were in their treasury and temples so much wealth as they said there was, and to bring word in what terms the war stood between that city and the Selinuntians. And ambassadors were sent into Sicily accordingly.

year xvi. A. C. 416.
Ol. 91. 1.

7. The same winter the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, all but the Corinthians, having drawn out their forces into the territory of the Argives, wasted a small part of their fields, and carried away certain cart-loads of their corn. Thence they went to Orneæ, and having placed there the Argive outlaws, left with them a few others of the rest of the army: and then making a composition for a certain time, that they of Orneæ and those Argives should not wrong each other, they carried their army home. But the Athenians arriving not long after with thirty galleys and six hundred men of arms, the people of Argos came also forth with their whole power, and joining with them, sat down betimes in the morning¹ before Orneæ. But when at night the army went somewhat far off to lodge, they within fled out; and the Argives the next day perceiving it, pulled Orneæ to the ground, and went home. And so also did the Athenians not long after with their galleys. Also the Athenians transported certain horsemen by sea, part of their own, and part Macedonian fugitives that lived with them, into Methone¹, and ravaged the territory of Perdiccas. And the Lacedæmonians sent unto the Chalcideans upon Thrace, who held peace with the Athenians from ten days to ten days, appointing them to aid Perdiccas. But they refused. And so ended the winter, and the sixteenth year of this war written by Thucydides.

A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1.
The Lacedæmonians waste part of Argolica, and put the outlaws of Argos into Orneæ.

The Athenians war upon Macedonia.

year xvi. A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 1.

8. The next summer, early in the spring, the Athenian ambassadors returned from Sicily, and the ambassadors of Egesta with them: and brought in silver uncoined sixty talents, for a month's pay of sixty galleys², which they would entreat the Athenians to send thither. And the Athenians having called an assembly, and heard both from the Egestæan and their own ambassadors, amongst other persuasive but untrue allegations, touching their money, how they had great store ready both in their treasury and temples, decreed the sending of sixty galleys into Sicily, and Alcibiades the son of Cleinias, Nicias the son of Niceratus, and Lamachus the son of Xenophanes, for commanders with authority absolute: the which were to aid the people of Egesta against the Selinuntians, and withal, if they had time to spare, to plant the Leontines anew in their city; and to order all other the affairs of Sicily as they should think most for the profit of the Athenians. Five days after this the people assembled again, to consult of the means how most speedily to put this armada in readiness; and to decree such things as the generals should further require for the expedition. But Nicias having heard¹ that himself was chosen for one of the generals, and conceiving that the state had not well resolved, but affected the conquest of all Sicily, a great matter, upon small and superficial pretences, stood forth, desiring to have altered this the Athenians' purpose, and spake as followeth:

year xvii. The Athenians decree the voyage of Sicily: and Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus for generals.

year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1.

9. "Though this assembly was called to deliberate of our preparation, and of the manner how to set forth our fleet for Sicily: yet to me it seemeth, that we ought rather once again to consult, whether it be not better not to send it at all; than upon a short deliberation in so weighty an affair, and upon the credit of strangers, to draw upon ourselves an impertinent war. For my own part, I have honour by it: and for the danger of my person, I esteem it the least of all men: (not but that I think him a good² member of the commonwealth, that hath regard also to his own person and estate; for such a man especially will desire the public to prosper for his own sake): but as I have never spoken heretofore, so nor now will I speak anything that is against my conscience, for gaining to myself a pre-eminence of honour: but that only which I apprehend for the best. And although I am sure, that if I go about to persuade you to preserve what you already hold, and not to hazard things certain for uncertain and future, my words will be too weak to prevail against your humour: yet this I must needs let you know, that neither your haste is seasonable, nor your desires easy to be achieved. 10. For I say, that going thither you leave many enemies here behind you, and more you endeavour to draw hither. You perhaps think that the league will be firm, that you have made with the Lacedæmonians; which, though as long as you stir not, may continue a league in name, (for so some have made it of their own side¹), yet if any considerable forces of ours chance to miscarry, our enemies will soon renew the war, as having made the peace constrained by calamities, and upon terms of more dishonour and necessity than ourselves: besides, in the league itself we have many

the oration of nicias.

year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. Oration of Nicias.

year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. Oration of Nicias.

year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. Oration of Nicias.

year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. Oration of Nicias.

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year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. Oration of Nicias.

things controverted. And some there be that refuse utterly to accept it, and they none of the weakest: whereof some are now in open war against us², and others, because the Lacedæmonians stir not, maintain only a truce with us from ten to ten days³, and so are contented yet to hold their hands. But peradventure, when they shall hear that our power is distracted, which is the thing we now hasten to do, they will be glad to join in the war with the Sicilians against us; the confederacy of whom they would heretofore have valued above many other. It behoveth us¹ therefore to consider of these things, and not to run into new dangers, when the state of our own city hangeth unsettled, nor seek a new dominion before we assure that which we already have. For the Chalcideans of Thrace, after so many years' revolt, are yet unreduced: and from others in divers parts of the continent, we have but doubtful obedience. But the Egestæans, being forsooth our confederates and wronged, they in all haste must be aided: though to right us on those by whom we have a long time ourselves been wronged, that we defer. 11. And yet if we should reduce the Chalcideans into subjection, we could easily also keep them so: but the Sicilians, though we vanquish them, yet being many and far off, we should have much ado to hold them in obedience. Now it were madness to invade such, whom conquering you cannot keep; and failing, should lose the means for ever after to attempt the same again². As for the Sicilians, it seemeth unto me, at least as things now stand, that they shall be of less danger to us if they fall under the dominion of the Syracusians, than they are now: and yet this is it that the Egestæans would most affright us with. For now the states of Sicily, in several, may perhaps be induced, in favour of the Lacedæmonians, to take part against us: whereas then, being reduced into one, it is not likely they would hazard with us state against state¹. For by the same means that they, joining with the Peloponnesians, may pull down our dominion, by the same it would be likely that the Peloponnesians would subvert theirs. The Grecians there will fear us most, if we go not at all; next, if we but show our forces and come quickly away. But if any misfortune befall us, they will presently despise us, and join with the Grecians here to invade us. For we all know, that those things are most admired which are farthest off, and which least come to give proof of the opinion conceived of them. And this, Athenians, is your own case with the Lacedæmonians and their confederates: whom because beyond your hope you have overcome in those things for which at first you feared them², you now in contempt of them turn your arms upon Sicily. But we ought not to be puffed up upon the misfortunes of our enemies: but to be confident then only, when we have mastered their designs³. Nor ought we to think that the Lacedæmonians set their minds on anything else, but how they may yet for the late disgrace repair their reputation, if they can, by our overthrow: and the rather, because they have so much and so long laboured to win an opinion in the world of their valour. The question with us therefore, if we be well advised, will not be of the Egestæans in Sicily, but how we may speedily defend our city against the insidiation of them that favour the oligarchy¹. 12. We must remember also that we have had now some short recreation from a late great plague and great war, and thereby are improved both in men and money; which it is most meet that we should spend here upon ourselves, and not upon those outlaws which seek for aid: seeing it maketh for them, to tell us a specious lie; who contributing only words whilst their friends bear all the danger, if they speed well, shall be disobliged of thanks, if ill, undo their friends for company. Now if there be any man here², that for ends of his own, as being glad to be general, especially being yet too young to have charge in chief, shall

advise the expedition, to the end he may have admiration for his expense upon horses, and help from his place to defray that expense: suffer him not to purchase his private honour and splendour with the danger of the public fortune. Believe rather that such men, though they rob the public, do nevertheless consume also their private wealth. Besides³, the matter itself is full of great difficulties, such as it is not fit for a young man to consult of, much less hastily to take in hand. 13. And I seeing those now sit by and abet¹ the same man, am fearful of them: and do on the other side exhort the elder sort, (if any of them sit near those other), not to be ashamed to deliver their minds freely, as fearing that if they gave their voice against the war they should be esteemed cowards; nor to doat (as they do) upon things absent²; knowing that by passion the fewest actions, and by reason the most do prosper: but rather for the benefit of their country, which is now cast into greater danger than ever before, to hold up their hands on the other side, and decree: “that the Sicilians, within the limits they now enjoy³, not misliked by you, and with liberty to sail by the shore in the Ionian gulf, and in the main of the Sicilian sea, shall possess their own, and compound their differences between themselves”. And for the Egestæans, to answer them in particular, thus: “that as without the Athenians they had begun the war against the Selinuntians, so they should without them likewise end it: and that we shall no more hereafter, as we have used to do, make such men our confederates, as when they do injury, we must maintain it, and when we require their assistance, cannot have it”. 14. And you the president, if you think it your office to take care of the commonwealth, and desire to be a good member of the same, put these things once more to the question, and let the Athenians speak to it again. Think (if you be afraid to infringe the orders of the assembly) that before so many witnesses, it will not be made a crime¹: but that you shall be rather thought a physician of your country, that hath swallowed down evil counsel. And he truly dischargeth the duty of a president, who laboureth to do his country the most good, or at least will not willingly do it hurt.”

15. Thus spake Nicias. But the most of the Athenians that spake after him, were of opinion that the voyage ought to proceed, the decree already made not to be reversed: yet some there were that said to the contrary. But the expedition was most of all pressed by Alcibiades the son of Cleinias, both out of desire he had to cross Nicias, with whom he was likewise at odds in other points of state, and also for that he had glanced at him invidiously in his oration: but principally for that he affected to have charge, hoping that himself should be the man to subdue both Sicily and Carthage to the state of Athens: and withal, if it succeeded, to increase his own private wealth and glory. For being in great estimation with the citizens, his desires were more vast than for the proportion of his estate, both in maintaining of horses and other his expenses, was meet: which proved afterwards none of the least causes of the subversion of the Athenian commonwealth. For most men fearing him, both for his excess in things that concerned his person and form of life, and for the greatness of his spirit in every particular action he undertook, as one that aspired to the tyranny, they became his enemy¹. And although for the public he excellently managed the war, yet every man, privately displeased with his course of life, gave the charge of the wars to others, and thereby not long after overthrew the state. Alcibiades at this time stood forth, and spake to this effect.

Motives of Alcibiades to further his voyage.

year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1.

16. “Men of Athens, it both belongeth unto me more than to any other to have this charge: and withal I think myself (for I must needs begin with this, as having been touched by Nicias) to be worthy of the same. For those things for which I am so much spoken of, do indeed purchase glory to my progenitors and myself: but to the commonwealth they confer both glory and profit. For the Grecians have thought our city a mighty one, even above the truth, by reason of my brave appearance at the Olympic games: whereas before they thought easily to have warred it down. For I brought thither seven chariots, and not only won the first, second, and fourth prize², but carried also in all other things a magnificence worthy the honour of the victory. And in such things as these, as there is honour to be supposed according to the law; so is there also a power conceived upon sight of the thing done. As for my expenses in the city upon setting forth of shows¹, or whatsoever else is remarkable in me, though naturally it procure envy in other citizens, yet to strangers this also is an argument of our greatness. Now, it is no unprofitable course of life², when a man shall at his private cost not only benefit himself, but also the commonwealth. Nor doth he that beareth himself high upon his own worth, and refuseth to make himself fellow with the rest, wrong the rest: for if he were in distress, he should not find any man that would share with him in his calamity. Therefore, as we are not so much as saluted when we be in misery; so let them likewise be content to be contemned of us when we flourish; or if they require equality, let them also give it. I know that such men, or any man else that excelleth in the glory of anything whatsoever, shall as long as he liveth be envied, principally of his equals, and then also of others amongst whom he converseth: but with posterity they shall have kindred claimed of them, though there be none; and his country will boast of him, not as of a stranger or one that had been a man of lewd life, but as their own citizen and one that had achieved worthy and laudable acts. This being the thing I aim at, and for which I am renowned¹, consider now whether I administer the public the worse for it or not. For having reconciled unto you the most potent states of Peloponnesus without much either danger or cost, I compelled the Lacedæmonians to stake all that ever they had upon the fortune of one day of Mantinea².

the oration of
alciabiades.

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Ol. 91. 1. Oration of
Alcibiades.

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Alcibiades.

17. And this hath my youth and madness, supposed to have been very madness³, with familiar and fit words wrought upon the power of the Peloponnesians: and shewing reason for my passion, made my madness now no longer to be feared⁴. But as long as I flourish with it, and Nicias is esteemed fortunate, make you use of both our services. And abrogate not your decree touching the voyage into Sicily, as though the power were great you are to encounter withal. For the number wherewith their cities are populous, is but of promiscuous nations, easily shifting and easily admitting new comers; and consequently not sufficiently armed, any of them, for the defence of their bodies, nor furnished, as the custom of the place appointeth, to fight for their country¹. But what any of them thinks he may get by fair speech, or snatch from the public by sedition, that only he looks after; with purpose, if he fail, to run the country. And it is not likely, that such a rabble should either with one consent give ear to what is told them, or unite themselves for the administration of their affairs in common: but if they hear

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of fair offers, they will one after one be easily induced to come in; especially if there be seditions amongst them, as we hear there are. And the truth is, there are neither so many men of arms as they boast of; nor doth it appear that there are so many Grecians there in all, as the several cities have every one reckoned for their own number. Nay, even Greece hath much belied itself, and was scarce sufficiently armed in all this war past². So that the business there, for all that I can by fame understand, is even as I have told you, and will yet be easier. For we shall have many of the barbarians, upon hatred of the Syracusians, to take our parts against them there: and if we consider the case aright, there will be nothing to hinder us at home. For our ancestors having the same enemies, which they say we leave behind us now in our voyage to Sicily, and the Persian besides, did nevertheless erect the empire we now have by our only odds of strength at sea. And the hope of the Peloponnesians against us was never less than now it is, though their power were also as great as ever: for they would be able to invade our land, though we went not into Sicily; and by sea they can do us no harm though we go, for we shall leave a navy sufficient to oppose theirs behind us¹.

18. “What therefore can we allege with any probability for our backwardness: or what can we pretend unto our confederates, for denying them assistance? Whom we ought to defend, were it but because we have sworn it to them, without objecting that they have not reciprocally aided us. For we took them not into league, that they should come hither with their aids: but that by troubling our enemies there, they might hinder them from coming hither against us. And the way whereby we, and whosoever else hath dominion, hath gotten it, hath ever been the cheerful succouring of their associates that required it, whether they were Greeks or barbarians. For if we should all sit still, or stand to make choice² which were fit to be assisted and which not, we should have little under our government of the estates of other men, but rather hazard our own. For when one is grown mightier than the rest, men use not only to defend themselves against him when he shall invade, but to anticipate him, that he invade not at all. Nor is it in our power to be our own carvers, how much we will have subject to us; but considering the case we are in, it is as necessary for us to seek to subdue those that are not under our dominion, as to keep so those that are: lest if others be not subject to us, we fall in danger of being subjected unto them. Nor are we to weigh quietness in the same balance that others do, unless also the institution of this state were like unto that of other states. Let us rather make reckoning, by enterprising abroad¹ to increase our power at home, and proceed on our voyage; that we may cast down the haughty conceit of the Peloponnesians, and show them the contempt and slight account we make of our present ease, by undertaking this our expedition into Sicily. Whereby, either conquering those states we shall become masters of all Greece, or weaken the Syracusians, to the benefit of ourselves and our confederates. And for our security to stay, if any city shall come to our side, or to come away if otherwise, our galleys will afford it. For in that we shall be at our own liberty, though all the Sicilians together were against it².

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“Let not the speech of Nicias, tending only to laziness, and to the stirring of debate between the young men and the old, avert you from it: but with the same decency³ wherewith your ancestors, consulting young and old together, have brought our dominion to

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the present height, endeavour you likewise to enlarge the same. And think not that youth or age, one without the other, is of any effect, but that the simplest, the middle sort, and the exactest judgments tempered together, is it that doth the greatest good; and that a state as well as any other thing will, if it rest, wear out of itself; and all men's knowledge decay; whereas by the exercise of war experience will continually increase, and the city will get a habit of resisting the enemy, not with words, but action. In sum, this is my opinion: that a state accustomed to be active, if it once grow idle, will quickly be subjected by the change: and that they of all men are most surely planted, that with most unity¹ observe the present laws and customs, though not always of the best."

19. Thus spake Alcibiades. The Athenians, when they had heard him together with the Egestæans and Leontine outlaws, who being then present² entreated, and objecting to them their oath begged their help in form of suppliants, were far more earnestly bent upon the journey than they were before. But Nicias, when he saw he could not alter their resolution with his oration, but thought he might perhaps put them from it by the greatness of the provision, if he should require it with the most, stood forth again and said in this manner³.

20. "Men of Athens, forasmuch as I see you violently bent on this expedition, such effect may it take as is desired.

Nevertheless I shall now deliver my opinion upon the matter as it yet standeth¹. As far as we understand by report, we set out against great cities, not subject one to another, nor needing innovation, whereby they should be glad, out of hard servitude, to admit of easier masters; nor such as are likely to prefer our government before their own liberty; but many, (as for one island), and those Greek cities². For besides Naxos and Catana, (which too I hope will join with us for their affinity with the Leontines), there are other seven, furnished in all respects after the manner of our own army; and especially those two against which we bend our forces most, Selinus and Syracuse. For there are in them many men of arms, many archers, many darters, besides many galleys and a multitude of men to man them. They have also store of money, both amongst private men and in their temples. This have the Selinuntians. The Syracusians have a tribute beside, coming in from some of the barbarians. But that wherein they exceed us most, is this: that they abound in horses, and have corn of their own, not fetched in from other places. 21. Against such a power we shall therefore need not a fleet only, and with it a small army; but there must great forces go along of land soldiers, if we mean to do anything worthy of our design, and not to be kept by their many horsemen from landing³; especially if the cities there, terrified by us, should now hold all together, and none but the Egestæans prove our friends and furnish us with a cavalry to resist them. And it would be a shame either to come back with a repulse, or to send for a new supply afterwards, as if we had not wisely considered our enterprise at first. Therefore we must go sufficiently provided from hence, as knowing that we go far from home, and are to make war in a place of disadvantage, and not as when we went as confederates to aid some of our subjects here at home¹, where we had easy bringing in of necessaries to the camp from the territories of friends. But we go far

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Nicias.

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Ol. 91. 1. Oration of
Nicias.

off, and into a country of none but strangers, and from whence in winter there can hardly come a messenger unto us in so little as four months. 22. Wherefore I am of opinion that we ought to take with us many men of arms, of our own, of our confederates, and of our subjects: and also out of Peloponnesus as many as we can get, either for love or money: and also many archers and slingers, whereby to resist their cavalry; and much spare shipping², for the more easy bringing in of provision. Also our corn, I mean, wheat and barley parched, we must carry with us from hence in ships³; and bakers from the mills, hired, and made to work by turns, that the army, if it chance to be weather-bound, may not be in want of victual. For being so great, it will not be for every city to receive it. And so for all things else, we must as much as we can provide them ourselves, and not rely on others. Above all, we must take hence as much money as we can: for as for that which is said to be ready at Eggesta, think it ready in words, but not in deeds. 23. For although we go thither with an army not only equal unto theirs, but also (excepting their men of arms for battle) in everything exceeding it: yet so shall we scarce be able both to overcome them, and withal to preserve our own. We must also make account, that we go to inhabit some city in that foreign and hostile country, and either the first day we come thither to be presently masters of the field¹, or failing, be assured to find all in hostility against us. Which fearing, and knowing that the business requires much good advice and more good fortune, (which is a hard matter, being we are but men), I would so set forth as to commit myself to fortune as little as I may, and take with me an army that in likelihood should be secure. And this I conceive to be both the surest course for the city in general, and the safest for us that go the voyage. If any man be of a contrary opinion, I resign him my place.”

24. Thus spake Nicias, imagining that either the Athenians would, upon the multitude of the things required, abandon the enterprise; or if he were forced to go, he might go with the more security. But the Athenians gave not over the desire they had of the voyage for the difficulty of the preparation, but were the more inflamed thereby to have it proceed; and the contrary fell out of that which he before expected¹. For they approved his counsel, and thought now there would be no danger at all. And every one alike fell in love with the enterprise: the old men, upon hope to subdue the place they went to, or that at least so great a power could not miscarry; and the young men, upon desire to see a foreign country, and to gaze², making little doubt but to return with safety. As for the common sort and the soldiers, they made account to gain by it not only their wages for the time, but also so to amplify the state in power, as that their stipend should endure for ever. So that through the vehement desire thereunto of the most, they also that liked it not, for fear if they held up their hands against it to be thought evil affected to the state, were content to let it pass. 25. And in the end a certain Athenian stood up, and calling upon Nicias, said he ought not to shift off nor delay the business any longer; but to declare there before them all, what forces he would have the Athenians to decree him. To which unwillingly he answered and said, he would consider of it first³ with his fellow-commanders. Nevertheless, for so much as he could judge upon the sudden, he said there would need no less than one hundred galleys; whereof for transporting of men of arms, so many of the Athenians’ own as

The Athenians upon this speech, made to desire them from the.

year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. enterprise, are the more encouraged to it.

year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1.

they themselves should think meet, and the rest to be sent for to their confederates: and that of men of arms in all, of their own and of their confederates, there would be requisite no less than five thousand; but rather more, if they could be gotten, and other provision proportionable. As for archers, both from hence and from Crete, and slingers, and whatsoever else should seem necessary, they would provide it themselves and take it with them¹.

26. When the Athenians had heard him, they presently decreed that the generals should have absolute authority, both touching the greatness of the preparation and the whole voyage, to do therein as should seem best unto them for the commonwealth. And after this, they went in hand with the preparation accordingly; and both sent unto the confederates, and enrolled soldiers at home. The city had by this time recovered herself from the sickness and from their continual wars, both in number of men fit for the wars, grown up after the ceasing of the plague, and in store of money gathered together by means of the peace: whereby they made their provisions with much ease². And thus were they employed in preparation for the voyage.

27. In the meantime the Mercuries of stone throughout the whole city of Athens, (now there were many of these of square stone set up by the law of the place, and many in the porches of private houses and in the temples¹), had in one night most of them their faces pared. And no man knew who had done it: and yet great rewards out of the treasury had been propounded to the discoverers; and a decree made, that if any man knew of any other profanation, he might boldly declare² the same, were he citizen, stranger, or bondman. And they took the fact exceedingly to heart, as ominous to the expedition, and done withal upon conspiracy for alteration of the state and dissolution of the democracy.

The faces of all the images of Mercury.

year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. throughout Athens pared plain.

28. Hereupon, certain strangers dwelling in the city, and certain serving-men, revealed something, not about the Mercuries, but of the paring of the statues of some other of the gods, committed formerly through wantonness and too much wine by young men; and withal, how they had in private houses acted the mysteries of their religion in mockery: amongst whom they also accused Alcibiades. This they that most envied Alcibiades, because he stood in the way that they could not constantly bear chief sway with the people, making account to have the primacy if they could thrust him out, took hold of and exceedingly aggravated; exclaiming, that both the mockery of the mysteries and the paring of the Mercuries tended to the deposing of the people, and that nothing therein was done without him; alleging for argument his other excess in the ordinary course of his life, not convenient in a popular estate. 29. He¹ at that present made his apology, and was there ready, if he had done any such thing, to answer it before he went the voyage, (for by this time all their preparation was in readiness), and to suffer justice if he were guilty, and if absolved to resume his charge: protesting against all accusations to be brought against him in his absence, and pressing to be put to death then presently if he had offended; and saying, that it would not be discreetly done, to send

Alcibiades accused for having in mockery acted the celebration of the mysteries of their religion.

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He desires to come to his trial before his going forth: but is not suffered.

year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1.

away a man accused of so great crimes with the charge of such an army before his trial. But his enemies, fearing lest if he came then to his trial he should have had the favour of his army, and lest the people, which loved him because the Argives and some of the Mantineans served them in this war only for his sake, should have been mollified, put the matter off and hastened his going out², by setting on other orators to advise, that for the present he should go, and that the setting forward of the fleet should not be retarded, and that at his return he should have a day assigned him for his trial: their purpose being, upon further accusation, which they might easily¹ contrive in his absence, to have him sent for back to make his answer. And thus it was concluded that Alcibiades should go.

30. After this, the summer being now half spent, they put to sea for Sicily. The greatest part of the confederates, and the ships that carried their corn, and all the lesser vessels, and the rest of the provision that went along, they before appointed to meet [upon a day set] at Corcyra, thence all together to cross over the Ionian gulf to the promontory of Iapygia. But the Athenians themselves, and as many of their confederates as were at Athens, upon the day appointed², betimes in the morning came down into Peiræus and went aboard to take sea. With them came down in a manner the whole multitude of the city, as well inhabitants as strangers: the inhabitants to follow after such as belonged unto them, some their friends, some their kinsmen, and some their children, filled both with hope and lamentations; hope of conquering what they went for, and lamentation, as being in doubt whether ever they should see each other any more, considering what a way they were to go from their own territory: (and now when they were to leave one another to danger, they apprehended the greatness of the same more than they had done before when they decreed the expedition: nevertheless their present strength, by the abundance of everything before their eyes prepared for the journey, gave them heart again in beholding it): but the strangers and other multitude came only to see the shew, as of a worthy and incredible design¹.

The Athenian fleet putteth to sea.

The description of the setting forth of the fleet.

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31. For this preparation, being the first Grecian power that ever went out of Greece from one only city, was the most sumptuous and the most glorious of all that ever had been sent forth before it to that day. Nevertheless for number of galleys and men of arms, that which went forth with Pericles to Epidaurus, and that which Agnon carried with him to Potidæa, was not inferior to it. For there went four thousand men of arms, three hundred horse, and one hundred galleys, out of Athens itself; and out of Lesbos and Chios fifty galleys, besides many confederates that accompanied him in the voyage. But they went not far, and were but meanly furnished. Whereas this fleet, as being to stay long abroad, was furnished for both kinds of service, in which of them soever it should have occasion to be employed, both with shipping and land-soldiers. For the shipping, it was elaborate with a great deal of cost, both of the captains of galleys and of the city. For the state allowed a drachma a day to every mariner: the empty galleys² which they sent forth, being of nimble ones sixty, and of such as carried their men of arms forty more: and the captains of galleys both put into them the most able

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servants; and besides the wages of the state, unto the [uppermost bank of oars, called the] *Thranitæ*, and to the servants, gave somewhat of their own; and bestowed great cost otherwise every one upon his own galley, both in the badges¹ and other rigging, each one striving to the utmost to have his galley, both in some ornament and also in swiftness, to exceed the rest. And for the land forces, they were levied with exceeding great choice², and every man endeavoured to excel his fellow in the bravery of his arms and utensils that belonged to his person. Insomuch as amongst themselves, it begat quarrel about precedency³: but amongst other Grecians, a conceit that it was an ostentation rather of their power and riches, than a preparation against an enemy. For if a man enter into account of the expense, as well of the public, as of private men that went the voyage; namely, of the public, what was spent already in the business, and what was to be given to the commanders to carry with them; and of private men, what every one had bestowed upon his person, and every captain on his galley, besides what every one was likely, over and above his allowance from the state, to bestow on provision for so long a warfare, and what the merchant⁴ carried with him for traffic, he will find the whole sum carried out of the city to amount to a great many talents. And the fleet was no less noised amongst those against whom it was to go, for the strange boldness of the attempt and gloriousness of the show, than it was for the excessive report of their number, for the length of the voyage, and for that it was undertaken with so vast future hopes in respect of their present power¹.

32. After they were all aboard, and all things laid in that they meant to carry with them, silence was commanded by the trumpet; and after the wine had been carried about² to the whole army, and all, as well the generals as the soldiers, had drunk a health to the voyage³, they made their prayers, such as by the law were appointed for before their taking sea, not in every galley apart, but all together, the herald pronouncing them. And the company from the shore, both of the city and whosoever else wished them well, prayed with them. And when they had sung the *Pæan* and ended the health, they put forth to sea: and having at first gone out in a long file, galley after galley, they after went a vie by *Ægina*⁴. Thus hasted these to be at *Corcyra*: to which place also the other army of the confederates were assembling.

At *Syracuse* they had advertisement of the voyage from divers places: nevertheless it was long ere anything would be believed. Nay, an assembly being there called, orations were made such as follow on both parts: as well by them that believed the report touching the Athenian army to be true, as by others that affirmed the contrary. And *Hermocrates* the son of *Hermon*, as one that thought he knew the certainty, stood forth and spake to this effect:

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Ol. 91. 1. The
Syracusians, upon the
fame of their coming,
do some believe it,
and some not.

33. “Concerning the truth of this invasion, though perhaps I shall be thought, as well as other men, to deliver a thing incredible; and though I know, that such as be either the authors or relaters of matter incredible, shall not only not persuade, but be also accounted fools: nevertheless, I will not for fear thereof hold my tongue, as long as the commonwealth is in danger; being confident that I know the truth hereof somewhat more certainly than others do. The Athenians are bent to come even against us, (which you verily wonder at), and that

the oration of
hermocrates.

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Ol. 91. 1. Oration of
Hermocrates.

with great forces both for the sea and land: with pretence indeed to aid their confederates the Egestæans and replant the Leontines; but in truth they aspire to the dominion of all Sicily, and especially of this city of ours; which obtained, they make account to get the rest with ease. Seeing then they will presently be upon us, advise with your present means, how you may with most honour¹ make head against them; that you may not be taken unprovided through contempt, nor be careless through incredulity; and that such as believe it, may not be dismayed with their audaciousness and power. For they are not more able to do hurt unto us, than we be unto them. Neither indeed is the greatness of their fleet without some advantage unto us: nay, it will be much the better for us, in respect of the rest of the Sicilians. For being terrified by them, they will the rather league with us. And if we either vanquish, or repulse them without obtaining what they came for, (for I fear not at all the effecting of their purpose); verily it will be a great honour to us, and in my opinion not unlikely to come to pass. For in truth there have been few great fleets, whether of Grecians or barbarians, sent far from home, that have not prospered ill. Neither are these that come against us, more in number than ourselves and the neighbouring cities: for surely we shall all hold together upon fear. And if for want of necessaries in a strange territory they chance to miscarry, the honour of it will be left to us against whom they bend their councils, though the greatest cause of their overthrow should consist in their own errors. Which was also the case of these very Athenians, who raised themselves by the misfortune of the Medes; (though it happened for the most part contrary to reason); because in name¹ they went only against the Athenians. And that the same shall now happen unto us, is not without probability.

34. "Let us therefore with courage put in readiness our own forces; let us send to the Siculi, to confirm those we have, and to make peace and league with others; and let us send ambassadors to the rest of Sicily, to show them that it is a common danger; and into Italy, to get them into our league, or at least that they receive not the Athenians. And in my judgment it were our best course to send also to Carthage: for even they are not without expectation of the same danger. Nay, they are in a continual fear that the Athenians will bring war upon them also, even to their city¹. So that upon apprehension that if they neglect us the trouble will come home to their own door, they will perhaps,

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Ol. 91. 1. Oration of
Hermocrates.

year xvii. A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 1. Oration of
Hermocrates.

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Ol. 91. 1. Oration of
Hermocrates.

either secretly or openly, or some way² assist us. And of all that now are, they are the best able to do it, if they please. For they have the most gold and silver: by which the wars and all things else are the best expedited. Let us also send to Lacedæmon and to Corinth, praying them not only to send their succours hither with speed, but also to set on foot the war there. But that which I think the best course of all, though through an habit of sitting still you will hardly be brought to it, I will nevertheless now tell you what it is. If the Sicilians all together, or if not all yet if we and most of the rest³, should draw together our whole navy, and with two months' provision go and meet the Athenians at Tarentum and the promontory of Iapygia; and let them see, that they must fight for their passage over the Ionian gulf before they fight for Sicily: it would both terrify them the most, and also put them into a consideration, that we, as the watchmen of our country, come upon them out of an amicable territory, (for we shall be received at Tarentum), whereas they themselves have a great deal of sea to pass

with all their preparations, and cannot keep themselves in their order for the length of the voyage: and that for us, it will be an easy matter to assail them, coming up slowly as they do and thin¹. Again, if lightening their galleys, they shall come up to us more nimble and more close together, we shall charge upon them already wearied², or we may, if we please, retire again into Tarentum. Whereas they, if they come over but with a part of their provisions, as to fight at sea, shall be driven into want of victuals in those desert parts; and either staying be there besieged, or, attempting to go by, leave behind them the rest of their provision, and be dejected, as not assured of the cities whether they will receive them or not. I am therefore of opinion, that dismayed with this reckoning they will either not put over at all from Corcyra, or whilst they spend time in deliberating, and in sending out to explore how many and in what place we are, the season will be lost and winter come³; or deterred with our unlooked-for opposition, they will give over the voyage. And the rather, for that as I hear the man of most experience amongst their commanders hath the charge against his will; and would take a light occasion to return, if he saw any considerable stop made by us in the way. And I am very sure, we should be voiced amongst them to the utmost. And as the reports are, so are men's minds; and they fear more such as they hear will begin with them, than such as give out that they will no more but defend themselves: because then they think the danger equal. Which would be now the case of the Athenians. For they come against us with an opinion that we will not fight: deservedly contemning us, because we joined not with the Lacedæmonians to pull them down. But if they should see us once bolder than they looked for, they would be terrified more with the unexpectedness than with the truth of our power itself. Be persuaded therefore, principally to dare to do this; or if not this, yet speedily to make yourselves otherwise ready for the war; and every man to remember, that though to show contempt of the enemy be best in the heat of fight, yet those preparations are the surest, that are made with fear and opinion of danger¹. As for the Athenians, they come; and I am sure are already in the way, and want only that they are not now here."

35. Thus spake Hermocrates. But the people of Syracuse were at much strife amongst themselves: some contending, that the Athenians would by no means come, and that the reports were not true; and others, that if they came they would do no more harm than they were likely again to receive. Some contemned and laughed at the matter: but some few there were that believed Hermocrates, and feared the event. But Athenagoras, who was chief magistrate of the people, and at that time most powerful with the commons, spake as followeth:

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Ol. 91. 1.

the oration of
athenagoras.

year xvii. A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 1. Oration of
Athenagoras.

year xvii. A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 1. Oration of
Athenagoras.

36. “He is either a coward or not well affected to the state, whosoever he be, that wishes the Athenians not to be so mad as coming hither to fall into our power. As for them that report such things as these and put you into fear, though I wonder not at their boldness, yet I wonder at their folly, if they think their ends not seen. For they that are afraid¹ of anything themselves, will put the city into affright, that they may shadow their own with the common fear. And this may the reports do at this time, not raised by chance, but framed on purpose by such as always trouble the state. But if you mean to deliberate wisely, make not your reckoning by the reports of these men, but by that which wise men and men of great experience, such as I hold the Athenians to be, are likely to do. For it is not probable, that leaving the Peloponnesians and the war there not yet surely ended, they should willingly come hither to a new war no less than the former: seeing, in my opinion, they may be glad that we invade not them, so many and so great cities as we are. 37. And if indeed they come, as these men say they will: I think Sicily more sufficient to dispatch the war than Peloponnesus, as being in all respects better furnished; and that this our own city is much stronger than the army which they say is now coming, though it were twice as great as it is. For I know they neither bring horses with them nor can they get any here, save only a few from the Egestæans, nor have men of arms so many as we, in that they are to bring them by sea¹. For it is a hard matter to come so far as this by sea, though they carried no men of arms in their galleys at all, if they carry with them all other their necessaries; which cannot be small against so great a city. So that I am so far from the opinion of these others, that I think the Athenians, though they had here another city as great as Syracuse, and confining on it, and should from thence make their war, yet should not be able to escape from being destroyed, every man of them; much less now, when all Sicily is their enemy². For in their camp, fenced with their galleys, they shall be cooped up, and from their tents, and forced munition, never be able to stir far abroad without being cut off by our horsemen. In short, I think they shall never be able to get landing: so much above theirs do I value our own forces.

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Ol. 91. 1. Oration of
Athenagoras.

38. “But these things, as I said before, the Athenians considering, I am very sure will look unto their own; and our men talk here of things that neither are, or ever will be¹: who I know have desired, not only now but ever, by such reports as these or by worse, or by their actions, to put the multitude in fear, that they themselves might rule the state. And I am afraid, lest attempting it often, they may one day effect it: and for us, we are² too poor-spirited either to foresee it ere it be done, or foreseeing to prevent it. By this means our city is seldom quiet, but subject to sedition and contention, not so much against the enemy as within itself; and sometimes also to tyranny and usurpation. Which I will endeavour (if you will second me) so to prevent hereafter, as nothing more of this kind shall befall you: which must be done, first by gaining you the multitude, and then by punishing the authors of these plots, not only when I find them in the action, (for it will be hard to take them so), but also for those things which they would and cannot do. For one must not only take revenge upon an enemy for what he hath already done, but strike him first for his evil purpose; for if a man strike not first, he shall first be stricken. And as for *the few*, I shall in somewhat reprove them, in somewhat have an eye to them, and in somewhat advise them¹. For this, I think, will

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Ol. 91. 1. Oration of
Athenagoras.

year xvii. A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 1. Oration of
Athenagoras.

be the best course to avert them from their bad intentions. Tell me forsooth, (I have asked² this question often), you that are the younger sort, What would you have? Would you now³ bear office? The law allows it not: and the law was made because ye are not [now] sufficient for government, not to disgrace you when you shall be sufficient⁴. But forsooth, you would not be ranked with the multitude! But what justice is it, that the same men should not have the same privileges? 39. Some will say, that the democracy is neither a well-governed nor a just state: and that the most wealthy are aptest to make the best government. But I answer first, *democracy* is a name of the whole; *oligarchy*, but of a part. Next, though the rich are indeed fittest to keep the treasure: yet the wise are the best counsellors, and the multitude upon hearing the best judge. Now in a democracy all these, both jointly and severally, participate equal privileges. But in the oligarchy, they allow indeed to the multitude a participation of all dangers: but in matters of profit, they not only encroach upon the multitude, but take from them and keep the whole. Which is the thing that you the rich⁵ and the younger sort affect: but in a great city cannot possibly embrace. But yet, O ye the most unwise of all men, unless you know that what you affect is evil, and if you know not that, you are the most ignorant of all the Grecians I know; or, ye most wicked of all men, if knowing it you dare do this¹: 40. yet I say, inform yourselves better, or change your purpose and help to amplify the common good of the city, making account that the good amongst you shall not only have an equal, but a greater share therein than the rest of the multitude; whereas if you will needs have all², you shall run the hazard of losing all. Away therefore with these rumours, as discovered and not allowed. For this city, though the Athenians come, will be able to defend itself with honour. And we have generals to look to that matter. And if they come not³, (which I rather believe), it will not, upon the terror of your reports, make choice of you for commanders, and cast itself into voluntary servitude: but taking direction of itself, it both judgeth your words virtually as facts⁴, and will not upon words let go her present liberty, but endeavour to preserve it by not committing the same actually to your discretion.”

41. Thus said Athenagoras. Then one of their generals rising up, forbade any other to stand forth, and spake himself to the matter in hand to this effect:

“It is no wisdom, neither for the speakers to utter such calumnies one against another, nor for the hearers to receive them. We should rather consider, in respect of these reports, how we may in the best manner, both every one in particular and the city in general, be prepared to resist them when they come. And if there be no need, yet to furnish the city with horses and arms and other habiliments of war, can do us no hurt. As for the care hereof and the musters, we will look to it: and will send men abroad both to the cities and for spials: and do whatsoever else is requisite. Somewhat we have done already: and what more we shall hereafter find meet¹, we will from time to time report unto you.”

year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. I. the speech of one of the syracusian generals.

Which when the general had said, the Syracusians dissolved the assembly.

The Athenians put out from Corcyra.

42. The Athenians were now all in Corcyra, both they and their confederates. And first the generals took a view² of the whole army, and put them into the order wherein they were to anchor and make their naval camp: and having divided them into three squadrons, to each squadron they assigned a captain by lot³, to the end that being at sea they might not come into want of water, or harbours, or any other necessaries, where they chanced to stay; and that they might otherwise be the⁴ more easy to be

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Ol. 91. 1.

The quantity of the
army.

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Ol. 91. 1.

governed, when every squadron had his proper commander. After this they sent before them three galleys into Italy and Sicily, to bring them word what cities in those parts would receive them: whom they appointed to come back and meet them, that they might know whether they might be received or not before they put in. 43. This done, the Athenians with all their provisions¹ put out from Corcyra towards Sicily; having with them in all one hundred and thirty-four galleys, and two Rhodian long-boats of fifty oars a-piece. Of these, a hundred were of Athens itself: whereof sixty were expedite, the other forty for transportation of soldiers: the rest of the navy belonged to the Chians and other the confederates. Of men of arms, they had in all five thousand one hundred. Of these, there were of the Athenians themselves fifteen hundred enrolled, and seven hundred more [of the poorer sort, called] Thetes, hired for defence of the galleys². The rest were of their confederates, some of them being their subjects: of Argives there were five hundred: of Mantineans and mercenaries, two hundred and fifty. Their archers in all, four hundred and eighty: of which eighty were Cretans. Rhodian slingers they had seven hundred. Of light-armed Megarean fugitives, one hundred and twenty: and in one vessel made for transportation of horses, thirty horsemen.

44. These were the forces that went over to the war at first. With these went also thirty ships carrying necessaries, wherein went also the bakers, and masons, and carpenters, and all tools of use

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in fortification: and with these thirty ships went one hundred boats by constraint¹; and many other ships and boats that voluntarily followed the army for trade: which² then passed all together from Corcyra over the Ionian gulf. And the whole fleet being come to the promontory of Iapygia and to Tarentum, and such other places as every one could recover, they went on by the coast of Italy, neither received of the states there into any city nor allowed any market³, having only the liberty of anchorage and water, (and that also at Tarentum and Locri⁴ denied them), till they were at Rhegium, where they all came together again, and settled their camp in the temple of Diana (for neither there were they suffered to come in) without the city, where the Rhegians allowed them a market. And when they had drawn their galleys to land, they lay still. Being here, they dealt with the Rhegians, who were Chalcideans, to aid the Leontines, Chalcideans likewise. To which was answered, that they would take part with neither; but what the rest of the Italians¹ should conclude, that also they would do. So the Athenians lay still, meditating on their Sicilian business, how they might carry it the best; and withal expected the return from Egesta of the three galleys which they had sent before them, desiring to know if so much money were there or not, as was reported by their messengers at Athens.

45. The Syracusians in the meantime from divers parts, and also from their spies, had certain intelligence that the fleet was now at Rhegium: and therefore made their preparations with all diligence, and were no longer incredulous; but sent unto the Siculi, to some cities men to keep them from revolting; to others, ambassadors; and into such places as lay upon the sea², garrisons: and examined the forces of their own city by a view taken of the arms and horse, whether they were complete or not; and ordered all things as for a war at hand, and only not already present.

The Syracusians certainly knowing of their coming, prepare for their defence.

46. The three galleys sent before to Egesta returned to the Athenians at Rhegium; and brought word, that for the rest of the money promised there was none, only there appeared thirty talents. At this the generals were presently discouraged; both because this first hope was crossed; and because also the Rhegians, whom they had already begun to persuade to their league, and whom it was most likely they should have won, as being of kin to the Leontines and always heretofore favourable to the Athenian state, now refused. And though to Nicias this news from the Egestæans was no more than he expected, yet to the other two it was extreme strange. But the Egestæans, when the first ambassadors from Athens went to see their treasure, had thus deceived them. They brought them into the temple of Venus in Eryx¹, and showed them the holy treasure, goblets, flagons, censers, and other furniture, in no small quantity; which being but silver, appeared to the eye a great deal above their true value in money. Then they feasted such as came with them², in their private houses; and at those feastings exhibited all the gold and silver vessels they could get together, either in the city of Egesta itself, or could borrow in other as well Phœnician as Grecian cities, for their own. So all of them in a manner³ making use of the same plate, and much appearing in every of those houses, it put those which came with the ambassadors¹ into a very great admiration: insomuch as at their return to Athens, they strove who should first proclaim what wealth they had seen. These men, having both been abused themselves and having abused others, when it was told that there was no such wealth in Egesta, were much taxed by the soldiers. But the generals went to counsel upon the business in hand.

year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. The hope of the Athenians of money from Egesta frustrated.

The fraud of the Egestæans.

year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1.

The several opinions of the generals, touching how to proceed.

47. Nicias was of this opinion: that it was best to go presently with the whole fleet to Selinus, against which they were chiefly set forth; and if the Egestæans would furnish them with money for the whole army, then to deliberate further upon the occasion; if not, then to require maintenance for the sixty galleys set forth at their own request, and staying with them by force or composition to bring the Selinuntians and them to a peace: and thence passing along by other of those cities, to make a show of the power of the Athenian state, and of their readiness to help their friends and confederates; and so to go home, unless they could light on some quick and unthought-of means to do some good for the Leontines, or gain some of the other cities to their own league: and not to put the commonwealth in danger at her own charges.

The opinion of Nicias.

48. Alcibiades said, it would not do well to have come out from Athens with so great a power, and then dishonourably without effect to go home again: but rather to send heralds to every city but Selinus and Syracuse, and assay to make the Siculi revolt from the Syracusians, and others to enter league with the Athenians, that they might aid them with men and victual: and first to deal with the Messanians, as being seated in the passage, and most opportune place of all Sicily for coming in, and having a port and harbour¹ sufficient for their fleet: and when they had gained those cities, and knew what help they were to have in the war, then to take in hand Syracuse and Selinus, unless these would agree with the Egæstæans and the other suffer the Leontines to be replanted.

The opinion of Alcibiades.

year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1.

49. But Lamachus was of opinion, that it was best to go directly to Syracuse, and to fight with them as soon as they could at their city, whilst they were yet unfurnished and their fear at the greatest. For that an army is always most terrible at first: but if it stay long ere it come in sight, men recollect their spirits, and contemn it the more² when they see it. Whereas if it come upon them suddenly while they expect it with fear, it would the more easily get the victory, and everything would affright them; as the sight of it (for then they would appear most for number) and the expectation of their sufferings, but especially the danger of a present battle. And that it was likely that many men might be cut off in the villages without, as not believing they would come; and though they should be already gotten in, yet the army, being master of the field and sitting down before the city, could want no money: and the other Sicilians would then neglect leaguings with the Syracusians, and join with the Athenians, no longer standing off and spying who should have the better. And for a place to retire unto and anchor in¹, he thought Megara most fit: being desert, and not far from Syracuse neither by sea nor land.

The opinion of Lamachus.

year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1.

50. Lamachus said this: but came afterwards to the opinion of Alcibiades. After this, Alcibiades with his own galley having passed over to Messana, and propounded to them a league and not prevailed, they answering that they would not let the army in but allow them only a market without the walls, returned back to Rhegium. And presently the generals having out of the whole fleet manned threescore galleys, and taken provision aboard, went along the shore to Naxos, having left the rest of the army with one of the generals at Rhegium. The Naxians having received them into the city, they went on by the coast to Catana. But the Catanæans receiving them not, (for there were some within that favoured the Syracusians), they entered the river of Terias; and having stayed there all that night, went the next day towards Syracuse leisurely² with the rest of their galleys; but ten they sent before into the great haven, [not to stay³, but] to discover if they had launched any fleet there, and to proclaim from their galleys, that the Athenians were come to replant the Leontines on their own, according to league and affinity, and that therefore such of the Leontines as were in Syracuse, should without fear go forth to the Athenians as to their friends and

Alcibiades seeketh league with the Messanians, but is denied.

The Athenians go with part of their fleet to Naxos:

and to Catana.

They send ten galleys to view Syracuse and the havens.

year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1.

benefactors. And when they had thus proclaimed, and well considered the city, and the havens, and the region where they were to seat themselves for the war, they returned to Catana.

51. An assembly being called at Catana, though they refused to receive the army they admitted the generals, and willed them to speak their minds. And whilst Alcibiades was in his oration and the citizens at the assembly, the soldiers having secretly pulled down a little gate which was but weakly built¹, entered the city, and were walking up and down in the market. And the Catanæans, such as favoured the Syracusians, seeing the army within, for fear stole presently out of the town, being not many. The rest concluded the league with the Athenians, and willed them to fetch in the rest of the army from Rhegium. After this, the Athenians went back to Rhegium: and rising from thence, came to Catana with their whole army together².

Catana surprised.

52. Now they had news from Camarina, that if they would come thither, the Camarinæans would join with them; and that the Syracusians were manning their navy. Whereupon with the whole army they went along the coast, first to Syracuse; where not finding any navy manned, they went on to Camarina¹. And being come close up to the shore, they sent a herald unto them.

The Athenians go to Camarina, but are not received.

year xvii. A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 1.

But the Camarinæans would not receive the army; alleging that they had taken an oath, not to receive the Athenians with more than one galley, unless they should have sent for more of their own accord. Having lost their labour, they departed; and landed in a part of the territory of Syracuse, and had gotten some booty. But the Syracusian horsemen coming out, and killing some stragglers of the light-armed, they returned again to Catana.

53. Here they find the galley called Salaminia, come thither from Athens, both for Alcibiades, who was commanded to come home to purge himself of such things as were laid to his charge by the state, and also for other soldiers that were with him, whereof some were accused for profanation of the mysteries, and some also for the Mercuries². For the Athenians, after the fleet was put to sea, proceeded nevertheless in the search of those that were culpable, both concerning the mysteries and the Mercuries.

Alcibiades called home to answer about the Mercuries.

year xvii. A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 1.

A. C. 510. Ol. 67. 2.

And making no inquiry into the persons of the informers, but through jealousy admitting of all sorts, upon the reports of evil men apprehended very good citizens and cast them into prison: choosing rather to examine the fact and find the truth by torments³, than that any man, how good soever in estimation, being once accused should escape unquestioned. For the people, having by fame understood that the tyranny of Peisistratus and his sons was heavy in the latter end; and withal, that neither themselves nor Harmodius, but the Lacedæmonians overthrew it¹: were ever fearful, and apprehended every thing suspiciously.

Digression touching the deposing of the

54. For the fact of Aristogeiton and Harmodius was undertaken upon an accident of love: which unfolding at large, I shall make appear that neither any other, nor the Athenians themselves, report any certainty either of their own tyrants or of the fact. For the old Peisistratus dying in the tyranny, not Hipparchus, as the most think, but Hippias, who was his eldest son, succeeded in the government. Now Harmodius, a man in the flower of his youth, of great beauty, was in the power of one Aristogeiton, a citizen of a middle condition that was his lover. This Harmodius having been solicited by Hipparchus the son of Peisistratus, and not yielding, discovered the same unto Aristogeiton. He apprehending it (as lovers use) with a great deal of anguish, and fearing the power of Hipparchus, lest he should take him away by force, fell presently, as much as his condition would permit, to a contriving how to pull down the tyranny. In the meantime Hipparchus, having again attempted Harmodius and not prevailed, intended, though not to offer him violence, yet in secret, as if forsooth he did it not for that cause, to do him some disgrace¹. For neither was the government otherwise heavy till then, but carried without their evil will. And to say the truth, these tyrants² held virtue and wisdom in great account for a long time, and taking of the Athenians but a twentieth part of their revenues, adorned the city, managed their wars, and administered their religion worthily. In other points they were governed by the laws formerly established, save that these took a care ever to prefer to the magistracy men of their own adherence. And amongst many that had the annual office of archon, Peisistratus also had it, the son of Hippias, of the same name with his grandfather; who also, when he was archon, dedicated the altar of the twelve gods¹ in the market-place, and that other in the temple of Apollo Pythius. And though the people of Athens, amplifying afterwards that altar which was in the market-place, thereby defaced the inscription: yet that upon the altar that is in the temple of Apollo Pythius, is to be seen still, though in letters somewhat obscure, in these words:

tyranny of Peisistratus and his sons.

A. C. 514. Ol. 66. 3.

A. C. 514. Ol. 66. 3.

Peisistratus the son of Hippias
 Erected this to stand
 I'th' Temple of Apollo Pythius,
 Witness of his command.

55. And that Hippias, being the elder brother, had the government, I can affirm, as knowing it by a more exact relation than other men: and it may be known also by this. It appears that of all the legitimate brethren, this only had children: as is both signified by the altar, and also by that pillar, which for a testimony of the injustice of the tyrants was erected in the Athenian citadel. In which there is no mention of any son of Thessalus or of Hipparchus, but of five sons of Hippias, which he had by Myrrhine, the daughter of Callias the son of Hyperechidas: for it is probable that the eldest was first married. And in the forepart of the pillar, his name after his father's was the first: not without reason, as being both next him in age, and having also enjoyed the tyranny. Nor indeed could Hippias have easily taken on him the government on a sudden, if his brother had died seized of the tyranny, and he been the same day to settle it on himself. Whereas he retained the same with abundant security, both for the customary fear in the people and diligence in the guard¹; and was not to seek like a younger brother, to whom the government

A. C. 514. Ol. 66. 3.

had not continually been familiar. But Hipparchus came to be named for his misfortune, and thereby grew an opinion afterwards that he was also tyrant.

56. This Harmodius therefore that denied his suit, he disgraced as he before intended. For when some had warned a sister of his, a virgin, to be present to carry a little basket in a procession, they rejected her again when she came: and said that they had never warned her at all, as holding her unworthy the honour². This was taken heavily by Harmodius; but Aristogeiton, for his sake, was far more exasperated than he. Whereupon, with the rest of the conspirators, he³ made all things ready for the execution of the design. Only they were to stay the time of the holiday called the Great Panathenæa, upon which day only such citizens as lead the procession might, without suspicion, be armed in good number. And they were to begin the fact themselves; but the rest were to help them against the halberdiers¹. Now the conspirators, for their better security, were not many; for they hoped that such also as were not privy to it, if they saw it once undertaken², being upon this occasion armed, would assist in the recovery of their own liberty.

57. When this holiday was come, Hippias was gone out of the city into the place called Cerameicum with his guard of halberdiers, and was ordering the procession how it was to go. And Harmodius and Aristogeiton, with each of them a dagger, proceeded to the fact. But when they saw one of the conspirators familiarly talking with Hippias, (for Hippias was very affable to all men), they were afraid, and believed that they were discovered and must presently have been apprehended. They resolved therefore (if it were possible) to be revenged first upon him that had done them the wrong, and for whose sake they had undergone all this danger; and, furnished as they were, ran [furiously] into the city, and finding Hipparchus at a place called Leocorium³, without all regard of themselves fell upon him, and with all the anger in the world, one upon jealousy, the other upon disgrace, struck and slew him. Aristogeiton, for the present, by means of the great confluence of people, escaped through the guard; but taken afterwards, was ungently handled¹; but Harmodius was slain upon the place. 58. The news being brought to Hippias in the Cerameicum, he went not towards the place where the fact was committed, but presently unto those that were armed for the solemnity of the shows and were far off, that he might be with them before they heard of it: and composing his countenance [as well as he could] to dissemble the calamity, pointed to a certain place, and commanded them to repair thither without their arms. Which they did accordingly, expecting that he would have told them somewhat. But having commanded his guard to take those arms away, he then fell presently to picking out of such as he meant to question, and whosoever else was found amongst them with a dagger. For with shields and spears to be in [the head of] the procession, was of custom.

59. Thus was the enterprise first undertaken upon quarrel of love, and then upon a sudden fear followed this unadvised adventure² of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. And after this time the tyranny grew sorer to the Athenians than it had been before. And Hippias standing more in fear, not only put many of the citizens to death, but also cast his eye on the states abroad, to see if he

might get any security from them in this alteration at home. He therefore afterwards (though an Athenian and to a Lampsacen¹) gave his daughter Archedice unto Æantidas the son of Hippocles, tyrant of Lampsacus; knowing that the Lampsacens were in great favour with King Darius. And her sepulchre is yet to be seen with this inscription:

Archedice, the daughter of King Hippias,
Who in his time
Of all the potentates of Greece was prime,
This dust doth hide.
Daughter, wife, sister, mother unto kings she was,
Yet free from pride.

And Hippias, after he had reigned three years more in Athens, and was in the fourth deposed by the Lacedæmonians and the exiled Alcmaeonides, went under truce to Sigeium, and to Æantidas at Lampsacus, and thence to King Darius: from whence, twenty years after in his old age, he came to Marathon with the Medan army.

A. C. 510.

A. C. 490. Ol. 72. 2.

60. The people of Athens bearing this in mind, and remembering all they had heard concerning them, were extremely bitter and full of jealousy towards those that had been accused of the mysteries: and thought all to have been done upon some oligarchical or tyrannical conspiracy. And whilst they were passionate upon this surmise, many worthy men had already been cast in prison: and yet they were not likely so to give over, but grew daily more savage, and sought to apprehend more still. Whilst they were at this pass, a prisoner¹ that seemed most to be guilty, was persuaded by one of his fellow prisoners to accuse somebody, whether it were true or not true: (for it is but conjectural on both sides; nor was there ever, then or after, any man that could say certainly who it was that did the deed): who brought him to it by telling him, that though he had not done it, yet he might be sure to save his own life,² and should deliver the city from the present suspicion: and that he should be more certain of his own safety by a free confession than by coming to his trial if he denied it. Hereupon, he accused both himself and others for the Mercuries. The people of Athens, gladly receiving the certainty (as they thought) of the fact, and having been much vexed before to think that the conspirators should never [perhaps] be discovered to their multitude³, presently set at liberty the accuser, and the rest with him whom he had not appeached: but for those that were accused, they appointed judges⁴, and all they apprehended they executed: and having condemned to die such as fled, they ordained a sum of money to be given to those that should slay them. And though it were all this while uncertain whether they suffered justly or unjustly, yet the rest of the city had a manifest ease for the present.

A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1.

The jealousy and passionate fury of the people in inquiry after the authors of the offences touching the mysteries and Mercuries.

year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. One of the prisoners is persuaded by a fellow-prisoner to appeach some man, whether true or not true: and doth so.

Divers men accused of the paring of the Mercuries.

year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1.

61. But touching Alcibiades, the Athenians took it extreme ill through the instigation of his enemies, the same that had opposed¹ him before he went. And seeing it was certain, as they thought, for the Mercuries; the other crime also concerning the mysteries, whereof he had been accused, seemed a great deal the more to have been committed by him upon the same reason and conspiracy against the people. For it fell out withal, whilst the city was in a tumult about this, that an army of the Lacedæmonians was come as far as the isthmus upon some design against the Bœotians². These therefore they thought were come thither, not against the Bœotians³, but by appointment of him; and that if they had not first apprehended the persons appeached, the city had been betrayed. And one night they watched all night long in their arms in the temple of Theseus within the city. And the friends of Alcibiades in Argos were at the same time suspected of a purpose to set upon the people there: whereupon the Athenians also delivered unto the Argive people those hostages⁴ which they held of theirs in the islands, to be slain. And there were presumptions⁵ against Alcibiades on all sides. Insomuch, as purposing by law to put him to death, they sent, as I have said, the galley called Salaminia into Sicily, both for him, and the rest with him that had been accused: but gave command to those that went, not to apprehend him, but to bid him follow them to make his purgation; because they had a care not to give occasion of stir either amongst their own or their enemy's soldiers; but especially, because they desired that the Mantineans and the Argives, who they thought followed the war by his persuasion, might not depart from the army. So he and the rest accused with him in his own galley, in company of the Salaminia, left Sicily and set sail for Athens. But being at Thurii they followed no further, but left the galley and were no more to be found: fearing indeed to appear to the accusation¹. They of the Salaminia made search for Alcibiades and those that were with him, for a while: but not finding him, followed on their course for Athens. Alcibiades, now an outlaw, passed shortly after in a small boat from Thurii into Peloponnesus; and the Athenians proceeding to judgment upon his not appearing, condemned both him and them to death.

Presumptions against Alcibiades.

Alcibiades sent for home.

year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. 2.

Alcibiades flieth.

year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. 2.

62. After this, the Athenian generals that remained in Sicily, having divided the army into two, and taken each his part by lot, went with the whole towards Selinus and Egesta: with intention, both to see if the Egestæans would pay them the money, and withal to get knowledge of the designs of the Selinuntians and learn the state of their controversy with the Egestæans. And sailing by the coast of Sicily, having it on their left hand, on that side which lieth to the Tyrrhene gulf, they came to Himera, the only Grecian city in that part of Sicily: which not receiving them, they went on, and by the way took Hyccara, a little town of the Sicilians enemy to the Egestæans, and a sea-town; and having made the inhabitants slaves, delivered the town to the Egestæans, whose horseforces were there with them. Thence the Athenians with their landmen returned through the territory of the Siculi to Catana; and the galleys went about with the captives. Nicias going with the fleet presently from Hyccara to Egesta, when he had dispatched with

The Athenian generals in Sicily go to Selinus and Egesta.

They take Hyccara.

year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 1. 2.

The end of the seventeenth summer.

them his other business, and received thirty talents of money, returned to the army. The captives they ransomed; of which they made one hundred and twenty talents more. Then they sailed about to their confederates of the Siculi, appointing them to send their forces: and with the half of their own they came before Hybla in the territory of Gela, an enemy city, but took it not. And so ended this summer.

63. The next winter the Athenians fell presently to make preparation for their journey against Syracuse: and the Syracusians, on the other side, prepared to invade the Athenians. For seeing the Athenians had not presently, upon the first fear and expectation of their coming, fallen upon them, they got every day more and more heart. And because they went far from them into those other parts of Sicily, and assaulting Hybla could not take it, they contemned them more than ever: and prayed their commanders, (as is the manner of the multitude, when they be in courage), seeing that the Athenians came not unto them, to conduct them to Catana. And the Syracusian horsemen, which were ever abroad for scouts, spurring up to the camp of the Athenians, amongst other scorns asked them, whether they came not rather to dwell in the land of another than to restore the Leontines to their own.

A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 2.
The Syracusians
contemn the
Athenians.

64. The Athenian generals having observed this, and being desirous to draw forth the Syracusians' whole power as far as might be from the city, to be able in the meantime without impeachment, going thither in the night by sea, to seize on some convenient place to encamp in; for¹ they knew they should not be able to do it so well in the face of an enemy prepared, nor if they were known to march by land, for that the Syracusian horsemen being many would greatly annoy the light-armed and other multitude, they themselves having no horsemen there: whereas thus they might possess themselves of a place, where the horse could not do them any hurt at all to speak of, (now the² Syracusian outlaws that were with them, had told them of a place near the temple Olympieium³, which also they seized): I say, the Athenian generals, to bring this their purpose to effect, contrived the matter thus. They send a man, of whose fidelity they were well assured, and in the opinion of the Syracusian commanders no less a friend of theirs. This man was a Catanæan, and said he came from Catana, from such and such, whose names they knew, and knew to be the remnant of their well-willers in that city. He told them that the Athenians lay every night within the town, and far from their arms; and that if with the whole power of their city, at a day appointed betimes in a morning they would come to their camp, those friends of the Syracusians would shut the Athenians in and set on fire their galleys; by which means, the Syracusians assaulting the pallisado, might easily win the camp¹: and that the Catanæans that were to help them herein were many, and those he came from already prepared for it.

year xvii. A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2. Nicias his
stratagem to get easy
landing and
encamping by
Syracuse.

year xvii. A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

year xvii. A. C. 415.
Ol. 91. 2.

The Athenians land,
pitch their camp, and

65. The Syracusan commanders, having been also otherwise encouraged, and having intended a preparation² to go against Catana though this messenger had not come, did so much the more unadvisedly believe the man; and straightways being agreed of the day on which they were to be there, sent him away. These commanders (for by this time the Selinuntians and some other their confederates were come in) appointed the Syracusians universally to set forwards by a day³. And when all their necessities were in readiness, and the day at hand on which they were to be there, they set forwards towards Catana, and encamped the night following upon the banks of the river Simæthus in the territory of the Leontines. The Athenians upon advertisement that they were set forth, rising with their whole army, both themselves and such of the Siculi and others as went with them¹, and going aboard their galleys and boats in the beginning of the night set sail for Syracuse. In the morning betimes the Athenians disembarked over against Olympieium², to make their camp. And the Syracusan horsemen, who were at Catana before the rest, finding the camp risen, came back to the foot and told them: whereupon they went all together back to the aid of the city³. 66. In the meantime, the way the Syracusians had to go being long, the Athenians had pitched their camp at leisure in a place of advantage: wherein it was in their own power to begin battle when they list, and where both in and before the battle the Syracusan horsemen could least annoy them. For on one side there were walls, and houses, and trees, and a lake that kept them off; on the other side steep rocks: and having felled trees hard by and brought them to the sea-side, they made a pallisado both before their galleys and towards Dascon¹. And on that part that was most accessible to the enemy, they made a fort with stone, (the best they could find, but unwrought), and with wood; and withal pulled down the bridge of the river Anapus. Whilst this was doing, there came none to empeach them from the city. The first² that came against them were the Syracusan horsemen; and by and by after, all the foot together. And though at first they came up near unto the camp of the Athenians, yet after, seeing the Athenians came not out against them, they retired again; and crossing to the other side of the Helorine highway, stayed there that night.

entrench themselves, ere the Syracusians return.

year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 2.

The Syracusan army cometh back.

67. The next day the Athenians and their confederates prepared to fight, and were ordered thus. The Argives and the Mantineans had the right wing, the Athenians were in the middle, and the rest of their confederates in the other wing. That half of the army which stood foremost, was ordered by eight in file: the other half towards their tents, ordered likewise by eights, was cast into the form of a long square³, and commanded to observe diligently where the rest of the army was in distress, and to make specially thither. And in the midst of these so arranged, were received such as carried the weapons and tools of the army¹.

The Athenians and Syracusians prepare to fight.

year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 2.

The Syracusians arranged their men of arms, who were Syracusians of all conditions and as many of their confederates as were present, by sixteens in file: (they that came to aid them, were chiefly the Selinuntians, and then the horsemen of the Geloans, about two hundred; and of the Camarinæans, about twenty horsemen and fifty archers): the cavalry they placed in the right point of the battle, being in all no less

than a thousand two hundred, and with them the darters. But the Athenians intending to begin the battle, Nicias went up and down the army, from one nation to another: to whom and to all in general he spake to this effect:

68. “What need I, sirs, to make a long exhortation, when this battle is the thing for which we all came hither²? For in my opinion, the present preparation is more able to give you encouragement, than any oration how well soever made, if with a weak army. For where we are together, Argives, Mantineans, Athenians, and the best of the islanders, how can we choose among so many and good confederates, but conceive great hope of the victory: especially against tag and rag, and not chosen men, as we are ourselves, and against Sicilians, who though they contemn us, cannot stand against us; their skill not being answerable to their courage? It must be remembered also that we be far from our own, and not near to any amicable territory but such as we shall acquire by the sword. My exhortation to you, I am certain, is contrary to that of the enemy. For they say to theirs, ‘You are to fight *for* your country’. I say to you, You are to fight *out of* your country, where you must either get the victory, or not easily get away; for many horsemen will be upon us. Remember therefore every man his own worth, and charge valiantly: and think the present necessity and strait we are in, to be more formidable than the enemy.”

the oration of nicias to his army.

year xvii. A. C. 415. Ol. 91. 2. Oration of Nicias.

69. Nicias having thus exhorted the army, led it presently to the charge. The Syracusians expected not to have fought at that instant: and the city being near, some of them were gone away; and some for haste came in running; and though late, yet every one, as he came, put himself in where was the greatest number. For they wanted neither willingness nor courage, either in this or any other battle; being no less valiant, so far forth as they had experience, than the Athenians: but the want of this made them, even against their wills, to abate also somewhat of their courage. Nevertheless though they thought not the Athenians would have begun the battle, and were thereby constrained to fight upon a sudden, yet they resumed their arms, and came presently forward to the encounter.

The battle between the Athenians and Syracusians.

And first, the casters of stones¹ and slingers and archers of either side, skirmished in the midst between the armies, mutually chasing each other, as amongst the light-armed was not unlikely. After this, the soothsayers brought forth their sacrifices according to the law of the place¹; and the trumpets instigated the men of arms to the battle. And they came on to fight, the Syracusians for their country and their lives for the present, and for their liberty in the future: on the other side, the Athenians to win the country of another and make it their own, and not to weaken their own by being vanquished: the Argives and other free confederates, to help the Athenians to conquer the country they came against, and to return to their own with victory: and their subject confederates came also on with great courage, principally for their better safety, as desperate if they overcame not; and withal upon the by, that by helping the Athenians to subdue the country of another, their own subjection might be the easier.

