THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"
A nihil Obstat.

F. INNOCENTIUS APAP, O.P., S.T.M.

Censor. Theol.

Imprimatur.

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Vicarius Generalis.

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F. RAPHAEL MOSS, O.P., S.T.L.

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Prior Provincialis Anglic.

Londini,

Die 7 Martii, 1922.
THE
"SUMMA THEOLOGICA"
OF
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

PART I.
QQ. LXXV.—CII.

LITERALLY TRANSLATED BY
FATHERS OF THE ENGLISH DOMINICAN
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LETTER FROM THE CARDINAL SECRETARY
OF STATE.

THE VATICAN,
February 24th, 1912.

To the Very Reverend Father Humbert Everest, O.P.,
Prior Provincial of the English Dominican Province.

REVEREND FATHER,

I am desired to inform you that the Holy Father has
been pleased to express his gratitude on receiving from you
the first volume of the *Summa* of St. Thomas Aquinas,
which, with the assistance of your beloved brethren of the
English Province, you have most wisely determined to
translate into your mother-tongue. I say 'most wisely,'
because to translate into the language of one's country the
immortal works of St. Thomas is to give to its people a
great treasure of human and Divine knowledge, and to
afford those who are desirous of obtaining it, not only the
best method of reasoning in unfolding and elucidating
sacred truths, but also the most efficacious means of
combating heresies. Therefore, without doubt, you have
undertaken a task worthy of religious men—worthy of the
sons of St. Dominic.

The Venerable Pontiff, in graciously accepting your gift,
returns you most cordial thanks, and earnestly prays
that your task may have a successful result and produce
abundant fruit. In token of his appreciation, he most
lovingly imparts to you and your fellow-workers the
Apostolic Benediction.

And for myself I extend to you the right hand of fellow-
ship, and thank you for the special volume of the transla-
tion which you presented to me.

I remain, Rev. Father,
Yours devotedly,

R. CARD. MERRY DEL VAL.
LETTER FROM THE MASTER-GENERAL OF THE FRIAR PREACHERS.

Collegio Angelico,
Roma, May 21st, 1911.

To the English Translators of the ‘Summa Theologica’ of St. Thomas.

Very Rev. and dear Fathers,

In translating into English the Summa Theologica of St. Thomas, you undertake a work which will bring profit to the Church and honour to the Dominican Order, and which, I hope, will be acceptable even to the laity; for what was said of the great doctor by his contemporaries is true for all time—that everybody can gather fruit from his writings, which are within the grasp of all. As a matter of fact, St. Thomas appeals to the light of reason, not in order to weaken the ground of faith, which is the Divine Reason, infinitely surpassing the reason of man, but, on the contrary, in order to increase the merit of faith by making us adhere more firmly to His revelation. For we see thereby how reasonable is our submission, how salutary it is to the mind, how profitable for our guidance, how joyful to the heart.

May your work contribute to this end! Thus it will be a sermon, preached through the press, by reason of its diffusion and duration more fruitful than that preached by word of mouth.

I bless you in our Holy Father, St. Dominic, and ask the help of your prayers for the Order and for myself.

Fr. Hyacinth M. Cormier, O.P.,
Master-General.

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TREATISE ON MAN
THE "SUMMA THEOLOGICA"

FIRST PART.
TREATISE ON MAN.

QUESTION LXXV.

OF MAN WHO IS COMPOSED OF A SPIRITUAL AND A CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE: AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, CONCERNING WHAT BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL.

(In Seven Articles.)

Having treated of the spiritual and of the corporeal creature, we now proceed to treat of man, who is composed of a spiritual and of a corporeal substance. We shall treat first of the nature of man, and secondly of his origin. Now the theologian considers the nature of man in relation to the soul; but not in relation to the body, except in so far as the body has relation to the soul. Hence the first object of our consideration will be the soul. And since Dionysius (Ang. Hier. xi.) says that three things are to be found in spiritual substances—essence, power, and operation—we shall treat first of what belongs to the essence of the soul; secondly, of what belongs to its power; thirdly, of what belongs to its operation.

Concerning the first, two points have to be considered; the first is the nature of the soul considered in itself; the second is the union of the soul with the body. Under the first head there are seven points of inquiry.

(1) Whether the soul is a body? (2) Whether the human soul is a subsistence? (3) Whether the souls of brute
animals are subsistent? (4) Whether the soul is man, or is man composed of soul and body? (5) Whether the soul is composed of matter and form? (6) Whether the soul is incorruptible? (7) Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel?

**FIRST ARTICLE.**

**WHETHER THE SOUL IS A BODY?**

*We proceed thus to the First Article:—*

**Objection 1.** It would seem that the soul is a body. For the soul is the moving principle of the body. Nor does it move unless moved. First, because seemingly nothing can move unless it is itself moved, since nothing gives what it has not; for instance, what is not hot does not give heat. Secondly, because if there be anything that moves and is not moved, it must be the cause of eternal, unchanging movement, as we find proved *Phys.* viii. 6; and this does not appear to be the case in the movement of an animal, which is caused by the soul. Therefore the soul is a mover moved. But every mover moved is a body. Therefore the soul is a body.

**Obj. 2.** Further, all knowledge is caused by means of a likeness. But there can be no likeness of a body to an incorporeal thing. If, therefore, the soul were not a body, it could not have knowledge of corporeal things.

**Obj. 3.** Further, between the mover and the moved there must be contact. But contact is only between bodies. Since, therefore, the soul moves the body, it seems that the soul must be a body.

**On the contrary,** Augustine says (*De Trin.* vi. 6) that the soul is simple in comparison with the body, inasmuch as it does not occupy space by its bulk.

**I answer that,** To seek the nature of the soul, we must premise that the soul is defined as the first principle of life in those things which live: for we call living things *animate,* and those things which have no life, *inanimate.*

* *I.e.*, having a soul.
Now life is shown principally by two actions, knowledge and movement. The philosophers of old, not being able to rise above their imagination, supposed that the principle of these actions was something corporeal: for they asserted that only bodies were real things; and that what is not corporeal is nothing: hence they maintained that the soul is something corporeal. This opinion can be proved to be false in many ways; but we shall make use of only one proof, based on universal and certain principles, which shows clearly that the soul is not a body.

It is manifest that not every principle of vital action is a soul, for then the eye would be a soul, as it is a principle of vision; and the same might be applied to the other instruments of the soul: but it is the first principle of life, which we call the soul. Now, though a body may be a principle of life, as the heart is a principle of life in an animal, yet nothing corporeal can be the first principle of life. For it is clear that to be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, does not belong to a body as such; since, if that were the case, every body would be a living thing, or a principle of life. Therefore a body is competent to be a living thing or even a principle of life, as such a body. Now that it is actually such a body, it owes to some principle which is called its act. Therefore the soul, which is the first principle of life, is not a body, but the act of a body; thus heat, which is the principle of calefaction, is not a body, but an act of a body.

Reply Obj. 1. As everything which is in motion must be moved by something else, a process which cannot be prolonged indefinitely, we must allow that not every mover is moved. For, since to be moved is to pass from potentiality to actuality, the mover gives what it has to the thing moved, inasmuch as it causes it to be in act. But, as is shown in Phys. viii. 6, there is a mover which is altogether immovable, and not moved either essentially, or accidentally; and such a mover can cause an invariable movement. There is, however, another kind of mover, which, though not moved essentially, is moved accidentally; and for this
reason it does not cause an invariable movement; such a mover is the soul. There is, again, another mover, which is moved essentially—namely, the body. And because the philosophers of old believed that nothing existed but bodies, they maintained that every mover is moved; and that the soul is moved directly, and is a body.

Reply Obj. 2. The likeness of the thing known is not of necessity actually in the nature of the knower; but given a thing which knows potentially, and afterwards knows actually, the likeness of the thing known must be in the nature of the knower, not actually, but only potentially; thus colour is not actually in the pupil of the eye, but only potentially. Hence it is necessary, not that the likeness of corporeal things should be actually in the nature of the soul, but that there be a potentiality in the soul for such a likeness. But the ancient philosophers omitted to distinguish between actuality and potentiality; and so they held that the soul must be a body in order to have knowledge of a body; and that it must be composed of the principles of which all bodies are formed in order to know all bodies.

Reply Obj. 3. There are two kinds of contact; of quantity, and of power. By the former a body can be touched only by a body; by the latter a body can be touched by an incorporeal thing, which moves that body.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE HUMAN SOUL IS SOMETHING SUBSISTENT?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the human soul is not something subsistent. For that which subsists is said to be this particular thing. Now this particular thing is said not of the soul, but of that which is composed of soul and body. Therefore the soul is not something subsistent.

Obj. 2. Further, everything subsistent operates. But the soul does not operate; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima i. 4), to say that the soul feels or understands is
like saying that the soul weaves or builds. Therefore the soul is not subsistent.

Obj. 3. Further, if the soul were subsistent, it would have some operation apart from the body. But it has no operation apart from the body, not even that of understanding: for the act of understanding does not take place without a phantasm, which cannot exist apart from the body. Therefore the human soul is not something subsistent.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x. 7): Whoever understands that the nature of the soul is that of a substance and not that of a body, will see that those who maintain the corporeal nature of the soul, are led astray through associating with the soul those things without which they are unable to think of any nature—i.e., imaginary pictures of corporeal things. Therefore the nature of the human intellect is not only incorporeal, but it is also a substance, that is, something subsistent.

I answer that, It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both incorporeal and subsistent. For it is clear that by means of the intellect man can have knowledge of all corporeal things. Now whatever knows certain things cannot have any of them in its own nature; because that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge of anything else. Thus we observe that a sick man’s tongue being vitiated by a feverish and bitter humour, is insensible to anything sweet, and everything seems bitter to it. Therefore, if the intellectual principle contained the nature of a body it would be unable to know all bodies. Now every body has its own determinate nature. Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body. It is likewise impossible for it to understand by means of a bodily organ; since the determinate nature of that organ would impede knowledge of all bodies; as when a certain determinate colour is not only in the pupil of the eye, but also in a glass vase, the liquid in the vase seems to be of that same colour.
Therefore the intellectual principle which we call the mind or the intellect has an operation \textit{per se} apart from the body. Now only that which subsists can have an operation \textit{per se}. For nothing can operate but what is actual; wherefore a thing operates according as it is; for which reason we do not say that heat imparts heat, but that what is hot gives heat. We must conclude, therefore, that the human soul, which is called the intellect or the mind, is something incorporeal and subsistent.

\textit{Reply Obj. 1. This particular thing} can be taken in two senses. Firstly, for anything subsistent; secondly, for that which subsists, and is complete in a specific nature. The former sense excludes the inheritance of an accident or of a material form; the latter excludes also the imperfection of the part, so that a hand can be called \textit{this particular thing} in the first sense, but not in the second. Therefore, as the human soul is a part of human nature, it can indeed be called \textit{this particular thing}, in the first sense, as being something subsistent; but not in the second, for in this sense, what is composed of body and soul is said to be \textit{this particular thing}.

\textit{Reply Obj. 2. Aristotle wrote those words as expressing not his own opinion, but the opinion of those who said that to understand is to be moved, as is clear from the context. Or we may reply that to operate \textit{per se} belongs to what exists \textit{per se}. But for a thing to exist \textit{per se}, it suffices sometimes that it be not inherent, as an accident or a material form; even though it be part of something. Nevertheless, that is rightly said to subsist \textit{per se}, which is neither inherent in the above sense, nor part of anything else. In this sense, the eye or the hand cannot be said to subsist \textit{per se}; nor can it for that reason be said to operate \textit{per se}. Hence the operation of the parts is through each part attributed to the whole. For we say that man sees with the eye, and feels with the hand, and not in the same sense as when we say that what is hot gives heat by its heat; for heat, strictly speaking, does not give heat. We may therefore say that the soul understands, as the eye sees;
but it is more correct to say that man understands through the soul.

Reply Obj. 3. The body is necessary for the action of the intellect, not as its organ of action, but on the part of the object; for the phantasm is to the intellect what colour is to the sight. Neither does such a dependence on the body prove the intellect to be non-subsistent; otherwise it would follow that an animal is non-subsistent, since it requires external objects of the senses in order to perform its act of perception.

**Third Article.**

**Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?**

*We proceed thus to the Third Article:—*

**Objection 1.** It would seem that the souls of brute animals are subsistent. For man is of the same genus as other animals; and, as we have just shown (A. 2), the soul of man is subsistent. Therefore the souls of other animals are subsistent.

**Obj. 2.** Further, the relation of the sensitive faculty to sensible objects is like the relation of the intellectual faculty to intelligible objects. But the intellect, apart from the body, apprehends intelligible objects. Therefore the sensitive faculty, apart from the body, perceives sensible objects. Therefore, since the souls of brute animals are sensitive, it follows that they are subsistent; just as the human intellectual soul is subsistent.

**Obj. 3.** Further, the soul of brute animals moves the body. But the body is not a mover, but is moved. Therefore the soul of brute animals has an operation apart from the body.

*On the contrary, Is what is written in the Book De Eccl. Dogm. (xvi., xvii.): Man alone we believe to have a subsistent soul: whereas the souls of animals are not subsistent.*

*I answer that, The ancient philosophers made no distinction between sense and intellect, and referred both to a*
corporeal principle, as has been said (A. 1). Plato, however, drew a distinction between intellect and sense; yet he referred both to an incorporeal principle, maintaining that sensing, just as understanding, belongs to the soul as such. From this it follows that even the souls of brute animals are subsistent. But Aristotle held that of the operations of the soul, understanding alone is performed without a corporeal organ. On the other hand, sensation and the consequent operations of the sensitive soul are evidently accompanied with change in the body; thus in the act of vision, the pupil of the eye is affected by a reflexion of colour: and so with the other senses. Hence it is clear that the sensitive soul has no *per se* operation of its own, and that every operation of the sensitive soul belongs to the composite. Wherefore we conclude that as the souls of brute animals have no *per se* operations they are not subsistent. For the operation of anything follows the mode of its being.

*Reply Obj.* 1. Although man is of the same *genus* as other animals, he is of a different *species*. Specific difference is derived from the difference of form; nor does every difference of form necessarily imply a diversity of *genus*.

*Reply Obj.* 2. The relation of the sensitive faculty to the sensible object is in one way the same as that of the intellectual faculty to the intelligible object, in so far as each is in potentiality to its object. But in another way their relations differ, inasmuch as the impression of the object on the sense is accompanied with change in the body; so that excessive strength of the sensible corrupts sense; a thing that never occurs in the case of the intellect. For an intellect that understands the highest of intelligible objects is more able afterwards to understand those that are lower. —If, however, in the process of intellectual operation the body is weary, this result is accidental, inasmuch as the intellect requires the operation of the sensitive powers in the production of the phantasms.

*Reply Obj.* 3. Motive power is of two kinds. One, the appetitive power, commands motion. The operation of
this power in the sensitive soul is not apart from the body; for anger, joy, and passions of a like nature are accompanied by a change in the body. The other motive power is that which executes motion in adapting the members for obeying the appetite; and the act of this power does not consist in moving, but in being moved. Whence it is clear that to move is not an act of the sensitive soul without the body.

Fourth Article.

Whether the soul is man?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the soul is man. For it is written (2 Cor. iv. 16): Though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man is renewed day by day. But that which is within man is the soul. Therefore the soul is the inward man.

Obj. 2. Further, the human soul is a substance. But it is not a universal substance. Therefore it is a particular substance. Therefore it is a hypostasis or a person; and it can only be a human person. Therefore the soul is man; for a human person is a man.

On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix. 3) commends Varro as holding that man is not a mere soul, nor a mere body; but both soul and body.

I answer that, The assertion, the soul is man, can be taken in two senses. First, that man is a soul; though this particular man, Socrates, for instance, is not a soul, but composed of soul and body. I say this, forasmuch as some held that the form alone belongs to the species; while matter is part of the individual, and not of the species. This cannot be true; for to the nature of the species belongs what the definition signifies; and in natural things the definition does not signify the form only, but the form and the matter. Hence in natural things the matter is part of the species; not, indeed, signate matter, which is the principle of individuality; but the common matter. For as it belongs to the notion of this particular man to be
composed of this soul, of this flesh, and of these bones; so it belongs to the notion of man to be composed of soul, flesh, and bones; for whatever belongs in common to the substance of all the individuals contained under a given species, must belong also to the substance of the species.

It may also be understood in this sense, that this soul is this man; and this could be held if it were supposed that the operation of the sensitive soul were proper to it, apart from the body; because in that case all the operations which are attributed to man would belong to the soul only; and whatever performs the operations proper to a thing, is that thing; wherefore that which performs the operations of a man is man. But it has been shown above (A. 3) that sensation is not the operation of the soul only. Since, then, sensation is an operation of man, but not proper to him, it is clear that man is not a soul only, but something composed of soul and body.—Plato, through supposing that sensation was proper to the soul, could maintain man to be a soul making use of the body.

Reply Obj. 1. According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix. 8), a thing seems to be chiefly what is principle in it; thus what the governor of a state does, the state is said to do. In this way sometimes what is principle in man is said to be man; sometimes, indeed, the intellectual part which, in accordance with truth, is called the inward man; and sometimes the sensitive part with the body is called man in the opinion of those whose observation does not go beyond the senses. And this is called the outward man.

Reply Obj. 2. Not every particular substance is a hypostasis or a person, but that which has the complete nature of its species. Hence a hand, or a foot, is not called a hypostasis, or a person; nor, likewise, is the soul alone so called, since it is a part of the human species.
FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SOUL IS COMPOSED OF MATTER AND FORM?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the soul is composed of matter and form. For potentiality is opposed to actuality. Now, whatsoever things are in actuality participate of the First Act, which is God; by participation of Whom, all things are good, are beings, and are living things, as is clear from the teaching of Dionysius (Div. Nom. v.). Therefore whatsoever things are in potentiality participate of the first potentiality. But the first potentiality is primary matter. Therefore, since the human soul is, after a manner, in potentiality; which appears from the fact that sometimes a man is potentially understanding; it seems that the human soul must participate of primary matter, as a part of itself.

Obj. 2. Further, wherever the properties of matter are found, there matter is. But the properties of matter are found in the soul—namely, to be a subject, and to be changed; for it is subject to science, and virtue; and it changes from ignorance to knowledge and from vice to virtue. Therefore matter is in the soul.

Obj. 3. Further, things which have no matter, have no cause of their existence, as the Philosopher says Metaϕ. viii. (Did. vii. 6). But the soul has a cause of its existence, since it is created by God. Therefore the soul has matter.

Obj. 4. Further, what has no matter, and is a form only, is a pure act, and is infinite. But this belongs to God alone. Therefore the soul has matter.

On the contrary, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii. 7, 8, 9) proves that the soul was made neither of corporeal matter, nor of spiritual matter.

I answer that, The soul has no matter. We may consider this question in two ways. First, from the notion of a soul in general; for it belongs to the notion of a soul to be the
form of a body. Now, either it is a form by virtue of itself, in its entirety, or by virtue of some part of itself. If by virtue of itself in its entirety, then it is impossible that any part of it should be matter, if by matter we understand something purely potential: for a form, as such, is an act; and that which is purely potential cannot be part of an act, since potentiality is repugnant to actuality as being opposite thereto. If, however, it be a form by virtue of a part of itself, then we call that part the soul: and that matter, which it actualizes first, we call the primary animate.

Secondly, we may proceed from the specific notion of the human soul, inasmuch as it is intellectual. For it is clear that whatever is received into something is received according to the condition of the recipient. Now a thing is known in as far as its form is in the knower. But the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely: for instance, it knows a stone absolutely as a stone; and therefore the form of a stone absolutely, as to its proper formal idea, is in the intellectual soul. Therefore the intellectual soul itself is an absolute form, and not something composed of matter and form. For if the intellectual soul were composed of matter and form, the forms of things would be received into it as individuals, and so it would only know the individual: just as it happens with the sensitive powers which receive forms in a corporeal organ; since matter is the principle by which forms are individualized. It follows, therefore, that the intellectual soul, and every intellectual substance which has knowledge of forms absolutely, is exempt from composition of matter and form.

Reply Obj. 1. The First Act is the universal principle of all acts; because It is infinite, virtually precontaining all things, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v.). Wherefore things participate of It not as a part of themselves, but by diffusion of Its processions. Now as potentiality is receptive of act, it must be proportionate to act. But the acts received which proceed from the First Infinite Act, and are participations thereof, are diverse, so that there cannot be one potentiality which receives all acts, as there is one act,
from which all participated acts are derived; for then the receptive potentiality would equal the active potentiality of the First Act. Now the receptive potentiality in the intellectual soul is other than the receptive potentiality of first matter, as appears from the diversity of the things received by each. For primary matter receives individual forms; whereas the intelligence receives absolute forms. Hence the existence of such a potentiality in the intellectual soul does not prove that the soul is composed of matter and form.

Reply Obj. 2. To be a subject and to be changed belong to matter by reason of its being in potentiality. As, therefore, the potentiality of the intelligence is one thing and the potentiality of primary matter another, so in each is there a different reason of subjection and change. For the intelligence is subject to knowledge, and is changed from ignorance to knowledge, by reason of its being in potentiality with regard to the intelligible species.

Reply Obj. 3. The form causes matter to be, and so does the agent; wherefore the agent causes matter to be, so far as it actualizes it by transmuting it to the act of a form. A subsistent form, however, does not owe its existence to some formal principle, nor has it a cause transmuting it from potentiality to act. So after the words quoted above, the Philosopher concludes, that in things composed of matter and form there is no other cause but that which moves from potentiality to act; while whatsoever things have no matter are simply beings at once.*

Reply Obj. 4. Everything participated is compared to the participator as its act. But whatever created form be supposed to subsist per se, must have existence by participation; for even life, or anything of that sort, is a participator of existence, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v.). Now participated existence is limited by the capacity of the participator; so that God alone, Who is His own existence,

* The Leonine edition has, simpliciter sunt quod vere entia aliquid. The Parma edition of S. Thomas’s Commentary on Aristotle has, statim per se unum quiddam est . . . et ens quiddam.
is pure act and infinite. But in intellectual substances, there is composition of actuality and potentiality, not, indeed, of matter and form, but of form and participated existence. Wherefore some say that they are composed of that whereby they are and that which they are; for existence itself is that by which a thing is.

**Sixth Article.**

**Whether the human soul is incorruptible?**

*We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:*

*Objection 1.* It would seem that the human soul is corruptible. For those things that have a like beginning and process seemingly have a like end. But the beginning, by generation, of men is like that of animals, for they are made from the earth. And the process of life is alike in both; because *all things breathe alike, and man hath nothing more than the beast,* as it is written (Eccles. iii. 19). Therefore, as the same text concludes, *the death of man and beast is one, and the condition of both is equal.* But the souls of brute animals are corruptible. Therefore, also, the human soul is corruptible.

*Obj. 2.* Further, whatever is out of nothing can return to nothingness; because the end should correspond to the beginning. But as it is written (Wisd. ii. 2), *We are born of nothing*; which is true, not only of the body, but also of the soul. Therefore, as is concluded in the same passage, *After this we shall be as if we had not been,* even as to our soul.

*Obj. 3.* Further, nothing is without its own proper operation. But the operation proper to the soul, which is to understand through a phantasm, cannot be without the body. For the soul understands nothing without a phantasm; and there is no phantasm without the body as the Philosopher says (*De Anima* i. 1). Therefore the soul cannot survive the dissolution of the body.

*On the contrary,* Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.) that human souls owe to Divine goodness that they are intel-
lectual, and that they have an incorruptible substantial life.

I answer that, We must assert that the intellectual principle which we call the human soul is incorruptible. For a thing may be corrupted in two ways—per se, and accidentally. Now it is impossible for any substance to be generated or corrupted accidentally, that is, by the generation or corruption of something else. For generation and corruption belong to a thing, just as existence belongs to it, which is acquired by generation and lost by corruption. Therefore, whatever has existence per se cannot be generated or corrupted except per se; while things which do not subsist, such as accidents and material forms, acquire existence or lose it through the generation or corruption of composite things. Now it was shown above (AA. 2, 3) that the souls of brutes are not self-subsistent, whereas the human soul is; so that the souls of brutes are corrupted, when their bodies are corrupted; while the human soul could not be corrupted unless it were corrupted per se. This, indeed, is impossible, not only as regards the human soul, but also as regards anything subsistent that is a form alone. For it is clear that what belongs to a thing by virtue of itself is inseparable from it; but existence belongs to a form, which is an act, by virtue of itself. Wherefore matter acquires actual existence as it acquires the form; while it is corrupted so far as the form is separated from it. But it is impossible for a form to be separated from itself; and therefore it is impossible for a subsistent form to cease to exist.

Granted even that the soul is composed of matter and form, as some pretend, we should nevertheless have to maintain that it is incorruptible. For corruption is found only where there is contrariety; since generation and corruption are from contraries and into contraries. Wherefore the heavenly bodies, since they have no matter subject to contrariety, are incorruptible. Now there can be no contrariety in the intellectual soul; for it receives according to the manner of its existence, and those things which it
receives are without contrariety; for the notions even of contraries are not themselves contrary, since contraries belong to the same knowledge. Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual soul to be corruptible. Moreover we may take a sign of this from the fact that everything naturally aspires to existence after its own manner. Now, in things that have knowledge, desire ensues upon knowledge. The senses indeed do not know existence, except under the conditions of here and now, whereas the intellect apprehends existence absolutely, and for all time; so that everything that has an intellect naturally desires always to exist. But a natural desire cannot be in vain. Therefore every intellectual substance is incorruptible.

Reply Obj. 1. Solomon reasons thus in the person of the foolish, as expressed in the words of Wisd. ii. Therefore the saying that man and animals have a like beginning in generation is true of the body; for all animals alike are made of earth. But it is not true of the soul. For the souls of brutes are produced by some power of the body; whereas the human soul is produced by God. To signify this, it is written as to other animals: Let the earth bring forth the living soul (Gen. i. 24): while of man it is written (ibid. ii. 7) that He breathed into his face the breath of life. And so in the last chapter of Ecclesiastes (xii. 7) it is concluded: (Before) the dust return into its earth from whence it was; and the spirit return to God Who gave it. Again the process of life is alike as to the body, concerning which it is written (Eccles. iii. 19): All things breathe alike, and (Wisd. ii. 2), The breath in our nostrils is smoke. But the process is not alike of the soul; for man is intelligent, whereas animals are not. Hence it is false to say: Man has nothing more than beasts. Thus death comes to both alike as to the body, but not as to the soul.