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70. After they were come to hand-strokes, they fought long on both sides. But in the meantime there happened some claps of thunder and flashes of lightning, together with a great shower of rain: insomuch as it added to the fear of the Syracusians, that were now fighting their first battle and not familiar with the wars; whereas to the other side that had more experience, the season of the year¹ seemed to expound that accident; and their greatest fear proceeded from the so long resistance of their enemies, in that they were not all this while overcome. When the Argives first had made the left wing of the Syracusians to give ground, and after them the Athenians had also done the like to those that were arranged against them: then the rest of the Syracusian army was presently broken and put to flight. But the Athenians pursued them not far; because the Syracusian horsemen, being many and unvanquished², whensoever any men of arms advanced far from the body of the army, charged upon them, and still drave them in again: but having followed as far as safely they might in great troops, they retired again and erected a trophy. The Syracusians having rallied themselves in the Helorine way, and recovered their order as well as they could for that time, sent³ a guard into Olympieium, lest the Athenians should take the treasure there: and returned with the rest of the army into the city. 71. The Athenians went not to assault the temple; but gathering together their dead, laid them upon the funeral fire, and stayed that night upon the place. The next day they gave truce to the Syracusians to take up their dead, of whom and of their confederates were slain about two hundred and sixty: and gathered up the bones of their own⁴. Of the Athenians and their confederates there died about fifty. And thus, having rifled the bodies of their dead enemies, they returned to Catana¹. For it was now winter; and to make war there, they thought it yet impossible before they had sent for horsemen to Athens, and levied other amongst their confederates there in Sicily, to the end they might not be altogether over-mastered in horse; and before they had also both levied money there and received more from Athens, and made league with certain cities, which they hoped after this battle would the more easily hearken thereunto; and before they had likewise provided themselves of victuals and other things necessary, as intending the next spring to undertake Syracuse again. 72. With this mind they went to winter at Naxos and Catana.

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The Athenians have the victory.

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The Syracusians after they had buried their dead, called an assembly: and Hermocrates the son of Hermon, a man not otherwise second to any in wisdom, and in war both able for his experience and eminent for his valour, standing forth gave them encouragement, and would not suffer them to be dismayed with that which had happened. “Their courage,” he said, “was not overcome, though their want of order had done them hurt. And yet in that they were not so far inferior, as it was likely they would have been: especially being (as one may say) home-bred artificers, against the most experienced in the war of all the Grecians². That they had also been hurt by the number of their generals and commanders,”—for there were fifteen that commanded in chief—“and by the many supernumerary soldiers under no command at all¹. Whereas if they would make but a few and skilful leaders, and prepare armour this winter for such as want it, to increase as much as might be the number of their men of arms, and compel them in other

Hermocrates encourageth the Syracusians:

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things to the exercise of discipline, in all reason they were to have the better of the enemy. For valour they had already, and to keep their order would be learnt by practice²: and both of these would still grow greater; skill, by practising with danger; and their courage would grow bolder of itself, upon the confidence of skill. And for their generals, they ought to choose them few and absolute, and to take an³ oath unto them, to let them lead the army wheresoever they thought best. For by this means, both the things that require secrecy would the better be concealed, and all things would be put in readiness with order and less tergiversation.”

73. The Syracusians, when they had heard him, decreed all that he advised: and elected three generals, him, Heracleides the son of Lysimachus, and Sicanus the son of Exekestus. They sent also ambassadors to Corinth and Lacedæmon, as well to obtain a league with them⁴, as also to persuade the Lacedæmonians to make a hotter war against the Athenians, and to declare themselves in the quarrel of the Syracusians: thereby either to withdraw them from Sicily, or to make them the less able to send supply to their army which was there already.

and is chosen general with two more.

The Syracusians send for aid into Peloponnesus.

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74. The Athenian army at Catana sailed presently to Messana, to receive it by treason of some within: but the plot came not to effect. For Alcibiades, when he was sent for from his charge, being resolved to fly, and knowing what was to be done¹, discovered the same to the friends of the Syracusians in Messana: who with those of their faction slew² such as were accused, and being armed upon occasion of the sedition, obtained to have the Athenians kept out. And the Athenians, after thirteen days' stay, troubled with tempestuous weather, provision also failing and nothing succeeding, returned again to Naxos: and having fortified their camp with a pallisado, they wintered there; and dispatched a galley to Athens for money and horsemen, to be with them early in the spring.

The Athenians attempt Messana, but fail.

75. The Syracusians this winter raised a wall before their city, all the length of the side towards Epipolæ³ including Temenites: to the end, if they chanced to be beaten, they might not be so easily enclosed as when they were in a narrower compass. And they put a guard into Megara, and another into Olympieium; and made pallisadoes on the seaside at all the places of landing. And knowing that the Athenians wintered at Naxos, they marched with all the power of the city unto Catana: and after they had wasted the territory, and burnt the cabins and camp where the Athenians had lodged before, returned home. And having heard that the Athenians had sent ambassadors to Camarina, according to a league made before in the time of Laches¹, to try if they could win them to their side, they also sent ambassadors to oppose it. For they suspected that the Camarinæans had sent those succours in the former battle, with no great good will: and that now they would take part with them no longer, seeing the Athenians had the better of the day, but would rather join with the Athenians upon the former league. Hermocrates therefore

A. C. 415. 4. Ol. 91. 2. The Syracusians enlarge the compass of their walls

year xvii. A. C. 415 4. Ol. 91. 2. and burn the tents of the Athenians by Catana.

Ambassadors both from the Athenians and Syracuse unto Camarina, for the friendship of that city.

and others being come to Camarina from the Syracusians, and Euphemus and others from the Athenians, when the assembly was met, Hermocrates desiring to increase their envy to the Athenians², spake unto them to this effect:

76. “Men of Camarina, we come not hither upon fear that the forces of the Athenians here present may affright you: but lest their speeches which they are about to make, may seduce you, before you have also heard what may be said by us. They are come into Sicily with that pretence indeed, which you hear given out, but with that intention which we all suspect: and to me they seem not to intend the replantation of the Leontines, but rather our supplantation. For surely it holdeth not in reason, that they who subvert the cities yonder, should come to plant any city here: nor that they should have such a care of the Leontines, because Chalcideans, for kindred’s sake, when they keep in servitude the Chalcideans themselves of Eubœa, of whom these here are but the colonies. But they both hold the cities there, and attempt those here, in one and the same kind. For when the Ionians, and the rest of the confederates their own colonies¹, had willingly made them their leaders in the war to avenge them of the Medes, the Athenians laying afterwards to their charge, to some the not sending of their forces², to some their war amongst themselves, and so to the rest the most colourable criminations they could get, subdued them all to their obedience. And it was not for the liberty of the Grecians that these men, nor for the liberty of themselves that the Grecians made head against the Medes: but the Athenians did it to make them serve, not the Medes, but them, and the Grecians to change their master, as they did, not for one less wise, but for one worse wise.

the oration of
hermocrates.

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Oration of
Hermocrates.

77. “But in truth we come not to accuse the Athenian state, though it be obnoxious enough, before you that know sufficiently the injuries they have done, but far rather to accuse ourselves: who though we have the examples before our eyes of the Grecians there brought into servitude for want of defending themselves, and though we see them now, with the same sophistry of replanting the Leontines and their kindred, and aiding of their confederates the Egestæans, prepare to do the like unto us, do not yet unite ourselves, and with better courage make them to know that we be not Ionians, nor Hellespontines, nor islanders, that changing serve always the Mede or some other master, but that we are Dorians and freemen, come to dwell here in Sicily out of Peloponnesus, a free country. Shall we stand still till we be taken city after city, when we know that that only way we are conquerable: and when we find them wholly bent to this, that by drawing some from our alliance with their words, and causing some to wear each other out with war upon hope of their confederacy, and winning others by other fit language, they may have the power to do us hurt¹? But we think, though one of the same island perish, yet if he dwell far off, the danger will not come to us; and before it arrive, we count unhappy only him that suffereth before us². 78. If any therefore be of this opinion, that it is not he, but the Syracusian that is the Athenian’s enemy; and thinketh it a hard matter that he should endanger himself for the territory that is mine: I would have him to consider, that he is to fight

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Hermocrates.

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Hermocrates.

not chiefly for mine, but equally for his own in mine, and with the more safety for that I am not destroyed before and he thereby destitute of my help, but stand with him in the battle. Let him also consider that the Athenians come not hither to punish the Syracusians for being enemies to you, but by pretence of me to make himself the stronger by your friendship¹. If any man here envieth, or also² feareth us, (for the strongest are still liable unto both), and would therefore wish that the Syracusians might be weakened to make them more modest, but not vanquished for their own safety's sake: that man hath conceived a hope beyond the power of man. For it is not reasonable³ that the same man should be the disposer both of his desires and of his fortune. And if his aim should fail him, he might, deploring his own misery, peradventure wish to enjoy⁴ my prosperity again. But this will not be possible to him that shall abandon me, and not undertake the same dangers, though not in title, yet in effect the same that I do. For though it be our power in title, yet in effect it is your own safety you defend. And you men of Camarina, that are borderers and likely to have the second place of danger, you should most of all have foreseen this, and not have aided us so dully. You should rather have come to us: and that which, if the Athenians had come first against Camarina, you should in your need have implored at our hands, the same you should now also have been seen equally to hearten us withal, to keep us from yielding. But as yet, neither you nor any of the rest have been so forward. 79. Perhaps upon fear, you mean to deal evenly between us both, and allege your league with the Athenians. You made no league against your friends, but against your enemies, in case any should invade you: and by it you are also tied to aid the Athenians, when others wrong them; but not when, as now, they wrong their neighbour. For even the Rhegians, who are also Chalcideans, refuse to help them in replanting the Leontines; though these also be Chalcideans. And then it were a hard case, if they suspecting a bad action under a fair justification, are wise without a reason¹; and you, upon pretence of reason, should aid your natural enemies, and help them that most hate you to destroy your more natural kindred.

“But this is no justice; to fight with them is justice, and not to stand in fear of their preparation. Which, if we hold together, is not terrible: but is, if contrarily (which they endeavour) we be disunited. For neither when they came against us, being none but ourselves, and had the upperhand in battle, could they yet effect their purpose; but quickly went their ways. 80. There is no reason therefore we should be afraid, when we are all together,

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but that we should have the better will to unite ourselves in a league: and the rather, because¹ we are to have aid from Peloponnesus, who every way excel these men in military sufficiency. Nor should you think that your purpose² to aid neither, as being in league with both, is either just in respect of us, or safe for yourselves: for it is not so just in substance, as it is in the pretence. For if through want of your aid, the assailed perish and the assailant become victor: what do you by your neutrality, but leave the safety of the one undefended, and suffer the other to do evil? Whereas it were more noble in you, by joining with the wronged and with your kindred, both to defend the common good of Sicily, and keep the Athenians, as your friends, from an act of injustice. To be short, we Syracusians say, that to demonstrate plainly, to you or to any other, the thing you already know, is no hard matter³: but we pray you, and withal if you reject our words we protest, that whereas the Ionians, who have ever

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been our enemies, do take counsel against us, you, that are Dorians as well as we, betray us. And if they subdue us, though it be by your counsels that they do it, yet they only shall have the honour of it: and for the prize of their victory, they will have none other but even the authors of their victory: but if the victory fall unto us, even you also, the cause of this our danger, shall undergo the penalty. Consider therefore now and take your choice, whether you will have the servitude without the present danger: or saving yourselves with us, both avoid the dishonour of having a master, and escape our enmity, which is likely otherwise to be lasting.”

81. Thus spake Hermocrates. After him Euphemus, ambassador from the Athenians, spake thus:

82. “Though our coming were to renew our former league, yet seeing we are touched by the Syracusan, it will be necessary we speak something here of the right of our dominion. And the greatest testimony of this right he hath himself given; in that he said, the Ionians were ever enemies to the Dorians. And it is true¹. For being Ionians, we have ever endeavoured to find out some means or other, how best to free ourselves from subjection to the Peloponnesians that are Dorians, more in number than we and dwelling near us. After the Medan war, having gotten us a navy, we were delivered thereby from the command and leading of the Lacedæmonians: there being no cause why they should rather be leaders of us than we of them, save only that they were then the stronger. And when we were made commanders of those Grecians which before lived under the king, we took upon us the government of them: because we thought, that having power in our hands to defend ourselves, we should thereby be the less subject to the Peloponnesians. And to say truth, we subjected the Ionians and islanders (whom the Syracusians say we brought into bondage being our kindred) not without just cause¹: for they came with the Medes against ours, their mother city: and for fear of losing their wealth durst not revolt, as we did, that abandoned our very city. But as they were content to serve, so they would have imposed the same condition upon us. 83. For these causes, we took upon us our dominion over them; both as worthy of the same, in that we brought the greatest fleet and promptest courage to the service of the Grecians, whereas they, with the like promptness in favour of the Medes, did us hurt; and also as being desirous to procure ourselves a strength against the Peloponnesians. And follow any other we will not², seeing we alone have pulled down the barbarian, and therefore have right to command; or at least have put ourselves into danger more for the liberty of the Peloponnesians, than of all the rest of Greece, and our own besides. Now to seek means for one’s own preservation, is a thing unblameable. And as it is for our own safety’s cause that we are now here, so also we find that the same will be profitable for you. Which we will make plain from those very things which they accuse, and you, as most formidable, suspect us of: being assured, that such as suspect with vehement fear, though they may be won for the present with the sweetness of an oration, yet when the matter comes to performance, will then do as shall be most for their turn.

the oration of
euphemus.

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“We have told you that we hold our dominion yonder upon fear; and that upon the same cause we come hither now, by the help of our friends to assure the cities here; and not to bring you into subjection, but rather to keep you from it. 84. And let no man object, that we be solicitous for those that are nothing to us: for as long as you be preserved, and able to make head against the Syracusians, we shall be the less annoyed by their sending of forces to the Peloponnesians¹. And in this point you are very much unto us. For the same reason, it is meet² also that we replant the Leontines; not to subject them, as their kindred in Eubœa, but to make them as puissant as we can: that being near, they may from their own territory weaken the Syracusians in our behalf. For as for our wars at home, we are a match for our enemies without their help; and the Chalcidean (whom having made a slave yonder, the Syracusian said, we absurdly attempt to vindicate into liberty here) is most beneficial to us there without arms, paying money only; but the Leontines, and other our friends here, are the most profitable to us when they are most in liberty.

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Oration of Euphemus.

85. “Now to a tyrant or city that reigneth, nothing can be thought absurd if profitable; nor any man a friend, that may not be trusted to. Friend or enemy he must be, according to the several occasions. But here it is for our benefit not to weaken our friends, but by our friends’ strength to weaken our enemies. This you must needs believe, inasmuch as yonder also we so command over our confederates, as every of them may be most useful to us: the Chians and Methymnæans redeem their liberty with providing us some galleys; the most of the rest, with a tribute of money somewhat more pressing. Some again of our confederates are absolutely free, notwithstanding that they be islanders, and easy to be subdued: the reason whereof is this; they are situate in places commodious about Peloponnesus. It is probable therefore, that here also we will so order our affairs as shall be most for our own turn, and most according to our fear, as we told you, of the Syracusians. For they affect a dominion over you; and having by advantage of your suspicion of us drawn you to their side, will themselves by force, or (if we go home without effect) by your want of friends, have the sole command of Sicily: which, if you join with them, must of necessity come to pass. For neither will it be easy for us to bring so great forces again together¹: nor will the Syracusians want strength to subdue you, if we be absent. Him that thinketh otherwise, the thing itself convinceth. 86. For when you called us in to aid you at the first, the fear you pretended was only this: that if we neglected you, the Syracusians would subdue you, and we thereby should participate of the danger². And it were unjust, that the argument you would needs have to prevail then with us, should now have no effect with yourselves; or that you should be jealous of the much strength we bring against the power of the Syracusians, when much rather you should give the less ear unto them. We cannot so much as stay here without you: and if becoming perfidious we should subdue these states, yet we are unable to hold them: both in respect of the length of the voyage, and for want of means of guarding them; because they be great, and provided after the manner of the continent³. Whereas they, not lodged near you in a camp, but inhabiting near you in a city of greater power than this of ours⁴, will be always watching their advantages against you: and when an opportunity shall be offered against any of your cities, will be sure not to let it slip. This they have already

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made to appear, both in their proceedings against the Leontines, and also otherwise. And yet have these the face to move you¹ against us that hinder this, and that have hitherto kept Sicily from falling into their hands. But we, on the other side, invite you to a far more real safety; and pray you, not to betray that safety which we both of us hold from one another at this present, but to consider, that they by their own number have way to you always, though without confederates; whereas you shall seldom have so great an aid again to resist them. Which if through your jealousy you suffer to go away without effect, or if it miscarry, you will hereafter wish for the least part of the same, when their coming can no more do you good.

87. “But, Camarinæans, be neither you nor others moved with their calumnies. We have told you the very truth, why we are suspected: and summarily we will tell it you again, claiming to prevail with you thereby. We say, we command yonder, lest else we should obey; and we assert into liberty the cities here, lest else we should be harmed by them: many things we have to be doing, because many things we are forced to beware of: and both now and before, we came not uncalled; but called as confederates to such of you as suffer wrong. Make not yourselves judges of what we do, nor go about as censors (which were now hard to do) to divert us; but as far as this busy humour and fashion of ours may be for your own service, so far take and use it: and think not the same hurtful alike to all, but that the greatest part of the Grecians have good by it. For in all places¹, though we be not of any side, yet both he that looketh to be wronged, and he that contriveth to do the wrong, by the obviousness of the hope that the one hath of our aid, and of the fear that the other hath of their own danger, if we should come, are brought by necessity, the one to moderation against his will, the other into safety without his trouble. Refuse not therefore the security now present, common both to us that require it, and to yourselves². But do as others use to do; come with us: and instead of defending yourselves always against the Syracusians, take your turn once, and put them to their guard as they have done you.”

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Oration of Euphemus.

88. Thus spake Euphemus. The Camarinæans stood thus affected. They bare good will to the Athenians, save that they thought they meant to subjugate Sicily: and were ever at strife with the Syracusians about their borders. Yet because they were afraid that the Syracusians, that were near them, might as well get the victory as the other, they had both formerly sent them some few horse, and also now resolved for the future to help the Syracusians, but underhand and as sparingly as possible: and withal that they might no less seem to favour the Athenians than the Syracusians, especially after they had won a battle, to give for the present an equal answer unto both¹. So after deliberation had, they answered thus: “That forasmuch as they that warred, were both of them their confederates, they thought it most agreeable to their oath for the present to give aid to neither”. And so the ambassadors of both sides went their ways.

The resolution of the
Camarinæans for
neutrality

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And the Syracusians made preparations for the war by themselves².

The Athenians seek to
win the Siculi:

The Athenians being encamped at Naxos, treated with the Siculi, to procure as many of them as they might to their side. Of whom, such as inhabited the plain and were subject to the Syracusians, for the most part held off: but they that dwelt in the most inland parts of the island, being a free people, and ever before dwelling in villages, presently agreed with the Athenians³; and brought corn into the army, and some of them also money. To those that held off, the Athenians went with their army: and some they forced to come in, and others they hindered from receiving the aids and garrisons of the Syracusians⁴. And having brought their fleet from Naxos, where it had been all the winter till now, they lay the rest of the winter at Catana, and re-erected their camp formerly burnt by the Syracusians. They sent a galley also to Carthage, to procure amity and what help they could from thence: and into Hetruria¹, because some cities there had of their own accord promised to take their parts. They sent likewise to the Siculi about them and to Egesta, appointing them to send in all the horse they could: and made ready bricks, and iron, and whatsoever else was necessary for a siege, and every other thing they needed, as intending to fall in hand with the war early the next spring.

they bring their fleet to Catana:

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they send for aid to Carthage, and into Hetruria:

year xvii. A. C. 415-4. Ol. 91. 2. and prepare to besiege Syracuse.

The ambassadors of Syracuse which were sent to Corinth and Lacedæmon, as they sailed by endeavoured also to move the Italians to a regard of this action of the Athenians¹. Being come to Corinth, they spake unto them, and demanded aid upon the title of consanguinity. The Corinthians having forthwith, for their own part, decreed cheerfully to aid them, sent also ambassadors from themselves along with these to Lacedæmon: to help them to persuade the Lacedæmonians, both to make a more open war against the Athenians at home, and to send some forces also into Sicily. At the same time that these ambassadors were at Lacedæmon from Corinth, Alcibiades was also there with his fellow-fugitives: who presently upon their escape passed over from Thurii first to Cyllene, the haven of the Eleians, in a ship, and afterwards went thence to Lacedæmon, sent for by the Lacedæmonians themselves, under public security. For he feared them for his doings about Mantinea. And it fell out, that in the assembly of the Lacedæmonians, the Corinthians, Syracusians, and Alcibiades made all of them the same request. Now the ephores and magistrates, though intending to send ambassadors to Syracuse to hinder them from compounding with the Athenians, being yet not forward to send them aid, Alcibiades stood forth and sharpened the Lacedæmonians: inciting them with words to this effect:

The Syracusians pray aid of the Corinthians and Lacedæmonians.

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Alcibiades at Lacedæmon instigateth the Lacedæmonians against his country.

the oration of alcibiades.

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89. “It will be necessary that I say something first concerning mine own accusation, lest through jealousy of me, you bring a prejudicate ear to the common business. My ancestors having on a certain quarrel renounced the office of receiving you¹, I was the man that restored the same again; and showed you all possible respect, both otherwise, and in the matter of your loss at Pylus. Whilst I persisted in my good will to you, being to make a peace at Athens, by treating the same with my adversaries you invested them with authority, and me with disgrace. For which cause, if in applying myself afterwards to the Mantineans and Argives, or in anything else I did you hurt, I did it justly: and if any man here were causelessly angry with me, then when he suffered, let him be now content again, when he knows the true cause of the same. Or if any man think the worse of me for inclining to the people, let him acknowledge that therein also he is offended without a cause. For we have been always enemies to tyrants; and what is contrary to a tyrant, is called the people: and from thence hath continued our adherence to the multitude. Besides, in a city governed by democracy, it was necessary in most things to follow the present course; nevertheless we have endeavoured to be more moderate than suiteth with the now headstrong humour of the people. But others there have been, both formerly and now, that have incited the common people to worse things than I²: and they are those that have also driven out me. But as for us, when we had the charge of the whole, we thought it reason³, by what form it was grown most great and most free, and in which we received it, in the same to preserve it. For though such of us as have judgment, do know well enough what the democracy is, and I no less than another, (insomuch as I could inveigh against it; but of confessed madness nothing can be said that is new), yet we thought it not safe to change it, when you our enemies were so near us.

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415–4. Ol. 91. 2.
Oration of Alcibiades.

90. “Thus stands the matter touching my own accusation. And concerning what we are to consult of, both you and I, if I know anything which you yourselves do not, hear it now¹. We made this voyage into Sicily, first (if we could) to subdue the Sicilians; after them the Italians²; after them, to assay the dominion of Carthage, and Carthage itself. If these or most of these enterprises succeeded, then next we should have undertaken Peloponnesus, with the accession both of the Greek forces there³, and with many mercenary barbarians, Iberians and others of those parts, confessed to be the most warlike of the barbarians that are now. We should also have built many galleys besides these which we have already, (there being plenty of timber in Italy); with the which besieging Peloponnesus round, and also taking the cities thereof with our land forces, upon such occasions as should arise from the land, some by assault and some by siege⁴, we hoped easily to have debelled it and afterwards to have gotten the dominion of all Greece. As for money and corn to facilitate some points of this, the places we should have conquered there, besides what here we should have found, would sufficiently have furnished us.

year xvii. A. C. 415.
4. Ol. 91. 2. Oration
of Alcibiades.

91. “Thus, from one that most exactly knoweth it, you have heard what is the design of the fleet now gone; and which the generals there, as far as they can, will also put in execution. Understand next, that unless you aid them, they yonder cannot possibly hold out. For the Sicilians, though inexpert, if many of them unite may well

year xvii. A. C.
415–4. Ol. 91. 2.
Oration of Alcibiades.

subsist: but that the Syracusians alone, with their whole power already beaten, and withal kept from the use of the sea¹, should withstand the forces of the Athenians already there, is a thing impossible. And if their city should be taken, all Sicily is had, and soon after Italy also: and the danger from thence which I foretold you, would not be long ere it fell upon you. Let no man therefore think that he now consulteth of Sicily only, but also of Peloponnesus, unless this be done with speed. Let² the army you send be of such, as being aboard may row, and landing presently be armed: and (which I think more profitable than the army itself) send a Spartan for commander, both to train the soldiers already there, and to compel unto it such as refuse. For thus will your present friends be the more encouraged, and such as be doubtful come to you with the more assurance. It were also good to make war more openly upon them here: that the Syracusians seeing your care may the rather hold out, and the Athenians be less able to send supply to their army. You ought likewise to fortify Deceleia in the territory of Athens, a thing which the Athenians themselves most fear, and reckon for the only evil they have not yet tasted in this war. And the way to hurt an enemy most, is to know certainly what he most feareth, and to bring the same upon him. For in reason a man therefore feareth a thing most, as having the precisest knowledge of what will most hurt him. As for the commodities which yourselves shall reap, and deprive the enemy of by so fortifying; letting much pass, I will sum you up the principal. Whatsoever the territory is furnished withal¹, will come most of it unto you, partly taken, and partly of its own accord. The revenue of the silver mines in Laurium, and whatsoever other profit they have from their land or from their courts of justice², will presently be lost: and, which is worse, their confederates will be remiss in bringing in their revenue: and will care little for the Athenians, if they believe once that you follow the war to the utmost. That any of these things be put in act speedily and earnestly, men of Lacedæmon, it resteth only in yourselves: for I am confident, and I think I err not, that all these things are possible to be done.

92. “Now I must crave this: that I be neither the worse esteemed, for that having once been thought a lover of my country, I go now amongst the greatest enemies of the same against it; nor yet mistrusted, as one that speaketh with the zeal of a fugitive. For though I fly from the malice of them that drave me out, I shall not, if you take my counsel, fly your profit. Nor are you enemies so much, who have hurt but your enemies, as they are, that have made enemies of friends. I love not my country, as wronged by it, but as having lived in safety in it¹. Nor do I think that I do herein go against any country of mine; but that I far rather seek to recover the country I have not. And he is truly a lover of his country, not that refuseth to invade the country he hath wrongfully lost: but that desires so much to be in it, as by any means he can he will attempt to recover it. I desire you therefore, Lacedæmonians, to make use of my service in whatsoever danger or labour confidently: seeing you know, according to the common saying, if I did hurt you much when I was your enemy, I can help you much when I am your friend. And so much the more, in that I know the state of Athens, and but conjectured at yours. And considering you are now in deliberation upon a matter of so extreme importance, I pray you think not much to send an army both into Sicily and Attica: as well to preserve the great matters that are there with the presence of a small part of your force, as also to pull down the power of the Athenians both present and to come:

year xvii. A. C.
415–4. Ol. 91. 2.
Oration of Alcibiades.

year xvii. A. C.
415–4. Ol. 91. 2.
Oration of Alcibiades.

and afterwards to dwell in safety yourselves, and to have the leading of all Greece; not forced, but voluntary and with their good affection.”

93. Thus spake Alcibiades. And the Lacedæmonians, though before this they had a purpose of their own accord to send an army against Athens, but had delayed and neglected it¹: yet when these particulars were delivered by him, they were a great deal the more confirmed in the same, conceiving that what they had heard was from one that evidently knew it. Insomuch as they had set their minds already upon the fortifying of Deceleia, and upon the sending of some succours into Sicily, for the present². And having assigned Gylippus the son of Cleandridas, unto the Syracusian ambassadors for chief commander³, they willed him to consider, both with them and the Corinthians, how best for their present means, and with greatest speed, some help might be conveyed unto them in Sicily. He thereupon appointed the Corinthians to send him two galleys presently to Asine, and to furnish the rest they meant to send, and to have them ready to sail when occasion should serve. This agreed upon, they departed from Lacedæmon.

The Lacedæmonians resolve to send Gylippus into Sicily.

In the meantime the galley arrived at Athens, which the generals sent home for money and horsemen. And the Athenians upon hearing, decreed to send both provision and horsemen¹ to the army. So the winter ended: and the seventeenth year of this war written by Thucydides.

The Athenians resolve to send provision and horsemen.

year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 2.

94. In the very beginning of the next spring the Athenians in Sicily departed from Catana, and sailed by the coast to Megara of Sicily. The inhabitants whereof, in the time of the tyrant Gelon, the Syracusians (as I mentioned before) had driven out, and now possess the territory themselves. Landing here, they wasted the fields: and having assaulted a certain small fortress of the Syracusians, not taking it, they went presently back, part by land and part by sea, unto the river Tereas. And landing again in the plain fields, wasted the same and burnt up their corn: and lighting on some Syracusians, not many, they slew some of them; and having set up a trophy, went all again on board their galleys. Thence they returned to Catana, and took in victual: then with their whole army they went to Centoripa, a small city of the Siculi; which yielding on composition, they departed, and in their way burnt up the corn of the Inessæans and the Hyblæans. Being come again to Catana, they find there two hundred and fifty horsemen² arrived from Athens, without horses, though not without the furniture, supposing to have horses there: and thirty archers on horseback, and three hundred talents of silver.

The Athenians burn the fields of certain towns of the Siculi and take Centoripa.

They receive money and horsemen from Athens.

The Lacedæmonians invade Argeia.

year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 2. The Argives take a great booty in

95. The same spring the Lacedæmonians led forth their army against Argos, and went as far as to Cleonæ: but an earthquake happening, they went home again. But¹ the Argives invaded the territory of Thyrea, confining on their own; and took a great booty from the Lacedæmonians, which they sold for no less than twenty–five talents.

Thyreatis. The commons of Thespiæ set upon the few, but with ill success.

Not long after², the commons of Thespiæ set upon them that had the government; but not prevailing, were part apprehended, and part escaped to Athens, the Athenians³ having also aided them.

96. The Syracusians the same summer, when they heard that the Athenians had horsemen sent to them from Athens, and that they were ready now to come against them, conceiving that if the Athenians gat not Epipolæ, a rocky ground and lying just against the city⁴, they would not be able, though masters of the field, to take in the city with a wall: intended therefore, lest the enemy should come secretly up, to keep the passages by which there was access unto it with a guard⁵. For the rest of the place is to the outside high and steep, falling to the city by degrees, and on the inside wholly subject to the eye. And it is called by the Syracusians, Epipolæ⁶, because it lieth above the level of the rest. The Syracusians, coming out of the city with their whole

Epipolæ a high ground before the city of Syracuse.

year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 2.

year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 2. Diomilus slain.

The Athenians fortify Labdalum.

power into a meadow by the side of the river Anapus betimes in the morning, (for Hermocrates and his fellow–commanders had already received their charge), were there taking a view of their arms: but¹ first they had set apart seven hundred men of arms, under the leading of Diomilus, an outlaw of Andros, both to guard Epipolæ, and to be ready together quickly upon any other occasion wherein there might be use of their service. 97. The Athenians the day following, having been already mustered, came from Catana with their whole forces, and landed their soldiers at a place called Leon, six or seven furlongs from Epipolæ, unperceived, and laid their navy at anchor under Thapsus. Thapsus is almost an island, lying out into the sea and joined to the land with a narrow isthmus; not far from Syracuse, neither by sea nor land. And the naval forces of the Athenians, having made a pallisado across the said isthmus, lay there quiet². But the land soldiers marched at high speed towards Epipolæ, and gat up by Euryelus before the Syracusians³ could come to them from out of the meadow, where they were mustering. Nevertheless they came on, every one with what speed he could, not only Diomilus with his seven hundred, but the rest also. They had no less to go from the meadow than twenty–five furlongs, before they could reach the enemy. The Syracusians therefore coming up in this manner⁴, and thereby defeated in battle at Epipolæ, withdrew themselves into the city. But Diomilus was slain, and three hundred of the rest. The Athenians after this erected a trophy, and delivered to the Syracusians the bodies of their dead under truce; and came down the next day to the city. But when none came out to give them battle, they retired again; and built a fort upon Labdalum¹, in the very brink of the precipices of Epipolæ, on the side that looketh towards Megara, for a place to keep their utensils and money in when they went out either to fight or to work.

98. Not long after, there came unto them from Egesta three hundred horsemen: and from the Siculi, namely² the Naxians and some others, about one hundred: and the Athenians had of their own two hundred and fifty; for which they had horses, part from the Egestæans and Catanæans, and part they bought. So that they had together in the whole, six hundred and fifty horsemen. Having put a guard into Labdalum, the Athenians went down to Syca³, and raised there a wall in circle very quickly; so that they struck a terror into the Syracusians with the celerity of the work. Who therefore coming forth, intended to have given them battle, and no longer to have neglected the matter. But when the armies were one set against the other, the Syracusian generals perceiving their own to be in disarray, and not easily to be embattled, led them again into the city, save only a certain part of their horsemen; which staying, kept the Athenians from carrying of stone and stragglings far abroad from their camp. But the Athenians with one squadron¹ of men of arms, together with their whole number of horse, charged the horsemen of the Syracusians and put them to flight: of whom they slew a part, and erected a trophy for this battle of horse.

year xviii. A. C. 414.
Ol. 91. 2.

99. The next day the Athenians fell to work upon their wall, to the north side of their circular wall²: some building, and some fetching stone and timber, which they still laid down toward the place called Trogilus, in the way by which the wall should come with the shortest compass from the great haven to the other sea. The Syracusians, by the persuasion of their generals, and principally of Hermocrates, intended not to hazard battle with their whole power against the Athenians any more: but thought fit rather, in the way where the Athenians were to bring their wall, to raise a counter-wall; which, if they could but do before the wall of the Athenians came on, it would exclude their further building: and if the Athenians should set upon them as they were doing it, they might send part of the army to defend it, and pre-occupate the accesses to it with a pallisado: and if they would come with their whole army to hinder them, then must they also be forced to let their own work stand still. Therefore they came out; and beginning at their own city, drew a cross-wall beneath the circular fortifications of the Athenians; and set wooden turrets upon it, made of the olive trees which they felled in the ground belonging to the temple. The Athenian navy was not yet come about into the great haven from Thapsus, but the Syracusians were¹ masters of the places near the sea; and the Athenians brought their provision to the army from Thapsus by land.

The Athenians begin to build on the north side of the fortification wherein they lay the wall wherewith to begirt the city.

year xviii. A. C. 414.
Ol. 91. 2. The Syracusians make a cross wall in their way.

100. The Syrcusians, when they thought both their pallisado and wall sufficient; and considering that the Athenians came not to impeach them in the work, as they that feared to divide their army and to be thereby the more easy to be fought withal, and that also hastened to make an end of their own wall wherewith to encompass the city, left one squadron² for a guard of their works, and retired with the rest into the city. And the Athenians cut off the pipes of their conduits, by which their water to drink was conveyed under ground into the town. And having observed also, that about noon the Syracusians kept within their tents, and that some of them were also gone into the city, and that such as

year xviii. A. C. 414.
Ol. 91. 2.

were remaining at the pallisado kept but negligent watch; they commanded three hundred chosen men of arms, and certain other picked out and armed from amongst the unarmed, to run suddenly to that counter-wall of the Syrasians. The rest of the army divided in two, went one part with one of the generals to stop the succour which might be sent from the city; and the other with the other general to the palisado next to the gate 1 [of the counter-wall]. The three hundred assaulted and took the pallisado; the guard whereof forsaking it, fled within the wall into the temple ground: and with them entered also their pursuers; but after they were in were beaten out again by the Syracusians, and some slain, both of the Argives and Athenians, but not many. Then the whole army went back together, and pulled down the wall and plucked up the pallisado: the pales whereof they carried with them to their camp, and erected a trophy.

101. The next day, the Athenians beginning at their circular wall 2, built onwards to that crag over the marshes, which on that part of Epipolæ looketh to the great haven, and by which the way to the haven, for their wall to come through the plain and marsh, was the shortest. As this was doing, the Syracusians came out again and made another pallisado, beginning at the city, through the middle of the marsh; and a ditch at the side of it, to exclude the Athenians from bringing their wall to the sea. But the Athenians, when they had finished their work as far as to the crag, assaulted the pallisado and trench of the Syracusians again. And having commanded their galleys to be brought about from Thapsus into the great haven of Syracuse, about break of day went straight down into the plain; and passing through the marsh, where the ground was clay and firmest, [and partly] upon boards and planks, won both the trench and pallisado, all but a small part, betimes in the morning; and the rest not long after. And here also they fought; and the victory fell to the Athenians: the Syracusians, those of the right wing, fled to the city; and they of the left, to 1 the river. The three hundred chosen Athenians, desiring to cut off their passage, marched at high speed towards the bridge. But the Syracusians fearing to be prevented, (for most of the horsemen were in this number) 2, set upon these three hundred: and putting them to flight, drave them upon the right wing of the Athenians, and following affrighted also the foremost guard 3 of the wing. Lamachus seeing this, came to aid them with a few archers from the left wing of their own, and with [all] the Argives: and passing over a certain ditch, having but few with him, was deserted and slain 1 with some six or seven more. These the Syracusians hastily snatched up, and carried into a place of safety beyond the river 2: and when they saw the rest of the Athenian army coming towards them, they departed. 102. In the meantime, they that fled at first to the city, seeing how things went, took heart again; and re-embattled themselves against the same Athenians that stood ranged against them before; and withal sent a certain portion of their army against the circular fortification of the Athenians upon Epipolæ; supposing to find it without defendants, and so to take it. And they took and demolished the outworks ten plethers 3 in length: but the circle itself was defended by Nicias, who chanced to be left within it for infirmity. For he commanded his servants

The Athenians build from their own fortification to the crags towards the great haven.

year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 2.

The Athenians take their palisado again.

Lamachus slain.

year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 2.

Nicias, assaulted in his camp, defendeth it.

year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 2.

to set fire on all the engines, and whatsoever wooden matter lay before the wall: knowing there was no other possible means to save themselves for want of men. And it fell out accordingly: for by reason of this fire they came no nearer, but retired. For the Athenians having by this time beaten back the enemy below, were coming up to relieve the circle: and their galleys withal (as is before mentioned) were going about from Thapsus into the great haven. Which they above perceiving, speedily made away, they and the whole army of the Syracusians, into the city: with opinion that they could no longer hinder them, with the strength they now had, from bringing their wall through unto the sea.

103. After this the Athenians erected a trophy, and delivered to the Syracusians their dead under truce: and they on the other side delivered to the Athenians the body of Lamachus and of the rest slain with him. And their whole army, both land and sea forces, being now together, they began to enclose the Syracusians with a double wall from Epipolæ and the rocks unto the sea-side. The necessaries of the army were supplied from all parts of Italy. And many of the Siculi, who before stood aloof to observe the way of fortune, took part now with the Athenians; to whom came also three penteconteri [long boats of fifty oars a-piece] from Hetruria; and divers other ways their hopes were nourished. For the Syracusians also, when there came no help from Peloponnesus, made no longer account to subsist by war; but conferred, both amongst themselves and with Nicias, of composition: for Lamachus being dead, the sole command of the army was in him. And though nothing were concluded, yet many things (as was likely with men perplexed, and now more straitly besieged than before) were propounded unto Nicias, and more amongst themselves. And 1 the present ill success had also spread some jealousy amongst them, one of another. And they discharged the generals under whose conduct this happened, as if their harm had come either from their unluckiness or from their perfidiousness: and chose Heracleides, Eucles, and Tellias in their places.

The Syracusians change their generals.

104. Whilst this passed, Gylippus of Lacedæmon and the Corinthian galleys were already at Leucas, purposing with all speed to go over into Sicily. But when terrible reports came unto them from all hands, agreeing in an untruth, that Syracuse was already quite enclosed, Gylippus had hope of Sicily no longer; but desiring to assure Italy, he and Pythen a Corinthian, with two Laconic and two Corinthian galleys, with all speed crossed the Ionic sea to Tarentum: and the Corinthians were to man ten galleys of their own, two of Leucas, and three of Ambracia, and come after. Gylippus went first from Tarentum to Thurii, as ambassador, by his father's right, who was free of the city of Tarentum 1: but not winning them to his side, he put out again, and sailed along the coast of Italy. Passing by the Terinæan gulf, he was put from the shore by a wind which in that quarter bloweth strongly against the north 1, and driven into the main sea; and after another extreme tempest brought in again into Tarentum: where he drew up such of his galleys as had been hurt by the weather, and repaired them. Nicias, hearing that he came, contemned the small number of his galleys, as also the Thurians

year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 2. Gylippus despaireth of Sicily, and seeks to save Italy.

year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 2.

Nicias despiseth the coming of Gylippus.

had before, supposing them furnished as for piracy: and appointed no watch for them yet.

105. About the same time of this summer, the Lacedæmonians invaded the territory of Argos, they and their confederates: and wasted a great part of their land. And the Athenians aided the Argives with thirty galleys: which most apparently broke the peace between them and the Lacedæmonians. For before, they went out from Pylus with the Argives and Mantineans, but in the nature of freebooters; and that also not into Laconia, but other parts of Peloponnesus². Nay, when the Argives have often entreated them but only to land with their arms in Laconia, and having wasted never so little of their territory to return, they would not. But now, under the conduct of Pythodorus, Læspodius, and Demaratus, they landed in the territory of Epidaurus Limera, and in Prasiæ, and there and in other places wasted the country: and gave unto the Lacedæmonians a most justifiable cause to fight against the Athenians. After this, the Athenians being departed from Argos with their galleys, and the Lacedæmonians gone likewise home, the Argives invaded Phliasia: and when they had wasted part of their territory, and killed some of their men, returned.

year xviii. A. C. 414.
Ol. 91. 2.

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THE SEVENTH BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.

THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS.

Gylippus arriveth at Syracuse: checketh the fortune of the Athenians: and cutteth off their works with a counter-wall.—The Lacedæmonians invade Attica and fortify Deceleia.—The confederates of each side are solicited for supplies to be sent to Syracuse.—Two battles fought in the great haven: in the first of which the Syracusians are beaten, in the second superior.—Demosthenes arriveth with a new army: and attempting the works of the enemy in Epipolæ by night, is repulsed with great slaughter of his men.—They fight the third time: and the Syracusians having the victory, block up the haven with boats.—A catalogue of the confederates on each side.—They fight again at the bars of the haven: where the Athenians losing their galleys, prepare to march away by land.—In their march they are afflicted, beaten, and finally subdued by the Syracusians.—The death of Nicias and Demosthenes, and misery of the captives in the quarry.—Which happened in the nineteenth year of this war.

1. Gylippus and Pythen, having repaired their galleys, from Tarentum went along the coast to Locri Epizephyrii¹. And upon certain intelligence now, that Syracuse was not wholly enclosed, but coming with an army there was entrance still by Epipolæ; they consulted whether it were better to take Sicily on their right hand, and adventure into the town by sea; or on the left, and so first to go to Himera, and then taking along both them and as many other as they could get to their side, to go into it by land. And it was resolved to go to Himera: the rather, because the four Attic galleys, which Nicias, though he contemned them before, had now when he heard they were at Locri sent to wait for them, were not arrived yet at Rhegium. Having prevented this guard, they crossed the strait: and touching at Rhegium and Messana by the way, came to Himera. Being there, they prevailed so far with the Himeræans, that they not only followed them to the war themselves, but also furnished with armour such of Gylippus and Pythen's mariners as wanted: for at Himera they had drawn their galleys to land. They likewise sent to the Selinuntians, to meet them at a place assigned with their whole army. The Geloans also, and other¹ of the Siculi, promised to send them forces, though not many: being much the willinger to come to the side, both for that Archonidas was lately dead, (who reigning over some of the Siculi in those parts, and being a man of no mean power, was friend to the Athenians), and also for that Gylippus seemed to come from Lacedæmon with a good will to the business. Gylippus, taking with him of his own mariners and sea-soldiers, for whom he had gotten arms, at the most seven hundred, and Himeræans with armour and without in the whole one thousand, and one hundred horse, and some light-armed Selinuntians, with some few horse of the Geloans, and of the Siculi in all about one thousand, marched with these towards Syracuse.

year xviii. A. C. 414.
Ol. 91. 3.

year xviii. A. C. 414.
Ol 91. 3. Gylippus
and Pythen resolve to
go to Syracuse.

They took the aid of
the men of Himera.

year xviii. A. C. 414.
Ol. 91. 3.

2. In the meantime, the Corinthians with the rest of their galleys putting to sea from Leucas, made after [as they were] every one with what speed he could: and Gylippus, one of the Corinthian commanders, though the last that set forth, arrived first at Syracuse with one galley, and but a little before the coming of Gylippus. And finding them ready to call an assembly about an end of the war, he hindered them from it, and put them into heart: relating, how both the rest of the galleys were coming, and also Gylippus the son of Cleandridas for general, sent unto them by the Lacedæmonians. With this the Syracusians were re-confirmed, and went presently out with their whole army to meet him: for they understood now that he was near [1](#). He, having taken Iegas, a fort, in his way, as he passed through the territory of the Siculi, and embattled his men, cometh to Epipolæ: and getting up by Euryelus, where also the Athenians had gotten up before, marched together with the Syracusians towards the wall of the Athenians. At the time when he arrived, the Athenians had finished a double wall of seven or eight furlongs towards the great haven [1](#); save only a little next the sea, which they were yet at work on. And on the other side of their circle, towards Trogilus and the other sea, the stones were for the most part laid ready upon the place: and the work was left in some places half, and in some wholly finished. So great was the danger that Syracuse was now brought into.

The Corinthian galleys left by Gylippus, make haste after him: and Gylippus arriving first, keepeth the Syracusians from compounding.

Gylippus arriveth at Syracuse

year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 3.

3. The Athenians, at the sudden coming on of Gylippus, though somewhat troubled at first, yet put themselves in order to receive him. And he, making a stand when he came near, sent a herald to them; saying, that if they would abandon Sicily within five days with bag and baggage, he was content to give them truce. Which the Athenians contemning, sent him away without any answer. After this, they were putting themselves into order of battle one against another: but Gylippus finding the Syracusians troubled, and not easily falling into their ranks, led back his army in a more open ground. Nicias led not the Athenians out against him, but lay still at his own fortification. And Gylippus seeing he came not up, withdrew his army into the top called Temenites [2](#); where he lodged all night. The next day, he drew out the greater part of his army, and embattled them before the fortification of the Athenians, that they might not send succour to any other place; but a part also they sent to the fort of Labdalum, and took it, and slew all those they found within it: for the place was out of sight to the Athenians. The same day the Syracusians also took an Athenian galley, as it entered into the great haven.

Gylippus offereth the Athenians five days' truce to be gone in.

The Syracusians win Labdalum.

year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 3.

The Syracusians build a wall upwards through Epipolæ, to stop the proceeding of the wall of the Athenians.

The Athenians fortify Plemmyrium.

4. After this, the Syracusians and their confederates began a wall through Epipolæ, from the city towards the single cross wall¹ upwards: that the Athenians, unless they could hinder it, might be excluded from bringing their own wall any further on. And the Athenians by this time, having made an end of their wall to the sea, were come up again: and Gylippus (for some part of the wall was but weak) rising with his army by night, went to assault it. But the Athenians also knowing it, (for they lodged all night without the wall), went presently to relieve it: which Gylippus perceiving, again retired². And the Athenians, when they had built it higher, kept the watch in this part themselves: and divided the rest of the wall to the charge of their confederates. Also it seemed good to Nicias to fortify the place called Plemmyrium. It is a promontory over against the city, which shooting into the entrance of the great haven straiteneth the mouth of the same: which fortified, he thought would facilitate the bringing in of necessaries to the army. For by this means, their galleys might ride nearer to the haven³ of the Syracusians: and not upon every motion of the navy of the enemies, to be to come out against them, as they were before, from the bottom of the [great] haven. And he had his mind set chiefly now upon the war by sea: seeing his hopes by land diminished since the arrival of Gylippus. Having therefore drawn his army and galleys to that place, he built about it three fortifications, wherein he placed his baggage; and where now also lay at road both his great vessels of carriage, and the nimblest of his galleys¹. Hereupon principally ensued the first occasion of the great loss of his sea soldiers. For having but little water, and that far to fetch, and his mariners going out also to fetch in wood, they were continually intercepted by the Syracusian horsemen, that were masters of the field. For the third part of the Syracusian cavalry were quartered in a little town called Olympieium², to keep those in Plemmyrium from going abroad to spoil the country. Nicias was advertised moreover of the coming of the rest of the Corinthian galleys: and sent out a guard of twenty galleys, with order to wait for them about Locri and Rhegium, and the passage there into Sicily.

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Nicias sendeth twenty galleys to lie in wait for the aid coming from Peloponnesus.

5. Gylippus in the meantime went on with the wall through Epipolæ, using the stones laid ready there by the Athenians³; and withal drew out the Syracusians and their confederates beyond the point of the same, and ever as he brought them forth put them into their order; and the Athenians, on the other side, embattled themselves against them. Gylippus, when he saw his time, began the battle: and being come to hands, they fought between the fortifications of them both, where the Syracusians and their confederates had no use at all of their horsemen. The Syracusians and their confederates being overcome, and the Athenians having given them truce to take up their dead and erected a trophy, Gylippus assembled the army, and told them, that this was not theirs, but his own fault; who by pitching the battle so far within the fortifications, had deprived them of the use both of their cavalry and darters; and that therefore he meant to bring them on again: and wished them to consider, that for forces they were nothing inferior to the enemy; and for courage, it were a thing not to be endured, that being Peloponnesians and Dorians, they should not master and drive out of the country Ionians, islanders, and a rabble of mixed nations.

Gylippus goeth on with his wall, and fighteth with the Athenians twice: and in the latter battle having the victory, he finished his wall, and utterly excluded the

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Ol. 91. 3. proceeding of the wall of the Athenians.

6. After this, when he saw his opportunity, he brought out the army again. Nicias and the Athenians, who thought it necessary, if not to begin the battle, yet by no means to set light by the wall in hand¹ : (for by this time it wanted but little of passing the point of theirs, and proceeding, would give the enemy advantage, both to win if he fought, and not to fight unless he listed)² : did therefore also set forth to meet the Syracusians. Gylippus, when he had drawn his men of arms farther without the walls than he had done before, gave the onset. His horsemen and darters he placed upon the flank of the Athenians, in ground enough, to which neither of their walls extended. And these horsemen, after the fight was begun, charging upon the left wing of the Athenians next them, put them to flight: by which means the rest of the army was by the Syracusians overcome likewise, and driven headlong within their fortifications. The night following, the Syracusians brought up their wall beyond the wall of the Athenians, so as they could no longer hinder them, but should be utterly unable, though masters of the field, to enclose the city.

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7. After this, the other twelve galleys of the Corinthians, Ambraciotes, and Leucadians, undescried of the Athenian galleys that lay in wait for them, entered the haven, under the command of Erasinides, a Corinthian: and helped the Syracusians to finish what remained to the cross wall¹ .

The rest of the galleys come in from Peloponnesus, unseen of the Athenians that were set to watch them.

Now Gylippus went up and down Sicily, raising forces both for sea and land, and soliciting to his side all such cities as formerly either had not been forward, or had wholly abstained from the war. Other ambassadors also, both of the Syracusians and Corinthians, were sent to Lacedæmon and Corinth, to procure new forces to be transported either in ships or boats, or how they could; because the Athenians had also sent to Athens for the like. In the meantime, the Syracusians both manned their navy, and made trial of themselves, as intending to take in hand that part also: and were otherwise exceedingly encouraged.

Gylippus goeth about Sicily, and sendeth into Peloponnesus for more aid.

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8. Nicias perceiving this, and seeing the strength of the enemy and his own necessities daily increasing, he also sent messengers to Athens, both at other times and often, upon the occasion of every action that passed: and now especially, as finding himself in danger, and that unless they quickly sent for those away that were there already, or sent a great supply unto them, there was no hope of safety. And fearing lest such as he sent, through want of utterance or judgment¹ , or through desire to please the multitude, should deliver things otherwise than they were, he wrote unto them a letter: conceiving that thus the Athenians should best know his mind, whereof no part could now be suppressed by the messenger, and might therefore enter into deliberation upon true grounds. With these letters, and other their instructions, the messengers took their journey. And Nicias in the meantime having a care to the well guarding of his camp, was wary of entering into any voluntary dangers.

Nicias writeth to Athens for supply, and to be eased of his charge.

9. In the end of this summer, Euetion, general for the Athenians, with Perdiccas, together with many Thracians warring against Amphipolis, took not the city; but bringing his galleys about into Strymon, besieged it from the river, lying at Imeræum. And so this summer ended.

The Athenians besiege Amphipolis.

The end of the eighteenth summer.

10. The next winter, the messengers from Nicias arrived at Athens; and having spoken what they had in charge, and answered to such questions as they were asked, they presented the letter: which the clerk of the city¹, standing forth, read unto the Athenians, containing as followeth:

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11. “Athenians, you know by many² other my letters what hath passed formerly: nor is it less needful for you to be informed of the state we are in, and to take counsel upon it, at this present. When we had in many battles beaten the Syracusians, against whom we were sent, and had built the walls within which we now lie, came Gylippus a Lacedæmonian, with an army out of Peloponnesus, and also out of some of the cities of Sicily; and in the first battle was overcome by us: but in the second, forced by his many horsemen and darters, we retired within our works. Whereupon giving over our walling up of the city for the multitude of our enemies, we now sit still. Nor³ can we indeed have the use of our whole army, because some part of the men of arms are employed to defend our walls. And they have built a

the letter of nicias to the people of athens.

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year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 3. Letter of Nicias.

year xviii. A. C. 414. Ol. 91. 3. Letter of Nicias.

single wall up to us, so that now we have no more means to enclose it, except one should come with a great army and win that cross wall of theirs by assault. And so it is, that we who seemed to besiege others, are besieged ourselves for so much as concerneth the land: for we cannot go far abroad by reason of their cavalry. 12. They have also sent ambassadors for another army into Peloponnesus: and Gylippus is gone amongst the cities of Sicily, both to solicit such to join with him in the war as have not yet stirred, and of others to get, if he can, both more land—soldiers and more munition for their navy. For they intend, as I have been informed, both to assault our wall by land with their army, and to make trial what they are able to do with their navy by sea. For¹ though our fleet (which they also have heard) were vigorous at first, both for soundness of the galleys and entireness of the men: yet our galleys are now soaked² with lying so long in the water, and our men consumed. For we want the means to haul a—land our galleys, and trim³ them: because the galleys of the enemy, as good as ours and more in number, do keep us in a continual expectation of assault, which they manifestly endeavour⁴. And seeing it is in their own choice to attempt or not, they have therefore liberty to dry their galleys at their pleasure: for they lie not, as we, in attendance upon others. 13. Nay, we could hardly do it, though we had many galleys spare, and were not constrained, as now, to keep watch upon them with our whole number. For should we abate though but a little of our observance, we should want provision: which as we are, being to pass so near their city, is brought in with difficulty. And hence it is, that our mariners both formerly have been, and are now wasted. For our mariners, fetching wood and water and foraging far off, are intercepted by the horsemen: and our slaves¹, now we are on equal terms, run over to

the enemy. As for strangers, some of them having come aboard by constraint, return presently to their cities; and others having been levied at first with great wages, thinking they came to enrich themselves rather than to fight, now they see the enemy make so strong resistance, both otherwise beyond their expectation and especially with their navy, partly take pretext to be gone that they may serve the enemy, and partly, Sicily being large, shift themselves away every one as he can. Some there are also, who having bought here Hyccarian slaves², have gotten the captains of galleys to accept of them in the room of themselves, and thereby destroyed the purity of our naval strength. 14. To you I write, who know how small a time any fleet continueth in the height of vigour: and how few of the mariners are skilful both how to hasten the course of a galley and how to contain the oar. But of all, my greatest trouble is this: that being general, I can neither make them do better, (for your natures are hard to be governed), nor get mariners in any other place, (which the enemy can do from many places), and must of necessity have them from whence we brought both those we have and those we have lost¹. For our now confederate cities, Naxos and Catana, are not able to supply us. Had the enemy but that one thing more, that the towns of Italy that now send us provision, seeing what estate we are now in and you not help us, would turn to them, the war were at an end and we expugned without another stroke.

“I could have written to you other things more pleasing than these, but not more profitable: seeing it is necessary for you to know certainly the affairs here, when you go to council upon them. Withal, because I know your natures to be such, as though you love to hear the best, yet afterwards when things fall not out accordingly you will call in question them that write it, I thought best to write the truth for my own safety’s sake. 15. And now think thus: that though we have carried ourselves, both captains and soldiers, in that for which we came at first hither, unblameably; yet since all Sicily is united against us, and another army expected out of Peloponnesus, you must resolve (for those we have here are not enough for the enemy’s present forces) either to send for these away, or to send hither another army, both of land and sea—soldiers, no less than the former, and money not a little; and also a general to succeed me, who am able no longer to stay here, being troubled with the stone [in the kidneys]. I must crave your pardon². I have done you many good services in the conducts of your armies, when I had my health. What you will do, do in the very beginning of spring, and delay it not. For the enemy will soon have furnished himself of his Sicilian aids: and though those from Peloponnesus will be later, yet if you look not to it, they will get hither partly unseen, as before, and partly by preventing you with speed.”

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16. These were the contents of the letter of Nicias. The Athenians, when they had heard it read, though they released not Nicias of his charge, yet for the present, till such time as others chosen to be in commission might arrive, they joined with him two of those that were already in the army, Menander and Euthydemon: to the end that he might not sustain the whole burthen alone in his sickness. They concluded likewise to send another army, as well for the sea as the land, both of Athenians enrolled and of their confederates. And for fellow—generals with Nicias, they elected Demosthenes the son of Alcisthenes, and Eurymedon the son of Thucles. Eurymedon they sent away presently for Sicily about the time of the

The Athenians
conclude to send a
new army to
Syracuse.

winter solstice, with ten galleys and twenty¹ talents of silver, to tell them there that aid was coming, and that there was care taken of them. 17. But Demosthenes staying, made preparation for the voyage to set out early the next spring: and sent unto the confederates, appointing what forces they should provide, and to furnish himself amongst them with money and galleys and men of arms.

The Athenians sent also twenty galleys about Peloponnesus, to watch that none should go over into Sicily from Corinth or Peloponnesus. For the Corinthians, after the ambassadors were come to them and had brought news of the amendment of the affairs in Sicily, thought it was well that they had sent thither those other galleys before: but now they were encouraged a great deal more, and prepared men of arms to be transported into Sicily in ships¹; and the Lacedæmonians did the like for the rest of Peloponnesus. The Corinthians manned five-and-twenty galleys, to present battle to the fleet that kept watch at Naupactus: that the ships with the men of arms, whilst the Athenians attended these galleys so embattled against them, might pass by unhindered.

They send twenty galleys to

year xviii. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 3. Naupactus, to keep the Corinthians from transporting their forces into Sicily.

18. The Lacedæmonians, as they intended before, and being also instigated to it by the Syracusians and Corinthians, upon advertisement now of the Athenians' new supply for Sicily prepared likewise to invade Attica; thereby to divert them. And Alcibiades also importunately urged the fortifying of Deceleia, and by no means to war remissly. But the Lacedæmonians were heartened thereunto principally, because they thought the Athenians having in hand a double war, one against them and another against the Sicilians, would be the easier pulled down:

The Lacedæmonians prepare to invade Attica and fortify Deceleia, supposing the Athenians to have broken the peace.

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and because they conceived the breach of the last peace was in themselves². For in the former war, the injury proceeded from³ their own side: in that the Thebans had entered Plataea in time of peace; and because also, whereas it was inserted in the former articles, that arms should not be carried against such as would stand to trial of judgment, they had refused such trial when the Athenians offered it. And they thought all their misfortunes had deservedly befallen them for that cause: remembering amongst others, the calamity at Pylus. But when the Athenians with a fleet of thirty sail¹ had spoiled part of the territory of Epidaurus, and of Prasiæ and other places, and their soldiers that lay in garrison in Pylus had taken booty in the country about; and seeing that as often as there arose any controversy touching any doubtful point of the articles, the Lacedæmonians offering trial by judgment, they refused it: then indeed, the Lacedæmonians conceiving the Athenians to be in the same fault that themselves had been in before, betook themselves earnestly to the war. And this winter, they sent about unto their confederates to make ready iron, and all instruments of fortification. And for the aid they were to transport in ships to the Sicilians, they both made provision amongst themselves, and compelled the rest of Peloponnesus to do the like. So ended this winter, and the eighteenth year of the war written by Thucydides.

19. The next spring, in the very beginning, earlier than ever before², the Lacedæmonians and their confederates entered with their army into Attica, under the command of Agis the son of Archidamus, their king. And first they wasted the champagne country; and then went in hand with the wall at Deceleia, dividing the work amongst the army, according to their cities. This Deceleia is from the city of Athens, at the most¹, but one hundred and twenty furlongs: and about as much or a little more from Bœotia. This fort they made in the plain, and in the most opportune place that could be to annoy the Athenians, and in sight of the city. Now the Peloponnesians and their confederates in Attica, went on with their fortification. They in Peloponnesus, sent away their ships with the men of arms about the same time into Sicily: of which the Lacedæmonians, out of the best of their Helotes and men made newly free², sent in the whole six hundred, and Ecritus a Spartan for commander: and the Bœotians three hundred, under the conduct of Xenon and Nicon, Thebans, and Hegesander, a Thespian. And these set forth first, and put to sea at Tænarus in Laconia. After them a little, the Corinthians sent away five hundred more, part from the city itself of Corinth, and part mercenary Arcadians; and Alexarchus, a Corinthian, for captain. The Sicyonians also sent two hundred with them that went from Corinth, and Sargeus a Sicyonian for captain. Now the twenty–five Corinthian galleys that were manned in winter, lay opposite to the twenty galleys of Athens which were at Naupactus, till such time as the men of arms in the ships from Peloponnesus might get away: for which purpose they were also set out at first, that the Athenians might not have their minds upon these ships so much as upon the galleys.

year xix. The Peloponnesians invade Attica, and fortify Deceleia.

year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 3.

The Peloponnesians send away their men of arms for Sicily.

20. In the meantime also the Athenians, whilst Deceleia was fortifying, in the beginning of the spring, sent twenty¹ galleys about Peloponnesus under the command of Charicles the son of Apollodorus; with order when he came to Argos, to take aboard the men of arms which the Argives were to send them, according to league²: and sent away Demosthenes (as they intended before) into Sicily, with threescore galleys of Athens and five of Chios, and one thousand two hundred men of arms of the roll of Athens, and as many of the islanders as they could get, provided by their subject confederates of all other necessaries for the war³. But he had order to join first with Charicles, and help him to make war first upon Laconia. So Demosthenes went to Ægina, and stayed there both for the remnant of his own army, if any were left behind, and for Charicles till he had taken aboard the Argives.

year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 3.

The Athenians send out Demosthenes towards Sicily.

21. In Sicily, about the same time of the spring, Gylippus also returned to Syracuse, bringing with him from the cities he had dealt withal as great forces as severally he could get from them. And having assembled the Syracusians, he told them that they ought to man as many galleys as they could, and make trial of a battle by sea: and that he hoped thereby to perform somewhat to the benefit of the war, which should be worthy the danger. Hermocrates also was none of the least means of getting them to undertake the Athenians with their navy: who

Gylippus persuadeth the Syracusians to fight by sea.

year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 3.

told them, “that neither the Athenians had this skill by sea hereditary, or from everlasting; but were more inland men than the Syracusians, and forced to become seamen by the Medes: and that to daring men, such as the Athenians are, they are most formidable that are as daring against them; for wherewith they terrify their neighbours, which is not always the advantage of power, but boldness of enterprizing, with the same shall they in like manner be terrified by their enemies¹”. “He knew it,” he said, “certainly, that the Syracusians by their unexpected daring to encounter the Athenian navy, would get more advantage in respect of the fear it would cause, than the Athenians should endamage them by their odds of skill.” He bade them therefore to make trial of their navy, and to be afraid no longer. The Syracusians, on these persuasions of Gylippus and Hermocrates, and others if any were, became now extremely desirous to fight by sea: and presently manned their galleys.

22. Gylippus, when the navy was ready, drew out his whole power of land soldiers in the beginning of night, meaning to go himself and assault the fortifications in Plemmyrium²: withal the galleys of the Syracusians, by appointment, thirty–five of them came up towards it out of the great haven; and forty–five more came about out of the little haven, where also was their arsenal, with purpose to join with those within, and to go together to Plemmyrium, that the Athenians might be troubled on both sides. But the Athenians having quickly manned sixty galleys to oppose them; with twenty–five of them they fought with the thirty–five of the Syracusians in the great haven, and with the rest went to meet those that came about from the little haven¹. And these fought presently before the mouth of the great haven, and held each other to it for a long time; one side endeavouring to force, the other to defend the entrance. 23. In the

The Syracusians win Plemmyrium, but are beaten by sea.

year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 3.

The Syracusians win the works of the Athenians in Plemmyrium.

year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 3. The Athenians get the victory by water.

meantime, Gylippus (the Athenians in Plemmyrium being now come down to the water side, and having their minds busied upon the fight of the galleys) betimes in the morning, and on a sudden assaulted the fortifications before they could come back again to defend them; and possessed first the greatest, and afterwards the two lesser: for they that watched in these, when they saw the greatest so easily taken, durst stay no longer. They that fled upon the losing of the first wall, and put themselves into boats and into a certain ship, got hardly into the camp: for whilst the Syracusians in the great haven had yet the better in the fight upon the water, they gave them chase with one nimble galley². But by that time that the other two walls were taken, the Syracusians upon the water were overcome: and the Athenians which fled from those two walls got to their camp with more ease. For those Syracusian galleys that fought before the haven’s mouth, having beaten back the Athenians, entered in disorder; and falling foul one on another, gave away the victory unto the Athenians: who put to flight not only them, but also those other by whom they had before been overcome within the haven, and sunk eleven galleys of the Syracusians and slew most of the men aboard them, save only the men of three galleys, whom they took alive. Of their own galleys they lost only three. When they had drawn to land the wreck of the Syracusian galleys, and erected a trophy in the little island over against Plemmyrium, they returned to their camp.

24. The Syracusians, though such were their success in the battle by sea, yet they won the fortification in Plemmyrium; and set up three trophies, for every wall one. One of the two walls last taken, they demolished: but two they repaired, and kept with a garrison. At the taking of these walls, many men were slain, and many taken alive: and their goods, which altogether was a great matter, were all taken. For the Athenians using these works for their storehouse, there was in them much wealth and victual belonging unto merchants, and much unto captains of galleys. For there were sails within it for forty galleys, besides other furniture; and three galleys drawn to land. And this loss of Plemmyrium, was it that most and principally impaired the Athenians' army. For the entrance of their provision was now no longer safe; for the Syracusians lying against them there with their galleys, kept them out, and nothing could be brought in unto them but by fight: and the army besides was thereby otherwise terrified and dejected.

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Ol. 91. 3.

25. After this the Syracusians sent out twelve galleys under the command of Agatharchus, a Syracusian. Of which one carried ambassadors into Peloponnesus, to declare what hope they had now of their business, and to instigate them to a sharper war in Attica. The other eleven went into Italy, upon intelligence of certain vessels laden with commodities coming to the Athenian army: which also they met with, and destroyed most of them; and the timber, which for building of galleys the Athenians had ready framed, they burned in the territory of Caulonia. After this they went to Locri: and riding here, there came unto them one of the ships that carried the men of arms of the Thespians, whom the Syracusians took aboard, and went homeward by the coast. The Athenians that watched for them with twenty galleys at Megara, took one of them, and the men that were in her; but could not take the rest: so that they escaped through to Syracuse. There was also a light skirmish in the haven of Syracuse, about the piles which the Syracusians had driven down before their old harbour¹, to the end that the galleys might ride within, and the Athenians not annoy them by assault. The Athenians having brought to the place a ship of huge greatness¹, fortified with wooden turrets and covered against fire, caused certain men with [little] boats to go and fasten cords unto the piles, and so broke² them up with craning. Some also the divers did cut up with saws. In the meantime the Syracusians from the harbour³, and they from the great ship, shot at each other: till in the end the greatest part of the piles were by the Athenians gotten up. But the greatest difficulty was to get up those piles which lay hidden. For some of them they had so driven in, as that they came not above the water: so that he that should come near, was in danger to be thrown upon them as upon a rock⁴. But these also for reward, the divers went down and sawed asunder. But the Syracusians continually drave down other in their stead. Other devices they had against each other, as was not unlikely between armies so near opposed: and many light skirmishes passed, and attempts of all kinds were put in execution. The Syracusians moreover sent ambassadors, some Corinthians, some Ambraciotes, and some Lacedæmonians, unto the cities about them⁵: to let them know that they had won Plemmyrium; and that in the battle by sea, they were not overcome by the strength of the enemy, but by their own disorder; and also to show what hope they were in in other respects, and to entreat their aid both of sea and land forces: forso much as the Athenians expecting

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another army, if they would send aid before it came whereby to overthrow that which they had now there, the war would be at an end. Thus stood the affairs of Sicily.

26. Demosthenes, as soon as his forces which he was to carry to the succour of those in Sicily were gotten together, put to sea from Ægina, and sailing into Peloponnesus joined with Charicles and the thirty galleys that were with him. And having taken aboard some men of arms of the Argives, came to Laconia; and first wasted part of the territory of Epidaurus Limera. From thence going to that part of Laconia which is over against the island Cythera, where there is a temple of Apollo¹, they wasted a part of the country: and fortified an isthmus there, both that the Helotes might have a refuge in it running away from the Lacedæmonians, and that freebooters from thence, as from Pylus, might fetch in prizes from the territory adjoining. As soon as the place was taken in, Demosthenes himself went on to Corcyra, to take up the confederates there, with intent to go thence speedily into Sicily. And Charicles having stayed to finish and put a garrison into the fortification, went afterwards with his thirty galleys to Athens: and the Argives also went home.

Demosthenes in his way to Sicily fortifieth a neck of land in Laconia.

27. The same winter also came to Athens a thousand and three hundred targetiers, of those called Machærophori¹ of the race of them that are called Dii: and were to have gone with Demosthenes into Sicily. But coming too late, the Athenians resolved to send them back again into Thrace, as being too chargeable a matter to entertain them only for the war in Deceleia: for their pay was to have been a drachma a man by the day. For Deceleia being this summer fortified first by the whole army, and then by the several cities maintained with a garrison² by turns, much endamaged the Athenians; and weakened their estate, both by destroying their commodities and consuming of their men, so as nothing more. For the former invasions, having been short, hindered them not from reaping the benefit of the earth for the rest of the time. But now, the enemy continually lying upon them, and sometimes with greater forces, sometimes of necessity with the ordinary garrison making incursions and fetching in booty, Agis the king of Lacedæmon being always there in person and diligently prosecuting the war: the Athenians were thereby very grievously afflicted. For they were not only deprived of the fruit of the land, but also above twenty thousand of their slaves fled over to the enemy, whereof the greatest part were artificers: besides they lost all their sheep and oxen. And by the continual going out of the Athenian horsemen, making excursions to Deceleia and defending the country, their horses became partly lamed through incessant labour in rugged grounds, and partly wounded by the enemy. 28. And their provision, which formerly they used to bring in from Eubœa by Oropus the shortest way, through Deceleia by land, they were now forced to fetch in by sea at great cost about the promontory of Sunium. And whatsoever the city was wont to be served withal from without, it now wanted: and instead of a city was become as it were a fort. And the Athenians watching on the battlements of the wall, in the day time by turns, but in the night, both winter and summer, all at once (except the horsemen), part at the walls and part at the arms, were

year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 3. The aids of the Thracians come too late to go into Sicily.

The incommodities which befell the Athenians by the fortification in Deceleia.

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quite tired¹. But that which pressed them most, was that they had two wars at once. And yet their obstinacy was so great, as no man would have believed till now they saw it. For being besieged at home from the fortification of the Peloponnesians, no man would have imagined that they should not only not have recalled their army out of Sicily, but have also besieged Syracuse there, a city of itself no less than Athens: and therein so much have exceeded the expectation of the rest of the Grecians both in power and courage, (who in the beginning of this war conceived, that if the Peloponnesians invaded their territory, some of them, that they might hold out two years, others three, no man more), as that in the seventeenth year after they were first invaded they should have undertaken an expedition into Sicily, and being every way weakened already by the former war, have undergone another, not inferior to that which they had before with the Peloponnesians. Now their treasure being by these wars, and by the detriment sustained from Deceleia, and other great expenses that came upon them, at a very low ebb, about this time they imposed on such as were under their dominion, a twentieth part of all goods passing by sea for a tribute¹; by this means to improve their comings in. For their expenses were not now as before; but so much greater, by how much the war was greater: and their revenue besides cut off.

29. The Thracians, therefore, that came too late to go with Demosthenes, they presently sent back, as being unwilling to lay out money in such a scarcity: and gave the charge of carrying them back to Diitrephes, with command as he went along those coasts, (for his way was through the Euripus), if occasion served, to do somewhat against the enemy. He accordingly landed them by Tanagra, and hastily fetched in some small booty. Then² going over the Euripus from Chalcis in Eubœa, he disembarked again in Bœotia and led his soldiers towards Mycalessus; and lay all night at the temple of Mercury undiscovered, which is distant from Mycalessus about sixteen furlongs. The next day he cometh

The Thracians sent back, in their way sack the city of Mycalessus.

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to the city, being a very great one³, and taketh it: for they kept no watch, nor expected that any man would have come in and assaulted them so far from the sea. Their walls also were but weak, in some places fallen down, and in others low-built: and their gates open through security. The Thracians entering into Mycalessus, spoiled both houses and temples, slew the people, without mercy on old or young, but killed all they could light on, both women and children; yea, and the labouring cattle, and whatsoever other living thing they saw. For the nation of the Thracians, where they dare, are extreme bloody, equal to any of the barbarians. Insomuch as there was put in practice at this time, besides other disorder¹, all forms of slaughter that could be imagined: they likewise fell upon the school-house, which was in the city a great one, and the children newly entered into it; and killed them every one. And the calamity of the whole city, as it was as great as ever befell any, so also was it more unexpected and more bitter. 30. The Thebans hearing of it, came out to help them: and overtaking the Thracians before they had gone far, both recovered the booty, and chased them to the Euripus and to the sea, where the galleys lay that brought them. Some of them they killed: of those most in their going aboard; for swim they could not; and such as were in the [small] boats, when they saw how things went a-land, had thrust off their boats, and lay without the Euripus². In the rest of the retreat, the

Thracians behaved themselves not unhandsomely against the Theban horsemen, by whom they were charged first: but running out, and again rallying themselves in a circle, according to the manner of their country, defended themselves well, and lost but few men in that action. But some also they lost in the city itself, whilst they stayed behind for pillage. But in the whole of thirteen hundred there were slain [only] two hundred and fifty. Of the Thebans and others that came out to help the city, there were slain, horsemen and men of arms, one with another about twenty; and amongst them Scirphondas of Thebes, one of the governors of Bœotia: and of the Mycallese there perished a part¹. Thus went the matter at Mycalessus: the loss which it received being, for the quantity of the city, no less to be lamented than any that happened in the whole war.

31. Demosthenes going from² Corcyra after his fortifying in Laconia, found a ship lying in Pheia of Elis, and in her certain men of arms of Corinth, ready to go into Sicily. The ship he sunk: but the men escaped, and afterwards getting another ship went on in their voyage. After this, Demosthenes being about³ Zacynthus and Cephallenia, took aboard their men of arms, and sent to Naupactus for the Messenians. From thence he crossed over to the continent of Acarnania, to Alyzea and Anactorium, which belonged to the Athenians. Whilst he was in these parts, he met with Eurymedon out of Sicily, that had been sent in winter unto the army with commodities¹: who told him amongst other things, how he had heard by the way after he was at sea, that the Syracusians had won Plemmyrium. Conon also, the captain of Naupactus, came to them, and related that the twenty–five galleys of Corinth that lay before Naupactus would not give over war and yet delayed to fight²: and therefore desired to have some galleys sent him, as being unable with his eighteen to give battle to twenty–five of the enemy. Whereupon Demosthenes and Eurymedon sent ten galleys more to those at Naupactus, the nimblest of the whole fleet, by Conon himself³: and went themselves about furnishing of what belonged to the army. Of whom Eurymedon went to Corcyra, and having appointed them there to man fifteen galleys, levied men of arms: for now giving over his course to Athens, he joined with Demosthenes, as having been elected with him in the charge of general: and Demosthenes took up slingers and darters in the parts about Acarnania.

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Ol. 91. 3. Eurymedon cometh to Demosthenes out of Sicily, and telleth him of the taking of Plemmyrium.

Demosthenes and Eurymedon levy forces for Sicily.

32. The ambassadors of the Syracusians, which after the taking of Plemmyrium had been sent unto the cities about¹, having now obtained and levied an army amongst them, were conducting the same to Syracuse. But Nicias, upon intelligence thereof, sent unto such cities of the Siculi as had the passages and were their confederates, the Centoripines, Halicyæans, and others, not to suffer the enemy to go by, but to unite themselves and stop them: for that they would not so much as offer to pass any other way, seeing the Agrigentines had already denied them. When the Sicilians were marching, the Siculi, as the Athenians had desired them, put themselves in ambush in three several places: and setting upon them unawares and on a sudden, slew about eight hundred of them, and all the ambassadors save only one, a

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Ol. 91. 3. Nicias overthroweth the new supply going to Syracuse from the neighbouring cities, and killeth eight hundred of them.

Corinthian: which conducted the rest that escaped, being about fifteen hundred, to Syracuse. 33. About the same time came unto them also the aid of the Camarinæans, five hundred men of arms, three hundred darters, and three hundred archers. Also the Geloans sent them men for five galleys², besides four hundred darters and two hundred horsemen. For now all Sicily³, except the Agrigentines, who were neutral; but all the rest, who before stood looking on, came in to the Syracusian side against the Athenians. [Nevertheless], the Syracusians, after this blow received amongst the Siculi, held their hands; and assaulted not the Athenians for a while.

Demosthenes and Eurymedon having their army now ready, crossed over from Corcyra and the continent with the whole army to the promontory of Iapygia¹. From thence they went to the Chœrades, islands of Iapygia: and here took in certain Iapygian darters to the number of two hundred and fifty, of the Messapian nation. And having renewed a certain ancient alliance with Artas, who reigned there and granted them those darters, they went thence to Metapontum², a city of Italy. There by virtue of a league, they got two galleys and three hundred darters: which taken aboard, they kept along the shore till they came to the territory of Thurii. Here they found the adverse faction to the Athenians to have been lately driven out in a sedition. And because they desired to muster their army here, that they might see if any were left behind; and persuade the Thurians to join with them freely in the war, and, as things stood, to have for friends and enemies the same that were so to the Athenians: they stayed about that in the territory of the Thurians.

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34. The Peloponnesians and the rest, who were at the same time in the twenty-five galleys that for safeguard of the ships lay opposite to the galleys before Naupactus, having prepared themselves for battle, and with more galleys¹, so as they were little inferior in number to those of the Athenians, went to an anchor under Irineus of Achaia in Rhyppica. The place where they rode was in form like a half moon; and their land forces they had ready on either side to assist them, both Corinthians and other their confederates of those parts², embattled upon the points of the promontory; and their galleys made up the space between, under the command of Polyantes, a Corinthian. Against these the Athenians came up with thirty-three galleys from Naupactus, commanded by Diphilus. The Corinthians at first lay still; but afterwards when they saw their time, and the signal given, they charged the Athenians, and the fight began. They held each other to it long. The Athenians sunk three galleys of the Corinthians: and though none of their own were sunk, yet seven were made unserviceable, which having encountered the Corinthian galleys a-head, were torn on both sides between the beaks and the oars by the beaks¹ of the Corinthian galleys, made stronger for the same purpose. After they had fought with equal fortune, and so as both sides challenged the victory; though yet the Athenians were masters of the wrecks, as driven by the wind into the main, and because the Corinthians came not out to renew the fight; they at length parted. There was no chasing of men that fled, nor a prisoner taken on either side; because the Peloponnesians and Corinthians fighting near the land easily

The battle by sea before Naupactus between the Corinthians and Athenians.

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escaped, nor was there any galley of the Athenians sunk. But when the Athenians were gone back to Naupactus, the Corinthians presently set up a trophy as victors; in regard that more of the Athenian galleys were made unserviceable, than of theirs; and thought themselves not to have had the worse, for the same reason that the others thought themselves not to have had the better. For the Corinthians think they have the better, when they have not much the worse²: and the Athenians think they have the worse, when they have not much the better. And when the Peloponnesians were gone and their army by land dissolved, the Athenians also set up a trophy in Achaia, as if the victory had been theirs; distant from Erineus, where the Peloponnesians rode, about twenty furlongs. This was the success of that battle by sea.

35. Demosthenes and Eurymedon, after the Thurians had put in readiness to go with them seven hundred men of arms and three hundred darters, commanded their galleys to go along the coast to Croton¹; and conducted their land soldiers, having first taken a muster of them all upon the side of the river Sybaris, through the territory of the Thurians. But coming to the river Hylia, upon word sent them from the men of Croton, that if the army went through their territory it should be against their will, they marched down to the seaside and to the mouth of the river Hylia; where they stayed all that night, and were met by their galleys. The next day embarking, they kept along the shore and touched at every town saving Locri, till they arrived at Petra in the territory of Rhegium.

Demosthenes and Eurymedon come along the shore of Italy, and take up forces.

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36. The Syracusians in the meantime, upon intelligence of their coming on, resolved to try again what they could do with their navy; and with their new supply of landmen, which they had gotten together on purpose to fight with the Athenians before Demosthenes and Eurymedon should arrive. And they furnished their navy, both otherwise and according to the advantages they had learnt in the last battle, and also made shorter the heads of their galleys, and thereby stronger; and made beaks to them of a great thickness, which they also strengthened with rafters fastened to the sides of the galleys, both within and without, of six cubits long¹: in such manner as the Corinthians had armed their galleys a-head, to fight with those before Naupactus. For the Syracusians made account, that against the Athenian galleys not so built, but weak before, as not using so much to meet the enemy a-head as upon the side by fetching a compass, they could not but have the better; and that to fight in the great haven many galleys in not much room, was an advantage to them: for that using the direct encounter, they should break with their firm and thick beaks the hollow and infirm foreparts of the galleys of their enemies; and that the Athenians, in that narrow room, would want means both to go about and to go through them¹, which was the point of art they most relied on. For as for their passing through, they would hinder it themselves as much as they could: and for fetching compass, the straitness of the place would not suffer it. And that fighting a-head, which seemed before to be want of skill in the masters [to do otherwise], was it they would now principally make use of: for in this would be their

The Syracusians make ready their galleys to fight with the Athenians there before the supply came.

Their manner of strengthening their galleys.

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principal advantage. For the Athenians, if overcome, would have no retiring but to the land, which was but a little way off and little in compass, near their own camp² : and of the rest of the haven themselves should be masters. And the enemy being pressed, could not choose, thronging together into a little room and all into one and the same place, but disorder one another: which was indeed the thing, that in all their battles by sea did the Athenians the greatest hurt; having not, as the Syracusians had, the liberty of the whole haven to retire unto³ . And to go about into a place of more room, they having it in their power to set upon them from the main sea, and to retire again at pleasure, they should never be able; especially having Plemmyrium for enemy, and the haven's mouth not being large.

37. The Syracusians having devised thus much over and above their former skill and strength¹ , and far more confident now since the former battle by sea, assaulted them both with their army and with their navy at once. The landmen from the city Gylippus drew sooner out a little, and brought them to the wall of the Athenians' camp upon the side toward the city² : and from

The Athenians and Syracusians fight.

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Olympieium, the men of arms all that were there, and the horsemen and light armed of the Syracusians came up to the wall on the other side. And by and by after³ , came sailing forth also the galleys of the Syracusians and their confederates. The Athenians, that thought at first they would have made the attempt only with their landmen, seeing also the galleys on a sudden coming towards them, were in confusion; and some of them put themselves in order upon and before the walls, against those that came from the city: and others went out to meet the horsemen and darters, that were coming in great numbers and with speed from Olympieium and the parts without: others again went aboard, and withal came to aid those ashore. But when the galleys were manned they put off, being seventy-five in number; and those of Syracuse about eighty. 38. Having spent much of the day in charging and retiring and trying each other, and performed nothing worth the mentioning, save that the Syracusians sunk a galley or two of the Athenians, they parted again: and the land soldiers retired at the same time from the wall of the Athenian camp. The next day the Syracusians lay still, without showing any sign of what they meant to do. Yet Nicias seeing that the battle by sea was with equality, and imagining that they would fight again, made the captains to repair their galleys, such as had been torn¹ : and two great ships to be moored without those piles which he had driven into the sea before his galleys, to be instead of a haven enclosed. These ships he placed about two acres' breadth² asunder: to the end, if any galley chanced to be pressed, it might safely run in and again go safely out at leisure. In performing of this, the Athenians spent a whole day from morning until night.

The Athenians and Syracusians fight again.

The stratagem of Ariston, a master of a galley.

39. The next day the Syracusians assaulted the Athenians again with the same forces³, both by sea and land, that they had done before; but begun earlier in the morning; and being opposed fleet against fleet, they drew out a great part of the day, now again as before, in attempting upon each other without effect. Till at last Ariston the son of Pyrrhichus, a Corinthian, the most expert master that the Syracusians had in their fleet, persuaded the commanders in the navy to send to such in the city as it belonged to, and command that the market should be speedily kept at the sea-side, and to compel every man to bring thither whatsoever he had fit for meat, and there to sell it: that the mariners disembarking, might presently dine by the galleys' side, and quickly again unlooked-for assault the Athenians afresh the same day. 40. This advice being liked, they sent a messenger, and the market was furnished. And the Syracusians suddenly rowed astern¹ towards the city; and disembarking, dined there right on the shore. The Athenians, supposing they had retired towards the city as vanquished, landed at leisure: and amongst other business went about the dressing of their dinner, as not expecting to have fought again the same day. But the Syracusians suddenly going aboard, came towards them again: and the Athenians, in great tumult and for the most part undined, embarking disorderly, at length with much ado went out to meet them. For a while they held their hands on both sides, and but observed each other. But anon after, the Athenians thought not fit, by longer dallying, to overcome themselves with their own labour, but rather to fight as soon as they could; and thereupon at once with a joint shout charged the enemy, and the fight began. The Syracusians received [and resisted²] their charge; and fighting, as they had before determined, with their galleys head to head with those of the Athenians, and provided with beaks for the purpose, brake the galleys of the Athenians very much between the heads of the galleys and the oars. The Athenians were also annoyed much by the darters from the decks; but much more by those Syracusians, who going about in small boats passed under the rows of the oars of the enemy's galleys, and coming close to their sides, threw their darts at the mariners from thence¹.

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41. The Syracusians having fought in this manner with the utmost of their strength, in the end gat the victory: and the Athenians, between the [two] ships, escaped into their harbour.

The Syracusians have the victory.

The Syracusian galleys chased them as far as to those ships: but the dolphins hanging from the masts² over the entrance of the harbour, forbade them to follow any further. Yet there were two galleys, which upon a jollity after victory approached them, but both were lost: of which one with her men and all was taken. The Syracusians, after they had sunk seven galleys of the Athenians and torn many more, and of the men had taken some alive and killed others, retired, and for both the battles erected trophies: and had already an assured hope of being far superior by sea, and also made account to subdue the army by land. And they prepared to assault them again in both kinds.

Demosthenes and Eurymedon with a new army arrive at Syracuse.

42. In the meantime Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with the Athenian supply; being³ about seventy–three galleys, and men of arms, of their own and of their confederates, about five thousand; besides darters, as well barbarians as Greeks, not a few, and slingers and archers, and all other provision sufficient. For the present it not a little daunted the Syracusians and their confederates, to see no end of their danger; and that, notwithstanding the fortifying in Deceleia, another army should come now equal and like unto their former; and that their power should be so great in every kind. And on the other side, it was a kind of strengthening after weakness to the Athenian army that was there before. Demosthenes, when he saw how things stood, and thinking it unfit to loiter and fall into Nicias his case:—for Nicias, who was formidable at his first coming, when he set not presently upon Syracuse but wintered at Catana, both grew into contempt, and was prevented also by the coming of Gylippus thither with an army out of Peloponnesus: the which, if Nicias had gone against Syracuse at first, had never been so much as sent for: for supposing themselves to have been strong enough alone, they had at once both found themselves too weak, and the city been enclosed with a wall; whereby, though they had sent for it, it could not have helped them as it did:—Demosthenes, I say, considering this, and that he also even at the present and the same day was most terrible to the enemy, intended with all speed to make use of this present terribleness of the army. And having observed that the cross wall of the Syracusians, wherewith they hindered the Athenians from enclosing the city, was but single; and that if they could be masters of the ascent to Epipolæ, and again of the camp there, the same might easily be taken, (for none would have stood against them): hasted to put it to trial, and thought it his shortest way to the dispatching of the war. For either he should have success, he thought, and so win Syracuse, or he would lead away the army, and no longer without purpose consume both the Athenians there with him and the whole state. The Athenians therefore went out, and first wasted the territory of the Syracusians about the river Anapus; and were the stronger, as at first, both by sea and land. For the Syracusians durst neither way go out against them, but only with their horsemen and darters from Olympieium. 43. After this, Demosthenes thought good to try the wall which the Athenians had built to enclose the city withal¹, with engines. But seeing the engines were burnt by the defendants fighting from the wall, and that having assaulted it in divers parts with the rest of his army, he was notwithstanding put back, he resolved to spend the time no longer; but having gotten the consent of Nicias and the rest in commission thereunto, to put in execution his design for Epipolæ, as was before intended. By day, it was thought impossible not to be discovered, either in their approach or in their ascent. Having therefore first commanded to take five days' provision of victual, and all the masons and workmen, as also store of casting weapons, and whatsoever they might need, if they overcame, for fortification: he and Eurymedon and Menander, with the whole army, marched about midnight to Epipolæ, leaving Nicias in the camp. Being come to Epipolæ at Euryelus, where also the army went up before, they were not only not discovered by the Syracusians that kept the watch, but ascending¹ took a certain fortification of the Syracusians there, and killed part of them that kept it. But the greatest number

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Demosthenes attempteth to win the wall which the Syracusians had built through Epipolæ to exclude the proceeding of the wall of the Athenians.

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escaping, ran presently to the camps, of which there were in Epipolæ three walled about without the city, one of Syracusians, one of other Sicilians, and one of confederates², and carried the news of their coming in, and told it to those six hundred Syracusians that kept this part of Epipolæ at the first; who presently went forth to meet them. But Demosthenes and the Athenians lighting on them, though they fought valiantly, put them to flight; and presently marched on³, making use of the present heat of the army to finish what he came for before it were too late: and others [going on] in their first course took the cross-wall of the Syracusians, they flying that kept it, and were throwing down the battlements thereof. The Syracusians, and their confederates, and Gylippus and those with him, came out to meet them from their camps: but because the attempt was unexpected and in the night, they charged the Athenians timorously, and were even at first forced to retire. But as the Athenians advanced more out of order, [chiefly] as having already gotten the victory, but¹ desiring also quickly to pass through all that remained yet unfoughten with, lest through their remissness in following they might again rally themselves; the Bœotians withstood them first, and charging forced them to turn their backs.

44. And here the Athenians were mightily in disorder and perplexed: so that it hath been very hard to be informed of any side, in what manner each thing passed. For if in the day time, when things are better seen, yet they that are present cannot tell how all things go, save only what every man with much ado seeth near unto himself: how then in a battle by night, (the only one that happened between great armies in all this war), can a man know² anything for certain? For though the moon shined bright, yet they saw one another no otherwise than as by the moonlight was likely: so as to see a body, but not be sure whether it were a friend or not. And the men of arms on both sides, being not a few in number, had but little ground to turn in. Of the Athenians, some were already overcome, others³ went on in their first way. Also a great part of the rest of the army was already, part gotten up, and part ascending, and knew not which way to march. For after the Athenians once turned their backs, all before them was in confusion⁴; and it was hard to distinguish of anything for the noise. For the Syracusians and their confederates prevailing, encouraged each other and received the assailants with exceeding great shouts: (for they had no other means in the night to express themselves): and the Athenians sought each other, and took for enemies all before them, though friends and of the number of those that fled; and by often asking the word, there being no other means of distinction, all asking at once they both made a great deal of stir amongst themselves, and revealed the word to the enemy. But they did not in like manner know the word of the Syracusians; because these, being victorious and undistracted, knew one another better: so that when they lighted on any number of the enemy, though they themselves were more, yet the enemy escaped as knowing the watchword; but they, when they could not answer, were slain. But that which hurt them most was the tune of the Pæan: which being in both armies the same, drave them to their wits' end. For the Argives and Corcyræans, and all other of the Doric race on the Athenians' part, when they sounded the Pæan, terrified the Athenians on one side: and the enemy terrified them with the like on the other side. Wherefore at the last¹, falling one upon another in divers parts of the army, friends against friends, and countrymen against countrymen, they not only terrified each

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other, but came to hand—strokes and could hardly again be parted. As they fled before the enemy, the way of the descent from Epipolæ by which they were to go back being but strait, many of them threw themselves down from the rocks, and died so. And of the rest that gat down safely into the plain, though the greatest part, and all that were of the old army by their knowledge of the country, escaped into the camp: yet of these that came last, some lost their way; and straying in the fields, when the day came on were cut off by the Syracusian horsemen that ranged the country about.

45. The next day the Syracusians erected two trophies; one in Epipolæ at the ascent¹, and another where the first check was given by the Bœotians. The Athenians received their dead under truce. And many there were that died, both of themselves and of their confederates: but the arms taken were more than for the number of the slain. For of such as were forced to quit their bucklers and leap down from the rocks, though some perished, yet some there also were that escaped.

46. After this, the Syracusians having by such unlooked—for prosperity recovered their former courage, sent Sicanus with fifteen galleys to Agrigentum, being in sedition; to bring that city, if they could, to their obedience². And Gylippus went again to the Sicilian cities³ by land, to raise yet another army, as being in hope to take the camp of the Athenians by assault, considering how the matter had gone in Epipolæ.

The Syracusians send for more supplies, and hope to win the Athenian camp.

47. In the meantime the Athenian generals went to council upon their late overthrow, and present general weakness¹ of the army. For they saw not only that their designs prospered not, but that the soldiers also were weary of staying. For they were troubled with sickness, proceeding from a double cause; this being the time of the year most obnoxious to diseases, and the place where they lay moorish and noisome: and all things else appeared desperate. Demosthenes² thought fit to stay no longer; and since the execution of his design at Epipolæ had failed, delivered his opinion for going out of the haven, whilst the seas were open, and whilst, at least with this addition of galleys, they were stronger than the army of the enemy. “For it was better,” he said, “for the city to make war upon those which fortify against them at home, than against the Syracusians; seeing they cannot now be easily overcome: and there was no reason why they should spend much money in lying before the city.” This was the opinion of Demosthenes.

The Athenian

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commanders take council what to do.

The advice of Demosthenes.

48. Nicias, though he also thought their estate bad, yet was unwilling to have their weakness discovered³; and by decreeing of their departure openly with the votes of many, to make known the same to the enemy; for if at any time they had a mind to be gone, they should then be less able to do it secretly. Besides, the estate of the enemy, inasmuch as he understood it better than the rest, put him into some hope that it might yet grow worse than their own, in case they pressed the siege; especially being already masters of the sea, far and near, with their present fleet¹. There was moreover a party for the Athenians

The opinion of Nicias.

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in Syracuse, that desired to betray the state into their hands: and that sent messengers unto him, and suffered him not to rise and be gone. All which he knowing, though he were in truth doubtful what opinion to be of, and did yet consider; nevertheless openly in his speech, he was against the withdrawing of the army: and said, “that he was sure the people of Athens would take it ill, if he went thence without their order: for that they were not to have such judges as should give sentence upon their own sight of things done, rather than upon the report of calumniators; but such as would believe whatsoever some fine speaker should accuse them of. That many, nay most of the soldiers here, who now cry out upon their misery², will there cry out on the contrary; and say the generals have betrayed the state, and come away for a bribe. That he³ would not therefore, knowing the nature of the Athenians so well, choose to be put to death unjustly, and charged with a dishonourable crime by the Athenians, rather than, if he must needs do one, to suffer the same at the hand of the enemy by his own adventure⁴. And yet,” he said, “the state of the Syracusians was still inferior to their own. For paying much money to strangers, and laying out much more on forts¹ [without and about the city]; having also had a great navy a year already in pay; they must needs want money at last, and all these things fail them². For they have spent already two thousand talents, and are much in debt besides. And whensoever they shall give over this course and make pay no longer, their strength is gone³; as being auxiliary, and not constrained to follow the war, as the Athenians are. Therefore it was fit,” he said, “to stay close to the city; and not to go away as if they were too weak in money, wherein they were much superior.”

49. Nicias, when he spake this, assured them of it⁴, as knowing the state of Syracuse precisely and their want of money; and that there were some that desired to betray the city to the Athenians, and sent him word not to go. Withal he had now confidence in the fleet, which, as being before overcome, he had not⁵. As for lying where they did, Demosthenes would by no means hear of it. But if the army might not be carried away without order from the Athenians, but must needs stay in Sicily; then, he said, they might go⁶ to Thapsus or Catana, from whence by their landmen they might invade and turn much of the country to them¹ and wasting the fields of the enemies, weaken the Syracusians; and be to fight with their galleys in the main sea, and not in a narrow, (which is the advantage of the enemy), but in a wide place, where the benefit of skill should be theirs; and where they should not be forced, in charging and retiring, to come up and fall off in narrow and circumscribed limits. In sum he said, he by no means liked to stay where they were: but with all speed, no longer delaying the matter, to arise and be gone. Eurymedon also gave the like counsel. Nevertheless, upon the contradiction of Nicias, there grew a kind of sloth and procrastination in the business; and a suspicion withal, that the asseveration² of Nicias was grounded on somewhat that he knew above the rest. And thereupon the Athenians deferred their going thence, and stayed upon the place.

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Gylippus returneth
with another army
from the cities of
Sicily.

50. In the meantime Gylippus and Sicanus returned unto Syracuse. Sicanus without his purpose at Agrigentum; for whilst he was yet in Gela, the sedition which had been raised in the behalf of the Syracusians was turned into friendship³ : but Gylippus not without another great army out of Sicily, besides the men of arms, which having set forth from Peloponnesus in ships the spring before, were then lately arrived at Selinus from out of Afric. For having been driven into Afric, and the Cyrenæans having given them two galleys with pilots, in passing by the shore they aided the Euesperitæ¹ besieged by the Africans; and having overcome the Africans, they went over to Neapolis, a town of traffic belonging to the Carthagenians; where the passage into Sicily is shortest, and but two days and a night's sail over; and from thence they crossed the sea to Selinus. As soon as they were come, the Syracusians again presently prepared to set upon the Athenians, both by sea and land. The Athenian generals seeing them have another army, and their own² not bettering, but every day growing worse than other, but especially as being pressed to it by the sickness of the soldiers, repented now that they removed not before: and Nicias being now no longer against it as he was, but desirous only that it might not be concluded openly³ , gave order unto all as secretly as was possible to put forth of the harbour, and to be ready when the sign should be given. But when they were about it, and everything was ready, the moon happened to be eclipsed: for it was full moon. And not only the greatest part of the Athenians⁴ called upon the generals to stay, but Nicias also (for he was addicted to superstition and observations of that kind somewhat too much) said that it should come no more into debate whether they should go or not, till the three times nine days were past, which the soothsayers appoint in that behalf. And the Athenians, though upon going, stayed still for this reason.

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The Athenians out of superstition forbear to remove, because of an eclipse of the moon.

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51. The Syracusians also having intelligence of this, were encouraged unto the pressing of the Athenians much the more: for that they confessed themselves already too weak for them, both by sea and land; for else they would never have sought to have run away. Besides, they would not have them sit down in any other part of Sicily, and become the harder to be warred on; but had rather thereright, and in a place most for their own advantage, compel them to fight by sea. To which end they manned their galleys; and after they had rested¹ as long as was sufficient, when they saw their time, the first day they assaulted the Athenians' camp. And some small number of men of arms and horsemen of the Athenians sallied out against them by certain gates: and the Syracusians intercepting some of the men of arms, beat¹ them back into the camp. But the entrance being strait, there were seventy of the horsemen lost; and men of arms some, but not many. 52. The² next day they came out with their galleys, seventy-six in number, and the Athenians set forth against them with eighty-six; and being come together, they fought. Eurymedon had charge of the right wing of the Athenians; and desiring to encompass the galleys of the enemies, drew forth his own galleys in length more towards the shore; and was cut off by the Syracusians, that had first overcome the middle battle of the Athenians, from the rest, in the bottom and inmost part of the

The Syracusians assault the Athenian camp with their landsoldiers.

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Ol. 91. 4. The Syracusians overcome the Athenians again by sea.

haven; and both slain himself, and the galleys that were with him lost. And that done, the rest of the Athenian fleet was also chased and driven ashore.

53. Gylippus, when he saw the navy of the enemy vanquished, and carried past the piles and their own harbour, came with a part of his army to the pier³ to kill such as landed, and to cause that the Syracusians might the easier pull the enemy's galleys from the shore, whereof themselves were masters. But the Tuscans, who kept guard in that part for the Athenians, seeing them coming that way in disorder, made head: and charging these first¹, forced them into the marsh called Lysimeleia. But when afterwards a greater number of the Syracusians and their confederates came to help them, then also the Athenians, to help the Tuscans, and for fear to lose their galleys, fought with them; and having overcome them, pursued them, and not only slew many² of their men of arms, but also saved the most of their galleys, and brought them back into the harbour. Nevertheless the Syracusians took eighteen, and slew the men taken in them. And amongst the rest they let drive before the wind (which blew right upon the Athenians) an old ship full of faggots and brands set on fire, to burn them. The Athenians on the other side, fearing the loss of their navy, devised remedies for the fire: and having quenched the flame and kept the ship from coming near, escaped that danger.

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54. After this the Syracusians set up a trophy, both for the battle by sea, and for the men of arms which they intercepted above before the camp, where also they took the horses. And the Athenians erected a trophy likewise, both for the flight of those footmen which the Tuscans drave into the marsh, and for those which they themselves put to flight with the rest of the army.

55. When the Syracusians had now manifestly overcome their fleet³; (for they feared at first the supply of galleys that came with Demosthenes); the Athenians were in good earnest utterly out of heart. And as they were much deceived in the event, so they repented more of the voyage¹. For having come against these cities, the only ones that were for institution like unto their own, and governed by the people as well as themselves², and which had a navy and horses and greatness; seeing they could create no dissension amongst them about change of government, to win them that way, nor could subdue it with the greatness of their forces when they were far the stronger, but misprospered in most of their designs; they were then at their wits' end: but now, when they were also vanquished by sea, (which they would never have thought), they were much more dejected than ever.

The Athenians
dejected, repent of the
voyage.

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Ol. 91. 4.

The Syracusians
intend to keep in the
Athenians, and reckon
upon the glory of a
full victory.

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56. The Syracusians went presently about the haven without fear, and meditated how to shut up the same: that the Athenians might not³ steal away without their knowledge, though they would. For now they studied not only how to save themselves, but how to hinder the safety of the Athenians. For the Syracusians conceived, not untruly, that their own strength was at this present the greater; and that if they could vanquish the Athenians and their confederates both by sea and land, it would be a mastery of great honour to them amongst the rest of the Grecians. For all the rest of Greece should be⁴ one part freed by it, and the other part out of fear of subjection hereafter: for it would be impossible for the Athenians, with the remainder of their strength, to sustain the war that would be made upon them afterwards. And they being reputed the authors of it, should be had in admiration, not only with all men now living, but also with posterity. And to say truth, it was a worthy mastery; both for the causes shewn, and also for that they became victors not of the Athenians only, but many others their confederates; nor again they themselves alone, but their confederates also, having been in joint command with the Corinthians and Lacedæmonians, and both exposed their city to the first hazard, and of the business by sea performed the greatest part themselves¹. The greatest number of nations, except the general roll of those which in this war adhered to Athens and Lacedæmon, were together at this one city.

The nations that were at the wars of Syracuse on the one side or other.

Athenians.

Lemnians. Imbrians.
Æginetæ.

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Ol. 91. 4. Hestîæans
of Eubœa.

Eretrians.

Chalcideans.

Styrians.

Carystians.

Ceians.

Andrians.

Tenians.

57. And this number on both sides, against Sicily and for it, some to help win, and some to help save it, came to the war at Syracuse: not on any pretence of right, nor as kindred to aid kindred, but as profit or necessity severally chanced to induce them². The Athenians being Ionic, went against the Syracusians that be Doric, voluntarily. With these, as being their colonies, went the Lemnians and Imbrians³, and the Æginetæ that dwelt in Ægina then, all of the same language and institutions with themselves: also the Hestæans of Eubœa¹. Of the rest, some went with them as their subjects, and some as their free confederates; and some also hired. Subjects and tributaries: as the Eretrians, Chalcideans, Styrians, and Carystians, from Eubœa: Ceians, Andrians, Tenians, from out of the islands: Milesians, Samians, and Chians, from Ionia. Of these the Chians followed them as free, not as tributaries of money, but of galleys. And these were almost all of them Ionians, descended from the Athenians; except only the Carystians, that are of the nation of the Dryopes². And though they were subjects and went upon constraint, yet they were Ionians against Dorians³. Besides these there went with them Æolians: namely, the Methymnæans, subjects to Athens, not tributaries of money but of galleys; and the Tenedians and Ænians, tributaries. Now here, Æolians were constrained to fight against Æolians⁴; namely, against their founders the Bœotians, that took part with the Syracusians. But the Plataæans, and only they, being Bœotians⁵, fought against Bœotians upon just quarrel. The Rhodians and Cythereans, Doric both¹, by constraint bore arms; one of them, namely the Cythereans, a colony of the Lacedæmonians, with the Athenians against the Lacedæmonians that were with Gylippus; and the other, that is to say, the Rhodians, being by descent Argives, not only against the Syracusians, who were also Doric, but against their own colony, the Geloans, which took part with the Syracusians. Then of the islanders about Peloponnesus, there went with them the Cephallenians and Zacynthians: not but that they were free states, but because they were kept in awe as islanders by the Athenians, who were masters of the sea. And the Corcyræans, being not only Doric but Corinthians, fought openly against both Corinthians and Syracusians, though a colony of the one, and of kin to the other: which they did necessarily, (to make the best of it²); but indeed no less willingly, in respect of their hatred to the Corinthians. Also the Messenians now so called, in Naupactus, were taken along to this war; and the Messenians at Pylus, then holden by the Athenians. Moreover the Megarean outlaws³, though not many, by advantage taken of their misery, were fain to fight against the Selinuntians that were Megareans likewise. But now the rest of their army was rather voluntary. The Argives not so much for the league, as for their enmity against the Lacedæmonians and their present particular spleen⁴, followed the Athenians to the war though Ionic, against Dorians. And the Mantineans and other Arcadian

Milesians.
Samians.
Chians.
Methymnæans.
Tenedians.
Ænians.
Plataæans.
year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. Rhodians and Cythereans.
Cephallenians. Zacynthians.
Corcyræans.
Messenians.
Megareans.
Argives.
year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. Mantineans and other Arcadians.
Cretans. Ætolians.
Acarnanians.
Thurians. Metapontians. Naxians. Catanæans. Egestæans.
Tuscans.
Iapygians.

mercenaries went with them, as men accustomed ever to invade the enemy shewed them: and now for gain had for enemies, as much as any, those other Arcadians which went thither with the Corinthians. The Cretans and Ætolians were all¹ mercenary: and it fell out, that the Cretans, who together with the Rhodians were founders of Gela, not only took not part with their colony, but fought against it willingly for their hire². And some Acarnanians also went with them for gain: but most of them went as confederates, in love to Demosthenes and for good will to the state of Athens. And thus many within the bound of the Ionian gulf. Then of Italians, fallen into the same necessity of seditious times³, there went with them to this war the Thurians and Metapontians: of Greek Sicilians, the Naxians and Catanæans. Of barbarian, the Egestæans, who also drew with them the most of those Greek Sicilians⁴. Without Sicily, there went with them some Tuscans, upon quarrels between them and the Syracusians; and some Iapygian mercenaries. These were the nations that followed the army of the Athenians.

58. On the other side, there opposed them on the part of the Syracusians, the Camarinæans their borders: and beyond them again the Geloans: and then (the Agrigentines not stirring) beyond them again the same way, the Selinuntians. These inhabit the part of Sicily that lieth opposite to Afric. Then the Himeræans, on the side that lieth on the Tyrrhene sea, where they are the only Grecians inhabiting, and only aided them. These were their confederates of the Greek nation within Sicily; all Dorians and free states. Then of the barbarians there, they had the Siculi¹, all but what revolted to the Athenians. For Grecians without Sicily, the Lacedæmonians sent them a Spartan commander, with some Helotes and the rest freedmen². Then aided them both with galleys and with land-men, the Corinthians only; and for kindred's sake, the Leucadians and Ambraciotes: out of Arcadia, those mercenaries sent by the Corinthians: and Sicyonians on constraint³: and from without Peloponnesus, the Bœotians. To the foreign aids the Sicilians themselves, as being great cities, added more in every kind than as much again: for they got together men of arms, galleys, and horses, great store, and other number in abundance. And to all these again the Syracusians themselves added, as I may say, about as much more, in respect of the greatness both of their city and of their danger.

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Ol. 91. 4.
Syracusians.
Camarinæans.
Himeræans.
Siculi.
Lacedæmonians.
Corinthians.
Leucadians.
Ambraciotes.
Arcadian mercenaries.
Sicyonians.

59. These were the succours assembled on either part, and which were then all there: and after them came no more, neither to the one side nor the other. No marvel then, if the Syracusians¹ thought it a noble mastery, if to the victory by sea already gotten they could add the taking of the whole Athenian army, so great as it was; and hinder their escape both by sea and land. Presently therefore they fall in hand with stopping up the mouth of the great haven, being about eight furlongs wide, with galleys laid cross and lighters and boats upon their anchors:

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Ol. 91. 4.
The Syracusians shut up the haven.

and withal prepared whatsoever else was necessary in case the Athenians would hazard another battle; meditating on no small matters in anything.

60. The Athenians, seeing the shutting up of the haven and the rest of the enemy's designs, thought good to go to council upon it. And the generals and commanders of regiments² having met and considered their present want, both otherwise and in this, that they neither had provision for the present, (for upon their resolution to be gone, they had sent before to Catana to forbid the sending in of any more), nor were likely to have for the future unless their navy got the upper hand: they resolved to abandon their camp above, and to take in some place, no greater than needs they must³, near unto their galleys, with a wall; and leaving some to keep it, to go aboard with the rest of the army, and to man every galley they had, serviceable and less serviceable: and having caused all sorts of men to go aboard and fight it out, if they gat the victory, to go to Catana; if not, to make their retreat in order of battle by land (having first set fire on their navy) the nearest way unto some amicable place, either barbarian or Grecian, that they should best be able to reach unto before the enemy.

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As they had concluded, so they did. For they both came down to the shore from their camp above: and also manned every galley they had, and compelled to go aboard every man of age of any ability whatsoever. So the whole navy was manned to the number of one hundred and ten galleys: upon which they had many archers and darters, both Acarnanians and other strangers, and all things else provided according to their means and purpose¹. And Nicias, when almost everything was ready, perceiving the soldiers to be dejected for being so far overcome by sea, contrary to their custom, and yet in respect of the scarcity of victual desirous as soon as could be to fight, called them together, and encouraged them then the first time² with words to this effect:

61. "Soldiers, Athenians and other our confederates, [though] the trial at hand will be common to all alike, and will concern the safety and country no less of each of us than of the enemy: (for if our galleys get the victory, we may every one see his native city again): yet¹ ought we not to be discouraged like men of no experience, who failing in their first adventures, ever after carry a fear suitable to their misfortunes. But you Athenians here present, having had experience already of many wars, and you our confederates, that have always gone along with our armies, remember how often the event falleth out otherwise in war than one would think: and in hope that fortune will once also be of our side, prepare yourselves to fight again in such manner as shall be worthy the number you see yourselves to be. 62. What we thought would be helps in the narrowness of the haven, against such a multitude of galleys as will be there, and against the provision of the enemy upon their decks, whereby we were formerly annoyed, we have with the masters now considered them all; and as well as our present means will permit, made them ready. For many archers and darters shall go aboard: and that multitude, which if we had been to fight in the main sea we would not have used, because by slugging the galleys it would take away the use of skill,

the oration of nicias.

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Ol. 91. 4. Oration of
Nicias

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Nicias

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Nicias

will nevertheless be useful here, where we are forced to make a landfight from our galleys. We have also devised, instead of what should have been provided for in the building of our galleys², against the thickness of the beaks of theirs, which did most hurt us, to lash their galleys unto ours with iron grapnels: whereby (if the men of arms¹ do their part) we may keep the galleys which once come close up from falling back again. For we are brought to a necessity now, of making it a land-fight upon the water: and it will be the best for us neither to fall back ourselves, nor to suffer the enemy to do so; especially when, except what our men on land shall make good, the shore is altogether hostile. 63. Which you remembering, must therefore fight it out to the utmost, and not suffer yourselves to be beaten back unto the shore: but when galley to galley shall once be fallen close, never think any cause worthy to make you part, unless you have first beaten off the men of arms of the enemy from their decks. And this I speak to you rather that are the men of arms, than to the mariners: inasmuch as that part belongeth rather unto you that fight above; and in you² it lieth even yet to achieve the victory for the most part with the landmen. Now for the mariners, I advise, and withal beseech them, not to be too much daunted with the losses past; having now both a greater number of galleys, and greater forces upon the decks. Think³ it a pleasure worth preserving, that being taken, by your knowledge of the language and imitation of our fashions, for Athenians (though you be not so), you are not only admired for it through all Greece, but also partake of our dominion in matter of profit, no less than ourselves; and for awfulness to the nations subject and protection from injury, more. You therefore that alone participate freely of our dominion, cannot with any justice betray the same. In despite therefore of the Corinthians, whom you have often vanquished, and of the Sicilians, who as long as our fleet was at the best durst never so much as stand us, repel them: and make it appear that your knowledge even with weakness and loss, is better than the strength of another with fortune. 64. Again, to such of you as are Athenians, I must remember this: that you have no more such fleets in your harbours, nor such able men of arms; and that if aught happen to you but victory, your enemies here will presently be upon you at home; and those at home will be unable to defend themselves, both against those that shall go hence, and against the enemy that lieth there already. So one part of us shall fall into the mercy of the Syracusians, against whom you yourselves know with what intent you came hither: and the other part which is at home, shall fall into the hands of the Lacedæmonians. Being therefore in this one battle to fight both for yourselves and them, be therefore valiant now if ever: and bear in mind every one of you, that you that go now aboard, are the land forces, the sea forces, the whole estate and great name of Athens. For which, if any man excel others in skill or courage, he can never shew it more opportunely than now, when he may both help himself with it and the whole.”

65. Nicias having thus encouraged them, commanded presently to go aboard. Gylippus and the Syracusians might easily discern that the Athenians meant to fight, by seeing their preparation.

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Besides, they had advertisement of their purpose to cast iron grapnels into their galleys; and as for everything else, so also for that they had made provision. For they covered the fore-part of their galleys, and also the decks for a great way, with hides: that the grapnels cast in might slip, and not be able to take hold. When all was ready, Gylippus likewise and the other commanders used unto their soldiers this hortative:

66. “That not only our former acts have been honourable, but that we are to fight now also for further honour, men of Syracuse and confederates, the most of you seem to know already; for else you never would so valiantly have undergone it¹ : and if there be any man that is not so sensible of it as he ought, we will make it appear unto him better. For whereas the Athenians came into this country, with design first to enslave Sicily, and then if that succeeded, Peloponnesus and the rest of Greece; and whereas already they had the greatest dominion of any Grecians whatsoever, either present or past: you, the first that ever withstood their navy, wherewith they were everywhere masters, have in the former battles overcome them, and shall in likelihood overcome them again in this. For men that are cut short where they thought themselves to exceed, become afterwards further out of opinion with themselves than they would have been if they had never thought so: and when they come short of their hope in things they glory in, they come short also in courage of the true strength of their forces. And this is likely now to be the case of the Athenians. 67. Whereas with us it falleth out, that our former courage, wherewith though unexperienced we durst stand them, being now confirmed, and an opinion added of being the stronger¹ , giveth to every one of us a double hope. And in all enterprises, the greatest hope conferreth for the most part the greatest courage. As for their imitation of our provisions, they are things we are acquainted withal, and we shall not in any kind be unprovided for them. But they, when they shall have many men of arms upon their decks, being not used to it; and many, as I may term them, land-darters² , both Acarnanians and others, who would not be able to direct their darts though they should sit³ ; how can they choose but put the galleys into danger, and be all in confusion amongst themselves, moving in a fashion not their own⁴ ? As for the number of their galleys, it will help them nothing: if any of you fear also that, as being to fight against odds in number. For many in little room are so much the slower to do what they desire, and easiest to be annoyed by our munition⁵ . But the very truth you shall now understand by these things, whereof we suppose we have most certain intelligence. Overwhelmed with calamities, and forced by the difficulties which they are in at this present, they are grown desperate; not trusting to their forces, but willing to put themselves upon the decision of fortune, as well as they may; that so they may either go out by force, or else make their retreat afterward by land, as men whose estates cannot change into the worse.

the oration of
gylippus and the
syracusan generals.

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Ol. 91. 4. Oration of
Gylippus and the
Syracusan generals.

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Ol. 91. 4. Oration of
Gylippus and the
Syracusan generals.

68. “Against such confusion, therefore, and against the fortune of our greatest enemies now betraying itself into our hands, let us fight with anger: and with an opinion, not only that it is most lawful to fulfil our hearts’ desire upon those our enemies, that justified their coming hither as a righting of themselves against an assailant; but also, that to be revenged on an enemy, is both most natural, and, as is most commonly said, the sweetest thing in the world¹ . And that they are our enemies, and our greatest enemies, you all well enough know; seeing them come hither into our dominion to bring us into servitude. Wherein if they had sped, they had put the men to the greatest tortures, the women and children to the greatest dishonesty, and the whole city to the most ignominious name² in the world. In regard whereof, it is not fit that any of you should be so tender,

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as to think it gain if they go away without putting you to further danger; for so they mean to do, though they get the victory: but effecting (as it is likely we shall) what we intend, both to be revenged of these, and to deliver unto all Sicily their liberty, which they enjoyed before, but now is more assured. Honourable is that combat¹, and rare are those hazards, wherein the failing bringeth little loss, and the success a great deal of profit.”

69. When Gylippus and the commanders of the Syracusians had in this manner encouraged their soldiers, they presently put their men on board; perceiving the Athenians to do the same. Nicias perplexed² with this present estate, and seeing how great and how near the danger was, being now on the point to put forth from the harbour; and doubting, as in great battles it falleth out, that somewhat in every kind was still wanting, and that he had not yet sufficiently spoken his mind, called unto him again all the captains of galleys, and spake unto them every one by their fathers, their tribes, and their proper names, and entreated every one of them that had reputation in any kind, not to betray the same; and those whose ancestors were eminent, not to deface their hereditary virtues; remembering them of their country’s liberty, and the uncontrolled power of all men to live as they pleased: and saying whatsoever else in such a pinch men are accustomed, not out of their store, to utter things stale³, and in all occasions the same, touching their wives, children, and patrial gods, but such things as being thought by them available in the present discouragement, they use to cry into their ears. And when he thought he had admonished them, not enough, but as much as the time would permit him, he went his way, and drew out those forces that were to serve on land on the sea-side: and embattled them so as they might take up the greatest length of ground they were able, thereby so much the more to confirm the courage of them that were aboard. And Demosthenes, Menander, and Eudemus, (for those of the Athenian commanders went aboard), putting forth of the harbour¹, went immediately to the lock of the haven, and to the passage that was left open, with intention to force their way out. 70. But the Syracusians and their confederates, being out already with the same number of galleys they had before, disposed part of them to the guard of the open passage², and the rest in circle about the haven; to the end they might fall upon the Athenians from all parts at once, and that their land-forces might withal be near to aid them wheresoever the galleys touched. In the Syracusian navy commanded Sicanus and Agatharchus, each of them over a wing; and Pythen, with the Corinthians, had the middle battle. After the Athenians were come to the lock of the haven, at the first charge they overcame the galleys placed there to guard it, and endeavoured to break open the bars thereof. But when afterwards the Syracusians and confederates came upon them from every side, they fought not at the lock only, but also in the haven itself: and the battle was sharp, and such as there had never before been the like. For the courage wherewith the mariners on both sides brought up their galleys to any part¹ they were bidden, was very great, and great was the plotting and counterplotting, and contention one against another of the masters: also the soldiers, when the galleys boarded each other, did their utmost to excel each other in all points of skill that could be used upon the decks²: and every man, in the place assigned him,

1st September.

Nicias encourageth his soldiers anew.

year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. He prepareth to fight.

year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. The Athenians and Syracusians fight.

year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.

put himself forth to appear the foremost. But many galleys falling close together in a narrow compass, (for they were the most galleys that in any battle they had used, and fought in the least room: being little fewer on the one side and the other than two hundred), they ran against each other but seldom, because there was no means of retiring nor of passing by, but made assaults upon each other oftener, as galley with galley, either flying or pursuing, chanced to fall foul³. And as long as a galley was making up, they that stood on the decks used⁴ their darts and arrows and stones in abundance: but being once come close, the soldiers at hand-strokes attempted to board each other. And in many places it so fell out, through want of room, that they which ran upon a galley on one side, were run upon themselves on the other; and that two galleys, or sometimes more, were forced to lie aboard of one; and that the masters were at once to have a care, not in one place only, but in many together, how to defend on the one side, and how to offend on the other: and the great noise of many galleys fallen foul of one another, both amazed them and took away their hearing of what their directors directed. For¹ they directed thick and loud on both sides, not only as art required, but out of their present eagerness: the Athenians crying out to theirs to force the passage, and now if ever valiantly to lay hold upon their safe return to their country; and the Syracusians and their confederates to theirs, how honourable a thing to every one of them it would be to hinder their escape, and by this victory to improve every man the honour of his own country. Moreover, the commanders of either side, where they saw any man without necessity to row a-stern, would call unto the captain of the galley by his name, and ask him, the Athenians, whether he retired because he thought the most hostile land to be more their friend than the sea, which they had so long been masters of²: the Syracusians theirs, whether when they knew that the Athenians desired earnestly by any means to fly, they would nevertheless fly from the flyers.

71. Whilst the conflict was upon the water, the land-men had a conflict, and sided with them in their affections¹: they of the place, contending for increase of the honours they had already gotten; and the invaders, fearing a worse estate than they were already in. For the Athenians, who had their whole fortune at stake in their galleys, were in such a fear of the event as they had never been in the like: and were thereby of necessity to behold the fight upon the water with very different passions². For the sight being near, and not looking all of them upon one and the same part, he that saw their own side prevail took heart, and fell to calling upon the gods, that they would not deprive them of their safety: and they that saw them have the worse, not only lamented, but shrieked outright; and had their minds more subdued by the sight of what was done, than they that were present in the battle itself. Others that looked on some part where the fight was equal, because the contention continued so as they could make no judgment on it, with gesture of body on every occasion agreeable to their expectation, passed the time in a miserable perplexity³. For they were ever within a little either of escaping, or of perishing. And one might hear in one and the same army, as long as the fight upon the water was indifferent, at one and the same time lamentations, shouts *that they won*, *that they lost*: and whatsoever else a great army in great danger is forced differently to utter. They also that were aboard suffered the same: till at last the Syracusians and

The diversity of passion of them that beheld the

year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. fight from the shore.

year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. The Athenians fly.

their confederates, after long resistance on the other side, put them to flight, and manifestly pressing, chased them with great clamour and encouragement of their own to the shore. And the sea-forces making to the shore, some one way and some another, except only such as were lost by being far from it, escaped into the harbour [1](#). And the army that was upon the land, no longer now of different passions, with one and the same vehemence [2](#), all with shrieks and sighs unable to sustain what befel, ran part to save the galleys, part to the defence of the camp: and the residue, who were far the greatest number, fell presently to consider every one of the best way to save himself. And this was the time wherein of all other they stood in greatest fear [3](#), and they suffered now the like to what they had made others to suffer before at Pylus. For the Lacedæmonians then, besides [4](#) the loss of their fleet, lost the men which they had set over into the island: and the Athenians now, without some accident not to be expected, were out of all hope to save themselves by land.

72. After this cruel battle, and many galleys and men on either side consumed, the Syracusians and their confederates, having the victory, took up the wreck and the bodies of their dead: and returning into the city, erected a trophy. But the Athenians, in respect of the greatness of their present loss, never thought upon asking leave to take up their dead or wreck: but fell immediately to consultation how to be gone [1](#) the same night. And Demosthenes coming unto Nicias, delivered his opinion for going once again aboard, and forcing the passage, if it were possible, betimes the next morning, saying that their galleys which were yet remaining and serviceable were more than those of the enemy: for the Athenians had yet left them about sixty, and the Syracusians under fifty. But when Nicias approved the advice, and would have manned out the galleys, the mariners refused to go aboard: as being not only dejected with their defeat, but also without opinion of ever having the upperhand any more. Whereupon they now resolved all to make their retreat by land.

year xix. A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

The stratagem of Hermocrates, to hinder the escape of the Athenians.

year xix. A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

2d September.

Gylippus goeth out with his forces, and besets the way.

year xix. A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

73. But Hermocrates of Syracuse suspecting their purpose, and apprehending it as a matter dangerous that so great an army, going away by land and sitting down in some part or other of Sicily, should there renew the war, repaired unto the magistrates: and admonished them, that it was not fit, through negligence, to suffer the enemy in the night time to go their ways, (alleging what he thought best to the purpose); but that all the Syracusians and their confederates should go out and fortify in their way, and prepossess all the narrow passages with a guard. Now they were all of them of the same opinion no less than himself, and thought it fit to be done: but they conceived withal, that the soldier now joyful and taking his ease after a sore battle, being also holiday, (for it was their day of sacrifice to Hercules [2](#)), would not easily be brought to obey. For through excess of joy for the victory, they would most of them, being holiday, be drinking; and look for anything rather than to be persuaded at this time to take up arms again and go out [1](#). But seeing the magistrates upon this consideration thought it hard to be done, Hermocrates not prevailing, of his own head contrived this. Fearing lest the Athenians should pass the worst of their way in the night, and so at ease out-go them, as soon as it grew dark he sent certain of his friends, and with them certain horsemen, to the Athenian camp: who approaching so near as to be heard

speak, called to some of them to come forth, as if they had been friends of the Athenians; (for Nicias had some within that used to give him intelligence); and bade them to advise Nicias not to dislodge that night, for that the Syracusians had beset the ways; but that the next day, having had the leisure to furnish their army, they might march away. 74. Upon this advertisement they abode that night, supposing it had been without fraud². And afterwards, because they went not presently, they thought good to stay there that day also, to the end that the soldiers might pack up their necessaries as commodiously as they could, and begone, leaving all things else behind them save what was necessary for their bodies. But Gylippus and the Syracusians, with their land forces, went out before them: and not only stopped up the ways in the country about by which the Athenians were likely to pass, and kept a guard at the fords of brooks and rivers, but also stood embattled to receive and stop their army in such places as they thought convenient. And with their galleys they rowed to the harbour of the Athenians, and towed their galleys away from the shore. Some few whereof they burnt, as the Athenians themselves meant to have done: but the rest at their leisure, as any of them chanced in any place to drive ashore, they afterwards hauled into the city¹.

75. After this, when everything seemed unto Nicias and Demosthenes sufficiently prepared, they dislodged, being now the third day from their fight by sea. It was a lamentable departure, not only for the particulars², as that they marched away with the loss of their whole fleet, and that instead of their great hopes they had endangered both themselves and the state: but also for the dolorous objects which were presented both to the eye and mind of every of them in particular, in the leaving of their camp. For their dead lying unburied, when any one saw his friend on the ground, it struck him at once both with fear and grief. But the living that were³ sick or wounded, both grieved them more than the dead, and were more miserable. For with entreaties and lamentations they put them to a stand, pleading to be taken along by whomsoever they saw of their fellows or familiars, and hanging on the necks of their comrades¹, and following as far as they were able: and when the strength of their bodies failed, that they could go no further, with ah-mes! and imprecations were there left. Insomuch as the whole army, filled with tears and irresolute², could hardly get away; though the place were hostile, and they had suffered already, and feared to suffer in the future, more than with tears could be expressed: but³ hung down their heads, and generally blamed themselves. For they seemed nothing else but even the people of some great city expugned by siege, and making their escape. For the whole number that marched, were no less one with another than forty thousand men. Of which not only the ordinary sort carried every one what he thought he should have occasion to use; but also the men of arms and horsemen, contrary to their custom, carried their victuals under their arms, partly for want and partly for distrust of their servants, who from time to time⁴ ran over to the enemy; but at this time went the greatest number. And yet what they carried was not enough to serve the turn: for not a jot more provision was left remaining in the camp. Neither were the sufferings of others⁵, and that equal division of misery, which nevertheless is wont to lighten it, in that we suffer with many, at this time so much as thought light in itself. And the rather, because they considered from what

3rd September. The Athenians march away from before Syracuse by land.

year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.

year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.

splendour and glory which they enjoyed before, into how low an estate they were now fallen. For never Grecian army so differed from itself. For whereas they came with a purpose to enslave others, they departed in greater fear of being made slaves themselves; and instead of prayers and hymns with which they put to sea, they went back again with the contrary maledictions¹; and whereas they came out seamen, they departed landmen, and relied not upon their naval forces but upon their men of arms. Nevertheless, in respect of the great danger yet hanging over them, these miseries seemed all [but] tolerable.

76. Nicias, perceiving the army to be dejected, and the great change that was in it, came up to the ranks, and encouraged and comforted them as far as for the present means he was able. And as he went from part to part he exalted his voice more than ever before, both as being earnest in his exhortation, and because also he desired that the benefit of his words might reach as far as might be.

77. "Athenians and confederates, we must hope still, even in our present estate. Men have been saved ere now from greater dangers than these are. Nor ought you too much to accuse yourselves, either for your losses past, or the undeserved miseries we are now in. Even I myself, that have the advantage of none of you in strength of body, (you see how I am in my sickness), nor am I thought inferior to any of you for prosperity past, either in respect of mine own private person or otherwise, am nevertheless now in as much danger as the meanest of you.

the oration of nicias to his afflicted army

year xix. A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4. Oration of Nicias

year xix. A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4. Oration of Nicias

And yet I have worshipped the gods frequently according to the law, and lived justly and unblameably towards men. For which cause my hope is still confident of the future: though these calamities, as being not according to the measure of our desert, do indeed make me fear. But they may perhaps cease. For both the enemies have already had sufficient fortune: and the gods, if any of them have been displeased with our voyage, have already sufficiently punished us. Others have invaded their neighbours as well as we: and as their offence, which proceeded of human infirmity, so their punishment also hath been tolerable. And we have reason now, both to hope for more favour from the gods; (for our case deserveth their pity rather than their hatred); and also not to despair of ourselves, seeing how good and how many men of arms you are, marching together in order of battle¹. Make account of this, that wheresoever you please to sit down, there presently of yourselves you are a city: such as not any other in Sicily can either easily sustain, if you assault, or remove, if you be once seated. Now for your march, that it may be safe and orderly, look to it yourselves; making no other account any of you, but what place soever he shall be forced to fight in, the same, if he win it, must be his country and his walls². March you must with diligence, both night and day alike, for our victual is short: and if we can but reach some amicable territory of the Siculi, (for these are still firm to us for fear of the Syracusians), then you may think yourselves secure. Let us therefore send before to them, and bid them meet us¹, and bring us forth some supplies of victual. In sum, soldiers, let me tell you it is necessary that you be valiant; for there is no place near, where being cowards you can possibly be saved: whereas if you escape through the enemies at this time, you may every one² see again whatsoever anywhere

he most desires; and the Athenians may re-erect the great power of their city, how low soever fallen. For the men, not the walls nor the empty galleys, are the city.”

78. Nicias, as he used this hortative, went withal about the army, and where he saw any man straggle and not march in his rank, he brought him about and set him in his place. Demonsthenes having spoken to the same or like purpose, did as much to those soldiers under him. And they marched forward, those with Nicias in a square battalion, and then those with Demosthenes in the rear³. And the men of arms received those that carried the baggage, and the other multitude, within them. When they were come to the ford of the river Anapus, they there found certain of the Syracusians and their confederates embattled against them on the bank: but these they put to flight, and having won the passage marched forward. But the Syracusian horsemen lay still upon them, and their light-armed plied them with their darts, in the flank. This day the Athenians marched forty furlongs, and lodged that night at the foot of a certain hill. The next day, as soon as it was light, they marched forwards about twenty furlongs; and descending into a certain champaign ground, encamped there, with intent both to get victual at the houses, (for the place was inhabited), and to carry water with them thence: for before them in the way they were to pass, for many furlongs together there was but little to be had. But the Syracusians in the meantime got before them, and cut off¹ their passage with a wall. This was at a steep hill, on either side whereof was the channel of a torrent with steep and rocky banks: and it is called Acræum Lepas². The next day the Athenians went on: and the horsemen and darters of the Syracusians and their confederates, being a great number of both, pressed them so with their horses and darts, that the Athenians after long fight were compelled to retire again into the same camp; but now with less victual than before, because the horsemen would suffer them no more to straggle abroad. 79. In the morning betimes they dislodged, and put themselves on their march again, and forced their way to the hill¹ which the enemy had fortified; where they found before them the Syracusian foot embattled in great length above the fortification [on the hill's side]: for the place itself was but narrow. The Athenians coming up assaulted the wall: but the shot of the enemy, who were many, and the steepness of the hill, (for they could easily cast home from above), making them unable to take it, they retired again and rested. There happened withal some claps of thunder and a shower of rain, as usually falleth out at this time of the year, being now near autumn: which further disheartened the Athenians, who thought that also this did tend to their destruction. Whilst they lay still, Gylippus and the Syracusians sent part of their army to raise a wall at their backs, in the way they had come: but this the Athenians hindered, by sending against them part of theirs. After this, the Athenians retiring with their whole army into a more champaign ground², lodged there that night: and the next day went forward again. And the Syracusians with their darts, from every part round about, wounded many of them; and when the Athenians charged, they retired, and when they retired, the Syracusians charged; and that especially upon the hindmost, that by putting to flight a few they might terrify the whole army. And for a good while the Athenians in this manner withstood them: and afterwards, being gotten five or six

The Athenians march, and the

year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. Syracusians assault them always as they go.

4th September.

5th September.

year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4. 6th September.

7th September.

year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.

furlongs forward, they rested in the plain: and the Syracusians went from them to their own camp.

80. This night it was concluded by Nicias and Demosthenes, seeing the miserable estate of their army, and the want already of all necessaries, and that many of their men in many assaults of the enemy were wounded, to lead away the army as far as they possibly could¹: not the way they purposed before, but toward the sea; which was the contrary way to that which the Syracusians guarded. Now this whole journey of the army lay not towards Catana, but towards the other side of Sicily, Camarina and Gela, and the cities, as well Grecian as barbarian, that way. When they had made many fires accordingly, they marched in the night: and (as usually it falleth out in all armies, and most of all in the greatest, to be subject to affright and terror, especially marching by night and in hostile ground, and the enemy near) were in confusion². The army of Nicias leading the way, kept together and got far afore; but that of Demosthenes, which was the greater half, was both severed from the rest and marched more disorderly. Nevertheless, by the morning betimes they got to the sea-side, and entering into the Helorine way they went on towards the river Cacyparis, to the end when they came thither to march upwards along the river's side through the heart of the country. For they hoped that this way the Siculi, to whom they had sent, would meet them. When they came to the river, here also they found a certain guard of the Syracusians stopping their passage with a wall and with piles. When they had quickly forced this guard, they passed the river, and again marched on to another river, called Erineus: for that was the way which the guides directed them¹.

Nicias and Demosthenes rise in the night, and march a contrary way: Nicias foremost, and in order; but Demosthenes in the rear, slower and more in disorder.

year xix. A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4. 8th
September.