Reply Obj. 2. As a thing can be created by reason, not of a passive potentiality, but only of the active potentiality of the Creator, Who can produce something out of nothing, so when we say that a thing can be reduced to nothing, we do not imply in the creature a potentiality to non-
existence, but in the Creator the power of ceasing to sustain existence. But a thing is said to be corruptible because there is in it a potentiality to non-existence.

Reply Obj. 3. To understand through a phantasm is the proper operation of the soul by virtue of its union with the body. After separation from the body it will have another mode of understanding, similar to other substances separated from bodies, as will appear later on (Q. LXXXIX., A. 1).

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SOUL IS OF THE SAME SPECIES AS AN ANGEL?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the soul is of the same species as an angel. For each thing is ordained to its proper end by the nature of its species, whence is derived its inclination for that end. But the end of the soul is the same as that of an angel—namely, eternal happiness. Therefore they are of the same species.

Obj. 2. Further, the ultimate specific difference is the noblest, because it completes the nature of the species. But there is nothing nobler either in an angel or in the soul than their intellectual nature. Therefore the soul and the angel agree in the ultimate specific difference; therefore they belong to the same species.

Obj. 3. Further, it seems that the soul does not differ from an angel except in its union with the body. But as the body is outside the essence of the soul, it seems that it does not belong to its species. Therefore the soul and an angel are of the same species.

On the contrary, Things which have different natural operations are of different species. But the natural operations of the soul and of an angel are different; since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii.), Angelic minds have simple and blessed intelligence, not gathering their knowledge of Divine things from visible things. Subsequently
he says the contrary to this of the soul. Therefore the soul and an angel are not of the same species.

I answer that, Origen (Peri Archon iii. 5) held that human souls and angels are all of the same species; and this because he supposed that in these substances the difference of degree was accidental, as resulting from their free-will: as we have seen above (Q. XLVII., A. 2). But this cannot be; for in incorporeal substances there cannot be diversity of number without diversity of species and inequality of nature; because, as they are not composed of matter and form, but are subsistent forms, it is clear that there is necessarily among them a diversity in species. For a separate form cannot be understood otherwise than as one of a single species; thus, supposing a separate whiteness to exist, it could only be one; forasmuch as one whiteness does not differ from another except as in this or that subject. But diversity of species is always accompanied with a diversity of nature; thus in species of colours one is more perfect than another; and the same applies to other species, because differences which divide a genus are contrary to one another. Contraries, however, are compared to one another as the perfect to the imperfect, since the principle of contrariety is habit, and privation thereof, as is written, Metaph. x. (Did. ix. 4). The same would follow if the aforesaid substances were composed of matter and form. For if the matter of one be distinct from the matter of another, it follows that either the form is the principle of the distinction of matter—that is to say, that the matter is distinct on account of its relation to divers forms; and even then there would result a difference of species and inequality of nature: or else the matter is the principle of the distinction of forms. But one matter cannot be distinct from another, except by a distinction of quantity, which has no place in these incorporeal substances, such as an angel and the soul. So that it is not possible for the angel and the soul to be of the same species. How it is that there can be many souls of one species will be explained later (Q. LXXVI., A. 2, ad 1).
Reply Obj. 1. This argument proceeds from the proximate and natural end. Eternal happiness is the ultimate and supernatural end.

Reply Obj. 2. The ultimate specific difference is the noblest because it is the most determinate, in the same way as actuality is nobler than potentiality. Thus, however, the intellectual faculty is not the noblest, because it is indeterminate and common to many degrees of intellectuality; as the sensible faculty is common to many degrees in the sensible nature. Hence, as all sensible things are not of one species, so neither are all intellectual things of one species.

Reply Obj. 3. The body is not of the essence of the soul; but the soul by the nature of its essence can be united to the body, so that, properly speaking, not the soul alone, but the composite, is the species. And the very fact that the soul in a certain way requires the body for its operation, proves that the soul is endowed with a grade of intellectuality inferior to that of an angel, who is not united to a body.
QUESTION LXXVI.

OF THE UNION OF BODY AND SOUL.

(In Eight Articles.)

We now consider the union of the soul with the body; and concerning this there are eight points for inquiry: (1) Whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form? (2) Whether the intellectual principle is multiplied numerically according to the number of bodies; or is there one intelligence for all men? (3) Whether in the body the form of which is an intellectual principle, there is some other soul? (4) Whether in the body there is any other substantial form? (5) Of the qualities required in the body of which the intellectual principle is the form? (6) Whether it be united to such a body by means of another body? (7) Whether by means of an accident? (8) Whether the soul is wholly in each part of the body?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL PRINCIPLE IS UNITED TO THE BODY AS ITS FORM?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It seems that the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii. 4) that the intellect is separate, and that it is not the act of any body. Therefore it is not united to the body as its form.

Obj. 2. Further, every form is determined according to the nature of the matter of which it is the form; otherwise no proportion would be required between matter and form. Therefore if the intellect were united to the body as its
form, since every body has a determinate nature, it would follow that the intellect has a determinate nature; and thus, it would not be capable of knowing all things, as is clear from what has been said (Q. LXXV., A. 2); which is contrary to the nature of the intellect. Therefore the intellect is not united to the body as its form.

**Obj. 3.** Further, whatever receptive power is an act of a body, receives a form materially and individually; for what is received must be received according to the condition of the receiver. But the form of the thing understood is not received into the intellect materially and individually, but rather immaterially and universally: otherwise the intellect would not be capable of the knowledge of immaterial and universal objects, but only of individuals, like the senses. Therefore the intellect is not united to the body as its form.

**Obj. 4.** Further, power and action have the same subject; for the same subject is what can, and does, act. But the intellectual action is not the action of a body, as appears from above (Q. LXXV., A. 2). Therefore neither is the intellectual faculty a power of the body. But virtue or power cannot be more abstract or more simple than the essence from which the faculty or power is derived. Therefore neither is the substance of the intellect the form of a body.

**Obj. 5.** Further, whatever has *per se* existence is not united to the body as its form; because a form is that by which a thing exists: so that the very existence of a form does not belong to the form by itself. But the intellectual principle has *per se* existence and is subsistent, as was said above (Q. LXXV., A. 2). Therefore it is not united to the body as its form.

**Obj. 6.** Further, whatever exists in a thing by reason of its nature exists in it always. But to be united to matter belongs to the form by reason of its nature; because form is the act of matter, not by any accidental quality, but by its own essence; otherwise matter and form would not make a thing substantially one, but only accidentally one. Therefore a form cannot be without its own proper matter. But
the intellectual principle, since it is incorruptible, as was shown above (Q. LXXV., A. 6), remains separate from the body, after the dissolution of the body. Therefore the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form.

On the contrary, According to the Philosopher, Metaph. viii. (Did. vii. 2), difference is derived from the form. But the difference which constitutes man is rational, which is applied to man on account of his intellectual principle. Therefore the intellectual principle is the form of man.

I answer that, We must assert that the intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of the human body. For that whereby primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which the act is to be attributed: for instance, that whereby a body is primarily healed is health, and that whereby the soul knows primarily is knowledge; hence health is a form of the body, and knowledge is a form of the soul. The reason is because nothing acts except so far as it is in act; wherefore a thing acts by that whereby it is in act. Now it is clear that the first thing by which the body lives is the soul. And as life appears through various operations in different degrees of living things, that whereby we primarily perform each of all these vital actions is the soul. For the soul is the primary principle of our nourishment, sensation, and local movement; and likewise of our understanding. Therefore this principle by which we primarily understand, whether it be called the intellect or the intellectual soul, is the form of the body. This is the demonstration used by Aristotle (De Anima ii. 2).

But if anyone say that the intellectual soul is not the form of the body he must first explain how it is that this action of understanding is the action of this particular man; for each one is conscious that it is himself who understands. Now an action may be attributed to anyone in three ways, as is clear from the Philosopher (Phys. v. 1); for a thing is said to move or act, either by virtue of its whole self, for instance, as a physician heals; or by virtue of a part, as a man sees by his eye; or through an accidental quality, as when we say that something that is white builds, because
it is accidental to the builder to be white. So when we say that Socrates or Plato understands, it is clear that this is not attributed to him accidentally; since it is ascribed to him as man, which is predicated of him essentially. We must therefore say either that Socrates understands by virtue of his whole self, as Plato maintained, holding that man is an intellectual soul; or that intelligence is a part of Socrates. The first cannot stand, as was shown above (Q. LXXV., A. 4), for this reason, that it is one and the same man who is conscious both that he understands, and that he senses. But one cannot sense without a body: therefore the body must be some part of man. It follows therefore that the intellect by which Socrates understands is a part of Socrates, so that in some way it is united to the body of Socrates.

The Commentator held that this union is through the intelligible species, as having a double subject, in the possible intellect, and in the phantasms which are in the corporeal organs. Thus through the intelligible species the possible intellect is linked to the body of this or that particular man. But this link or union does not sufficiently explain the fact, that the act of the intellect is the act of Socrates. This can be clearly seen from comparison with the sensitive faculty, from which Aristotle proceeds to consider things relating to the intellect. For the relation of phantasms to the intellect is like the relation of colours to the sense of sight, as he says De Anima iii. 5, 7. Therefore, as the species of colours are in the sight, so are the species of phantasms in the possible intellect. Now it is clear that because the colours, the images of which are in the sight, are on a wall, the action of seeing is not attributed to the wall: for we do not say that the wall sees, but rather that it is seen. Therefore, from the fact that the species of phantasms are in the possible intellect, it does not follow that Socrates, in whom are the phantasms, understands, but that he or his phantasms are understood.

Some, however, tried to maintain that the intellect is united to the body as its motor; and hence that the intellect and body form one thing so that the act of the
intellect could be attributed to the whole. This is, however, absurd for many reasons. First, because the intellect does not move the body except through the appetite, the movement of which presupposes the operation of the intellect. The reason therefore why Socrates understands is not because he is moved by his intellect, but rather, contrariwise, he is moved by his intellect because he understands. Secondly, because, since Socrates is an individual in a nature of one essence composed of matter and form, if the intellect be not the form, it follows that it must be outside the essence, and then the intellect is to the whole Socrates as a motor to the thing moved. Whereas the act of intellect remains in the agent, and does not pass into something else, as does the action of heating. Therefore the action of understanding cannot be attributed to Socrates for the reason that he is moved by his intellect. Thirdly, because the action of a motor is never attributed to the thing moved, except as to an instrument; as the action of a carpenter to a saw. Therefore if understanding is attributed to Socrates, as the action of what moves him, it follows that it is attributed to him as to an instrument. This is contrary to the teaching of the Philosopher, who holds that understanding is not possible through a corporeal instrument (De Anima iii. 4). Fourthly, because, although the action of a part be attributed to the whole, as the action of the eye is attributed to a man; yet it is never attributed to another part, except perhaps indirectly; for we do not say that the hand sees because the eye sees. Therefore if the intellect and Socrates are united in the above manner, the action of the intellect cannot be attributed to Socrates. If, however, Socrates be a whole composed of a union of the intellect with whatever else belongs to Socrates, and still the intellect be united to those other things only as a motor, it follows that Socrates is not one absolutely, and consequently neither a being absolutely, for a thing is a being according as it is one.

There remains, therefore, no other explanation than that given by Aristotle—namely, that this particular man understands, because the intellectual principle is his form. Thus
from the very operation of the intellect it is made clear that the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form.

The same can be clearly shown from the nature of the human species. For the nature of each thing is shown by its operation. Now the proper operation of man as man is to understand; because he thereby surpasses all other animals. Whence Aristotle concludes (Ethic. x. 7) that the ultimate happiness of man must consist in this operation as properly belonging to him. Man must therefore derive his species from that which is the principle of this operation. But the species of anything is derived from its form. It follows therefore that the intellectual principle is the proper form of man.

But we must observe that the nobler a form is, the more it rises above corporeal matter, the less it is merged in matter, and the more it excels matter by its power and its operation; hence we find that the form of a mixed body has another operation not caused by its elemental qualities. And the higher we advance in the nobility of forms, the more we find that the power of the form excels the elementary matter; as the vegetative soul excels the form of the metal, and the sensitive soul excels the vegetative soul. Now the human soul is the highest and noblest of forms. Wherefore it excels corporeal matter in its power by the fact that it has an operation and a power in which corporeal matter has no share whatever. This power is called the intellect.

It is well to remark that if anyone holds that the soul is composed of matter and form, it would follow that in no way could the soul be the form of the body. For since the form is an act, and matter is only in potentiality, that which is composed of matter and form cannot be the form of another by virtue of itself as a whole. But if it is a form by virtue of some part of itself, then that part which is the form we call the soul, and that of which it is the form we call the primary animate, as was said above (Q. LXXV., A. 5).

Reply Obj. 1. As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii. 2), the ultimate natural form to which the consideration of the natural philosopher is directed is indeed separate; yet it
exists in matter. He proves this from the fact that man and the sun generate man from matter. It is separate indeed according to its intellectual power, because the intellectual power does not belong to a corporeal organ, as the power of seeing is the act of the eye; for understanding is an act which cannot be performed by a corporeal organ, like the act of seeing. But it exists in matter so far as the soul itself, to which this power belongs, is the form of the body, and the term of human generation. And so the Philosopher says (De Anima iii.) that the intellect is separate, because it is not the faculty of a corporeal organ.

From this it is clear how to answer the Second and Third objections: since, in order that man may be able to understand all things by means of his intellect, and that his intellect may understand immaterial things and universals, it is sufficient that the intellectual power be not the act of the body.

Reply Obj. 4. The human soul, by reason of its perfection, is not a form merged in matter, or entirely embraced by matter. Therefore there is nothing to prevent some power thereof not being the act of the body, although the soul is essentially the form of the body.

Reply Obj. 5. The soul communicates that existence in which it subsists to the corporeal matter, out of which and the intellectual soul there results unity of existence; so that the existence of the whole composite is also the existence of the soul. This is not the case with other non-subsistent forms. For this reason the human soul retains its own existence after the dissolution of the body; whereas it is not so with other forms.

Reply Obj. 6. To be united to the body belongs to the soul by reason of itself, as it belongs to a light body by reason of itself to be raised up. And as a light body remains light, when removed from its proper place, retaining meanwhile an aptitude and an inclination for its proper place; so the human soul retains its proper existence when separated from the body, having an aptitude and a natural inclination to be united to the body.
SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL PRINCIPLE IS MULTIPLIED ACCORDING TO THE NUMBER OF BODIES?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the intellectual principle is not multiplied according to the number of bodies, but that there is one intellect in all men. For an immaterial substance is not multiplied in number within one species. But the human soul is an immaterial substance; since it is not composed of matter and form, as was shown above (Q. LXXV., A. 5). Therefore there are not many human souls in one species. But all men are of one species. Therefore there is but one intellect in all men.

Obj. 2. Further, when the cause is removed, the effect is also removed. Therefore, if human souls were multiplied according to the number of bodies, it follows that the bodies being removed, the number of souls would not remain; but from all the souls there would be but a single remainder. This is heretical; for it would do away with the distinction of rewards and punishments.

Obj. 3. Further, if my intellect is distinct from your intellect, my intellect is an individual, and so is yours; for individuals are things which differ in number but agree in one species. Now whatever is received into anything must be received according to the condition of the receiver. Therefore the species of things would be received individually into my intellect, and also into yours: which is contrary to the nature of the intellect which knows universals.

Obj. 4. Further, the thing understood is in the intellect which understands. If, therefore, my intellect is distinct from yours, what is understood by me must be distinct from what is understood by you; and consequently it will be reckoned as something individual, and be only potentially something understood; so that the common intention will have to be abstracted from both; since from things
diverse something intelligible common to them may be abstracted. But this is contrary to the nature of the intellect; for then the intellect would seem not to be distinct from the imagination. It seems, therefore, to follow that there is one intellect in all men.

Obj. 5. Further, when the disciple receives knowledge from the master, it cannot be said that the master's knowledge begets knowledge in the disciple, because then also knowledge would be an active form, such as heat is, which is clearly false. It seems, therefore, that the same individual knowledge which is in the master is communicated to the disciple; which cannot be, unless there is one intellect in both. Seemingly, therefore, the intellect of the disciple and master is but one; and, consequently, the same applies to all men.

Obj. 6. Further, Augustine (De Quant. Animae xxxii.) says: If I were to say that there are many human souls, I should laugh at myself. But the soul seems to be one chiefly on account of the intellect. Therefore there is one intellect of all men.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. ii. 3) that the relation of universal causes to universals is like the relation of particular causes to individuals. But it is impossible that a soul, one in species, should belong to animals of different species. Therefore it is impossible that one individual intellectual soul should belong to several individuals.

I answer that, It is absolutely impossible for one intellect to belong to all men. This is clear if, as Plato maintained, man is the intellect itself. For it would follow that Socrates and Plato are one man; and that they are not distinct from each other, except by something outside the essence of each. The distinction between Socrates and Plato would be no other than that of one man with a tunic and another with a cloak; which is quite absurd.

It is likewise clear that this is impossible if, according to the opinion of Aristotle (De Anima ii. 2), it is supposed that the intellect is a part or a power of the soul which is
the form of man. For it is impossible for many distinct individuals to have one form, as it is impossible for them to have one existence, for the form is the principle of existence.

Again, this is clearly impossible, whatever one may hold as to the manner of the union of the intellect to this or that man. For it is manifest that, supposing there is one principal agent, and two instruments, we can say that there is one agent absolutely, but several actions; as when one man touches several things with his two hands, there will be one who touches, but two contacts. If, on the contrary, we suppose one instrument and several principal agents, we might say that there are several agents, but one act; for example, if there be many drawing a ship by means of a rope; there will be many drawing, but one pull. If, however, there is one principal agent, and one instrument, we say that there is one agent and one action, as when the smith strikes with one hammer, there is one striker and one stroke. Now it is clear that no matter how the intellect is united or coupled to this or that man, the intellect has the precedence of all the other things which appertain to man; for the sensitive powers obey the intellect, and are at its service. Therefore, if we suppose two men to have several intellects and one sense,—for instance, if two men had one eye,—there would be several seers, but one sight. But if there is one intellect, no matter how diverse may be all those things of which the intellect makes use as instruments, in no way is it possible to say that Socrates and Plato are otherwise than one understanding man. And if to this we add that to understand, which is the act of the intellect, is not affected by any organ other than the intellect itself; it will further follow that there is but one agent and one action: that is to say that all men are but one "understander," and have but one act of understanding, in regard, that is, of one intelligible object.

However, it would be possible to distinguish my intellectual action from yours by the distinction of the phantasms—that is to say, were there one phantasm of a stone in me, and another in you—if the phantasm itself, as it is
one thing in me and another in you, were a form of the
possible intellect; since the same agent according to divers
forms produces divers actions; as, according to divers forms
of things with regard to the same eye, there are divers
visions. But the phantasm itself is not a form of the
possible intellect; it is the intelligible species abstracted from
the phantasm that is a form. Now in one intellect, from
different phantasms of the same species, only one intel-
ligible species is abstracted; as appears in one man, in
whom there may be different phantasms of a stone; yet
from all of them only one intelligible species of a stone is
abstracted; by which the intellect of that one man, by one
operation, understands the nature of a stone, notwith-
standing the diversity of phantasms. Therefore, if there
were one intellect for all men, the diversity of phantasms
which are in this one and that one would not cause a
diversity of intellectual operation in this man and that man.
It follows, therefore, that it is altogether impossible and un-
reasonable to maintain that there exists one intellect for all
men.

Reply Obj. 1. Although the intellectual soul, like an
angel, has no matter from which it is produced, yet it is the
form of a certain matter; in which it is unlike an angel.
Therefore, according to the division of matter, there are
many souls of one species; while it is quite impossible for
many angels to be of one species.

Reply Obj. 2. Everything has unity in the same way that
it has being; consequently we must judge of the multi-
plicity of a thing as we judge of its being. Now it is
clear that the intellectual soul, by virtue of its very being,
is united to the body as its form; yet, after the dissolution
of the body, the intellectual soul retains its own being.
In like manner the multiplicity of souls is in proportion to
the multiplicity of bodies; yet, after the dissolution of the
bodies, the souls retain their multiplied being.

Reply Obj. 3. Individuality of the intelligent being, or
of the species whereby it understands, does not exclude the
understanding of universals; otherwise, since separate in-
tellects are subsistent substances, and consequently individual, they could not understand universals. But the materiality of the knower, and of the species whereby it knows, impedes the knowledge of the universal. For as every action is according to the mode of the form by which the agent acts, as heating is according to the mode of the heat; so knowledge is according to the mode of the species by which the knower knows. Now it is clear that common nature becomes distinct and multiplied by reason of the individuating principles which come from the matter. Therefore if the form, which is the means of knowledge, is material—that is, not abstracted from material conditions—its likeness to the nature of a species or genus will be according to the distinction and multiplication of that nature by means of individuating principles; so that knowledge of the nature of a thing in general will be impossible. But if the species be abstracted from the conditions of individual matter, there will be a likeness of the nature without those things which make it distinct and multiplied; thus there will be knowledge of the universal. Nor does it matter, as to this particular point, whether there be one intellect or many; because, even if there were but one, it would necessarily be an individual intellect, and the species whereby it understands, an individual species.

Reply Obj. 4. Whether the intellect be one or many, what is understood is one; for what is understood is in the intellect, not according to its own nature, but according to its likeness; for the stone is not in the soul, but its likeness is, as is said De Anima iii. 8. Yet it is the stone which is understood, not the likeness of the stone; except by a reflection of the intellect on itself: otherwise, the objects of sciences would not be things, but only intelligible species. Now it happens that different things, according to different forms, are likened to the same thing. And since knowledge is begotten according to the assimilation of the knower to the thing known, it follows that the same thing may happen to be known by several knowers; as is apparent in regard to the senses; for several see the same
colour, according to different likenesses. In the same way several intellects understand one object understood. But there is this difference, according to the opinion of Aristotle, between the sense and the intelligence—that a thing is perceived by the sense according to the disposition which it has outside the soul—that is, in its individuality; whereas the nature of the thing understood is indeed outside the soul, but the mode according to which it exists outside the soul is not the mode according to which it is understood. For the common nature is understood as apart from the individualizing principles; whereas such is not its mode of existence outside the soul. But, according to the opinion of Plato, the thing understood exists outside the soul in the same conditions as those under which it is understood; for he supposed that the natures of things exist separate from matter.

*Reply Obj. 5.* One knowledge exists in the disciple and another in the master. How it is caused will be shown later on (Q. CXVII., A. 1).

*Reply Obj. 6.* Augustine denies a plurality of souls, that would involve a plurality of species.

**Third Article.**

**Whether besides the Intellectual Soul there are in Man other Souls essentially different from one another?**

*We proceed thus to the Third Article:*—

*Objection 1.* It would seem that besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls essentially different from one another, such as the sensitive soul and the nutritive soul. For corruptible and incorruptible are not of the same substance. But the intellectual soul is incorruptible; whereas the other souls, as the sensitive and the nutritive, are corruptible, as was shown above (Q. LXXV., A. 6). Therefore in man the essence of the intellectual soul, the sensitive soul, and the nutritive soul, cannot be the same.

*Obj. 2.* Further, if it be said that the sensitive soul in
man is incorruptible; on the contrary, corruptible and incorruptible differ generically, says the Philosopher, Metaph. x. (Did. ix. 10). But the sensitive soul in the horse, the lion, and other brute animals, is corruptible. If, therefore, in man it be incorruptible, the sensitive soul in man and brute animals will not be of the same genus. Now, an animal is so called from its having a sensitive soul; and, therefore, animal will not be one genus common to man and other animals, which is absurd.

 Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii. 3) that the embryo is an animal before it is a man. But this would be impossible if the essence of the sensitive soul were the same as that of the intellectual soul; for an animal is such by its sensitive soul, while a man is a man by the intellectual soul. Therefore in man the essence of the sensitive soul is not the same as the essence of the intellectual soul.

 Obj. 4. Further, the Philosopher says, Metaph. viii. (Did. vii. 2), that the genus is taken from the matter, and difference from the form. But rational, which is the difference constituting man, is taken from the intellectual soul; while he is called animal by reason of his having a body animated by a sensitive soul. Therefore the intellectual soul may be compared to the body animated by a sensitive soul, as form to matter. Therefore in man the intellectual soul is not essentially the same as the sensitive soul, but presupposes it as a material subject.

 On the contrary, It is said in the Book De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus xv.: Nor do we say that there are two souls in one man, as James and other Syrians write; one, animal, by which the body is animated, and which is mingled with the blood; the other, spiritual, which obeys the reason; but we say that it is one and the same soul in man, that both gives life to the body by being united to it, and orders itself by its own reasoning.

 I answer that, Plato held that there were several souls in one body, distinct even as to organs, to which souls he referred the different vital actions, saying that the nutri-
tive power is in the liver, the concupiscible in the heart, and the power of knowledge in the brain. Which opinion is rejected by Aristotle (De Anima ii. 2), with regard to those parts of the soul which use corporeal organs; for this reason, that in those animals which continue to live when they have been divided, in each part are observed the operations of the soul, as sense and appetite. Now this would not be the case if the various principles of the soul’s operations were essentially different, and distributed in the various parts of the body. But with regard to the intellectual part, he seems to leave it in doubt whether it be only logically distinct from the other parts of the soul, or also locally.

The opinion of Plato might be maintained if, as he held, the soul were supposed to be united to the body, not as its form, but as its motor. For it involves nothing unreasonable that the same movable thing be moved by several motors; and still less if it be moved according to its various parts. If we suppose, however, that the soul is united to the body as its form, it is quite impossible for several essentially different souls to be in one body. This can be made clear by three reasons.

In the first place, an animal would not be absolutely one, in which there were several souls. For nothing is absolutely one except by one form, by which a thing has existence: because a thing has from the same source both existence and unity; and therefore things which are denominated by various forms are not absolutely one; as, for instance, a white man. If, therefore, man were living by one form, the vegetative soul, and animal by another form, the sensitive soul, and man by another form, the intellectual soul, it would follow that man is not absolutely one. Thus Aristotle argues, Metaph. viii. (Did. vii. 6), against Plato, that if the idea of an animal is distinct from the idea of a biped, then a biped animal is not absolutely one. For this reason, against those who hold that there are several souls in the body, he asks (De Anima i. 5), what contains them?—that is, what makes them one? It cannot be said that they are
united by the one body; because rather does the soul contain the body and make it one, than the reverse.

Secondly, this is proved to be impossible by the manner in which one thing is predicated of another. Those things which are derived from various forms are predicated of one another, either accidentally, (if the forms are not ordered one to another, as when we say that something white is sweet), or essentially, in the second manner of essential predication, (if the forms are ordered one to another, the subject belonging to the definition of the predicate; as a surface is presupposed to colour; so that if we say that a body with a surface is coloured, we have the second manner of essential predication). Therefore, if we have one form by which a thing is an animal, and another form by which it is a man, it follows either that one of these two things could not be predicated of the other, except accidentally, supposing these two forms not to be ordered to one another,—or that one would be predicated of the other according to the second manner of essential predication, if one soul be presupposed to the other. But both of these consequences are clearly false: because animal is predicated of man essentially and not accidentally; and man is not part of the definition of an animal, but the other way about. Therefore of necessity by the same form a thing is animal and man; otherwise man would not really be the thing which is an animal, so that animal can be essentially predicated of man.

Thirdly, this is shown to be impossible by the fact that when one operation of the soul is intense it impedes another, which could never be the case unless the principle of action were essentially one.

We must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive soul, the intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are numerically one soul. This can easily be explained, if we consider the differences of species and forms. For we observe that the species and forms of things differ from one another, as the perfect and the imperfect; as in the order of things, the animate are more perfect than the inanimate,
and animals more perfect than plants, and man than brute animals; and in each of these genera there are various degrees. For this reason Aristotle, *Metaph.* viii. (Dit. vii. 3), compares the species of things to numbers, which differ in species by the addition or subtraction of unity. And (*De Anima* ii. 3) he compares the various souls to the species of figures, one of which contains another; as a pentagon contains and exceeds a tetragon. Thus the intellectual soul contains virtually whatever belongs to the sensitive soul of brute animals, and to the nutritive soul of plants. Therefore, as a surface which is of a pentagonal shape, is not tetragonal by one shape, and pentagonal by another—since a tetragonal shape would be superfluous as contained in the pentagonal—so neither is Socrates a man by one soul, and an animal by another; but by one and the same soul he is both animal and man.

*Reply Obj. 1.* The sensitive soul is incorruptible, not by reason of its being sensitive, but by reason of its being intellectual. When, therefore, a soul is sensitive only, it is corruptible; but when with sensibility it has also intellectuality, it is incorruptible. For although sensibility does not give incorruptibility, yet it cannot deprive intellectuality of its incorruptibility.

*Reply Obj. 2.* Not forms, but composites, are classified either generically or specifically. Now man is corruptible like other animals. And so the difference of corruptible and incorruptible which is on the part of the forms does not involve a generic difference between man and the other animals.

*Reply Obj. 3.* The embryo has first of all a soul which is merely sensitive, and when this is removed, it is supplanted by a more perfect soul, which is both sensitive and intellectual: as will be shown farther on (*Q.* CXVIII., A. 2, *ad 2*).

*Reply Obj. 4.* We must not consider the diversity of natural things as proceeding from the various logical notions or intentions, which flow from our manner of understanding, because reason can apprehend one and the
same thing in various ways. Therefore since, as we have said, the intellectual soul contains virtually what belongs to the sensitive soul, and something more, reason can consider separately what belongs to the power of the sensitive soul, as something imperfect and material. And because it observes that this is something common to man and to other animals, it forms thence the notion of the genus: while that wherein the intellectual soul exceeds the sensitive soul, it takes as formal and perfecting; and thence it gathers the difference of man.

Fourth Article.

Whether in man there is another form besides the intellectual soul?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in man there is another form besides the intellectual soul. For the Philosopher says (De Anima ii. 1), that the soul is the act of a physical body which has life potentially. Therefore the soul is to the body as a form to matter. But the body has a substantial form by which it is a body. Therefore some other substantial form in the body precedes the soul.

Obj. 2. Further, man moves himself as every animal does. Now everything that moves itself is divided into two parts, of which one moves, and the other is moved, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii. 5). But the part which moves is the soul. Therefore the other part must be such that it can be moved. But primary matter cannot be moved (ibid. v. 1), since it is a being only potentially; indeed everything that is moved is a body. Therefore in man and in every animal there must be another substantial form, by which the body is constituted.

Obj. 3. Further, the order of forms depends on their relation to primary matter; for before and after apply by comparison to some beginning. Therefore if there were not in man some other substantial form besides the rational soul, and if this were to inhere immediately to primary
matter; it would follow that it ranks among the most imperfect forms which inhere to matter immediately.

Obj. 4. Further, the human body is a mixed body. Now mingling does not result from matter alone; for then we should have mere corruption. Therefore the forms of the elements must remain in a mixed body; and these are substantial forms. Therefore in the human body there are other substantial forms besides the intellectual soul.

On the contrary, Of one thing there is but one substantial being. But the substantial form gives substantial being. Therefore of one thing there is but one substantial form. But the soul is the substantial form of man. Therefore it is impossible for there to be in man another substantial form besides the intellectual soul.

I answer that, If we suppose that the intellectual soul is not united to the body as its form, but only as its motor, as the Platonists maintain, it would necessarily follow that in man there is another substantial form, by which the body is established in its being as movable by the soul. If, however, the intellectual soul be united to the body as its substantial form, as we have said above (A. 1), it is impossible for another substantial form besides the intellectual soul to be found in man.

In order to make this evident, we must consider that the substantial form differs from the accidental form in this, that the accidental form does not make a thing to be simply, but to be such, as heat does not make a thing to be simply, but only to be hot. Therefore by the coming of the accidental form a thing is not said to be made or generated simply, but to be made such, or to be in some particular condition; and in like manner, when an accidental form is removed, a thing is said to be corrupted, not simply, but relatively. Now the substantial form gives being simply; therefore by its coming a thing is said to be generated simply; and by its removal to be corrupted simply. For this reason, the old natural philosophers, who held that primary matter was some actual being—for instance, fire or air, or something of that sort—maintained
that nothing is generated simply, or corrupted simply; and stated that every becoming is nothing but an alteration, as we read Phys. i. 4. Therefore, if besides the intellectual soul there pre-existed in matter another substantial form by which the subject of the soul were made an actual being, it would follow that the soul does not give being simply; and consequently that it is not the substantial form: and so at the advent of the soul there would not be simple generation; nor at its removal simple corruption, all of which is clearly false.

Whence we must conclude, that there is no other substantial form in man besides the intellectual soul; and that the soul, as it virtually contains the sensitive and nutritive souls, so does it virtually contain all inferior forms, and itself alone does whatever the imperfect forms do in other things. The same is to be said of the sensitive soul in brute animals, and of the nutritive soul in plants, and universally of all more perfect forms with regard to the imperfect.

Reply Obj. 1. Aristotle does not say that the soul is the act of a body only, but the act of a physical organic body which has life potentially; and that this potentiality does not reject the soul. Whence it is clear that when the soul is called the act, the soul itself is included; as when we say that heat is the act of what is hot, and light of what is lucid; not as though lucid and light were two separate things, but because a thing is made lucid by the light. In like manner, the soul is said to be the act of a body, etc., because by the soul it is a body, and is organic, and has life potentially. Yet the first act is said to be in potentiality to the second act, which is operation; for such a potentiality does not reject—that is, does not exclude—the soul.

Reply Obj. 2. The soul does not move the body by its essence, as the form of the body, but by the motive power, the act of which presupposes the body to be already actualized by the soul: so that the soul by its motive power is the part which moves; and the animate body is the part moved.
Reply Obj. 3. We observe in matter various degrees of perfection, as existence, living, sensing, and understanding. Now what is added is always more perfect. Therefore that form which gives matter only the first degree of perfection is the most imperfect; while that form which gives the first, second, and third degree, and so on, is the most perfect; and yet it inheres to matter immediately.

Reply Obj. 4. Avicenna held that the substantial forms of the elements remain entire in the mixed body; and that the mixture is made by the contrary qualities of the elements being reduced to an average. But this is impossible, because the various forms of the elements must necessarily be in various parts of matter; for the distinction of which we must suppose dimensions, without which matter cannot be divisible. Now matter subject to dimension is not to be found except in a body. But various bodies cannot be in the same place. Whence it follows that elements in the mixed body would be distinct as to situation. And then there would not be a real mixture which is in respect of the whole; but only a mixture apparent to sense, by the juxtaposition of particles.

Averroes maintained that the forms of elements, by reason of their imperfection, are a medium between accidental and substantial forms, and so can be more or less; and therefore in the mixture they are modified and reduced to an average, so that one form emerges from them. But this is even still more impossible. For the substantial being of each thing consists in something indivisible, and every addition and subtraction varies the species, as in numbers, as stated in *Metaph.* viii. (Did. vii. 3); and consequently it is impossible for any substantial form to receive more or less. Nor is it less impossible for anything to be a medium between substance and accident.

Therefore we must say, in accordance with the Philosopher (*De Gener.* i. 10), that the forms of the elements remain in the mixed body, not actually but virtually. For the proper qualities of the elements remain, though modified; and in them is the power of the elementary forms.
This quality of the mixture is the proper disposition for the substantial form of the mixed body; for instance, the form of a stone, or of any sort of soul.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL IS PROPERLY UNITED TO SUCH A BODY?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the intellectual soul is improperly united to such a body. For matter must be proportionate to the form. But the intellectual soul is incorruptible. Therefore it is not properly united to a corruptible body.

Obj. 2. Further, the intellectual soul is a perfectly immaterial form; a proof whereof is its operation in which corporeal matter does not share. But the more subtle is the body, the less has it of matter. Therefore the soul should be united to a most subtle body, to fire, for instance, and not to a mixed body, still less to a terrestrial body.

Obj. 3. Further, since the form is the principle of the species, one form cannot produce a variety of species. But the intellectual soul is one form. Therefore, it should not be united to a body which is composed of parts belonging to various species.

Obj. 4. Further, what is susceptible of a more perfect form should itself be more perfect. But the intellectual soul is the most perfect of souls. Therefore since the bodies of other animals are naturally provided with a covering, for instance, with hair instead of clothes, and hoofs instead of shoes; and are, moreover, naturally provided with arms, as claws, teeth, and horns; it seems that the intellectual soul should not have been united to a body which is imperfect as being deprived of the above means of protection.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii. 1), that the soul is the act of a physical organic body having life potentially.
I answer that, Since the form is not for the matter, but rather the matter for the form, we must gather from the form the reason why the matter is such as it is; and not conversely. Now the intellectual soul, as we have seen above (Q. LV., A. 2) in the order of nature, holds the lowest place among intellectual substances; inasmuch as it is not naturally gifted with the knowledge of truth, as the angels are; but has to gather knowledge from individual things by way of the senses, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii.). But nature never fails in necessary things: therefore the intellectual soul had to be endowed not only with the power of understanding, but also with the power of feeling. Now the action of the senses is not performed without a corporeal instrument. Therefore it behoved the intellectual soul to be united to a body fitted to be a convenient organ of sense.

Now all the other senses are based on the sense of touch. But the organ of touch requires to be a medium between contraries, such as hot and cold, wet and dry, and the like, of which the sense of touch has the perception; thus it is in potentiality with regard to contraries, and is able to perceive them. Therefore the more the organ of touch is reduced to an equable complexion, the more sensitive will be the touch. But the intellectual soul has the power of sense in all its completeness; because what belongs to the inferior nature pre-exists more perfectly in the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v.). Therefore the body to which the intellectual soul is united should be a mixed body, above others reduced to the most equable complexion. For this reason among animals, man has the best sense of touch. And among men, those who have the best sense of touch have the best intelligence. A sign of which is that we observe those who are refined in body are well endowed in mind, as stated in De Anima ii. 9.

Reply Obj. 1. Perhaps someone might attempt to answer this by saying that before sin the human body was incorruptible. This answer does not seem sufficient; because before sin the human body was immortal not by nature,
but by a gift of Divine grace; otherwise its immortality would not be forfeited through sin, as neither was the immortality of the devil.

Therefore we answer otherwise by observing that in matter two conditions are to be found; one which is chosen in order that the matter be suitable to the form; the other which follows by force of the first disposition. The artisan, for instance, for the form of the saw chooses iron adapted for cutting through hard material; but that the teeth of the saw may become blunt and rusted, follows by force of the matter itself. So the intellectual soul requires a body of equable complexion, which, however, is corruptible by force of its matter. If, however, it be said that God could avoid this, we answer that in the formation of natural things we do not consider what God might do; but what is suitable to the nature of things, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii. 1). God, however, provided in this case by applying a remedy against death in the gift of grace.

Reply Obj. 2. A body is not necessary to the intellectual soul by reason of its intellectual operation considered as such; but on account of the sensitive power, which requires an organ of equable temperment. Therefore the intellectual soul had to be united to such a body, and not to a simple element, or to a mixed body, in which fire was in excess; because otherwise there could not be an equability of temperament. And this body of an equable temperment has a dignity of its own by reason of its being remote from contraries, thereby resembling in a way a heavenly body.

Reply Obj. 3. The parts of an animal, for instance, the eye, hand, flesh, and bones, and so forth, do not make the species; but the whole does, and therefore, properly speaking, we cannot say that these are of different species, but that they are of various dispositions. This is suitable to the intellectual soul, which, although it be one in its essence, yet on account of its perfection, is manifold in power: and therefore, for its various operations it requires various dispositions in the parts of the body to which it is united. For this reason we observe that there is a greater
variety of parts in perfect than in imperfect animals; and in these a greater variety than in plants.

Reply Obj. 4. The intellectual soul as comprehending universals, has a power extending to the infinite; therefore it cannot be limited by nature to certain fixed natural notions, or even to certain fixed means whether of defence or of clothing, as is the case with other animals, the souls of which are endowed with knowledge and power in regard to fixed particular things. Instead of all these, man has by nature his reason and his hands, which are the organs of organs (De Anima iii.), since by their means man can make for himself instruments of an infinite variety, and for any number of purposes.

Sixth Article.

Whether the intellectual soul is united to the body through the medium of accidental dispositions?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the intellectual soul is united to the body through the medium of accidental dispositions. For every form exists in its proper disposed matter. But dispositions to a form are accidents. Therefore we must presuppose accidents to be in matter before the substantial form; and therefore before the soul, since the soul is a substantial form.

Obj. 2. Further, various forms of one species require various parts of matter. But various parts of matter are unintelligible without division in measurable quantities. Therefore we must suppose dimensions in matter before the substantial forms, which are many belonging to one species.

Obj. 3. Further, what is spiritual is connected with what is corporeal by virtual contact. But the virtue of the soul is its power. Therefore it seems that the soul is united to the body by means of a power, which is an accident.

On the contrary, Accident is posterior to substance, both in the order of time and in the order of reason, as the Philosopher says, Metaph. vii. (Did. vi. 1). Therefore it
is unintelligible that any accidental form exist in matter before the soul, which is the substantial form.

I answer that, If the soul were united to the body, merely as a motor, there would be nothing to prevent the existence of certain dispositions mediating between the soul and the body; on the contrary, they would be necessary, for on the part of the soul would be required the power to move the body; and on the part of the body, a certain aptitude to be moved by the soul.

If, however, the intellectual soul is united to the body as the substantial form, as we have already said above (A. 1), it is impossible for any accidental disposition to come between the body and the soul, or between any substantial form whatever and its matter. The reason is because since matter is in potentiality to all manner of acts in a certain order, what is absolutely first among the acts must be understood as being first in matter. Now the first among all acts is existence. Therefore, it is impossible for matter to be apprehended as hot, or as having quantity, before it is actual. But matter has actual existence by the substantial form, which makes it to exist absolutely, as we have said above (A. 4). Wherefore it is impossible for any accidental dispositions to pre-exist in matter before the substantial form, and consequently before the soul.

Reply Obj. 1. As appears from what has been already said (A. 4), the more perfect form virtually contains whatever belongs to the inferior forms; therefore while remaining one and the same, it perfects matter according to the various degrees of perfection. For the same essential form makes man an actual being; a body, a living being, an animal, and a man. Now it is clear that to every genus follow its own proper accidents. Therefore as matter is apprehended as perfected in its existence, before it is understood as corporeal, and so on; so those accidents which belong to existence are understood to exist before corporeity; and thus dispositions are understood in matter before the form, not as regards all its effects, but as regards the subsequent effect.
Reply Obj. 2. Dimensions of quantity are accidents consequent to the corporeity which belongs to the whole matter. Wherefore matter, once understood as corporeal and measurable, can be understood as distinct in its various parts, and as receptive of different forms according to the further degrees of perfection. For although it is essentially the same form which gives matter the various degrees of perfection, as we have said (ad 1), yet it is considered as different when brought under the observation of reason.

Reply Obj. 3. A spiritual substance which is united to a body as its motor only, is united thereto by power or virtue. But the intellectual soul is united by its very being to the body as a form; and yet it guides and moves the body by its power and virtue.

SEVENTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SOUL IS UNITED TO THE ANIMAL BODY BY MEANS OF A BODY?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:

Objection 1. It seems that the soul is united to the animal body by means of a body. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii. 19), that the soul administers the body by light, that is, by fire, and by air, which are most akin to a spirit. But fire and air are bodies. Therefore the soul is united to the human body by means of a body.

Obj. 2. Further, a link between two things seems to be that thing the removal of which involves the cessation of their union. But when breathing ceases, the soul is separated from the body. Therefore the breath, which is a subtle body, is the means of union between soul and body.

Obj. 3. Further, things which are very distant from one another, are not united except by something between them. But the intellectual soul is very distant from the body, both because it is incorporeal, and because it is incorruptible. Therefore it seems to be united to the body by means of an incorruptible body, and such would be some heavenly
light, which would harmonize the elements, and unite them together.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii. 1): We need not ask if the soul and body are one, as neither do we ask if wax and its shape are one. But the shape is united to the wax without a body intervening. Therefore also the soul is thus united to the body.

I answer that, If the soul, according to the Platonists, were united to the body merely as a motor, it would be right to say that some other bodies must intervene between the soul and body of man, or any animal whatever; for a motor naturally moves what is distant from it by means of something nearer.

If, however, the soul is united to the body as its form, as we have said above (A. 1), it is impossible for it to be united by means of another body. The reason of this is that a thing is one, according as it is a being. Now the form, through itself, makes a thing to be actual since it is itself essentially an act; nor does it give existence by means of something else. Wherefore the unity of a thing composed of matter and form, is by virtue of the form itself, which by reason of its very nature is united to matter as its act. Nor is there any other cause of union except the agent, which causes matter to be in act, as the Philosopher says, Metaph. viii. (Did. vii. 6).

From this it is clear how false are the opinions of those who maintained the existence of some mediate bodies between the soul and body of man. Of these certain Platonists said that the intellectual soul has an incorruptible body naturally united to it, from which it is never separated, and by means of which it is united to the corruptible body of man. Others said that the soul is united to the body by means of a corporeal spirit. Others said it is united to the body by means of light, which, they say, is a body and of the nature of the fifth essence; so that the vegetative soul would be united to the body by means of the light of the sidereal heaven; the sensible soul, by means of the light of the crystal heaven; and the intellectual
soul by means of the light of the empyrean heaven. Now all this is fictitious and ridiculous: for light is not a body; and the fifth essence does not enter materially into the composition of a mixed body (since it is unchangeable), but only virtually: and lastly, because the soul is immediately united to the body as the form to matter.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine speaks there of the soul as it moves the body; whence he uses the word administration. It is true that it moves the grosser parts of the body by the more subtle parts. And the first instrument of the motive power is a kind of spirit, as the Philosopher says in De causa motus animalium (De mot. animal. x.).

Reply Obj. 2. The union of soul and body ceases at the cessation of breath, not because this is the means of union, but because of the removal of that disposition by which the body is disposed for such a union. Nevertheless the breath is a means of moving, as the first instrument of motion.

Reply Obj. 3. The soul is indeed very distant from the body, if we consider the condition of each separately: so that if each had a separate existence, many means of connection would have to intervene. But insomuch as the soul is the form of the body, it has not an existence apart from the existence of the body, but by its own existence is united to the body immediately. This is the case with every form which, if considered as an act, is very distant from matter, which is a being only in potentiality.

Eighth Article.

Whether the whole soul is in each part of the body?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the whole soul is not in each part of the body; for the Philosopher says in De causa motus animalium (De mot. animal. x.): It is not necessary for the soul to be in each part of the body; it suffices that it
be in some principle of the body causing the other parts to live, for each part has a natural movement of its own.

Obj. 2. Further, the soul is in the body of which it is the act. But it is the act of an organic body. Therefore it exists only in an organic body. But each part of the human body is not an organic body. Therefore the whole soul is not in each part.

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii. 1) that the relation of a part of the soul to a part of the body, such as the sight to the pupil of the eye, is the same as the relation of the soul to the whole body of an animal. If, therefore, the whole soul is in each part of the body, it follows that each part of the body is an animal.

Obj. 4. Further, all the powers of the soul are rooted in the essence of the soul. If, therefore, the whole soul be in each part of the body, it follows that all the powers of the soul are in each part of the body; thus the sight will be in the ear, and hearing in the eye, and this is absurd.

Obj. 5. Further, if the whole soul is in each part of the body, each part of the body is immediately dependent on the soul. Thus one part would not depend on another; nor would one part be nobler than another; which is clearly untrue. Therefore the soul is not in each part of the body.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. vi. 6), that in each body the whole soul is in the whole body, and in each part is entire.

I answer that, As we have said, if the soul were united to the body merely as its motor, we might say that it is not in each part of the body, but only in one part through which it would move the others. But since the soul is united to the body as its form, it must necessarily be in the whole body, and in each part thereof. For it is not an accidental form, but the substantial form of the body. Now the substantial form perfects not only the whole, but each part of the whole. For since a whole consists of parts, a form of the whole which does not give existence to each of the parts of the body, is a form consisting in composition and order, such as the form of a house; and such a form is
accidental. But the soul is a substantial form; and therefore it must be the form and the act, not only of the whole, but also of each part. Therefore, on the withdrawal of the soul, as we do not speak of an animal or a man unless equivocally, as we speak of a painted animal or a stone animal; so is it with the hand, the eye, the flesh and bones, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii. 1). A proof of which is, that on the withdrawal of the soul, no part of the body retains its proper action; although that which retains its species, retains the action of the species. But act is in that which it actuates: wherefore the soul must be in the whole body, and in each part thereof.

That it is entire in each part thereof, may be concluded from this, that since a whole is that which is divided into parts, there are three kinds of totality, corresponding to three kinds of division. There is a whole which is divided into parts of quantity, as a whole line, or a whole body. There is also a whole which is divided into logical and essential parts: as a thing defined is divided into the parts of a definition, and a composite into matter and form. There is, further, a third kind of whole which is potential, divided into virtual parts. The first kind of totality does not apply to forms, except perhaps accidentally; and then only to those forms, which have an indifferent relationship to a quantitative whole and its parts; as whiteness, as far as its essence is concerned, is equally disposed to be in the whole surface, and in each part of the surface; and, therefore, the surface being divided, the whiteness is accidentally divided. But a form which requires variety in the parts, such as a soul, and specially the soul of perfect animals, is not equally related to the whole and the parts: hence it is not divided accidentally when the whole is divided. So therefore quantitative totality cannot be attributed to the soul, either essentially or accidentally. But the second kind of totality, which depends on logical and essential perfection, properly and essentially belongs to forms: and likewise the virtual totality, because a form is the principle of operation.
Therefore if it be asked whether the whole whiteness is in the whole surface and in each part thereof, it is necessary to distinguish. If we mean quantitative totality which whiteness has accidentally, then the whole whiteness is not in each part of the surface. The same is to be said of totality of power: since the whiteness which is in the whole surface moves the sight more than the whiteness which is in a small part thereof. But if we mean totality of species and essence, then the whole whiteness is in each part of a surface.

Since, however, the soul has not quantitative totality, neither essentially, nor accidentally, as we have seen; it is enough to say that the whole soul is in each part of the body, by totality of perfection and of essence, but not by totality of power. For it is not in each part of the body, with regard to each of its powers; but with regard to sight, it is in the eye; and with regard to hearing, it is in the ear; and so forth. We must observe, however, that since the soul requires variety of parts, its relation to the whole is not the same as its relation to the parts; for to the whole it is compared primarily and essentially, as to its proper and proportionate perfectible; but to the parts, secondarily, inasmuch as they are ordained to the whole.

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher is speaking there of the motive power of the soul.

Reply Obj. 2. The soul is the act of an organic body, as of its primary and proportionate perfectible.

Reply Obj. 3. An animal is that which is composed of a soul and a whole body, which is the soul's primary and proportionate perfectible. Thus the soul is not in a part. Whence it does not follow that a part of an animal is an animal.

Reply Obj. 4. Some of the powers of the soul are in it according as it exceeds the entire capacity of the body, namely, the intellect and the will; whence these powers are not said to be in any part of the body. Other powers are common to the soul and body; wherefore each of these powers need not be wherever the soul is, but only in that
part of the body, which is adapted to the operation of such a power.

Reply Obj. 5. One part of the body is said to be nobler than another, on account of the various powers, of which the parts of the body are the organs. For that part which is the organ of a nobler power, is a nobler part of the body: as also is that part which serves the same power in a nobler manner.
QUESTION LXXVII.

OF THOSE THINGS WHICH BELONG TO THE POWERS OF THE SOUL IN GENERAL.

(In Eight Articles.)