81. In the meantime the Syracusians and their confederates, as soon as day appeared, and that they knew the Athenians were gone, most of them accusing Gylippus as if he had let them go with his consent, followed them with speed the same way, which they easily understood they were gone; and about dinner time overtook them. When they were come up to those with Demosthenes, who were the hindmost, and had marched more slowly and disorderly than the other part had done, as having been put into disorder in the night, they fell upon them and fought. And the Syracusian horsemen hemmed them in and forced them up into a narrow compass, the more easily now¹, because they were divided from the rest. Now the army of Nicias was gone by this time one hundred and fifty furlongs² further on. For he led away the faster, because he thought not that³ their safety consisted in staying and fighting voluntarily; but rather in a speedy retreat, and then only fighting when they could not choose. But Demosthenes was both in greater and more continual toil, in respect that he marched in the rear, and consequently was pressed by the enemy⁴: and seeing the Syracusians pursuing him, he went not on, but put his men in order to fight, till by his stay he was encompassed, and reduced, he and the Athenians with him, into great disorder. For being shut up⁵ within a place enclosed round with a

Demosthenes overtaken by the enemy, resisteth as long as he can, and is taken.

year xix. A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

year xix. A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

Demosthenes yieldeth.

wall, and which on either side had a way [open] amongst abundance of olive trees; they were charged from all sides at once with the enemy's shot. For the Syracusians assaulted them in this kind, and not in close battle, upon very good reason. For to hazard battle against men desperate, was not so much for theirs, as for the Athenians' advantage. Besides, after so manifest successes, they spared themselves somewhat; because they were loth to wear themselves out⁶ before the end of the business; and thought by this kind of fight to subdue and take them alive. 82. Whereupon, after they had plied the Athenians and their confederates all day long from every side with shot, and saw that with their wounds and other annoyance they were already tired: Gylippus and the Syracusians and their confederates first made proclamation, that if any of the islanders would come over to them, they should be at liberty. And the men of some few cities went over. And by and by after, they made agreement with all the rest that were with Demosthenes; that they should deliver up their arms, and none of them be put to death, neither violently, nor by bonds, nor by want of the necessities of life. And they all yielded, to the number of six thousand men: and the silver they had, they laid it all down, casting it into the hollow of targets; and filled with the same four targets. And these men they carried presently into the city.

Nicias, and those that were with him, attained the same day to the river Erineus; which passing, he caused his army to sit down upon a certain ground more elevate than the rest. 83. Where the Syracusians the next day overtook and told him, that those with Demosthenes had yielded themselves; and willed him to do the like. But he, not believing it, took truce for a horseman to enquire the truth. Upon return of the horseman, and word that they had yielded, he sent a herald to Gylippus and the Syracusians: saying, that he was content to compound on the part of the Athenians, to repay whatsoever money the Syracusians had laid out, so that his army might be suffered to depart; and that till payment of the money were made, he would deliver them hostages, Athenians, every hostage rated as a talent. But Gylippus and the Syracusians refusing the condition, charged them; and having hemmed them in, plied them with shot, as they had done the other army, from every side till evening. This part of the army was also pinched with the want both of victual and other¹ necessaries. Nevertheless observing the quiet of the night, they were about to march. But no sooner took they their arms up, than the Syracusians perceiving it gave the alarm. Whereupon the Athenians finding themselves discovered, sat down again: all but three hundred, who breaking by force through the guards, marched as far as they could that night². 84. And Nicias, when it was day, led his army forward; the Syracusians and their confederates still pressing them in the same manner, shooting and darting at them from every side. The Athenians hasted to get the river Asinarus; not only because they were urged on every side by the assault of the many horsemen and other multitude, and thought to be more at ease when they were over the river, but out of weariness also and desire to drink. When they were come unto the river, they rushed in without any order, every man striving who should first get over. But the pressing of the enemy, made the passage now more difficult³. For being forced to take the river in heaps, they fell upon and trampled one another under their feet; and

9th September.
The offer of Nicias to redeem his army not accepted.
year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.
10th September.
year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.
10th September.
year xix. A. C. 413. Ol. 91. 4.

falling amongst the spears and utensils of the army, some perished presently; and others catching hold one of another¹, were carried away together down the stream. And [not only] the Syracusians standing along the farther bank, being a steep one, killed the Athenians with their shot from above, as they were many of them greedily drinking, and troubling one another in the hollow of the river: but the Peloponnesians came also down and slew them with their swords, and those especially that were in the river². And suddenly the water was corrupted: nevertheless they drunk it, foul as it was with blood and mire; and many also fought for it. 85. In the end, when many dead lay heaped in the river, and the army was utterly defeated, part at the river, and part (if any gat away) by the horsemen; Nicias yielded himself unto Gylippus, (having more confidence in him than in the Syracusians): to be for his own person at the discretion of him and the Lacedæmonians, and³ no further slaughter to be made of the soldiers. Gylippus from thenceforth commanded to take prisoners. So the residue, except such as were hidden from them, (which were many), they carried alive into the city. They sent also to pursue the three hundred which brake through their guards in the night; and took them. That which was left together of this army to the public, was not much¹; but they that were conveyed away by stealth were very many: and all Sicily was filled with them, because they were not taken, as those with Demosthenes were, by composition. Besides, a great part [of these] were slain; for the slaughter [at this time] was exceeding great, none greater in all the Sicilian war². They were also not a few that died in those other assaults in their march. Nevertheless many also escaped, some then presently, and some by running away after servitude; the rendezvous of whom was Catana.

86. The Syracusians and their confederates being come together, returned with their prisoners, all they could get, and with the spoil, into the city. As for all other the prisoners of the Athenians and their confederates, they put them into the quarries³, as the safest custody. But Nicias and Demosthenes they killed, against Gylippus his will. For Gylippus thought the victory would be very honourable, if, over and above all his other success, he could carry home both the generals of the enemy to Lacedæmon. And it fell out that one of them, Demosthenes, was their greatest enemy, for the things he had done in the island and at Pylus; and the other, upon the same occasion, their greatest friend. For Nicias had earnestly laboured to have those prisoners which were taken in the island, to be set at liberty; by persuading the Athenians to the peace. For which cause the Lacedæmonians were inclined to love him: and it was principally in confidence of that, that he rendered himself to Gylippus. But certain Syracusians, as it is reported, some of them for fear (because they had been tampering with him) lest being put to the torture he might bring them into trouble, whereas now they were well enough; and others, especially the Corinthians, fearing he might get away by corruption of one or other, being wealthy, and work them some mischief afresh, having persuaded their confederates to the same, killed him. For these, or for causes near unto these, was he put to death: being the man that, of all the Grecians of my time, had least deserved to be brought to so great a degree of misery¹.

year xix. A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

year xix. A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

87. As for those in the quarries, the Syracusians handled them at first but ungently. For in this hollow place², first the sun and suffocating air (being without roof) annoyed them one way: and on the other side, the nights coming upon that heat, autumnal and cold, put them, by reason of the alteration, into strange diseases: especially doing all things, for want of room, in one and the same place; and the carcasses of such as died of their wounds, or change¹ [of air] or other like accident, lying together there on heaps. Also the smell was intolerable: besides that they were afflicted with hunger and thirst. For for eight months together, they allowed no more but to every man a cotyle² of water by the day, and two cotyles of corn. And whatsoever misery is probable that men in such a place may suffer, they suffered. Some seventy days they lived thus thronged. Afterwards, retaining the Athenians, and such Sicilians and Italians as were of the army with them, they sold the rest. How many were taken in all, it is hard to say exactly: but they were seven thousand at the fewest. And this was the greatest action that happened in all this war, or at all, that we have heard of amongst the Grecians³: being to the victors most glorious, and most calamitous to the vanquished. For being wholly overcome in every kind, and receiving small loss in nothing, their army, and fleet, and all [that ever they had], perished (as they use to say) with an universal destruction¹. Few of many returned home. And thus passed the business concerning Sicily.

year xix. A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

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THE EIGHTH BOOK OF THE HISTORY OF THUCYDIDES.

THE PRINCIPAL CONTENTS.

The revolt of the Athenian confederates and the offers made by Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, the king's lieutenants of the lower Asia, draw the Lacedæmonians to the war in Ionia and Hellespont.—First in Ionia, and the provinces of Tissaphernes: who, by the counsel of Alcibiades and connivance of Astyochus, hindereth their proceedings.—Alcibiades in the meanwhile, to make way for his return into his country, giveth occasion of sedition about the government: whence ensued the authority of the four hundred, under the pretext of the five thousand: the recalling of Alcibiades by the army: and at length, by his countenance, the deposing again of the four hundred, and end of the sedition.—But in the meantime they lose Eubœa.—Mindarus, the successor of Astyochus, finding himself abused by Tissaphernes, carrieth the war to Pharnabazus into Hellespont: and there presently loseth a battle to the Athenians before Abydos, being then summer and the twenty-first year of the war.

1. When the news was told at Athens, they believed not a long time, though it were plainly related and by those very soldiers¹ that escaped from the defeat itself, that all was so utterly lost as it was. When they knew it, they were mightily offended with the orators¹ that furthered the voyage: as if they themselves had never decreed it. They were angry also with those that gave out prophecies², and with the soothsayers: and with whosoever else had at first by any divination put them into hope that Sicily should be subdued. Every thing, from every place, grieved them; and fear and astonishment, the greatest that ever they were in, beset them round³. For they were not only grieved for the loss which both every man in particular and the whole city sustained, of so many men of arms, horsemen, and serviceable men, the like whereof they saw was not left: but seeing they had neither galleys in their haven, nor money in their treasury, nor furniture in their galleys, were even desperate at that present of their safety; and thought the enemy out of Sicily would come forthwith with their fleet into Peiræus, especially after the vanquishing of so great a navy; and that the enemy here would surely now, with double preparation in every kind, press them to the utmost both by sea and land, and be aided therein by their revolting confederates. Nevertheless, as far as their means would stretch, it was thought best to stand it out; and getting materials and money where they could have it, to make ready a navy, and to make sure of their confederates, especially those of Eubœa; and to introduce a greater frugality in the city⁴, and to erect a magistracy of the elder sort, as occasion should be offered to preconsult of the business that passed. And they were ready, in respect of their present fear, (as is the people's fashion), to order every thing aright. And as they resolved this, so they did it. And the summer ended.

year xix. A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

year xix. A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4. The fear
and sorrow of the
Athenians upon
hearing of the news.

The Athenians resolve
to stand it out.

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Ol. 91. 4.

The end of the
nineteenth summer.

2. The winter following, upon the great overthrow of the Athenians in Sicily, all the Grecians were presently up against them. Those who before were confederates of neither side, thought fit no longer, though uncalled, to abstain from the war, but to go against the Athenians of their own accord; as having not only every one severally this thought, that had the Athenians prospered in Sicily they would afterwards have come upon them also, but imagined¹ withal that the rest of the war would be but short, whereof it would be an honour to participate. And such of them as were confederates of the Lacedæmonians, longed now more than ever to be freed as soon as might be of their great toil. But above all, the cities subject to the Athenians were ready, even beyond their ability, to revolt; as they that judged according to their passion, without admitting reason in the matter, that the next summer they were to remain with victory². But the Lacedæmonians themselves took heart, not only from all this, but also principally from that, that their confederates in Sicily with great power, having another navy now necessarily added to their own¹, would in all likelihood be with them in the beginning of the spring. And being every way full of hopes, they purposed without delay² to fall close to the war: making account, if this were well ended, both to be free hereafter from any more such dangers as the Athenians, if they had gotten Sicily, would have put them into; and also having pulled them down, to have the principality of all Greece now secure unto themselves.

The Grecians take part all of them against the Athenians.

The hopes of the Lacedæmonians.

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3. Whereupon Agis their king went out with a part of his army the same winter from Deceleia, and levied money amongst the confederates for the building of a navy: and turning into the Melian gulf, upon an old grudge took a great booty from the Cætæans, which he made money of³; and forced those of Pthiotis being Achaïans, and others in those parts subjects to the Thessalians, (the Thessalians complaining and unwilling), to give them hostages and money. The hostages he put into Corinth, and endeavoured to draw them into the league. And the Lacedæmonians imposed upon the states confederate, the charge of building one hundred galleys: that is to say, on their own state and on the Bœotians, each twenty-five; on the Phœceans and Locrians, fifteen; on the Corinthians, fifteen; on the Arcadians, Sicyonians, and Pellenians, ten; and on the Megareans, Trœzenians, and Hermionians, ten. And put all things else in readiness presently with the spring to begin the war.

Agis levieth money.

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The Lacedæmonians appoint a fleet of a hundred galleys to be made ready amongst the cities of league.

4. The Athenians also made their preparations, as they had designed; having gotten timber and built their navy this same winter, and fortified the promontory of Sunium that their cornboats might come about in safety. Also they abandoned the fort in Laconia, which they had built as they went by for Sicily. And generally where there appeared expense upon anything unuseful, they contracted their charge.

The Athenians build their navy, and contract their charges.

The Eubœans

5. Whilst they were on both sides doing thus¹, there came unto Agis about their revolt from the Athenians, first the ambassadors of the Eubœans. Accepting the motion, he sent for Alcamenes the son of Sthenelaidas and for Melanthus from Lacedæmon, to go commanders into Eubœa. Whom, when he¹ was come to him with about three hundred freedmen, he was now about to send over. But in the meantime came the Lesbians, they also desiring to revolt: and by the means² of the Bœotians Agis changed his former resolution, and prepared for the revolt of Lesbos, deferring that of Eubœa; and assigned them Alcamenes, the same that should have gone into Eubœa, for their governor³: and the Bœotians promised them ten galleys, and Agis other ten. Now this was done without acquainting therewith the state of Lacedæmon. For Agis, as long as he was about Deceleia with the power he had, had the law in his own hands, to send what army and whither he listed, and to levy men and money at his pleasure. And at this time, the confederates of him (as I may call them) did better obey him, than the confederates of the Lacedæmonians did them at home⁴: for having the power in his hands, he was terrible wheresoever he came. And he was now for the Lesbians. But the Chians and Erythræans, they also desiring to revolt, went not to Agis, but to the Lacedæmonians in the city: and with them went also an ambassador from Tissaphernes, lieutenant to king Darius in the low countries of Asia¹. For Tissaphernes also instigated the Peloponnesians, and promised to pay their fleet. For he had lately begged of the king² the tribute accruing in his own province; for which he was in arrearage, because he could receive nothing out of any of the Greek cities by reason of the Athenians. And therefore he thought by weakening the Athenians, to receive his tribute the better, and withal to draw the Lacedæmonians into a league with the king: and thereby, as the king had commanded, to kill or take alive Amorges, Pissuthnes his bastard son, who was in rebellion against him about Caria³. The Chians therefore and Tissaphernes followed this business jointly.

year xix. A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4. offer to
revolt to Agis.

The Lesbians offer to
revolt to Agis.

The Chians and
Erythræans desire to
revolt.

year xix. A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.
Tissaphernes,
lieutenant of the
lower Asia, laboureth
to have the
Lacedæmonians come
unto him.

6. Calligeitus the son of Laophon, a Magarean, and Timagoras the son of Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, both banished their own cities and abiding with Pharnabazus the son of Pharnaces, came also about the same time to Lacedæmon; sent by Pharnabazus to procure a fleet for the Hellespont, that he also, if he could, might cause the Athenian cities in his province to revolt for his tribute's sake, and be the first to draw the Lacedæmonians into league with the king: just the same things that were desired before by Tissaphernes. Now Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes treating apart¹, there was great canvassing at Lacedæmon, between the one side that persuaded to send to Ionia and Chios, and the other that would have the army and fleet go first into the Hellespont. But the Lacedæmonians indeed approved best by much of the business of the Chians and of Tissaphernes. For with these co-operated Alcibiades, hereditary guest and friend of Endius the ephore of that year in the highest degree: insomuch as in respect of that guesthood, Alcibiades his family received a Laconic name². For Endius was called Endius Alcibiadis. Nevertheless the Lacedæmonians sent first one Phrynus, a man of those parts³, to Chios, to see if the galleys they had

year xix. A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.
Pharnabazus,
lieutenant of
Hellespont, laboureth
the like for himself.

year xix. A. C. 413.
Ol. 91. 4.

were so many as they reported, and whether the city were otherwise so sufficient as it was said to be. And when the messenger brought back word that all that had been said was true, they received both the Chians and the Erythræans presently into their league: and decreed to send them forty galleys, there being at Chios, from such places as the Chians named, no less than sixty already. And of these at first they were about to send out ten, with Melancredas for admiral¹: but afterwards, upon occasion of an earthquake, for Melancredas they sent Chalcideus, and instead of ten galleys they went about the making ready of five only in Laconia. So the winter ended: and nineteenth year of this war written by Thucydides².

7. In the beginning of the next summer, because the Chians pressed to have the galleys sent away, and feared lest the Athenians should get notice what they were doing; (for all their ambassadors went out by stealth); the Lacedæmonians send away to Corinth three Spartans, to will them with all speed to transport their galleys over the isthmus to the other sea towards Athens, and to go all to Chios, as well those which Agis had made ready to go to Lesbos as the rest: the number of the galleys of the league which were then there, being forty wanting one. 8. But Calligeitus and Timagoras, who came from Pharnabazus, would have no part in this fleet that went for Chios; nor would deliver the money, twenty–five talents, which they had brought with them, to pay for their setting forth, but made account to go out with another fleet afterwards by themselves. When Agis saw that the Lacedæmonians meant to send first to Chios, he resolved not of any other course himself; but the confederates assembling at Corinth went to council upon the matter, and concluded thus: that they should go first to Chios under the command of Chalcideus, who was making ready the five galleys at Laconia; and then to Lesbos under the charge of Alcamenes, intended also to be sent thither by Agis; and lastly into Hellespont, in which voyage they ordained that Clearchus, the son of Rhamphias, should have the command; and concluded to carry over the isthmus first the one half of their galleys, and that those should presently put to sea, that the Athenians might have their minds more upon those, than on the other half to be transported afterwards. For they determined to pass that sea openly; contemning the weakness of the Athenians, in respect they had not any navy of importance yet appearing. As they resolved, so presently they carried over one and twenty galleys. 9. But when the rest urged to put to sea, the Corinthians were unwilling to go along before they should have ended the celebration of the Isthmian holidays, then come. Hereupon Agis was content, that they for their parts should observe the Isthmian truce; and he therefore to take the fleet upon himself as his own¹. But the Corinthians not agreeing to that, and the time passing away, the Athenians got intelligence the easier of the practice of the Chians: and sent thither Aristocrates, one of their generals, to accuse them of it. The Chians denying the matter, he commanded them for their better credit to send along with him some galleys for their aid due by the league¹: and they sent seven. The cause why they sent these galleys, was the *many* not acquainted with the practice; and the *few* and *conscious* not willing to undergo the enmity of the multitude without

year xx. A. C. 412.
Ol. 91. 4. The Lacedæmonians send to Corinth to hasten away the fleet to Chios.

The confederates in council at Corinth set down

year xx. A. C. 412.
Ol. 91. 4. an order for the war following, with which to begin and which to follow.

The Athenians understand the purpose of the Chians to revolt.

year xx. A. C. 412.
Ol. 91. 4.

having strength first, and their not expecting any longer the coming of the Lacedæmonians, because they had so long delayed them.

10. In the meantime the Isthmian games were celebrating, and the Athenians (for they had word sent them of it) came and saw²; and the business of the Chians grew more apparent. After they went thence, they took order presently that the fleet might not pass from Cenchreïæ undiscovered. And after the holidays were over, the Corinthians put to sea for Chios³ under the conduct of Alcámenes. And the Athenians at first with equal number came up to them, and endeavoured to draw them out into the main sea⁴

The Athenians drive the Peloponnesian galleys into Peiræus, a desert haven, and there besiege them.

year xx. A. C. 412.
Ol. 91. 4.

: but seeing the Peloponnesians followed not far, but turned another way, the Athenians went also from them. For the seven galleys of Chios, which were part of this number, they durst not trust. But afterwards having manned thirty–seven others⁵, they gave chase to the enemy by the shore, and drave them into Peiræus in the territory of Corinth: (this Peiræus is a desert haven, and the utmost upon the confines of Epidauria). One galley that was far from land, the Peloponnesians lost; the rest they brought together into the haven. But the Athenians charging them by sea with their galleys, and withal setting their men a–land, mightily troubled and disordered them: brake their galleys upon the shore, and slew Alcámenes their commander. And some¹ they lost of their own.

11. The fight being ended, they assigned a sufficient number of galleys to lie opposite to those of the enemy, and the rest to lie under a² little island not far off: in which also they encamped, and sent to Athens for a supply. For the Peloponnesians had with them for aid of their galleys, the Corinthians the next day³: and not long after, divers others of the inhabitants thereabouts. But when they considered that the guarding of them in a desert place would be painful, they knew not what course to take; and once they thought to have set the galleys on fire: but it was concluded afterwards to draw them to the land, and guard them with their landmen till some good occasion should be offered for their escape. And Agis also, when he heard the news, sent unto them Thermon, a Spartan. The Lacedæmonians having been advertised of the departure of these galleys from the isthmus, (for the ephores had commanded Alcámenes, when he put to sea to send them word by a horseman¹), were minded presently to have sent away also the five galleys also that were in Laconia, and Chalcideus the commander of them, and with him Alcibiades. But afterwards, as they were ready to go out, came the news of the galleys chased into Peiræus: which so much discouraged them, in respect they stumbled in the very entrance of the Ionic war, that they purposed now, not only not to send away those galleys of their own, but also to call back again some of those that were already at sea.

year xx. A. C. 412.
Ol. 91. 4. The voyage of Chalcideus and Alcibiades to Chios.

12. When Alcibiades saw this, he dealt with Endius and the rest of the ephores again, not to fear the voyage: alleging that they would [make haste, and] be there before the Chians should have heard of the misfortune of the fleet; and that as soon as he should arrive in Ionia himself, he could easily make the cities there to revolt, by declaring unto them the weakness of the Athenians and the diligence of the Lacedæmonians; wherein he should be thought more worthy to be believed than any other. Moreover to

Endius he said, that it would be an honour in particular to him, that Ionia should revolt and the king be made confederate to the Lacedæmonians by his own means², and not to have it the mastery of Agis: for he was at difference with Agis. So having prevailed with Endius and the other ephores¹, he took sea with five galleys, together with Chalcideus of Lacedæmon; and made haste.

13. About the same time came back from Sicily those sixteen galleys of the Peloponnesians, which, having aided Gylippus in that war, were intercepted by the way about Leucadia and evil entreated by twenty–seven galleys of Athens, that watched thereabouts under the command of Hippocles, the son of Menippus, for such galleys as should return out of Sicily. For all the rest, saving one, avoiding the Athenians, were arrived in Corinth before¹.

year xx. A. C. 412.
Ol. 91. 4. Sixteen galleys of Peloponnesus, intercepted and hardly handled in their return from Sicily by the Athenians, arrive in Corinth.

14. Chalcideus and Alcibiades, as they sailed, kept prisoner every man they met with by the way; to the end that notice might not be given of their passage. And touching first at Corycus in the continent, where also they dismissed those whom they had apprehended; after conference there with some of the conspirators of the Chians, that advised them to go to the city without sending them word before, they came upon the Chians suddenly and unexpected. It put the commons into much wonder and astonishment: but the *few* had so ordered the matter beforehand, that an assembly² chanced to be holden at the same time. And when Chalcideus and Alcibiades had spoken in the same; and told them that many galleys were coming to them, but not that those other galleys were besieged in Peiræus; the Chians first, and afterwards the Erythræans, revolted from the Athenians. After this they went with three galleys to Clazomenæ, and made that city to revolt also. And the Clazomenians presently crossed over to the continent, and there fortified Polichna¹: lest they should need a retiring place from the little island wherein they dwelt. The rest also, all that had revolted, fell to fortifying, and making of preparation for the war.

year xx. A. C. 412.
Ol. 91. 4.

Chios and Erythræ revolt.

Clazomenæ revolteth.

year xx. A. C. 412.
Ol. 91. 4.

15. This news of Chios was quickly brought to the Athenians; who conceiving themselves to be now beset with great and evident danger, and that the rest of the confederates, seeing so great a city to revolt, would be no longer quiet, in this their present fear² decreed that those thousand talents, which through all this war they had affected to keep untouched, forthwith abrogating the punishment ordained for such as spake or gave their suffrages³ to stir it, should now be used, and therewith galleys not a few manned. They decreed also to send thither out of hand, under the command of Strombichides the son of Diotimus, eight galleys of the number of those that besieged the enemy at Peiræus; the which, having forsaken their charge to give chase to the galleys that went with Chalcideus, and not able to overtake them, were now returned: and shortly after also to send Thrasyycles to help them with twelve galleys more, which

The Athenians abrogate the decree touching the thousand talents reserved for the extremities of state, and furnish out a fleet with the money.

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Ol. 91. 4.

also had departed from the same guard upon the enemy. And those seven galleys of Chios, which likewise kept watch at Peiræus with the rest, they fetched from thence, and gave the bondmen that served in them their liberty, and the chains to those that were free. And instead of all those galleys that kept guard¹ upon the galleys of the Peloponnesians, they made ready other with all speed in their places; besides thirty more, which they intended to furnish out afterwards. Great was their diligence; and nothing was of light importance that they went about for the recovery of Chios.

16. Strombichides in the meantime arrived² at Samos: and taking Teos revolteth. into his company one Samian galley, went thence to Teos, and entreated them not to stir. But towards Teos was Chalcideus also coming with twenty-three galleys from Chios: and with him also the land forces of the Clazomenians and Erythræans³. Whereof Strombichides having been advertised, he put forth again before his arrival; and standing off at sea, when he saw the many galleys that came from Chios, he fled towards Samos, they following him. The land forces, the Teians would not at the first admit: but after this flight of the Athenians, they brought them in. And these for the most part⁴ held their hands for a while, expecting the return of Chalcideus from the chase: but when he stayed somewhat long, they fell of themselves to the demolishing of the wall built about the city of Teos by the Athenians towards the continent; wherein they were also helped by some few barbarians, that came down thither under the leading of Tages, deputy lieutenant of Tissaphernes.

17. Chalcideus and Alcibiades, when they had chased Strombichides into Samos, armed the mariners that were in the galleys of Peloponnesus, and left them in Chios; instead of whom they manned with mariners of Chios both those and twenty galleys more: and with this fleet they went to Miletus with intent to cause it to revolt. For the intention of Alcibiades, that was acquainted with the principal Milesians, was to prevent the fleet which was to come from Peloponnesus, and to turn these cities first¹; that the honour of it might be ascribed to the Chians, to himself, to Chalcideus, and (as he had promised) to Endius that set them out, as having brought most of the cities to revolt with the forces of the Chians only and of those galleys that came with Chalcideus. So these, for the greatest part of their way undiscovered, and arriving not much sooner than Strombichides and Thrasycles, (who now chancing to be present with [those] twelve galleys from Athens followed them with Strombichides), caused the Milesians to revolt. The Athenians following them at the heels with nineteen galleys, being shut out by the Milesians, lay at anchor at Lada², an island over against the city.

Presently upon the revolt of Miletus was made the first league between the king and the Lacedæmonians by Tissaphernes and Chalcideus, as followeth:

18. “The Lacedæmonians and their confederates have made a league with the king and Tissaphernes on these articles:

“Whatsoever territory or cities the king possesseth, and his ancestors have possessed, the same are to remain the king’s.

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Ol. 91. 4.

Miletus revolteth.

year xx. A. C. 412.
Ol. 91. 4. League
between Tissaphernes
and the
Lacedæmonians.

“Whatsoever money or other profit redounded to the Athenians from their cities¹, the king and the Lacedæmonians are jointly to hinder, so as the Athenians may receive nothing from thence, neither money nor other thing.

“The king, and the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, are to make joint war against the Athenians. And without consent of both parts it shall not be lawful to lay down the war against the Athenians, neither for the king, nor for the Lacedæmonians and their confederates.

“If any shall revolt from the king, they shall be enemies to the Lacedæmonians and their confederates: and if any shall revolt from the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, they shall in like manner be enemies to the king.”

19. This was the league. Presently after this the Chians set out ten galleys more, and went to Anæa: both to hearken what became of the business at Miletus, and also to cause the cities thereabouts to revolt. But word being sent them from Chalcideus to go back, and that Amorges was at hand² with his army, they went thence to the temple of Jupiter. [Being there] they¹

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Ol. 91. 4.

Lebedos and Eræ
revolt.

descried sixteen galleys more, which had been sent out by the Athenians under the charge of Diomedon after the putting to sea of those with Thrasyclus: upon sight of whom they fled, one galley to Ephesus, the rest towards Teos. Four of them the Athenians took, but empty, the men having gotten on shore: the rest escaped into the city of Teos. And the Athenians went away again towards Samos. The Chians putting to sea again with the remainder of their fleet and with the land forces, caused first Lebedos to revolt, and then Eræ: and afterwards returned, both with their fleet and landmen, every one to his own.

20. About the same time, the twenty galleys of Peloponnesus, which the Athenians had formerly² chased into Peiræus, and against whom they now lay with a like number, suddenly forced their passage; and having the victory in fight, took four of the Athenian galleys; and going to Cenchreïæ, prepared afresh for their voyage to Chios and Ionia. At which time there came also unto them from Lacedæmon for commander, Astyochus; who was now admiral of the whole navy³. When the landmen were gone from Teos, Tissaphernes himself came thither with his forces; and he also demolished the wall as much as was left standing, and went his way again. Not long after the going away of him, came thither Diomedon with ten galleys of Athens. And having made a truce with the Teians, that he also might be received, he put to sea again, and kept the shore to Eræ, and assaulted it; but failing to take it, departed.

The Peloponnesians
in Peiræus escape.

Astyochus admiral of
the Peloponnesians.

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Ol. 91. 4.

Tissaphernes razeth
the remainder of the
Athenian wall at
Teos.

21. It fell out about the same time that the commons of Samos, together with the Athenians who were there with three galleys, made an insurrection against the great men; and slew of them in all about two hundred. And having banished four hundred more, and distributed amongst themselves their lands and houses, (the Athenians having now, as assured of their fidelity, decreed them their liberty), they administered

the affairs of the city from that time forward by themselves, no more communicating with the Geomori¹, nor permitting any of the common people to marry with them.

22. After this, the same summer, the Chians, as they had begun, persevering in their earnestness to bring the cities to revolt, even without the Lacedæmonians, [with their single forces], and desiring to make as many fellows of their danger as they were able, made war by themselves with thirteen galleys against Lesbos: which was according to what was concluded by the Lacedæmonians, namely, to go thither in the second place, and thence into the Hellespont. And withal the land forces, both of such Peloponnesians as were present and of their confederates thereabouts, went along by them to Clazomenæ and Cyme: these under the command of Eualas a Spartan, and the galleys, of Deiniades a man of the parts thereabouts¹. The galleys putting in at Methymna, caused that city to revolt first.²

year xx. A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1. The Chians endeavour to turn Lesbos from the Athenians to the Lacedæmonians with their single power: and cause first Methymna, then Mytilene to revolt.

23. Now Astyochus the Lacedæmonian admiral, having set forth as he intended from Cenchreïæ³, arrived at Chios. The third day after his coming thither, came Leon and Diomedon into Lesbos with twenty–five galleys of Athens: for Leon came with a supply of ten galleys more from Athens afterwards¹. Astyochus in the evening of the same day, taking with him one galley more of Chios, took his way toward Lesbos, to help it what he could: and put in at Pyrrha, and the next day at Eressos. Here he heard that Mytilene was taken by the Athenians, even with the shout of their voices. For the Athenians coming unexpected, entered the haven²: and having beaten the galleys of the Chians, disembarked and overcame those that made head against them, and won the city. When Astyochus heard this, both from the Eressians and from those Chian galleys that came from Methymna with Eubulus; which having been left there before, as soon as Mytilene was lost fled, and three of them chanced to meet with him, (for one was taken by the Athenians); he continued his course for Mytilene no longer: but having caused Eressos to revolt, and armed the soldiers he had aboard, made them to march toward Antissa and Methymna by land³, under the conduct of Eteonicus; and he himself with his own galleys and those three of Chios, rowed thither along the shore, hoping that the Methymnæans, upon sight of his forces, would take heart and continue in their revolt. But when in Lesbos all things went against him, he re–embarked his army and returned to Chios. And the landmen⁴ that were aboard, and should have gone into Hellespont, went again into their cities. After this came to them six galleys to Chios, of those of the confederate fleet at Cenchreïæ. The Athenians, when they had reestablished the state of Lesbos, went thence and took Polichna, which the Clazomenians had fortified in the continent; and brought them all back again into the city which is in the island, save only the authors of the revolt; for these got away to Daphnus. And Clazomenæ returned to the obedience of the Athenians.

year xx. A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

The Athenians recover Mytilene

Astyochus seeing he could do no good at Lesbos, returned to Chios.

year xx. A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

The Athenians recover Clazomenæ.

24. The same summer, those Athenians that with twenty galleys lay in the isle of Lada before Miletus, landing in the territory of Miletus at Panormus, slew Chalcideus the Lacedæmonian commander, that came out against them but with a few; and set up a trophy, and the third day after departed [1](#) . But the Milesians pulled down the trophy, as erected where the Athenians were not masters.

Chalcideus slain.

Leon and Diomedon, with the Athenian galleys that were at Lesbos, made war upon the Chians by sea from the isles called Cenusæ, which lie before Chios, and from Sidussa and Ptelem (forts they held in Erythræa), and from Lesbos [2](#) . They that were aboard were men of arms of the roll, compelled to serve in the fleet [3](#) . With these they landed at Cardamyle; and having overthrown the Chians that made head in a battle at Bolissus, and slain many of them, they recovered from the enemy all the places of that quarter. And again they overcame them in another battle at Phanæ, and in a third at Leuconium. After this, the Chians went out no more to fight: by which means the Athenians made spoil of their territory, excellently well furnished [1](#) . For except it were the Lacedæmonians, the Chians were the only men that I have heard of, that had joined advisedness to prosperity; and the more their city increased, had carried the more respect in the administration thereof to assure it. Nor ventured they now to revolt, (lest any man should think that, in this act at least, they regarded not what was the safest), till they had many and strong confederates with whose help to try their fortune; nor till such time as they perceived the people of Athens (as they themselves could not deny) to have their estate after the defeat in Sicily reduced to extreme weakness. And if through human misreckoning they miscarried in aught, they erred with many others: who in like manner had an opinion, that the state of the Athenians would quickly have been overthrown.

The Athenians make sharp war upon Chios.

year xx. A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

Praise of the Chians.

Being therefore shut up by sea, and having their lands spoiled, some within undertook to make the city return unto the Athenians. Which though the magistrates perceived, yet they themselves stirred not; but having received Astyochnus into the city with four galleys that were with him from Erythræ, they took advice together, how by taking hostages, or some other gentle way, to make them give over the conspiracy. Thus stood the business with the Chians.

25. In the end of this summer a thousand five hundred men of arms of Athens, and a thousand of Argos [1](#) , (for the Athenians had put armour upon five hundred light-armed of the Argives), and of other confederates a thousand more, with forty-eight galleys, reckoning those which were for transportation of soldiers, under the conduct of Phrynicus, Onomacles, and Scironides, came in [2](#) to Samos, and crossing over to Miletus encamped before it. And the Milesians issued forth with eight hundred men of arms of their own, besides the Peloponnesians that came with Chalcideus and some auxiliar strangers [3](#) with Tissaphernes (Tissaphernes himself being also there with his cavalry): and fought with the Athenians and their confederates. The Argives, who made one wing of themselves,

year xx. A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1. The Athenians fight with the Milesians, and begin to besiege the city.

year xx. A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

advancing before the rest and in some disorder, in contempt of the enemy, as being Ionians and not likely to sustain their charge, were by the Milesians overcome: and lost no less than three hundred of their men. But the Athenians, when they had first overthrown the Peloponnesians, and then beaten back the barbarians and other multitude, and not fought with the Milesians at all, (for they, after they were come from the chase of the Argives and saw their other wing defeated, went into the town), sat down with their arms, as being now masters of the field, close under the wall of the city. It fell out in this battle, that on both sides the Ionics had the better of the Dorics. For the Athenians overcame the opposite Peloponnesians; and the Milesians, the Argives. The Athenians, after they had erected their trophy, the place being an isthmus, prepared to take in the town with a wall: supposing if they got Miletus, the other cities would easily come in.

26. In the meantime it was told them about twilight, that the five and fifty galleys from Peloponnesus and Sicily were hard by, and only not already come. For [1](#) there came into Peloponnesus out of Sicily, by the instigation of Hermocrates to help to consummate the subversion of the Athenian state, twenty galleys of Syracuse and two of Selinus: and the galleys that had been preparing in Peloponnesus being then also ready, they were, both these and the other, committed to the charge of Theramenes, to be conducted by him to Astyochus the admiral: and they put in first at Eleus [2](#), an island over against Miletus. And being advertised there that the Athenians lay before the town, they went from thence into the gulf of Iasus, to learn how the affairs of the Milesians stood.

The Athenians rise from Miletus upon the coming of fifty-five galleys from Peloponnesus.

year xx. A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

year xx. A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

Alcibiades coming a horseback to Teichiussa of the territory of Miletus, in which part of the gulf the Peloponnesian galleys lay at anchor, they were informed by him of the battle: for Alcibiades was, with the Milesians and with Tissaphernes, present in it. And he exhorted them, unless they meant to lose what they had in Ionia and the whole business, to succour Miletus with all speed, and not to suffer it to be taken in with a wall. 27. According to this, they concluded to go the next morning and relieve it. Phrynichus, when he had certain word from Derus [1](#) of the arrival of those galleys, his colleagues advising to stay and fight it out with their fleet, said that he would neither do it himself, nor suffer them to do it, or any other, as long as he could hinder it. For seeing he might fight with them hereafter, when they should know against how many galleys of the enemy, and with what additions to their own [2](#), sufficiently and at leisure made ready, they might do it; he would never, he said, for fear of being upbraided with baseness, (for it was no baseness for the Athenians to let their navy give way upon occasion; but by what means soever it should fall out, it would be a great baseness to be beaten [3](#)), be swayed to hazard battle against reason, and not only to dishonour the state, but also to cast it into extreme danger; seeing that since their late losses it hath scarce been fit with their strongest preparation, willingly, no nor urged by precedent necessity, to undertake [4](#), how then without constraint to seek out voluntary dangers? Therefore he commanded them with all speed to take aboard those that were wounded, and their landmen and whatsoever utensils they brought with them; but to leave behind whatsoever they had taken in the territory of the enemy, to the end that their galleys might be the lighter: and to put off for Samos, and thence, when they had all their fleet together, to make out against the enemy as

occasion should be offered. As Phrynichus advised this, so he put it in execution: and was esteemed a wise man, not then only, but afterwards; nor in this only, but in whatsoever else he had the ordering of. Thus the Athenians presently in the evening, with their victory unperfect, dislodged from before Miletus. From Samos the Argives, in haste and in anger for their overthrow, went home.

28. The Peloponnesians setting forth betimes in the morning from Teichiussa, put in at Miletus¹; and stayed there one day. The next day they took with them those galleys of Chios, which had formerly been chased together with Chalceus; and meant to have returned to Teichiussa, to take aboard such necessaries² as they had left ashore. But as they were going, Tissaphernes came to them with his landmen, and persuaded them to set upon Iasus, where Amorges the king's enemy then lay. Whereupon they assaulted Iasus upon a sudden: and they within not thinking but they had been the fleet of the Athenians, took it. The greatest praise in this action was given to the Syracusians. Having taken Amorges, the bastard son of Pissuthnes, but a rebel to the king, the Peloponnesians delivered him to Tissaphernes, to carry him if he would to the king, as he had order to do. The city they pillaged; wherein, as being a place of ancient riches, the army got a very great quantity of money. The auxiliary soldiers of Amorges, they received without doing them hurt, into their own army; being for the most part Peloponnesians. The town itself they delivered to Tissaphernes, with all the prisoners, as well free as bond; upon composition with him, at a Daric stater¹ by the poll. And so they returned to Miletus. And from hence they sent Pedaritus the son of Leon, whom the Lacedæmonians had sent hither to be governor of Chios, to Erythræ; and with him, the bands that had aided Amorges by land; and made Philip governor there in Miletus. And so this summer ended.

The Peloponnesians and Tissaphernes take Iasus: wherein was Amorges, rebel to the king, whom they take prisoner.

year xx. A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

The end of the twentieth summer.

29. The next winter Tissaphernes, after he had put a garrison into Iasus, came to Miletus: and for one month's pay, which was promised on his part at Lacedæmon, he gave unto the soldiers through the whole fleet after an Attic drachma a man by the day. But for the rest of the time he would pay but three oboles, till he had asked the king's pleasure: and if the king commanded it, then he said he would pay them the full drachma. Nevertheless upon the contradiction of Hermocrates, general of the Syracusians, (for Theramenes was but slack in exacting pay, as not being general, but only to deliver the galleys that came with him to Astyochus), it was agreed that but for the five galleys that were over and above, they should have more than three oboles a man. For to fifty-five galleys he allowed three talents a month; and to as many as should be more than that number, after the same proportion¹.

year xx. A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

The Athenians send part of the fleet against Chios, and part against Miletus.

30. The same winter the Athenians that were at Samos, (for² there were now come in thirty–five galleys more from home, with Charminus, Strombichides, and Euctemon, their commanders), having gathered together their galleys, as well those that had been at Chios as all the rest, concluded, distributing to every one his charge by lot, to go lie before Miletus with a fleet; but against Chios, to send out both a fleet and an army of landmen. And they did so. For Strombichides, Onomacles, and Euctemon, with thirty galleys and part of those thousand³ men of arms that went to Miletus, which they carried along with them in vessels for transportation of soldiers, according to their lot went to Chios: and the rest remaining at Samos with seventy–four galleys, were masters of the sea, and went¹ to Miletus.

year xx. A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

31. Astyochus, who was now² in Chios requiring hostages in respect of the treason, after he heard of the fleet that was come with Theramenes, and that the articles of the league with Tissaphernes were mended³, gave over that business: and with ten galleys of Peloponnesus and ten of Chios, went thence and assaulted Pteleum; but not being able to take it, he kept by the shore to Clazomenæ. There he summoned those within to yield: with offer to such of them as favoured the Athenians, that they might go up and dwell at Daphnus. And Tamos the deputy lieutenant⁴ of Ionia, offered them the same. But they not hearkening thereunto, he made an assault upon the city, being unwallèd: but when he could not take it, he put to sea again, and with a mighty wind was himself carried to Phocæa and Cume; but the rest of the fleet put in at Marathusa, Pele, and Drimysa, islands that lie over against Clazomenæ. After they had stayed there eight days in regard of the winds, spoiling and destroying, and partly taking aboard whatsoever goods of the Clazomenians lay without, they went afterwards to Phocæa and Cume to Astyochus. 32. While Astyochus was there, the ambassadors of the Lesbians came unto him, desiring to revolt¹ from the Athenians. And as for him, they prevailed with him: but seeing the Corinthians and the other confederates were unwilling in respect of their former ill success there, he put to sea for Chios. Whither after a great tempest his galleys, some from one place and some from another, at length arrived all. After this, Pedaritus, who was now² at Erythræ, whither he was come from Miletus by land, came over with his forces into Chios. Besides those forces he brought over with him, he had the soldiers which were of the five galleys that came thither with Chalcideus and were left there, to the number of five hundred; and armour to arm them.

Astyochus goeth from Chios to Clazomenæ:

thence to Phocæa and Cume.

year xx. A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1. The Lesbians offer to turn to Astyochus.

Now some of the Lesbians having promised to revolt³, Astyochus communicated the matter with Pedaritus and the Chians, alleging how meet it would be to go with a fleet and make Lesbos to revolt; for that they should either get more confederates, or failing, they should at least weaken the Athenians. But they gave him no ear; and for the Chian galleys, Pedaritus told him [plainly] he should have none of them. 33. Whereupon Astyochus taking with him five galleys of Corinth, a sixth of Megara, one of Hermione, and those of Laconia which he brought with him, went towards Miletus to his charge: mightily threatening the Chians, in case they should need him, not to help them.

Astyochus and Pedaritus, the governor of Chios, disagree.

When he was come to Corycus in Erythræa, he stayed there. And the Athenians from Samos lay on the other side of the point, the one not knowing that the other was so near¹. Astyochus, upon a letter sent him from Pedaritus, signifying that there were come certain Erythrean captives dismissed from Samos with design to betray Erythræ, went presently back to Erythræ: so little he missed of falling into the hands of the Athenians. Pedaritus also went over to him; and having narrowly enquired touching these seeming traitors, and found that the whole matter was but a pretence which the men had used for their escape from Samos², they acquitted them, and departed one to Chios, the other, as he was going before, towards Miletus.

year xx. A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

34. In the meantime, the army of the Athenians being come about by sea from Corycus to Arginum, lighted on three long-boats of the Chians; which³ when they saw, they presently chased. But there arose a great tempest; and the long-boats of Chios with much ado recovered the harbour. But of the Athenian galleys, especially such as followed them furthest, there perished three, driven ashore at the city of Chios; and the men that were aboard them were part taken, and part slain. The rest of the fleet escaped into a haven called Phœnicus, under the hill Mimas: from whence they got afterwards to Lesbos, and there fortified¹.

The Athenian galleys tossed with tempest.

year xx. A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1. The Athenians take the galleys of the Peloponnesians, sent to waft in the ships of corn from Ægypt to Cnidus.

35. The same winter Hippocrates setting out from Peloponnesus with ten galleys of Thurium, commanded by Dorieus the son of Diogoras² with two others, and with one galley of Laconia and one of Syracuse, went to Cnidus. This city was now revolted from Tissaphernes³: and the Peloponnesians that lay at Miletus hearing of it, commanded that, the one half of their galleys remaining for the guard of Cnidus, the other half should go about Triopium, and help to bring in the ships which were to come from Ægypt⁴. This Triopium is a promontory of the territory of Cnidus, lying out in the sea and consecrated to Apollo. The Athenians, upon advertisement hereof, setting forth from Samos, took those galleys¹ that kept guard at Triopium: but the men that were in them escaped to land. After this they went to Cnidus, which they assaulted; and had almost taken, being without wall. And the next day they assaulted it again; but being less able to hurt it now than before, because they had fenced it better this night, and the men also were gotten into it that fled from their galleys under Triopium, they invaded² and wasted the Cnidian territory; and so went back to Samos.

year xx. A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1.

36. About the same time, Astyochus being come to the navy at Miletus, the Peloponnesians had³ plenty of all things for the army. For they had not only sufficient pay, but the soldiers also had store of money yet remaining of the pillage of Iasus. And the Milesians underwent the war with a good will. Nevertheless the former articles of the league made by Chalcideus with Tissaphernes seemed⁴ defective, and not so advantageous to them as to him. Whereupon they agreed to new ones, in the presence of Tissaphernes⁵, which were these:

They assault the city of Cnidus, but cannot win it.

37. “The agreement of the Lacedæmonians and their confederates with king Darius and his children⁶, and with Tissaphernes, for league and amity according to the articles following:

The second league between the Lacedæmonians and the king of Persia.

“Whatsoever territories and cities do belong unto king Darius, or were his father’s or his ancestors’, against these shall neither the Lacedæmonians¹ go to make war, nor any way to annoy them:

year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1.

neither shall the Lacedæmonians nor their confederates exact tribute of any of those cities. Neither shall king Darius, nor any under his dominion, make war upon or any way annoy the Lacedæmonians, or any of the Lacedæmonian confederates.

“If the Lacedæmonians or their confederates shall need anything of the king, or the king of the Lacedæmonians or of their confederates: what they shall persuade each other to do, that if they do it, shall be good.

“They shall both of them make war jointly against the Athenians and their confederates: and when they shall give over the war, they shall also do it jointly.

“Whatsoever army shall be in the king’s country, sent for by the king, the king shall defray.

“If any of the cities comprehended in the league made with the king, shall invade the king’s territories, the rest shall oppose them and defend the king to the utmost of their power. If any city of the king’s, or under his dominion, shall invade the Lacedæmonians or their confederates, the king shall make opposition and defend them to the utmost of his power.”

38. After this accord made, Theramenes delivered his galleys into the hands of Astyochus: and putting to sea in a light-horseman, is no more seen¹.

year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1. Theramenes goeth to sea in a light-horseman, and is cast away.

The Athenians that were now come with their army from Lesbos to Chios, and were masters of the field and of the sea, fortified Delphinium, a place both strong to the land-ward, and that had also a harbour² for shipping, and was not far from the city itself of Chios. And the Chians, as having been disheartened in divers former battles, and otherwise not only not mutually well affected, but jealous one of another; (for Tydeus³ and his accomplices had been put to death by Pedaritus for Atticism, and the rest of the city was kept in awe, but by force, and for a time); stirred not against them. And for the causes mentioned, not

The Chians in distress, send for aid to Astyochus.

Astyochus refuseth to aid them, and is complained of by Pedaritus his letters to the state.

conceiving themselves, neither with their own strength nor with the help of those that Pedaritus had with him, sufficient to give them battle, they sent to Miletus to require aid from Astyochus. Which when he denied them, Pedaritus sent letters to Lacedæmon complaining of the wrong. Thus proceeded the affairs of the Athenians at Chios. Also their fleet at Samos went often out against the fleet of the enemy at

Miletus: but when theirs would never come out of the harbour to encounter them, they returned to Samos and lay still.

39. The same winter, about the solstice, went out from Peloponnesus towards Ionia those twenty–seven galleys, which at the procurement of Calligeitus of Megara and Timagoras of Cyzicus were made ready by the Lacedæmonians for Pharnabazus. The commander of them was Antisthenes a Spartan: with whom the Lacedæmonians sent eleven Spartans more to be of council with Astyochus; whereof Lichas the son of Arcesilaus was one¹. These had commission, that when they should be arrived at Miletus, besides their general care to order everything to the best, they should send away these galleys, either the same or more or fewer, into the Hellespont to Pharnabazus, if they so thought fit; and to appoint Clearchus the son of Rhamphias, that went along in them, for commander: and that the same eleven, if they thought it meet, should put Astyochus from his charge, and ordain Antisthenes in his place: for they had him in suspicion for the letters of Pedaritus. These galleys holding their course from Malea through the main sea, and arriving at Melos, lighted on ten galleys of the Athenians: whereof three they took, but without the men, and fired them. After this, because they feared lest those Athenian galleys that escaped from Melos should give notice of their coming to those in Samos, (as also it fell out), they changed their course and went towards Crete: and having made their voyage the longer that it might be the safer, they put in at Caunus in Asia. Now from thence, as being in a place of safety, they sent a messenger to the fleet at Miletus for a convoy.

year xx. A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1. The galleys that were provided for Pharnabazus set forth toward Ionia.

Antisthenes and eleven other Spartans sent with absolute authority into Ionia.

They arrive at Caunus in Asia.

40. The Chians and Pedaritus about the same time, notwithstanding [their former repulse, and] that Astyochus was still backward, sent messengers to him, desiring him to come with his whole fleet to help them, being besieged: and not to suffer the greatest of their confederate cities in all Ionia to be thus shut up by sea and ravaged by land, as it was. For the Chians having many slaves¹, more than any one state except that of the Lacedæmonians, whom for their offences they the more ungently punished because of their number; many of them, as soon as the Athenians appeared to be settled in their fortifications, ran over presently to them; and were they, that knowing the territory so well, did it the greatest spoil. Therefore the Chians said he must help them, whilst there was hope and possibility to do it: Delphinium being still in fortifying and unfurnished², and greater fences being in making both about their camp and fleet. Astyochus, though he meant it not before, because he would have made good his threats, yet when he saw the confederates were willing, he was bent to have relieved them.

year xx. A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1. The Chians desire help of Astyochus.

year xx. A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 1.

Astyochus is diverted from helping the Chians, and goeth to waft in the twenty–seven galleys

41. But in the meantime came the messenger from the twenty–seven galleys, and from the Lacedæmonian counsellors, that were come to Caunus¹. Astyochus therefore esteeming the wafting in of these galleys, whereby they might the more freely command the sea, and the safe coming in of those Lacedæmonians, who were to look into his actions, a business that ought to be preferred above all other, presently gave over his journey for Chios, and went towards Caunus. As he went by the coast, he landed at Cos Meropidis², being unwall'd, and thrown down by an earthquake which had happened there, the greatest verily in man's memory; and rifled it, the inhabitants being fled into the mountains: and overrunning the country, made booty of all that came in his way, saving of freemen; and those he dismissed. From Cos he went by night to Cnidus: but found it necessary, by the advice of the Cnidians, not to land his men there, but to follow as he was after those twenty galleys of Athens, wherewith Charminus, one of the Athenian generals gone out from Samos, stood watching for those twenty–seven galleys that were come from Peloponnesus, the same that Astyochus himself was going to convoy in. For they at Samos had had intelligence from Miletus¹ of their coming: and Charminus was lying for them about Syme, Chalce, Rhodes, and the coast of Lycia: for by this time he knew that they were at Caunus. 42. Astyochus, therefore, desiring to outgo the report of his coming, went as he was to Syme; hoping to find those galleys out from the shore. But [a shower of] rain, together with the cloudiness of the sky, made his galleys to miss their course in the dark, and disordered them.

of Peloponnesus that lay at Caunus.

year xx. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

The next morning, the fleet being scattered, the left wing was manifestly descried by the Athenians, whilst the rest wandered yet about the island. And thereupon Charminus and the Athenians put forth against them with twenty galleys², supposing they had been the same galleys they were watching for from Caunus: and presently charging, sunk three of them and hurt others, and were superior in the fight, till such time as, contrary to their expectation, the greater part of the fleet came in sight, and enclosed them about. They then betook themselves to flight: and with the loss of six galleys the rest escaped into the island of Teuglussa, and from thence to Halicarnassus. After this the Peloponnesians putting in at Cnidus, and joining with those seven–and–twenty galleys that came from Caunus, went all together to Syme: and having there erected a trophy, returned again and lay at Cnidus.

A fight between the Peloponnesian and Athenian fleets: wherein the Athenians had the worse.

43. The Athenians, when they understood what had passed in this battle, went from Samos with their whole navy to Syme. But neither went they out against the navy in Cnidus, nor the navy there against them. Whereupon they took up the furniture of their galleys at Syme, and assaulted Loryma, a town in the continent; and so returned to Samos.

year xx. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

Tissaphernes and the Lacedæmonians disagree about the

The whole navy of the Peloponnesians being¹ at Cnidus, was [now] in repairing and refurnishing with such things as it wanted: and withal those eleven Lacedæmonians conferred with Tissaphernes (for he also was present) touching such things as they disliked in the articles before agreed on², and concerning the war, how it might be carried for the future in the best and most advantageous manner for them both. But Lichas was he that considered the business more nearly; and said, that neither the first league, nor yet the later by Theramenes, was made as it ought to have been: and that it would be a very hard condition, that whatsoever territories the king and his ancestors possessed before, he should possess the same now³; for so he might bring again into subjection all the islands, and the sea, and the Locrians, and all as far as Bœotia; and the Lacedæmonians, instead of restoring the Grecians into liberty, should put them into subjection to the rule of the Medes. Therefore he required other and better articles to be drawn, and not to stand to these: as for pay, in the new articles they would require none¹. But Tissaphernes chafing at this, went his way in choler: and nothing was done.

articles of their league.

year xx. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

44. The Peloponnesians solicited by messengers from the great men of Rhodes, resolved to go thither: because they hoped it would not prove impossible, with their number of seamen and army of land soldiers, to bring that island into their power²; and withal supposed themselves able, with their present confederates, to maintain their fleet without asking money any more of

Rhodes revolteth to the Peloponnesians.

year xx. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

Tissaphernes. Presently therefore, the same winter, they put forth from Cnidus: and arriving in the territory of Rhodes, at Cameirus, first frightened the commons out of it, that knew not of the business; and they fled³. Then the Lacedæmonians called together both these, and the Rhodians of the two cities Lindus and Iëlysus; and persuaded them to revolt from the Athenians. And Rhodes turned to the Peloponnesians. The Athenians at the same time, hearing of their design, put forth with their fleet from Samos, desiring to have arrived before them: and were seen in the main sea, too late, though not much⁴. For the present they went away to Chalce, and thence back to Samos; but afterwards they came forth with their galleys divers times, and made war against Rhodes, from Chalce, Cos, and Samos. Now the Peloponnesians did no more to the Rhodians, but levy money amongst them to the sum of thirty–two talents: and otherwise for fourscore days that they lay there, having their galleys hauled ashore, they meddled not¹.

A. C. 412.

Alcibiades flieth to Tissaphernes, and crosseth the business of the Peloponnesians.

He adviseth Tissaphernes to shorten their pay:

45. In this time, as also before the going of the Peloponnesians to Rhodes, came to pass the things that follow. Alcibiades, after the death of Chalcideus and battle at Miletus, being suspected by the Peloponnesians, and Astyochus having received letters from them from Lacedæmon to put him to death; (for he was an enemy to Agis, and also otherwise not well trusted): retired to Tissaphernes first, for fear; and afterwards to his power hindered² the affairs of the Peloponnesians. And being in everything his instructor, he not only cut shorter their pay, insomuch as from a drachma he brought it to three oboles, and those also not continually paid; advising Tissaphernes to tell them, how that the Athenians, men of a long continued skill in naval affairs, allowed but three oboles to their own, not so much for want of money, but lest the mariners, some of them growing insolent by superfluity, should disable their bodies by spending their money on such things as would weaken them, and others should quit the galleys with the arrear of their pay in their captains' hands for a pawn¹: but also gave counsel to Tissaphernes to give money to the captains of the galleys and to the generals of the several cities, save only those of Syracuse, to give way unto it. For Hermocrates [the general of the Syracusians] was the only man, that in the name of the whole league stood against it. And for the cities that came to require money, he would put them back himself, and answer them in Tissaphernes his name; and say, namely to the Chians, that they were impudent men, being the richest of the Grecian states and preserved by strangers, to expect nevertheless that others, for their liberty, should not only venture their persons, but maintain them with their purses: and to other states, that they did unjustly, having laid out their money before they revolted that they might serve the Athenians, not to bestow as much or more now upon themselves: and told them, that Tissaphernes, now he made war at his own charges, had reason to be sparing; but when money should come down from the king he would give them their full pay, and assist the cities as should be fit. 46. Moreover, he advised Tissaphernes not to be too hasty to make an end of the war, nor to fetch in the Phœnician fleet which was making ready, nor take more men² into pay, whereby to put the whole power both by sea and land into the hands of one: but to let the dominion remain divided into two, that the king, when one side troubled him, might set upon it with the other: whereas the dominion both by sea and land being in one, he will want by whom to pull down those that hold it, unless with great danger and cost he should come and try it out himself: but thus the danger would be less chargeable, he being but at a small part of the cost; and he should wear out the Grecians one against another, and himself in the meantime remain in safety¹. He said further, that the Athenians were fitter to partake dominion with him than the other; for that they were less ambitious of power by land; and that their speeches and actions tended more to the king's purpose²: for that they would join with him to subdue the Grecians, that is to say, for themselves as touching the dominion by sea, and for the king as touching the Grecians in the king's territories: whereas the Lacedæmonians, on the contrary, were come to set them free: and it was not likely but that they that were come to deliver the Grecians from the Grecians, will, if they overcome the Athenians, deliver

year xx. A. C. 412.
Ol. 92. 1. and to
corrupt the captains.

The integrity of
Hermocrates.

Alcibiades answereth
in Tissaphernes' name
to the cities that call
upon him for money,
and puts them off.

He counselleth
Tissaphernes to
prolong the war, and
afflict both sides.

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Ol. 92. 1.

He adviseth him, of
the two, to favour the
Athenians the rather,
as fitter to help
subdue the Grecians.

them also from the barbarians. He gave counsel therefore, first to wear them out both; and then, when he had clipped, as near as he could, the wings of the Athenians, to dismiss the Peloponnesians out of his country.

And Tissaphernes had a purpose to do accordingly; as far as by his actions can be conjectured. For hereupon he gave himself to believe Alcibiades, as his best counsellor in these affairs: and neither paid the Peloponnesians their wages, nor would suffer them to fight by sea: but pretending the coming of the Phœnician fleet, whereby they might afterwards fight with odds¹, he overthrew their proceedings, and abated the vigour of their navy, before very puissant; and was in all things else more backward than he could possibly dissemble.

Tissaphernes, guided by the counsel of Alci-

year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1. biades, hindereth the success of the Peloponnesians.

47. Now Alcibiades advised the king and Tissaphernes to this, whilst he was with them, partly because he thought the same to be indeed the best course; but partly also, to make way for his own return into his country: knowing that if he destroyed it not, the time would one day come that he might persuade the Athenians to recall him. And the best way to persuade them to it, he thought, was this: to make it appear unto them that he was powerful with Tissaphernes. Which also came to pass. For after the Athenian soldiers at Samos saw what power he had with him, the captains of galleys and principal men there²: partly upon Alcibiades his own motion, who had sent to the greatest amongst them, that they should remember him to the best sort, and say that he desired to come home, so the government might be in the hands of a few, not of evil persons nor yet of the multitude that cast him out³; and that he would bring Tissaphernes to be their friend, [and to war on their side]: but chiefly of their own accords, had their minds inclined to the deposing of the popular government.

Alcibiades aimeth at his return to Athens by making show of his power with Tissaphernes.

Motion made for the recalling of Alcibiades, and deposing of the people.

year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1.

48. This business was set on foot first in the camp; and from thence proceeded afterwards into the city. And certain persons went over to Alcibiades out of Samos, and had conference with him. And when he had undertaken to bring to their friendship first Tissaphernes, and then the king, in case the government were taken from the people: for then, he said, the king might the better rely upon them: they that were of most power in the city, who also were the most toiled out¹, entered into great hope both to have the ordering of the state at home themselves, and victory also over the enemy. And when they came back to Samos, they drew all such as were for their purpose into an oath of conspiracy with themselves: and to the multitude gave it out openly, that if Alcibiades might be recalled and the people put from the government, the king would turn their friend and furnish them with money.

Conspiracy in the army at Samos against the democracy of Athens.

year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1. Phrynichus

Though the multitude were grieved with this proceeding for the present, yet for the great hope they had of the king's pay they stirred not. But they that were setting up the oligarchy, when they had communicated thus much to the multitude, fell to consideration, anew and with more of their complices, of the things spoken by Alcibiades. And the rest thought the matter easy, and worthy to be believed: but Phrynichus, who yet was general of the army, liked it not; but thought, as the truth was, that Alcibiades cared no more for the oligarchy than the democracy, nor had any other aim in it, but only by altering the government that then was to be called home by his associates: and said, "they were especially to look to this, that they did not mutiny for the king¹, who could not very easily be induced (the Peloponnesians being now as much masters at sea as themselves, and having no small cities within his dominions) to join with the Athenians, whom he trusted not; and to trouble himself, when he might have the friendship of the Peloponnesians, that never did him hurt: as for the confederate cities to whom they promise oligarchy, in that they themselves do put down the democracy," he said, "he knew full well, that neither those which were already revolted would the sooner return to, nor those that remained be ever the more confirmed in their obedience thereby: for they would never be so willing to be in subjection either to *the few* or to *the people*, as they would be to have their liberty, which side soever it were that should give it them: but would think, that even those which are termed *the good men*², if they had the government, would give them as much to do as the people, being contrivers and authors to the people of doing those mischiefs against them, out of which they make most profit unto themselves: and that if *the few* had the rule, then they should be put to death unheard, and more violently than by the former; whereas the people is their refuge, and moderator of the others' insolence. This," he said, "he was certain that the cities thought; in that they had learned the same by the actions themselves: and that therefore what was yet propounded by Alcibiades, he by no means approved¹." 49. But those of the conspiracy there assembled, not only approved the present proposition, but also made preparation to send Pisander² and others ambassadors to Athens: to negotiate concerning the reduction of Alcibiades, the dissolution of the democracy, and the procuring unto the Athenians the friendship of Tissaphernes.

is against the recalling of Alcibiades.

year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1.

The treason of Phrynichus against the state, for fear of Alcibiades.

He writes secret letters to Astyochus.

year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1. Astyochus appeareth him to Alcibiades.

Phrynichus sends to Astyochus again, and offers to put the

50. Now Phrynichus knowing that an overture was to be made at Athens for the restoring of Alcibiades, and that the Athenians would embrace it; and fearing lest being recalled he should do him a mischief (in regard he had spoken against it) as one that would have hindered the same: betook himself to this course. He sends secret letters to Astyochus, the Lacedæmonian general, who was yet³ about Miletus, and advertised him that Alcibiades undid their affairs, and was procuring the friendship of Tissaphernes for the Athenians: writing in plain terms the whole business, and desiring to be excused if he rendered evil to his enemy with some disadvantage to his country. Astyochus had before this laid by the purpose of revenge against Alcibiades, especially when he was not in his own hands¹. And going to him to Magnesia and to Tissaphernes, related unto them what advertisement he had received from Samos, and made himself the appeacher. For he adhered, as was said, to Tissaphernes for his private lucre, both in this and in divers other matters: which was also the cause that concerning the pay, when the abatement was made, he was not so stout in opposing it as he ought to have been. Hereupon Alcibiades sendeth letters presently to those that were in office at Samos, accusing Phrynichus of what he had done, and requiring to have him put to death. Phrynichus perplexed with this discovery, and brought into danger indeed, sends again to Astyochus, blaming what was past as not well concealed: and promised now to be ready to deliver unto him the whole army at Samos to be destroyed: writing from point to point, (Samos being unwall'd), in what manner he would do it; and saying, that since his life was brought in danger, they could not blame him though he did this or any other thing, rather than be destroyed by his most deadly enemies. This also Astyochus revealed unto Alcibiades. 51. But Phrynichus having had notice betimes how he abused him, and that letters of this from Alcibiades were in a manner come², he anticipates the news himself: and tells the army, that whereas Samos was unwall'd and the galleys rid not all within, the enemy meant to come and assault the harbour¹: that he had sure intelligence hereof, and that they ought therefore with all speed to raise a wall about the city, and to put garrisons into other places thereabouts². Now Phrynichus was general himself, and it was in his own power to see it done. They then fell to walling; whereby Samos (which they meant to have done howsoever) was so much the sooner wall'd in. Not long after came letters from Alcibiades, that the army was betrayed by Phrynichus, and that the enemy purpos'd to invade the harbour where they lay³. But now they thought not Alcibiades worthy to be believed, but rather that having foreseen the design of the enemy, he went about, out of malice, to fasten it upon Phrynichus as conscious of it likewise. So that he did him no hurt by telling it, but bare witness rather of that which Phrynichus had told them of before.

whole army into his hands.

The device of Phrynichus to avoid the danger.

year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1.

52. After this Alcibiades endeavoured to incline and persuade Tissaphernes to the friendship of the Athenians. For though Tissaphernes feared the Peloponnesians, because their fleet was greater than that of the Athenians; yet if he had been able⁴, he had a good will to have been persuaded by him; especially in his anger against the Peloponnesians, after the dissension at Cnidus, about the league made by Theramenes; (for they were already fallen out, the Peloponnesians being about this time in Rhodes). Wherein that which

Alcibiades endeavoureth to turn Tissaphernes to the part of the Athenians.

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had been before spoken by Alcibiades, how that the coming of the Lacedæmonians was to restore all the cities to their liberty, was now verified by Lichas; in that he said, it was an article not to be suffered, that the king should hold those cities which he and his ancestors then or before had holden. Alcibiades therefore, as one that laboured for no trifle, with all his might applied himself to Tissaphernes.

53. The Athenian ambassadors sent from Samos with Pisander, being arrived at Athens, were making their propositions to the people: and related unto them summarily the points of their business, and principally this; “that if they would call home Alcibiades, and not suffer the government to remain in the hands of the people in such manner as it did, they might have the king for their confederate, and get the victory of the Peloponnesians”.

Pisander getteth the Athenians to be content with the oligarchy, and to give him and others commission to treat with Alcibiades.