We proceed to consider those things which belong to the powers of the soul; first, in general, secondly, in particular. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the essence of the soul is its power? (2) Whether there is one power of the soul, or several? (3) How the powers of the soul are distinguished from one another? (4) Of the order of the powers, one to another. (5) Whether the powers of the soul are in it as in their subject? (6) Whether the powers flow from the essence of the soul? (7) Whether one power rises from another? (8) Whether all the powers of the soul remain in the soul after death?

First Article.

Whether the essence of the soul is its power?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the essence of the soul is its power. For Augustine says (De Trin. ix. 4), that mind, knowledge, and love are in the soul substantially, or, which is the same thing, essentially: and (ibid. x. 11), that memory, understanding, and will are one life, one mind, one essence.

Obj. 2. Further, the soul is nobler than primary matter. But primary matter is its own potentiality. Much more therefore is the soul its own power.

Obj. 3. Further, the substantial form is simpler than the accidental form; a sign of which is that the substantial
form is not intensified or relaxed, but is indivisible. But the accidental form is its own power. Much more therefore is that substantial form which is the soul.

Obj. 4. Further, we sense by the sensitive power and we understand by the intellectual power. But that by which we first sense and understand is the soul, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii. 2). Therefore the soul is its own power.

Obj. 5. Further, whatever does not belong to the essence is an accident. Therefore if the power of the soul is something else beside the essence thereof, it is an accident, which is contrary to Augustine, who says that the foregoing (see Obj. 1) are not in the soul as in a subject, as colour or shape, or any other quality, or quantity, are in a body; for whatever is so, does not exceed the subject in which it is: whereas the mind can love and know other things (De Trin. ix. 4).

Obj. 6. Further, a simple form cannot be a subject. But the soul is a simple form; since it is not composed of matter and form, as we have said above (Q. LXXV., A. 5). Therefore the power of the soul cannot be in it as in a subject.

Obj. 7. Further, an accident is not the principle of a substantial difference. But sensitive and rational are substantial differences; and they are taken from sense and reason, which are powers of the soul. Therefore the powers of the soul are not accidents; and so it would seem that the power of the soul is its own essence.

On the contrary, Dionysius (Cæl. Hier. xi.) says that heavenly spirits are divided into essence, power, and operation. Much more, then, in the soul is the essence distinct from the virtue or power.

I answer that, It is impossible to admit that the power of the soul is its essence, although some have maintained it. For the present purpose this may be proved in two ways. First, because, since power and act divide being and every kind of being, we must refer a power and its act to the same genus. Therefore, if the act be not in the genus of substance, the power directed to that act cannot be in the
genus of substance. Now the operation of the soul is not in
the genus of substance; for this belongs to God alone,
whose operation is His own substance. Wherefore the
Divine power which is the principle of His operation is
the Divine Essence itself. This cannot be true either of the
soul, or of any creature; as we have said above when speak-
ing of the angels (Q. LIV., A. 3). Secondly, this may be
also shown to be impossible in the soul. For the soul by
its very essence is an act. Therefore if the very essence of
the soul were the immediate principle of operation, whatever
has a soul would always have actual vital actions, as that
which has a soul is always an actually living thing. For
as a form the soul is not an act ordained to a further act,
but the ultimate term of generation. Wherefore, for it to
be in potentiality to another act, does not belong to it
according to its essence, as a form, but according to its
power. So the soul itself, as the subject of its power, is
called the first act, with a further relation to the second act.
Now we observe that what has a soul is not always actual
with respect to its vital operations; whence also it is said in
the definition of the soul, that it is the act of a body having
life potentially; which potentiality, however, does not ex-
clude the soul. Therefore it follows that the essence of the
soul is not its power. For nothing is in potentiality by
reason of an act, as act.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine is speaking of the mind as it
knows and loves itself. Thus knowledge and love as
referred to the soul as known and loved, are substantially
or essentially in the soul, for the very substance or essence
of the soul is known and loved. In the same way are we to
understand what he says in the other passage, that those
things are one life, one mind, one essence. Or, as some
say, this passage is true in the sense in which the potential
whole is predicated of its parts, being midway between the
universal whole, and the integral whole. For the universal
whole is in each part according to its entire essence and
power; as animal in a man and in a horse; and therefore it
is properly predicated of each part. But the integral whole
is not in each part, neither according to its whole essence, nor according to its whole power. Therefore in no way can it be predicated of each part; yet in a way it is predicated, though improperly, of all the parts together; as if we were to say that the wall, roof, and foundations are a house. But the potential whole is in each part according to its whole essence, not, however, according to its whole power. Therefore in a way it can be predicated of each part, but not so properly as the universal whole. In this sense, Augustine says that the memory, understanding, and will are the one essence of the soul.

Reply Obj. 2. The act to which primary matter is in potentiality is the substantial form. Therefore the potentiality of matter is nothing else but its essence.

Reply Obj. 3. Action belongs to the composite, as does existence; for to act belongs to what exists. Now the composite has substantial existence through the substantial form; and it operates by the power which results from the substantial form. Hence an active accidental form is to the substantial form of the agent (for instance, heat compared to the form of fire) as the power of the soul is to the soul.

Reply Obj. 4. That the accidental form is a principle of action is due to the substantial form. Therefore the substantial form is the first principle of action; but not the proximate principle. In this sense the Philosopher says that the soul is that whereby we understand and sense.

Reply Obj. 5. If we take accident as meaning what is divided against substance, then there can be no medium between substance and accident; because they are divided by affirmation and negation, that is, according to existence in a subject, and non-existence in a subject. In this sense, as the power of the soul is not its essence, it must be an accident; and it belongs to the second species of accident, that of quality. But if we take accident as one of the five universals, in this sense there is a medium between substance and accident. For the substance is all that belongs to the essence of a thing; whereas whatever is beyond the
essence of a thing cannot be called accident in this sense; but only what is not caused by the essential principle of the species. For the proper does not belong to the essence of a thing, but is caused by the essential principles of the species; wherefore it is a medium between the essence and accident thus understood. In this sense the powers of the soul may be said to be a medium between substance and accident, as being natural properties of the soul. When Augustine says that knowledge and love are not in the soul as accidents in a subject, this must be understood in the sense given above, inasmuch as they are compared to the soul, not as loving and knowing, but as loved and known. His argument proceeds in this sense; for if love were in the soul loved as in a subject, it would follow that an accident transcends its subject, since even other things are loved through the soul.

Reply Obj. 6. Although the soul is not composed of matter and form, yet it has an admixture of potentiality, as we have said above (Q. LXXV., A. 5, ad 4); and for this reason it can be the subject of an accident. The statement quoted is verified in God, Who is the Pure Act; in treating of which subject Boëthius employs that phrase (De Trin. i.).

Reply Obj. 7. Rational and sensitive, as differences, are not taken from the powers of sense and reason, but from the sensitive and rational soul itself. But because substantial forms, which in themselves are unknown to us, are known by their accidents; nothing prevents us from sometimes substituting accidents for substantial differences.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE ARE SEVERAL POWERS OF THE SOUL?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there are not several powers of the soul. For the intellectual soul approaches nearest to the likeness of God. But in God there is one simple power: and therefore also in the intellectual soul.

Obj. 2. Further, the higher a power is, the more unified
it is. But the intellectual soul excels all other forms in power. Therefore above all others it has one virtue or power.

**Obj. 3.** Further, to operate belongs to what is in act. But by the one essence of the soul, man has actual existence in the different degrees of perfection, as we have seen above (Q. LXXVI., AA. 3, 4). Therefore by the one power of the soul he performs operations of various degrees.

**On the contrary,** The Philosopher places several powers in the soul (De Anima ii. 2, 3).

*I answer that,* Of necessity we must place several powers in the soul. To make this evident, we observe that, as the Philosopher says (De Cælo ii. 12), the lowest order of things cannot acquire perfect goodness, but they acquire a certain imperfect goodness, by few movements; and those which belong to a higher order acquire perfect goodness by many movements; and those yet higher acquire perfect goodness by few movements; and the highest perfection is found in those things which acquire perfect goodness without any movement whatever. Thus he is least of all disposed to health, who can only acquire imperfect health by means of a few remedies; better disposed is he who can acquire perfect health by means of many remedies; and better still, he who can by few remedies; best of all is he who has perfect health without any remedies. We conclude, therefore, that things which are below man acquire a certain limited goodness; and so they have a few determinate operations and powers. But man can acquire universal and perfect goodness, because he can acquire beatitude. Yet he is in the last degree, according to his nature, of those to whom beatitude is possible; therefore the human soul requires many and various operations and powers. But to angels a smaller variety of powers is sufficient. In God there is no power or action beyond His own Essence.

There is yet another reason why the human soul abounds in a variety of powers;—because it is on the confines of spiritual and corporeal creatures; and therefore the powers of both meet together in the soul.
Reply Obj. 1. The intellectual soul approaches to the Divine likeness, more than inferior creatures, in being able to acquire perfect goodness; although by many and various means; and in this it falls short of more perfect creatures.

Reply Obj. 2. A unified power is superior if it extends to equal things: but a multiform power is superior to it, if it is over many things.

Reply Obj. 3. One thing has one substantial existence, but may have several operations. So there is one essence of the soul, with several powers.

Third Article.

Whether the powers are distinguished by their acts and objects?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the powers of the soul are not distinguished by acts and objects. For nothing is determined to its species by what is subsequent and extrinsic to it. But the act is subsequent to the power; and the object is extrinsic to it. Therefore the soul's powers are not specifically distinct by acts and objects.

Obj. 2. Further, contraries are what differ most from each other. Therefore if the powers are distinguished by their objects, it follows that the same power could not have contrary objects. This is clearly false in almost all the powers; for the power of vision extends to white and black, and the power of taste to sweet and bitter.

Obj. 3. Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed. Hence if the difference of powers came from the difference of objects, the same object would not come under different powers. This is clearly false; for the same thing is known by the cognitive power, and desired by the appetitive.

Obj. 4. Further, that which of itself is the cause of anything, is the cause thereof, wherever it is. But various objects which belong to various powers, belong also to
some one power; as sound and colour belong to sight and hearing, which are different powers, yet they come under the one power of common sense. Therefore the powers are not distinguished according to the difference of their objects.

On the contrary, Things that are subsequent are distinguished by what precedes. But the Philosopher says (De Anima ii. 4) that acts and operations precede the powers according to the reason; and these again are preceded by their opposites, that is their objects. Therefore the powers are distinguished according to their acts and objects.

I answer that, A power as such is directed to an act. Wherefore we seek to know the nature of a power from the act to which it is directed, and consequently the nature of a power is diversified, as the nature of the act is diversified. Now the nature of an act is diversified according to the various natures of the objects. For every act is either of an active power or of a passive power. Now, the object is to the act of a passive power, as the principle and moving cause: for colour is the principle of vision, inasmuch as it moves the sight. On the other hand, to the act of an active power the object is a term and end; as the object of the power of growth is perfect quantity, which is the end of growth. Now, from these two things an act receives its species, namely, from its principle, or from its end or term; for the act of heating differs from the act of cooling, in this, that the former proceeds from something hot, which is the active principle, to heat; the latter from something cold, which is the active principle, to cold. Therefore the powers are of necessity distinguished by their acts and objects.

Nevertheless, we must observe that things which are accidental do not change the species. For since to be coloured is accidental to an animal, its species is not changed by a difference of colour, but by a difference in that which belongs to the nature of an animal, that is to say, by a difference in the sensitive soul, which is sometimes rational, and sometimes otherwise. Hence rational and irrational are differences dividing animal, constituting its various species. In like manner, therefore, not any
variety of objects diversifies the powers of the soul, but a
difference in that to which the power of its very nature is
directed. Thus the senses of their very nature are directed
to the passive quality which of itself is divided into colour,
sound, and the like, and therefore there is one sensitive
power with regard to colour, namely, sight, and another
with regard to sound, namely, hearing. But it is accidental
to a passive quality, for instance, to something coloured, to
be a musician or a grammarian, great or small, a man or
a stone. Therefore by reason of such differences the powers
of the soul are not distinct.

Reply Obj. 1. Act, though subsequent in existence to
power, is, nevertheless, prior to it in intention and logically;
as the end is with regard to the agent. And the object,
although extrinsic, is, nevertheless, the principle or end of
the action; and those conditions which are intrinsic to a
thing, are proportionate to its principle and end.

Reply Obj. 2. If any power were to have one of two
contraries as such for its object, the other contrary would
belong to another power. But the power of the soul does
not regard the nature of the contrary as such, but rather
the common aspect of both contraries; as sight does not
regard white as such, but as colour. This is because of
two contraries one, in a manner, includes the idea of the
other, since they are to one another as perfect and im-
perfect.

Reply Obj. 3. Nothing prevents things which coincide
in subject, from being considered under different aspects;
therefore they can belong to various powers of the soul.

Reply Obj. 4. The higher power of itself regards a more
universal formality of the object than the lower power;
because the higher a power is, to a greater number of
things does it extend. Therefore many things are com-
bined in the one formality of the object, which the higher
power considers of itself; while they differ in the formalities
regarded by the lower powers of themselves. Thus it is that
various objects belong to various lower powers; which
objects, however, are subject to one higher power.
Fourth Article.

Whether among the powers of the soul there is order?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there is no order among the powers of the soul. For in those things which come under one division, there is no before and after, but all are naturally simultaneous. But the powers of the soul are contradistinguished from one another. Therefore there is no order among them.

Obj. 2. Further, the powers of the soul are referred to their objects, and to the soul itself. On the part of the soul, there is not order among them, because the soul is one. In like manner the objects are various and dissimilar, as colour and sound. Therefore there is no order among the powers of the soul.

Obj. 3. Further, where there is order among powers, we find that the operation of one depends on the operation of another. But the action of one power of the soul does not depend on that of another; for sight can act independently of hearing, and conversely. Therefore there is no order among the powers of the soul.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (De Anima ii. 3) compares the parts or powers of the soul to figures. But figures have an order among themselves. Therefore also the powers of the soul have order.

I answer that, Since the soul is one, and the powers are many; and since a number of things that proceed from one must proceed in a certain order; there must be some order among the powers of the soul. Accordingly we may observe a triple order among them, two of which correspond to the dependence of one power on another; while the third is taken from the order of the objects. Now the dependence of one power on another can be taken in two ways; according to the order of nature, forasmuch as perfect things are by their nature prior to imperfect things; and according to
the order of generation and time; forasmuch as from being imperfect, a thing comes to be perfect. Thus, according to the first kind of order among the powers, the intellectual powers are prior to the sensitive powers; wherefore they direct them and command them. Likewise the sensitive powers are prior in this order to the powers of the nutritive soul.

In the second kind of order, it is the other way about. For the powers of the nutritive soul are prior by way of generation to the powers of the sensitive soul; for which, therefore, they prepare the body. The same is to be said of the sensitive powers with regard to the intellectual. But in the third kind of order, certain sensitive powers are ordered among themselves, namely, sight, hearing, and smelling. For the visible naturally comes first; since it is common to higher and lower bodies. But sound is audible in the air, which is naturally prior to the mingling of elements, of which smell is the result.

Reply Obj. 1. The species of a given genus are to one another as before and after, like numbers and figures, if considered in their nature; although they may be said to be simultaneous, according as they receive the predication of the common genus.

Reply Obj. 2. This order among the powers of the soul is both on the part of the soul (which, though it be one according to its essence, has a certain aptitude to various acts in a certain order) and on the part of the objects, and furthermore on the part of the acts, as we have said above.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument is verified as regards those powers among which order of the third kind exists. Those powers among which the two other kinds of order exist are such that the action of one depends on another.
Fifth Article.

Whether all the powers of the soul are in the soul as their subject?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that all the powers of the soul are in the soul as their subject. For as the powers of the body are to the body; so are the powers of the soul to the soul. But the body is the subject of the corporeal powers. Therefore the soul is the subject of the powers of the soul.

Obj. 2. Further, the operations of the powers of the soul are attributed to the body by reason of the soul; because, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii. 2), The soul is that by which we sense and understand primarily. But the natural principles of the operations of the soul are the powers. Therefore the powers are primarily in the soul.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii. 7, 24) that the soul senses certain things, not through the body, in fact, without the body, as fear and suchlike; and some things through the body. But if the sensitive powers were not in the soul alone as their subject, the soul could not sense anything without the body. Therefore the soul is the subject of the sensitive powers; and for a similar reason, of all the other powers.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigilia i.) that sensation belongs neither to the soul, nor to the body, but to the composite. Therefore the sensitive power is in the composite as its subject. Therefore the soul alone is not the subject of all the powers.

I answer that, The subject of operative power is that which is able to operate, for every accident denominates its proper subject. Now the same is that which is able to operate, and that which does operate. Therefore the subject of power is of necessity the subject of operation, as again the Philosopher says in the beginning of De Somno et Vigilia. Now, it is clear from what we have said above (Q. LXXV., AA. 2, 3; Q. LXXVI., A. 1, ad 1), that some operations of
the soul are performed without a corporeal organ, as understanding and will. Hence the powers of these operations are in the soul as their subject. But some operations of the soul are performed by means of corporeal organs; as sight by the eye, and hearing by the ear. And so it is with all the other operations of the nutritive and sensitive parts. Therefore the powers which are the principles of these operations have their subject in the composite, and not in the soul alone.

Reply Obj. 1. All the powers are said to belong to the soul, not as their subject, but as their principle; because it is by the soul that the composite has the power to perform such operations.

Reply Obj. 2. All such powers are primarily in the soul, as compared to the composite; not as in their subject, but as in their principle.

Reply Obj. 3. Plato’s opinion was that sensation is an operation proper to the soul, just as understanding is. Now in many things relating to Philosophy Augustine makes use of the opinions of Plato, not asserting them as true, but relating them. However, as far as the present question is concerned, when it is said that the soul senses some things with the body, and some without the body, this can be taken in two ways. Firstly, the words with the body or without the body may determine the act of sense in its mode of proceeding from the sentient. Thus the soul senses nothing without the body, because the action of sensation cannot proceed from the soul except by a corporeal organ. Secondly, they may be understood as determining the act of sense on the part of the object sensed. Thus the soul senses some things with the body, that is, things existing in the body, as when it feels a wound or something of that sort; while it senses some things without the body, that is, which do not exist in the body, but only in the apprehension of the soul, as when it feels sad or joyful on hearing something.
Sixth Article.

Whether the powers of the soul flow from its essence?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence. For different things do not proceed from one simple thing. But the essence of the soul is one and simple. Since, therefore, the powers of the soul are many and various, they cannot proceed from its essence.

Obj. 2. Further, that from which a thing proceeds is its cause. But the essence of the soul cannot be said to be the cause of the powers; as is clear if one considers the different kinds of causes. Therefore the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence.

Obj. 3. Further, emanation involves some sort of movement. But nothing is moved by itself, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. vii. 1, 2); except, perhaps, by reason of a part of itself, as an animal is said to be moved by itself, because one part thereof moves and another is moved. Neither is the soul moved, as the Philosopher proves (De Anima i. 4). Therefore the soul does not produce its powers within itself.

On the contrary, the powers of the soul are its natural properties. But the subject is the cause of its proper accidents; whence also it is included in the definition of accident, as is clear from Metaph. vii. (Did. vi. 4). Therefore the powers of the soul proceed from its essence as their cause.

I answer that, the substantial and the accidental form partly agree and partly differ. They agree in this, that each is an act; and that by each of them something is after a manner actual. They differ, however, in two respects. First, because the substantial form makes a thing to exist absolutely, and its subject is something purely potential. But the accidental form does not make a thing to exist absolutely; but to be such, or so great, or in some particular condition; for its subject is an actual being.
Hence it is clear that actuality is observed in the substantial form prior to its being observed in the subject: and since that which is first in a genus is the cause in that genus, the substantial form causes existence in its subject. On the other hand, actuality is observed in the subject of the accidental form prior to its being observed in the accidental form; wherefore the actuality of the accidental form is caused by the actuality of the subject. So the subject, forasmuch as it is in potentiality, is receptive of the accidental form: but forasmuch as it is in act, it produces it. This I say of the proper and per se accident; for with regard to the extraneous accident, the subject is receptive only, the accident being caused by an extrinsic agent. Secondly, substantial and accidental forms differ, because, since that which is the less principal exists for the sake of that which is the more principal, matter therefore exists on account of the substantial form; while on the contrary, the accidental form exists on account of the completeness of the subject.

Now it is clear, from what has been said (A. 5), that either the subject of the soul’s powers is the soul itself alone, which can be the subject of an accident, forasmuch as it has something of potentiality, as we have said above (A. 1, ad 6); or else this subject is the composite. Now the composite is actual by the soul. Whence it is clear that all the powers of the soul, whether their subject be the soul alone, or the composite, flow from the essence of the soul, as from their principle; because it has already been said that the accident is caused by the subject according as it is actual, and is received into it according as it is in potentiality.

Reply Obj. 1. From one simple thing many things may proceed naturally, in a certain order; or again if there be diversity of recipients. Thus, from the one essence of the soul many and various powers proceed; both because order exists among these powers; and also by reason of the diversity of the corporeal organs.

Reply Obj. 2. The subject is both the final cause, and in
a way the active cause, of its proper accident. It is also as it were the material cause, inasmuch as it is receptive of the accident. From this we may gather that the essence of the soul is the cause of all its powers, as their end, and as their active principle; and of some as receptive thereof.

*Reply Obj. 3.* The emanation of proper accidents from their subject is not by way of transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance; thus one thing results naturally from another, as colour from light.

**Seventh Article.**

**Whether one power of the soul arises from another?**

*We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—*

*Objection 1.* It would seem that one power of the soul does not arise from another. For if several things arise together, one of them does not arise from another. But all the powers of the soul are created at the same time with the soul. Therefore one of them does not arise from another.

*Obj. 2.* Further, the power of the soul arises from the soul as an accident from the subject. But one power of the soul cannot be the subject of another; because nothing is the accident of an accident. Therefore one power does not arise from another.

*Obj. 3.* Further, one opposite does not arise from the other opposite; but everything arises from that which is like it in species. Now the powers of the soul are oppositely divided, as various species. Therefore one of them does not proceed from another.

*On the contrary,* Powers are known by their actions. But the action of one power is caused by the action of another power, as the action of the imagination by the action of the senses. Therefore one power of the soul is caused by another.

*I answer that,* In those things which proceed from one according to a natural order, as the first is the cause of all, so that which is nearer to the first is, in a way, cause of those which are more remote. Now it has been shown above (A. 4) that among the powers of the soul there are several
kinds of order. Therefore one power of the soul proceeds from the essence of the soul by the medium of another. But since the essence of the soul is compared to the powers both as a principle active and final, and as a receptive principle, either separately by itself, or together with the body; and since the agent and the end are more perfect, while the receptive principle, as such, is less perfect; it follows that those powers of the soul which precede the others, in the order of perfection and nature, are the principles of the others, after the manner of the end and active principle. For we see that the senses are for the sake of the intelligence, and not the other way about. The senses, moreover, are a certain imperfect participation of the intelligence; wherefore, according to their natural origin, they proceed from the intelligence as the imperfect from the perfect. But considered as receptive principles, the more imperfect powers are principles with regard to the others; thus the soul, according as it has the sensitive power, is considered as the subject, and as something material with regard to the intelligence. On this account, the more imperfect powers precede the others in the order of generation, for the animal is generated before the man.

Reply Obj. 1. As the power of the soul flows from the essence, not by a transmutation, but by a certain natural resultant, and is simultaneous with the soul, so is it the case with one power as regards another.

Reply Obj. 2. An accident cannot of itself be the subject of an accident; but one accident is received prior to another into substance, as quantity prior to quality. In this sense one accident is said to be the subject of another; as surface is of colour, inasmuch as substance receives an accident through the means of another. The same thing may be said of the powers of the soul.

Reply Obj. 3. The powers of the soul are opposed to one another, as perfect and imperfect; as also are the species of numbers and figures. But this opposition does not prevent the origin of one from another, because imperfect things naturally proceed from perfect things.
Eighth Article.

Whether all the powers remain in the soul when separated from the body?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:

Objection 1. It would seem that all the powers of the soul remain in the soul separated from the body. For we read in the book De Spiritu et Anima that the soul withdraws from the body, taking with itself sense and imagination, reason and intelligence, concupiscibility and irascibility.

Obj. 2. Further, the powers of the soul are its natural properties. But properties are always in that to which they belong; and are never separated from it. Therefore the powers of the soul are in it even after death.

Obj. 3. Further, the powers even of the sensitive soul are not weakened when the body becomes weak; because, as the Philosopher says (De Anima i. 4), If an old man were given the eye of a young man, he would see even as well as a young man. But weakness is the road to corruption. Therefore the powers of the soul are not corrupted when the body is corrupted, but remain in the separated soul.

Obj. 4. Further, memory is a power of the sensitive soul, as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. i.). But memory remains in the separated soul; for it was said to the rich glutton whose soul was in hell: Remember that thou didst receive good things during thy lifetime (Luke xvi. 25). Therefore memory remains in the separated soul; and consequently the other powers of the sensitive part.

Obj. 5. Further, joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part, which is a power of the sensitive soul. But it is clear that separate souls grieve or rejoice at the pains or rewards which they receive. Therefore the concupiscible power remains in the separate soul.

Obj. 6. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii. 32) that, as the soul, when the body lies senseless, yet not quite dead, sees some things by imaginary vision; so also when
by death the soul is quite separate from the body. But the imagination is a power of the sensitive part. Therefore the power of the sensitive part remains in the separate soul; and consequently all the other powers.

*On the contrary,* It is said (*De Eccl. Dogm. xix.*) that of two substances only does man consist; the soul with its reason, and the body with its senses. Therefore the body being dead, the sensitive powers do not remain.

*I answer that,* As we have said already (*AA. 5, 6, 7*), all the powers of the soul belong to the soul alone as their principle. But some powers belong to the soul alone as their subject; as the intelligence and the will. These powers must remain in the soul, after the destruction of the body. But other powers are subjected in the composite; as all the powers of the sensitive and nutritive parts. Now accidents cannot remain after the destruction of the subject. Wherefore, the composite being destroyed, such powers do not remain actually; but they remain virtually in the soul, as in their principle or root.