Now when many opposed that point touching the democracy; and the enemies of Alcibiades clamoured withal, that it would be a horrible thing he should return by forcing the government¹,

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when the Eumolpidæ and Ceryces² bare witness against him concerning the mysteries for which he fled, and prohibited his return under their curse: Pisander, at this great opposition and querimony, stood out, and going amongst them took out one by one those that were against it, and asked them; “whether, now that the Peloponnesians had as many galleys at sea to oppose them as they themselves had, and confederate cities more than

Phrynichus accused by Pisan—

year xx. A. C. 412. Ol. 92. 1. der, and discharged of his command.

they, and were furnished with money by the king and Tissaphernes, the Athenians being without, they had any other hope to save their state but by persuading the king to come about to their side”. And they that were asked having nothing to answer, then in plain terms he said unto them: “This you cannot now obtain, except we administer the state with more moderation, and bring the power into the hands of a few, that the king may rely upon us. And we¹ deliberate at this time, not so much about the form, as about the preservation of the state; for if you mislike the form², you may change it again hereafter. And let us recall Alcibiades, who is the only man that can bring this to pass.” The people hearing of the oligarchy, took it very heinously at first: but when Pisander had proved evidently, that there was no other way of safety, in the end, partly for fear and partly because they hoped again to change the government, they yielded thereunto. So they ordered, that Pisander and ten others should go and treat both with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades, as to them should seem best. Withal, upon the accusation of Pisander against Phrynichus, they discharged both Phrynichus and Scironides, his fellow-commissioner, of their command: and made Diomedon and Leon generals of the fleet in their places. Now the cause why Pisander accused Phrynichus, and said he had betrayed Iasus and Amorges, was only this: he thought him a man unfit for the business now in hand with Alcibiades.

Pisander, after he had gone about to all those combinations¹, (which were in the city before, for obtaining of places of judicature and of command), exhorting them to stand together and advise about deposing the democracy; and when he had dispatched the rest of his business, so as there should be no more cause for him to stay there²: took sea with those other ten to go to Tissaphernes.

55. Leon and Diomedon arriving the same winter at the Athenian fleet, made a voyage against Rhodes; and finding there the Peloponnesian galleys drawn up to land, disembarked and overcame in battle such of the Rhodians as made head; and then put to sea again and went to Chalce. After this they made sharper war upon them from Cos³. For from thence they could better observe the Peloponnesian navy when it should put off from the land.

A. C. 411. Leon and Diomedon war upon the Peloponnesian navy at Rhodes.

In this while there arrived at Rhodes Xenophontidas, a Laconian, sent out of Chios from Pedaritus, to advertise them that the fortification of the Athenians there was now finished: and that unless they came and relieved them with their whole fleet, the state of Chios must utterly be lost. And it was resolved to relieve them. But Pedaritus in the meantime, with the whole power both of his own auxiliary forces and of the Chians, made an assault upon the fortification which the Athenians had made about their navy: part whereof he won, and had gotten some galleys that were drawn a-land. But the Athenians issuing out upon them, first put to flight the Chians, and then overcame also the rest of the army about Pedaritus: and slew Pedaritus himself, and took many of the Chians prisoners and much armour¹. 56. After this the Chians were besieged both by sea and land more narrowly: and great famine was in the city.

year xx. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. Chios distressed, and Pedaritus the captain slain.

Pisander, and the other Athenian ambassadors that went with him, when they came to Tissaphernes, began to confer about the agreement. But Alcibiades (for he was not sure of Tissaphernes, because he stood in fear too much of the Peloponnesians, and had a purpose besides, as Alcibiades himself had taught him, to weaken both sides [yet more]), betook himself to this shift: that Tissaphernes should break off the treaty by making to the Athenians exorbitant demands. And it seemed that Tissaphernes and he aimed at the same thing¹: Tissaphernes for fear; and Alcibiades, for that when he saw Tissaphernes not desirous to agree, [though the offers were never so great], he was unwilling to have the Athenians think he could not persuade him to it, but rather that he was already persuaded and willing, and that the Athenians came not to him with sufficient offers. For Alcibiades being the man that spake for Tissaphernes, though he were also present, made unto them such excessive demands, that though the Athenians should have yielded to the greatest part of them, yet it must have been attributed to them that the treaty went not on². For they demanded, first, that all Ionia should be rendered: then again, the adjacent islands and other things: which the Athenians stood not against. In fine, at the third meeting, when he feared now plainly to be found unable to make good his word, he required, that they should suffer the king to build a navy, and sail up and down by their coast³ wheresoever and with what number soever of galleys he himself should think good. Upon this the Athenians would treat no longer, esteeming the conditions intolerable and that Alcibiades had abused them, and so went away in a chafe to Samos.

Alcibiades unable to make good his word, about bringing Tissaphernes to the Athenians' side, demands excessive conditions, to make the breach ap-

year xx. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. pear to proceed from the Athenians, and to save his own credit.

year xx. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

57. Presently after this, the same winter, Tissaphernes went to Caunus, with intent both to bring the Peloponnesians back to Miletus, and also, (as soon as he should have agreed unto new articles, such as he could get), to give the fleet their pay; and not to fall directly out with them: for fear lest so many galleys wanting maintenance, should either be forced by the Athenians to fight and so be overcome, or, emptied of men, the business might succeed with the Athenians according to their own desire without him. Besides he was afraid¹, lest looking for maintenance they should make spoil in the continent. In consideration and foresight of all which things, he desired to counterpoise the Grecians². And sending for the Peloponnesians, he gave them their pay; and now made the third league, as followeth:

Tissaphernes
hearkeneth again to
the Peloponnesians.

58. “In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, Alexippidas being ephor in Lacedæmon, agreement was made in the plain of Mæander, between the Lacedæmonians and their confederates on one part, and Tissaphernes and Hieramenes¹ and the sons of Pharnaces on the other part, concerning the affairs of the king, and of the Lacedæmonians and their confederates.

The third league
between Tissa-

year xx. A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 1. phernes and
the Peloponnesians.

“That whatsoever country in Asia belongeth to the king, shall be the king’s still²: and that concerning his own countries, it shall be lawful for the king to do whatsoever he shall think meet.

“That the Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall not invade any the territories of the king to harm them; nor the king, the territories of the Lacedæmonians or their confederates.

“If any of the Lacedæmonians or their confederates shall invade the king’s country to do it hurt, the Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall oppose it: and if any of the king’s country shall invade the Lacedæmonians or their confederates to do them hurt, the king shall oppose it.

“That Tissaphernes shall, according to the rates agreed on³, maintain the present fleet till the king’s fleet arrive.

“That when the king’s navy shall be come, the Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall maintain their own navy themselves, if they please: or if they will have Tissaphernes to maintain it, he shall do it; and that the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, at the end of the war, repay Tissaphernes whatsoever money they shall have received of him¹.

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Ol. 92. 1.

“When the king’s galleys shall be arrived, both they and the galleys of the Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall make the war jointly, according as to Tissaphernes and the Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall seem good: and if they will give over the war against the Athenians, they shall give it over in the same manner.”

59. Such were the articles. After this Tissaphernes prepared for the fetching in of the Phœnician fleet, according to the agreement, and to do whatsoever else he had undertaken: desiring to have it seen, at least, that he went about it.

60. In the end of this winter, the Bœotians took Oropus by treason. It had in it a garrison of Athenians². They that plotted it, were certain Eretrians and some of Oropus itself; who were then contriving the revolt of Eubœa. For the place being built to keep Eretria in subjection³, it was impossible, as long as the Athenians held it, but that it would much annoy both Eretria and the rest of Eubœa. Having⁴ Oropus in their hands already, they came to Rhodes to call the Peloponnesians into Eubœa. But the Peloponnesians had a greater inclination to relieve Chios now distressed: and putting to sea, departed out of Rhodes with their whole fleet. When they were come about Triopium, they descried the Athenian fleet in the main sea going from Chalce. And neither side assaulting other, they put in, the one fleet at Samos, the other at Miletus: for the Peloponnesians saw they could not pass to relieve Chios without a battle. Thus ended this winter; and the twentieth year of this war written by Thucydides.

Oropus taken by treason.

year xx. A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 1.

61. The next summer, in the beginning of the spring, Dercylidas a Spartan was sent by land into Hellespont with a small army, to work the revolt of Abydos, a colony of the Milesians. And the Chians at the same time, whilst Astyochnus was at a stand how to help them, were compelled by the pressure of the siege to hazard a battle by sea. Now whilst Astyochnus lay at Rhodes, they had received into the city of Chios, after the death of Pedaritus, one Leon a Spartan, that came along with Antisthenes as a private soldier¹: and with him twelve galleys that lay at the guard of Miletus, whereof five were Thurians, four Syracusians, one of Anœa, one of Miletus, and one of Leon's own. Whereupon the Chians issuing forth with the whole force of the city, seized a certain place of strength: and¹ put forth thirty-six galleys against thirty-two of the Athenians, and fought. After a sharp fight, wherein the Chians and their associates had not the worst, and when it began to be dark, they retired again into the city.

year xxi.

The Chians fight against the Athenians that besieged them.

year xxi. A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 1.

62. Presently after this, Dercylidas being arrived now in Hellespont from Miletus by land, Abydos revolted to him and to Pharnabazus: and two days after revolted Lampsacus.

Strombichides having intelligence of this, made haste thither from Chios with four-and-twenty sail of Athenians: those being also of that number which transported his men of arms. And when he had overcome the Lampsacenes that came out against him, and taken Lampsacus, being an open town, at the first shout of their voices, and made prize of all the goods they found and of the slaves, he placed the freemen there again: and went against Abydos. But when that city neither yielded nor could be taken by assault, he crossed over from Abydos to the opposite shore: and in Sestos, a city of Chersonesus, possessed heretofore by the Medes², he placed a garrison for the custody of the whole Hellespont.

Abydos and Lampsacus revolt.

Strombichides recovereth Lampsacus.

63. In the meantime not only the Chians had the sea at more command, but Astyochus also and the army at Miletus, having been advertised of what passed in the fight by sea, and that Strombichides and those galleys with him were gone away, took heart. And Astyochus going to Chios with two galleys, fetched away the galleys that were there¹ : and with the whole fleet now together went against Samos. But seeing they of Samos, by reason of their jealousy one towards another, came not against him, he went back again to Miletus. For it was about this time that the democracy was put down at Athens² .

year xxi. A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 1.

For after that Pisander and his fellow-ambassadors that had been with Tissaphernes, were come to Samos, they both assured their affairs yet better in the army, and also provoked the principal men of the Samians to attempt with them the erecting of the oligarchy; though there were then an insurrection amongst them against the oligarchy. And withal the Athenians at Samos, in a conference amongst themselves, deliberated how, since Alcibiades would not, to let him alone; for indeed they thought him no fit man to come into an oligarchy: but for themselves, seeing they were already engaged in the danger, to take care both to keep the business from a relapse, and withal to sustain the war, and to contribute money and whatsoever else was needful with alacrity, out of their private estates; and no more to toil for other than themselves³ . 64. Having thus advised, they sent Pisander with half the ambassadors presently home, to follow the business there; with command to set up the oligarchy in all the cities they were to touch at by the way: the other half they sent about¹ , some to one part [of the state] and some to another. And they sent away Diotrophes to his charge, who was now about Chios, chosen to go governor of the cities upon Thrace.

The democracy at Athens put down by Pisander and his fellows.

The authors of the oligarchy resolve to leave out Alcibiades, and to govern the state with their private means for themselves.

year xxi. A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 1.

He, when he came to Thasos, deposed the people. And within two months at most after he was gone, the Thasians fortified their city: as needing no longer an aristocracy with the Athenians² , but expecting liberty every day by the help of the Lacedæmonians. For there were also certain of them with the Peloponnesians, driven out by the Athenians: and these³ practised with such in the city as were for their purpose, to receive galleys into it and to cause it to revolt. So that it fell out for them just as they would have it: that that estate of theirs⁴ was set up without their danger, and that the people was deposed that would have withstood it. Insomuch as at Thasos it fell out contrary to what those Athenians thought, which erected the oligarchy: and so, in my opinion, it did in many other places of their dominion. For the cities now grown wise⁵ , and withal resolute in their proceedings, sought a direct liberty; and preferred not before it that outside of a well-ordered government, introduced by the Athenians.

The Athenians having set up the oligarchy in Thasos, it presently revolteth from them.

year xxi. A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 1. The proceeding of

65. They with Pisander, according to the order given them, entering into the cities as they went by, dissolved the democracies: and having in some places obtained also an aid of men of arms, they came to Athens: and found the business, for the greatest part, dispatched to their hands by their accomplices before their coming. For certain young men combining themselves, had not only murdered Androcles privily, a principal patron of the popular government, and one that had his hand the farthest in the banishment of Alcibiades: (whom they slew for two causes; for the sway he bare amongst the people; and to gratify Alcibiades, who they thought would return and get them the friendship of Tissaphernes): but had also made away divers men unfit for their design in the same manner. They had withal an oration ready made, which they delivered in public, wherein they said, that there ought none to receive wages but such as served in the wars¹, nor to participate of the government more than five thousand; and those, such as by their purses and persons were best able to serve the commonwealth. 66. And this with the most carried a good shew: because they that would set forward the alteration of the state, were to have the managing of the same¹. Yet the *people* and the *Council of the Bean* met still; but debated nothing, save what the conspirators thought fit: nay, all that spake were of that number, and had considered before what they were to say². Nor would any of the rest speak against them, for fear, because they saw the combination was great: and if any man did, he was quickly made away by one convenient means or other; and no inquiry made after the deed-doers, nor justice prosecuted against any that was suspected. But the people were so quiet and so afraid, that every man thought it gain to escape violence, though he said never a word. Their hearts failed them, because they thought the conspirators more indeed than they were: and to learn their number, in respect of the greatness of the city and for that they knew not one another, they were unable³. For the same cause also was it impossible for any man that was angry at it, to bemoan himself, whereby to be revenged on them that conspired⁴: for he must have told his mind, either to one he knew not, or to one he knew and trusted not. For the *populars* approached each other, every one with jealousy, as if they thought him of the plot. For indeed there were such amongst them, as no man would have thought would ever have turned to the oligarchy: and those were they that caused¹ in *the many* that diffidence; and by strengthening the jealousy of the populars one against another, conferred most to the security of *the few*.

Pisander in setting up the oligarchy.

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67. During this opportunity, Pisander and they that were with him, coming in fell in hand presently with the remainder of the business. And first they assembled the people, and delivered their opinion, for ten men to be chosen with power absolute to make a draught of laws; and having drawn them, to deliver their opinion at a day appointed before the people, touching the best form of government for the city. Afterwards, when that day came, they summoned the assembly to Colonus²: which is a place consecrated to Neptune without the city, about two furlongs off. And they that were appointed to write the laws, presented this, and only this: *That it should be lawful for any Athenian to deliver whatsoever opinion he pleased*; imposing of great punishments upon whosoever should either accuse any that so spake of violating the laws³, or otherwise do him hurt. Now here indeed it was in plain terms propounded,

year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. The form of the new oligarchy.

“that not any magistracy of the form before used, might any longer be in force, nor any fee belong unto it: but that five Prytanes might be elected, and these five choose a hundred, and every one of this hundred take unto him three others: and these four hundred entering into the council–house, might have absolute authority to govern the state as they thought best, and to summon the five thousand as oft as to them it should seem good”.

68. He that delivered this opinion was Pisander: who was also otherwise openly the forwardest to put down the democracy. But he that contrived the whole business, how to bring it to this pass, and had long thought upon it, was Antiphon: a man for virtue not inferior to any Athenian of his time, and the ablest of any man both to devise well, and also to express well what he had devised: and though he came not into the assemblies of the people, nor willingly to any other debatings, because the multitude had him in jealousy for the opinion they had of the power of his eloquence; yet when any man that had occasion of suit, either in the courts of justice or in the assembly of the people, came to him for his counsel, this one man was able to help him most. The same man, when afterwards the government of the four hundred went down and was vexed of the people, was heard plead for himself, when his life was in question for that business¹, the best of any man to this day. Phrynichus also shewed himself an earnest man for the oligarchy, and that more earnestly than any other; because he feared Alcibiades, and knew him to be acquainted with all his practices at Samos with Astyochus; and thought in all probability, that he would never return to live under the government of *the few*. And this man, in any matter of weight, appeared the most sufficient to be relied on¹. Also Theramenes the son of Agnon, an able man both for elocution and understanding, was another of the principal of those that overthrew the democracy.

Pisander a principal man of the oligarchs.

Antiphon another setter up of the few.

The praise of Antiphon.

Phrynichus an–

year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. other author of the oligarchy.

So that it is no marvel if the business took effect, being by many and wise men conducted, though it were a hard one. For it went sore with the Athenian people, almost a hundred years after the expulsion of the tyrants, to be now deprived of their liberty: having not only not been subject to any, but also for the half of this time been inured to dominion over others.

69. When the assembly, after it had passed these things no man contradicting, was dissolved; then afterwards they brought the four hundred into the council–house in this manner. The Athenians were evermore partly on the walls, and partly at their arms in the camp, in regard of the enemy that lay at Deceleia¹. Therefore on the day appointed, they suffered such as knew not their intent, to go forth as they were wont. But to such as were of the conspiracy, they quietly gave order not to go to the camp itself², but to lag behind at a certain distance: and if any man should oppose what was in doing, to take arms and keep them back. They to whom this charge was given, were [the] Andrians, Tenians, three hundred Carystians, and such of the colony of Ægina which the

The Four Hundred enter upon the senate and dismiss the senate of five hundred called.

year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. the Council of the Bean.

year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

Athenians had sent thither to inhabit³, as came on purpose to this action with their own arms. These things thus ordered, the four hundred, with every man a secret dagger, accompanied with one hundred and twenty young men of Greece⁴, whom they used for occasions of shedding of blood, came in upon the Counsellors of the Bean, as they sat in the councilhouse, and commanded them to take their salary and be gone: which also they brought ready with them, for the whole time they were behind⁵, and paid it to them as they went out. 70. And the rest of the citizens mutinied not, but rested quiet¹.

The four hundred being now entered into the council-house, created Prytanies amongst themselves by lot, and made their prayers and sacrifices to the gods, all that were before usual at the entrance upon the government. And afterwards receding far from that course which in the administration of the state was used by the people, saving that for Alcibiades his sake they recalled not the outlaws, in other things they governed the commonwealth imperiously: and not only slew some, though not many, such as they thought fit to be made away, and imprisoned some, and confined others to places abroad; but also sent heralds to Agis, king of the Lacedæmonians, who was then at Deceleia, signifying that they would come to composition with him; and that now he might better treat with them, than he might before with the unconstant people. 71. But he, not imagining that the city was yet in quiet nor willing so soon to deliver up their ancient liberty, but rather that if they saw him approach with great forces they would be in tumult, not yet believing fully but that some stir or other would arise amongst them, gave no answer at all to those that came from the four hundred, touching the composition: but having sent for new and great forces out of Peloponnesus, came down himself not long after, both with the army at Deceleia and those new comers, to the Athenian walls: hoping that they would fall into his hands according to his desire, at least the more easily for their confusion, or perhaps at the very first shout of their voices, in respect of the tumult that in all likelihood was to happen both within and without the city. For, as for the long walls, in regard of the few defendants likely to be found upon them, he thought he could not fail to take them¹. But when he came near, and the Athenians were without any the least alteration within; and had with their horsemen which they sent out, and a part of their men of arms and of their light-armed and of their archers, overthrown some of his men that approached too near, and gotten some arms and bodies of the slain: rectified thus, he withdrew his army again. And himself, and such as were with him before, stayed in their places at Deceleia; but as for those that came last, after they had stayed awhile in the country, he sent them home again. After this the four hundred, notwithstanding their former repulse, sent ambassadors unto Agis anew: and he now receiving them better, by his advice they sent ambassadors also to Lacedæmon about an agreement, being desirous of peace.

Agis, in hope that the city was in sedition, cometh to assault it, but is repulsed.

year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

The Four Hundred send to Lacedæmon to procure a peace.

They sent to Samos, to excuse their doings to the army.

72. They likewise sent ten men to Samos, to satisfy the army: and to tell them, “that the oligarchy was not set up to any prejudice of the city or citizens, but for the safety of the whole state: and that they which had their hands in it were five thousand, and not four hundred only¹; notwithstanding that the Athenians, by reason of warfare and employment abroad, never assembled, of how great consequence soever was the matter to be handled, so frequent as to be five thousand there at once”². And having in other things instructed them how to make the best of the matter, they sent them away immediately after the government was changed: fearing, as also it fell out, lest the seafaring multitude would not only not continue in this oligarchical form themselves, but the mischief beginning there would depose them also.

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73. For in Samos there was a commotion about the oligarchy already: and this that followeth, happened about the same time that the four hundred were set up in Athens. Those Samians that had risen³ against the nobility, and were of the people’s side, turning when Pisander came thither, at the persuasion of him and of those Athenians in Samos that were his accomplices, conspired together to the number of three hundred, and were to have assaulted the rest as populars. And one Hyperbolus, a lewd fellow¹, who, not for any fear of his power or for any dignity, but for wickedness of life and dishonour he did the city, had been banished by ostracism, they slew: abetted therein both by Charminus, one of the commanders, and by other Athenians that were amongst them, who had given them their faith. And together with these, they committed other facts of the same kind: and were fully bent to have assaulted the popular side. But they having gotten notice thereof, made known the design both to the generals, Leon and Diomedon; (for these being honoured by the people, endured the oligarchy unwillingly); and also to Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, whereof one was captain of a galley, and the other captain of a band of men of arms², and to such others continually as they thought stood³ in greatest opposition to the conspirators: and required of them that they would not see them destroyed, and Samos alienated from the Athenians, by the only means of which their dominion had till this time kept itself in the state it is in. They hearing it, went to the soldiers, and exhorted them one by one not to suffer it; especially to the Paralians, who were all Athenians and freemen, come thither in the galley called Paralus, and had always before been enemies to the oligarchy¹. And Leon and Diomedon, whensoever they went forth any whither, left them certain galleys for their guard: so that when the three hundred assaulted them, the commons of the Samians, with the help of all these, and especially of the Paralians, had the upperhand: and of the three hundred slew thirty. Three of the chief authors they banished: and burying in oblivion the fault of the rest, governed the state from that time forward as a democracy.

The oligarchy assaulted at Samos by the populars.

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year xxi. A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 1.

The army sent to Athens to signify their doings against the oligarchy at Samos: not knowing that the

74. The Paralus, and in it Chæreas the son of Archestratus, a man of Athens, one that had been forward in the making of this change, the Samians and the soldiers dispatched presently away to Athens, to advertise them of what was done: for they knew not yet, that the government was in the hands of the four hundred. When they arrived, the four hundred cast some two or three of these of the Paralus into prison: the rest, after they had taken the galley from them and put them aboard another military galley, they commanded to keep guard about Eubœa. But Chæreas, by some means or other getting presently away, seeing how things went, came back to Samos; and related to the army all that the Athenians had done, aggravating it to the utmost: as that they punished every man with stripes, to the end that none should contradict the doings of those that bore rule; and that their wives and children at home were abused; and that they had an intention further to take and imprison all that were of kin to any of the army which was not of their faction, to the intent to kill them if they of Samos would not submit to their authority. And many other things he told them, adding lies of his own. 75. When they heard this, they were ready at first to have fallen upon the chief authors of the oligarchy, and upon such of the rest as were partakers of it. Yet afterwards, being hindered by such as came between [1](#) and advised them not to overthrow the state, the enemy lying so near with their galleys to assault them; they gave it over. After this, Thrasybulus the son of Lycus, and Thrasyllus, (for these were the principal authors of the change), determining now openly to reduce the state at Samos to a democracy, took oaths of all the soldiers, especially of the oligarchicals, the greatest they could devise [2](#) : both that they should be subject to the democracy and agree together; and also that they should zealously prosecute the war against the Peloponnesians; and withal be enemies to the four hundred, and not to have to do with them by ambassadors. The same oath was taken by all the Samians that were of age; and the Athenian soldiers communicated with them their whole affairs, together with whatsoever should succeed of their dangers [1](#) : for whom and for themselves, they made account there was no refuge of safety; but that if either the four hundred or the enemy at Miletus overcame them, they must needs perish.

oligarchy was then in authority at Athens.

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The democracy re-established in the army.

year xxi. A C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

76. So there was a contention at this time: one side compelling the city to a democracy; the other, the army to an oligarchy. And presently there was an assembly of the soldiers called: wherein they deprived the former commanders, and such captains of galleys as they had in suspicion, of their charge; and chose others, both captains of galleys and commanders, in their places; of which Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus were two. And they stood up and encouraged one another, both otherwise, and with this: “that they had no cause to be dejected for the city’s revolting from them; for they at Athens, being the lesser part, had forsaken them, who were not only the greater part, but also every way the better provided [2](#) . For they having the whole navy, could compel the rest of the cities subject unto them to pay in their money as well now, as if they were to set out from Athens itself. And that they also had a city, namely Samos, no weak one; but even such a one, as when they were enemies, wanted little of taking the dominion of the sea

The army encourageth itself against the city and state at home by comparison of their strength.

year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

year xxi. A C 411. Ol. 92. 1.

from the Athenians. That the seat of the war, was the same it was before³ ; and that they should be better able to provide themselves of things necessary, having the navy, than they should be that were at home in the city. And that they at Athens were masters of the entrance of Peiræus, both formerly by the favour of them at Samos¹ : and that now also, unless they restore them the government, they shall again be brought to that pass, that those at Samos shall be better able to bar them the use of the sea, than they shall be to bar it them of Samos. That it was a trifle and worth nothing, which was conferred to the overcoming of the enemy by the city; and a small matter it would be to lose it, seeing they had neither any more silver to send them, (for the soldiers shifted for themselves), nor yet good direction, which is the thing for which the city hath the command of the armies. Nay, that in this point they erred which were at Athens; in that they had abrogated the laws of their country: whereas they at Samos did both observe the same themselves, and endeavour to constrain the other to do so likewise² . So that such of them in the camp as should give good council, were as good as they in the city. And that Alcibiades, if they would decree his security and his return, would with all his heart procure the king to be their confederate. And that which is the main thing, if they failed of all other helps, yet with so great a fleet they could not fail of many places to retire to, in which they might find both city and territory.”

77. When they had thus debated the matter in the assembly and encouraged one another, they made ready, as at other times, whatsoever was necessary for the war¹ . And the ten ambassadors which were sent to Samos from the four hundred, hearing of this by the way at Delos, whither they were come already, stayed still there.

78. About the same time also, the soldiers of the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus murmured amongst themselves, that Astyochus and Tissaphernes overthrew the state of their affairs. Astyochus in refusing to fight; both before, when their own fleet was stronger² , and that of the Athenians but small; and also now, whilst they were said to be in sedition, and their fleet divided; and in expecting the Phœnician fleet, in fame, not in fact to come from Tissaphernes³ : and Tissaphernes, in that he not only brought not in that fleet of his, but also impaired theirs by not giving them their pay, neither fully nor continually: and that they therefore ought no longer to delay time, but to hazard battle. This was urged principally by the Syracusians.

Upon the murmur of the soldiers against Astyochus, he goeth to Samos to offer the Athenians battle:

79. Astyochus and the confederates, when they heard of the murmur, and had in council resolved to fight, especially after they were informed that Samos was in a tumult: putting forth with their whole fleet to the number of one hundred and twelve sail, with order given to the Milesians to march by land to the same place, went to Mycale. But the Athenians, being come out from Samos with their fleet of eighty–two galleys, and riding now at Glauce of the territory of Mycale, ([for] in this part [toward Mycale] Samos is but a little way from the continent), when they descried the Peloponnesian fleet coming against them, put in again to Samos: as not esteeming themselves a sufficient number, to hazard their whole

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who refuse it.

The Athenians offer battle to the Peloponnesians, and they refuse it.

fortune on the battle. Besides, they stayed for the coming of Strombichides from Hellespont to their aid (for they saw that they of Miletus had a desire to fight) with those galleys that went from Chios against Abydos¹ : for they had sent unto him before. So these retired into Samos. And the Peloponnesians putting in at Mycale, there encamped: as also did the land-forces of the Milesians, and others of the country thereabouts. The next day, when they meant to have gone against Samos, they received news that Strombichides with his galleys was arrived out of Hellespont: and thereupon returned presently to Miletus. Then the Athenians on the other side, with the addition of these galleys, went to Miletus, being now one hundred and eight sail, intending to fight: but when nobody came out against them, they likewise went back to Samos.

80. Immediately after this, the same summer, the Peloponnesians, who refused to come out against the enemy, as holding themselves with their whole fleet too weak to give them battle, and were now at a stand how to get money for the maintenance of so great a number of galleys¹ : sent Clearchus, the son of Rhamphias, with forty galleys, according to the order at first from Peloponnesus² , to Pharnabazus. For not only Pharnabazus himself had sent for, and promised to pay them: but they were advertised besides by ambassadors, that Byzantium had a purpose to revolt. Hereupon these Peloponnesian galleys having put out into the main sea, to the end that they might not be seen as they passed by; and tossed with tempests, part of them, which were the greatest number, and Clearchus with them, got into Delos, and came afterwards to Miletus again; but Clearchus went thence again into the Hellespont by land, and had the command there: and part under the charge of Helixus, a Megarean, which were ten sail, went safely through into the Hellespont, and caused Byzantium to revolt. And after this, when they of Samos heard of it, they sent certain galleys into Hellespont to oppose them, and to be a guard to the cities thereabouts: and there followed a small fight between them of eight galleys to eight, before Byzantium.

The Peloponnesians send part of their fleet to—

year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. wards the Hellespont, but there went through but only ten galleys.

81. In the meantime, they that were in authority at Samos, and especially Thrasybulus, who after the form of government changed was still of the mind to have Alcibiades recalled, at length in an assembly persuaded the soldiers to the same. And when they had decreed for Alcibiades both his return and his security, he went to Tissaphernes and fetched Alcibiades to Samos: accounting it their only means of safety, to win Tissaphernes from the Peloponnesians to themselves. An assembly being called, Alcibiades complained of and lamented the calamity of his own exile, and speaking much of the business of the state gave them no small hopes of the future time: hyperbolically magnifying his own power with Tissaphernes, to the end that both they which held the oligarchy at home might the more fear him, and so the conspiracies¹ dissolve, and also those at Samos the more honour him and take better heart unto themselves; and withal, that the enemy might object the same to the utmost to Tissaphernes² , and fall

Alcibiades is recalled and cometh to Samos.

year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

He manifesteth his power with Tissaphernes.

Alcibiades general of the Athenian army.

year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

from their present hopes. Alcibiades therefore, with the greatest boast that could be, affirmed that Tissaphernes had undertaken to him, that as long as he had anything left, if he might but trust the Athenians they should never want for maintenance; no, though he should be constrained³ to make money of his own bed; and that he would fetch the Phœnician fleet, now at Aspendus, not to the Peloponnesians but to the Athenians: and that then only he would rely upon the Athenians, when Alcibiades called home should undertake for them⁴. 82. Hearing this and much more, they chose him presently for general together with those that were before; and committed unto them the whole government of their affairs. And now there was not a man that would have sold his present hopes, both of subsisting themselves¹ and being revenged of the four hundred, for any good in the world: and were ready even then, upon those words of his, contemning the enemy there present, to set sail for Peiræus. But he, though many pressed it, by all means forbade their going against Peiræus, being to leave their enemies so near: but since they had chosen him general, he was, he said, to go to Tissaphernes first, and to dispatch such business with him as concerned the war. And as soon as the assembly brake up, he took his journey accordingly: to the end that he might seem to communicate everything with him, and for that he desired also to be in more honour with him, and to show that he was general, and a man capable to do him² good or hurt. And it happened to Alcibiades, that he awed the Athenians with Tissaphernes, and Tissaphernes with the Athenians.

83. When the Peloponnesians that were at Miletus, heard that Alcibiades was gone home; whereas they mistrusted Tissaphernes before, now they much more accused him³. For it fell out, that when at the coming of the Athenians with their fleet before Miletus they refused to give them battle, Tissaphernes became thereby a great deal slacker in his payment; and besides that he was hated by them before this for Alcibiades' sake⁴, the soldiers now, meeting in companies apart, reckoned up one to another the same matters which they had noted before, and some also, men of value and not the common soldier alone, recounted this withal; how they had never had their full stipend; that the allowance was but small, and yet not continually paid; and that unless they either fought, or went to some other place where they might have maintenance, their men would abandon the fleet; and that the cause of all this was in Astyochus, who for private lucre gave way to the humour of Tissaphernes. 84. Whilst these were upon this consideration, there happened also a certain tumult about Astyochus. For the mariners of the Syracusians and Thurians, by how much they were a multitude that had greater liberty than the rest, with so much the stouter importunity they demanded their pay. And he not only gave them somewhat an insolent answer, but also threatened Dorieus, that amongst the rest spake for the soldiers under himself, and lift up his staff against him. When the soldiers saw that, they took up a cry like seamen indeed, all at once; and were running upon Astyochus to have stricken him. But foreseeing it, he fled to an altar; and was not stricken, but they were parted again¹. The Milesians also took in a certain fort in Miletus, built by Tissaphernes, having privily assaulted it; and cast out the garrison that was within it. These things were by the rest of the confederates, and especially by the Syracusians,

The Peloponnesians murmur against Tissaphernes and Astyochus.

year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

Mutiny against Astyochus.

The Milesians take in the fort

year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. made in their city by Tissaphernes.

well approved of: but Lichas liked them not; saying, it behoved the Milesians, and the rest dwelling within the king's dominion, to have obeyed Tissaphernes in all moderate things, and till such time as the war should have been well dispatched to have courted him. And the Milesians, for this and other things of this kind, were offended with Lichas: and afterwards when he died of sickness, would not permit him to be buried in that place where the Lacedæmonians then present would have had him.

85. Whilst they were quarrelling¹ about their business with Astyochus and Tissaphernes, Mindarus cometh in from Lacedæmon to succeed Astyochus in his charge of the fleet: and as soon as he had taken the command upon him, Astyochus departed. But with him Tissaphernes sent² a Carian, named Gauleites, one that spake both the languages, both to accuse the Milesians about the fort, and also to make an apology for himself: knowing that the Milesians went principally to exclaim upon him; and that Hermocrates went with them, and would bewray how Tissaphernes undid the business of the Peloponnesians with Alcibiades, and dealt on both hands. For he was continually at enmity with him about the payment of the soldiers' wages: and in the end, when Hermocrates was banished from Syracuse, and other commanders of the Syracusan fleet, namely, Potamis, Myscon, and Demarchus, were arrived at Miletus, Tissaphernes lay more heavy upon him being an outlaw, than before; and accused him amongst other things, that he had asked him money, and because he could not have it became his enemy. So Astyochus and Hermocrates and the Milesians went their way to Lacedæmon.

Mindarus successor to Astyochus, taketh charge of the army, and Astyochus goeth home.

year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

Alcibiades by this time was come back from Tissaphernes to Samos. 86. And those ambassadors of the four hundred, which had been sent out before¹ to mollify and to inform those of Samos, came from Delos now, whilst Alcibiades was present. An assembly being called, they were offering to speak. But the soldiers at first would not hear them; but cried out to have them put to death, for that they had deposed the people: yet afterwards with much ado they were calmed, and gave them hearing. They declared, "that the change had been made for the preservation of the city, not to destroy it, nor to deliver it to the enemy; for they could have done that before now, when the enemy during their government assaulted it²: that every one of the five thousand was to participate of the government in their turns³: and their friends were not, as Chæreas had laid to their charge, abused; nor had any wrong at all, but remained every one quietly upon his own." Though they delivered this and much more, yet the soldiers believed them not¹, but raged still; and declared their opinions, some in one sort some in another, most agreeing in this to go against Peiræus. And now Alcibiades appeared to be the first and principal man in doing service to the commonwealth². For when the Athenians at Samos were carried headlong to invade themselves: in which case most manifestly the enemy had presently possessed himself of Ionia and Hellespont: [it was thought that] he was the man that kept them from it. Nor was there any man at that time able to have held in the multitude, but himself. He both made them to desist from the voyage, and rated off from the ambassadors those that were in

The ambassadors from the Four Hundred to excuse the change at Athens

year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

Alcibiades saveth the Athenian state.

year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

their own particular incensed against them. Whom also he sent away, giving them their answer himself: “That he opposed not the government of the five thousand, but willed them to remove the four hundred, and to establish the council that was before of five hundred: that if they had frugally cut off any expense, so that such as were employed in the wars might be the better maintained, he did much commend them for it.” And withal he exhorted them to stand out, and give no ground to their enemies: for that as long as the city held out, there was great hope for them to compound³; but if either part miscarry once, either this at Samos or the other at Athens, there would none be left for the enemy to compound withal¹.

There chanced to be present also the ambassadors of the Argives, sent unto the popular faction of the Athenians in Samos, to assist them. These Alcibiades commended, and appointed to be ready when they should be called for: and so dismissed them. These Argives came in with those of the Paralus, that had been bestowed formerly² in the military galley by the four hundred, to go about Eubœa, and to convoy Læspodias, Aristophon, and Melesias, ambassadors from the four hundred, to Lacedæmon. These as they sailed by Argos, seized on the ambassadors³, and delivered them as principal men in deposing of the people to the Argives: and returned no more to Athens, but came with the galley they then were in to Samos, and brought with them these ambassadors from the Argives.

87. The same summer, Tissaphernes, at the time⁴ that the Peloponnesians were offended with him most, both for the going home of Alcibiades and divers other things, as now manifestly Atticizing, with purpose, as indeed it seemed, to clear himself to them concerning his accusations, made ready for his journey to Aspendus for the Phœnician fleet, and willed Lichas to go along with him: saying that he would substitute Tamos his deputy lieutenant over the army, to pay the fleet¹ whilst himself was absent.

Tissaphernes goeth to the Phœnician fleet at Aspendus.

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Ol. 92. 1.

This matter is diversly reported: and it is hard to know with what purpose he went to Aspendus, and yet brought not the fleet away with him. For it is known that one hundred and forty–seven sail of Phœnicians were come forward as far as Aspendus: but why they came not through, the conjectures are various. Some think it was upon design (as he formerly² intended) to wear out the Peloponnesian forces: for which cause also Tamos, who had that charge, made no better, but rather worse payment than himself. Others, that having brought the Phœnicians as far as Aspendus, he might dismiss them for money: for he never meant to use their service³. Some again said, it was because they exclaimed so against it at Lacedæmon: and that it might not be said he abused them, but that he went openly to a fleet really set out.

Conjectures of divers upon his going.

For my own part, I think it most clear that it was to the end to consume and to balance the Grecians, that he brought not those galleys in: consuming them, in that he went thither and delayed the time; and equalizing them, in that bringing them to neither he made neither party the stronger. For if he had had a mind to end the war, it is manifest he might have been sure to have done it.

The opinion of the author.

year xxi. A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 1.

For if he had brought them to the Lacedæmonians, in all reason he had given them the victory, who had a navy already¹ rather equal than inferior to that of their enemies. But that which hurt them most², was the pretence he alleged for not bringing the fleet in. For he said, they were not so many sail as the king had ordained to be gotten together. But sure he might have ingratiated himself more in this business, by dispatching it with less of the king's money, than by spending more³. But whatsoever was his purpose, Tissaphernes went to Aspendus and was with the Phœnicians: and by his own appointment the Peloponnesians sent Philip, a Lacedæmonian, with him with two galleys, as to take charge of the fleet.

88. Alcibiades, when he heard that Tissaphernes was gone to Aspendus, goes after him with thirteen galleys, promising to those at Samos a safe and great benefit; which was, that he would either bring those Phœnician galleys to the service of the Athenians, or at least hinder their coming to the Peloponnesians: knowing, as is likely, the mind of Tissaphernes by long acquaintance, that he meant not to bring them on, and desiring, as much as he could, to procure him the ill will of the Peloponnesians for the friendship shown to himself and to the Athenians, that he might thereby the better engage him to take their part. So he presently put to sea, holding his course for Phaselis and Caunus upwards⁴.

Alcibiades, knowing that Tissaphernes would never bring on the fleet, goeth after him, to make the Peloponnesians think the fleet was stayed for his and the Athenians' sakes

89. The ambassadors of the four hundred being returned from Samos to Athens, and having related what they had in charge from Alcibiades: how that he exhorted them to hold out, and not give ground to the enemy; and that he had great hopes to reconcile them to the army, and to overcome the Peloponnesians: whereas many of the sharers in the oligarchy were formerly discontented, and would gladly, if they could have done it safely, have quitted the business, they were now a great deal more confirmed in that mind. And already they had their meetings apart, and did cast aspersions on the government; and had for their ringleaders some of the heads of the oligarchicals and such as bare office amongst them, as Theramenes the son of Agnon, and Aristocrates the son of Scellius, and others, who though they

year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. Sedition at Athens about the change of the oligarchy into democracy again.

Ambition of the oligarchicals amongst themselves over-

year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1. throweth their government.

were partakers with the foremost in the affairs of state, yet feared, as they said, Alcibiades and the army at Samos; and joined in the sending of ambassadors to Lacedæmon, because they were loth, by singling themselves from the greater number, to hurt the state, not that they dismissed the state into the hands of a very few: but said, that the five thousand ought in fact to be assigned, and not in voice only, and the government to be reduced to a greater equality. And this was indeed the form pretended in words by the four hundred. But the most of them, through private ambition, fell upon that, by which an oligarchy made out of a democracy is chiefly overthrown¹. For at once they claimed every one, not to be equal, but to be far the chief. Whereas in a democracy, when election is made, because a man is not overcome by his equals, he can better brook it¹. But the great power of Alcibiades at Samos, and the opinion they had that the oligarchy was not like to last, was it that

most evidently encouraged them: and thereupon they every one contended who should most eminently become the patron of the people.

90. But those of the four hundred that were most opposite to such a form of government, and the principal of them; both Phrynichus, who had been general at Samos and was ever since² at difference with Alcibiades; and Aristarchus, a man that had been an adversary to the people both in the greatest manner and for the longest time; and Pisander and Antiphon, and others of the greatest power, not only formerly, as soon as they entered into authority, and afterwards when the state at Samos revolted to the people, sent ambassadors to Lacedæmon and bestirred themselves for the oligarchy³, and built a wall in the place called Eetioneia: but much more afterwards, when their ambassadors were come from Samos, and that they saw not only the populars, but also some others of their own party thought trusty before, to be now changed. And to Lacedæmon they sent Antiphon and Phrynichus with ten others with all possible speed, as fearing their adversaries¹ both at home and at Samos, with commission to make a peace with the Lacedæmonians on any tolerable conditions, whatsoever or howsoever: and in this time went on with the building of the wall in Eetioneia with greater diligence than before. The scope they had in this wall, as it was given out by Theramenes² [the son of Agnon], was not so much to keep out those of Samos, in case they should attempt by force to enter into Peiræus, as at their pleasure to be able to let in both the galleys and the land-forces of the enemies. For this Eetioneia is the pier³ of the Peiræus, close unto which is the mouth of the haven. And therefore they built this wall so to another wall that was built before to the continent, that a few men lying within it might command the entrance. For the end of each wall was brought to the tower upon the [very] mouth of the haven¹, as well of the old wall towards the continent as of the new which was built within it to the water. They built also an open ground-gallery, an exceeding great one and close to their new wall within Peiræus: and were masters of it, and constrained all men as well to bring thither their corn which they had already come in, as to unload² there whatsoever should come in afterward; and to take and sell it from thence.

The oligarchs

year xxi. A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 1. fortify the mouth of the haven of Peiræus.

year xxi. A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 1.

Theramenes murmureth against their fortifying in Eetioneia.

year xxi. A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 1. The scope of the oligarchs.

Phrynichus murdered.

year xxi. A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 1. Theramenes and his faction set themselves against the rest of the Four Hundred.

91. These things Theramenes murmured at long before: and when the ambassadors returned from Lacedæmon without compounding for them all in general, he gave out that this wall would endanger the undoing of the city. For at this very instant there happened to be riding on the coast of Laconia forty-two galleys, amongst which were some of Tarentum, some of Locri, some Italians, and some Sicilians³; set out from Peloponnesus at the instance of the Eubœans, bound for Eubœa and commanded by Hegesandridas the son of Hegesander, a Spartan. And these Theramenes said were coming, not so much towards Eubœa, as towards those that fortified in Eetioneia: and that if they were not looked to, they would surprise the city⁴. Now some matter might indeed be gathered also from those that were accused: so that it was not a mere slander. For their principal design was, to retain the oligarchy with dominion over their confederates: but if they failed of that, yet being masters of the galleys and of the fortification, to have subsisted free themselves: if barred of that, then rather than to be the only men to suffer death under the restored democracy, to let in the enemy; and without either navy or fortification to have let what would have become of the city, and to have compounded for the safety of their own persons¹. 92. Therefore they went diligently on with the fortification, wherein were wickets and entries and backways for the enemy: and desired to have it finished in time. And though these things were spoken but amongst a few before and in secret, yet when Phrynichus, after his return from his Lacedæmonian ambassage, was by a certain watchman² wounded treacherously in the market-place when it was full, as he went from the council-house, and not far from it fell instantly dead, and the murtherer gone; and that one of his complices, an Argive, taken by the four hundred and put to the torture, would confess no man of those named to him, nor anything else saving this, that many men used to assemble at the house of the captain of the watch and at other houses: then at length, because this accident bred no alteration, Theramenes and Aristocrates, and as many other, either of the four hundred or out of that number, as were of the same faction, proceeded more boldly to assault the government. For now also the fleet being come about from Laconia¹, and lying upon the coast of Epidaurus, had made incursions upon Ægina. And Theramenes thereupon alleged, that it was improbable that those galleys holding their course for Eubœa, would have put in at Ægina and then have gone back again to lie at Epidaurus, unless they had been sent for by such men as he had ever accused of the same: and that therefore there was no reason any longer to sit still. And in the end, after many seditious and suspicious speeches, they fell upon the state in good earnest. For the soldiers that were in Peiræus employed in fortifying Eetioneia, (amongst whom was also Aristocrates, captain of a band of men, and his band with him²), seized on Alexicles, principal commander of the soldiers under the four hundred, an eminent man of the other side: and carrying him into a house, kept him in hold. As soon as the news hereof was brought unto the four hundred, who chanced at the same time to be sitting in the council-house, they were ready all of them presently to have taken arms¹, threatening Theramenes and his faction. He to purge himself was ready to go with them and to help to rescue Alexicles: and taking with him one of the commanders who was also of his faction, went down into Peiræus. To help him went also Aristarchus, and certain horsemen of the younger sort. Great and terrible was the tumult. For in the city they thought Peiræus was already taken; and him that was laid

year xxi. A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 1.

year xxi. A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 1.

The soldiers pull
down the wall they
had built in Eetioneia.

in hold, slain: and in Peiræus, they expected every hour the power of the city to come upon them. At last the ancient men, stopping them that ran up and down the city to arm themselves; and Thucydides of Pharsalus, the city's host, being then there, going boldly and close up to every one he met, and crying out unto them not to destroy their country when the enemy lay so near waiting for an advantage: with much ado quieted them, and held their hands from spilling their own blood. Theramenes coming into Peiræus, (for he also had command over the soldiers), made a shew by his exclaiming of being angry with them: but Aristarchus and those that were of the contrary side, were extremely angry in good earnest. Nevertheless the soldiers went on with their business, and repented not a jot of what they had done². Then they asked Theramenes, if he thought this fortification were made to any good end, and whether it were not better to have it demolished. And he answered, that if they thought good to demolish it, he also thought the same. At which word they presently got up, both the soldiers and also many others of Peiræus, and fell a digging down of the wall. Now the provocation that they used to the multitude, was in these words: "that whosoever desired that the sovereignty should be in the five thousand instead of the four hundred, ought also to set himself to the work in hand." For notwithstanding all this, they thought fit as yet to veil the democracy with the name of the five thousand; and not to say plainly whosoever will have the sovereignty in the *people*: lest the five thousand should have been extant indeed, and so a man by speaking to some or other of them, might do hurt to the business through ignorance. And for this cause it was that the four hundred would neither let the five thousand be extant, nor yet let it be known that they were not. For to make so many participant of the affairs of state, they thought was a direct democracy: but to have it doubtful, would make them afraid of one another.

93. The next day, the four hundred, though out of order¹, yet met together in the councilhouse, and the soldiers in Peiræus, having enlarged Alexicles whom they had before imprisoned, and quite razed the fortification, came into the theatre of Bacchus near to Munychia, and there sat down with their arms: and presently, according as they had resolved in an assembly then holden, marched into the city, and there sat down again in the temple of Castor and Pollux¹. To this place came unto them certain men elected by the four hundred, and man to man reasoned and persuaded with such as they saw to be of the mildest temper, both to be quiet themselves and to restrain the rest: saying, that not only the five thousand should be made known who they were, but that out of these such should be chosen in turns to be of the four hundred, as the five thousand should think good: and entreating them by all means that they would not in the meantime overthrow the city, and force it into the hand of the enemy. Hereupon the whole number of the men of arms, after many reasons alleged to many men, grew calmer: and feared most² the loss of the whole city. And it was agreed betwixt them, that an assembly should be held for making of accord in the temple of Bacchus at a day assigned.

year xxi. A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 1.

A day appointed for an assembly, wherein to treat of agreement.

94. When they came to the temple of Bacchus, and wanted but a little of a full assembly, came news that Hegesandridas with his forty-two galleys came from Megara along the coast towards Salamis. And now there was not a soldier¹ but thought it the very same thing that

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Ol. 92. 1.

Theramenes and his party had before told them, “that those galleys were to come to the fortification”, and that it was now demolished to good purpose. But Hegesandridas, perhaps upon appointment, hovered upon the coast of Epidaurus and thereabouts: but it is likely that in respect of the sedition of the Athenians he stayed in those parts, with hope to take hold of some good advantage. Howsoever it was, the Athenians as soon as it was told them, ran presently with all the power of the city down to Peiræus: less esteeming their domestic war than that of the common enemy, which was not now far off, but even in the haven². And some went aboard the galleys that were then ready, some launched the rest; and others ran to defend the walls and mouth of the haven.

95. But the Peloponnesian galleys being now³ gone by and gotten about the promontory of Sunium, cast anchor between Thoricus and Prasiæ, and put in afterwards at Oropus. The Athenians with all speed, constrained to make use of tumultuary forces¹, such as a city in time of sedition might afford, and desirous with all haste to make good their greatest stake, (for Eubœa, since they were shut out of Attica, was all they had), sent a fleet under the command of Timocharis to Eretria. Which arriving, with those galleys that were in Eubœa before, made up the number of six-and-thirty sail. And they were presently constrained to hazard battle: for Hegesandridas brought out his galleys from Oropus, when he had first there dined. Now Oropus is from Eretria about three-score furlongs of sea. Whereupon the Athenians also, as the enemy came towards them, began to embark: supposing that their soldiers had been somewhere near unto the galleys. But it fell out that they were gone abroad to get their dinner, not in the market; (for by set purpose of the Eretrians, to the end that the enemy might fall upon the Athenians that embarked slowly before they were ready, and force them to come out and fight², nothing was there to be sold); but in the utmost houses of the city. There was besides a sign set up at Eretria, to give them notice at Oropus at what time to set forward. The Athenians drawn out by this device³, and fighting before the haven of Eretria, made resistance nevertheless for a while: but afterwards they turned their backs, and were chased ashore. Such as fled to the city of the Eretrians, taking it for their friend, were handled most cruelly, and slaughtered by them of the town; but such as got to the fort in Eretria, holden by the Athenians, saved themselves: and so did so many of their galleys as got to Chalcis.

The battle between the Athenians and the fleet of Hegesandridas at Eretria.

year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

The Athenians defeated.

year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 1.

The Peloponnesians, after they had taken twenty-two Athenian galleys with the men, whereof some they slew and some they took prisoners, erected a trophy: and not long after having caused all Eubœa to revolt, save only Oreus, which the Athenians held with their own forces¹, they settled the rest of their business there.

Eubœa revolteth

The lamentable estate of the Athenians upon the loss of Eubœa.

96. When the news of that which had happened in Eubœa was brought to Athens, it put the Athenians into the greatest astonishment that ever they had been in before. For neither did their loss in Sicily, though then thought great, nor any other at any time so much affright them as this. For now when the army at Samos was in rebellion, when they had no more galleys nor men to put aboard, when they were in sedition amongst themselves and in continual expectation of falling together by the ears: then in the neck of all arrived this great calamity; wherein they not only lost their galleys, but also, which was worst of all, Eubœa, by which they [had] received more commodity than by Attica. How then could they choose but be dejected? But most of all they were troubled, and that for the nearness, with a fear lest upon this victory the enemy should take courage and come immediately into Peiræus, now empty of shipping: of which they thought nothing wanting, but that they were not there already. And had they been anything adventurous, they might easily have done it: and then 1, had they stayed there and besieged them, they had not only increased the sedition, but also compelled the fleet to come away from Ionia to the aid of their kindred and of the whole city, though enemies to the oligarchy; and in the meantime gotten the Hellespont, Ionia, the Islands, and all places even to Eubœa, and, as one may say, the whole Athenian empire into their power. But the Lacedæmonians, not only in this but in many other things, were most commodious enemies to the Athenians to war withal. For being of most different humours; the one swift, the other slow; the one adventurous, the other timorous; the Lacedæmonians gave them great advantage, especially when their greatness was by sea. This was evident in the Syracusians: who being in condition like unto them, warred best against them.

year xxi. A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 1. The Lacedæmonians let slip the advantage which they might have had, if in prosecution of the victory they had come to Peiræus.

The Lacedæmonians commodious enemies to the Athenians.

97. The Athenians upon this news made ready, notwithstanding, twenty galleys; and called an assembly, one then presently in the place called Pnyx, where they were wont to assemble at other times: in which having deposed the four hundred, they decreed the sovereignty to the five thousand; of which number were all such to be, as were charged with arms: and from that time forward to salariate no man for magistracy; with a penalty on the magistrate receiving the salary, to be held for an execrable person. There were also divers other assemblies held afterwards; wherein they elected law-makers, and enacted other things concerning the government 1. And now first (at least in my time) the Athenians seem to have ordered their state aright: which consisted now of a moderate temper, both of *the few* and of *the many*. And this was the first thing, that after so many misfortunes past made the city again to raise her head.

The Athenians settle their government, and put an end to the sedition, by deposing the Four Hundred, and setting up the Five Thousand.

year xxi. A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 1.

They decreed also the recalling of Alcibiades, and those that were in exile with him: and sending to him and to the army at Samos, willed them to fall in hand with their business.

They recall Alcibiades.

98. In this change Pisander and Alexicles, and such as were with them, and they that had been principal in the oligarchy, immediately withdrew themselves to Deceleia. Only Aristarchus (for it chanced that he had charge of the soldiers) took with him certain archers of the most barbarous², and went with all speed to CEnoe. This was a fort of the Athenians in the confines of Bœotia; and (for the loss that the Corinthians had received by the garrison of CEnoe¹) was by voluntary Corinthians, and by some Bœotians by them called in to aid them, now besieged.

Most of the oligarchicals fly to the enemy.

Aristarchus betrayeth CEnoe.

year xxi. A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 1.

Aristarchus therefore having treated with these, deceived those in CEnoe: and told them, that the city of Athens had compounded with the Lacedæmonians, and that they were to render up the place to the Bœotians; for that it was so conditioned in the agreement. Whereupon, believing him as one that had authority over the soldiery, and knowing nothing because besieged, upon security for their pass they gave up the fort. So the Bœotians receive CEnoe: and the oligarchy and sedition at Athens cease.

99. About the same time of this summer, when none of those whom Tissaphernes at his going to Aspendus had substituted to pay the Peloponnesian navy at Miletus, did it; and seeing neither the Phœnician fleet nor Tissaphernes came² to them; and seeing Philip, that was sent along with him, and also another, one Hippocrates a Spartan that was lying in Phaselis, had written to Mindarus the general, that the fleet was not to come at all and in every thing Tissaphernes abused them; seeing also that Pharnabazus had sent for them, and was willing, upon the coming to him of their fleet, for his own part also as well as Tissaphernes, to cause the rest of the cities within his own

A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 2.
Mindarus with the Peloponnesian fleet, seeing Tissaphernes and the Phœnician fleet came not, resolves to go to Pharnabazus in the Hellespont.

year xxi. A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.

province to revolt from the Athenians: then at length, Mindarus hoping for benefit by him³, with good order and sudden warning, that the Athenians at Samos might not be aware of their setting forth, went into the Hellespont with seventy-three galleys, besides sixteen which the same summer were gone into the Hellespont before, and had overrun part¹ of Chersonnesus. But tossed with the wind she was forced to put in at Icarus: and after he had stayed there through ill weather some five or six days, he arrived at Chios.

100. Thrasyllus having been advertised of his departure from Miletus, he also puts to sea from Samos with five and fifty sail; hasting to be in the Hellespont before him. But hearing that he was in Chios, and conceiving that he would stay there, he appointed spies to lie in Lesbos and in the continent over against it, that the fleet of the enemy might not remove without his knowledge: and he himself going to Methymna, commanded provision to be made of meal, and other necessaries; intending, if they stayed there long, to go from Lesbos and invade them in Chios. Withal, because Eressos was revolted from Lesbos², he

Mindarus stayeth by the way at Chios: Thrasyllus in the meantime outgoes him, and watches for his going by at Lesbos.

year xxi. A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.

purposed to go thither with his fleet: if he could, to take it in. For the most potent of the Methymnæan exiles had gotten into their society about fifty men of arms³ out of Cume, and hired others out of the continent: and with their whole number in all three

hundred, having for their leader Anaxarchus a Theban, chosen in respect of their descent from the Thebans¹, first assaulted Methymna. But beaten in the attempt by the Athenian garrison that came against them from Mytilene, and again in a skirmish without the city driven quite away, they passed by the way of the mountain to Eressos, and caused it to revolt. Thrasyllus therefore intended to go thither with his galleys, and to assault it. At his coming he found Thrasybulus there also before him, with five galleys from Samos: for he had been advertised of the outlaws coming over; but being too late to prevent them, he went to Eressos and lay before it at anchor. Hither also came two galleys of Methymna, that were going home from the Hellespont: so that they were in all threescore and seven sail, out of which they made an army, intending with engines, or any other way they could, to take Eressos by assault².

101. In the meantime, Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet that was at Chios, when they had spent two days in victualling their galleys, and had received of the Chians three Chian tessaracostes³ a man, on the third day put speedily off from Chios: and kept far¹ from the shore, that they might not fall amongst the galleys at Eressos. And leaving Lesbos on the left hand, went to the continent side: and putting in at a haven in Craterei², belonging to the territory of Phocæa, and there dining, passed along the territory of Cume, and came to Arginusæ in the continent over against Mytilene, where they supped. From thence they put forth late in the night, and came to Harmatus, a place in the continent over against Methymna: and after dinner going a great pace by Lectus, Larissa, Hamaxitus, and other the towns in those parts, came before midnight to Rhœteium; this now is in Hellespont³. But some of his galleys put in at Sigeium, and other places thereabouts.

Mindarus and his fleet steal by into the Hellespont unseen of those that watched their going in Lesbos.

year xxi. A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.

102. The Athenians that lay with eighteen galleys at Sestos, knew that the Peloponnesians were entering into the Hellespont by the fires, both those which their own watchmen put up, and by the many which appeared on the enemies' shore: and therefore the same night in all haste, as they were, kept the shore of Chersonnesus towards Elæus, desiring to get out into the wide sea and to decline the fleet of the enemy: and went out unseen of those sixteen galleys that lay at Abydos⁴, though these had warning before from the fleet of their friends that came on, to watch them narrowly that they went not out. But in the morning, being in sight of the fleet with Mindarus and chased by him, they could not all escape, but the most of them got to the continent and into Lemnos; only four of the hindmost were taken near Elæus: whereof the Peloponnesians took one with the men in her, that had run herself aground at the temple of Protesilaus; and two other without the men; and set fire on a fourth, abandoned upon the shore of Imbros.

The Athenians at Sestos with eighteen galleys steal out of the Hellespont: but are met by Mindarus, and four of them taken.

year xxi. A. C. 411.
Ol. 92. 2.

103. After this they besieged Elæus the same day, with those galleys of Abydos which were with them¹, and with the rest, being now altogether fourscore and six sail. But seeing it would not yield, they went away to Abydos.

The Athenians, who had been deceived by their spies, and not imagining that the enemy's fleet could have gone by without their knowledge, and attended at leisure the assault of Eressos: when now they knew they were gone, immediately left Eressos and hastened to the defence of Hellespont. By the way they took two galleys of the Peloponnesians, that having ventured into the main more boldly in following the enemy than the rest had done, chanced to light upon the fleet of the Athenians. The next day they came to Elæus, and stayed: and thither from Imbros came unto them those other galleys that had escaped from the enemy. Here they spent five days in preparation for a battle².

The Athenians haste from Lesbos after the Peloponnesians into Hellespont.

104. After this, they fought in this manner. The Athenians went by the shore, ordering their galleys one by one, towards Sestos. The Peloponnesians also, when they saw this, brought out their fleet against them from Abydos.

Being sure to fight, they drew out their fleets in length, the Athenians along the shore of Chersonnesus, beginning at Idacus and reaching as far as Arrhiana, threescore and six¹ galleys: and the Peloponnesians, from Abydos to Dardanum, fourscore and six² galleys. In the right wing of the Peloponnesians, were the Syracusians: in the other, Mindarus himself, and those galleys that were nimblest. Amongst the Athenians, Thrasyllus had the left wing, and Thrasybulus the right: and the rest of the commanders, every one the place assigned him.

year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 2. The Athenians and Peloponnesians fight, and the Athenians get the victory.

Now the Peloponnesians laboured to give the first onset, and with their left wing to over-reach the right wing of the Athenians and keep them from going out³, and to drive those in the middle to the shore which was near. The Athenians, who perceived it, where the enemy went about to cut off their way out, put forth the same way that they did, and outwent them: the left wing of the Athenians was also gone forward by this time beyond the point called *Cynos-sema*⁴. By means whereof that part of the fleet which was in the midst became both weak and divided, especially when theirs was the less fleet: and the sharp and angular figure of the place about *Cynos-sema*, took away the sight of what passed there from those that were on the other side.

105. The Peloponnesians therefore, charging this middle part, both drave their galleys to the dry land: and being far superior in fight, went out after them and assaulted them upon the shore.

year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 2.

And to help them neither was Thrasybulus able who was in the right wing, for the multitude of the enemies that pressed him; nor Thrasyllus in the left wing, both because he could not see what was done for the promontory of *Cynos-sema*, and because also he was kept from it by the Syracusians and others, lying upon his hands no fewer in number than themselves. Till at last the Peloponnesians, bold upon their victory, chasing some one galley some another, fell into some disorder in a part¹ of their army. And then those about Thrasybulus, having observed that the opposite galleys sought now no more to go beyond them, turned upon them; and fighting put them presently to flight²: and having also cut off from the rest of the fleet such galleys of the Peloponnesians, of that part that had the victory, as were scattered

abroad, some they assaulted³, but the greatest number they put into affright unfoughten. The Syracusians also, whom those about Thrasylus had already caused to shrink, when they saw the rest fly fled outright.

106. This defeat being given, and the Peloponnesians having for the most part escaped first to the river Pydius⁴, and afterwards to Abydos: though the Athenians took but few of their galleys, (for the narrowness of the Hellespont afforded to the enemy a short retreat), yet the victory was the most seasonable to them that could be. For having till this day stood in fear of the

The courage of the Athenians erected with this victory.

year xxi. A C 411. Ol. 92. 2.

Peloponnesian navy, both for the loss which they had received by little and little and also for their great loss in Sicily, they now ceased either to accuse themselves, or to think highly any longer of the naval power of their enemies. The galleys they took were these: eight of Chios, five of Corinth, of Ambracia two¹, of Leucas, Laconia, Syracuse, and Pellene, one a-piece. Of their own they lost fifteen.

When they had set up a trophy in the promontory of Cynos-sema, and taken up the wrecks, and given truce to the enemies to fetch away the bodies of their dead: they presently sent away a galley with a messenger to carry news of the victory to Athens. The Athenians, upon the coming in of this galley hearing of their unexpected good fortune, were encouraged much after their loss in Eubœa and after their sedition: and conceived that their estate might yet keep up, if they plied the business courageously.

107. The fourth day after this battle, the Athenians that were in Sestos having hastily prepared² their fleet, went to Cyzicus, which was revolted: and espying, as they passed by, the eight galleys come from Byzantium riding under Harpagium and Priapus, set upon them: and having also overcome those that came to their aid from the land, took them³. Then coming to Cyzicus, being an open town, they brought it again into their own power; and levied a sum of money amongst them.

The Athenians recover Cyzicus, and take eight galleys of the Peloponnesians.

The Peloponnesians¹ in the meantime going from Abydos to Elæus, recovered as many of their galleys [formerly] taken as remained whole: the rest, the Elæusians [had] burnt. They also sent Hippocrates and Epicles into Eubœa, to fetch away the fleet that was there.

year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 2. The Peloponnesians recover some of their galleys taken, at Elæus.

108. About the same time also, returned Alcibiades to Samos with his thirteen galleys² from Caunus and Phaselis: reporting that he had diverted the Phœnician fleet from coming to the Peloponnesians, and that he had inclined Tissaphernes to the friendship of the Athenians more than he was before. Thence manning out nine galleys more, he exacted a great sum of money of the Hallicarnasseans, and fortified Cos. Being now almost autumn, he returned to Samos³.

They send for the fleet with Hegesandridas out of Eubœa.

Alcibiades returneth from Aspendus to Samos.

Hefortifieth Cos.

The Peloponnesians being now in Hellespont, the Antandrians (who are Æolians) received into the city men of arms⁴ from Abydos by land through mount Ida, upon injury that had been done them by Arsaces, a deputy lieutenant of Tissaphernes. This Arsaces having feigned a certain war, not declared against whom, had formerly called out the chiefest of the Delians (the which in hallowing of Delos by the Athenians were turned out, and had planted themselves in Adramyttium) to go with him to this war: and when under colour of amity and confederacy he had drawn them out, he observed a time when they were at dinner, and having hemmed them in with his own soldiers murdered them with darts. And therefore, for this act's sake fearing lest he might do some unlawful prank against them also, and for that he had otherwise done them injury¹, they cast his garrison out of their citadel.

The Antandrians put out the garrison of Tissaphernes out of their citadel.

year xxi. A. C. 411. Ol. 92. 2.

109. Tissaphernes, hearing of this, being the act of the Peloponnesians as well as that at Miletus or that at Cnidus; (for in those cities his garrisons had also been cast out in the same manner²); and conceiving that he was deeply charged to them, and fearing lest they should do him some other hurt; and withal not enduring that Pharnabazus should receive them, and with less time and cost speed better against the Athenians than he had done: resolved to make a journey to them in the Hellespont, both to complain of what was done at Antandros, and to clear himself of his accusations the best he could, as well concerning the Phœnician fleet as other matters. And first he put in at Ephesus, and offered sacrifices to Diana³.

Tissaphernes goeth toward Hellespont, to recover the favour of the Peloponnesians.

When the winter following this summer shall be ended, the one-and-twentieth year [of this war] shall be complete¹.

The end of the one-and-twentieth summer.

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ERRATA.

- Vol. i. p. 12, note 1. For “Simnæ” read “Limnæ”.
- p. 256, note 2. For “was, with Nisæaga, lost” read “was, with Nisæa, again lost”.
- For “Megalces” read “Megacles”.
- p. 270, note 4. For “migrated from Arne in Thessaly” read “migrated thence”.
- Vol. ii. p. 260, line 18. For “Irineus” read “Erineum”.

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[1] Exercises dedicated to Apollo, and celebrated at Delphi about the twelfth of the month Elaphebolium, as may be gathered by the beginning of the truce on that day. [In the month Elaphebolion of the third year of the Olympiad, according to Corsini, Boeckh, Mueller, Goeller, and others: who take the meaning of this passage to be, that “the truce was dissolved, and war again renewed up to the time of the Pythian games”, at which time followed the peace; see ch. 19. In the month Hecatombæon of the same year, according to Arnold, who follows Haack and others in rendering the passage: “the truce having lasted till the celebration of the Pythian games, then ended”. The passage has given rise to much controversy, which concerns the date of the Pythian games rather than any fact in this history.]

[1] [“Not pure to perform the functions of priest”.—They are said by Diodorus to have incurred the displeasure of Athens by their attachment to Sparta. The command of the Delphic oracle for their restoration (see ch. 32.) seems to show a connexion

between them and that oracle, which may have afforded them the opportunity of injuring Athens. Thirlwall.]

[2][See iii. 104.]

[1][*The Lacedæmonian*. iv. 132]

[2][That is, the *new* wall.]

[1][That is, the land of the state: not the private property of individuals. As at Rome, the agrarian laws concerned only the public lands. See Arnold's note.]

[2][“Making desert”.]

[1][“Those Locrians, that had settled and been again driven from Messana”:—“*and* the Locrians thereupon held Messana for a while.” These were the Locrians called Epizephyrii.]

[1][“Cleon, when as before mentioned he sailed from Torone for Amphipolis, making” &c. Bekker &c. ?ς: vulgo ?ς. The voyage has been already mentioned, ch. 3.]

[2][μάλιστα: “about”.]

[1][“*During this* while”.]

[2][Amphipolis is supposed to have been situated, like Syracuse, not on the *top*, but on the *slope* of the hill: and this is the “strong hill” whereon Cleon halted, and whence he could look down into every part of the city. This explains the term κατ’λθεν, “in not coming *down* with engines”.—“*It was thought*” &c.]

[1][That is, *citizens* only.]

[2][Contempt, ?π? το? ?ντος, “from seeing the real state of the case”.]

[1][“To attack”.]

[1][“Or else to be the *subjects* of the Athenians, (if at the best you escape without *slavery* or death), and that subjection more irksome than before: and to be besides the hinderers” &c. The distinction is made between δο?λος, the general term, signifying both *political* and *domestic* slavery: and ?νδρ’άποδον, signifying the latter only. Arnold.]

[2][“And in the city (the interior of which was exposed to view from without) as he was sacrificing at the temple of Pallas and about the matters before related, it was told Cleon (for &c.)” The act of sacrificing indicated the intention of Brasidas to fight: see vi. 69, note.]

[1] [“And thinking *to be beforehand* in the retreat”. Bekker &c. ῥθῆσεσθαι: vulgo, ῥῥθῆσεσθαι.]

[2] [“And in their march to begin the movement with the left wing in the direction of Eion, as the only practicable plan”. Göl. Arn.—“And Brasidas upon this seeing his opportunity, and that” &c.]

[3] [“The palisade”.]

[4] [“The steepest part of the hill”: where Cleon halted to view the city. Arn. Goell. The “long wall” was to the south of the city.]

[1] [“And Brasidas, upon their retreat advancing upon the right wing, is wounded”.]

[2] [Cleon was a tanner by trade: a man of slender abilities, and possessed of no knowledge, political or military. His eloquence was impetuous and coarse, set off with a loud voice. He was the first that ventured to abandon the grave manner and decent gesture prescribed by usage to the Athenian orator: and adopted the style, as it is described by Cicero, of the Roman orator; the femur percussum, pedis supplotio, &c.]

[1] [“And preserving him (from the enemy), brought him” &c.]

[2] [A distinguished honour: the ordinary burial-place being always outside the walls. The Athenians at the height of the Roman power refused this honour to M. Marcellus: “quod religione se impediri dicerent, neque tamen id antea cuiquam concesserant”. Cicero, epis. ad divers. iv. 12. At Rome to bury within the walls was forbidden by the Twelve Tables: though Cicero mentions some few exceptions, “ut C. Fabricius, virtutis causa”. De legibus, ii. 23. Arnold.]

[3] [“Sacrificed to him as to a hero”.—ῥντέμνειν, to sacrifice to the dead, by cutting off the head from the back of the neck, whereby it fell to the ground: and so opposed to ῥάξειν, to sacrifice to the gods above, by holding back the head so as to look upwards, and cutting the throat. Arnold. Nevertheless, ῥάξει is the term used by Ulysses in Hecuba, Eurip. 221, for the sacrifice of Polyxene to Achilles, and such the manner of the sacrifice.—The worship of their founder was a duty of the colonists amongst the Greeks. Thus the Chersonesitans to Miltiades, τελευτήσαντι θύουσι, ῥς νόμος οῖκιστῥ (Herod. vi. 38.).]

[1] [That is, Spartans had never before been known to surrender with arms in their hands: for they had before lost more men, as at Thermopylæ, and at Thyrea (Herod. i. 82). Of the 420 men of arms sent over into Sphacteria, not half were Spartans (see iv. 38.)]

[1] [This is the treaty referred to in ii. 9: no more particular account is given of it. For Cynuria, see ch. 41.]

[2] [οῖ Σπαρῥτιῥται πρῥτοι. In a certain sense all Dorians were equal in rights and dignity: but there were yet manifold gradations, which when once formed, were

retained by the aristocratic feelings of the people. In the first place, there was the dignity of the Heracleid families, which without possessing any essential privilege in Sparta had a precedence throughout the whole nation: and connected with this, a certain pre-eminence of the Hyllean tribe. Then again in the times of the Peloponnesian war “men of the first rank”, οἱ πρῶτοι ἄνδρες, are often mentioned in Sparta, who, without being magistrates, had a considerable influence on the government. The καλοὶ κ' ἀγαθοὶ were also, in general, persons of distinction. Muell. iii. 5. Of the following words “and all *equally* their kinsmen” no satisfactory explanation is given. Goeller renders them: “et pariter sibi cognati”.]

[1][Cleon is accused of being the author, not only of the fine imposed on Pericles in the second year of the war, (an act for which, as aimed at a party man, there may be some allowance), but of another act of a different character, the banishment of Thucydides. It is to be hoped that this latter charge is without foundation: if for no other reason, that our estimation of his character, drawn by the hand of the exile, may not be affected.]

[2][“*Whilst* he had never &c. and was still in repute, to carry his good fortune” &c.]

[1][The *Theori*, messengers to the oracle, were at Sparta called after their god, Pythii: of whom each of the two kings, in their character of high priest, nominated two. The office was one of great dignity: they were entrusted to deliver the oracle truly and honestly to the kings; and were the assessors of the kings and gerusia, and the messmates of the former both at home and in the field. It is probable that the three Pythian interpreters at Athens, who were however specially chosen for each theoria, once possessed equal dignity: but their powers, naturally incompatible with a democracy, were lost at a very early period: see Muell. iii. 1.—The *semigod* is Hercules: the Spartans, the conquerors and lords of the Achæans, submitting to be governed themselves by kings, as it is said, the descendants of Hercules, and therefore of Achæan blood. That the Dorians were led to the conquest of Peloponnesus by Achæan chiefs, was a tradition current, not only amongst the Dorians themselves, but amongst other nations also: and the victory of Echemus, the king of Tegea, over Hyllus, the son of Hercules, in the first Dorian invasion, is pleaded by the Tegeatans as their title to the post of honour at the battle of Plataea (Herod. ix. 26).—Thucydides here attributes the founding of Lacedæmon to Eurysthenes and Procles, (the sons of Aristodemus, one of the three sons of Aristomachus), the first *two* kings of Sparta: whereas Herodotus, in relating the origin of the two kings (vi. 52), says that Aristodemus, and not his sons, was the founder. In either case, Sparta must have been a place of very slight importance before the Dorian invasion: which alone made it the ruler of the surrounding states. It was built differently from Mycenæ, Tiryns, and other Achæan cities of the Cyclopean, or Pelasgian, architecture: the Acropolis is on a hill of inconsiderable height, of easy ascent, and without trace of ancient fortification or walls: it has no monuments of the times of the fabulous princes, the Pelopidæ &c., whilst Amyclæ, amongst many others, possessed the tombs of Cassandra, Agamemnon, and Clytemnestra: Muell. i. 5.—The “ploughing with a silver share”, betokened a famine, and the consequent dearness of the fruits of the earth. Schol.—Pleistoanax, condemned for bribery (see vi. 104, n.) to pay a fine beyond his means, lived in banishment in a house partly in, and partly out of the temple, that he

might enjoy security and at the same time avoid profaning the temple: which could not be done, were the whole house in it.]

[1][“*About* the spring &c. already braved them beforehand with” &c.]

[1][The Delphian nobility were of Doric origin: and so great was their influence over the temple, that they may be considered as the actual managers of it. They formed a criminal court, and sentenced all offenders against the temple, by the Pythian decision, to be hurled from a precipice: and whether any murder was expiable or not, was a question within their jurisdiction. Muell. ii. 1.—As the temple therefore of the Doric god: at whose bidding the Spartans entered on many hazardous enterprizes, dethroned the tyrants throughout Greece, &c.: and without whose sanction they never undertook any important action (as this history shews by many examples): its independence was of the last importance to Sparta.]

[1][The tribute taxed in the time of Aristides, was four hundred and sixty talents. In his lifetime, whether with his assent or not is disputed, the treasury, on the nominal proposal of the Samians, was removed from Delos (i. 96) to Athens. The tribute, as may be supposed, suffered no reduction by the change. Cimon having first of all stripped the weaker states in succession of their means of defence (i. 99), the tribute was ere long raised by Pericles to six hundred, and in course of time by Alcibiades and others to thirteen hundred talents. The cause of this increase is well worthy of attention. It was the practice of Cimon and the aristocratical party to ingratiate themselves with the people, by distributing their vast wealth in so called liberality amongst the lower class of citizens. Great as was the mischief of this practice, it was thrown into the shade by the invention of Pericles. Unable to contend with the private wealth of his antagonists, he resorted to a similar application of the public money: and his entrance into the public assembly was marked by a series of measures, all tending to enable the poorer citizens to live upon the public treasury. Besides the vast public works, good in themselves, but undertaken mainly with the view of giving bread to a great number of workmen, he was the author of two remarkable laws. In former times, it had been found necessary for the public tranquillity, that the admission to the theatre, originally gratuitous, should be subjected to the charge of a small sum of money. Pericles passed a law entitling every citizen to this money out of the treasury. Had the design been simply to place the amusement of the theatre within reach of the poor citizens, the obvious plan was to revive the free admission. In course of time, the *theoricon* absorbed the entire surplus funds of the treasury, after defraying the ordinary civil expenditure: and the military chest was left to depend on extraordinary contributions. His other measure was still more mischievous: the payment of an obole to the juror for his attendance at the courts of justice. The pay was just high enough to ensure the attendance of the most objectionable class of jurors to sit in judgment on the life and fortune of their fellow-citizens. Corruption was probably a vice inherent in the tribunals as organized by Solon: the 6000 sworn citizens, or *jurors*, called the *ῥητορῆς*. But that the bribing of them was, a few years later than the present time, reduced to a regular system; and that condemnations of obnoxious individuals were extorted by threats of withholding prosecutions, and thereby cutting short the juror's pay: this Pericles alone is answerable for. As to the allies, the amount of direct taxes wrung from them, was the least of their grievances. A far sorer burthen was the

transfer of all criminal causes, and all suits involving property above a certain low amount, from their own tribunals to those of Athens. She derived therefrom the profits, comparatively trifling, arising from fees of justice and the influx of strangers into the city, at the expense of suffering to the allies difficult to be conceived. This is what the Athenian orator (i. 77) wishes to represent as a *commercium juris præbendi et repetendi*. At the time of Pericles' accession to power, the Athenians, amongst whom democracy had already made rapid strides, had still left one security for an impartial trial in criminal cases. This security stood in his way: and he did not hesitate, by the overthrow of the Areopagus, to place the life and fortune of every citizen at the mercy of a vote of an assembly of 6000 citizens. Of the justice dealt out by a popular assembly, an example is seen in the affair of the Hermes-busts (vi. 44, note): another in the fate of the ten generals after the battle of Arginusæ. The working of the Heliæa shewed itself in the occasional direct division of the rich man's property amongst the citizens at large (Herm. § 163, n. 7): and in the common practice of confiscating the property of the rich to supply the wants of the treasury, whence the jurors derived their salary (Arist. v. 5, vi. 2, 5.). It may perhaps be a question, whether if victory in this war had sided with Athens, she could long have survived this state of things: and whether Pericles had any faith in her so doing.]

[1][“And all others, allies of the Spartans, in Scione, and all” &c.]

[1][In formulis jurisjurandi, varii et confirmandi et fidem dandi gradus erant. Præter usitatum testium jusjurandum aliud erat sanctius, quod magis quam alia fidem obstringere videbatur: quale præstabant Areopagitæ, dum se et omnem progeniem diris devovent, quodque ut præcipua gravitate et vi præditum memoratur. Imprimis illam formulam obligare putaverunt, qua per liberos jurabant. Goeller.—He observes also, that the Athenians swore on behalf of themselves *and their allies* (see ch. 47): here therefore they swear both to the Lacedæmonians and to their allies, whilst the latter swear to the Athenians only.—The *Amyclæum* was a temple of Apollo at *Amyclæ*, and not actually a part of Sparta so called, as supposed by some: but from its nearness, Amyclæ itself was considered as part of Sparta, as the Peiræus of Athens and the Heræum of Argos. Haack. Popp.]

[2]By Delphi, where the Pythian games were kept.

[1][“This treaty begins from the ephoralty of Pleistolas, the fourth day before the end (i. e. the 26th) of the month Artemisium; and from the archonship of Alcæus at Athens, the sixth day before the end (the 24th) of the month Elaphebolion”.]

[2][“A few days *less*.” Goeller, Arnold. Of the next sentence the sense may be correctly given: but the text, as it stands, is admitted to be untranslatable.]

[3][That is, “as they are here written”.]

[1][“Might be altered: and finding it already ratified” &c. Goeller.]

[1][ἔνθετον: in its strict sense, an alliance *offensive* and *defensive* (see i. 44); here, an alliance *defensive* only.]

[1][“And hitherto hath been written this first war, which during these ten years was without intermission.” Goeller.]

[1][Auctoris computatio annorum progreditur usque ad annum Ol. 91. 2. A.C. 414: quo tempore Lacedæmonii, ab Alcibiade exstimulati, rursus ad bellum aperte cum Atheniensibus gerendum se accinxerunt: vide vi. 93. Exeunt ipsi sex anni et menses decem. Goeller.]

[1][“For let him consider how it (the composition) is characterized by the facts of the case”. Arnold, Goeller.]

[2][“Found in this solitary instance the event exactly agreeing with the prediction”. Arn.—“*For* I myself remember yet” &c.]

[3][“And I lived to the end of it, being of an age to judge of events and also applying” &c.]

[4][“Conversant with.” Arnold.]

[1][“The controversy therefore after these ten years, and the following rupture of the treaty, and the war thereupon how it was” &c.]

[2][“After concluding &c., the embassies from Peloponnesus, which were sent for to assist at them, retired from Lacedæmon. And all but the Corinthians went home: but they turning” &c. Bekk. &c.]

[3][“The Argives”—The limiting the alliance to such states as treated others upon a footing of equality in the distribution of justice, operated as an exclusion from it of all states not independent on the one hand, and of Athens and Sparta on the other. Goeller.]

[1][?γήσεσθαι: to obtain the ?γεμονία, or to be the leading power.]

[2][“But rather made their account by being at peace with both”. Arnold, Goeller.—The Dorians that subdued Argos, did not, like the Spartans, congregate themselves in the capital, but dispersed themselves in several of the ancient and considerable cities: whereby the influence of Argos in Argolis was almost annihilated, and she was reduced to being the head of a league for common defence and regulation of the common interests. Within a century after the Dorian invasion, Spartan ambition had made attempts, with little success, upon Argos: but when the final conquest of Cynuria (see ch. 41, n.) had given her the key of Argolis, Cleomenes in a decisive victory, some time between 524 and the Persian war (see Muell. iii. 4), slew six thousand of her Dorian citizens. After this disaster, and till the next generation arrived at manhood and expelled them, the government fell into the hands of the slaves (*gymnesii*): and to replenish her free population, she was obliged to collect and admit to the rights of citizenship the subject pericæci of the surrounding cities. She was too crippled to take any part in the Persian war, and followed the counsel of the oracle: “hostile to her neighbours, but the friend of the gods, to draw in her spear and sit watchfully guarding her head: and the head will take care of the body”: Herod. vii.

148. Hatred of Spartan supremacy had no small influence on her policy: she preferred exclusion from the common affairs of Peloponnesus, and even submitting to the yoke of the barbarian, rather than acknowledge the ἡγεμονία of Sparta: Herod. *ibid.* Her new population was industrious, and multiplied apace; and prosperity and wealth returned to Argos: but her constitution thereby received a democratic tendency inconsistent with the Doric character, the peculiar features of which gradually disappeared.]

[1][Except the possession of Messenia, nothing was so vitally important to Sparta as her influence over the towns of Arcadia: as their hostility would exclude her from all intercourse with the rest of Greece. Very little is known of the manner in which she gained a footing in those towns. The invading Dorians effected no settlement in their march through Arcadia in their route to Sparta: though no opposition is heard of by any state except Tegea. Still in the two first Messenian wars the Arcadians appear as the allies of the Messenians. In later times their territory, the most extensive in Peloponnesus, served only as a thoroughfare for hostile armies: the people, the native Pelasgians, who had immemorial possession of the land (Herod. i. 146, viii. 73), had no weight in the affairs of Peloponnesus, and shed their blood for hire in quarrels with which they had no concern. The Mantineans however, though they now followed the policy of Argos, had long been attached to the Peloponnesian league, and the faithful ally of Sparta: and their present defection may be attributed partly to their desire to retain possession of Parrhasia and to their hostility to Tegea, (ever since its reduction the staunch ally of Sparta), and partly to the establishment of a democratic government under the influence of Argos. This defection is not forgotten in after times: see ch. 50, n.]

[1]The Peloponnesian.

[2][See ii. 30, iv. 49.]

[3][τοῦς ἡγεμονίας.]

[1][In ch. 28.—“The reason of this was, that the Eleians had a quarrel” &c.]

[2][That is, of the Lepreatans’ territory.—“The Eleians left the Lepreatans in possession of their lands, with the imposition thereon of a talent” &c.]

[3][“Were independent”: that is, of the Eleians.]

[1][This seems to refer to the fundamental preliminary agreement, described in ch. 17 in very different terms: “that peace should be concluded on the terms of each party rendering what they had taken in the war”: otherwise we must suppose that the Peloponnesian confederates had given each other a guarantee to this effect *before* the war. Thirlwall.]

[2][“Thought themselves also wronged: but being watched and courted by the Lacedæmonians, and thinking the Argive democracy would not be so commodious for them &c., they stirred &c.” Goell.]

[3][See Cleon's decree, iv. 122.]

[1][“Part (of their plan)”.—“the whole of Peloponnesus”.—Tegea since its reduction by Sparta, had ever been supported by her, in accordance with her policy of preventing the growth of any considerable state, against the pretensions of Mantinea: and to the fidelity of Tegea she was perhaps indebted for her safety at this perilous moment. All her recollections connected with Tegea were not of a pleasant nature. Led by their misinterpretation of an ambiguous oracle, the Spartans (854, A.C.) invaded the territory of Tegea, carrying with them the fetters which they expected to lay upon the Tegeatans: but being overthrown, submitted to have them imposed on themselves. Herodotus (i. 67.) saw the same fetters suspended in the temple of Minerva at Tegea. The importance of Tegea to Sparta in a military point of view has already been noticed: iii. 8, note.]

[1][“But no treaty”.]

[2][“As a check upon Sciritis”. See v. 51. Arn.]

[3][“Themselves guarded the territory of their confederates the Parrhasians”. Arnold.]

[1][An essential condition of their freedom: being bound to the soil, and incapable of removal from it, or of receiving their freedom but at the will of the state.]

[2][νεοδαμώδων: “recently ascribed to the δῆμος,” i. e. *new Spartans*: a name acquired by the enfranchised helot after having been some time in possession of his liberty. Their number soon nearly equalled that of the citizens. There were also *Mothones* or *Mothaces* (from μόθων, *verna*): helots, that having been brought up with young Spartans (like Eumæus in the house of Ulysses) obtained their freedom without the rights of citizenship. Their descendants however must sometimes have obtained those rights: since Callicratides, Lysander, and Gylippus were of Mothonic origin. Mueller. iii. 3.]

[3][“They disgraced them.” Of ῥτυμία there were, both at Sparta and Athens, various degrees. The highest degree at Sparta was a kind of excommunication, reserved for him that disgraced himself in the field, or returned, as Aristodemus at Thermopylæ, without his companions. The culprit could fill no public office: had the lowest place in the chorus: in the game of ball, neither party would have him on their side: he could find no competitor in the gymnasium, no companion of his tent in the field: none would give him fire: his degradation was made visible to the world by his ragged cloak and halfshaved beard. Muell. iii. 10.—The same degree of infamy at Athens amounted to actual outlawry, the ῥτυμος fairly losing all protection of the law, both public and private: whilst the minor degree deprived him of some specified rights only; as the right of speaking and voting in the public assembly, of entering the agora, of sailing to the Hellespont or to Ionia, &c. Herm. § 124.]

[1][“*Being* in office”. The object of disgracing, was to render them incapable of abusing their office to the detriment of the state.]

[2] [“The Dians”: that is, the inhabitants of Dium in the peninsula of Athos. The Dictideans are unknown. Popp. Goell. Arn.]

[3] [“Places”. Methone, Pteleum, Atalantis, Cythera &c. Goell.]

[1] [“Would choose the friendship of &c., at *the risk* of the enmity” &c.: Arn.—“Would prefer making friends &c. *before* coming to a rupture” &c.: Goell.]

[2] [“*Commissioned* to deliver”.]

[1] [“To the Bœotarchs”.]

[2] [“Meanwhile it was thought fit by the Bœotarchs, Corinthians, Megareans, and the ambassadors from Chalcidice, to take an oath to each other to give” &c.]

[1] [The Bœotian states were united in a confederacy represented by a congress of deputies, who met at the festival of *Pambœotia*, in the temple of the Itonian Athene near Coroneia, more perhaps for religious than political purposes. There were also other national councils which deliberated on peace and war, of perhaps nearly equal antiquity: though first mentioned at a later period when there were *four* of them. It does not appear how they were constituted, or whether with reference to as many territorial divisions, of which we have no other trace. The chief magistrates of the league, called *Bœotarchs*, presided in those councils and commanded the national forces. The *fourteen* wooden images carried to the top of Cithæron (iv. 99, note) seem to point to that as the original number of the confederate states: and that of the Bœotarchs was perhaps once the same, though afterwards reduced and undergoing many changes. Thebes had early the privilege of appointing two: one of whom was superior in authority over all the rest, and was president of the board. Thirl.—It is probably this Bœotarch of Thebes, that in federal decrees is called ῥχων ῥν κοινῶ βοιωτῶν, sometimes simply ῥχων. To exercise the office, which was annual, beyond the legitimate time, was a capital offence: and Epaminondas and Pelopidas, even after the battle of Leuctra, were brought to trial for violating this law. But the Bœotarch was reeligible: and Pelopidas accordingly was chosen Bœotarch eleven years consecutively. Mueller, Hermann, § 179]

[1] [“To have *tried* to league”.]

[2] [The acquisition of Mecyberna (a port–town about two miles from Olynthus) was the commencement of a series of conquests, which led Olynthus to aspire to the rank of an imperial state. Not long after the end of this war, she succeeded in forming and placing herself at the head of a confederacy of the Chalcidean states, embracing not fewer than 32 towns; some, as Potidæa, of considerable note. Her power was further augmented in a very important degree by the cession to her from Amyntas of a considerable part of the kingdom of Macedonia. She became of ability to bring into the field as many as 8,000 heavy infantry, a far greater number of targetiers, and nearly 1,000 horse. Thebes and Athens did not disdain to send ambassadors to her, to treat of an alliance. Sparta became alarmed, and sent an army of not less than 10,000 to crush the danger in its infancy. This, not without receiving some checks, she

succeeded in doing: and little foreseeing the remote consequences, conceived she had achieved a great triumph. But the power of Olynthus, now broken, was unequal afterwards to withstand the attacks of Philip: who subdued and razed her to the ground. And the Chalcidean peninsula, which had hitherto separated Macedonia from the sea, at the same time that it became the fairest part of his dominions, virtually made him master of the whole of Greece. See Thirl. ch. 37, 43.]

[1][“Were so desirous of the Bœotian connexion, that” &c. The effect of making this separate treaty, was to raise Bœotian from a dependent member of the confederacy to the rank of an independent ally. Herm.§ 38.]

[2][By the Bœotians: see ch. 42.]

[1][“Intending to compound &c., and then, *so far as circumstances permitted*, to keep quiet”. Goeller.]

[2][The Cynurii are one of the seven races described by Herodotus (viii. 73.) as inhabiting Peloponnesus: of which, he says, four, the Dorians, Ætolians, Dryopes, and Lemnians, were foreign races; one, the Achæans, had never quitted Peloponnesus, but dwelt, not in their original seats, but in those of the Ionians; and two, the Arcadians and Cynurians, were aboriginal (that is, Pelasgians), and dwelt in their original seats: but of all these, the Cynurians were the only Ionians, though the Argive government had *doricised* them. Cynuria, a valley between Laconia and Argolis, is said to have been subdued by Sparta as early as 1006: but in 720 the war about it was renewed, and the Argives got and kept possession of it and of the whole coast as far as Malea, including the island of Cythera, till about 548 (the time at which Sparta reduced Tegea), when they finally lost it by the famous battle of Thyrea, alluded to by Thucydides. The two armies being about to join battle, it was agreed to decide the dispute for Cynuria by a contest between 300 chosen men on each side. The armies withdrew to avoid the temptation to violate the agreement: and the 600 fought till there were left only two Argives, and one Spartan, Othryades, who were parted by night. The Argives ran home to report their victory: whereupon Othryades spoiled the dead, erected a trophy, and slew himself to avoid the disgrace of surviving his companions. The next day the victory was claimed by the Argives, as having the greater number of survivors; by the Spartans, as having erected a trophy. The dispute was settled by a battle, in which Sparta was victorious: and the Argives shaved their heads, and vowed their hair should never grow till they recovered Cynuria. (Herod. i. 82). Much blood was shed for this inconsiderable territory: which decided which was to be the leading power in Peloponnesus. It was not till Sparta was master of it, that she was able to attack Argos with success: see ch. 28, note.]

[1][“By the Bœotians”.]

[1][“A man though yet young (as he would be considered in any other city), yet for the dignity of his ancestors of great consideration”. Both by his father’s and mother’s side, he was connected with the noblest of the Eupatrids. He traced his paternal line through Eurysaces, son of Ajax, to Æacus: his mother, the daughter of Megacles, belonged to the Alcmaeonides, and thus Cleisthenes, the friend of the democracy, was

among his ancestors. His father Clinias had equipped and manned a galley with 200 men in the Persian war: he fell at the battle of Coroneia (447), leaving Alcibiades, perhaps, seven or eight years old, and the heir to one of the largest fortunes in Athens. Thirl.]

[1][“His grandfather”.]

[2][“And that having made peace with themselves, first to *subdue* the Argives and then turn upon the Athenians destitute of help, that this was their object in making peace”. Duker]

[3][“To come with the Mantineans and Eleians and invite the Athenians to an alliance, the opportunity” &c.]

[4][“When they knew”.]

[1][That is, they ratified afresh the existing treaty: thereby intimating that the Bœotian alliance was not to be considered as a dissolution of that with the Athenians.]

[2][“A *peace*”. This relates only to forbearing to attack each other: the *alliance* follows below.]

[1][“Nor for the Athenians or their confederates against the Argives or Eleians or Mantineans, or their confederates, by any fraud or machination whatsoever”.]

[2][“*Eleians* and Mantineans have made a *defensive alliance* with each other” &c.]

[1][“*Nor by sea*, to make war” &c.]

[2][“For a man of arms, a light-armed soldier, and an archer; and of a drachme of Ægina” &c.—The Æginetan drachme was equal to *ten* Athenian oboli: three Æginetan oboli, therefore, or half-drachme, were equal to five Athenian oboli; that is, to not quite sevenpence English (see i. 96). The Athenian standard supplanted the Æginetan from the time of the founding of Messene and Megalopolis. See Muell. iii. 10.]

[1][“With victims full-grown”: not the young of their several kinds: *hostiæ majores*, and not *hostiæ lactantes*. Arn.]

[2][“The *home* magistrates”: that is, the prytanes, archons, secretaries, and other high officers, as opposed to the *strategi*. Goell.—Of the “council”, and of “the eighty” of Argos we are entirely ignorant. The *Artynæ* must be an ancient office, and older at least than the abolition of the monarchy, that is, than the Persian war: for the same office existed in their ancient colony, Epidaurus, whose constitution resembled that of Argos only in the more ancient period. Its origin may have been a division of the regal authority into civil and military functions. Muell. iii. 8.]

[3][ο? δημιουργο?: magistrates not uncommon in Peloponnesus. Amongst the Achæans at least, their chief duty was to transact business with the people: which

makes it possible that at Argos they were identical with the *leaders of the people*. Muell. iii. 8.—The *theori* were a sacred college whose functions were perpetual, like the college of pontifices and augurs at Rome. Arn.]

[4][ο? τ? τέλη ἡγοντες; not simply magistrates, but some particular body of men exercising sovereign authority. Goell. A body like the original senate at Rome. Arn.]

[1][The great Panathenæan holidays. “Panathenæa Magna quarto quoque anno, et tertio quovis Olympiadum, inde ab Hecatombæonis die vicessimo octavo celebrabantur”. Goeller.]

[1]*Pankratium* consisted of wrestling and fighting with fists.

[2][“According to *the Olympic law*”:—“That they had borne arms against the fort of Phyrcon, and put their soldiers into Lepreum in the time of the Olympic truce”.—Sparta in conjunction with the Eleians and Ætolians were the authors of the ἡκεχειρία, or Peloponnesian armistice. The same ἡλυμπιακὰ σπονδὰ put a stop to warfare for a sufficient period, to enable the spectators to go and return from the festival in safety: and during this period the territory of Elis was of course regarded as inviolable, and no armed force could traverse it without incurring the penalties of sacrilege. The Eleians sent round to the different states the σπονδοῦροι, *trucebearers*, of Jupiter: who proclaimed the armistice, first to their own countrymen, and then to the other Peloponnesian states: after which no army could invade another’s territory. The fine here imposed is the same as that required at this time for the ransom of prisoners of war: whence it is evident that the transgressors of the truce were considered as becoming slaves of the god, and required to be ransomed from him. The fine was divided between the Eleians and the temple of Olympia. By these and similar laws was the armistice protected, which was intended not merely to secure the celebration of the games from disturbance, but to effect a peaceable meeting of the Peloponnesians, and give occasion to the settling of disputes and conclusion of alliances. Apollo, the Doric god, was at this time regarded as the protector of the sacred armistice. Thirl. ch. x: Muell. i. 7. It does not however appear, that the non-payment of the fine moved either the Eleians or the Delphians to claim the Lacedæmonians as slaves of the god. The important influence of the Delphic oracle on these games is said to have occasioned the time of their celebration to be regulated by the Pythian cycle of eight years.]

[1][“But considering at the time that they (the Lacedæmonians) had done them no wrong, they (the Eleians) afterwards announced to them the truce: and after that, they (the Lacedæmonians) nowhere bore arms against them”. Goell.]

[1][The Lacedæmonians being excluded from the games, Lichas had entered his chariot in the name of the Bœotian people instead of his own. He appears again hereafter in viii. 43, 84.—From the frequency with which he introduces the subject, Thucydides seems to have duly appreciated, what he did not live to know by experience, the value of the Spartan professions of “making a war for the liberty of Greece”. Nothing was so much coveted by the Spartans as an excuse for giving effect to their leading maxim of dividing, in order to render powerless, the Peloponnesian

states: and this unwise provocation was not forgotten when the Spartans found their hands free from the occupation of this war. Three years had not elapsed from that time, when Elis was required by the “deliverers of Greece” to acknowledge the independence of her subject towns: and on her refusal, the allies of Sparta were summoned to invade and ravage her territory. The Arcadians and Achaïans in particular were attracted by the scent of the rich booty: and the campaign is said to have spread abundance over the rest of Peloponnesus. In the end her walls were demolished, her subject towns made independent, and she herself reduced to the state of a dependent ally of Sparta. The next was a more decided step. The peace of Antalcidas, the main feature in which was the guarantee of the independence of all the Greek states, had received the assent of Sparta in the expectation that the oligarchy would be found powerful enough to get the upper hand in all the Peloponnesian states. But finding that she had miscalculated, in direct violation of that treaty she called on Manteneia (385) to throw down her walls: in other words, to place herself at the mercy of Sparta. The refusal to obey was followed by the demolition of the city, and the distribution of the inhabitants amongst the five hamlets out of which it was originally formed. Phlius, by a timely compliance, saved herself from a similar fate. After these acts, which were discountenanced by both her allies, Corinth and Thebes, it will excite no surprise to see Sparta seize and occupy, in time of peace, the Cadmeia of Thebes. All this, however, might have been pardonable, and as the first necessary step towards the establishment of a government of Peloponnesus, even justifiable, had the Spartans at the same time shown any signs of a capacity for effecting that object. But the example of Heracleia (see ch. 52, and iii. 93) and the countenance given by her to all the worst acts of the 30 tyrants in Athens, are amongst the manifold proofs that the government of others was a business with which the Spartans had very little acquaintance.]

[1][“Grievously infested after the late battle”.—“Hegesippidas *the* Lacedæmonian”.]

[2][“With the co-operation”.]

[1][Epidaurus, Trœzen, Ægina, and other towns, received their share of Doric inhabitants either mediately or immediately from Argos: but she having lost her power over the towns of Argolis, certain obligations on the part of those cities towards Argos belonging to early times, became at a later period mere forms. Such was the obligation of the Epidaurians to send sacrifices to the temple of Apollo Pythæus: a temple erected on the ascent to the Larissa of Argos, probably soon after the Dorian invasion, to the national deity who had led them into the country, and common to all the surrounding district, though belonging more particularly to the Argives. The Dryopians, in their character of Craugallidæ (see iv. 54, note) had erected temples to the same god at Asine in acknowledgment of a similar dependence: of which one only was spared by the Argives, when they destroyed that town. Muell. i. 5. Which of the above two temples is meant by Thucydides, is disputed: Arnold understands that at Argos, Valcknaer and others that at Asine.—Of the word βουταμίων, “in consideration of their pastures”, no explanation is given.]

[1][This is an exception to the general rule of the Peloponnesian confederacy, that the object for which the allies were summoned, should be publicly declared: a rule of

some moment for the independence of the less important members. Another example of the same exception is seen in the invasion of Attica by Cleomenes: Herod. v. 74.]

[2] [“And sent word about to their allies, to be prepared to march after the next month, which was the month Carneius and a festival with the Dorians. Upon their retreat, the Argives setting out on the fourth day before the end of the month next to the month Carneius, and marching the whole of that day, crossed the frontiers of the Epidaurians and began wasting their territory”. Bekk. Arn.—“And marching that day, invaded the Epidaurian territory and wasted it the whole time (till the Carneian holidays)”. Goell.—The *Hyacinthia* and *Carneia* were festivals in consecutive months in honour of Apollo of Amyclæ: the latter a warlike festival, lasting nine days, during which nine tents were pitched near the city, in each of which lived nine men in the manner of a military camp. Muell. ii. 8. It was unlawful for the Dorians to bear arms during this festival: and the Spartans made it their excuse for leaving the Athenians, when they applied to them for aid, to fight the battle of Marathon single-handed: see Herod. vi. 106, 120.—Arnold supports his reading, by supposing that the διαβατήρια, the passage of the frontiers, was the only object of the Argives: that, that effected, they might ravage the territory unmolested, whilst the allies of the Epidaurians were prevented by the festival from crossing the frontiers to help them.]

[1] [“That some one from either side should go” &c.]

[2] [ξερατεσθαι: “had ended their expedition”: Haack. Popp. Bred. Arn.: the same word being used in the first part of the sentence in the sense of “drew forth their army”. Goeller, by an alteration of the text and punctuation, makes the sense as follows: “The Athenians &c., hearing that the Lacedæmonians were in the field, came to help with a thousand men &c.: and when they were no longer wanted, went home”.]

[1] Which was erected for the articles of the peace to be written in. [The writing upon this pillar that the Lacedæmonians had violated their oaths, was a step short of declaring the treaty to be at an end: which would have been done by destroying the pillar. Arn.]

[2] [That is, expecting that the Epidaurians would be abroad, defending their territory against the plundering warfare of the Argives. Arnold.]

[1] [“If they *quickly*” &c.]

[2] [“Were *met* together”.]

[3] [“Five hundred horsemen, and as many *hamippi*”. The Bœotian cavalry were accompanied by light-armed men, who sometimes mounted behind, sometimes vaulted off rapidly, and were thus doubly formidable. Muell. iii. 12.]

[4] [“Both *at first*”.]

[1] [“To the road through Nemea: by which they thought the Lacedæmonians &c. would fall in (to the plain of Argos)”.]

[2][“By another by–road over the mountains”. Muell.]

[3][“By the road to Nemea”.]

[4][“Out of Nemea”.]

[1][“As they had been ordered”.]

[2][πρόξενος: see iii. 70, note.]

[1][The escort of the king was called by the name of *damosia*, and consisted of his tent–comrades: to which belonged the Polemarchs, the Pythians, the three ἄμιοι and the two ephors who attended the king on all expeditions. Muell. iii. 12.]

[2][As soon as the king had assumed the command of the army, and had crossed the boundaries, he became, by ancient custom, general with unlimited command. He had authority to dispatch and assemble armies, and to lead and encamp the army according to his own judgment. Any person who dared to resist him, was outlawed: and he had power of life and death, and could execute without trial. Muell. iii. 6.]

[3][*And it was best seen whilst it was yet all together in Nemea*”. It is probable that the Lacedæmonians and their allies on their return took the road through Nemea to Phlius, being the easiest route: they could not otherwise have been all together at Nemea. Schol.]

[1][“Thus the army, offended with Agis, retreated” &c. Bekker.]

[2][“In the bed of the Charadrus: the place the soldiers use, before entering the city, to have their causes (ἢ στρατείας) that have arisen out of the campaign heard”. Goell. The military courts were held without the city: because within the walls, the ordinary law would have resumed its authority and its usual forms. Arn.]

[1][“And these prevailed with also, yet staid” &c. Goell.]

[2][“They *all*”: all the allies.]

[3][Tegea and Mantinea, the two principal towns of Arcadia, were connected by their position, the former with Sparta, the latter with Argos, which supplied occasion for interminable feuds between them: and these feuds were heightened by the circumstance that the contiguous plains, which formed the main part of their territories, were liable to be much damaged by the waters from their mountains, which might easily be turned toward either side. Thirl.]

[1][δέκα μυριάσι: a hundred thousand drachmæ: that is, if these were, as supposed by Mueller, Æginetan drachmæ, about 5,729*l.* 3*s.* 4*d.*: the Æginetan drachme being about thirteen–pence three–farthings. See ch. 47 and i. 96, note.]

[2][“They made a decree *at* that present, such &c.; for they elected ten Spartans to be of his council, without whose” &c. Mueller (iii. 6) considers the law not to have been

passed for that campaign only. We have already seen instances in which the Spartan general has been put under the restraint of a council: as the case of Alcidas, iii. 69, 76, 79. But in those cases the council had not an equal voice with the general.]

[1][“Seeing that they were marching against” &c.]

[2][Some apprehension of his own “different from his original plan”.]

[3][The plain of Mantinea is a high table-land, considerably above the level of the valleys on the coast of Peloponnesus, although surrounded by high mountains with respect to which it is itself a low plain. It is so complete a basin, that the streams which flow into it from the mountains have no outlet but through the mountains themselves: the limestone of the country abounds in caverns, and the streams, sinking into these, appear again at a considerable distance in the valleys at a lower level near the coast, These *swallows*, *katavóthra*, are exceedingly numerous in Arcadia: almost all the streams being, at some part of their course, swallowed up, and reappearing at a greater or less interval. This plain is so complete a level, that in some parts there is not slope enough to carry off the mountain torrents: and it would be flooded, but for trenches made to carry the waters towards one or other of the *katavóthra* provided by nature for their discharge. Thus the waters about Mantinea were, anciently, carried off by the *katavóthra* at the southern extremity of the plain, in the territory of Tegea. But Agis, here, turns them in the opposite direction, towards Mantinea: where the *katavóthra* were smaller, and the drainage consequently would be less easily effected. Arnold.]

[1][“If they should light upon him”.]

[1][“And straightway they fell of themselves rapidly into their ranks”.]

[2][“Are commanders of commanders”. An allusion to the endless gradations of rank in the Lacedæmonian army: whereby almost every Spartan was in some respect a commander.]

[3][Originally the *Sciritæ* were no doubt, as they were called, inhabitants of the district *Sciritis*, on the confines of Laconia, towards *Parrhasia*; their rights and duties appear to have been defined by agreement; their mode of fighting was also perhaps Arcadian. In marches they formed the advanced guard: in camp they occupied the extreme place, and in battle the left wing. Although we have no express statement of their mode of arming, they can hardly have been heavy-armed troops: since they were particularly employed when a rapid change of position, or a vigorous attack, such as storming heights, was required. They were often at the post of greatest danger. They were 600 in this war. Muell. iii. 12.]

[4][*νεοδαμώδεις*: see ch. 34, note.]

[1][From the time that the Dorian Argives took in and made citizens of the *periœci* of the surrounding towns, for replenishing their own numbers (see ch. 28, note), commences an entirely new era in the constitution of Argos. The newly-adopted citizens appear to have obtained the full rights of the old: and the change in her

constitution was no less, than if the whole body of the Achæan pericæci in Laconia had declared themselves the sovereign power. Democracy had ever after the upper hand in Argos, which could not be without the disappearance of the Dorian character: as was seen in the diminution of their military skill. For this reason the Argives were reduced to form a standing army of a thousand citizens of noble extraction, under the command of generals possessing great civil power. This body soon endeavoured to set up an oligarchy: but the democracy proved to be the preponderating power. Mueller, iii. 4. See Hermann, § 33, 38.]

[1][“In all seven lochi; in each lochos four pentecostyes; in each pentecostys four enomotiã”.—The ἑνωμοτία was, as the word shows, a number of men bound by a common *oath*: they stood in the deep phalanx one behind the other, the enomotarch at the head of the whole file. But here the enomotia appears to have had four files of eight men each: that is, 32 men in all. The seven lochi therefore contained 3584 hoplites. To these adding the 300 picked men about the king, the 400 cavalry, and the old men in reserve by the baggage, perhaps 500, the whole amount would be 4784. A sixth part of the army having been sent back (ch. 64), the entire army must have been 5740 men: representing the number of hoplites, which after all her losses in the field Sparta herself could at this time furnish. Fifty years later, at the battle of Leuctra, 700 Spartans were all she could bring into the field (see iv. 126, note).—It was to her hoplites, armed with long spear, short sword, and a huge shield hanging from the neck by a thong and reaching down to the knee, that her attention was almost exclusively devoted. It was this manner of arming that the Achæans found themselves unable to cope with, when the Dorians invaded Peloponnesus: and to this the Spartans owed their victory over the naked Persians at Plataea, who, as Herodotus says (ix. 62), were not behind the Spartans in either courage or strength, but without armour or military skill could make no impression on the Spartan phalanx. But Iphicrates, the Athenian, discovered the way, by doubling the length of the spear and sword, and greatly diminishing the size of the shield, of rendering the *peltastæ* (targetiers) formidable even to the Spartan hoplites: as they found out at the battle of Leuctra.]

[1][“And for their *dominion* or servitude: that the one, after tasting of it, might not be taken” &c. See ch. 28.]

[2][The ἡγεμονία refers to the time of the Pelopidæ: and the Dorians here appropriate to themselves the greatness of the Achæans of Mycenæ. Arn.—“And at one time an equal share *of it*”: that is, an equal share with the Spartans of the *leading* (ἡγεμονία). Goeller.]

[3][μετ’ τῶν πολεμικῶν νόμων: “with war-songs”. The *paean* took its name from that of Apollo: he was first called πατήρων (*healer*), then the hymn, and lastly the singers. It was originally a song sung after any deliverance: as after a plague, or victory. And νόμος was the strain or musical part of the song. Muell. ii. 6, 8.]

[1][As “large” armies &c.]

[1][“To make a flank movement from themselves” (the Lacedæmonians, the centre of the army) “until they extended as far as the Mantineans”. The Sciritæ and Mantineans were the left and right wing of each army.]

[2][“Two polemarchs, with their lochi out of” &c.]

[3][“And when upon the lochi not moving forward, he ordered the Sciritæ to join them (the Lacedæmonians), they too were no longer able to effect the junction”.]

[1][In reality, *hoplites*: see iv. 38, n.]

[2][It may be supposed that, like Sparta, Argos contained five quarters, each of which had its own lochos: but no *information* about these five lochi is attainable. Arn.]

[3][“And some, not quick enough to escape being overtaken”.]

[4][“As soon as &c. they were now broken off on both sides; and at the same time the right wing of the Lacedæmonians and Tegeates with their superior numbers surrounded the Athenians; and danger beset them on both sides, in the one part being surrounded, and in the other already beaten”. Compare the battle in iv. 96. Goell.]

[1][“*Many* were slain”.—“The flight *however* and going off” &c. Besides not making long pursuits, the Lacedæmonians were also forbidden to spoil the slain during the battle; for a very obvious reason.]

[2][The spoiling of arms, at least during the battle, was forbidden to the Spartans: and the consecration to the gods of the spoils of the slain enemies, as well as all rejoicings for victory, were considered as illomened. With the retreat ceased all hostilities. Muell. iii. 12.]

[1][“When the battle was about taking place”. It was against the law that both kings should be with the army at the same time: a law occasioned by the dissension between Demaretus and Cleomenes. Herod. v. 75.]

[2][“To be still the same”.]

[1][“And of the Argives left behind to defend it and that came out to meet them, slew many”.]

[2][Neither Jupiter nor Juno were genuine Dorian gods, but were amongst those borrowed by them from other nations. The whole of Argolis and Corinth were from early times under the protection of Juno, originally a Pelasgian goddess: and Argos was the original seat of her worship, which thence received its peculiar form and character; the worship of the Samian Juno, as well as that at Sparta, Epidaurus, and Ægina, being supposed, from the resemblance of the ceremonies, to be derived from Argos. The native traditions concerning Io are only fabulous expressions for the ideas and feelings excited by this religion: and the Corinthian fables of Medea, whose worship with that of Juno the Corinthians introduced at Corcyra, refer to the indigenous worship of Juno Acræa. Mueller, iv. 10.]

[1][πρῶτος: see iii. 70, note.]

[2][“And brought two propositions: one, of the terms on which the war should proceed, if they would have war: another of the terms on which there should be peace, if they would have peace”. Goeller.]

[3][“To the assembly”: see i. 87, n.]

[4][See ch. 61.]

[5][That is, the Athenians and the allies: see ch. 75. Goeller.]

[1][παῖς: any *child*.]

[2][“And for so much as concerneth the offering to the god &c. the Spartans to require an oath of the Epidaurians, and to administer it to them accordingly”. This is Goeller’s suggestion. Arnold considers the passage as corrupt: but that the general sense of it is, that the matter of the beast for sacrifice alleged by the Argives to be due to the temple of Apollo Pythæus from the Epidaurians (see ch. 53), should be decided by the oath of the Epidaurians, whether they believed it to be due or not. As to the custom amongst the ancients of purging themselves by their oath, besides the examples cited by Arnold there is one in Homer, *Iliad* ψ. 580.]

[3][This clause is aimed at the Athenians, as the preceding one at the Mantineans and Eleians.]

[4][“And having shown these to their confederates, let them *make composition* if they will”. Goeller.]

[1][“And if any thing else shall seem good to the allies, let them send it home (to the Spartans and Argives)”. Goell. See the same precaution, ch. 41. The purport of this obscure passage seems to be, that the treaty was to be communicated to the allies of each, but not to depend on their sanction. Thirl.]

[2][“Let the other cities in Peloponnesus be partakers of the treaty and alliance, retaining their own laws and institutions and their own territory, giving equal and like trials of judgments (κατὰ πάτρια) according to the customs of their *ancestors*”. Bekker &c.: κοινανέοντων. Vulgo, κοινῶν ἰόντων.]

[1][“And now managing their affairs in common, they voted to receive no herald or embassy from the Athenians, till” &c.]

[1][He was eighth in descent from Temenus of Argos, the founder of the family of the Temenidæ, the kings of Macedonia.]

[2][See ch. 75.]

[3]Which they had the leading of in Arcadia. [That is, over the Parrhasians and others: see ch. 33, 67. A leading maxim of Spartan policy, not less perseveringly

followed up than the subversion of the *tyrants*, was to keep Peloponnesus divided amongst the greatest possible number of independent states: this, in the mistaken expectation that the aristocratical party would thereby become predominant in Peloponnesus, was her object in the peace of Antalcidas (387). As to Arcadia in particular, nothing was so much to be dreaded by her as its becoming united, and thereby independent and powerful: as it would thereby lie in its power at any time to cut her off from all intercourse with the north of Greece. This it was that suggested to the Thebans the founding of Megalopolis: a plan executed by Epaminondas after the battle of Leuctra, and followed a year or two later by the still more deadly blow to Sparta, the founding of Messene.]

[1][The Dians. See ch. 35.]

[2][The Gymnopædia, a festival in which large choruses of naked men and boys appeared, said to owe its institution to the famous battle of the 300 (see ch. 41, note): of which Mueller observes (i. 7. 16.), that the story is the more fabulous, for being celebrated in sacred songs at the Gymnopædia. The story was not yet a century and a half old.]

[1][“Both from those of the Lacedæmonian faction in the city, and from the Argives who had been driven out”. Goell. Hobbes has followed Portus in turning ἡγάλων into ἡγαίων, and leaving out the latter word after καὶ τὴν ἡξίω.]

[2][“Were privy to this their building”.]

[3][The Peloponnesian population being agricultural, and knowing little of these handicrafts, were less skilful than the Athenian workmen. Arnold.]

[1][This is according to the translation of Portus: considered by Goeller to be correct as to the sense, though departing from the text, which is corrupt. Haack also proposes to read τὴν μακεδονίαν.]

[2][That is, from his undertaking: “by his tergiversation”. Göll.]

[1][Herod. viii. 48. The Minyans, the posterity of the Argonauts settled at Lemnos, were driven thence by the Pelasgians, whom the Bœotians had forced to take shelter in Attica, whence they were for some cause again compelled to seek a fresh home. These Minyans, according to Herodotus (iv. 148), took refuge in Laconia: and having in the third generation revolted against the Dorians, migrated in consequence from Laconia to Crete, accompanied by some Spartans. In their passage they left a portion of their body in Melos; which dated its unfortunate connexion with Sparta from this epoch. Thirl. ch. 7. For the date of its foundation, see chap. 112.]

[1][κρίνετε: “decide”, or, “form your opinion upon every &c”.]

[2][“If, as is likely, we shall be superior in the argument in point of right and justice, and therefore yield not, will bring” &c.]

[1][“But agreeably to what we both of us really think, (to the real sentiments of both), we would have you think of getting what you can, (not what you may have a right to): both of us knowing, that in human disputation justice is then only considered, when strength is equal; whereas” &c. Arn. Goell.]

[2][“We then consider it at any rate profitable to you, (for to that, you having thus placed for discussion the point of profit in the place of that of justice, must we address ourselves), not to trample on that which is for the good of all men, but as mortals, ever in danger of stumbling, to place justice in moderation, which has before now convinced many a one, that he has been a gainer by remaining somewhat within his strict right”. Göl.—“To place justice in moderation, and to any one that can satisfy his hearers with somewhat within the limits of strict justice, to let him have the benefit of it”. Arn.—Bekker &c., ἡντινῶν: vulgo, ἡκτόν.]

[1][“But we have not now to do with the Lacedæmonians, but to see whether the subject is to set upon and get the better of those that once commanded him”. Bekker, &c. Goeller agrees with Hobbes.—With respect to the sentiment “we fear not the sequel”; Thucydides probably was a witness of the *politic* moderation of the Lacedæmonians, which at the end of the war saved Athens from the doom awarded to her by Corinth and Thebes: see ch. 50, note, and iii. 68, note.]

[2][“To advantage our own dominion”.]

[1][“And that they remain free by their own strength, and that we through fear do not meddle with them.”]

[2][“Unless you that are islanders, and weaker than the rest, shall get the better of the masters of the sea”. This is apparently the sense, but the grammatical construction of the words is by Arnold pronounced to be desperate.]

[3][“But do you not think there is security in it?”—That is, in not trying to subdue those from whom you have no right to claim obedience. Schol.]

[1][“Assuredly then, if you &c., it would be in us” &c.]

[2][“Is sometimes more uncertain or unexpected”. Goell.]

[1][That is, their *all*.]

[2][“But with those that are making a cast for their all, (for &c.), though it be known for treacherous, and whilst one knowing it might be on his guard against it, it still does not desert them”.—That is, they next put hope in chance. Goell.]

[1][“For neither have we any opinions of right and wrong, nor do we aught, at variance with the belief of men in what concerns the gods, or to their will in what concerns themselves. For of the gods we believe, and of man we know for certain, that by a natural necessity wherever they are the stronger, there they will reign”.]

[1][“But we, for this very same way of thinking of theirs, do now especially trust to their interest, that they will not betray &c., and thereby become *untrustworthy* to such of the Grecians” &c.]

[2][“We think that they will consider dangers undergone for us, less hazardous than those undergone for others, by how much the nearer for action we lie to Peloponnesus” &c. Goell.]

[3][“Of those that call others to their aid”.]

[1][“But about what comes nearer home to you, your confederacy and your own territory”. Bekk. Arn.]

[2][“You may some day come, by experience of these things (the invasions of Attica by the Peloponnesians), to know that the Athenians never gave over” &c. Goeller.]

[3][“For you will hardly betake yourselves to that false shame, which in dangers leading to manifest destruction, and therefore disgraceful to incur, has been the ruin of many men”. Goell.]

[1][“*Will* not” &c.]

[2][“Which is your only country, and is to be happy” &c. Such is the sense of this corrupt passage.]

[3][“Having determined on the same answer as they had already made”. These Melians were not the government, and *decreed* nothing.]

[4][“Of men *and* of the Lacedæmonians”.]

[1][“Making a treaty of peace, such as” &c.]

[2][That is, “an inroad”.]

[3][“Did not even then war”.]

[1][“By proclamation.”]

[2][Hoc vix intelligi potest de foro urbis Meliorum. Puto designari forum rerum venalium in munitionibus Atheniensium, et locum ubi asservabatur frumentum, et alia ad usus militum qui urbem obsidebant. Id indicant ea, quæ mox de frumento et aliis rebus a Meliis raptis Thucydides dicit. Duk.—De foris militaribus vid. i. 62, iii. 6. Goell.]

[3][“And other provision as much as they wanted”. Bekker &c., χρήσιμα: vulgo, χρήμασιν.]

[1][It would seem from the threats put into the mouth of the Athenian speaker (see ch. 93, 111), that the same decree which ordered the expedition, had also fixed the

punishment to be inflicted on the Melians if they resisted: as had been done in the case of Scione. The guilt of proposing, or at any rate of supporting the decree, is laid to the charge of Alcibiades. Thirl. ch. 24.—The foregoing dialogue has been the subject of much comment, which would perhaps have been spared, had more attention been given to its scope and object. The Athenians supposing, truly or falsely, that the independence of the Melians endangered their empire by encouraging revolt amongst their allies, prepared to subdue them: but resolved first to try the effect of an embassy to persuade them to surrender without a struggle. The ambassadors were not admitted to speak before the popular assembly: and thus shut out from all opportunity of either sowing dissension or of appealing to the passions of their audience, they found themselves reduced to the sober arguments of expediency. The attempt of the Melians to draw them on to the ground of justice, whereon their own triumph was certain, is met by the declaration of the ambassadors that they do not come there to argue that question, but to deliberate only on what was for the interest of both parties. The Melians accordingly proceed to argue, that it is not for the interest of the Athenians to outrage public feeling by the unprovoked invasion of an independent state: and if there they have the best of the argument, they are unable, on the other hand, to find any satisfactory answer to the question, “where lies your hope of safety”. There is in this an open avowal of the real motives, by which nations universally, and individuals for the most part, are governed in their dealings with each other: stripped indeed of the ordinary disguise of the conventional language of *right* and *justice*, in which those motives are usually enveloped. But so far as Thucydides is concerned, it is difficult to say what were the arguments really used on this occasion, if these were not they. As to the Athenians, they were probably as much mistaken in the policy even of the invasion itself, as they most certainly were in the revolting effusion of blood that followed: which could tend to no other end than to defeat their own object, the security of their empire; as they found to their cost at the termination of the Sicilian expedition. And those that would desire to know what mankind might possibly have become under a decided and permanent ascendancy of the Hellenic race, must lament to see both Sparta and Athens exhibit such a total lack of the art “*regere imperio populos*”, as to leave that race without a hope.]

[1][“Is divided by a space of the sea of 20 stadia, so as not to be main land”. It does not appear that there was one measure for the land, and another for the sea.]

[2][Thucydides calls this river “the Sicanus, the river in Iberia”: but what river he speaks of, is not known with any certainty. Iberia seems to have been the name of the country extending westward of the Rhone; as far, at least, as the Pyrenees: for whether the Iberians were migrators to the north of those mountains, is disputed. Niebuhr seems to think they were.]

[1][Segesta, oppidum pervetus, quod ab Ænea fugiente a Troja, atque in hæc loca veniente, conditum esse demonstrant. Cicero in Verr. iv.—The Elymians were probably composed of different tribes, varying in their degrees of affinity to the Greeks, though we cannot adopt the Greek legend which represents them as fugitives from Troy mixed with Phoceans and with followers of Philoctetes: and Thucydides himself seems to mark the uncertainty of the tradition, by observing that the

Chalcideans under Theocles were the first Greeks who gained a footing in Sicily. Thirlwall. chap. 12.]

[2] [“With a favourable (or *aft*) wind”. But whether κατίοντος means here a “favourable” wind, or one “setting down the current”, is matter of doubt.—The current was commonly said to run *down* from the Tyrrhenian into the Sicilian sea. Arn.—The name of Opicans (Oscans or Ausones) was given by the Greeks, before the end of the 4th century of Rome (i.e., before 352 A.C.), to all the tribes dwelling within the limits assigned to Italy by Timæus. Niebuhr, Rom. Hist.]

[3] [“Of the Sikeli”. Bekker &c., σικελῶν: vulgo, ῥῥικάδων.—It was not till late that the name of Italy was given to the whole region comprised within its natural boundaries, the Alps and the sea. That name in the earliest times was a national one in the south, and meant no more than the land of the *Itali*: and was not extended to the more northerly regions till the Roman sway had united the peninsula into one state, and by colonization and the diffusion of the Latin tongue had moulded its inhabitants into a single nation. The Greeks, who regarded none but the Ænотrians (by which name they designated the Pelasgi seated in Lucania and Bruttium) as Italians, were long strangers to the wider extent in which the name was applied within the country itself, and never so applied it. The region which originally bore the name was, according to them, the peninsula bounded by the isthmus between the Scylletic and Napetine gulfs, that is, the southern part of what was afterwards called Bruttium. It was from Antiochus, a historian contemporary with Herodotus, that it was first learnt that the whole country to the south of Tarentum and Posidonia, when it belonged to the Ænотrians, was called Italia. For his own days, however, Antiochus drew a narrower boundary of Italy: by a line from Metapontum to the river Laos. Tarentum he places beyond the limits of Italy, in Iapygia. Hence the Tarentines were not embraced under the name *Italiois*, or Italian Greeks. Niebuhr.—It was in the course of the century following the beginning of the Olympiads, that the Greeks established themselves on the coast of Sicily; and spread themselves so far over the south of Italy, that it acquired the name of the Great or the Greater Greece. Thirl. ch. 12.]

[1] [“And all round Sicily the Phœnicians inhabited promontories by the sea, which they had taken off with a fortification, and small islands adjacent” &c.]

[2] [Now Palermo: the capital.]

[1] [The name of the Delphian god had now attained throughout Peloponnesus the universal respect which it so long enjoyed: it had led the way to the settlement and conquest of that peninsula, and hence he was called the *leader* and *founder* of the Dorians. The regulation of colonies by the Delphian oracle was the chief instrument which extended the worship of Apollo on the Mediterranean. Muell. ii. 3.—The θεωροῖ (ambassadors) were men sent yearly by the mother-country, to be present at certain solemn festivals of the colony, carrying with them sacrifices and gifts. Goell.]

[2] Nasos, Ortygia: an island, part of the city of Syracuse. [? πόλις ? ἄλιος: the rest was then called ? ἄλιος.]

[1][“And the rest being driven forth from Thapsos, and Hyblon, a king of the Sikeli, letting them take the place and instigating them to settle there, built Megara” &c.]

[2][“But the place where now the citadel stands, and which was the first that was walled in, is called Lindii”. Nomen hoc primordiis coloniæ inditum est, quia Antiphemus et Rhodii, ejus socii, maximam partem Lindo, urbe Rhodia, venerant. Goell.—The plural form of the name, like that of Λεόντινοι, illustrates what Thucydides calls a general custom in the earliest times, that the several tribes gave their own names to the countries where they settled. When the Lindians first arrived in Sicily, they called their first fortified settlement, established probably on the top of a hill or cliff, by no other name than their own. Afterwards as the settlement grew and the buildings extended down into the plain and to the river, so that what was once the whole town was now only a small part of it, the new and enlarged town was distinguished by a local name derived from the river which ran beside it; but the original city, now become a citadel, retained its old national name. So at Argos, the citadel, which was the old Pelasgian settlement, retained its Pelasgian name Larissa; the more modern city, which grew up at its feet, received the name which belonged formerly to the whole country, and was called Argos. France supplies many instances of towns having succeeded to the name of the people of the whole district: as in Amiens, Ambiani; Tours, Turones; Rheims, Rhemi; &c. Arn.]

[1][The name, in the geography of the Greeks of the time of Thucydides, for the coast of the Tyrrhenian sea, from the Tiber southwards as far as the confines of Ænotria: that is, nearly as far as Pæstum and the river Silarus. Arn.]

[2][Samians and Milesians. Herodotus, vi. 22.]

[3][See iii. 86, note.]

[1][Hippocrates &c., “he became the founder and colonized anew Camarina. And being again overturned by Gelon, it was a third time new–colonized by *Geloans*”. Γελῶν for Γέλωνος, is a correction of Wesseling adopted by Poppo, Goeller, and Arnold. Tertia urbis instauratio debetur Gelois, qui multis a Gelonis morte annis in eam commigrarunt. Goell.]

[2][The *kindred* refers to all such as were Ionians, that is, Chalcideans; such as the Leontines, Naxians, Catanæans: the *new confederates*, to some of the remaining people of Sicily, as the Camarinæans and Agrigentines, who were brought over to the Athenians by Phæax in v. 4. Haack. This is a mistake as to Camarina: see 75. iii. 86. Poppo.]

[1][“Blockaded them”.]

[1][“Sat down for one day”. Orneæ, Tiryns, and Mycenæ, were amongst the towns dispeopled by Argos to replenish her own population: see v. 28, note. The old Achæan inhabitants of Orneæ, who appear to have remained unsubdued till about 580, afterwards gave their name of Orneatans to all the subject periœci of Argos.]

[1][“Methone on the borders of Macedonia”.]

[2][This is a talent for a month's pay of each ship's crew: which, taking the crew at two hundred men, would be a drachme per day for every man. This is double the usual pay: but the same which we have already seen to have been given to those that served at the siege of Potidæa, iii. 17: owing perhaps to the same reason, the distance from home and probable length of the service. Arn.]

[1][Bekker and the rest, ἠκούσιος: "having *against his will* been chosen", &c. Vulgo, ἠκούσας. In support of the first, Duker cites Nicias, ch. 12: "if there be any man here, (ἡμενος ἀρεθεῖς), that is *glad* to be chosen" &c.: and Hermocrates, ch. 34: "for that the man of most experience has the charge *against his will*". See also Plutarch, Alcib. 18. Goell.]

[2][An *equally good*" &c.]

[1][“For to that end have the practices been directed of some, both amongst ourselves and our enemies”. Meaning Alcibiades, and the ephors Cleobulus and Xenares: see v. 36. Schol.]

[2][As the Corinthians. The Eleians and Megareans had not accepted it.]

[3][A truce that might be renounced at the end of every ten days. These were the Bœotians.]

[1][“So that it behoveth a *certain person* (Alcibiades) to consider of these things, and not to endanger our city whilst it is yet at sea, (not yet safe in port), and not to grasp at new dominion before we are sure of that we have already: if so it be, that the Chalcideans Thraceward have been so many years in open revolt, and are yet unreduced”. Goell.]

[2][“And failing, should be in a very different plight from what we were before attacking them”. The Sicilians at present, if not subjects, are still not enemies: but that will not be so, after an attack upon them which shall miscarry. Schol.]

[1][“Whereas in the other case, it is not likely that one power would molest the other”.]

[2][“Whom because beyond your hope (considering what your fear of them used to be) you have overcome, you now in contempt” &c. Goell.]

[3][“Then only, when we are masters of our own minds, or of ourselves”. Goell. “Of their, the enemy's minds”: that is, by fairness or superior ability. Arn.]

[1][The question &c. “will not be about these Sicilian barbarians, the Egestæans, but how to be without loss of time on our guard against a city plotting against us through their oligarchical government”. See i. 19: “the Lacedæmonians drew them to embrace” &c.]

[2] He glanceth at Alcibiades. [Tam sumptuosum erat Athenis, et vero in plurimis Græciæ partibus equos alere, ut documentum esset magnarum opum, et putaretur indicare opulentiam et inde nobilitatem majorum. Goell.]

[3] [“*And that the matter*” &c.]

[1] [παρακελευστος: “persons that have got possession of any office of state as president, epistates, senator &c., by contrivance or other illegal means:” as interpreted by Goeller. He adds, that they appear to be the followers of the *societies* or *clubs* mentioned in viii. 54: see note *ibid.* But he does not explain how Alcibiades, now playing the part of a demagogue, could have any connection with any of the clubs, all of which were aristocratical.]

[2] [“To doat on what they have not got; knowing that by passion men rarely succeed, but by foresight very often: but on behalf of their country, which is making a cast of greater peril than ever before, to hold up their hands” &c.]

[3] [That is to say, the Sicilians were not to sail in the Grecian seas, nor the Grecians on the coast of Sicily, with more than one ship of war. A common stipulation: see ii. 7. iii. 71. iv. 78. vi. 52. viii. 56. Arn.]

[1] [“Considering, if you dread putting the question a second time, that a violation of the laws has nothing criminal in it, when done before so many witnesses”. The putting the question a second time, was a mode of reviewing the decrees of the people not consistent with the established forms of the Athenian assembly.]

[1] [“They became his enemy as one that aspired” &c.]

[2] [“For I ran seven chariots, which is more than any private man ever did before: and I was victor, and was besides second and fourth, and carried in all other things a magnificence” &c.]

[1] χορηγία: the exhibition of masks, games, and other festivals. [The Choregi were ten in number, one for each tribe. It was their business to provide the chorus in all dramatic entertainments, as well as in the dithyrambic or lyric recitations, in the festival of the great Dionysia. They paid the expenses of the training of the chorus, and also of its maintenance during the interval: and they furnished the dresses and whatever else was required by the chorus in the performance of its part. Arn.—The expenses of the office required a fortune of at least three talents: and as no man would accept it willingly, the office went through the tribe in a certain order. Herm. § 161.]

[2] [“It is no unprofitable object”. Vulgo, Bekker, Goeller, διάνοια. Duker, Bauer, Arnold, ?νοα: taking it in an ironical sense.]

[1] [“Renowned in my private life”.]

[2] [“From which though they escaped, they have not even yet recovered their confidence. And this hath my youth” &c.]

[3] [παρ?? ὑσιν: beyond nature, “monstrous”. Arn.—“Beyond my years”: in reply to Nicias, κα? τ? πρ?γμα μέγα, κ. τ. λ. in ch. 12. Goell.]

[4] [“And this is the work of my youth, and what is called my monstrous folly. So did I deal with the Peloponnesian power with all discreetness of speech, and gaining credit by my vehemence obtained belief for my words. And now no longer dread it (my folly): but as long” &c. Arn. Vulgo, πε?οβ?σθαι: Bekker &c., πε?όβησθε.]

[1] [“For their cities swarm with a motley population, and easily admit of changes and new forms in their constitutions: and for this reason no one is furnished to fight as for his own country, either in respect of his personal appointments, or of the means of public defence”. See ch. 36, note.]

[2] [“Greece was much deceived as to the number of her heavy-armed soldiers, and was scarcely sufficiently armed in this present war”. Goell.]

[1] [“And the hope &c. was never less than now: and be they never so determined, by land indeed they are strong enough to invade us though we went not into Sicily, but by sea they can do us no harm; for we shall leave” &c.]

[2] [“Or stand to make distinction of races”. Bekker &c., ὑλοκρῖνο?εν: vulgo, ὑλοκρίνοιεν.—“We should be making but small addition to our present dominion, but should rather put that self-same empire to hazard”.]

[1] [“*There*”, in Sicily.]