So it is false that, as some say, these powers remain in the soul even after the corruption of the body. It is much more false that, as they say also, the acts of these powers remain in the separate soul; because these powers have no act apart from the corporeal organ.

*Reply Obj. 1.* That book has no authority, and so what is there written can be despised with the same facility as it was said; although we may say that the soul takes with itself these powers, not actually but virtually.

*Reply Obj. 2.* These powers, which we say do not actually remain in the separate soul, are not the properties of the soul alone, but of the composite.

*Reply Obj. 3.* These powers are said not to be weakened when the body becomes weak, because the soul remains unchangeable, and is the virtual principle of these powers.

*Reply Obj. 4.* The recollection spoken of there is to be taken in the same way as Augustine (*De Trin. x. 11; xiv. 7*) places memory in the mind; not as a part of the sensitive soul.
Reply Obj. 5. In the separate soul, sorrow and joy are not in the sensitive, but in the intellectual appetite, as in the angels.

Reply Obj. 6. Augustine in that passage is speaking as inquiring, not as asserting. Wherefore he retracted some things which he had said there (Retract. ii. 24).
QUESTION LXXVIII.
OF THE SPECIFIC POWERS OF THE SOUL.
(In Four Articles.)

We next treat of the powers of the soul specifically. The theologian, however, has only to inquire specifically concerning the intellectual and appetitive powers, in which the virtues reside. And since the knowledge of these powers depends to a certain extent on the other powers, our consideration of the powers of the soul taken specifically will be divided into three parts: first, we shall consider those powers which are a preamble to the intellect; secondly, the intellectual powers; thirdly, the appetitive powers.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) The powers of the soul considered generally. (2) The various species of the vegetative part. (3) The exterior senses. (4) The interior senses.

FIRST ARTICLE.

Whether there are to be distinguished five genera of powers in the soul?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there are not to be distinguished five genera of powers in the soul—namely, vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive, and intellectual. For the powers of the soul are called its parts. But only three parts of the soul are commonly assigned—namely, the vegetative soul, the sensitive soul, and the rational soul. Therefore there are only three genera of powers in the soul, and not five.

Obj. 2. Further, the powers of the soul are the principles
of its vital operations. Now, in four ways is a thing said to live. For the Philosopher says (De Anima ii. 2): In several ways a thing is said to live, and even if only one of these is present, the thing is said to live; as intellect and sense, local movement and rest, and lastly, movement of decrease and increase due to nourishment. Therefore there are only four genera of powers of the soul, as the appetitive is excluded.

Obj. 3. Further, a special kind of soul ought not to be assigned as regards what is common to all the powers. Now desire is common to each power of the soul. For sight desires an appropriate visible object; whence we read (Ecclus. xl. 22): The eye desireth favour and beauty, but more than these green sown fields. In the same way every other power desires its appropriate object. Therefore the appetitive power should not be made a special genus of the powers of the soul.

Obj. 4. Further, the moving principle in animals is sense, intellect, or appetite, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii. 10). Therefore the motive power should not be added to the above as a special genus of soul.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii. 3), The powers are the vegetative, the sensitive, the appetitive, the locomotive, and the intellectual.

I answer that, There are five genera of powers of the soul, as above numbered. Of these, three are called souls, and four are called modes of living. The reason of this diversity lies in the various souls being distinguished accordingly as the operation of the soul transcends the operation of the corporeal nature in various ways; for the whole corporeal nature is subject to the soul, and is related to it as its matter and instrument. There exists, therefore, an operation of the soul which so far exceeds the corporeal nature that it is not even performed by any corporeal organ; and such is the operation of the rational soul. Below this, there is another operation of the soul, which is indeed performed through a corporeal organ, but not through a corporeal quality, and this is the operation of the sensitive
soul; for though hot and cold, wet and dry, and other such corporeal qualities are required for the work of the senses, yet they are not required in such a way that the operation of the senses takes place by virtue of such qualities; but only for the proper disposition of the organ. The lowest of the operations of the soul is that which is performed by a corporeal organ, and by virtue of a corporeal quality. Yet this transcends the operation of the corporeal nature; because the movements of bodies are caused by an extrinsic principle, while these operations are from an intrinsic principle; for this is common to all the operations of the soul, since every animate thing, in some way, moves itself. Such is the operation of the vegetative soul; for digestion, and what follows, is caused instrumentally by the action of heat, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii. 4).

Now the powers of the soul are distinguished generically by their objects. For the higher a power is, the more universal is the object to which it extends, as we have said above (Q. LXXVII., A. 3, ad 4). But the object of the soul's operation may be considered in a triple order. For in the soul there is a power the object of which is only the body that is united to that soul; the powers of this genus are called vegetative, for the vegetative power acts only on the body to which the soul is united. There is another genus in the powers of the soul, which genus regards a more universal object—namely, every sensible body, not only the body to which the soul is united. And there is yet another genus in the powers of the soul, which genus regards a still more universal object—namely, not only the sensible body, but all being in universal. Wherefore it is evident that the latter two genera of the soul's powers have an operation in regard not merely to that which is united to them, but also to something extrinsic. Now, since whatever operates must in some way be united to the object about which it operates, it follows of necessity that this something extrinsic, which is the object of the soul's operation, must be related to the soul in a twofold manner. First, inasmuch as this something extrinsic has a natural aptitude
to be united to the soul, and to be by its likeness in the soul. In this way there are two kinds of powers—namely, the sensitive in regard to the less common object—the sensible body; and the intellectual, in regard to the most common object—universal being. Secondly, forasmuch as the soul itself has an inclination and tendency to the something extrinsic. And in this way there are again two kinds of powers in the soul: one—the appetitive—in respect of which the soul is referred to something extrinsic as to an end, which is first in the intention; the other—the locomotive power—in respect of which the soul is referred to something extrinsic as to the term of its operation and movement; for every animal is moved for the purpose of realizing its desires and intentions.

The modes of living are distinguished according to the degrees of living things. There are some living things in which there exists only vegetative power, as the plants. There are others in which with the vegetative there exists also the sensitive, but not the locomotive power; such are immovable animals, as shellfish. There are others which besides this have locomotive powers, as perfect animals, which require many things for their life, and consequently movement to seek necessaries of life from a distance. And there are some living things which with these have intellectual power—namely, men. But the appetitive power does not constitute a degree of living things; because wherever there is sense there is also appetite (De Anima ii. 3).

Thus the first two objections are hereby solved.

Reply Obj. 3. The natural appetite is that inclination which each thing has, of its own nature, for something; wherefore by its natural appetite each power desires something suitable to itself. But the animal appetite results from the form apprehended; this sort of appetite requires a special power of the soul—mere apprehension does not suffice. For a thing is desired as it exists in its own nature, whereas in the apprehensive power it exists not according to its own nature, but according to its likeness. Whence it is clear that sight desires naturally a visible object for the
purpose of its act only—namely, for the purpose of seeing; but the animal by the appetitive power desires the thing seen, not merely for the purpose of seeing it, but also for other purposes. But if the soul did not require things perceived by the senses, except on account of the actions of the senses, that is, for the purpose of sensing them; there would be no need for a special genus of appetitive powers, since the natural appetite of the powers would suffice.

Reply Obj. 4. Although sense and appetite are principles of movement in perfect animals, yet sense and appetite, as such, are not sufficient to cause movement, unless another power be added to them; for immovable animals have sense and appetite, and yet they have not the power of motion. Now this motive power is not only in the appetite and sense as commanding the movement, but also in the parts of the body, to make them obey the appetite of the soul which moves them. Of this we have a sign in the fact that when the members are deprived of their natural disposition, they do not move in obedience to the appetite.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE PARTS OF THE VEGETATIVE SOUL ARE FITTINGLY DESCRIBED AS THE NUTRITIVE, AUGMENTATIVE, AND GENERATIVE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the parts of the vegetative soul are not fittingly described—namely, the nutritive, augmentative, and generative. For these are called natural forces. But the powers of the soul are above the natural forces. Therefore we should not class the above forces as powers of the soul.

Obj. 2. Further, we should not assign a particular power of the soul to that which is common to living and non-living things. But generation is common to all things that can be generated and corrupted, whether living or not living. Therefore the generative force should not be classed as a power of the soul.
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Obj. 3. Further, the soul is more powerful than the body. But the body by the same force gives species and quantity; much more, therefore, does the soul. Therefore the augmentative power of the soul is not distinct from the generative power.

Obj. 4. Further, everything is preserved in being by that whereby it exists. But the generative power is that whereby a living things exists. Therefore by the same power the living thing is preserved. Now the nutritive force is directed to the preservation of the living thing (De Anima ii. 4), being a power which is capable of preserving whatever receives it. Therefore we should not distinguish the nutritive power from the generative.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii. 2, 4) that the operations of this soul are generation, the use of food, and (cf. ibid. iii. 9) growth.

I answer that, The vegetative part has three powers. For the vegetative part, as we have said (A. 1), has for its object the body itself, living by the soul; for which body a triple operation of the soul is required. One is whereby it acquires existence, and to this is directed the generative power. Another is whereby the living body acquires its due quantity; to this is directed the augmentative power. Another is whereby the body of a living thing is preserved in its existence and in its due quantity; to this is directed the nutritive power.

We must, however, observe a difference among these powers. The nutritive and the augmentative have their effect where they exist, since the body itself united to the soul grows and is preserved by the augmentative and nutritive powers which exist in one and the same soul. But the generative power has its effect, not in one and the same body but in another; for a thing cannot generate itself. Therefore the generative power, in a way, approaches to the dignity of the sensitive soul, which has an operation extending to extrinsic things, although in a more excellent and more universal manner; for that which is highest in an inferior nature approaches to that which is
lowest in the higher nature, as is made clear by Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii.). Therefore, of these three powers, the generative has the greater finality, nobility, and perfection, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii. 4), for it belongs to a thing which is already perfect to produce another like unto itself. And the generative power is served by the augmentative and nutritive powers; and the augmentative power by the nutritive.

Reply Obj. 1. Such forces are called natural, both because they produce an effect like that of nature, which also gives existence, quantity, and preservation (although the above forces accomplish these things in a more perfect way); and because those forces perform their actions instrumentally, through the active and passive qualities, which are the principles of natural actions.

Reply Obj. 2. Generation of inanimate things is entirely from an extrinsic source; whereas the generation of living things is in a higher way, through something in the living thing itself, which is the semen containing the principle productive of the body. Therefore there must be in the living thing a power that prepares this semen; and this is the generative power.

Reply Obj. 3. Since the generation of living things is from a semen, it is necessary that in the beginning an animal of small size be generated. For this reason it must have a power in the soul, whereby it is brought to its appropriate size. But the inanimate body is generated from determinate matter by an extrinsic agent; therefore it receives at once its nature and its quantity, according to the condition of the matter.

Reply Obj. 4. As we have said above (A. 1), the operation of the vegetative principle is performed by means of heat, the property of which is to consume humidity. Therefore, in order to restore the humidity thus lost, the nutritive power is required, whereby the food is changed into the substance of the body. This is also necessary for the action of the augmentative and generative powers.
THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FIVE EXTERIOR SENSES ARE PROPERLY DISTINGUISHED?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem inaccurate to distinguish five exterior senses. For sense can know accidents. But there are many kinds of accidents. Therefore, as powers are distinguished by their objects, it seems that the senses are multiplied according to the number of the kinds of accidents.

Obj. 2. Further, magnitude and shape, and other things which are called common sensibles, are not sensibles by accident, but are contradistinguished from them by the Philosopher (De Anima ii. 6). Now the diversity of objects, as such, diversifies the powers. Since, therefore, magnitude and shape are further from colour than sound is, it seems that there is much more need for another sensitive power that can grasp magnitude or shape than for that which grasps colour or sound.

Obj. 3. Further, one sense regards one contrariety; as sight regards white and black. But the sense of touch grasps several contrarieties; such as hot or cold, damp or dry, and suchlike. Therefore it is not a single sense but several. Therefore there are more than five senses.

Obj. 4. Further, a species is not divided against its genus. But taste is a kind of touch. Therefore it should not be classed as a distinct sense from touch.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii. 1): There is no other besides the five senses.

I answer that, The reason of the distinction and number of the senses has been assigned by some to the organs in which one or other of the elements preponderate, as water, air, or the like. By others it has been assigned to the medium, which is either in conjunction or extrinsic, and is either water or air, or suchlike. Others have ascribed it to the various natures of the sensible qualities, according
as such quality belongs to a simple body or results from complexity. But none of these explanations is apt. For the powers are not for the organs, but the organs for the powers; wherefore there are not various powers for the reason that there are various organs; on the contrary, for this has nature provided a variety of organs, that they might be adapted to various powers. In the same way nature provided various mediums for the various senses, according to the convenience of the acts of the powers. And to be cognizant of the natures of sensible qualities does not pertain to the senses, but to the intellect.

The reason of the number and distinction of the exterior senses must therefore be ascribed to that which belongs to the senses properly and *per se*. Now, sense is a passive power, and is naturally immuted by the exterior sensible. Wherefore the exterior cause of such immutation is what is *per se* perceived by the sense, and according to the diversity of that exterior cause are the sensitive powers diversified.

Now, immutation is of two kinds, one natural, the other spiritual. Natural immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received, according to its natural existence, into the thing immuted, as heat is received into the thing heated. Whereas spiritual immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received, according to a spiritual mode of existence, into the thing immuted, as the form of colour is received into the pupil which does not thereby become coloured. Now, for the operation of the senses, a spiritual immutation is required, whereby an intention of the sensible form is effected in the sensile organ. Otherwise, if a natural immutation alone sufficed for the sense's action, all natural bodies would feel when they undergo alteration.

But in some senses we find spiritual immutation only, as in *sight*: while in others we find not only a spiritual but also a natural immutation; either on the part of the object only, or likewise on the part of the organ. On the part of the object we find natural immutation, as to place, in sound
which is the object of hearing; for sound is caused by percussion and commotion of the air: and we find natural immutation by alteration, in odour which is the object of smelling; for in order to exhale an odour, a body must be in a measure affected by heat. On the part of the organ, natural immutation takes place in touch and taste; for the hand that touches something hot becomes hot, while the tongue is moistened by the humidity of the flavoured morsel. But the organs of smelling and hearing are not affected in their respective operations by any natural immutation unless indirectly.

Now, the sight, which is without natural immutation either in its organ or in its object, is the most spiritual, the most perfect, and the most universal of all the senses. After this comes the hearing and then the smell, which require a natural immutation on the part of the object; while local motion is more perfect than, and naturally prior to, the motion of alteration, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii. 7). Touch and taste are the most material of all: of the distinction of which we shall speak later on (ad 3, 4). Hence it is that the three other senses are not exercised through a medium united to them, to obviate any natural immutation in their organ; as happens as regards these two senses.

Reply Obj. 1. Not every accident has in itself a power of immutation, but only qualities of the third species, which are the principles of alteration: therefore only suchlike qualities are the objects of the senses; because the senses are affected by the same things whereby inanimate bodies are affected, as stated in Phys. vii. 2.

Reply Obj. 2. Size, shape, and the like, which are called common sensibles, are midway between accidental sensibles and proper sensibles, which are the objects of the senses. For the proper sensibles first, and of their very nature, affect the senses; since they are qualities that cause alteration. But the common sensibles are all reducible to quantity. As to size and number, it is clear that they are species of quantity. Shape is a quality about quantity,
since the notion of shape consists in fixing the bounds of magnitude. Movement and rest are sensed according as the subject is affected in one or more ways in the magnitude of the subject or of its local distance, as in the movement of growth or of locomotion, or again, according as it is affected in some sensible qualities, as in the movement of alteration; and thus to sense movement and rest is, in a way, to sense one thing and many. Now quantity is the proximate subject of the qualities that cause alteration, as surface is of colour. Therefore the common sensibles do not move the senses first and of their own nature, but by reason of the sensible quality; as the surface by reason of colour. Yet they are not accidental sensibles, for they produce a certain variety in the immutation of the senses. For sense is immuted differently by a large and by a small surface; since whiteness itself is said to be great or small, and therefore is divided according to its proper subject.

Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher seems to say (De Anima ii. 11), the sense of touch is generically one, but is divided into several specific senses, and for this reason it extends to various contrarieties; which senses, however, are not separate from one another in their organ, but are spread throughout the whole body, so that their distinction is not evident. But taste, which perceives the sweet and the bitter, accompanies touch in the tongue, but not in the whole body; so it is easily distinguished from touch. We might also say that all those contrarieties agree, each in some proximate genus, and all in a common genus, which is the common and formal object of touch. Such common genus is, however, unnamed, just as the proximate genus of hot and cold is unnamed.

Reply Obj. 4. The sense of taste, according to a saying of the Philosopher (De Anima ii. 9), is a kind of touch existing in the tongue only. It is not distinct from touch in general, but only from the species of touch distributed in the body. But if touch is one sense only, on account of the common formality of its object: we must say that taste is distinguished from touch by reason of a different formality
of immutation. For touch involves a natural, and not only
a spiritual, immutation in its organ, by reason of the
quality which is its proper object. But the organ of taste
is not necessarily immuted by a natural immutation by
reason of the quality which is its proper object, so that the
tongue itself becomes sweet or bitter: but by reason of a
quality which is a preamble to, and on which is based, the
flavour, which quality is moisture, the object of touch.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INTERIOR SENSES ARE SUITABLY
DISTINGUISHED?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the interior senses are
not suitably distinguished. For the common is not divided
against the proper. Therefore the common sense should
not be numbered among the interior sensitive powers, in
addition to the proper exterior senses.

Obj. 2. Further, there is no need to assign an interior
power of apprehension when the proper and exterior sense
suffices. But the proper and exterior senses suffice for us
to judge of sensible things; for each sense judges of its
proper object. In like manner they seem to suffice for the
perception of their own actions; for since the action of the
sense is, in a way, between the power and its object, it
seems that sight must be much more able to perceive its
own vision, as being nearer to it, than the colour; and in
like manner with the other senses. Therefore for this
there is no need to assign an interior power, called the
common sense.

Obj. 3. Further, according to the Philosopher (De Memor.
et Remin. i.), the imagination and the memory are passions
of the first sensitive. But passion is not divided against
its subject. Therefore memory and imagination should
not be assigned as powers distinct from the senses.

Obj. 4. Further, the intellect depends on the senses less
than any power of the sensitive part. But the intellect
knows nothing but what it receives from the senses; whence we read (Poster. i. 8), that *those who lack one sense lack one kind of knowledge*. Therefore much less should we assign to the sensitive part a power, which they call the *estimative* power, for the perception of intentions which the sense does not perceive.

*Obj. 5.* Further, the action of the cogitative power, which consists in comparing, adding, and dividing, and the action of the reminiscence, which consists in the use of a kind of syllogism for the sake of inquiry, is not less distant from the actions of the estimative and memorative powers, than the action of the estimative is from the action of the imagination. Therefore either we must add the cogitative and reminiscitive to the estimative and memorative powers, or the estimative and memorative powers should not be made distinct from the imagination.

*Obj. 6.* Further, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii. 6, 7, 24) describes three kinds of vision; namely, corporeal, which is an action of the sense; spiritual, which is an action of the imagination or phantasy; and intellectual, which is an action of the intellect. Therefore there is no interior power between the sense and intellect, besides the imagination.

*On the contrary,* Avicenna (De Anima iv. 1) assigns five interior sensitive powers; namely, *common sense, phantasy, imagination, and the estimative and memorative powers.*

*I answer that,* As nature does not fail in necessary things, there must needs be as many actions of the sensitive soul as may suffice for the life of a perfect animal. If any of these actions cannot be reduced to the same one principle, they must be assigned to diverse powers; since a power of the soul is nothing else than the proximate principle of the soul's operation.

Now we must observe that for the life of a perfect animal, the animal should apprehend a thing not only at the actual time of sensation, but also when it is absent. Otherwise, since animal motion and action follow apprehension, an animal would not be moved to seek something absent: the contrary of which we may observe specially in perfect
animals, which are moved by progression, for they are moved towards something apprehended and absent. Therefore an animal through the sensitive soul must not only receive the species of sensible things, when it is actually affected by them, but it must also retain and preserve them. Now to receive and retain are, in corporeal things, reduced to diverse principles; for moist things are apt to receive, but retain with difficulty, while it is the reverse with dry things. Wherefore, since the sensitive power is the act of a corporeal organ, it follows that the power which receives the species of sensible things must be distinct from the power which preserves them.

Again we must observe that if an animal were moved by pleasing and disagreeable things only as affecting the sense, there would be no need to suppose that an animal has a power besides the apprehension of those forms which the senses perceive, and in which the animal takes pleasure, or from which it shrinks with horror. But the animal needs to seek or to avoid certain things, not only because they are pleasing or otherwise to the senses, but also on account of other advantages and uses, or disadvantages: just as the sheep runs away when it sees a wolf, not on account of its colour or shape, but as a natural enemy: and again a bird gathers together straws, not because they are pleasant to the sense, but because they are useful for building its nest. Animals, therefore, need to perceive such intentions, which the exterior sense does not perceive. And some distinct principle is necessary for this; since the perception of sensible forms comes by an immutation caused by the sensible, which is not the case with the perception of those intentions.

Thus, therefore, for the reception of sensible forms, the proper sense and the common sense are appointed, and of their distinction we shall speak farther on (ad 1, 2). But for the retention and preservation of these forms, the phantasy or imagination is appointed; which are the same, for phantasy or imagination is as it were a storehouse of forms received through the senses. Furthermore, for the
apprehension of intentions which are not received through the senses, the *estimative* power is appointed: and for the preservation thereof, the *memorative* power, which is a storehouse of such-like intentions. A sign of which we have in the fact that the principle of memory in animals is found in some such intention, for instance, that something is harmful or otherwise. And the very formality of the past, which memory observes, is to be reckoned among these intentions.

Now, we must observe that as to sensible forms there is no difference between man and other animals; for they are similarly immuted by the extrinsic sensible. But there is a difference as to the above intentions: for other animals perceive these intentions only by some natural instinct, while man perceives them by means of collation of ideas. Therefore the power which in other animals is called the natural estimative, in man is called the *cogitative*, which by some sort of collation discovers these intentions. Wherefore it is also called the *particular reason*, to which medical men assign a certain particular organ, namely, the middle part of the head: for it compares individual intentions, just as the intellectual reason compares universal intentions. As to the memorative power, man has not only memory, as other animals have in the sudden recollection of the past; but also *reminiscence* by syllogistically, as it were, seeking for a recollection of the past by the application of individual intentions. Avicenna, however, assigns between the estimative and the imaginative, a fifth power, which combines and divides imaginary forms: as when from the imaginary form of gold, and the imaginary form of a mountain, we compose the one form of a golden mountain, which we have never seen. But this operation is not to be found in animals other than man, in whom the imaginative power suffices thereto. To man also does Averroes attribute this action in his book *De sensu et sensibilibus* (viii.). So there is no need to assign more than four interior powers of the sensitive part—namely, the common sense, the imagination, and the estimative and memorative powers.
Reply Obj. 1. The interior sense is called *common* not by predication, as if it were a genus; but as the common root and principle of the exterior senses.

Reply Obj. 2. The proper sense judges of the proper sensible by discerning it from other things which come under the same sense; for instance, by discerning white from black or green. But neither sight nor taste can discern white from sweet; because what discerns between two things must know both. Wherefore the discerning judgment must be assigned to the common sense; to which, as to a common term, all apprehensions of the senses must be referred: and by which, again, all the intentions of the senses are perceived; as when someone sees that he sees. For this cannot be done by the proper sense, which only knows the form of the sensible by which it is immuted, in which immutation the action of sight is completed, and from which immutation follows another in the common sense which perceives the act of vision.

Reply Obj. 3. As one power arises from the soul by means of another, as we have seen above (Q. LXXVII., A. 7), so also the soul is the subject of one power through another. In this way the imagination and the memory are called passions of the *first sensitive*.

Reply Obj. 4. Although the operation of the intellect has its origin in the senses: yet, in the thing apprehended through the senses, the intellect knows many things which the senses cannot perceive. In like manner does the estimative power, though in a less perfect manner.

Reply Obj. 5. The cogitative and memorative powers in man owe their excellence not to that which is proper to the sensitive part; but to a certain affinity and proximity to the universal reason, which, so to speak, overflows into them. Therefore they are not distinct powers, but the same, yet more perfect than in other animals.

Reply Obj. 6. Augustine calls that vision spiritual which is effected by the images of bodies in the absence of bodies. Whence it is clear that it is common to all interior apprehensions.
QUESTION LXXIX.

OF THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS.

(In Thirteen Articles.)

The next question concerns the intellectual powers, under which head there are thirteen points of inquiry: (1) Whether the intellect is a power of the soul, or its essence? (2) If it be a power, whether it is a passive power? (3) If it is a passive power, whether there is an active intellect? (4) Whether it is something in the soul? (5) Whether the active intellect is one in all? (6) Whether memory is in the intellect? (7) Whether the memory be distinct from the intellect? (8) Whether the reason is a distinct power from the intellect? (9) Whether the superior and inferior reason are distinct powers? (10) Whether the intelligence is distinct from the intellect? (11) Whether the speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers? (12) Whether synderesis is a power of the intellectual part? (13) Whether the conscience is a power of the intellectual part?

First Article.

Whether the intellect is a power of the soul?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the intellect is not a power of the soul, but the essence of the soul. For the intellect seems to be the same as the mind. Now the mind is not a power of the soul, but the essence: for Augustine says (De Trin. ix. 2): Mind and spirit are not relative things, but denominate the essence. Therefore the intellect is the essence of the soul.

Obj. 2. Further, different genera of the soul’s powers are not united in some one power, but only in the essence of the
soul. Now the appetitive and the intellectual are different genera of the soul's powers as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii. 3), but they are united in the mind, for Augustine (De Trin. x. 11) places the intelligence and will in the mind. Therefore the mind and intellect of man is the very essence of the soul and not a power thereof.