[2] [“For at sea we shall beat all the Sicilians put together”. Bekker and the rest, ναυκράτορες: vulgo, α?τοκρ?άτορες.]

[3] [“The accustomed order”.]

[1] [“With most constancy”.]

[2] [“Coming forward”.]

[3] [“And Nicias, seeing that by the same arguments he could no longer divert them from their purpose, but that by the vastness of the provision, if he should require a great one, he might perhaps bring about a change of mind, stood forth again” &c.]

[1] [“The present matter”.]

[2] [“*And* the Greek cities, for one island, in number many”. The “other seven”, are Syracuse, Gela, Selinus, Agrigentum, Messana, Himera, Catana. Goell.]

[3] [“And not be cooped up by their many horsemen”.]

[1] [“And shall have to carry on a war, not like one amongst your subject states here, when you have gone as the ally of one against another; where we have had” &c.]

[2][“And in ships we must be far superior”.]

[3][“In ships *of burthen*; and bakers, pressed into the service from the mills, in proportion”. Arn.]

[1][“And we must consider ourselves like those that go to make a settlement amongst a foreign and hostile race: who must the first day they land straightway make themselves masters of the field, or” &c.]

[1][“The contrary of what he intended. For they considered that he approved of the expedition, and that now there would be no” &c.]

[2][“And know by inquiry”. Schol.]

[3][“More at leisure”.]

[1][“And as for the rest of the armament in proportion, both archers from hence and from Crete &c., that they (himself and the generals) would provide it” &c.]

[2][“The city had just recovered itself during the armistice from the effects of the sickness and the continual war, both in number of youth grown up and in stock of money: so that there was a more ready supply of all things”.—At Athens the public mind was entirely occupied by this one thought: all conversation turned upon this subject. The young greedily listened to the descriptions with which the veterans who had already served in Sicily, fed their curiosity: and in the palæstra would interrupt their exercises to trace the form of the island in the sand, and to discuss its position with respect to Africa and Carthage. Thirl.]

[1][“That is to say, the square figure, of which by the custom of the place there are so many in private doorways and in the temples”. The square form of these images is variously explained: as signifying, that as the master of eloquence and truth, on whichever side it fell it alighted safely; or that eloquence had no need of hands or feet, or of any of the bodily powers.]

[2][“He might with impunity denounce the same”. The μήνυσις, *denunciation* or *information*, was the proceeding open to those that were not citizens, whereby having first obtained ῥηδεια, *impunity*, they might denounce any public wrongdoer. The citizen could do the same by the εἰσαγγελία, a proceeding attended with less danger and expense to the informer, and needing no ῥηδεια. See Herm. § 133.—The first trace of the existence of a party sworn to the overthrow of the democracy, is supposed to be that mentioned by Thucydides, i. 107: the discovery of which party and of their intrigues with Sparta led to the battle of Tanagra. § 164.]

[1][“He on the spot both made answer to the informations against him, and declared himself ready before sailing (for by this time every thing was ready for the expedition) to stand his trial whether he had done any of these things; and if he had, to suffer justice” &c.]

[2][“Turned it off and prevented it”: that is, his trial at that time.]

[1][“Could better contrive”.]

[2][“Upon *a* day” &c. Hobbes perhaps refers to the “day set” for meeting at Corcyra.]

[1][“As a thing worth seeing, and surpassing belief”. Valla, Portus.]

[2] *Empty*, in respect of those that carried provision. [“For the state allowed a drachme a day to every mariner, and furnished empty galleys, of the swift ones sixty, and of such as carried” &c.—The following is Hermann’s account of the mode of maintaining the Athenian navy. “When with the extended naval power of Athens, the old division of the people into forty–eight, and later into fifty *Naukrariæ*, each of which provided a ship, became extinct, the generals appointed every year from amongst the richest citizens the necessary number of Trierarchs, one for every ship: which the Trierarch thereupon had at his own cost to fit out and keep in repair, the state providing nothing more than the empty vessels and the pay for the ship’s company. It is believed that later the expenses of Trierarch, like those of *Choregus*, were divided between two. When however the command of the ship in person, originally part of the duty of Trierarch, became less essential, thereupon sprung up the custom for the Trierarch to sell by auction to him that would undertake it on the lowest terms, the charge of the entire trierarchy: a mischief which the regulation of the *Symmorii*, made A.C.357, raised to a still greater height. It was then that the twelve hundred wealthiest citizens became permanently bound to the duty of Trierarch; and were for that purpose divided into twenty *Symmorii*; and each of these again into *Synteleiæ*, of sixteen members at the most, each *Synteleia* having the charge of providing for a ship; at less cost however than formerly, because the state now provided the furniture of the vessel. The richest amongst the *Symmorii* made the ready outlay, and afterwards divided it amongst the rest: not unfrequently contriving to rid themselves of all contribution: although being the same for all, their share was therefore proportionally small. Demosthenes, in *Olymp. cx.* first re–established the just proportion: whereby with the possession of a certain fortune was combined the duty of maintaining a trireme: so that the less rich, up to that amount, had the privilege of becoming a member of a *Synteleia*; the richer, on the contrary, in proportion to their means had to take the charge of more than one ship”. *Antiq.* § 161.—The fortune which by the law of Demosthenes subjected the possessor to the charge of one trireme, was ten talents: under which amount, the possessor might enter the *Synteleia*. The number of ships which one man might be charged with, seems to have been limited to three. See *Dem. pro Cor.* At the present time, there appear to have been elected annually four hundred Trierarchs: and a fortune exceeding eight talents, as Goeller says, subjected to this duty, which no one was liable to two years consecutively. The *Naukrariæ*, abovementioned, were divisions of the four *ῥυλα?* of Athens; each of which was divided into three *Phratriæ*, and each *Phratria* into four *Naukrariæ*. Boeckh says “that each *Naukraria* furnished two horsemen and one ship, *κα? να?ν μίαν*, whence perhaps the name”.]

[1] *σημε?α*: the images, which being set on the fore part of the vessel, did give it the name for the most part.

[2][καταλόγοις χρη?ο?ς: “were chosen out of the best lists”: that is, composed of none but citizens, and those all within the military age. Compare Herod. iv, 135. Arn.]

[3][“It begat contention amongst themselves, each striving in his own station to surpass the rest”.]

[4][“What either soldier or merchant carried” &c.]

[1][“And the fleet was not less noised about for the strange boldness of the attempt and the gloriousness of the show, than for the excessive greatness of the expedition as compared with those against whom they were setting forth; and for that it was the most distant expedition from home ever attempted, and with the greatest hopes of the future, if compared with their present means”. See Thucydides’ own opinion of what the expedition was capable of, ii. 65.]

[2][“Had been mixed throughout the whole army”.]

[3]σπένδοντες. It was a form amongst the Grecians and other nations then, both before great enterprises to wish good fortune, and at the making of league and peace to ratify what they did, by drinking one to another. [What is here called “drinking to each other”, is the ordinary ceremony of a libation (wine poured into the sea). “And when both the epibatæ and the generals had from golden and silver cups made their libations”. See the libation by Æneas; in Æneid. v. 776.]

[4][“They vied with each other as far as Ægina”.]

[1][“How you may best” &c.]

[1][“Through the report that they went” &c. Goell.]

[1][“Will some time or another invade their city”.]

[2][Anglice: openly or secretly, or some way or another. Arnold].

[3][“And as many as possible of the rest”.]

[1][Bekker &c., κατ’ ?λίγον: “few at a time”. Vulgo, κατ’ λόγον. Hobbes has followed the Scholiast, or an interpolation of Portus in his Latin translation.]

[2][“If they should use their oars, we might charge them weary with rowing, or we might” &c.]

[3][“I am therefore from this reasoning of opinion, that excluded hence they would not so much as put over from Corcyra; but that either whilst they are spending time &c., their operations will be driven into the winter; or that deterred with our” &c. Valla.]

[1][“That the time for showing contempt of one’s enemy, is the heat of fight: but that at the present moment the most useful thing would be, to consider preparation made

with fear as the most secure, and therefore to act as if in danger". Compare ii. 11. Goell.]

[1] ["That have privately some fear": that is, that have good cause to be afraid of somewhat.—For the right understanding of this speech, some knowledge is requisite of the leading events of the history of the Greek cities in Sicily: and of the result of those events, the present state of parties there. Syracuse, like other Dorian colonies, contained originally three different classes: the original colonists, the γαμόροι (Herod. vii. 155), who conquered and *divided* the land, and formed the πολιτεύμα or governing body: the natives whom they reduced to slavery, called κυλλύριοι (a name not understood): and the δῆμος, a vast body of exiled and discontented persons from Greece, who had subsequently been invited to reinforce the original colonists, without however being received into the πολιτεύμα. But the Dorian states of Sicily and Italy had, unlike those of Peloponnesus, admitted the demus into the city. Hence the great size of their cities: and a still more important consequence. For the demus was found to be what Gelo called it, ξυνοίκημα ἡγαριώτατον (Herod. vii. 156), a most unwelcome inmate: and was ever struggling to force its way into the government, and, above all, to obtain a redivision (ἡναδασμός) of the lands. The gamori and their cyllirii stood to the demus in the same relation as the patricians and their clients to the plebeians at Rome: and the change in the constitution took much the same course, first to a *politeia*, and thence in time to an absolute democracy. In 492, the union of the demus and the slaves drove the gamori into exile. But confusion and anarchy, the fruit of the supineness of the men of property (Arist. v. 3), soon made the people glad to submit to the tyranny of Gelo, though bringing back in his train the ejected gamori. His dynasty was overthrown in 466, and again made way for a politeia. The foreign mercenaries, whom he had admitted to the rights of citizenship, were disfranchised: and upon their flying to arms, were driven from the city, and settled at Messana: and the estates which Gelo had provided them with at the expense of the aristocracy, were restored to their former owners. The example of Syracuse was followed by the Greek cities in general: the tyrants were ejected and democratic constitutions established throughout Sicily. But though at first at peace amongst themselves, internally they enjoyed but little tranquillity. The multitude were ill satisfied with barren political privileges, which resigned the real advantages (in their eyes) of the revolution to those that had regained their estates. The ἡναδασμός formed the exciting topic with them: and the attempts of demagogues by that handle to re-establish tyranny, are said to have been the origin of an institution at Syracuse similar to ostracism at Athens, called *petalism*: the laurel-leaf serving the purpose of the oyster-shell. But being found to end only in deterring the best citizens from taking part in public affairs, it was soon abandoned. The distracted state of affairs encouraged the Sikel chief, Ducetius, to attempt the restoration of the empire of his countrymen. The jealousy of the growing power of Syracuse, especially of her conquests in the Sikel country, the fruit of the war of Ducetius, engendered a war between that state and Agrigentum: in which most of the Greek cities sided with one or other of the rival states. But the victory over the Agrigentine party at Himera (452), finally established the supremacy of Syracuse over all the Dorian, if not all the Grecian states of Sicily, except Camarina. Hermocrates, a young noble, is the leader of the aristocratical party: whilst Athenagoras seems to have a kind of tribunician authority, as official advocate of the commons. This is the period of the Syracusan constitution, which is alluded to with

approbation by Aristotle (v. 10). But the Athenian expedition was the cause of further changes: see vii. 87, note. See Muell. iii. 9: Thirl. ch. xxii.]

[1][“Nor have men of arms so many as we, not at least coming in their fleet”.]

[2][Though they had here &c. “they would scarcely be able to escape &c.: much less when all Sicily is their enemy, (as it will be, for there will be no division), and in a camp pitched by men just landed from their ships, with tents and other equipments such as necessity may supply them with, and never able for our horsemen to stir far abroad”. Arn. Goell.]

[1][“Nor can be”.]

[2][“Lest we should be”.]

[1][“Which must he done, first by gaining you *the many* &c.: (for one must not only take revenge &c.): and on the other hand *the few*, by in somewhat reproving them” &c.]

[2][“Asked *myself*”.]

[3][That is, “before your time”.]

[4][“Rather than to disgrace you as sufficient”.]

[5][δυνάμενοι: “the nobles”.]

[1][“But even yet, ye most unwise of all men: (ye are either the most stupid of all the Grecians, if you do not know that you are preparing mischief for yourselves, or the most wicked, if you know that and yet dare do it): even yet, I say”, &c. Arn. Bekker and the rest put a full stop at τολμῶτε.]

[2][“Whereas if you affect other matters, (than the common good), you shall run &c.”]

[3][“And if there be not any of these things true, as I believe there is not, &c.”]

[4][That is, that they will be as treacherous in their acts as false in their words. Goell.]

[1][“And whatsoever we may find out, we will” &c.]

[2][?πεξέτασιν: “a *second* review”: that is, on the uniting of the army; there having probably been one of its parts before sailing. Arn.]

[3][“They assigned by lot one to each general; to the end that they might not by sailing *together* come into want of water” &c. The generals were three: see ch. 8. Bekker &c., ἓμα πλέοντες: vulgo, ἑναπλέοντες.]

[4][“More orderly and more” &c.]

[1][“With such an armament as that described”.]

[2][?πιβάται: *marines*. See iii. 95.—The 1500 Athenians were ?κ καταλόγου, sometimes called ?κ τ?ν τάξεων. All citizens were subject to the expense and duties of hoplitæ, and were *enrolled* accordingly: and to them are opposed the δ?μος ψιλός and Thetes, as also the *allies*. Goell.—From a lost passage of Aristophanes, the thetes, like the *proletarii* among the Romans, are stated not to have been subject to military duty. But though that may have been so in earlier times, it may still be assumed that it was not long before they began to serve as light-armed and in the fleet; and that in cases of great urgency they served as heavy-armed, as did even many of the *metæci*, without however being *bound* to this duty. It is probable therefore that they were armed at the public expense. Thucydides accordingly mentions *thetes* amongst the heavy-armed: but distinguishes them from the heavy-armed levied ?κ καταλόγου. Boeckh. The *marines* are so levied in viii.24.]

[1][Vessels belonging to private individuals pressed into the service by the state. See ch. 22.]

[2][“All which” &c.]

[3][That is, the cities would sell them no provisions. ?γορά signifies the thing sold, as well as the market. Goeller.]

[4][The most celebrated of all the Lacedæmonian colonies, and one which really proceeded from Sparta, was Tarentum. The history of its origin, though buried in fable, is connected with that of the first Messenian war. The leader of the colony was a Heracleid; though Taras is called a son of Neptune, because they carried over his worship from Tænarum to Italy. The fruitful and luxuriant soil, the soft and voluptuous climate, and the commerce for which Tarentum was well situated (though never actively carried on), engendered that effeminacy of character, which gave countenance to the fable that the founders were παρθενίαι, sons of unmarried women. The Locrians who in 683 founded Locri, must also have had Spartan leaders: since, as their coins show, they paid particular honours to the Dioscuri, and in time of distress in war the statues of those gods were sent to them from Sparta, as to a people of the same origin. Muell. i. 6. As to the παρθενίαι, Aristotle (v. 7) seems not to doubt the truth of the story of their having been the founders of Tarentum.]

[1][?ταλι?ται: *Italians*, the name of the Greek settlers in Italy, in distinction to the ?ταλοί, *Italians*, or natives. The same distinction holds between the Σικελι?ται and the Σικελοί, the Sicilians and the Sikeli: that is, the Greek settlers and the natives.]

[2][περιπόλια: “and to the stations of the national guards, garrisons”.]

[1]Eryx was a city near Egesta, and subject to it.

[2][“Those that came in the trireme”. τριηριτ?ν, see Herod. v. 85.]

[3][“All for the most part making use of the same plate”.]

[1][“It put the Athenians of the triremes into” &c.]

[1][“As having a port and station whence conveniently to attack and watch the movements of the enemy”. In iv. 1 Messina is said to have the προσβολή of Sicily. Goell.]

[2][“Contemn it rather”.]

[1][“And whence to watch for opportunities to attack the enemy”. Goeller.]

[2][“In column”. Bekker &c., ?π? κέρως: some MSS. ?πικαίρω?ως.]

[3][These words “not to stay”, which are unmeaning, are not in the Greek. “They sent forward ten of their galleys to sail to the great haven, and discover &c.; and to approach the city and proclaim from their galleys &c.”]

[1][“Ill walled-up”. Goell. Arn.]

[2][“And made their camp”. Bekker and Goeller read διαπλεύσαντες, “the Athenians crossed the strait to Rhegium”; instead of πλεύσαντες, which is simply “they went to Rhegium”. Arnold says that the former would be the proper expression for those coming from Rhegium to Catana, but is not applicable to those going from Catana to Rhegium, on account of the difference in the course owing to the formation of the coast.]

[1][α?θις: “they again continued along the coast to Camarina”. Arn.]

[2][“And also for others of the army, against whom as well as him there were informations relating to the profanation of the mysteries, and also to the affair of the Mercuries”.]

[3][“They thought it better to sift the matter thoroughly and get at the truth, than that owing to the bad character of the informer any one, even having the character of a good citizen, should be accused and escape unquestioned”. Hobbes has taken the scholiast’s interpretation of βασανίσαι τ? πρ?γμα: which can scarcely mean torture applied to the *person* accused. Valla and Portus take it in its natural sense.]

[1][The Athenian democracy received their first great impulse from a quarter, whence it might have been little looked for: from oligarchical Sparta. The Alcmaeonidæ, whom fear of Peisistratus had driven from Athens, on the death of Hipparchus settled at Delphi, and there contrived to bribe the Pythoness to bid all that came to the oracle from Sparta, whether in a public or private character, to rid Athens of her tyrants. Her habitual reverence for the commands of her god, backed by her eagerness to lay hold of every opportunity to carry out her favourite policy, was too much for her friendly feelings towards the family of Peisistratus: and Hippias was driven from Athens. But a short experience made her sensible that she had mistaken (as she did again, a century and more later, in the peace of Antalcidas) the relative

strength of the aristocratical and democratical parties. Athens too, hitherto nowise superior to her neighbours, was no sooner released from the shackles of her tyrants and in the enjoyment of a regular government, than she surpassed them all in warlike qualities. With this too came to light the treason of the Pythoness: supposed to have been the work of Cleisthenes, the leader of the democracy. Cleomenes was therefore dispatched with an army to the aid of the sinking party of Isagoras, which was nevertheless forced to seek its safety in flight: not however before Cleomenes had been master of the Acropolis, and there found prophecies, left behind (purposely perhaps) by the Peisistratidæ, announcing dire evils to befall Sparta from Athens. And Sparta hereupon was ready, but for the strenuous protest of the confederates, to have undone her own work and recalled Hippias to Athens. See Herod. v. 68–96.]

[1][*πρῶτη λακίῃ*: from *πηλῆς*, *mud*, signifies the offering of any species of insult, by word or deed, whether cognizable by law or not. Goell.]

[2][“These, tyrants as they were, held” &c. Göl. The tenth of all rents &c., levied by Peisistratus, was reduced by his sons to a twentieth.]

[1][The altar of the *twelve gods*, which is mentioned by Herodotus (vi. 108) as being in existence in 520, is supposed by Goeller to have been the central point whence, from the time of Peisistratus, the distances were measured throughout Attica. On the sides of the road, busts of Hermes were placed by Hipparchus to serve as mile–stones.—“And that other of Apollo in the temple of Pythium”.]

[1][“Whereas he *both* retained the same with abundant security, owing to his having long accustomed the people to dread him and to his habitual attention to his guards, *and* was not to seek” &c. Goell.]

[2][“As being unfit for the office. This being taken heavily by Harmodius, Aristogeiton too was for his sake far more exasperated (than before)”. Both Harmodius and Aristogeiton were, according to Herodotus (v. 55), descended from the Gephyræans, a Phœnician race that came with Cadmus to Bœotia, as it is since called. On the expulsion of the Cadmeians by the Argives, the Gephyræans were left in possession of Tanagra: but the subsequent irruption of the Bœotians drove them to Athens (see iii. 61, note). If therefore the *κανηφόροι* or *basket-carriers* in the Panathenæa and other festivals were chosen strictly *ἄξενες*, from the virgins of pure blood, the sister of Harmodius, as of foreign origin, was undoubtedly liable to exception on that ground.]

[3][“*They* made all things” &c.]

[1]The guard of Hippias the tyrant.

[2][“If any number, however small, should make a beginning”.]

[3][“*The* temple called Leocorium”. A temple of Minerva at Athens, taking its name from the three daughters, sacrificed, according to report, by their father Leos to Minerva for the safety of the city, at the bidding of the Delphic oracle.]

[1][This is understood to mean, that he was put to very severe torture to extort from him the names of his accomplices. This was a practice not confined to Athens. To slaves, and even foreigners, whose evidence was considered material, torture was applied as a matter of course: as however ready they might be to give their evidence, it was considered worthless without it.]

[2][“This desperate feat”.]

[1]A woman of Athens, a city flourishing for letters and civility, to a man of Lampsacus, a city infamous for barbarity and effeminacy.

[1][This prisoner was Andocides, the orator.—As Thucydides could not satisfy himself as to the credit due to his story, it would be presumption for any one now to pronounce upon it. But the narrative which we have still remaining from the hand of Andocides himself, in an oration composed some years after in his own defence, raises a strong suspicion that it had at most but a very slender ground—work of truth. Thirl. ch. xxv.]

[2][“Yet by obtaining a promise of pardon he might both save his own life and deliver” &c.—“by a free confession under a promise of pardon, than” &c.]

[3][“That those who were conspiring against the multitude”.]

[4][“They went through the forms of trial”.]

[1][“That set upon him”.]

[2][“That an army, no great one, of the Lacedæmonians was come as far as the isthmus upon some practice *with* the Bœotians” (against the Athenians).]

[3][“Not on an understanding with the Bœotians”.]

[4][The 300 Argives suspected of Lacedæmonism: see v. 84.]

[5][“And suspicion beset Alcibiades on all sides”.]

[1][“Fearing to go home to meet their trial with the present prejudice existing against them”. Goell. Arn. That Alcibiades and the rest should have declined a trial will surprise no one, when it is considered, amongst other indications of the temper of the Athenian people and the sort of trial they were likely to have, that the story of the principal informer, Diocles, was this: that he knew the mutilators of the Hermesbusts, that they amounted to 300 persons, that on the night of the outrage he had seen them enter the orchestra of the theatre, that he stood behind a pillar and could discern, by the light of the moon which shone full in their faces, the features of almost all, that he did not see the outrage perpetrated, but the next day meeting some of the 300 he taxed them with the deed, which they admitted and gave him money to be silent: and that on this evidence, uncorroborated and unquestioned, it was resolved by the council of 500 (which was invested with extraordinary powers for investigating the supposed conspiracy) to arrest and put to the torture forty—two persons named in a

list given in by Diocles, two in this list being members of the council. This informer was crowned and drawn in a chariot to the council-house, to be entertained amongst the privileged guests at the public table. He afterwards confessed himself to be an impostor, and suffered death. Superstition seems to have had its share in producing this popular madness. There are many indications, that during the war, while the public morals were more and more infected with licentiousness, and the new sceptical opinions were spreading among the upper classes, superstition was gaining ground in the great body of the people. The proceedings and disclosures which followed the mutilation of the Hermes-busts, though the result of political intrigues, are still no to be overlooked as illustrations of the state of religion. And the remains of the old comedy contain many allusions to the introduction of new rites, all of a mystic and enthusiastic nature, and belonging to foreign and barbarous superstitions, which seem either to have been imported during this period into Athens, or to have attracted a greater number of devotees than before, especially among the women. Such were the orgies of the Thracian goddess Cotytto, those of the god Sabazius, the Phrygian Bacchus, the worship of Rhea or Cybele, and of Adonis. Some of these rites, as the secret orgies of Cotytto, appear, like the Roman Bacchanalia, to have been used as a cover for the grossest licentiousness. It was generally noticed as an ill omen, that the festival of Adonis, which was celebrated by the women with representation of funeral exsequies, fell on the day on which the Sicilian expedition was decreed. See Thirl. ch. xxv. xxxii.]

[1][“For they knew they should not be so well able (to effect their object) if they should disembark in the face of an enemy prepared against them; or if they should be known to be marching by land, for that” &c.]

[2][“Some Syracusan outlaws”.]

[3][The Syracusans derived this worship of Jupiter from that at Olympia in Elis: Archias, their founder, having been accompanied by one of the Iamidæ, the sacred family of Olympia. The worship of the Olympian Jupiter seems to have originated with the Achæans, who also in other places consecrated temples to Jupiter alone. But it is remarkable that in no Doric country was there any great establishment of the worship of this god: but wherever it occurred, it was connected with and subordinate to that of some other deity. Muell. ii. 10. The Syracusans reckoned their time by the office of the Amphilis, or high priest of the Olympieum.]

[1][“The army”: that is, the Athenians in the camp, as distinguished from those in Catana. Goell. Arn.]

[2][παρεσκευάσθαι, “a preparation”, is set down by Arnold as an interpolation. Duker says: “sufficiebat ?έναι ?π? κατάνη: omnino suspectum habeo hunc locum”. “Having intended to *have been prepared* to go” &c. Goell.]

[3][“Gave orders to the Syracusians to be ready for the expedition with all their forces”.]

[1][“That had come to join them”.]

[2][“*The Olympieium*”.]

[3][Syracuse is said by Plutarch to have been a city not inferior to Athens: and must therefore have contained at one time about 200,000 inhabitants. Ortygia, the ancient city, called also Νῆσοϛ, and by the Romans *Insula, Arx, Urbs, Peninsula*, was (except Temenites) the only name of the various quarters of the city known to Thucydides. That which was afterwards called *Acradina*, he calls τῆν ἑξὼ πόλιν. The name *Temenites* afterwards became changed for *Neapolis*: and in time Tyca and Epipolæ also became suburbs of the city. The circuit of the ancient walls of this *Pentapolis* was, according to Strabo, 180 stadia: which agrees pretty nearly with the result of modern surveys. The territory of the city extended toward the north to that of the Leontines: on the south it was conterminous with that of the Camarinæans. Many of the Sikelian cities were tributary to it. The population has in modern times returned within its ancient limits of Ortygia: and does not now exceed at the utmost 40,000, and is according to some far less. See Goeller, ch. 66, note.]

[1][“They made a stockade along the line of their galleys; and close to Dascon, where it was most easy of access to the enemy, hastily erected a fort with unhewn stones &c.” Bekk. Arn. Goeller’s punctuation agrees with that of Hobbes.]

[2][“*But* first the Syracusan horsemen came to help, and then afterwards all the foot too was collected together. And they marched up at first near, but after &c”.]

[3][“Of a *hollow* square”. For the difference in the Athenian and Syracusan tactics, see iv. 93. note.]

[1][“And in the middle of these, who formed the reserve, they placed the baggage-carriers”.]

[2][“What need we a long exhortation, who are here for one and the same contest”: that is, “we are all engaged in one common cause, and should be mutually encouraged by the sight of each other”. Arn.]

[1][“The *throwers* of stones”. λιθοβόλοι, *lapidatores*, milites erant, qui saxa non fundis, sed manibus emittebant”. Goell.]

[1][“According to custom”. It is not meant that the Syracusans only offered the usual sacrifice. The Greeks in general always sacrificed before battle (see iv. 92, v. 10.); and waited to engage till the sacrifice was pronounced propitious: a custom which was of course turned to account by the general. At the battle of Plataæ, Pausanias induced the Lacedæmonians and Tegeetans to support with patience a murderous attack by the Persian archers, till the sacrifice appeared fair (Herod. ix. 61): that is, till the movement of the Persians gave him the opportunity for charging with advantage.]

[1][That is, winter. See the next chapter.]

[2][“Because the Syracusan horsemen being &c., *checked them, and* whensoever” &c.]

[3][?μως: “notwithstanding their defeat sent” &c.]

[4][Ut in patriam relata, ibi sepelirentur, ut arbitror: quod et de Themistoclis ossibus quidam prodiderunt, et de Eumene Plutarchus. Notus est ex omnibus scriptoribus hic mos veterum. Duk. For the bones of Themistocles, see also i. 138.]

[1][“And with the spoils of their enemies they returned” &c.]

[2][“And being moreover like men, if one may so say, without any knowledge of a trade (?διώτας) opposed to the most experienced of all Greece”. Arn.—“That they had also been *greatly* hurt” &c.]

[1][“And the disorder and anarchy of the many”: that is, “of the privates”.]

[2][“They were to have the better of their enemy: when to their courage, which they have already, should be added good order in action”.]

[3][τ? ρκιον: “*the* oath”. The usual oath of unlimited obedience, taken when any commander was invested with unlimited authority. Arnold.]

[4][“Both that an allied force might join them”. Arnold.]

[1][“For Alcibiades, upon leaving his command on being sent for home, knowing that he would have to fly, and being aware of what was about to be done, discovered” &c.]

[2][“First slew &c., and then falling into sedition and arming themselves, obtained” &c.]

[3][τ?ς ?πιπολ?ς; Anglice *Overton*. Epipolæ was the name of the steep and broken ground, that rose with a continual ascent from the city towards the western and inland parts: from whence was visible the whole interior of the city. Its highest part, and the ground immediately adjacent to it, consisted of three continuous hills, standing in a straight line. By the principal of these, Euryelus, which formed the extremity of Epipolæ, was the ascent from the parts about the river Anapus, and from the inland country, and from Megara, Thapsos, and Leon. Goell.—“including τ?ν τεμενίτην”: a name of Apollo, apparently so called from τέμενος, in like manner as Diana Nemorensis Aricii extra Romam from *nemus*. This name of Apollo, *Temenites*, became that of the quarter where his τε?μενος stood. And that it stood in Neapolis, which after the time of Thucydides became the name of this quarter of the city, appears from Cicero iv. Verr, 73. Goell.]

[1][See iii. 86.]

[2][“To be beforehand in accusing the Athenians”. Bekker &c., προδιαβαλε?ν: vulgo, προσδιαβαλε?ν.]

[1][?π? σ??ν: “of their own free choice”. Goell. Arn. Hobbes has taken “their colonies”, that is, “those descended from themselves”, from Portus and the Scholiast.]

[2][See i. 99.]

[1][“And seeing them wholly bent upon this, to draw some &c., and to cause some &c., and to beguile others as, finding apt matter to address to each, they best may”. Goeller.]

[2][“And think we, that if a neighbour, a distant one, perish before us, the danger will not reach us: but that he that has ill fortune before us, is the only one that is to be unlucky”?]

[1][“But by pretending to hate me (the Syracusan), to gain thereby the friendship (?κείνου) of the Sicilian that is the enemy of the Syracusan”. Goeller.]

[2][“Or *even* feareth us”.]

[3][“Possible”.]

[4][“To envy”.]

[1][?λόγως makes an antithesis to ε?λόγ?: which, as in many other cases, seems all that can be said for it.—“And you”, ε?λόγ? προ?άσει, “with a reasonable pretext, should aid your” &c.]

[1][“Especially as aid will be here from” &c.]

[2][“That forecast of yours, to aid neither forsooth, as being in league” &c. Bekker &c., προμήθειαν: vulgo, προθυμίαν.]

[3][ο?δε?ν ?ργον ε?ναι: “is of no profit”. Goeller.]

[1][“But the matter stands thus”. It cannot be said that the Ionians were ever enemies to the Dorians. Mueller (i. 8.) observes, that it is remarkable that during the whole of the time in which Sparta was founding her empire, (that is, down to the sixth century A.C.), we read of no serious contest between Dorians and Ionians: that Megara and Ægina carried on border-wars with Athens, but the whole race took no part in the contest: and that in regard to the important island of Salamis, Sparta in her character of umpire actually awarded the possession of it to Athens, to the great detriment of Megara.]

[1][“And having ourselves become the leaders (?γεμόνες) of those who were before subject to the king, we continue such: thinking that so having power to defend ourselves, we should be less in the power of the Peloponnesians, and, to speak plainly, having subdued, but not without just cause, the Ionians and islanders, &c. For they came” &c.—The Dorians of Asia, armed after the Hellenic fashion and sprung from Peloponnesus, furnished 30 ships. The Ionians, who so long as they were seated in what is now called Achaia, and before the coming of Danaus and Xuthus to Peloponnesus, were, as the Greeks say, called Ægialan Pelasgi, but in the time of Ion son of Xuthus, Ionians, furnished 100 ships, and the islanders 17: both armed after the Hellenic fashion. This was the Pelasgian race, which afterwards, as well as the 12

Ionic states from Athens, was called Ionic. The Æolians, armed after the Hellenic fashion, and anciently, as the Greeks say, called Pelasgi, furnished 60 ships. The Hellespontians, colonists of the Ionians and Dorians, (save those of Abydos, who were left by Xerxes to guard the bridge), furnished 100 ships, armed after the Hellenic fashion. Herod. vii. 93–5.]

[2][“And we use no specious phrases, as that we alone &c.; or that we have put ourselves into danger for the liberty of them (the Dorians and islanders) more than that of all Greece, our own amongst the rest. *But to seek means*” &c. Bekker &c., ο? καλλιεπούμεθα: vulgo, ο?κ ?λλ? ?πόμεθα.]

[1][“And let no one suppose that we be solicitous for those that are nothing to us; remembering, that so long as you be preserved, from the very fact of your being strong enough to make head against the Syracusans, we are less likely to be annoyed by their sending of forces to the Peloponnesians”.]

[2][It is reasonable”.]

[1][“For neither would it be easy even for us to deal with so great a force, when united in one; nor without us, would you find these here (the Syracusans) a feeble enemy”.]

[2][προσείοντες ?όβον: “the fear you held up before our eyes, was no other than this: that if we looked on and saw you got under by the Syracusans, we too should be in danger”. προσείειν dicuntur pastores, quum frondem manu quatientes, pecus quo volunt ducunt. Daker.]

[3][And therefore, such as a maritime power could not deal with.]

[4][That is, “than this power which we have brought here”.]

[1][“To move you, as if you were men that know not what you are about, against us” &c.]

[1][“For in every place, that even where we are not at hand, yet he that looketh &c., and he that contriveth &c., for the obvious expectation each hath, one of meeting with our aid, the other, that if we come we are like to put him in some jeopardy, they are both brought” &c.]

[2][“Refuse not therefore this security, both common to him that requires it, and now present to yourselves”.]

[1][“But fearing lest the Syracusans, that were near them, should even without their aid get the victory, they at the first sent *those* (το?ς) few horse: and now resolved for the future in *fact* rather to support the Syracusans, but as sparingly as possible; but for the present, that they might no less &c., in *words* to give equal answer to each”.]

[2][“And the Syracusans prepared themselves for the war. And the Athenians” &c.]

[3] [“But the scattered inhabitants of the inland parts, who had been from all time independent, agreed straightway, all but a few, with the Athenians”.—*α? ο?κήσεις*, a term chosen rather than *πόλεις*, or even *κ?μαί*, to denote the absolutely barbarian habits of those Sikeli, whose habitations had nothing in them approaching to civil union. Arn.]

[4] [“But others they were hindered (from forcing to come in) by the Syracusans sending garrisons and supporting them with succours”.]

[1] [*?ς τυρσηνίαν*.—If we search for the traces of their diffusion, the Pelasgi will appear to be one of the greatest nations of Europe: extending in their migrations almost as widely as the Celts. Thessalian, Sikelian, Tyrsenian, Pelasgian: these are only various names of a nation extending from the Po and Arno almost to the Bosphorus: and it was by no arbitrary fiction that Æschylus makes Pelasgus, son of *παλαίχθων*, boast that his people were masters of the whole country west of the Strymon. The regions of the east, again, were overrun with Pelasgic tribes. Lemnos, Imbros, and Samothrace, were well known Pelasgian settlements even down to the historical period: they inhabited Lesbos and Chios before the Greeks, and, as it is said, the whole of Ionia from Mycale and of Æolis. But all that was left in later times of this immense race, were detached and widely-scattered remnants, like those of the Celtic tribes in Spain: which, like them too, were conceived to be, not the fragments of a great people, but settlements formed, like those of the Greeks, by dispersed migrations and colonizations.—Tyrsenia was the name by which the Greeks, in early times, designated the whole of western Italy. We find a line of Tyrsenian settlements, whose Pelasgic origin is well established, along the whole coast of the sea, which thence derives its name, from Pisa down to the borders of Ænotria. In the historical age, however, the nation peculiarly so called by the Greeks were the Etruscans: with whom their colonies in Sicily and Italy were continually forming relations of war or peace, and whose fame stood high in Hellas itself for power, arts, and wealth. It was forgotten that the Etruscans, who called themselves *Rasena*, and appear to have been of Rætian (Rhætian) origin, and neither in language nor laws to have had the remotest resemblance to the Greeks or Pelasgi, had gotten the name of Tyrrhenians only by having conquered Tyrrhenia, and become the masters of those Tyrrhenians who did not quit their homes. And from Tyrrhenia retaining its name after this conquest, two entirely different races came to be called Tyrrhenians by the Greeks: the Pelasgi on the coast of Asia and the islands in the north of the Ægean, and the Etruscans. As to the former, it was evidently the custom at the time of the Peloponnesian war, to call the old Pelasgian inhabitants of Lemnos and Imbros Tyrsenian Pelasgi. They were the descendants of the Pelasgi, who, after the Dorian invasion, left Bœotia, and obtained for a time settlements in Attica on condition of labouring for the state (ii. 17, note). After ousting the Minyæ and abiding long in Lemnos and Imbros, being compelled by the Athenians to migrate anew, they shaped their course, some to the Hellespont, some to the coast of Thrace and the peninsula of Mount Athos. Hence Thucydides (iv. 109) says that Athos was inhabited by a Pelasgic race, the Tyrsenians who had previously settled in Attica and Lemnos. They came originally, as the story runs, from the south of Etruria: and must undoubtedly have called themselves Tyrsenians. Their first appearance however was in Acarnania: and all that Pausanias could learn of their extraction, was that they were Sikelians: a name which had extended across the Ionian

sea to Epirus. And the probability is that they came, not from the Tiber, but from Epirus: and the Pelasgic extraction of the Epirots having been forgotten in the time of Thucydides, they were the only Pelasgi then known in southern Hellas.—When the Greek settlements were founded in Italy, the Etruscans had not yet made their appearance. It is to the Pelasgi, and not to the Etruscans, we must refer the lines wherein Hesiod speaks of Agrius and Latinus as ruling the renowned Tyrsenians: and they must be the pirates that infested the western seas before the Greeks sent colonies to Sicily, and that with the Carthaginians (about 540 A. C.) defeated the Phocæans (see Herod. i. 166). Subsequently all the pirates of the lower sea seem to have been regarded by the Greeks as Tyrrhenians.—About 500 A.C. the Etruscans were at the height of their power, and commanded the whole Tyrrhenian sea. The defeat of their fleet by Hiero in 474, seems to have broken their maritime power: in the course of this century they lost the whole country beyond the Apennines, and in three centuries more were swallowed up in the Roman empire. See Niebuhr, *Ænolians and Pelasgi.*]

[1][“They endeavoured to move the *Italiots* not to disregard what the Athenians were about, as aimed equally at themselves”. Of the Italiots, the Tarentines and Locrians were connected by blood or alliance with the Peloponnesians: the Metapontians, Thurians, and Rhegians with the Athenians.]

[1][“Renounced your προξενίαν”: see iii. 70, note: and v. 43.]

[2][“To the wickeder measures”.]

[3][“We however became leaders of the democracy, thinking it reason in what form &c., in that to preserve it: (for such of us as have any judgment know &c.: but of confessed madness nothing new can be said): *and* we thought it not safe” &c.]

[1][“And concerning what you are to consult about, and I, if I know aught more than you, am to advise, hear it now”.]

[2][“The Italiots”.—“The dominion of Carthage”; that is, Sardinia, Corsica, and probably some of the states of Africa. Arn.]

[3][“If these, in whole or in part, succeeded, we were now to undertake Peloponnesus, having gained the accession of the whole power of the Greeks there, and hiring many of the barbarians” &c.]

[4][“With which besieging Peloponnesus round, and by attacks by land with our army at the same time, of the cities taking some by assault and some walling in” &c.]

[1][“For the Sicilians, though very inexpert, yet if they could closely unite, might even yet get the better: but that the Syracusans &c., and withal blockaded by the fleet, should withstand” &c.]

[2][“Unless this be done with speed, and an army be embarked for those parts, of such as” &c.]

[1][That is, the live and dead stock; slaves, cattle, trees, &c. Arn.]

[2][The courts of justice would be closed, the citizens' whole time being occupied with the war: and the state would thereby lose the fees and fines arising from the suits of its own citizens, and what is more serious, from the suits of their allies, who were obliged to resort to the tribunals at Athens. Boeckh. See v. 18, note.]

[1][“I retain not my love of country, wherein I am wronged by it, but wherein I lived in safety in it as one of the citizens”.]

[1][περιορώμενοι: “had delayed it *through circumspection*”.]

[2][“Sending forthwith”.]

[3][“And appointing Gylippus, the son of Cleandridas, commander of the Syracusans”.]

[1][“To send both *the* money and *the* horsemen”.]

[2][“*The* 250 horsemen”: those mentioned in the last chapter.]

[1][“*And* after this”.]

[2][“And the same summer, not long after”.]

[3][“And the Thebans coming to help, were part apprehended and part escaped” &c. Bekker and the rest, θηβαίων: vulgo, ?θηναίων.]

[4][“*Overhanging* the city”.]

[5][“For that in no other way could they get up. For the rest of the place” &c.]

[6][Anglice, *Overton*.]

[1][“*And* they first set apart”.]

[2][“And the Athenians on the morrow of the same night (that is, at the same time with the Syracusans) were reviewing their army: (they had unperceived put in with their army from Catana at the place called Leon, distant from Epipolæ six or seven stadia, and had landed their infantry, and stationed their fleet at Thapsos, a peninsula projecting with a narrow isthmus into the sea, not far distant from Syracuse either by sea or land): and their naval forces had palisadoed the isthmus, and were lying quiet in Thapsos”.]

[3][“Saw them or could come to them” &c.]

[4][“Disorderly manner”.]

[1][A continuation of the tumuli at the summit of Epipolæ, perhaps so called from its resemblance to the Greek letter *lambda*. Goell.]

[2][“*And Naxians*”.]

[3]A temple of Fortune, part of the city. [σὺκ?: by Livy and Cicero written *Tyca* and *Tycha*. The latter (Verr. iv.) speaks of a temple of Fortune existing in that district.—The “wall in a circle” is the wall of circumvallation.]

[1][?υλ? μία: “one *tribe*”. From this, amongst other passages, it appears that the Athenians observed the custom, common amongst other nations, of retaining the distinction of tribes in the arrangement of their army. The same appears of the Messenians, in iii. 90: of the Spartans, in v. 15: and of the Syracusans, vi. 100. So at the battle of Marathon, the Athenians were arranged in their tribes (Herod. vi. 111). And Nestor, in Il. ii. 362, bids Agamemnon separate the men by tribes and phratriæ, “so that tribe may support tribe, and phratria phratria”. Hence the word ?ύλοπις is used by Homer for μάχη, or battle.]

[2][“The Athenians fell to work upon the northern part of their wall of circumvallation”.]

[1][“Were as yet masters”.]

[2][?υλ?ν μίαν: see ch. 98, note. Arnold believes there is no information of the number of tribes at Syracuse: for though at Corinth there were eight, this would be no rule for its colony, placed under such different circumstances, and receiving from time to time such numbers of new citizens: and as in ch. 72, the number of generals appears to be fifteen, it may be supposed that as in Athens the generals were ten, corresponding to the ten tribes, and the same in other democratical states, so in Syracuse the tribes were fifteen. Of the aqueduct, or conduit, the traces are yet extant.]

[1][Πυλίς, modo est portula munimenti alicujus, per quam milites præsidii exeunt et intrans, plerumque palis a subito hostium impetu munita: modo, est portula postica mœnium urbis. Hic, πυλίς est portula partis urbis, quæ ex Temenite in Epipolas ferebat. Goeller.]

[2][“Beginning *from* their wall of circumvallation”. It was already begun in ch. 99.—Hanc celeritatem circummunitionis si quis cum Plutarcho miretur, comparet Epipolas viginti diebus muro triginta stadiorum circumdatas apud Diodorum xiv. 18: comparet ingentia opera circa Carthaginem spatio viginti dierum noctiumque a Scipione ducta, et obsidionem Numantiæ. Goeller. See Plutarch. Nicias, 17.]

[1][“*By the river*”: that is, towards the bridge.]

[2][“But the Syracusans fearing to be prevented, and also having there the greater part of their horsemen, set upon” &c.]

[3][? πρώτη ?υλακ?. Velim doceri quænam in pugna sit πρώτη ?υλακ? cornuum. Interim suspicari licebit, fortassis legendum esse ?υλ?: vide cap. 98. Duk. Arnold has adopted ?υλ?.]

[1][“And being deserted by all but a few of those that had passed the ditch with him, was slain with” &c.]

[2][Beyond the river they were in safety, having possession of the Olympieium. See chap. 75.]

[3]The plether, according to Suidas, contains 68 cubits. [The cubit was a foot and a half: the plethron is said by Goeller to be 100 feet.]

[1][“*For* the present ill success” &c.]

[1][“Went first on an embassy from Tarentum to Thurii, on the strength of his father’s having been a citizen of the latter place”. Both father and son are a striking example of the singular venality of the Spartan character. The father Cleandridas, the counsellor of king Pleistoanax (v. 16), was charged with receiving a bribe from Pericles (A. C. 445) to withdraw their army, when invading Attica after the battle of Coroneia (iii. 68, note). Cleandridas fled from his trial, was condemned to death in his absence, and finished his days in a voluntary exile. The son Gylippus, charged with a like offence, ended his life by starvation. The difficulty is, not merely to account for an unusually strong propensity to a vice, which seems to have prevailed amongst kings, gerontes, ephors, generals, all alike: but to explain how the practice could exist consistently with the banishment from the state of the precious metals. Of its universal prevalence the oracle leaves no doubt: ? ?λοχρηματία σπάρταν ?λε?, ?λλο δε? ο?δέν, “avarice, and nothing else, will be the ruin of Sparta”. See Herm. § 46.—Cleandridas had been of eminent service to the Thurians, in concluding a peace between them and the Tarentines, with whom they were at war: which was followed in 433 by the founding of Heracleia. The earliest mention of the Lucanians is on the occasion of the skill and courage displayed by him in leading the Thurians against them. But in 389 the Thurians were defeated, and almost exterminated near Laos, of which the Lucanians had made themselves masters. See Niebuhr, vol. i. p. 96.]

[1][“By a wind sitting in the north”: that is, blowing *from* the north. The words κατ’ τὴν τερινᾶρον κολπον, are incapable of explanation, and by Goeller are included in brackets.]

[2][“And that rather about the rest of Peloponnesus, than into Laconia”.]

[1][These Locrians, who take their name from the promontory Epizephyrium, were for the most part descendants of the Ozolian and Opuntian Locrians: but Syracusans contributed largely to the foundation of their city; besides which the Spartans are said to have colonized Locri in the first Messenian war. It may therefore be considered as a Doric state: its constitution was oligarchical, and in this state as well as Opus are found the hundred families, which by virtue of their nobility enjoyed a large share of the government: their dialect moreover was Doric. They were governed by the laws given to them by Zaleucus about 650 A. C.: the earliest written code which existed in Greece. See Muel. iii. 11.]

[1][“And *certain* of the Sikeli”.]

[1][“For they understood that he was already near”.]

[1][“And he chanced to come at the critical moment, at which the Athenians had already finished a double wall reaching to the great harbour, of seven or eight stadia: save” &c.]

[2][That is, the rock which separated Tycha and Neapolis.]

[1][πρὸς τὴν γκαρῶσιον: “towards the cross wall of the Syracusans”. that is, so as to meet the *former* cross wall, which had been taken by the Athenians, vi. 100. Göl.—“towards the cross wall of the *Athenians*”: that is, their wall of circumvallation, which ran *across* this new wall. Thirl.—“in a cross direction”: that is, across the Athenian wall. Arn.]

[2][“Retreated hastily”.]

[3]The lesser haven, [Laccius].

[1][“And his fighting galleys”.]

[2][“At Polichne near the Olympieum”. Goeller.]

[3][“Using the stones which the Athenians had before laid there for themselves: and kept the Syracusans and their allies continually drawn out and in battle array in advance of the wall. And the Athenians, on the other side, &c.”]

[1][“The wall which was now drawing near to theirs”.]

[2][“And proceeding, would make it all one to the Athenians whether they fought and conquered, or whether they fought not”: that is, victory would no longer be of any use to them. Goell.]

[1][“Helped the Syracusans to build up to the cross wall”: that is, the wall of the Athenians, which crossed the Syracusan wall. In the last chapter, the Syracusans are said to have already brought their wall beyond the Athenian wall: which Goeller explains, by supposing that in their haste they built the extremity at the Athenian line first, and the Corinthians now helped them to fill up the interval.]

[1][Bekker &c., μνήμη: “of memory”. Goell. Arn. vulgo, γνώμη.]

[1][There were three different secretaries. The secretary of the Prytaneium, who was chosen by lot, and changed with each Prytaneia: he had charge of the votes and proceedings of the council. Another was elected by the council, to take charge of the laws. The third, the one here meant, was chosen by the people, and read documents, when necessary, to the assembly and the council. Herm. § 127.]

[2][“In other messages”. In his last edition Bekker has included in brackets the word πολλάς. Goeller observes that the Athenians had not yet been twelve months in Sicily; and the passage being four months (see vi. 21), Nicias could scarcely in that

time have sent *many* messages.—Consistently with ch. 8, the word *πιστολας* must be taken in the sense of *oral* despatches. Thirl.]

[3][“We now sit still: (for we cannot have the use of our whole army &c.): and they have built” &c.]

[1][“And let none think it so great a matter that they should attack us even by sea. For though” &c.]

[2][“Are now leaky”.]

[3][*διαψυξαι*: naves subductas siccare. Hemsterh. ad Lucian. Cont.]

[4][“Keep us in continual expectation of an assault. And they are manifestly practising themselves; and it is in their own choice” &c.]

[1][*θεράποντες*. “*ministri nautarum*”: sic *θεράποντες* militum sunt, iv. 16. Goeller.]

[2]These were they which Nicias, upon the taking of Hyccara, made sale of himself. [See vi. 62.]

[1][“Nor get supplies for the ships from any place, (which the enemy &c.), but our stock in hand and our daily consumption are limited to what we brought with us”. Arn.]

[2][“Consideration: *for* I &c.”]

[1][Haack. Popp. Thirl. Arn. “120”.—Goell. Bekk. “20”.]

[1][“In ships of burthen”.]

[2][“The first breach of the peace was in them” (the Athenians).]

[3][“*Rather* from their own side”.]

[1][For this expedition, see vi. 105.]

[2][“Very early indeed”.]

[1][“About 120 stadia”.]

[2][*νεοδαμωδον*: see v. 34, note.]

[1][“Thirty galleys”.]

[2][“With order to go also to Argos, and summon on shipboard, according to the league, the *hoplitæ* of the Argives”.]

[3][“As many of the islanders as they could get from all sides, and from the rest of their allies, their subjects, getting whatsoever they might have of use for the war”.]

[1][“They (the Syracusans) too, may in like manner strike the same fear into them”.]

[2][He marched out of the city by Epipolæ, descended into the plain in the rear of the Athenian lines, crossed the Anapus, and came upon Plemmyrium along the table-land extending from the sea to the fort and temple of Olympieium. Arn.]

[1][“From the dock-yard”.]

[2][“And the men in the first taken fort, so many at least as escaped to certain boats and merchant-ships, with some difficulty reached the camp: for the Syracusans at this time having the best of the fight with the ships in the great haven, they were chased by one nimble galley”.—“The camp”, that is, the camp which the Athenians had in the double-wall from the crag of Temenites to the sea, where, as appears in chap 11, was stationed a part of their army. And to keep up the communication between Plemmyrium and the double-wall, they still kept a naval camp in the bay (μυχ?) of the great haven near Dascon: for that all their ships did not remove to Plemmyrium, appears from eh. 4 and 53. To that naval camp first of all, therefore, betook themselves the fugitives from Plemmyrium; and thence to the double-wall. Goell.]

[1][“Their old (νεωσοίκων) docks under cover”: wherein ships were built or repaired. νεώρσιον (ch. 22) the “dock-yard”: ?πίνειον, a “town having a dock-yard”. See ii. 84, i. 30, and the scholiast. Goell.]

[1][μυριατόρον: “of the burthen of ten thousand *talents*”; or, according to those who use the form μυριαμτόρον, of ten thousand *amphoræ*: the burthen of ships being reckoned in both talents and amphoræ.]

[2][“Dragged them up”.]

[3][“The covered docks”.]

[4][“So that it was dangerous to sail near them, lest not seeing them one should be stranded as on a rock”.]

[5][That is to say, in Sicily.]

[1][“To where is the temple of Apollo, opposite to Cythera of Laconia”. Cythera was also the name of a town in Cyprus.]

[1][“Of the Thracian sword-men of the Dian race”. See ii. 96.]

[2][“With garrisons that infested the country by turns”.]

[1][“And the city was obliged to bring from abroad all things alike: and instead of a city &c. For the Athenians were harrassed both summer and winter, with watching on the battlements” &c.]

[1][The exhaustion of her allies, brought about by the extraordinary war-taxes imposed over and above the standing tribute, obliged Athens at this time to commute all their taxes into one of a twentieth of all imports and exports. Herm. § 166.—This continued to be paid to the end of the war. Goell.]

[2][“And in the evening going over” &c.]

[3][“At day-break he cometh to the city, being *no* great one”. Bekk. &c., ο? μεγαλ?: vulgo ο? deest.]

[1][“Other no small disorder”.]

[2][Popp. Goell. Arn.: ?ξω τοξεύματος, “out of bow-shot”: vulgo et Bekk.: ?ξω ζεύγματος, “beyond the *bridge* over the Euripus”. — The corrupt (the latter) reading maintained its hold on the MSS. the more easily, that in the time of the lower empire there was a bridge over the Euripus, which was naturally called ζε?γμα. But it is absurd to suppose that the Athenians would have made Eubœa accessible by land, when it was so important to her to keep it under the protection of her navy. Arnold.—“*For* in the rest of the retreat” &c. Their loss was greatest in getting aboard: not great in the rest of the retreat, *because* they behaved therein not amiss.]

[1][μέρος τι: “a considerable part of the whole”. Goell. Arn.]

[2][“*To* Corcyra”. Bekker &c. ?π?: vulgo, ?κ.]

[3][“Arriving at”.]

[1][“He met with Eurymedon returning from Sicily; who had at the time before-mentioned in winter taken the supply of money to the army, and had been sent back: who told him &c.” He was despatched to Sicily at the winter solstice (see ch. 16): his arrival in Sicily is not noticed. Goeller says it was now the end of June: which gives six months for the voyage to Sicily and back]

[2][“And were about to fight”.]

[3][They send away ten galleys “with Conon: and go themselves about completing the assembling of their army”. The galleys at Naupactus were originally 20: see ch. 17.]

[1][Selinus and Himera are particularly meant, whose route lay along the southern coast. Arn.]

[2][“Sent them a navy to the number of five ships”.]

[3][“Almost all Sicily”.]

[1][“Having their army from Corcyra and the continent now ready, crossed the Ionian sea with &c.”—Iapygia embraced the southeastern part of Italy, according to the more ancient writers, from Metapontum, or including that city, from the Siris to mount

Garganus, or as the Greeks called it, mount Drion; which seems to have been the southern limit of Ombrica in their early geography. This extensive country is said by the Greeks to have been inhabited by three distinct tribes, the Messapians, the Peucetians, and the Daunians: by the first, on the peninsula to the east of Tarentum; by the Peucetians, to the north of them along the coast from Brundisium to Barium; between which and mount Garganus lay the Daunians. The name *Iapygia* is the same with Apulia: the Latin termination *icus* in Appicus, which is the same as Apulus, being contracted in Oscan into *ix*; thus making *Apix*. No good Roman writer would ever say *Iapygia* instead of *Apulia*: nor any good Greek writer the reverse. Niebuhr.]

[2][Metapontum was founded by a body of Achæans, at the invitation of Sybaris: herself also of Achæan origin and mistress of the country afterwards called Lucania, and the founder of Posidonia (Pæstum) and Laos. By the industrious cultivation of her highly fertile territory Metapontum afterwards attained to extraordinary wealth. She became united with Sybaris and Croton and their four colonies in a league similar to the Achæan league. The extraordinary city Sybaris, which has received opprobrium probably altogether unmerited, at all events much exaggerated, was in 510 A.C. utterly destroyed by Croton: the first irremediable wound sustained by Magna Græcia, followed by a bloody revolution in which Croton wore herself out.—The Messapians, who had extended their dominion far into Ænотria, had become before the present time the object of jealousy and alarm to the neighbouring tribes: and the Peucetians and Daunians, leagued with the Tarentines, had destroyed their power. They were still the enemies of the Tarentines, and as such therefore the friends of the Athenians. Niebuhr. See also Muell. ii. 3.]

[1][“About the same time the Peloponnesians in the twenty–five galleys, who to cover the passage to Sicily of the transports were lying opposite to the galleys in Naupactus, having made ready for action and manned some additional galleys, so as they were &c.”]

[2][That is, the Achaians; who had now all sided with Sparta. Arn.]

[1][“Were struck and stove in on the bows by the heads of the Corinthian galleys, which had their *epotides* made stouter for this very object”. The *epotides*, literally *earcaps*, were two beams projecting from the bows for holding the beak.]

[2][“Thought they had the better, if they had not &c.; and the Athenians thought &c.”]

[1][The Crotoniatæ, according to Herodotus (viii. 47), were by race Achæans: but Mueller observes that the colony must have been established under the authority of Sparta; Apollo and Hercules, the Doric god and hero, being both worshipped there with especial honour, and the early constitution being also Doric. Croton was the soil whereon Pythagoras made the experiment of his real aristocracy. The single galley sent by this state to assist the Greeks at the battle of Salamis, was the sole instance of support given to their cause by any state beyond the limits of Greece: Herod. *ibid.*—Thurii was a scion of Sybaris, also an Achæan colony and contemporaneous with Croton (A.C. 710). About sixty years after the overthrow and destruction of their

city by Croton, the descendants of the exiled Sybarites succeeded in again forming a settlement on its site: but in a few years were again forced to fly by the jealousy of Croton. The exiles now applied for help to Sparta and Athens: and by the latter state were favourably received. Under the usual guidance of an oracle, the new city, called Thurii from a fountain which rose there, was built with geometrical regularity near the former site of Sybaris. Amongst the new settlers were Herodotus the historian, and Lysias the orator. The Sybarite exiles, however, not being content to live on terms of equality with the new settlers, dissensions arose, in which the former are said to have been exterminated. The remaining Thurians then invited adventurers to join them from Greece on terms of perfect equality. In imitation of the Athenians, they divided themselves into ten tribes, named after the different nations of which the colony was composed. Of these, four represented Athens, Ionia, Eubœa, and the islands; three Peloponessus; and three the north of Greece. See Thirl. ch. xviii.]

[1][“And placed in the bows thick epotides, supported by beams running along them to the sides of the galley, six cubits long both within and without”: that is, six cubits within the galley, and six without.]

[1][περίπλουν, διέκπλουν: see i. 49, note.]

[2][“If driven back, could make no *anacrousis* save to the land”:—“that, namely, opposite their own camp”. The Syracusans were in possession of all the rest of the shore of the harbour: and the short distance of the line of battle from the shore would not admit of performing the *anacrousis* (see i. 49, note) with proper effect.]

[3][“Wherein to execute the *anacrousis*”.]

[1][“The Syracusans having thus adapted their plans to their present knowledge and power”. What in ordinary cases would be bad seamanship, was well suited to the case of the Syracusans. Arnold, Goeller.]

[2][“Against so much of it as fronted the city”.]

[3][“And straight hereupon”.]

[1][“Such as had any damage: and moored ships of burthen without the piles &c.” It appears that there were several of these ships.]

[2][“Two plethra”: see vi. 102, n.]

[3][“The same manner of attack”.]

[1][πρύμναν κρουσάμενοι: “retreating”. ?νακρούσασθαι, to row astern in order to charge again; πρύμναν κρούσασθαι, in order to retreat.]

[2][Vulgo, ?μύνοντο: Bekk. om.]

[1][Through the port-holes, which were large enough to admit at least a man’s head: see Herod. v. 33.]

[2] ["From the beams". These beams seem to have been of considerable size, and the whole engine powerful enough to break clean through any galley on which the dolphin fell. — The ships were moored, not abreast, but one after another in two files. Goell.]

[3] ["With the foreign ships".]

[1] ["The cross wall of the Syracusans". Bekker &c., παρατειχίσματος: vulgo, ποτειχίσματος. Thucydides carefully distinguishes the former word, by which he always means the cross wall of the Syracusans, from the latter, which he applies to the Athenian wall of circumvallation. See Lucian. de Conscr. Hist. c. 38. Goell.]

[1] ["Advancing". At Euryelus they were already at the summit of the heights.—The fortification taken was apparently on the very crest of the slope, on or near the spot which the Athenians had formerly fortified at Labdalum. Arn.]

[2] ["One of *the* Syracusans, one of *the* other Sicilians", &c. The three camps appear to have been formed immediately under the walls of the city. The six hundred Syracusans were probably stationed higher on the slope, perhaps at the point where the cross wall terminated. Arn. Goell.]

[3] [τς τ? πρ?όσθεν: that is, they marched on without staying to take the cross wall.—π? τς πρώτης, "in their first course", is unexplained.]

[1] ["*And* desiring".]

[2] ["Could any one *have known*" &c.: apte ad hunc locum. Goeller, Arnold.]

[3] ["Others, not worsted".]

[4] ["For all before them, the flight having taken place, was already in confusion, and it was hard &c."]

[1] ["When they were once thrown into confusion, falling" &c.—The pæan varied according to the tribe. All Dorians, as Spartans, Argives, Corinthians, and Syracusans, had the same. Muell. ii. 6.]

[1] [That is to say, at Euryelus: see ch. 2.]

[2] ["To bring over the city, and induce it to send succours". π?άγεσθαι is well explained by Reiske, "perducere veluti vitulum ostensa fronde". Arn. Goell.]

[3] ["To the rest of Sicily". Bekker &c., τς τ?ν ?λλην Σικελίαν: vulgo, τς Σ.]

[1] ["Discouragement".]

[2] ["Demosthenes *therefore* was of opinion &c: *but*, as he was minded even when the attempt was hazarded at Epipolæ, so, since it had failed, he gave his vote for losing no time in going off, whilst the sea" &c.]

[3][“Was unwilling in terms to confess their weakness”.]

[1][“For they would wear them out by want of money; especially being now, with their present fleet, more decidedly masters at sea”.]

[2][“Cry out that their affairs were desperate”.]

[3][“That he at any rate”.]

[4][?δί?: “in his own person”.]

[1][?ν περιπολίους: see vi. 45, n.]

[2][“They were badly off now, and in course of time would not know how to get on”.]

[3][“And as soon as ever they fail in the pay of any part of their forces, be it never so inconsiderable, their affairs are ruined”.]

[4][“In saying this, Nicias’ reliance was upon his knowing” &c. It is manifest from the last chapter, that he did not disclose his intrigues with the party in Syracuse.]

[5][Nicias relied on his knowing &c: “and was encouraged, as on the former occasion, by his confidence in the fleet”. Goell. Duker says of this passage, “hæc mihi ænigmata sunt”.]

[6][“They *must* rise and go” &c.]

[1][“Whence with their landmen they might overrun much of the country and subsist themselves, whilst they weakened their enemies by wasting their territory”. Bekker &c., θρέψονται: vulgo, τρέπονται.]

[2][“The confidence”.]

[3][“The party that was for friendship with the Syracusans had been driven out”. Goell. Arn.]

[1][A people to the west of Barca, and to the north of the Auschisæ. Herod. iv. 171.]

[2][“Their own affairs”.]

[3][That is to say, he did not wish a council of war to be held, at which the taxiarchs and trierarchs would be present, and the question decided by open voting. And the generals being ἀποκράτορες, (having absolute authority), might act on their own responsibility. Arn.]

[4][“Looking upon it as ominous, called” &c. Pericles, who had gained from Anaxagoras some more correct notions of the heavenly bodies than were common in his time, had ventured on the occasion of the expedition about Peloponnesus in 430

(ii. 56) to disregard an eclipse of the sun: and explained its real cause, by showing that the same effect was produced by a cloak held up between the sun and the eyes of the bystanders. But the nature of an eclipse of the moon was still less generally understood. Unfortunately the astronomer Meton did not accompany the expedition, having, it is said, feigned madness to avoid it: and one of the most intelligent among the soothsayers, Stilbides, was lately dead. Still, if none of the rest could have been found to declare, as appears to have been the opinion of Philochorus, one learned on those questions (Plut. Nicias), that for a retreating army the veiling of one of the celestial luminaries was an auspicious sign, three days' delay was commonly held sufficient. But the soothsayers of Nicias enjoined that the retreat should be deferred for three times nine days, that is, till the next full moon. See Thirl. ch. 26. There is some difference of opinion whether "three", or "three times nine days" is the proper reading: founded mainly upon a passage of Diodorus.]

[1][“And after essaying themselves”. Bekker &c., ἡνεπειρῆντο: some MSS., ἡνεπαύοντο.]

[1][“And putting to flight the rest, beat them back” &c.]

[2][“And this day, the Syracusans retreated. But the next day they came out with their galleys seventy–six in number; and at the same time marched against the fortifications with their infantry. And the Athenians set forth” &c.]

[3][“To the causeway”.—χηλῆ is here not an artificial mole, but one of the prominencies forming and embracing the bay near Dascon. Goell.—After following the citywall for some way, till it turned off in an inland direction, the χηλῆ then continued along the edge of the harbour: forming a sort of narrow causeway between the sea on one side, and the marshy ground on the other. And the ground being thus narrow, the Syracusans, as soon as they were beaten, were naturally driven off the causeway into the marshy ground on their right–hand, called the marsh of Lysimeleia. Arn.]

[1][“But the Tyrseni, who &c, made head: and charging the first they met, forced &c”.]

[2][“Some few”. Bekker &c., οἱ πολλοίς: vulgo, om. οἱ.]

[3][“*Even* their fleet”.]

[1][“Were utterly out of heart, and great was their dismay: but far greater still their repenting of the voyage”.]

[2][See vi. 36, note.]

[3][“Might no longer” &c.]

[4][“Should be straightway one part freed”.]

[1][“Having opened the way to the greatest part of it themselves. *For* the greatest number” &c. προκόψαντες, a metaphor taken from cutting a way before one through a forest. Arn. Goell.]

[2][“For so many as follows, on both sides, against Sicily and for it, those with the Athenians to help win, and those with the Syracusans to help save it, came to the war at Syracuse, not siding with each other according to justice or kindred, but rather as profit” &c.]

[3][Lemnos and Imbros (Herod. v. 26) were in the reign of Darius at the close of the sixth century A.C. still occupied by the Pelasgians who migrated thither from Attica (see vi. 88, note). Lemnos was colonized with Athenians by Miltiades some years before the battle of Marathon (Herod. vi. 140): and Imbros may have been colonized by him in his flight from the Chersonese to Athens (ibid. 41).]

[1][“And moreover the Hestiaeans, dwelling in Hestiae in Euboea: all of the same language” &c.—For the Aeginetæ, see ii. 27: and for the Hestiaeans, see i. 114.]

[2][See iv. 54, note. Herodotus (viii. 46) reckons the Styrians amongst the Dryopes.]

[3][“Yet *at any rate* as Ionians against Dorians they still followed”. Popp. Goell. Arn. ὠνέξ γε: vulgo et Bekk. τε.]

[4][See iii. 2, note.]

[5][καταντικρ?: “being outright Bœotians”: not like the Methymnæans, descended from a common stock, but actual Bœotians themselves. Arn. But see iii. 61, note.]

[1][For Rhodes, see iii. 104, note: Cythera, iv. 53, 54.]

[2][“As they pretended”.

[3][See iv. 66–74.]

[4][“Each man’s present particular *interest*”. Bekker &c., ἡεῖλιας: vulgo deest. Valla has “utilitatis”.]

[1][“Were *also* mercenary”.]

[2][“That the Cretans, who &c., unwillingly for their hire, came not with, but against their colony”. Bekker &c., ἡκοντας: Valla, *ultro*.—“And some of the Acarnanians, for love of gain but more for love of Demosthenes” &c.]

[3][“Of Italiots the Thurians and Metapontians, as having been overtaken in *such* necessities at that time, necessities belonging to seditious times, went with them”. Necessities *such*, as to force them to fly their country and join the Athenians. Arn. Goell.]

[4][“Of the Sikeli”. Bekker &c., σικελῶν: vulgo, σικελιωτῶν.]

[1][“The Sikeli alone, all” &c.]

[2][“Sent them a Spartan general, but the rest neodamodes and helots: (now *neodamode* is equivalent to *freeman*): then aided” &c. See *Neodamodes*, v. 34, note.]

[3][Sicyon was reduced by Sparta in 418: see v. 81.]

[1][“And their allies”. Bekker &c.]

[2][ταξίαρχοι: see iv. 4, note. It seems to be the opinion of Schœmann, as cited by Goeller, that the taxiarch of the tribe commanded the hoplitæ of his tribe in the field.]

[3][“No greater than they needs must for their baggage and their sick, near” &c. By the “camp above”, is meant the upper extremity of the Athenian lines, where they extended to the κρημνός, the cliff of Epipolæ, and were most distant from the sea-shore. The Athenians were now, as observed by Nicias, more like a besieged than a besieging army: the enemy having a free communication with the surrounding country by means of Epipolæ, whilst their cavalry, with a safe retreat at Olympieium, could act on the rear of the Athenian lines, and prevent them from getting provisions. Arn. Goell.]

[1][“And *such* a purpose”: of gaining the victory, not by skill, but by the landsmen on board. Arnold, Goeller.]

[2][“And first of all exhorted”. Bekker &c., τε: vulgo, τότε.]

[1][“*And* we ought not to be discouraged”.]

[2][“We have also devised what was called for to fit our ships to encounter the thick epotides of the enemy, which did most &c.”.]

[1][“If the marines do” &c.]

[2][“In us”. Bekker &c.]

[3][“And to bear in mind that pleasure, how worthy it is to be preserved, that being taken” &c. This is addressed to the *metæci*, who formed a large part of the seamen of the Athenian navy. Of these the ἠστοτελεῖς stood nearly on the footing of Athenian citizens (see ii. 31, note). But that they received *more* protection from injury than the citizens, or were in any respect better off, seems to be considered as an exaggeration. They had not in fact the full rights of citizens.]

[1][Undergone “what you have”.]

[1][“Of having overcome the strongest and being therefore” &c.]

[2][ἠκόντισται χερσαῖοι. Such as being upon land could use their darts, but not tottering upon the water.]

[3][“Sitting still”: that is, motionless as they will be. Goell. Arn.]

[4]That is, according to the motion of the galley, not steadily as upon land.

[5][“And very easy to injure with the devices adopted by us”: that is, the thick epotides &c.]

[1][“Most lawful against enemies, to justify, as vengeance taken upon a future aggressor, the satiating of the mind’s desire, but also that we shall have the opportunity of avenging ourselves on our enemy, said to be the sweetest” &c. Goell.]

[2]The name of subject.

[1][“But that it were an honourable struggle, to effect, as is likely we shall, what we intend, to be revenged &c. And those are the rarest of hazards, wherein” &c.]

[2][?κπεπληγμένος: terrified.]

[3][“Their country, the most free in the word, and the uncontrolled power *in it* of all men” &c.:—“not caring though they seem to utter things stale, *although* on all occasions the same” &c. Goell.]

[1][“Putting forth of their own station”.—The words, “and to the passage” &c., are considered by Poppo and Goeller to be an interpolation: it not appearing that there was any such passage, and the word *διέκπλουν*, in Thucydides, always meaning some naval evolution.]

[2][“Of the mouth of the harbour”.]

[1][?πότε, “whenever”.]

[2][“Also the marines, when &c., did their best that the service on deck might not be behind the rest of the skill displayed”.]

[3][“The (?μβολα?) charges on the enemy’s side, owing to there being no room for anacrousis or diecplous, were few: whilst the (προσβολα?) running aboard of each other, as one galley might chance to fall foul of another in flight or attack, were far more frequent”. See i. 49, note.]

[4][?π’ α?τ?v: “against it”.]

[1][“Of what their *keleustæ* said. For loud was the exhorting, and loud the shouting on both sides amongst the *keleustæ*”. See ii. 84, n.]

[2][“Which they had with no small labour made themselves masters of”. Bekk. Goell. Arn., ο? δι’?λίγου πόνου: vulgo, om. πόνου.]

[1][“During this doubtful conflict on the water, the army on the shore of both sides had also their struggle and contention of mind”.]

[2][“And were thereby” &c. Considered to be a corrupt passage.]

[3][“Moving their bodies in their extreme fear in sympathy with their thoughts, passed their time as ill as the worst of them”. Arn.]

[1][“All that were not taken on the water, reaching the shore escaped to the camp”.]

[2][“The same *impulse*”.]

[3][“Consternation”.]

[4][“*By* the loss &c., lost also” &c.]

[1][That is, how to retreat *by land*. “*But Demosthenes*” &c.]

[2][As Dorians, the Syracusans worshipped the Dorian hero Hercules.]

[1][“They would most of them be drinking in the feast: and that they might expect to persuade them to any thing rather than at this time to take up arms &c.”]

[2][“And having so said, they went their way: and the Athenians reported what they had heard to their generals; who suspecting no fraud, upon this report abode that night”.]

[1][“And the rest at their leisure and without opposition they towed away wheresoever each had drifted, and hauled” &c.]

[2][“Not on one account only”.]

[3][“That were left behind, both wounded and sick, were to the living far more grievous than the dead”.]

[1][“*Departing* comrades”.]

[2][“And in this straight”.]

[3][“And besides their grief there was a general dissatisfaction with themselves: for they seemed” &c.—“of a city expugned, and that no small one. For the whole number that marched” &c.]

[4][“Who before this, but now in greatest numbers, ran over” &c. It must be borne in mind, that the Greek soldier did not, like the Roman, carry his own provisions.]

[5][“The rest of their ignominy”:—“*especially* considering from what splendour and glory” &c.]

[1][“Omens”. Goell.]

[1] [“And surveying yourselves, your men of arms how good, and in your ranks how many you are, despair not too much, but consider that wheresoever you please to sit down” &c.]

[2] [“By winning it, he will thereby gain both country and walls”.]

[1] [“They have been sent to and told to meet us”. Bekker &c., προπέπεμπται: vulgo, προπέμπετε.]

[2] [“The *rest* of you shall see again &c., and you, Athenians, shall re-erect &c.”]

[3] [“And they marched arranged in a hollow oblong, the division of Nicias *leading the way*, and that of Demosthenes following”. Bekker &c., πρῶτον μετὰ γούμενον: vulgo desunt.]

[1] [“And were cutting off”: that is, during this halt of the Athenians.]

[2] [λέπας, according to Goeller, signifies *rupes*: “the top of the rock”.—It must be remembered, that the object of the Athenians was to penetrate far enough into the interior to reach the country of the Sikeli. This they attempted in the first instance to effect, by ascending one of the valleys which fall into that of the Anapus: but being unable to force their passage in this direction, they fell back upon the coast, intending to follow the coast-road through the low country near the sea till they should arrive at another valley, when they would again turn inland, and make a second attempt to penetrate to their friends the Sikeli. Arn.]

[1] [“And sought to force and win the hill” &c. Goell.—“embattled in great *depth* above” &c.]

[2] [“More towards the plain”.]

[1] [“The miserable estate &c., both *from* the want &c. and *from* many being wounded, to leave burning all the fires they could and lead away the army as far &c.”—It being now manifest that to reach the Sikelian country by the valley from Syracuse, was utterly hopeless, the generals resolved to change the line of retreat, and to penetrate into the interior by the valley of the Cacyparis, terminating on the sea-coast about six or seven miles to the southward of the Anapus. To effect this they proposed to gain a march upon the enemy by setting out at night, and falling back towards the sea till they came into the road from Syracuse to Helorus: and then to follow this road in a direction parallel to the coast, till they reached the Cacyparis, when they would turn again to the right and once more move towards the interior. Arnold.]

[2] [“A panic seized them”.]

[1] [Finding the enemy already on the Cacyparis, they were afraid of finding the valley stopped at the upper end; and therefore marched on to the next, that of the Erineus: their guides informing them that by ascending this they might gain the interior; and here, as they hoped, might anticipate the enemy. Arnold.]

[1][“*Indeed*”. Bekker &c., δ?: one MS. ?δη.]

[2][“As much as fifty stadia”. Bekker &c, κα? πεντήκοντα: vulgo, ?κατ?ν κ. π.]

[3][“That in their present condition their safety &c.”]

[4][“And was the first to sustain the enemy: and at this time, knowing the Syracusans were pursuing him, he was more taken up with ordering his men for battle than in marching on, till &c.”]

[5][“Being driven back in confusion”. Arn.]

[6][“To be taken off”.]

[1]Vulgo, ?λλων: Bekk. &c. om.]

[2][“Went off in the night as they could”.]

[3][“They rush in, observing order no longer; and every man striving to get over first, and the enemy lying upon them, made the passage now difficult”.]

[1][“And entangled (in the baggage) sank down”. Goell. Arn. It is said a little below, that the men fought with each other for the water: a fact inconsistent with the stream being strong enough to “carry them away”.]

[2][And the Syracusans &c. killed the Athenians, as they were drinking, “and confusedly crowded together in the hollow of the river: and the Peloponnesians especially went down and slew them in the river. And the water was quickly spoiled: nevertheless &c.”—Here, as in other instances, the Syracusans showed no inclination to come to close quarters with the Athenians: but were better pleased to see that done by the Peloponnesian troops, whilst they themselves plied them with missiles from a distance. Arn.]

[3][“*But* no further slaughter &c. *And* after this Gylippus” &c.]

[1][“The portion of the army that was collected together in a body, was not much: but they that” &c.]

[2][Hobbes has adapted his language to the words “*Sicilian war*”. The comparison is undoubtedly weak: and some desire to read “*Grecian war*”.]

[3][Lautumias Syracusanas omnes audistis, plerique nostis. Opus est ingens, magnificum regum ac tyrannorum. Totum est ex saxo in mirandam altitudinem depresso, et multorum operis penitus exciso, ideoque, quamquam ?στέγαστον, nihil tam clausum ad exitus, nihil tam septum undique, nihil tam tutum ad custodias nec fieri nec cogitari potest. In has lautumias, si qui publice custodiendi sunt, etiam ex ceteris oppidis Siciliae deduci imperantur. Cic. ii. Verr. 5, cited by Goell.—In retaliation of this treatment of the Athenians, the Syracusans taken by Thrasyllus at the battle of Ephesus, were put into the quarries of Munychia. But the prisoners

contrived to dig their way out through the rock: and escaped to Megara, where they occasioned the revolt of Nisæa, which Athens did not again recover.]

[1][“Deserved, for his study of every lawful virtue, to be brought &c.”]

[2][“For in a hollow, and many in small space, first the sun &c.”]

[1][“Or *the* change”: of temperature above-mentioned.]

[2][See iv. 16, note.]

[3][“Or, as appears to me, the greatest even of the Hellenic actions known by report”.—We have a description by Livy of a moment, two centuries later than the present time, when Syracuse, not as now exulting over a defeated besieging army, was on the point, after standing a three years’ siege, of tasting the treatment of a city taken by assault. “Marcellus, ut mœnia ingressus, ex superioribus locis urbem, omnium ferme illa tempestate pulcherrimam, subjectam oculis vidit, illachrymasse dicitur, partim gudio tantæ perpetratæ rei, partim vetusta gloria urbis. Atheniensium classes demersæ, et duo ingentes exercitus cum duobus clarissimis ducibus deleti, occurrebant; et tot bella cum Carthaginensibus tanto cum discrimine gesta; tot tam opulenti tyranni regesque Ea quum universa occurrerent animo, subiretque cogitatio, jam illa momento horæ arsura omnia, et ad cineres reditura: priusquam signa Achradinam admoveret, præmittit Syracusanos, ut alloquio leni perlicerent hostes ad dedendam urbem.” xxv. 24.—For the present, as at Athens the ναυτικὸς ἄγλος, the authors of the victory of Salamis, and thence of the Athenian ἡγεμονία and dominion of the sea, established an unlimited and irresistible democracy, so did it happen here. But less than ten years’ experience of their own incapacity for the task of government, drove them to make trial of dictators: an experiment which at last ended in the tyranny of Dionysius: another example to be added to those of Theagenes of Megara (iv. 66, note) and Peisistratus of Athens, of the people becoming the dupe of confidence placed in a demagogue for his merit of ἡπέχθεια ἢ πρὸς τοῦ πλουσίου, *hatred of the rich*. See Arist. v. 4, 5.]

[1][The loss is computed by Isocrates at 40,000 soldiers, and 240 triremes: by Boeckh, at 65,000 soldiers. The narrative of Thucydides shows a loss of 209 triremes. Goeller.]

[1][“By the best or most credible of the soldiers that escaped” &c. Goell.—“that all was at any rate so utterly lost” &c.]

[1][That is, Demostratus; and probably Pisander, ch. 49: also Androcles, ch. 65. Goell.]

[2][The people misinterpreted an oracle from Dodona, Σικελίαν ὀκίζεῖν: overlooking a small hill so called not far from the city.]

[3][“And these events had changed their hopes into fear and the utmost consternation”. Goell.]

[4][That is, in respect of sacred festivals, shows, and the pay of the jurors. Duk.—The preconsultation operated as a veto upon moving any matter in the public assembly not first approved of by this council. It seems probable that this innovation was intended as a step to further changes of an oligarchical tendency. See Thirl. ch. xxvii.]

[1][?γούμενοι: om. Bekker, &c.]

[2][“As they that judged according to passion: and did not allow them a word to say as to their being able to hold out another summer”: that is, considered they had no chance of holding out. Arnold, Goeller.]

[1][“To their former resources”. The meaning is, that necessity had compelled the Sicilians to equip a fleet, which but for the Athenian expedition they never would have done. Arn.]

[2][“They purposed *in earnest* to fall” &c.]

[3][“Upon *the* old enmity between them carried off the greater part of their pillageable property, and made money of it: and forced the Achæans of Phthia” &c. The unexpected excursion left no time to drive off the cattle: which Agis seized, and then restored to the owners for money. Arn.—The Ænians, or as they are called from dwelling about mount Ceta, the Cætæans, in early times inhabited the inland parts of Thessaly. Although they admitted a certain dependence on the Delphic oracle, and adopted the fables of Hercules, yet from their geographical position they lived in opposition and hostility to the Malians and Dorians. It is probable, that the migration of the Dorians to Peloponnesus is in some way connected with the arrival of the Ænians in this region. It was chiefly on this account that Sparta founded Heracleia in Trachinia (iii. 92): which would doubtless have caused the revival of an important Doric power in this part of Greece, had not the jealousy of the Thessalians and Dolopians, and even of the Malians themselves, been awakened at its first establishment. Muell. i. 2.—The “others in those parts”, must have been the Perrhæbians to the north of Larissa, and the Magnesians to the east of mount Pelion. For these were subject to the Thessalians, and were called pericæci, but had not ceased to be distinct nations: Thessaly itself comprehending the valley of the Peneus (the ancient ῥῥος πελασγικῶν), and a district towards the Pegasæan bay called by Herodotus ἀολίς. This country, and the towns of Larissa, Crannon, Pharsalus, and Iolcus, the Thessalians had in their own immediate possession: the cultivation however being performed by their slaves the penestæ, the ancient Pelasgo-Æolian inhabitants. Idem iii. 4.]

[1][“And no less active than if they were at the beginning of preparation for the war, there came this winter unto Agis” &c.]

[1][“When *they* were come”.]

[2][“The co-operation”. The Lesbians were akin to the Bœotians: see iii. 2, note.]

[3] [“For harmost”. The name of a Spartan officer appointed in those states, which had hitherto been under the Athenian government: who was found no less oppressive than their old masters. Herm. §39.]

[4] [“And at this time the allies did far more readily, as one may say, obey him than the Lacedæmonians at home”. For the power of the Spartan kings beyond the frontiers, see v. 60, note.]

[1] [“Darius son of Artaxerxes”. Lower Asia, according to Herodotus, was divided by Darius, son of Hystaspes, into three satrapies: one called the province of Dascylium (i. 129), and comprehending the Hellespontine cities, Phrygia, Bithynia, Paphlagonia, and Cappadocia: another, Ionia, Æolis, Caria, Lycia, and Pamphylia: and a third comprising only Mysia and Lydia. But the two last were more generally united under one governor who resided at Sardis, and was called Satrap τῶν κάτω, or τῶν ἑπὶ θαλάσσιων. This province appears sometimes to have had civil and military governors distinct from each other: the σατράπης and the στρατηγός τῶν κάτω being different persons. Arn]

[2] [“For he had lately been called upon by the king to pay the tribute accruing &c.”]

[3] [Pissuthnes, the satrap of Ionia, had rebelled against Darius; and after maintaining himself with the aid of some Greek auxiliaries for some time against Tissaphernes and two other generals, had at last been induced to surrender on solemn assurance of personal security. He was brought to Darius, and put to death by a torture called the σποδός, and said to be the invention of Darius himself. The intended victim was entertained with a banquet, and it was contrived that he should fall asleep. He then sank through a trap-door into a pit filled with cinders, where he rotted and starved. This atrocity was probably the cause of the rebellion of the son. See Thirl. ch. xxvii.]

[1] [“Now each side treating these matters a part, both those from Pharnabazus and those from Tissaphernes”.]

[2] [“*The Laconic name*”: that is, Alcibiades, originally a Laconian name. As *Endius* was the son of Alcibiades, so again his son would be *Alcibiades* the son of Endius: and so, according to the Greek custom, the two names would alternate through all generations. See Arnold’s note.]

[3] [“One of the pericæci”.]

[1] [“The then admiral”. ii. 80, n.]

[2] [This expression, and the same in ch. 60, are amongst the proofs adduced to show that this book was written by Thucydides. See ch. 109, note.]

[1] [“And that he should take upon himself the responsibility of the expedition”.—“The Athenians got *more* intelligence of &c.”]

[1] [“He commanded them as a pledge of their fidelity to the league, to send some galleys”. Duk. Göll.]

[2] [“And the Athenians, the games (or the truce of the games) being announced, sent *theori* to them”. Goell. See i. 25, note.]

[3] [“With twenty–one ships”.]

[4] [“And the Athenians, with equal number, first of all sailing up to them, then began to retreat towards the main sea”. Arn. Goell.]

[5] [“But afterwards manned others, so that the number in all was thirty–seven”: that is, having manned sixteen additional ships. “It seems easier to adopt this interpretation of the words of Thucydides, than with Krueger to strike out the words *καὶ τριάκοντα*: though, as he observes, they may have crept into the text from ch. 15, and if omitted they would leave the context perfectly intelligible and probable”. Thirlwall.—Poppo and Arnold consider the above the correct interpretation. Goeller takes the words in their literal sense, that there were manned thirty–seven additional ships, making in all fifty–eight.]

[1] [That is, some *men*.]

[2] [“Under *the* little island”.]

[3] [“For there came to the Peloponnesians the next day the Corinthians, who were going to their ships to protect them”. Arn. Goell.]

[1] [“And to the Lacedæmonians it was first of all reported that the ships had got to sea from the isthmus: (for the ephors had ordered Alcamenes, when that should happen to send &c.): and they were minded &c.”.]

[2] [“By his (Alcibiades) means”:—“for he (Alcibiades) was at difference” &c. Goell. For the cause of this difference see ch. 44, note.]

[1] [Of the origin of the office of the five ephori little is known. They were ancient Doric magistrates: but by whom or when instituted, is uncertain. Their power seems to have originated in judicial functions: the basis being a superintendence (whence their name, *ἑποροι*, *inspectors*,) over the market. This was at Sparta no unimportant object of care: every Spartan bringing his corn to market to exchange for other commodities. This jurisdiction received its first extension from the privilege of instituting scrutinies into the official conduct of all magistrates, except the gerontes: in the end, it usurped many of the functions of royalty. Thus, the ephors transacted business with foreign ambassadors, and dispatched their own abroad. In war, they sent out the troops on what day they deemed fit: and appear to have had even the power to determine the number. The king, or the general to whom they entrusted the army, received from them instructions how to act: they were recalled by their scytale, and summoned by them before a judicial tribunal. They had, it appears, at all times the management of the treasury: and as the finances of Sparta were continually on the increase, so the office of treasurer must have become more important. But it is evident that the power of the ephors was essentially founded on the supreme authority of the public assembly, which they had the privilege of convening and putting to the vote, and whose agents and plenipotentiaries they were. Unable to act for itself, it entrusted

to the ephors, who were chosen from among the people on democratic principles, a power similar to that exercised in so pernicious a manner by the demagogues of Athens. Plato and Aristotle compare their power to a tyranny: and in Greece the tyrant, it will be remembered, generally arose out of the demagogue. Accordingly, the ephors reached the summit of their power, when they began to lead the public assembly. They are censured by Aristotle (ii. 7.) for their corrupt habits and dissolute life: their mode of election was, he says, a mockery. They were the cause of the dissolution of the Spartan constitution: the decrees by which it was undermined, (particularly the law of the ephor Epitadeus, permitting the gift and devise of landed property), originated with them. And when Agis and Cleomenes engaged in a fruitless struggle with a degenerate age to restore the constitution of Lycurgus, they began with the overthrow of the ephors. See Muell. iii. 7.]

[1][“About this time were returning the sixteen galleys of the Peloponnesians from Sicily, which had aided Gylippus in *putting an end* to the war. And being intercepted about Leucadia, and evil entreated &c, all but one escaped the Athenians and arrived at Corinth.” Bekker, &c, *ξυνδιαπολεμήσασαι*: vulgo, *ξυνπολεμήσασαι*.]

[2][βουλήν, “the council”: which is used in opposition to *ἑκκλησία*, the assembly of the people: and implies that the constitution of Chios was oligarchical. An assembly was hardly the thing wanted.]

[1][*τῶν πολίχων*. A general name, which has become a proper one by usage; like Ham, Kirby &c, in English; or more like *Borgo* in Italian: the full name of the place being properly *τῶν πολίχων τῶν κλαζομενίων*, *Borgo dei Clazomeni*; and thence in common speech, simply *τῶν πολίχων*, *Borgo*. Arn.—*Clazomenæ*, at this time an island, was by Alexander joined to the continent by a mole. Goell.]

[2][*ἑκπλήξεως*: consternation.]

[3][“As spake or put it to the vote”.]

[1][“That had left the guard”:—“they manned and sent out with all speed others in their places”.]

[2][“With his eight galleys”.]

[3][*παρῆτι*: “and at the same time the land forces of the Clazomenians and Erythræans moved along the shore”: that is, by the side of Chalcideus. Arn. Goell.]

[4][And the land forces held their hand” &c. Bekker &c, *οἱ πεζοί*: vulgo, *οἱ πολλοί*.]

[1][“Was to bring over them (the Milesians) before the arrival of the fleet from Peloponnesus”.]

[2][“Lade, *the* island” &c. The scene of the sea-fight in 498 between the Persians under Darius and the revolted Ionians: see Herod vi. 7–17. It is now joined to the continent by the mud of the Mæander, and its place marked only by a hill: and Miletus is no longer on the sea-shore.]

[1][“From these cities”.]

[2][“At hand by land”.]

[1][“And they descry” &c.—Around the temple of Jupiter a small town had probably grown up, as at the more famous δι?ς ?ερ?v near the mouth of the Bosphorus. The “land forces” mentioned a little below, were those of the Clazomenians and Erythræans, said in ch. 16 to have been admitted into Teos. Arnold.]

[2][“Had as before mentioned chased”: see ch. 10.]

[3][“To whom now belonged the entire (ναυαρχία) command of the fleet”: that is, of the fleet of the allies, as well as of Sparta.—In the fifth century A. C. a general demoralization, the fruit of the extended limits of the foreign power of Sparta, pervaded by degrees every department of the state. Expeditions in distant countries, beyond seas especially, operated not only to thwart the design of the legislator, by bringing individuals in contact with foreign manners and luxuries, but occasioned in many respects a total abandonment of it. From this source flowed a degree of self-seeking, the more dangerous that the possibility of it had not been contemplated in framing the constitution. But the necessity of sending to various countries commanders independent of the king, ran counter to the constitution of Lycurgus. This begat new dignities: *Harmosts* for the conquered cities, *Navarchs* and *Epistolcis* for the fleet: the lawful limits of which offices means were soon found to evade. And that characters such as Clearchus and Lysander, should under these circumstances be found not proof against the allurements of fame and ambition, is far less surprising than the same weakness in Pausanias, in whose time Sparta possessed more of the virtue of self-denial. Herm. § 46.]

[1][The same class as the γαμόροι of Syracuse: see vi. 36, note.—“Nor permitting the common people either to give their children in marriage to them, or to marry from amongst them”. Goell.]

[1][“Deiniadas, a pericæcos”. This is an unusual occurrence. But the Spartans did not hold the naval service in much estimation: and moreover, the inhabitants of the maritime towns were more practised in naval affairs than the Dorians of the interior. Even here it is not to be supposed that the pericæcos had any Spartans under him: but that like Gylippus, he was no more than a commander of the Chians. See Muell. iii. 2.]

[2]It seemeth that something is here wanting, and supplied thus by Fran. Porta. “Then the Chians, leaving four galleys here for guard of the place, went to Mytilene with the rest, and caused that city also to revolt”. [The foregoing sentence is supplied by Æmilius, not Francis, Portus. Valla has supplied the sentence in nearly the same words. The Greek is found in one MS. only. “And four ships are left behind in it. And the rest again caused Mytilene to revolt”.]

[3][“Setting forth with four ships, as he was preparing to do, from Cenchreiaë”. See ch. 20.]

[1][After Diomedon in ch. 19.]

[2][“As they were sailing unexpectedly entering the haven”.]

[3][“And armed (the *inhabitants*), he sends the hoplitæ of his own ships to Antissa &c.” Goell. Arn.]

[4][That is, the forces of “their confederates thereabouts” (ch. 22), who with the Peloponnesian landforces had accompanied the Chian fleet in its expedition to Lesbos. Arn. Goell.]

[1][“Sailed across and set up a trophy”.]

[2][“Leon and Diomedon, with &c., from the Cænussæ, the islands lying before Chios, and from Sidusse and Pteleum, *destroyed* the forts they possessed in Erythræa: and making Lesbos the base of their operations, made war with their fleet upon Chios”. Valla, Goeller: inserting καθε?λον, found in one MS.]

[3][The epibatæ, usually chosen from the fourth class, were now, owing to the peculiar exigency of the times, drawn from the higher classes. Goell. Arn.]

[1][“And from the Medan war until that time unravaged”.]

[1][A *thousand* of Athens: *fifteen hundred* of Argos: Bekk. &c.]

[2][“From Athens”.]

[3][It is a question whether these were Greeks or barbarians: probably however they were Greeks: Arcadians, we may suppose, from Peloponnesus (see v. 29, note). The word ξενικ?v describes them with respect to Tissaphernes, and not to the historian himself. The “Peloponnesians that came with Chalcideus” must have been too few to offer any resistance to a 1000 heavy-armed Athenians, being only the epibatæ of five ships: but the Peloponnesian mercenaries of Tissaphernes added considerably to their strength. “And some foreign (?πικουρ?ικ?v) *mercenaries* of Tissaphernes”. Arn.]

[1][“For of the Sikeliots, at the instigation mainly of Hermocrates &c., there came of Syracusan galleys twenty and of Selinuntian two, and those from Peloponnesus, which had been preparing and were now ready. And both were committed to Theramenes of Lacedæmon &c.”]

[2][“At Leros, *the* island” &c. Bekker &c., λέρου: vulgo, ?λεόν.]

[1][Bekker &c., λέρου: vulgo, δέρου.]

[2][“And with how many of their own against *them*” (the enemy’s galleys).]

[3][“But rather would it be base to have to compound, if they were beaten, on any terms”. Goell. Valla and Portus agree with Hobbes.]

[4] [“Willingly, or at any rate only on strong necessity, to undertake the enemy”. Goell.]

[1] [“*After* (the departure of the Athenians) put in” &c. Goell.]

[2] [σκεύη: The masts, sails, and rigging; which had, as usual, been left on shore, when the fleet sailed in expectation of going into action. Compare Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1. § 13: vi. 2. 27. Arn. See ch. 43.]

[1] [The Daric stater was of gold, and equivalent to twenty Attic drachmæ. Schol.—The Daric stater, as also that of Philip of Macedon, Alexander, and Lysimachus, was equal in value to the golden Attic stater, or the Attic didrachme. And the didrachme was valued at 20 drachmæ of silver: so that in the mina there would be 5 staters, in the talent 300; calculating the value of gold at ten times that of silver. Boeckh. The same appears from Xenoph. Anab. i. 7. § 18. Arn.]

[1] [“It was agreed that for every 5 ships, they should have somewhat more than 3 oboli a man a day. For he gave 3 talents a month for 5 ships: and to the rest, insomuch as there were more ships than this number (that is, for any number less than five), he was to give after the same rate.” Goell. Vulgo, ἄρξ πέντε ναῖς καὶ πενήκοντα: Bekker &c. om. καὶ π.—The alteration of 3 oboles a man a day to 3 talents for every 5 ships a month, would give 36 minæ for each ship a month: and reckoning 200 men to each ship, the month’s pay of each man would be 18 drachmæ, or 3 oboles a day.]

[2] [“The Athenians having gathered &c, as well &c as *all the rest* (for there were now &c).”—This was done in pursuance of the advice of Phrynichus (ch. 27), to assemble their fleet at Samos, and make sorties from time to time. The distribution of the command by lot, was practised, where no one of the generals was ἀποκράτωρ: see instances in vi. 42, 62.]

[3] [See chap. 25, note.]

[1] [“Made a descent on”.]

[2] [“At the time before mentioned,” ch. 24:—“as a *precaution against* treason”.]

[3] [“And that the affairs of the league were in better plight”.—“And with *the* ten galleys of Peloponnesus”: that is, six that arrived in ch. 23, and four brought by Astyochus in ch. 24.]

[4] [ἄρχος must be the subsatrap.]

[1] [“*Again* to revolt”. See ch. 22, 23.]

[2] [“Who at the time before mentioned (ch. 28) went by land from Miletus, being at Erythræ passed over” &c. The “five galleys” see in ch. 6, 8, 12, 17.]

[3] [“Having announced their intention to revolt”:—“to go with *the* fleet”.]

[1][“And the Athenians sailing with an army from Samos to Chios took up their station on the opposite side of a hill; separated from each other without knowing it. *But* Astyochus, upon a letter from Peraditus reaching him at nightfall &c., went presently &c.”]

[2][That is, the men had persuaded the Athenians, that if they had their liberty they could bring Erythræ back to them.]

[3][“And no sooner did they see them and give chase, than straight a great tempest arose: and the longboats &c.” Goell.]

[1][“And there began preparations for *the* fortification”: that is, for fortifying Delphinium (ch. 38). Arn.]

[2][Diagoras was of the royal family of Rhodes; where the monarchy expired about 660 A. C. His sons had before the present time been condemned to death and banished by the Athenians, as heads of the aristocracy. Doreus, one of them, is again condemned, and again escapes in ch. 84. The ancient fortune of the Rhodians, which was owing to their adherence to the Doric customs and to their great commercial activity, was interrupted by the troubles of this war: in which democracy and aristocracy were alternately introduced by the Athenian and Lacedæmonian influence. Soon after this period (A. C. 408) the city of Rhodes was founded, and peopled with the inhabitants of the three cities, Lindus, Ialysus, and Cameirus: see iii, 103, n. In 396 Rhodes was again recovered and made democratical by Athens: but in 391 the Spartan party was again uppermost, and the Social War finally put an end to Athenian influence. The Doric characteristics were retained here longer than in most other Doric states: courage, constancy, with a haughty sternness of manners, and a certain temperance, which in a manner contrasted with their magnificence in meals, buildings, and all the arts. Muell. iii. 9.]

[3][Popp. Goell. Arn. Thirl. $\pi\tau\sigma\alpha\epsilon\rho\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, “revolted *from* the Athenians *through* Tissaphernes”. Vulgo et Bekk. $\pi\tau$.]

[4][“And they in Miletus hearing of it, bade that one-half &c., the other half, which were about Triopion, should attack and seize the corn ships from Egypt”. That is, the Athenian corn ships: part of Egypt being at this time in revolt from Persia. Goell.]

[1][“The six galleys that” &c.]

[2][They went away and wasted” &c. Bekker &c, $\pi\epsilon\lambda\theta\acute{o}\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$: vulgo, $\pi\epsilon\lambda\theta\acute{o}\nu\tau\epsilon\varsigma$.]

[3][“Had still plenty” &c.]

[4][“To the Peloponnesians”]

[5][“Whilst Theramenes was still there”.]

[6][The king’s sons were probably named, in order that they might be bound after their father’s death. For the new king, it seems, was not bound by his predecessor’s

acts, unless accepted by himself. Thus the treaties with Philip and Antiochus were renewed with their successors. Livy xl. xlii. Arnold.]

[1][“Nor their allies”. This and the former treaty (ch. 18) differ, in this article, only in the substitution of ὅσα for ἐχόν, *property* for *possession*: “whatsoever belonged unto”, instead of “whatsoever they used to possess”: what territories *belong* to the king, being still left an open question. See again ch. 58.]

[1][“Sails away and is lost at sea”. Thirl.—“Sails away and disappears”: fearing to be called to account at Sparta for complying with Tissaphernes about the pay. Arn. Goell.]

[2][“Having harbours”.]

[3][“For the accomplices of Tydeus, the son of Ion, had now &c, and the rest of the city was by force reduced to an oligarchy”. Whether this Ion is the poet of Chios, one of some celebrity, whose first tragedy was represented in 452, is uncertain.]

[1][See Lichas, ch. 43, 84, and v. 50. The powers of these ξύμβουλοι are far more extensive than of those in ii. 85, iii. 69, 76, or even in v. 63: the reason of this strong measure appears, perhaps, in ch. 50.]

[1][The Chians had been a trading people from very early times: and are said to be the first of the Greeks that regularly dealt in slaves. The antiquity of slavery amongst them is proved by their slaves still retaining the Homeric name θεράποντες, signifying “those that wait on others”, whether bond or free: which had never been exchanged for the more common name δοῦλος. Arn.—The Athenians were probably not far behind the Chians: Hermann (§ 114) calculating their slaves at nearly 400,000: though Mueller (iii. 3) says that, in this war, their slaves were not 200,000. It seems certain, however, that their number was considerable enough to induce the state to render their condition not only tolerable, but very little inferior to that of the citizens: Herm. *ibid.*—It appears from Herodotus (vi. 37), that in earlier times slavery was known in no part of Greece. It was the want of slaves that drew to the *Nine-pipes* for water the daughters of the Athenian citizens, for violating whom the Pelasgi were expelled from Attica.]

[2][“Unfinished”.]

[1][“Came a message from Caunus, that the 27 galleys and the council of the Lacedæmonians are at hand”.]

[2][“At Cos Meropis”. Cos was said to be the daughter of the hero Merops, by whom it was first settled. The ancient inhabitants were called by the Greeks *Meropes*. Some connect the name with the Homeric epithet of ἰθροποι, μέροπες, *articulate speakers*.—“The city being unwall’d &c., he rifled &c.”]

[1][“from Melos. Bekk. &c.”]

[2][With less than *the* twenty galleys”: see ch. 41.]

[1][“Being now at Cnidus”.]

[2][“Touching what had been already done, if aught displeased them, and concerning the war &c.”]

[3][“It would be a serious matter, if whatsoever territory the king &c had ever *ruled*, the same he should now claim as part of his empire”.—“All the islands and *Thessaly*, and the Locri” &c.]

[1][“Or at any rate not to stand to these: nor was pay wanted upon any such terms”.]

[2][“Because they hoped to bring that island, one not inconsiderable both for number of ships and land forces, into their power”.]

[3][“And arriving first at Cameirus of Rhodes with 94 ships, frightened &c; especially as the city was unwalled; and they fled”.]

[4][“But being too late, though not much, they thereupon went away to Chalce”.]

[1][“And the Peloponnesians levied of the Rhodians 32 talents, and drew up their ships and did nothing else for 80 days”.]

[2][“Endamaged with him (Tissaphernes) the affairs &c”.—Alcibiades, during his stay at Sparta, had made an implacable enemy of Agis. He is said to have excited his jealousy, by declaring himself ambitious of giving a king to Sparta: which, whether well or ill founded, was increased by his queen Timæa calling, amongst her women, her infant son Leotychides by the name of Alcibiades. The Spartan government too was far from being well pleased with the influence of Alcibiades amongst the Asiatic Greeks, though immediately subservient to its interest. See Thirl. ch. xxviii.]

[1][That is, leaving in their captains’ hands their arrears of pay: a pledge, which would induce the captain to give leave of absence to the injury of the service. Goell.]

[2][“More of the Grecians”.]

[1][“And the danger would be less, to wear out the Greeks against each other, at less cost and with security to himself”.]

[2][“And that they conducted the war on principles and with a practice most conformable to the king’s interest”. Arn.]

[1][“With more than enough”. Goell. Arn.]

[2][What is said in the first instance of “the soldiers”, that is, of the army in general, becomes limited to the trierarchs and principal men, when mention is made of a regular design on mere political grounds to overthrow the constitution: for to this the army at large had no inclination. Arn.—“To remember him to the *chief men*”.]

[3] [“And not of the mischievous and democratical party that cast him out”.—Hobbes seems to have read *ξυμπολεμεν*, “to war on their side”, for *ξυμπολετεύειν*: “to come home and share in the government”.]

[1] [That is, with the public burthens, which were thrown principally on the rich. Goell.]

[1] [“And said that for themselves they had especially to see to it, that there be no sedition: that it was not easy for the king (the Peloponnesians being &c.) to join” &c.]

[2] [*καλοῦς κῆραθοῦς*. See iv. 40, n.]

[1] [“And that he at all events was not pleased with aught that Alcibiades even at the present time was about”.]

[2] [Peisander had been one of the most active in stirring the public feeling in the affair of the Hermesbusts.]

[3] [*ῥτι τότε*; “yet at the time before mentioned”: ch. 42. All this took place before the Peloponnesians set out for Rhodes in ch. 44.]

[1] [“But Astyochus was not thinking of punishing Alcibiades, especially as he no longer put himself, as heretofore, within his reach: but going” &c.]

[2] [“Were all but arrived”.]

[1] [“The naval camp”.]

[2] [“To fortify the city and take other precautions”.]

[3] [“Meant to attack them”.]

[4] [That is, to become a friend of the Athenians.—“especially when he saw the difference at Cnidus with the Peloponnesians about the treaty of Theramenes. For now about this time, they being in Rhodes, had happened the quarrel, wherein that which &c.” See ch. 43.]

[1] [“That he should return, who had violated the laws”.]

[2] Eumolpidæ, a family descended from Eumolpus, the author at Athens of the Mysteries of Ceres. This family had the chief authority in matters that concerned those rites. — Ceryces, heralds in war, ambassadors in peace. Suidas. They pronounced all formal words in the ceremonies of their religion, and were a family descended from Ceryx son of Mercury. [Other families besides these are mentioned, in which public rites were hereditary: as the Eteobotadæ, Thaulonidæ, &c. Goell.—In every family of the Kerukes, the father had his son solemnly enrolled in the sacred order as soon as he had passed his boyhood, having first made oath that he was his true son, to prevent the intermixture of any strange blood. At Sparta, the sacred order of the Kerukes and *μάγειροι*, *cooks*, were strictly hereditary. Arn.]

[1][“And *unless* we deliberate &c: and *unless* we recall” &c.]

[2][That is, “any of these present alterations”.]

[1][ζυνωμοσία, sometimes called ?ταιρεία, *societies* or *clubs*: already mentioned in iii. 82. These were naturally the resort of the weaker of the two political parties: and accordingly the first trace of them appears in the time of Cimon, when the aristocracy was on the decline. Their professed object was to give each other mutual support in elections and in suits in the courts of law: their real object, to overthrow the democracy, by the aid, if need be, of the foreign enemy, and at the expense of the independence of their own state. And accordingly Lysander, in his choice of the 30 tyrants, is said to have been guided by no principle of either aristocracy or wealth, but simply by the clubs.]

[2][“And having arranged other matters (?π? το?ς παρο?σιν) against the present democracy, so that there should be no longer delay: took sea” &c. Schol. Goell.]

[3][“And carried on the war thence (from Chalce) rather *than* from Cos”. Bekk. &c., μ?λλον ? ?κ: vulgo om. ?. It appears in ch. 60, that the Athenians had taken up their station at Chalce. Arnold.]

[1][“And slew Pedaritus and many of the Chians, and took much armour”.]

[1][“And it seems to me that this same thing was also the object of Tissaphernes”.]

[2][“For Alcibiades, speaking on behalf and in the presence of Tissaphernes, made such excessive demands, that the Athenians, though conceding in a great measure whatever he asked, were nevertheless the side that brake off the conference”.]

[3][Bekker, Arnold, Thirlwall, ?αυτο?, “his own”, the king’s coast. Goeller and others: ?αυτ?v, the coast “of themselves”, that is, of Persia and the Athenians. This touches the question of the treaty said by Diodorus and Plutarch to have been concluded between the Athenians and Persia after Cimon’s victories, A. C. 450; whereby it was provided, that no king’s ship of war should sail beyond Phaselis and the Cyanean or Chelidonian islands. Arnold seems inclined to give some credit to the treaty: upon which Haack remarks, that Thucydides makes no mention of it in i. 112, where he relates the expedition and death of Cimon: whilst Hermann (§ 39) contents himself with referring to the authorities on both sides; calling it “the so-called Cimonian peace”. Thirlwall however treats it as an undoubted fabrication. Goeller observes, that whether that story be true or not, and supposing the Athenians on this occasion to deliver up to the king all Ionia, it was still important to them to restrain him from menacing the islands with his fleet: for which reason he prefers ?αυτ?v. The passage in Livy, xxxiii. 20: “Nephelida, promontorium Ciliciæ, inclytum fœdere antiquo Atheniensium”: is supposed to refer to this treaty of Cimon.—“Which the Athenians not opposing, at last at the third meeting, fearing &c., he required &c. Then indeed the Athenians would concede no more, but conceiving they were trifled with and abused by Alcibiades, went away &c.”]

[1][“Especially afraid”.]

[2][“In consideration &c., conformably to his design of counterpoising the Grecians, sending” &c.]

[1][Hieramenes is said to have married a sister of Darius.]

[2][“That the king’s territory, so far as it lies in Asia, belongs to the king”. Another expression intended to evade the question, what is or is not the king’s territory: see ch. 18, 37.]

[3][κατ’ τὴν ξυγκείμενα: “according to the original treaty”. It is not clear whether this refers to the rate of pay, or only to the general undertaking mentioned in ch. 5, to pay the Peloponnesian fleet. The rate of pay specified at Sparta appears, from ch. 29, to have been a drachme a day. But after the present treaty the Peloponnesians, it seems, contented themselves with the ordinary allowance: for Xenophon, *Hell.* i. 5, speaks of a contract whereby the king had engaged to give half a drachme a day. Kreuger supposes that this was the rate always implied, when no particular sum was expressed. *Thirl.* ch. xxviii.]

[1][Received, that is, after the arrival of the king’s fleet. Goeller, Arnold, Thirlwall.]

[2][Took Oropus “though garrisoned by Athenians”.]

[3][“For the place being immediately opposite to Eretria, it was impossible &c.”]

[4][“Having then Oropus &c., the Eretrians come to Rhodes” &c.]

[1][“The Chians had, after the death of Pedaritus, received as commander Leon, a Spartan from Miletus, who came with Antisthenes as epibates”. The meaning here of *epibates* (iii. 95, note) is doubtful. Kreuger supposes it to be the title of an inferior officer in the Spartan naval service, like *πιστολαε?*; but this the scholiast denies. Perhaps it only signified one who sailed with the admiral, to be ready for any special service which might need a Spartan. Arn., Antisthenes, see ch. 39.]

[1][“And at the same time”.]

[2][Popp. Goell. Arn. τότε: “held at that memorable time by the Medes” (i. 89). Vulgo et Bekk. ποτε.]

[1][Not *all* the ships; for the Chians would not have parted with their own: it seems therefore that Leon’s squadron only can be referred to. *Thirl.*]

[2][“For about this time, and still earlier, the democracy *had been* put down at Athens”. Bekk. &c., κατελέλυτο: vulgo, κατελύετο.—It was in the month of April that Astyochus sailed to Samos: and the government of the Four Hundred was set up in Athens at the end of February or the beginning of March. Goell.]

[3][“And at the same time their Athenian partisans at Samos considered amongst themselves, that they had best let Alcibiades alone; since he would not join them: (for that he was no fit man to come into an oligarchy): and to depend on themselves, being

already engaged &c., to see that affairs suffer no relapse, and *with alacrity* to contribute &c., *as* men toiling no longer for other than themselves.”]

[1][“To other subject places”.]

[2][That is, the aristocracy of Thasos had no need of the aristocracy of Athens.]

[3][“With all their might”.]

[4][“That the city was set up”.]

[5][σωφροσύνην λαβοῦσαι: “assuming a sober wary spirit”: with regard to the means of effecting their object. The phrase is very singular and obscure. Thirl.]

[1][“They openly too held language, preconcerted amongst them, that none ought to receive wages, but such &c.” The pay of the army and navy, a highly necessary measure of Pericles (i. 141, note), first placed arms in the hands of such as were necessitated to gain their daily bread. In the course of this war, either by Cleon or an unknown Callistratus, was introduced the further innovation of paying the citizens that attended the assembly (iii. 59, note). This, together with the pay of the jurors (v. 18, note), magistrates, senators &c., was now abolished: which at once operated to exclude from the magistracies and judicial offices the classes without property. The former however was revived after the fall of the 30 tyrants.]

[1][“This was thrown out as a bait to *the many*: for as for the powers of government, the authors of the revolution meant to keep them to themselves”. The 400 were all chosen by Peisander and his party: the 5000 were never to be named at all.—The “council of the bean” was the senate: chosen by the bean, that is, by ballot.]

[2][“And all that was to be said, was considered beforehand by the conspirators”.]

[3][“And to find out the conspirators, a thing impossible for the greatness of the city, their ignorance of each other also put it out of their power”.]

[4][“For the same cause, one that was aggrieved could not even complain to any one, thereby to repel him that was plotting against him.”]

[1][“Most of all caused”.]

[2][“They enclosed the assembly at &c.—about ten stadia off”.—The Scythians, or foreign mercenary police, used to enclose the place of assembly with a red rope, as well to exclude non-voters as to confine the voters till the business was finished. The ordinary place of assembly, originally the Pnyx within the city, was afterwards, as in most democratic states, the theatre, mostly that of Dionysus in the Peiræus. (Herm. § 128). The present assembly was held without the city, that is, beyond the influence of the slaves and metœci, who would have favoured any disturbance.]

[3][“Should either prosecute by γραφή παρανόμων, or should otherwise do him hurt. And thereupon it was openly propounded, that no magistracy” &c. See iii. 43, note.]

[1][“When called in question for having established (the Four Hundred)”. Thucydides is said to have been a disciple of Antiphon: a supposition which receives countenance from the terms in which he is here spoken of. He is also said to have been the first orator who wrote speeches for his clients, or opened a school of rhetoric. He is sent, in ch. 90, with Phrynichus and others on an embassy to Sparta: for this he was tried and lost his life: his property was confiscated, his body refused burial in Attica, and his family declared ῥτιμοι.]

[1][“And for this dangerous business, after that he entered upon it, he appeared the ablest of all”. See his assassination, ch. 92. The career of the person next named, Theramenes, son of Hagnon, is remarkable. He will be found before long deserting to the democracy. He was one of the promoters of the prosecution of the ten generals for not recovering their own dead after their victory at Arginusæ. He was afterwards one of Lysander’s 30 tyrants: and was finally put to death for his opposition to the headlong measures of Critias, the leader of the extreme party amongst the thirty.]

[1][“The Athenians, in regard of the enemy at Deceleia, were all of them evermore, some upon the walls, and some on station where the arms were piled. On *this* day, therefore, they suffered” &c. As soon as the assembly was dissolved, those that were not in the conspiracy, were allowed to disperse as usual after the parade.]

[2][“Not to go exactly to the station of the arms”.]

[3][These new settlers peculiarly dreaded the Peloponnesians getting the upper hand in the war, and restoring (as in fact they did at the end of the war) the Æginetæ whom they had dispossessed of their estates. Arn.]

[4][Supposed to be called *Grecians*, to distinguish them from the Scythians, of whom the ordinary police of Athens was composed. They were probably members of some of the aristocratical clubs already noticed: see ch. 54. Arn.]

[5][“For the remainder of the current year”.]

[1][“And when the council went out in this manner without opposition, and the rest of the citizens mutinied not, but rested quiet: then the Four Hundred being entered into the council–house &c.”]

[1][“Hoping either that their agitation would render them more submissive to their (the Peloponnesians’) purpose, or that in the confusion likely to be found both within and without he might succeed, even with the very first attack, in taking the long walls, in regard of their deserted state for the same reason”. Goell. Arn. τ?ς τ?v μακρ?v τευχ?v: vulgo et Bekk. τ?v γ?ρ μ. τ.]

[1][“And that the government was in the hands of 5000, and not 400 only.”]

[2][It is observed that this could not be true, because some decrees, as ostracism and all *privilegia*, required a majority, or at all events the presence, of 6000 citizens. It is also observed that it does not appear how so large a proportion of the citizens could be absent on foreign service, as to leave at home no more than 5000 to attend the

assembly. But in the first place, that is not said: but only that 5000 did not attend the assembly. And next, the assertion is not that of Thucydides, but of Pisander and his party: and most probably an exaggeration. Of the citizens however, whose gross number is reckoned at about 20,000, a fourth part would be a large proportion to assemble on any but very important occasions.]

[3][τότε: “at the time before-mentioned”: see ch. 21.]

[1][μοχθηρῶν ἠθῶπων: an epithet implying that he was capable of any baseness. He labours under the charge not only of political profligacy, but of private dishonesty in the exercise of his trade of a lampmaker. Thirl. ch. xxxii. There is a tradition that it was by an intrigue of Alcibiades that ostracism was applied to Hyperbolus, and that it answered its intended purpose: ostracism was thereby rendered contemptible, and fell into disuse (Herm. § 164). It is an invention attributed to Cleisthenes: it was afterwards adopted by the democracies of Argos and Megara, and under another name, *petalism*, at Syracuse also. It is spoken of by Aristotle (iii. 9, v. 8) with some approbation, not only as a check on the dangerous power of individuals, but also as some security against the people resorting to more violent measures to rid themselves of obnoxious persons. He adds however that the people knew not how to use their weapon: instead of looking to the common weal, στασιαστικῶς ἤχρῶντο τοῦ στρακισμοῦ. iii. 9.]

[2][“Captain of the hoplites”.]

[3][“And to such others as they thought stood always”.]

[1][“Especially to the Paralians, the crew of the ship (Paralus); all Athenians and freemen, and ever at all times hostile to oligarchy, even before its appearance”.—The whole ναυτικῶς ἔχλος, the greater part of whom were slaves, (i. 141, note; iii. 17, note), was strongly disposed to democracy: but the Paralians, receiving higher pay, had a still stronger interest than the rest in upholding the maritime dominion, and therefore also the democracy, of Athens.]

[1][“By those between (the two extreme parties)”: that is to say, by the moderate men. Goeller.]

[2][See v. 18, note.]

[1][“Made common cause with them as to the result of the present dangerous crisis”.]

[2][“The better able to provide themselves”. Goell. Arn.]

[3][“For that they both had Samos for their city, &c.: and were able to defend themselves from the enemy from this place as heretofore”.—The allusion of taking the dominion of the sea from Athens, is to the events of i. 116: where Pericles, notwithstanding the honours he received on his return from that expedition, and his comparison of his nine months’ siege of Samos to Agamemnon’s ten years’ siege of Troy, appears to have had a narrow escape of coming home with a different tale.]

[1][“Of themselves, stationed as an advanced guard at Samos”.]

[2][“And *will* endeavour to force them (the Athenians) to do so”.]

[1][“They set themselves also to preparing for war with no less alacrity”.]

[2][“Whilst they were themselves yet in greater strength”: greater, that is, than now.]

[3][“They were running the risk of perishing by delay”.]

[1][For these galleys see ch. 62. “Besides, having previous intelligence that they in Miletus were intending to fight, they stayed” &c.]

[1][“The same summer, the Peloponnesians, immediately after their declining to put to sea, as being now in their opinion too weak to engage with the united force of the enemy, being at a stand how &c, especially as Tissaphernes paid badly: send Clearchus with forty galleys” &c. Goell.]

[2][See this order in chap. 39.]

[1][ξυνωμοσίαι: “the clubs”.]

[2][“That the enemy might to the utmost be embroiled with Tissaphernes”. Goell. Arn.]

[3][“At last be constrained”.]

[4][“Should undertake to him (Tissaphernes)”. Bekker &c., α?τ?: vulgo, α?το?ς.]

[1][“Of *saving* themselves”.]

[2][“To do him *now* good” &c. Bekker &c., ?δη: vulgo om.]

[3][“Were much more ill–disposed towards him”. Duk. Goell.]

[4][“Became slacker in his payments: and added to the hatred they bore him even before this on account of Alcibiades. And the soldiers meeting &c.”]

[1][“For the multitude (the mariners) of the Syracusans and Thurians, being for the most part freemen, therefore with the stoutest importunity &c.” Their navy was not, like that of the Athenians and Peloponnesians, manned with slaves.—“And he not only gave them a somewhat insolent answer and used threats, but against Dorieus, as he spake in behalf of his men, he lifted up his staff.” The custom of carrying sticks was common to the Spartans with the Dorians of lower Italy. Muell. iv. 2. See Herod. iii. 137, where the Crotonians attack το?σι σκυτάλοισι the Persians laying hands on Democedes.—“When the multitude of the soldiers saw it, they as well indeed as the sailors raised a cry and ran upon Astyochus &c:—he was not however stricken indeed, but &c.”]

[1][“In this sort”.]

[2][“Sent as ambassador”. The Carians generally understood Greek, and also acted as interpreters to the Persians. Mardonius sends a Carian to consult the oracles of Greece: and Cyrus has Carian interpreters at his court. See Valckenaer ad Herod. viii. 133. Goell.]

[1][τότε: see ch. 72, 77.]

[2][The assault by Agis in ch. 71.]

[3][“That all should in their turn partake (or be) of the 5000”. Arn.]

[1][“Gave heed to them none the more”.]

[2][“Appeared then for the first time to have done service to the state inferior to no man”. Goell.]

[3][“There was great hope they might also compose their own differences”.]

[1][“Even when their differences shall be composed, there will no longer be any hope”: that is, reconciliation will come too late.]

[2][τότε: see ch. 74.]

[3][“About Eubœa. And as they (the Paralians) were carrying the Athenian ambassadors sent by the 400 to Lacedæmon, Læspodias &c, as they sailed by Argos they laid hands on the ambassadors, and” &c. Vulgo, ο? ?πειδ? ?γένοντο: Bekker &c., om. ο?.]

[4][“Tissaphernes about *this* time of the same summer, when the Peloponnesians &c.”]

[1][“His deputy to pay the army so long as &c.”]

[2][“*Actually* did intend”.]

[3][“For in no case (whether he got money or not) did he mean to use their service.” Goell.]

[1][“Who indeed, even as it was, were lying opposite to the Athenians with a navy rather equal” &c.]

[2][“But what *bewrayed him* most”. Bekker &c., κατα?ωρ??.]

[3][“By not spending much of the king’s money, and by effecting the same matters with less”.]

[4][That is, towards the centre of the Persian government. Arn]

[1][Theramenes, Aristocrates, and others, “who were partakers with the foremost of the affairs of the state, but being in real fear of the army at Samos and Alcibiades, and of the ambassadors sent to Lacedæmon, lest without the authority of the majority (of the oligarchy) they should do the state some mischief, avowed frankly, not indeed that they were desirous of ridding themselves of the domination of a narrow oligarchy, but that the 5000 ought to be constituted in reality and not in name only, and a more equal *politeia* established. Such was their political pretence in words. But the most of them through private ambition were intent upon that, by which” &c. Goell.—They feared, or affected to fear, that the ambassadors sent to Lacedæmon had some secret instructions from the small minority who had assumed all the powers of government, to concert measures for betraying the city into the enemy’s hand. Thirl. ch. xxviii.]

[1][“A man more easily brooks want of success, as being the result of inferior deserts”. Goell.]

[2][τότε: “who was at difference &c. *at the time of his command at Samos*”.]

[3][“For peace”. Bekk. &c., τῶν ἡμετέρας: vulgo, τῶν ἡμετέρας.]

[1][“The state of affairs”.]

[2][“And those with him”.]

[3][“Is a pier &c.”—The city walls being carried down to either side of the harbour’s mouth, were prolonged thence across the mouth upon moles, until a passage only was left in the middle for two or three triremes abreast between two towers, the opening of which might be further secured by a chain. Leake’s Topography of Athens.—The “old wall” ran inland from the point where the mole touched the ordinary line of coast, intended to cover the place from an enemy attacking from *without*. The “new wall” was to secure their fort on the mole from an attack from Peiræus or the interior of the harbour. And the object was to isolate Eetioneia like a castle, cut off from the harbour by the new wall, as it was from the country on the outside by the old wall. The city might now at any time be reduced by famine. Ar.]

[1][“Which was narrow”.]

[2][ἡμετέρας. Locus Athenis erat ἡμετέρας dictus: quod illic exemptas navibus aut curribus sarcinas seponerent. Hudson.]

[3][“All this then was denounced by Theramenes both long before, and again when the ambassadors returned &c.: saying, that this wall would endanger &c.”—“Riding at Las in Laconia”—“some from Tarentum and Locri, Italiots and Sikeliots”.

[4][“If they were not looked to, they (in the city) would be destroyed ere they were aware”.]

[1][“To let in the enemy, and compound for the city, to do as it might without walls or ships, so that they at least might have security for their own persons”. Goell.]

[2] ["By one of the peripoli;—and the murderer escaped, but his accomplice, an Argive, taken &c., would confess the name of no one as the instigator, nor ought else save this &c." By the *Peripolarch*, Goeller understands, not the "captain of the watch", but the prefect of the ephebi, that is, of the peripoli: though the name *peripolarch* belonged equally to both.]

[1] ["From Las."]

[2] ["For the soldiers &c., amongst whom was Aristocrates, a taxiarch, at the head of his own $\eta\lambda\lambda\acute{o}\tau\eta\iota$ (vi. 98, n.), seized on Alexicles, a general of the oligarchy and much given to the clubs ($\eta\tau\alpha\acute{\iota}\rho\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$), and carrying him into a house kept him in hold. And there aided them in this, moreover, one Hermon, commander of the peripoli stationed at Munychia: and what was more, the bulk of the hoplites assented to it all. As soon as the news hereof was brought &c." Bekker &c., $\eta\tau\alpha\acute{\iota}\rho\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$: vulgo, $\eta\tau\acute{\epsilon}\rho\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$.]

[1] ["They were ready, all but such as were dissatisfied with the state of things, to run to *the* arms (that is to say, where they were piled): threatening, &c."]

[2] ["But the ancient men with difficulty hindering those that were running about the city and making for the arms, and Thucydides &c., who was there, being active in stopping every man he met &c., they became pacified and held &c. And Theramenes coming to Peiræus, being himself also a general, made a shew &c.: but Aristarchus and those opposed to *the multitude* were in high wrath. But the hoplites went to work most of them all the same, and listened to nothing, and asked Theramenes whether &c." Bekker &c., $\tau\eta\ \pi\lambda\acute{\eta}\theta\eta\iota$: vulgo, $\tau\eta\ \eta\lambda\eta\theta\epsilon\iota$?

[1] ["In perturbation as they were, yet" &c.]

[1] ["And piled their arms, and held an assembly: and it being so resolved, marched straightway to the city, and there piled their arms in the Anaceium."—The Anaceium was the temple of Castor and Pollux, so called from their Peloponnesian name $\eta\nu\alpha\kappa\epsilon\varsigma$, one the meaning of which is not settled (see Plut. Thes.). The worship of the Tyndaridæ is not of Dorian origin, although they were considered as the leaders of the Spartan army. It was found by the Dorians at the time of their entrance into Peloponnesus already established at Amyclæ, Therapne, and other places: and was perhaps founded in the ancient Peloponnesian worship of the great gods or Cabiri, which in time became transferred to the human Tyndaridæ. Their images were two upright beams with two others laid across them, called $\delta\acute{o}\kappa\alpha\nu\alpha$: one or both of their statues accompanied every military expedition, according as one or both of the kings went with the army. See Muell. ii. 10.]

[2] ["Feared very much."]

[1] [Popp. Goell. Arn.: $\tau\eta\ \pi\omicron\lambda\lambda\eta\ \nu$, "and every one of the *many* thought": vulgo et Bekk. $\tau\eta\ \nu\ \eta\pi\lambda\iota\tau\eta\ \nu$.]

[2] [Literally, "As their domestic war, greater than that from their foreign enemy, was not far off but at the very mouth of their harbour." The sense required seems to be that

of Arnold: “seeing that a foreign war, greater than their domestic one, was not far off, but” &c.]

[3][“Sailing by, and doubling the promontory” &c.]

[1][“Raw and undisciplined forces, as would be the case the city being in sedition and they wishing to send speedy aid in a matter of the last importance: (for Eubœa, cut off as Attica was, was every thing to them): sent” &c.]

[2][“Just as they were”.]

[3][“Putting to sea in this unprepared state”.]

[1][“For of this the Athenians held possession themselves”. The Athenian *cleruchi*, or settlers planted there by Pericles after the last recovery of the island in 445. See i. 114. Arnold.]

[1][“And then had they, either by lying off the Peiræus raised to a still greater height the sedition of the city, or stayed and besieged them, they had forced the fleet, though enemies &c., to come away &c.”]

[1][“Wherein they made framers of the constitution, and passed other votes for establishing the *politeia*:” νομοθέτας, corresponding to the ξυγγραφεως of the oligarchy in ch. 67. Arn.—“And at the first, the Athenians seem, within my time at least, to have ordered their affairs better by far than at any other time”. Thucydides here, as in ch. 89, seems to use the word πολιτεία in the same sense in which it is used by Aristotle (iii. 5): ?ταν δε? τ? πλ?θος πρ?ς τ? κοιν?ν πολιτεύηται συμ?έρον, καλε?ται τ? κοιν?ν ?νομα πασ?ν τ?ν πολιτει?ν, πολιτεία. And the chief requisite of Aristotle’s *politeia* is also found in the present Athenian constitution: δι?περ κατ? ταύτην τ?ν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τ? προπολεμο?ν, κα? μετέχουσιν α?τ?ς ο? κεκτημένοι τ? ?πλα.]

[2][Designat ministros publicos, qui τοξόται Athenis vocabantur. Erant enim hoc genus fere barbari: unde et Scythæ dicti. Duker. They were at first 300: afterwards raised to 1200. Herm. § 129.]

[1][“And owing to an accident which befell them (the Corinthians) of the slaughter by those in Cœnoe of some of their men returning from Deceleia, was besieged by &c.”]

[2][“No signs hitherto of either &c. coming”.]

[3][Seeing that Pharnabazus had sent &c., “and like Tissaphernes, was eager himself too to bring the fleet, and make the remaining cities of his own government to revolt, hoping to get something by it: then indeed Mindarus, with good order &c., went” &c.]

[1][“A considerable part”. For the 16 galleys, see ch. 102.—The Hellespont and Bosphorus, the great thoroughfare of Greek commerce, became at this time the

principal theatre of the war: it was observed by Agis, that the issue of the struggle would depend on the command of it. Thirl. ch. xxix.]

[2][“Eressos of Lesbos had revolted”. &c.]

[3][“For the most potent &c. had brought over from Cume about 50 heavy-armed volunteers: and had hired others &c.”]

[1][“Anaxander a Theban:—their *relationship* to the Thebans”: see iii. 2, note. Bekk. &c., ἠναξανδρος; vulgo, ἠναξάρχου.]

[2][“To these were added two ships returning from the Hellespont, and the Methymnæan ships; so that they were in all &c.: with the landforces of which they prepared, with engines &c.” The Methymnæan ships must have been five, to make 67 in all.]

[3]A *tessaracoste* seemeth to have been a coin amongst the Chians, and the fortieth part of some greater coin. [Like the ἠκται ἠωκαΐδες. If it was the fortieth part of the stater, its value would be about 3 oboli: and the whole would be 3 days’ pay, at 3 oboli a-day. Arn.]

[1][“Kept *not* far &c.” Bekk. &c., ο? πελάγια: vulgo, om. ο?. If they left Lesbos on the *left* hand, they were not *far* from the shore.]

[2][“Carteria”. Bekker &c.]

[3][“And *were then* in the Hellespont”.]

[4][See chap. 99.]

[1][“Which *joined* them”.]

[2][“For *the* battle”.]

[1][Bekk. &c., “76”: vulgo, “86.”]

[2][Vulgo et Bekk. “68”: Goell. “88” Arn. Thirl. “86”. See chapter 103.]

[3][“To keep them, if they could, from getting out”: that is, out of the strait.]

[4][So called from Hecuba, who was changed into a dog and died there. See Eurip. Hecuba, 1245–55.]

[1][“A considerable part”.]

[2][“And then Thrasybulus, desisting now from the attempt to outgo the left wing of the Peloponnesians, turned and attacked the ships opposed to him, and put them straight to flight”.]

[3] ["They beat *them*, and the greatest part" &c.]

[4] [Bekker &c., μείδιον: vulgo, πύδιον. Nothing is known of either name.]

[1] ["And of Bœotia two".]

[2] ["Repaired".]

[3] ["And having overpowered the men on shore, took the ships": for the ships, see ch. 80.—At *Harpagium* is said to have taken place the rape (?ῤπαγ?) of Ganymede.]

[1] ["*But* the Peloponnesians too &c." The Athenians had left their prizes at Elæus, which was their station before the battle.]

[2] [See ch. 88.]

[3] ["Having so done, and established a governor in Cos, being now almost autumn he returned to Samos. And Tissaphernes, when he heard of the sailing of the Peloponnesian ships from Miletus to the Hellespont, returned from Aspendus to Ionia. Whilst the Peloponnesians were in the Hellespont, the Antandrians &c."]

[4] ["Whom they had transported from Abydos &c."]

[1] ["And for that he imposed upon them other intolerable grievances, they cast &c."]

[2] ["Tissaphernes, seeing that this too was the work of the Peloponnesians, and not only that at Miletus and Cnidus: for &c." For the garrison at Miletus, see ch. 84.]

[3] [The great goddess of the Ephesians. The many-sided divinity of Ephesus was much less a Grecian than an Asiatic goddess, and was intimately allied with the leading personages of the Persian theology. Thirl. ch. xxix. See iii. 104, the latter part of the note.]

[1] [Goeller considers this last sentence as spurious: because, if genuine, Thucydides, when he wrote it, must either have abandoned the idea of continuing the history, or have noted the year for fear of forgetting it. The whole of this eighth book has been denied by some of the ancient writers, all later than Dionysius of Halicarnassus, to be the work of Thucydides: and has been variously ascribed to his daughter, to Theopompus, and to Xenophon: to the latter, owing to his own history being, as was supposed, connected with that of Thucydides by the phrase with which it commences, μετ' ἑα?ἑα. One of the main arguments adduced against its authenticity, is the absence in this book of all speeches. To this it is replied, that the purpose for which the speeches are introduced in the former books, the description of the characters, manners and civil constitutions of the belligerent nations, was already answered: and that of the characters that appear in this book, except Alcibiades, already sufficiently described, none are of any great note: and that at Athens with the entrance of the oligarchy vanished all liberty of speech. Goeller observes that this latter part of the history is certainly less highly finished: yet, but for the absence of speeches, the critics would not readily have adjudged it to be less perfect than the rest: and he adds

“ultimum librum Thucydidis esse, vix jam a quoquam dubitatur”. With respect to the supposition of Xenophon being the author of this book, and that his own history beginning with μετά ταῦτα is an immediate continuation of it; it is observed by Mr. Thirlwall, that it is certain that an interval of five or six weeks must have intervened between the last event here related and that with which Xenophon’s narrative opens: and that it seems clear that the beginning of his work has been lost.