_Obj._ 3. Further, according to Gregory, in a homily for the Ascension (xxix. in Ev.), _man understands with the angels._ But angels are called _minds_ and _intellects._ Therefore the mind and intellect of man are not a power of the soul, but the soul itself.

_Obj._ 4. Further, a substance is intellectual by the fact that it is immaterial. But the soul is immaterial through its essence. Therefore it seems that the soul must be intellectual through its essence.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher assigns the intellectual faculty as a power of the soul (De Anima ii. 3).

_I answer that,_ In accordance with what has been already shown (Q. LIV., A. 3; Q. LXXVII., A. 1) it is necessary to say that the intellect is a power of the soul, and not the very essence of the soul. For then alone the essence of that which operates is the immediate principle of operation, when operation itself is its being: for as power is to operation as its act, so is the essence to being. But in God alone His action of understanding is His very Being. Wherefore in God alone is His intellect His essence: while in other intellectual creatures, the intellect is a power.

_Reply Obj._ 1. Sense is sometimes taken for the power, and sometimes for the sensitive soul; for the sensitive soul takes its name from its chief power, which is sense. And in like manner the intellectual soul is sometimes called intellect, as from its chief power; and thus we read (De Anima i. 4), that the _intellect is a substance._ And in this sense also Augustine says that the mind is spirit and essence (De Trin. ix. 2; xiv. 16).

_Reply Obj._ 2. The appetitive and intellectual powers are different genera of powers in the soul, by reason of the different formalities of their objects. But the appetitive
power agrees partly with the intellectual power and partly with the sensitive in its mode of operation either through a corporeal organ or without it: for appetite follows apprehension. And in this way Augustine puts the will in the mind; and the Philosopher, in the reason (De Anima iii. 9).

Reply Obj. 3. In the angels there is no other power besides the intellect, and the will, which follows the intellect. And for this reason an angel is called a mind or an intellect; because his whole power consists in this. But the soul has many other powers, such as the sensitive and nutritive powers, and therefore the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 4. The immateriality of the created intelligent substance is not its intellect; but through its immateriality it has the power of intelligence. Wherefore it follows not that the intellect is the substance of the soul, but that it is its virtue and power.

Second Article.

Whether the Intellect is a Passive Power?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:

Objection 1. It would seem that the intellect is not a passive power. For everything is passive by its matter, and acts by its form. But the intellectual power results from the immateriality of the intelligent substance. Therefore it seems that the intellect is not a passive power.

Obj. 2. Further, the intellectual power is incorruptible, as we have said above (Q. LXXIX., A. 6). But if the intellect is passive, it is corruptible (De Anima iii. 5). Therefore the intellectual power is not passive.

Obj. 3. Further, the agent is nobler than the patient, as Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii. 16) and Aristotle (De Anima, l.c.) say. But all the powers of the vegetative part are active; yet they are the lowest among the powers of the soul. Much more, therefore, all the intellectual powers, which are the highest, are active.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii. 4) that to understand is in a way to be passive.
I answer that, To be passive may be taken in three ways. Firstly, in its most strict sense, when from a thing is taken something which belongs to it by virtue either of its nature, or of its proper inclination: as when water loses coolness by heating, and as when a man becomes ill or sad. Secondly, less strictly, a thing is said to be passive, when something, whether suitable or unsuitable, is taken away from it. And in this way not only he who is ill is said to be passive, but also he who is healed; not only he that is sad, but also he that is joyful; or whatever way he be altered or moved. Thirdly, in a wide sense a thing is said to be passive, from the very fact that what is in potentiality to something receives that to which it was in potentiality, without being deprived of anything. And accordingly, whatever passes from potentiality to act, may be said to be passive, even when it is perfected. And thus with us to understand is to be passive. This is clear from the following reason. For the intellect, as we have seen above (Q. LXXVIII., A. 1), has an operation extending to universal being. We may therefore see whether the intellect be in act or potentiality by observing first of all the nature of the relation of the intellect to universal being. For we find an intellect whose relation to universal being is that of the act of all being: and such is the Divine intellect, which is the Essence of God, in which originally and virtually, all being pre-exists as in its first cause. And therefore the Divine intellect is not in potentiality, but is pure act. But no created intellect can be an act in relation to the whole universal being; otherwise it would needs be an infinite being. Wherefore every created intellect is not the act of all things intelligible, by reason of its very existence; but is compared to these intelligible things as a potentiality to act.

Now, potentiality has a double relation to act. There is a potentiality which is always perfected by its act: as the matter of the heavenly bodies (Q. LVIII., A. 1). And there is another potentiality which is not always in act, but proceeds from potentiality to act; as we observe in things that are corrupted and generated. Wherefore the angelic
intellect is always in act as regards those things which it can understand, by reason of its proximity to the first intellect, which is pure act, as we have said above. But the human intellect, which is the lowest in the order of intelligence and most remote from the perfection of the Divine intellect, is in potentiality with regard to things intelligible, and is at first like a clean tablet on which nothing is written, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii. 4). This is made clear from the fact, that at first we are only in potentiality to understand, and afterwards we are made to understand actually. And so it is evident that with us to understand is in a way to be passive; taking passion in the third sense. And consequently the intellect is a passive power.

Obj. 1. This objection is verified of passion in the first and second senses, which belong to primary matter. But in the third sense passion is in anything which is reduced from potentiality to act.

Obj. 2. Passive intellect is the name given by some to the sensitive appetite, in which are the passions of the soul; which appetite is also called rational by participation, because it obeys the reason (Ethic. i. 13). Others give the name of passive intellect to the cogitative power, which is called the particular reason. And in each case passive may be taken in the two first senses; forasmuch as this so-called intellect is the act of a corporeal organ. But the intellect which is in potentiality to things intelligible, and which for this reason Aristotle calls the possible intellect (De Anima iii. 4) is not passive except in the third sense: for it is not an act of a corporeal organ. Hence it is incorruptible.

Reply Obj. 3. The agent is nobler than the patient, if the action and the passion are referred to the same thing: but not always, if they refer to different things. Now the intellect is a passive power in regard to the whole universal being: while the vegetative power is active in regard to some particular thing, namely, the body as united to the soul. Wherefore nothing prevents such a passive force being nobler than such an active one.
THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THERE IS AN ACTIVE INTELLECT?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there is no active intellect. For as the senses are to things sensible, so is our intellect to things intelligible. But because sense is in potentiality to things sensible, the sense is not said to be active, but only passive. Therefore, since our intellect is in potentiality to things intelligible, it seems that we cannot say that the intellect is active, but only that it is passive.

Obj. 2. Further, if we say that also in the senses there is something active, such as light: on the contrary, light is required for sight, inasmuch as it makes the medium to be actually luminous; for colour of its own nature moves the luminous medium. But in the operation of the intellect there is no appointed medium that has to be brought into act. Therefore there is no necessity for an active intellect.

Obj. 3. Further, the likeness of the agent is received into the patient according to the nature of the patient. But the passive intellect is an immaterial power. Therefore its immaterial nature suffices for forms to be received into it immaterially. Now a form is intelligible in act from the very fact that it is immaterial. Therefore there is no need for an active intellect to make the species actually intelligible.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii. 5), As in every nature, so in the soul is there something by which it becomes all things, and something by which it makes all things. Therefore we must admit an active intellect.

I answer that, According to the opinion of Plato, there is no need for an active intellect in order to make things actually intelligible; but perhaps in order to provide intellectual light to the intellect, as will be explained farther on (A. 4). For Plato supposed that the forms of natural things subsisted apart from matter, and consequently that they are
intelligible: since a thing is actually intelligible from the very fact that it is immaterial. And he called such forms species or ideas; from a participation of which, he said that even corporeal matter was formed, in order that individuals might be naturally established in their proper genera and species: and that our intellect was formed by such participation in order to have knowledge of the genera and species of things. But since Aristotle did not allow that forms of natural things exist apart from matter, and as forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible; it follows that the natures or forms of the sensible things which we understand are not actually intelligible. Now nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act; as the senses are made actual by what is actually sensible. We must therefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by the abstraction of the species from material conditions. And such is the necessity for an active intellect.

Reply Obj. 1. Sensible things are found in act outside the soul; and hence there is no need for an active sense. Wherefore it is clear that in the nutritive part all the powers are active, whereas in the sensitive part all are passive: but in the intellectual part, there is something active and something passive.

Reply Obj. 2. There are two opinions as to the effect of light. For some say that light is required for sight, in order to make colours actually visible. And according to this the active intellect is required for understanding, in like manner and for the same reason as light is required for seeing. But in the opinion of others, light is required for sight; not for the colours to become actually visible; but in order that the medium may become actually luminous, as the Commentator says on De Anima ii. And according to this, Aristotle's comparison of the active intellect to light is verified in this, that as it is required for understanding, so is light required for seeing; but not for the same reason.

Reply Obj. 3. If the agent pre-exist, it may well happen that its likeness is received variously into various things, on
account of their dispositions. But if the agent does not pre-exist, the disposition of the recipient has nothing to do with the matter. Now the intelligible in act is not something existing in nature; if we consider the nature of things sensible, which do not subsist apart from matter. And therefore in order to understand them, the immaterial nature of the passive intellect would not suffice but for the presence of the active intellect, which makes things actually intelligible by way of abstraction.

**FOURTH ARTICLE.**

**WHETHER THE ACTIVE INTELLECT IS SOMETHING IN THE SOUL?**

*We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:*—

*Objection 1.* It would seem that the active intellect is not something in the soul. For the effect of the active intellect is to give light for the purpose of understanding. But this is done by something higher than the soul: according to Jo. i. 9, *He was the true light that enlighteneth every man coming into this world.* Therefore the active intellect is not something in the soul.

*Obj. 2.* Further, the Philosopher (*De Anima* iii. 5) says of the active intellect, *that it does not sometimes understand and sometimes not understand.* But our soul does not always understand: sometimes it understands, and sometimes it does not understand. Therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul.

*Obj. 3.* Further, agent and patient suffice for action. If, therefore, the passive intellect, which is a passive power, is something belonging to the soul; and also the active intellect, which is an active power: it follows that man would always be able to understand when he wished, which is clearly false. Therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul.

*Obj. 4.* Further, the Philosopher (*De Anima* iii. 5) says that the active intellect is *a substance in actual being.* But nothing can be in potentiality and in act with regard to the
same thing. If, therefore, the passive intellect, which is in potentiality to all things intelligible, is something in the soul, it seems impossible for the active intellect to be also something in our soul.

Obj. 5. Further, if the active intellect is something in the soul, it must be a power. For it is neither a passion nor a habit; since habits and passions are not in the nature of agents in regard to the passivity of the soul; but rather passion is the very action of the passive power; while habit is something which results from acts. But every power flows from the essence of the soul. It would therefore follow that the active intellect flows from the essence of the soul. And thus it would not be in the soul by way of participation from some higher intellect: which is unfitting. Therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii., l.c.), that it is necessary for these differences, namely, the passive and active intellect, to be in the soul.

I answer that, The active intellect, of which the Philosopher speaks, is something in the soul. In order to make this evident, we must observe that above the intellectual soul of man we must needs suppose a superior intellect, from which the soul acquires the power of understanding. For what is such by participation, and what is mobile, and what is imperfect always requires the pre-existence of something essentially such, immovable and perfect. Now the human soul is called intellectual by reason of a participation in intellectual power; a sign of which is that it is not wholly intellectual but only in part. Moreover it reaches to the understanding of truth by arguing, with a certain amount of reasoning and movement. Again it has an imperfect understanding; both because it does not understand everything, and because, in those things which it does understand, it passes from potentiality to act. Therefore there must needs be some higher intellect, by which the soul is helped to understand.

Wherefore some held that this intellect, substantially separate, is the active intellect, which by lighting up the
phantasms as it were, makes them to be actually intelligible. But, even supposing the existence of such a separate active intellect, it would still be necessary to assign to the human soul some power participating in that superior intellect, by which power the human soul makes things actually intelligible. Just as in other perfect natural things, besides the universal active causes, each one is endowed with its proper powers derived from those universal causes: for the sun alone does not generate man; but in man is the power of begetting man: and in like manner with other perfect animals. Now among these lower things nothing is more perfect than the human soul. Wherefore we must say that in the soul is some power derived from a higher intellect, whereby it is able to light up the phantasms. And we know this by experience, since we perceive that we abstract universal forms from their particular conditions, which is to make them actually intelligible. Now no action belongs to anything except through some principle formally inherent therein; as we have said above of the passive intellect (Q. LXXVI., A. 1). Therefore the power which is the principle of this action must be something in the soul. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii. 5) compared the active intellect to light, which is something received into the air: while Plato compared the separate intellect impressing the soul to the sun, as Themistius says in his commentary on De Anima iii. But the separate intellect, according to the teaching of our faith, is God Himself, Who is the soul’s Creator, and only beatitude; as will be shown later on (Q. XC., A. 3; I.-II., Q. III., A. 7). Wherefore the human soul derives its intellectual light from Him, according to Ps. iv. 7, The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us.

Reply Obj. 1. That true light enlightens as a universal cause, from which the human soul derives a particular power, as we have explained.

Reply Obj. 2. The Philosopher says those words not of the active intellect, but of the intellect in act: of which he had already said: Knowledge in act is the same as the
thing. Or, if we refer those words to the active intellect, then they are said because it is not owing to the active Intellect that sometimes we do, and sometimes we do not understand, but to the intellect which is in potentiality.

Reply Obj. 3. If the relation of the active intellect to the passive intellect were that of the active object to a power, as, for instance, of the visible in act to the sight; it would follow that we could understand all things instantly, since the active intellect is that which makes all things (in act). But now the active intellect is not an object, rather is it that whereby the objects are made to be in act: for which, besides the presence of the active intellect, we require the presence of phantasms, the good disposition of the sensitive powers, and practice in this sort of operation: since through one thing understood, other things come to be understood, as from terms are made propositions, and from first principles, conclusions. From this point of view it matters not whether the active intellect is something belonging to the soul, or something separate from the soul.

Reply Obj. 4. The intellectual soul is indeed actually immaterial, but it is in potentiality to determinate species. On the contrary, phantasms are actual images of certain species, but are immaterial in potentiality. Wherefore nothing prevents one and the same soul, inasmuch as it is actually immaterial, having one power by which it makes things actually immaterial, by abstraction from the conditions of individual matter: which power is called the active intellect; and another power, recepient of such species, which is called the passive intellect by reason of its being in potentiality to such species.

Reply Obj. 5. Since the essence of the soul is immaterial, created by the supreme intellect, nothing prevents that power which it derives from the supreme intellect, and whereby it abstracts from matter, flowing from the essence of the soul, in the same way as its other powers.
Fifth Article.

Whether the active intellect is one in all?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that there is one active intellect in all. For what is separate from the body is not multiplied according to the number of bodies. But the active intellect is separate, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii. 5). Therefore it is not multiplied in the many human bodies, but is one for all men.

Obj. 2. Further, the active intellect is the cause of the universal, which is one in many. But that which is the cause of unity is still more itself one. Therefore the active intellect is the same in all.

Obj. 3. Further, all men agree in the first intellectual concepts. But to these they assent by the active intellect. Therefore all agree in one active intellect.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii., l.c.) that the active intellect is as a light. But light is not the same in the various things enlightened. Therefore the same active intellect is not in various men.

I answer that, The truth about this question depends on what we have already said (A. 4). For if the active intellect were not something belonging to the soul, but were some separate substance, there would be one active intellect for all men. And this is what they mean who hold that there is one active intellect for all. But if the active intellect is something belonging to the soul, as one of its powers, we are bound to say that there are as many active intellects as there are souls, which are multiplied according to the number of men, as we have said above (Q. LXXVI., A. 2). For it is impossible that one same power belong to various substances.

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher proves that the active intellect is separate, by the fact that the passive intellect is separaten: because, as he says (loc. cit.), the agent is more noble than the patient. Now the passive intellect is said to
be separate, because it is not the act of any corporeal organ. And in the same sense the active intellect is also called separate; but not as a separate substance.

Reply Obj. 2. The active intellect is the cause of the universal, by abstracting it from matter. But for this purpose it need not be the same intellect in all intelligent beings; but it must be one in its relationship to all those things from which it abstracts the universal, with respect to which things the universal is one. And this befits the active intellect inasmuch as it is immaterial.

Reply Obj. 3. All things which are of one species enjoy in common the action which accompanies the nature of the species, and consequently the power which is the principle of such action; but not so as that power be identical in all. Now to know the first intelligible principles is the action belonging to the human species. Wherefore all men enjoy in common the power which is the principle of this action: and this power is the active intellect. But there is no need for it to be identical in all. Yet it must be derived by all from one principle. And thus the possession by all men in common of the first principles proves the unity of the separate intellect, which Plato compares to the sun; but not the unity of the active intellect, which Aristotle compares to light.

Sixth Article.

Whether memory is in the intellectual part of the soul?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that memory is not in the intellectual part of the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii. 2, 3, 8) that to the higher part of the soul belong those things which are not common to man and beast. But memory is common to man and beast, for he says (ibid. 2) that beasts can sense corporeal things through the senses of the body, and commit them to memory. Therefore memory does not belong to the intellectual part of the soul.
Obj. 2. Further, memory is of the past. But the past is said of something with regard to a fixed time. Memory, therefore, knows a thing under a condition of a fixed time; which involves knowledge under the conditions of here and now. But this is not the province of the intellect, but of the sense. Therefore memory is not in the intellectual part, but only in the sensitive part.

Obj. 3. Further, in the memory are preserved the species of those things of which we are not actually thinking. But this cannot happen in the intellect, because the intellect is reduced to act by the fact that the intelligible species are received into it. Now the intellect in act implies understanding in act; and therefore the intellect actually understands all things of which it has the species. Therefore the memory is not in the intellectual part.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x. 11) that memory, understanding, and will are one mind.

I answer that, Since it is of the nature of the memory to preserve the species of those things which are not actually apprehended, we must first of all consider whether the intelligible species can thus be preserved in the intellect: because Avicenna held that this was impossible. For he admitted that this could happen in the sensitive part, as to some powers, inasmuch as they are acts of corporeal organs, in which certain species may be preserved apart from actual apprehension. But in the intellect, which has no corporeal organ, nothing but what is intelligible exists. Wherefore every thing of which the likeness exists in the intellect must be actually understood. Thus, therefore, according to him, as soon as we cease to understand something actually, the species of that thing ceases to be in our intellect, and if we wish to understand that thing anew, we must turn to the active intellect, which he held to be a separate substance, in order that the intelligible species may thence flow again into our passive intellect. And from the practice and habit of turning to the active intellect there is formed, according to him, a certain aptitude in the passive intellect for turning to the active intellect; which aptitude he calls the habit.
of knowledge. According, therefore, to this supposition, nothing is preserved in the intellectual part that is not actually understood: wherefore it would not be possible to admit memory in the intellectual part.

But this opinion is clearly opposed to the teaching of Aristotle. For he says (De Anima iii. 4) that, when the passive intellect is identified with each thing as knowing it, it is said to be in act, and that this happens when it can operate of itself. And, even then, it is in potentiality, but not in the same way as before learning and discovering. Now, the passive intellect is said to be each thing, inasmuch as it receives the intelligible species of each thing. To the fact, therefore, that it receives the species of intelligible things it owes its being able to operate when it wills, but not so that it be always operating: for even then is it in potentiality in a certain sense, though otherwise than before the act of understanding—namely, in the sense that whoever has habitual knowledge is in potentiality to actual consideration.

The foregoing opinion is also opposed to reason. For what is received into something is received according to the conditions of the recipient. But the intellect is of a more stable nature, and is more immovable than corporeal matter. If, therefore, corporeal matter holds the forms which it receives, not only while it actually does something through them, but also after ceasing to act through them, much more cogent reason is there for the intellect to receive the species unchangeably and lastingly, whether it receive them from things sensible, or derive them from some superior intellect. Thus, therefore, if we take memory only for the power of retaining species, we must say that it is in the intellectual part. But if in the notion of memory we include its object as something past, then the memory is not in the intellectual, but only in the sensitive part, which apprehends individual things. For past, as past, since it signifies being under a condition of fixed time, is something individual.

Reply Obj. 1. Memory, if considered as retentive of
species, is not common to us and other animals. For species are not retained in the sensitive part of the soul only, but rather in the body and soul united: since the memorative power is the act of some organ. But the intellect in itself is retentive of species, without the association of any corporal organ. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii. 4) that the soul is the seat of the species, not the whole soul, but the intellect.

Reply Obj. 2. The condition of past may be referred to two things—namely, to the object which is known, and to the act of knowledge. These two are found together in the sensitive part, which apprehends something from the fact of its being immuted by a present sensible: wherefore at the same time an animal remembers to have sensed before in the past, and to have sensed some past sensible thing. But as concerns the intellectual part, the past is accidental, and is not in itself a part of the object of the intellect. For the intellect understands man, as man: and to man, as man, it is accidental that he exist in the present, past, or future. But on the part of the act, the condition of past, even as such, may be understood to be in the intellect, as well as in the senses. Because our soul’s act of understanding is an individual act, existing in this or that time, inasmuch as a man is said to understand now, or yesterday, or tomorrow. And this is not incompatible with the intellectual nature: for such an act of understanding, though something individual, is yet an immaterial act, as we have said above of the intellect (Q. LXXVI., A. 1); and therefore, as the intellect understands itself, though it be itself an individual intellect, so also it understands its act of understanding, which is an individual act, in the past, present, or future. In this way, then, the notion of memory, in as far as it regards past events, is preserved in the intellect, forasmuch as it understands that it previously understood: but not in the sense that it understands the past as something here and now.

Reply Obj. 3. The intelligible species is sometimes in the intellect only in potentiality, and then the intellect is said
to be in potentiality. Sometimes the intelligible species is in the intellect as regards the ultimate completion of the act, and then it understands in act. And sometimes the intelligible species is in a middle state, between potentiality and act: and then we have habitual knowledge. In this way the intellect retains the species, even when it does not understand in act.

Seventh Article.

Whether the Intellectual Memory is a Power Distinct from the Intellect?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the intellectual memory is distinct from the intellect. For Augustine (De Trin. x. 11) assigns to the soul memory, understanding, and will. But it is clear that the memory is a distinct power from the will. Therefore it is also distinct from the intellect.

Obj. 2. Further, the reason of distinction among the powers in the sensitive part is the same as in the intellectual part. But memory in the sensitive part is distinct from sense, as we have said (Q. LXXVIII., A. 4). Therefore memory in the intellectual part is distinct from the intellect.

Obj. 3. Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. x. 11; xi. 7), memory, understanding, and will are equal to one another, and one flows from the other. But this could not be if memory and intellect were the same power. Therefore they are not the same power.

On the contrary, From its nature the memory is the treasury or storehouse of species. But the Philosopher (De Anima iii.) attributes this to the intellect, as we have said (A. 6 ad 1). Therefore the memory is not another power from the intellect.

I answer that, As has been said above (Q. LXXVII., A. 3), the powers of the soul are distinguished by the different formal aspects of their objects: since each power is defined in reference to that thing to which it is directed.
and which is its object. It has also been said above (Q. LIX., A. 4) that if any power by its nature be directed to an object according to the common ratio of the object, that power will not be differentiated according to the individual differences of that object: just as the power of sight, which regards its object under the common ratio of colour, is not differentiated by differences of black and white. Now, the intellect regards its object under the common ratio of being: since the passive intellect is that in which all are in potentiality. Wherefore the passive intellect is not differentiated by any difference of being. Nevertheless there is a distinction between the power of the active intellect and of the passive intellect: because as regards the same object, the active power which makes the object to be in act must be distinct from the passive power, which is moved by the object existing in act. Thus the active power is compared to its object as a being in act is to a being in potentiality; whereas the passive power, on the contrary, is compared to its object as a being in potentiality is to a being in act. Therefore there can be no other difference of powers in the intellect, but that of passive and active. Wherefore it is clear that memory is not a distinct power from the intellect: for it belongs to the nature of a passive power to retain as well as to receive.

Reply Obj. 1. Although it is said (3 Sent., D. i.) that memory, intellect, and will are three powers, this is not in accordance with the meaning of Augustine, who says expressly (De Trin. xiv.) that if we take memory, intelligence, and will as always present in the soul, whether we actually attend to them or not, they seem to pertain to the memory only. And by intelligence I mean that by which we understand when actually thinking; and by will I mean that love or affection which unites the child and its parent. Wherefore it is clear that Augustine does not take the above three for three powers; but by memory he understands the soul's habit of retention; by intelligence, the act of the intellect; and by will, the act of the will.

Reply Obj. 2. Past and present may differentiate the
sensitive powers, but not the intellectual powers, for the reason given above.

Reply Obj. 3. Intelligence arises from memory, as act from habit; and in this way it is equal to it, but not as a power to a power.

Eighth Article.

Whether the reason is distinct from the intellect?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the reason is a distinct power from the intellect. For it is stated in De Spiritu et Anima that when we wish to rise from lower things to higher, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination, then reason, then the intellect. Therefore the reason is distinct from the intellect, as imagination is from sense.

Obj. 2. Further, Boëthius says (De Consol. iv. 6), that intellect is compared to reason, as eternity to time. But it does not belong to the same power to be in eternity and to be in time. Therefore reason and intellect are not the same power.

Obj. 3. Further, man has intellect in common with the angels, and sense in common with the brutes. But reason, which is proper to man, whence he is called a rational animal, is a power distinct from sense. Therefore is it equally true to say that it is distinct from the intellect, which properly belongs to the angel: whence they are called intellectual.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii. 20) that that in which man excels irrational animals is reason, or mind, or intelligence, or whatever appropriate name we like to give it. Therefore reason, intellect, and mind are one power.

I answer that, Reason and intellect in man cannot be distinct powers. We shall understand this clearly if we consider their respective actions. For to understand is simply to apprehend intelligible truth: and to reason is
to advance from one thing understood to another, so as to know an intelligible truth. And therefore angels who, according to their nature, possess perfect knowledge of intelligible truth, have no need to advance from one thing to another; but apprehend the truth simply and without mental discussion, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii.). But man arrives at the knowledge of intelligible truth by advancing from one thing to another; and therefore he is called rational. Reasoning, therefore, is compared to understanding, as movement is to rest, or acquisition to possession; of which one belongs to the perfect, the other to the imperfect. And since movement always proceeds from something immovable, and ends in something at rest; hence it is that human reasoning, by way of inquiry and discovery, advances from certain things simply understood—namely, the first principles; and, again, by way of judgment returns by analysis to first principles, in the light of which it examines what it has found. Now it is clear that rest and movement are not to be referred to different powers, but to one and the same, even in natural things: since by the same nature a thing is moved towards a certain place, and rests in that place. Much more, therefore, by the same power do we understand and reason: and so it is clear that in man reason and intellect are the same power.

Reply Obj. 1. That enumeration is made according to the order of actions, not according to the distinction of powers. Moreover, that book is not of great authority.

Reply Obj. 2. The answer is clear from what we have said. For eternity is compared to time as immovable to movable. And thus Boëthius compared the intellect to eternity, and reason to time.

Reply Obj. 3. Other animals are so much lower than man that they cannot attain to the knowledge of truth, which reason seeks. But man attains, although imperfectly, to the knowledge of intelligible truth, which angels know. Therefore in the angels the power of knowledge is not of a different genus from that which is in the human reason, but is compared to it as the perfect to the imperfect.
NINTH ARTICLE.

Whether the higher and lower reason are distinct powers?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the higher and lower reason are distinct powers. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii. 4, 7), that the image of the Trinity is in the higher part of the reason, and not in the lower. But the parts of the soul are its powers. Therefore the higher and lower reason are two powers.

Obj. 2. Further, nothing flows from itself. Now, the lower reason flows from the higher, and is ruled and directed by it. Therefore the higher reason is another power from the lower.

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi. 1) that the scientific part of the soul, by which the soul knows necessary things, is another principle, and another part from the opinionative and reasoning part by which it knows contingent things. And he proves this from the principle that for those things which are generically different, generically different parts of the soul are ordained. Now contingent and necessary are generically different, as corruptible and incorruptible. Since, therefore, necessary is the same as eternal, and temporal the same as contingent, it seems that what the Philosopher calls the scientific part must be the same as the higher reason, which, according to Augustine (loc. cit. 7) is intent on the consideration and consultation of things eternal: and that what the Philosopher calls the reasoning or opinionative part is the same as the lower reason, which, according to Augustine, is intent on the disposal of temporal things. Therefore the higher reason is another power than the lower.

Obj. 4. Further, Damascene says (De Fid. Orth. ii.) that opinion rises from imagination: then the mind by judging of the truth or error of the opinion discovers the truth: whence mens (mind) is derived from metiendo (measuring).
And therefore the intellect regards those things which are already subject to judgment and true decision. Therefore the opinionative power, which is the lower reason, is distinct from the mind and the intellect, by which we may understand the higher reason.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xii. 4) that the higher and lower reason are only distinct by their functions. Therefore they are not two powers.

I answer that, The higher and lower reason, as they are understood by Augustine, can in no way be two powers of the soul. For he says that the higher reason is that which is intent on the contemplation and consultation of things eternal: forasmuch as in contemplation it sees them in themselves, and in consultation it takes its rules of action from them. But he calls the lower reason that which is intent on the disposal of temporal things. Now these two—namely, eternal and temporal—are related to our knowledge in this way, that one of them is the means of knowing the other. For by way of discovery, we come through knowledge of temporal things to that of things eternal, according to the words of the Apostle (Rom. i. 20), *The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made*: while by way of judgment, from eternal things already known, we judge of temporal things, and according to laws of things eternal we dispose of temporal things.

But it may happen that the medium and what is attained thereby belong to different habits: as the first indemonstrable principles belong to the habit of intellect; whereas the conclusions which we draw from them belong to the habit of science. And so it happens that from the principles of geometry we draw a conclusion in another science—for example, perspective. But the power of the reason is such that both medium and term belong to it. For the act of the reason is, as it were, a movement from one thing to another. But the same movable thing passes through the medium and reaches the end. Wherefore the higher and lower reasons are one and the same power. But according to
Augustine they are distinguished by the functions of their actions, and according to their various habits: for wisdom is attributed to the higher reason, science to the lower.

Reply Obj. 1. We can speak of parts, in whatever way a thing is divided. And so far as reason is divided according to its various acts, the higher and lower reason are called parts; but not because they are different powers.

Reply Obj. 2. The lower reason is said to flow from the higher, or to be ruled by it, as far as the principles made use of by the lower reason are drawn from and directed by the principles of the higher reason.

Reply Obj. 3. The scientific part, of which the Philosopher speaks, is not the same as the higher reason: for necessary truths are found even among temporal things, of which natural science and mathematics treat. And the opinionative and ratiocinative part is more limited than the lower reason; for it regards only things contingent. Neither must we say, without any qualification, that a power, by which the intellect knows necessary things, is distinct from a power by which it knows contingent things: because it knows both under the same objective aspect—namely, under the aspect of being and truth. Wherefore it perfectly knows necessary things which have perfect being in truth: since it penetrates to their very essence, from which it demonstrates their proper accidents. On the other hand, it knows contingent things, but imperfectly; forasmuch as they have but imperfect being and truth. Now perfect and imperfect in the action do not vary the power, but they vary the actions as to the mode of acting, and consequently the principles of the actions and the habits themselves. And therefore the Philosopher postulates two lesser parts of the soul—namely, the scientific and the ratiocinative, not because they are two powers, but because they are distinct according to a different aptitude for receiving various habits, concerning the variety of which he inquires. For contingent and necessary, though differing according to their proper genera, nevertheless agree in the common
aspect of being, which the intellect considers, and to which they are variously compared as perfect and imperfect.

Reply Obj. 4. That distinction given by Damascene is according to the variety of acts, not according to the variety of powers. Error opinion signifies an act of the intellect which leans to one side of a contradiction, whilst in fear of the other. While to judge or measure (mensurare) is an act of the intellect, applying certain principles to examine propositions. From this is taken the word mens (mind). Lastly, to understand is to adhere to the formed judgment with approval.

Tenth Article.

Whether intelligence is a power distinct from intellect?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the intelligence is another power than the intellect. For we read in De Spiritu et Anima that when we wish to rise from lower to higher things, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination, then reason, then intellect, and afterwards intelligence. But imagination and sense are distinct powers. Therefore also intellect and intelligence are distinct.

Obj. 2. Further, Boëthius says (De Consol. v. 4) that sense considers man in one way, imagination in another, reason in another, intelligence in another. But intellect is the same power as reason. Therefore, seemingly, intelligence is a distinct power from intellect, as reason is a distinct power from imagination or sense.

Obj. 3. Further, actions come before powers, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii. 4). But intelligence is an act separate from others attributed to the intellect. For Damascene says (De Fid. Orth. ii.) that the first movement is called intelligence; but that intelligence which is about a certain thing is called intention; that which remains and conforms the soul to that which is understood is called invention, and invention when it remains in the same man, examining and judging of itself, is called phronesis (that is,
wisdom), and phronesis if dilated makes thought, that is, orderly internal speech; from which, they say, comes speech expressed by the tongue. Therefore it seems that intelligence is some special power.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii. 6) that intelligence is of indivisible things in which there is nothing false. But the knowledge of these things belongs to the intellect. Therefore the intelligence is not another power than the intellect.

I answer that, This word intelligence properly signifies the intellect's very act, which is to understand. However, in some works translated from the Arabic, the separate substances which we call angels are called intelligences, and perhaps for this reason, that such substances are always actually understanding. But in works translated from the Greek, they are called intellects or minds. Thus intelligence is not distinct from intellect, as power is from power; but as act is from power. And such a division is recognized even by the philosophers. For sometimes they assign four intellects—namely, the active and passive intellects, the intellect in habit, and the actual intellect. Of which four the active and passive intellects are different powers; just as in all things the active power is distinct from the passive. But three of these are distinct, as three states of the passive intellect, which is sometimes in potentiality only, and thus it is called passive; sometimes it is in the first act, which is knowledge, and thus it is called intellect in habit; and sometimes it is in the second act, which is to consider, and thus it is called intellect in act, or actual intellect.

Reply Obj. 1. If this authority is accepted, intelligence there means the act of the intellect. And thus it is divided against intellect as act against power.

Reply Obj. 2. Boethius takes intelligence as meaning that act of the intellect which transcends the act of the reason. Wherefore he also says that reason alone belongs to the human race, as intelligence alone belongs to God, for it belongs to God to understand all things without any investigation.
Reply Obj. 3. All those acts which Damascene enumerates belong to one power—namely, the intellectual power. For this power first of all only apprehends something; and this act is called intelligence. Secondly, it directs what it apprehends to the knowledge of something else, or to some operation; and this is called intention. And when it goes on in search of what it intends, it is called invention. When, by reference to something known for certain, it examines what it has found, it is said to know or to be wise, which belongs to phronesis or wisdom; for it belongs to the wise man to judge, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i. 2). And when once it has obtained something for certain, as being fully examined, it thinks about the means of making it known to others; and this is the ordering of interior speech, from which proceeds external speech. For every difference of acts does not make the powers vary, but only what cannot be reduced to the one same principle, as we have said above (Q. LXXVIII., A. 4).

Eleventh Article.

Whether the Speculative and Practical Intelleccts Are Distinct Powers?

We proceed thus to the Eleventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers. For the apprehensive and motive are different kinds of powers, as is clear from De Anima ii. 3. But the speculative intellect is merely an apprehensive power; while the practical intellect is a motive power. Therefore they are distinct powers.

Obj. 2. Further, the different nature of the object differentiates the power. But the object of the speculative intellect is truth, and of the practical is good; which differ in nature. Therefore the speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers.

Obj. 3. Further, in the intellectual part, the practical intellect is compared to the speculative, as the estimative
is to the imaginative power in the sensitive part. But the estimative differs from the imaginative, as power from power, as we have said above (Q. LXXVIII., A. 4). Therefore also the speculative intellect differs from the practical.

On the contrary, The speculative intellect by extension becomes practical (De Anima iii. 10). But one power is not changed into another. Therefore the speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers.

I answer that, The speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers. The reason of which is that, as we have said above (Q. LXXVII., A. 3), what is accidental to the nature of the object of a power, does not differentiate that power; for it is accidental to a thing coloured to be man, or to be great or small; hence all such things are apprehended by the same power of sight. Now, to a thing apprehended by the intellect, it is accidental whether it be directed to operation or not, and according to this the speculative and practical intellects differ. For it is the speculative intellect which directs what it apprehends, not to operation, but to the consideration of truth; while the practical intellect is that which directs what it apprehends to operation. And this is what the Philosopher says (De Anima iii., loc. cit.); that the speculative differs from the practical in its end. Whence each is named from its end: the one speculative, the other practical—i.e., operative.

Reply Obj. 1. The practical intellect is a motive power, not as executing movement, but as directing towards it; and this belongs to it according to its mode of apprehension.

Reply Obj. 2. Truth and good include one another; for truth is something good, otherwise it would not be desirable; and good is something true, otherwise it would not be intelligible. Therefore as the object of the appetite may be something true, as having the aspect of good, for example, when some one desires to know the truth; so the object of the practical intellect is good directed to operation, and under the aspect of truth. For the practical intellect knows truth, just as the speculative, but it directs the known truth to operation.
Reply Obj. 3. Many differences differentiate the sensitive powers, which do not differentiate the intellectual powers, as we have said above (A. 7, ad 2, Q. LXXVII., A. 3, ad 4).

Twelfth Article.

Whether Synderesis is a Special Power of the Soul Distinct from the Others?

We proceed thus to the Twelfth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that synderesis is a special power, distinct from the others. For those things which fall under one division seem to be of the same genus. But in the gloss of Jerome on Ezech. i. 6 synderesis is divided against the irascible, the concupiscible, and the rational, which are powers. Therefore synderesis is a power.

Obj. 2. Further, opposite things are of the same genus. But synderesis and sensuality seem to be opposed to one another because synderesis always incites to good; while sensuality always incites to evil: whence it is signified by the serpent, as is clear from Augustine (De Trin. xii. 12, 13). It seems, therefore, that synderesis is a power just as sensuality is.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii. 10) that in the natural power of judgment there are certain rules and seeds of virtue, both true and unchangeable. And this is what we call synderesis. Since, therefore, the unchangeable rules which guide our judgment belong to the reason as to its higher part, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii. 2), it seems that synderesis is the same as reason: and thus it is a power.

On the contrary, According to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii. 2), rational powers regard opposite things. But synderesis does not regard opposites, but inclines to good only. Therefore synderesis is not a power. For if it were a power it would be a rational power, since it is not found in brute animals.

I answer that, Synderesis is not a power but a habit; though some held that it is a power higher than reason;
while others* said that it is reason itself, not as reason, but as a nature. In order to make this clear we must observe that, as we have said above (A. 8), man's act of reasoning, since it is a kind of movement, proceeds from the understanding of certain things—namely, those which are naturally known without any investigation on the part of reason, as from an immovable principle,—and ends also at the understanding, inasmuch as by means of those principles naturally known, we judge of those things which we have discovered by reasoning. Now it is clear that, as the speculative reason argues about speculative things, so the practical reason argues about practical things. Therefore we must have, bestowed on us by nature, not only speculative principles, but also practical principles. Now the first speculative principles bestowed on us by nature do not belong to a special power, but to a special habit, which is called the understanding of principles, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. vi. 6). Wherefore the first practical principles, bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to a special power, but to a special natural habit, which we call synderesis. Whence synderesis is said to incite to good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as through first principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we have discovered. It is therefore clear that synderesis is not a power, but a natural habit.

Reply Obj. 1. The division given by Jerome is taken from the variety of acts, and not from the variety of powers; and various acts can belong to one power.

Reply Obj. 2. In like manner, the opposition of sensuality to synderesis is an opposition of acts, and not of the different species of one genus.

Reply Obj. 3. Those unchangeable notions are the first practical principles, concerning which no one errs; and they are attributed to reason as to a power, and to synderesis as to a habit. Wherefore we judge naturally both by our reason and by synderesis.

* Cf. Alexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. II., Q. LXXIII.
Thirteenth Article.

Whether Conscience be a Power?

We proceed thus to the Thirteenth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that conscience is a power; for Origen says* that conscience is a correcting and guiding spirit accompanying the soul, by which it is led away from evil and made to cling to good. But in the soul, spirit designates a power—either the mind itself, according to the text (Eph. iv. 13), Be ye renewed in the spirit of your mind—or the imagination, whence imaginary vision is called spiritual, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii. 7, 24). Therefore conscience is a power.

Obj. 2. Further, nothing is a subject of sin, except a power of the soul. But conscience is a subject of sin; for it is said of some that their mind and conscience are defiled (Titus i. 15). Therefore it seems that conscience is a power.

Obj. 3. Further, conscience must of necessity be either an act, a habit, or a power. But it is not an act; for thus it would not always exist in man. Nor is it a habit; for conscience is not one thing but many, since we are directed in our actions by many habits of knowledge. Therefore conscience is a power.

On the contrary, Conscience can be laid aside. But a power cannot be laid aside. Therefore conscience is not a power.

I answer that, Properly speaking conscience is not a power, but an act. This is evident both from the very name and from those things which in the common way of speaking are attributed to conscience. For conscience, according to the very nature of the word, implies the relation of knowledge to something: for conscience may be resolved into cum alio scientia, i.e., knowledge applied to an individual case. But the application of knowledge to something is done by some act. Wherefore from this explanation of the name it is clear that conscience is an act.

* Commentary on Rom. ii. 15.
The same is manifest from those things which are attributed to conscience. For conscience is said to witness, to bind, or incite, and also to accuse, torment, or rebuke. And all these follow the application of knowledge or science to what we do: which application is made in three ways. One way in so far as we recognize that we have done or not done something; Thy conscience knoweth that thou hast often spoken evil of others (Eccles. vii. 23), and according to this, conscience is said to witness. In another way, so far as through the conscience we judge that something should be done or not done; and in this sense, conscience is said to incite or to bind. In the third way, so far as by conscience we judge that something done is well done or ill done, and in this sense conscience is said to excuse, accuse, or torment. Now, it is clear that all these things follow the actual application of knowledge to what we do. Wherefore, properly speaking, conscience denominates an act. But since habit is a principle of act, sometimes the name conscience is given to the first natural habit—namely, synderesis: thus Jerome calls synderesis conscience (Gloss. Ezech. i. 6); Basil,* the natural power of judgment, and Damascene† says that it is the law of our intellect. For it is customary for causes and effects to be called after one another.

Reply Obj. 1. Conscience is called a spirit, so far as spirit is the same as mind; because conscience is a certain pronouncement of the mind.

Reply Obj. 2. The conscience is said to be defiled, not as a subject, but as the thing known is in knowledge; so far as someone knows he is defiled.

Reply Obj. 3. Although an act does not always remain in itself, yet it always remains in its cause, which is power and habit. Now all the habits by which conscience is formed, although many, nevertheless have their efficacy from one first habit, the habit of first principles, which is called synderesis. And for this special reason, this habit is sometimes called conscience, as we have said above.

* Hom. in princ. Proverb. † De Fide Orthod. iv. 22.
QUESTION LXXX.

OF THE APPETITIVE POWERS IN GENERAL.

(In Two Articles.)

Next we consider the appetitive powers, concerning which there are four heads of consideration: first, the appetitive powers in general; second, sensuality; third, the will; fourth, the free-will. Under the first there are two points of inquiry. (1) Whether the appetite should be considered a special power of the soul? (2) Whether the appetite should be divided into intellectual and sensitive as distinct powers?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE APPETITE IS A SPECIAL POWER OF THE SOUL?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the appetite is not a special power of the soul. For no power of the soul is to be assigned for those things which are common to animate and to inanimate things. But appetite is common to animate and inanimate things: since all desire good, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i. 1). Therefore the appetite is not a special power of the soul.

Obj. 2. Further, powers are differentiated by their objects. But what we desire is the same as what we know. Therefore the appetitive power is not distinct from the apprehensive power.

Obj. 3. Further, the common is not divided from the proper. But each power of the soul desires some particular desirable thing—namely, its own suitable object. Therefore, with regard to this object which is the desirable in general, we should not assign some particular power distinct from the others, called the appetitive power.

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On the contrary, The Philosopher distinguishes (De Anima ii. 3) the appetitive from the other powers. Damascus also (De Fid. Orth. ii. 22) distinguishes the appetitive from the cognitive powers.

I answer that, It is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul. To make this evident, we must observe that some inclination follows every form: for example, fire, by its form, is inclined to rise, and to generate its like. Now, the form is found to have a more perfect existence in those things which participate knowledge than in those which lack knowledge. For in those which lack knowledge, the form is found to determine each thing only to its own being—that is, to its nature. Therefore this natural form is followed by a natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite. But in those things which have knowledge, each one is determined to its own natural being by its natural form, in such a manner that it is nevertheless receptive of the species of other things: for example, sense receives the species of all things sensible, and the intellect, of all things intelligible, so that the soul of man is, in a way, all things by sense and intellect: and thereby, those things that have knowledge, in a way, approach to a likeness to God, in Whom all things pre-exist, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v.).

Therefore, as forms exist in those things that have knowledge in a higher manner and above the manner of natural forms; so must there be in them an inclination surpassing the natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite. And this superior inclination belongs to the appetitive power of the soul, through which the animal is able to desire what it apprehends, and not only that to which it is inclined by its natural form. And so it is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul.

Reply Obj. 1. Appetite is found in things which have knowledge, above the common manner in which it is found in all things, as we have said above. Therefore it is necessary to assign to the soul a particular power.

Reply Obj. 2. What is apprehended and what is desired
are the same in reality, but differ in aspect: for a thing is apprehended as something sensible or intelligible, whereas it is desired as suitable or good. Now, it is diversity of aspect in the objects, and not material diversity, which demands a diversity of powers.

Reply Obj. 3. Each power of the soul is a form or nature, and has a natural inclination to something. Wherefore each power desires by the natural appetite that object which is suitable to itself. Above which natural appetite is the animal appetite, which follows the apprehension, and by which something is desired not as suitable to this or that power, such as sight for seeing, or sound for hearing; but simply as suitable to the animal.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SENSITIVE AND INTELLECTUAL APPETITES ARE DISTINCT POWERS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the sensitive and intellectual appetites are not distinct powers. For powers are not differentiated by accidental differences, as we have seen above (Q. LXXVII., A. 3). But it is accidental to the appetitive object whether it be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect. Therefore the sensitive and intellectual appetites are not distinct powers.

Obj. 2. Further, intellectual knowledge is of universals; and so it is distinct from sensitive knowledge, which is of individual things. But there is no place for this distinction in the appetitive part: for since the appetite is a movement of the soul to individual things, seemingly every act of the appetite regards an individual thing. Therefore the intellectual appetite is not distinguished from the sensitive.

Obj. 3. Further, as under the apprehensive power, the appetitive is subordinate as a lower power, so also is the motive power. But the motive power which in man follows the intellect is not distinct from the motive power which in
animals follows sense. Therefore, for a like reason, neither is there distinction in the appetitive part.

On the contrary, The Philosopher (De Anima iii. 9) distinguishes a double appetite, and says (ibid. 11) that the higher appetite moves the lower.

I answer that, We must needs say that the intellectual appetite is a distinct power from the sensitive appetite. For the appetitive power is a passive power, which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended: wherefore the apprehended appetible is a mover which is not moved, while the appetite is a mover moved, as the Philosopher says in De Anima iii. 10, and Metaph. xii. (Did. xi. 7). Now things passive and movable are differentiated according to the distinction of the corresponding active and motive principles; because the motive must be proportionate to the movable, and the active to the passive: indeed, the passive power itself has its very nature from its relation to its active principle. Therefore, since what is apprehended by the intellect and what is apprehended by sense are generically different; consequently, the intellectual appetite is distinct from the sensitive.

Reply Obj. 1. It is not accidental to the thing desired to be apprehended by the sense or the intellect; on the contrary, this belongs to it by its nature; for the appetible does not move the appetite except as it is apprehended. Wherefore differences in the thing apprehended are of themselves differences of the appetible. And so the appetitive powers are distinct according to the distinction of the things apprehended, as their proper objects.

Reply Obj. 2. The intellectual appetite, though it tends to individual things which exist outside the soul, yet tends to them as standing under the universal; as when it desires something because it is good. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhetoric. ii. 4) that hatred can regard a universal, as when we hate every kind of thief. In the same way by the intellectual appetite we may desire the immaterial good, which is not apprehended by sense, such as knowledge, virtue, and suchlike.
Reply Obj. 3. As the Philosopher says (De Anima iii. 11), a universal opinion does not move except by means of a particular opinion; and in like manner the higher appetite moves by means of the lower: and therefore there are not two distinct motive powers following the intellect and the sense.
QUESTION LXXXI.

OF THE POWER OF SENSUALITY.

(In Three Articles.)

Next we have to consider the power of sensuality, concerning which there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether sensuality is only an appetitive power? (2) Whether it is divided into irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers? (3) Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER SENSUALITY IS ONLY APPETITIVE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that sensuality is not only appetitive, but also cognitive. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii. 12) that the sensual movement of the soul which is directed to the bodily senses is common to us and beasts. But the bodily senses belong to the apprehensive powers. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power.

Obj. 2. Further, things which come under one division seem to be of one genus. But Augustine (De Trin. xii., loc. cit.) divides sensuality against the higher and lower reason, which belong to knowledge. Therefore sensuality also is apprehensive.

Obj. 3. Further, in man's temptations sensuality stands in the place of the serpent. But in the temptation of our first parents, the serpent presented himself as one giving information and proposing sin, which belong to the cognitive power. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power.

On the contrary, Sensuality is defined as the appetite of things belonging to the body.
I answer that, The name sensuality seems to be taken from the sensual movement, of which Augustine speaks (De Trin. xii. 12, 13), just as the name of a power is taken from its act; for instance, sight from seeing. Now the sensual movement is an appetite following sensitive apprehension. For the act of the apprehensive power is not so properly called a movement as the act of the appetite: since the operation of the apprehensive power is completed in the very fact that the thing apprehended is in the one that apprehends: while the operation of the appetitive power is completed in the fact that he who desires is borne towards the thing desirable. Therefore the operation of the apprehensive power is likened to rest: whereas the operation of the appetitive power is rather likened to movement. Wherefore by sensual movement we understand the operation of the appetitive power: so that sensuality is the name of the sensitive appetite.

Reply Obj. 1. By saying that the sensual movement of the soul is directed to the bodily senses, Augustine does not give us to understand that the bodily senses are included in sensuality, but rather that the movement of sensuality is a certain inclination to the bodily senses, since we desire things which are apprehended through the bodily senses. And thus the bodily senses appertain to sensuality as a preamble.

Reply Obj. 2. Sensuality is divided against higher and lower reason, as having in common with them the act of movement: for the apprehensive power, to which belong the higher and lower reason, is a motive power; as is appetite, to which appertains sensuality.

Reply Obj. 3. The serpent not only showed and proposed sin, but also incited to the commission of sin. And in this, sensuality is signified by the serpent.
SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SENSITIVE APPETITE IS DIVIDED INTO THE IRASCIBLE AND CONCUPISCIBLE AS DISTINCT POWERS?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the sensitive appetite is not divided into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers. For the same power of the soul regards both sides of a contrariety, as sight regards both black and white, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii. 11). But suitable and harmful are contraries. Since, then, the concupiscible power regards what is suitable, while the irascible is concerned with what is harmful, it seems that irascible and concupiscible are the same power in the soul.

Obj. 2. Further, the sensitive appetite regards only what is suitable according to the senses. But such is the object of the concupiscible power. Therefore there is no sensitive appetite differing from the concupiscible.

Obj. 3. Further, hatred is in the irascible part: for Jerome says on Matt. xiii. 33: *We ought to have the hatred of vice in the irascible power.* But hatred is contrary to love, and is in the concupiscible part. Therefore the concupiscible and irascible are the same powers.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Natura Hominis) and Damascene (De Fid. Orth. ii. 12) assign two parts to the sensitive appetite, the irascible and the concupiscible.

I answer that, The sensitive appetite is one generic power, and is called sensuality; but it is divided into two powers, which are species of the sensitive appetite—the irascible and the concupiscible. In order to make this clear, we must observe that in natural corruptible things there is needed an inclination not only to the acquisition of what is suitable and to the avoiding of what is harmful, but also to resistance against corruptive and contrary agencies which are a hindrance to the acquisition of what is suitable, and are productive of harm. For example, fire has a natural inclination,
not only to rise from a lower position, which is unsuitable to it, towards a higher position which is suitable, but also to resist whatever destroys or hinders its action. Therefore, since the sensitive appetite is an inclination following sensitive apprehension, as natural appetite is an inclination following the natural form, there must needs be in the sensitive part two appetitive powers—one through which the soul is simply inclined to seek what is suitable, according to the senses, and to fly from what is hurtful, and this is called the concupiscible: and another, whereby an animal resists these attacks that hinder what is suitable, and inflict harm, and this is called the irascible. Whence we say that its object is something arduous, because its tendency is to overcome and rise above obstacles. Now these two are not to be reduced to one principle: for sometimes the soul busies itself with unpleasant things, against the inclination of the concupiscible appetite, in order that, following the impulse of the irascible appetite, it may fight against obstacles. Wherefore also the passions of the irascible appetite counteract the passions of the concupiscible appetite: since concupiscence, on being roused, diminishes anger; and anger being roused, diminishes concupiscence in many cases. This is clear also from the fact that the irascible is, as it were, the champion and defender of the concupiscible, when it rises up against what hinders the acquisition of the suitable things which the concupiscible desires, or against what inflicts harm, from which the concupiscible flies. And for this reason all the passions of the irascible appetite rise from the passions of the concupiscible appetite and terminate in them; for instance, anger rises from sadness, and having wrought vengeance, terminates in joy. For this reason also the quarrels of animals are about things concupiscible—namely, food and sex, as the Philosopher says (De Animal. viii.).

Reply Obj. 1. The concupiscible power regards both what is suitable and what is unsuitable. But the object of the irascible power is to resist the onslaught of the unsuitable.

* De Animal. Histor.
Reply Obj. 2. As in the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part there is an estimative power, which perceives those things which do not impress the senses, as we have said above (Q. LXXVIII., A. 2); so also in the sensitive appetite there is a certain appetitive power which regards something as suitable, not because it pleases the senses, but because it is useful to the animal for self-defence: and this is the irascible power.

Reply Obj. 3. Hatred belongs simply to the concupiscible appetite: but by reason of the strife which arises from hatred, it may belong to the irascible appetite.

Third Article.

Whether the Irascible and Concupiscible Appetites Obey Reason?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason. For irascible and concupiscible are parts of sensuality. But sensuality does not obey reason, wherefore it is signified by the serpent, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii. 12, 13). Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason.

Obj. 2. Further, what obeys a certain thing does not resist it. But the irascible and concupiscible appetites resist reason: according to the Apostle (Rom. vii. 23): I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind. Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason.

Obj. 3. Further, as the appetitive power is inferior to the rational part of the soul, so also is the sensitive power. But the sensitive part of the soul does not obey reason: for we neither hear nor see just when we wish. Therefore, in like manner, neither do the powers of the sensitive appetite, the irascible and concupiscible, obey reason.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fid. Orth. ii. 12) that the part of the soul which is obedient and amenable to reason is divided into concupiscence and anger.
I answer that, in two ways the irascible and concupiscible powers obey the higher part, in which are the intellect or reason, and the will; first, as to the reason, secondly as to the will. They obey the reason in their own acts, because in other animals the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by the estimative power; for instance, a sheep, esteeming the wolf as an enemy, is afraid. In man the estimative power, as we have said above (Q. LXXVIII., A. 4), is replaced by the cogitative power, which is called by some the particular reason, because it compares individual intentions. Wherefore in man the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by this particular reason. But this same particular reason is naturally guided and moved according to the universal reason: wherefore in syllogistic matters particular conclusions are drawn from universal propositions. Therefore it is clear that the universal reason directs the sensitive appetite, which is divided into concupiscible and irascible; and this appetite obeys it. But because to draw particular conclusions from universal principles is not the work of the intellect, as such, but of the reason: hence it is that the irascible and concupiscible are said to obey the reason rather than to obey the intellect. Anyone can experience this in himself: for by applying certain universal considerations, anger or fear or the like may be modified or excited.

To the will also is the sensitive appetite subject in execution, which is accomplished by the motive power. For in other animals movement follows at once the concupiscible and irascible appetites: for instance, the sheep, fearing the wolf, flies at once, because it has no superior counteracting appetite. On the contrary, man is not moved at once, according to the irascible and concupiscible appetites: but he awaits the command of the will, which is the superior appetite. For wherever there is order among a number of motive powers, the second only moves by virtue of the first: wherefore the lower appetite is not sufficient to cause movement, unless the higher appetite consents. And this is what the Philosopher says (De Anima. iii. 11), that the
higher appetite moves the lower appetite, as the higher sphere moves the lower. In this way, therefore, the irascible and concupiscible are subject to reason.

Reply Obj. 1. Sensuality is signified by the serpent, in what is proper to it as a sensitive power. But the irascible and concupiscible powers denominate the sensitive appetite rather on the part of the act, to which they are led by the reason, as we have said.

Reply Obj. 2. As the Philosopher says (Polit. i. 2): We observe in an animal a despotic and a politic principle: for the soul dominates the body by a despotic power; but the intellect dominates the appetite by a politic and royal power. For a power is called despotic whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the right to resist in any way the orders of the one that commands them, since they have nothing of their own. But that power is called politic and royal by which a man rules over free subjects, who, though subject to the government of the ruler, have nevertheless something of their own, by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who commands. And so, the soul is said to rule the body by a despotic power, because the members of the body cannot in any way resist the sway of the soul, but at the soul’s command both hand and foot, and whatever member is naturally moved by voluntary movement, are moved at once. But the intellect or reason is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible by a politic power: because the sensitive appetite has something of its own, by virtue whereof it can resist the commands of reason. For the sensitive appetite is naturally moved, not only by the estimative power in other animals, and in man by the cogitative power which the universal reason guides, but also by the imagination and sense. Whence it is that we experience that the irascible and concupiscible powers do resist reason, inasmuch as we sense or imagine something pleasant, which reason forbids, or unpleasant, which reason commands. And so from the fact that the irascible and concupiscible resist reason in something, we must not conclude that they do not obey.
Reply Obj. 3. The exterior senses require for action exterior sensible things, whereby they are affected, and the presence of which is not ruled by reason. But the interior powers, both appetitive and apprehensive, do not require exterior things. Therefore they are subject to the command of reason, which can not only incite or modify the affections of the appetitive power, but can also form the phantasms of the imagination.
QUESTION LXXXII.

OF THE WILL.

(In Five Articles.)

We next consider the will. Under this head there are five points of inquiry: (1) Whether the will desires something of necessity? (2) Whether it desires everything of necessity? (3) Whether it is a higher power than the intellect? (4) Whether the will moves the intellect? (5) Whether the will is divided into irascible and concupiscible?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WILL DESIRES SOMETHING OF NECESSITY?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the will desires nothing of necessity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v. 10) that if anything is necessary, it is not voluntary. But whatever the will desires is voluntary. Therefore nothing that the will desires is desired of necessity.

Obj. 2. Further, the rational powers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii. 2), extend to opposite things. But the will is a rational power, because, as he says (De Anima iii. 9), the will is in the reason. Therefore the will extends to opposite things, and therefore it is determined to nothing of necessity.

Obj. 3. Further, by the will we are masters of our own actions. But we are not masters of that which is of necessity. Therefore the act of the will cannot be necessitated.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii. 4) that all desire happiness with one will. Now if this were not necessary, but contingent, there would at least be a few
exceptions. Therefore the will desires something of necessity.

I answer that, The word necessity is employed in many ways. For that which must be is necessary. Now that a thing must be may belong to it by an intrinsic principle;—either material, as when we say that everything composed of contraries is of necessity corruptible;—or formal, as when we say that it is necessary for the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right angles. And this is natural and absolute necessity. In another way, that a thing must be, belongs to it by reason of something extrinsic, which is either the end or the agent. On the part of the end, as when without it the end is not to be attained or so well attained: for instance, food is said to be necessary for life, and a horse is necessary for a journey. This is called necessity of end, and sometimes also utility. On the part of the agent, a thing must be, when someone is forced by some agent, so that he is not able to do the contrary. This is called necessity of coercion.

Now this necessity of coercion is altogether repugnant to the will. For we call that violent which is against the inclination of a thing. But the very movement of the will is an inclination to something. Therefore, as a thing is called natural because it is according to the inclination of nature, so a thing is called voluntary because it is according to the inclination of the will. Therefore, just as it is impossible for a thing to be at the same time violent and natural, so it is impossible for a thing to be absolutely coerced or violent, and voluntary.

But necessity of end is not repugnant to the will, when the end cannot be attained except in one way: thus from the will to cross the sea, arises in the will the necessity to wish for a ship.

In like manner neither is natural necessity repugnant to the will. Indeed, more than this, for as the intellect of necessity adheres to the first principles, the will must of necessity adhere to the last end, which is happiness: since the end is in practical matters what the principle is in
speculative matters. For what befits a thing naturally and immovably must be the root and principle of all else appertaining thereto, since the nature of a thing is the first in everything, and every movement arises from something immovable.

Reply Obj. 1. The words of Augustine are to be understood of the necessity of coercion. But natural necessity does not take away the liberty of the will, as he says himself (ibid.).

Reply Obj. 2. The will, so far as it desires a thing naturally, corresponds rather to the intellect as regards natural principles than to the reason, which extends to opposite things. Wherefore in this respect it is rather an intellectual than a rational power.

Reply Obj. 3. We are masters of our own actions by reason of our being able to choose this or that. But choice regards not the end, but the means to the end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii. 9). Wherefore the desire of the ultimate end does not regard those actions of which we are masters.

Second Article.

Whether the will desires of necessity, whatever it desires?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the will desires all things of necessity, whatever it desires. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv.) that evil is outside the scope of the will. Therefore the will tends of necessity to the good which is proposed to it.

Obj. 2. Further, the object of the will is compared to the will as the mover to the thing movable. But the movement of the movable necessarily follows the mover. Therefore it seems that the will's object moves it of necessity.

Obj. 3. Further, as the thing apprehended by sense is the object of the sensitive appetite, so the thing apprehended by the intellect is the object of the intellectual appetite,
which is called the will. But what is apprehended by the sense moves the sensitive appetite of necessity: for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix. 14) that animals are moved by things seen. Therefore it seems that whatever is apprehended by the intellect moves the will of necessity.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Retract. i. 9) that it is the will by which we sin and live well, and so the will extends to opposite things. Therefore it does not desire of necessity all things whatsoever it desires.

I answer that, The will does not desire of necessity whatsoever it desires. In order to make this evident we must observe that as the intellect naturally and of necessity adheres to the first principles, so the will adheres to the last end, as we have said already (A. 1). Now there are some things intelligible which have not a necessary connection with the first principles; such as contingent propositions, the denial of which does not involve a denial of the first principles. And to such the intellect does not assent of necessity. But there are some propositions which have a necessary connection with the first principles: such as demonstrable conclusions, a denial of which involves a denial of the first principles. And to these the intellect assents of necessity, when once it is aware of the necessary connection of these conclusions with the principles; but it does not assent of necessity until through the demonstration it recognizes the necessity of such connection. It is the same with the will. For there are certain individual goods which have not a necessary connection with happiness, because without them a man can be happy: and to such the will does not adhere of necessity. But there are some things which have a necessary connection with happiness, by means of which things man adheres to God, in Whom alone true happiness consists. Nevertheless, until through the certitude of the Divine Vision the necessity of such connection be shown, the will does not adhere to God of necessity, nor to those things which are of God. But the will of the man who sees God in His Essence of necessity adheres to God, just as now we desire of necessity to be
happy. It is therefore clear that the will does not desire of necessity whatever it desires.

Reply Obj. 1. The will can tend to nothing except under the aspect of good. But because good is of many kinds, for this reason the will is not of necessity determined to one.

Reply Obj. 2. The mover, then, of necessity causes movement in the thing movable, when the power of the mover exceeds the thing movable, so that its entire capacity is subject to the mover. But as the capacity of the will regards the universal and perfect good, its capacity is not subjected to any individual good. And therefore it is not of necessity moved by it.

Reply Obj. 3. The sensitive power does not compare different things with each other, as reason does: but it simply apprehends some one thing. Therefore, according to that one thing, it moves the sensitive appetite in a determinate way. But the reason is a power that compares several things together: therefore from several things the intellectual appetite—that is, the will—may be moved; but not of necessity from one thing.

Third Article.

Whether the Will Is a Higher Power Than the Intellect?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the will is a higher power than the intellect. For the object of the will is good and the end. But the end is the first and highest cause. Therefore the will is the first and highest power.

Obj. 2. Further, in the order of natural things we observe a progress from imperfect things to perfect. And this also appears in the powers of the soul: for sense precedes the intellect, which is more noble. Now the act of the will, in the natural order, follows the act of the intellect. Therefore the will is a more noble and perfect power than the intellect.

Obj. 3. Further, habits are proportioned to their powers,
as perfections to what they make perfect. But the habit which perfects the will—namely, charity—is more noble than the habits which perfect the intellect: for it is written (1 Cor. xiii. 2): If I should know all mysteries, and if I should have all faith, and have not charity, I am nothing. Therefore the will is a higher power than the intellect.

On the contrary, The Philosopher holds the intellect to be the highest power of the soul (Ethic. x. 7).

I answer that, The superiority of one thing over another can be considered in two ways: absolutely and relatively. Now a thing is considered to be such absolutely which is considered such in itself; but relatively as it is such with regard to something else. If therefore the intellect and will be considered with regard to themselves, then the intellect is the higher power. And this is clear if we compare their respective objects to one another. For the object of the intellect is more simple and more absolute than the object of the will; since the object of the intellect is the very idea of appetible good; and the appetible good, the idea of which is in the intellect, is the object of the will. Now the more simple and the more abstract a thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself; and therefore the object of the intellect is higher than the object of the will. Therefore, since the proper nature of a power is in its order to its object, it follows that the intellect in itself and absolutely is higher and nobler than the will. But relatively and by comparison with something else, we find that the will is sometimes higher than the intellect, from the fact that the object of the will occurs in something higher than that in which occurs the object of the intellect. Thus, for instance, I might say that hearing is relatively nobler than sight, inasmuch as something in which there is sound is nobler than something in which there is colour, though colour is nobler and simpler than sound. For, as we have said above (Q. XVI., A. 1; Q. XXVII., A. 4), the action of the intellect consists in this—that the idea of the thing understood is in the one who understands; while the act of the will consists in this—that the will is inclined to the thing itself as existing in itself,
And therefore the Philosopher says in *Metaph.* vi. (Did. v. 2) that *good and evil*, which are objects of the will, *are in things*, but *truth and error*, which are objects of the intellect, *are in the mind*. When, therefore, the thing in which there is good is nobler than the soul itself, in which is the idea understood; by comparison with such a thing, the will is higher than the intellect. But when the thing which is good is less noble than the soul, then even in comparison with that thing the intellect is higher than the will. Wherefore the love of God is better than the knowledge of God; but, on the contrary, the knowledge of corporeal things is better than the love thereof. Absolutely, however, the intellect is nobler than the will.

*Reply Obj.* 1. The aspect of causality is perceived by comparing one thing to another, and in such a comparison the idea of good is found to be nobler: but truth signifies something more absolute, and extends to the idea of good itself: wherefore even good is something true. But, again, truth is something good: forasmuch as the intellect is a thing, and truth its end. And among other ends this is the most excellent: as also is the intellect among the other powers.

*Reply Obj.* 2. What precedes in order of generation and time is less perfect: for in one and the same thing potentiality precedes act, and imperfection precedes perfection. But what precedes absolutely and in the order of nature is more perfect: for thus act precedes potentiality. And in this way the intellect precedes the will, as the motive power precedes the thing movable, and as the active precedes the passive; for good which is understood moves the will.

*Reply Obj.* 3. This reason is verified of the will as compared with what is above the soul. For charity is the virtue by which we love God.
FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WILL MOVES THE INTELLECT?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the will does not move the intellect. For what moves excels and precedes what is moved, because what moves is an agent, and the agent is nobler than the patient, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii. 16), and the Philosopher (De Anima iii. 5). But the intellect excels and precedes the will, as we have said above (A. 3). Therefore the will does not move the intellect.

Obj. 2. Further, what moves is not moved by what is moved, except perhaps accidentally. But the intellect moves the will, because the good apprehended by the intellect moves without being moved; whereas the appetite moves and is moved. Therefore the intellect is not moved by the will.

Obj. 3. Further, we can will nothing but what we understand. If, therefore, in order to understand, the will moves by willing to understand, that act of the will must be preceded by another act of the intellect, and this act of the intellect by another act of the will, and so on indefinitely, which is impossible. Therefore the will does not move the intellect.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fid. Orth. ii. 26): It is in our power to learn an art or not, as we list. But a thing is in our power by the will, and we learn art by the intellect. Therefore the will moves the intellect.

I answer that, A thing is said to move in two ways: First, as an end; for instance, when we say that the end moves the agent. In this way the intellect moves the will, because the good understood is the object of the will, and moves it as an end. Secondly, a thing is said to move as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what impels moves what is impelled. In this way the will moves the intellect, and all the powers of the soul, as Anselm says (Eadmer, De Similitudinibus). The reason is, because
wherever we have order among a number of active powers, that power which regards the universal end moves the powers which regard particular ends. And we may observe this both in nature and in things politic. For the heaven, which aims at the universal preservation of things subject to generation and corruption, moves all inferior bodies, each of which aims at the preservation of its own species or of the individual. The king also, who aims at the common good of the whole kingdom, by his rule moves all the governors of cities, each of whom rules over his own particular city. Now the object of the will is good and the end in general, and each power is directed to some suitable good proper to it, as sight is directed to the perception of colour, and the intellect to the knowledge of truth. Therefore the will as an agent moves all the powers of the soul to their respective acts, except the natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our will.

Reply Obj. 1. The intellect may be considered in two ways: as apprehensive of universal being and truth, and as a thing and a particular power having a determinate act. In like manner also the will may be considered in two ways: according to the common nature of its object—that is to say, as appetitive of universal good—and as a determinate power of the soul having a determinate act. If, therefore, the intellect and will be compared with one another according to the universality of their respective objects, then, as we have said above (A. 3), the intellect is simply higher and nobler than the will. If, however, we take the intellect as regards the common nature of its object and the will as a determinate power, then again the intellect is higher and nobler than the will, because under the notion of being and truth is contained both the will itself, and its act, and its object. Wherefore the intellect understands the will, and its act, and its object, just as it understands other species of things, as stone or wood, which are contained in the common notion of being and truth. But if we consider the will as regards the common nature of its object, which is good, and the intellect as a thing and a special power;
then the intellect itself, and its act, and its object, which is truth, each of which is some species of good, are contained under the common notion of good. And in this way the will is higher than the intellect, and can move it. From this we can easily understand why these powers include one another in their acts, because the intellect understands that the will wills, and the will wills the intellect to understand. In the same way good is contained in truth, inasmuch as it is an understood truth, and truth in good, inasmuch as it is a desired good.

Reply Obj. 2. The intellect moves the will in one sense, and the will moves the intellect in another, as we have said above.

Reply Obj. 3. There is no need to go on indefinitely, but we must stop at the intellect as preceding all the rest. For every movement of the will must be preceded by apprehension, whereas every apprehension is not preceded by an act of the will; but the principle of counselling and understanding is an intellectual principle higher than our intellect—namely, God—as also Aristotle says (Eth. Eudemic. vii. 14), and in this way he explains that there is no need to proceed indefinitely.

Fifth Article.

Whether we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the superior appetite?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that we ought to distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the superior appetite, which is the will. For the concupiscible power is so called from concupiscere (to desire), and the irascible part from irasci (to be angry). But there is a concupiscence which cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, but only to the intellectual, which is the will; as the concupiscence of wisdom, of which it is said (Wisd. vi. 21): The concupiscence of wisdom bringeth to the eternal kingdom. There is also a certain anger which cannot belong to the
sensitive appetite, but only to the intellectual; as when our anger is directed against vice. Wherefore Jerome commenting on Matt. xiii. 33 warns us to have the hatred of vice in the irascible part. Therefore we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the intellectual soul as well as in the sensitive.

Obj. 2. Further, as is commonly said, charity is in the concupiscible, and hope in the irascible part. But they cannot be in the sensitive appetite, because their objects are not sensible, but intellectual. Therefore we must assign an irascible and a concupiscible power to the intellectual part.

Obj. 3. Further, it is said (De Spiritu et Anima) that the soul has these powers—namely, the irascible, concupiscible, and rational—before it is united to the body. But no power of the sensitive part belongs to the soul alone, but to the soul and body united, as we have said above (Q. LXXVIII., AA. 5, 8). Therefore the irascible and concupiscible powers are in the will, which is the intellectual appetite.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) says that the irrational part of the soul is divided into the desiderative and irascible, and Damascene says the same (De Fid. Orth. ii. 12). And the Philosopher says (De Anima iii. 9) that the will is in the reason, while in the irrational part of the soul are concupiscence and anger, or desire and animus.

I answer that, The irascible and concupiscible are not parts of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. Because, as was said above (Q. LIX., A. 4; Q. LXXIX., A. 7), a power which is directed to an object according to some common notion is not differentiated by special differences which are contained under that common notion. For instance, because sight regards the visible thing under the common notion of something coloured, the visual power is not multiplied according to the different kinds of colour: but if there were a power regarding white as white, and not as something coloured, it would be distinct from a power regarding black as black.

Now the sensitive appetite does not consider the common
notion of good, because neither do the senses apprehend
the universal. And therefore the parts of the sensitive
appetite are differentiated by the different notions of par-
ticular good: for the concupiscible regards as proper to it
the notion of good, as something pleasant to the senses and
suitable to nature: whereas the irascible regards the notion
of good as something that wards off and repels what is
hurtful. But the will regards good according to the common
notion of good, and therefore in the will, which is the intel-
lectual appetite, there is no differentiation of appetitive
powers, so that there be in the intellectual appetite an
irascible power distinct from a concupiscible power: just
as neither on the part of the intellect are the apprehensive
powers multiplied, although they are on the part of the
senses.

Reply Obj. 1. Love, concupiscence, and the like can be
understood in two ways. Sometimes they are taken as
passions—arising, that is, with a certain commotion of the
soul. And thus they are commonly understood, and in this
sense they are only in the sensitive appetite. They may,
however, be taken in another way, as far as they are simple
affections without passion or commotion of the soul, and
thus they are acts of the will. And in this sense, too, they
are attributed to the angels and to God. But if taken in
this sense, they do not belong to different powers, but only
to one power, which is called the will.

Reply Obj. 2. The will itself may be said to be irascible,
as far as it wills to repel evil, not from any sudden move-
ment of a passion, but from a judgment of the reason.
And in the same way the will may be said to be con-
cupiscible on account of its desire for good. And thus in
the irascible and concupiscible are charity and hope—that
is, in the will as ordered to such acts. And in this way,
too, we may understand the words quoted (De Spiritu et
Anima); that the irascible and concupiscible powers are in
the soul before it is united to the body (as long as we un-
derstand priority of nature, and not of time), although there
is no need to have faith in what that book says. Whence
the answer to the third objection is clear.
QUESTION LXXXIII.

OF FREE-WILL.

(In Four Articles.)

We now inquire concerning free-will. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether man has free-will? (2) What is free-will—a power, an act, or a habit? (3) If it is a power, is it appetitive or cognitive? (4) If it is appetitive, is it the same power as the will, or distinct?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER MAN HAS FREE-WILL?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that man has not free-will. For whoever has free-will does what he wills. But man does not what he wills; for it is written (Rom. vii. 19): For the good which I will I do not, but the evil which I will not, that I do. Therefore man has not free-will.

Obj. 2. Further, whoever has free-will has in his power to will or not to will, to do or not to do. But this is not in man's power: for it is written (Rom. ix. 16): It is not of him that willeth—namely, to will—nor of him that runneth—namely, to run. Therefore man has not free-will.

Obj. 3. Further, what is free is cause of itself, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i. 2). Therefore what is moved by another is not free. But God moves the will, for it is written (Prov. xxi. 1): The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it; and (Phil. ii 13): It is God Who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish. Therefore man has not free-will.

Obj. 4. Further, whoever has free-will is master of his
own actions. But man is not master of his own actions: for it is written (Jer. x. 23): *The way of a man is not his: neither is it in a man to walk.* Therefore man has not free-will.

*Obj. 5.* Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii. 5): *According as each one is, such does the end seem to him.* But it is not in our power to be of one quality or another; for this comes to us from nature. Therefore it is natural to us to follow some particular end, and therefore we are not free in so doing.

*On the contrary,* It is written (Ecclus. xv. 14): *God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel; and the gloss adds: That is of his free-will.*

*I answer that,* Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards and punishments would be in vain. In order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act without judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, because it judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute animals. But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free-will.

*Reply Obj. 1.* As we have said above (Q. LXXXI., A. 3,
ad 2), the sensitive appetite, though it obeys the reason, yet in a given case can resist by desiring what the reason forbids. This is therefore the good which man does not when he wishes—namely, not to desire against reason, as Augustine says (ibid.).

*Reply Obj. 2.* Those words of the Apostle are not to be taken as though man does not wish or does not run of his free-will, but because the free-will is not sufficient thereto unless it be moved and helped by God.

*Reply Obj. 3.* Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates in each thing according to its own nature.

*Reply Obj. 4.* Man's way is said not to be his in the execution of his choice, wherein he may be impeded, whether he will or not. The choice itself, however, is in us, but presupposes the help of God.

*Reply Obj. 5.* Quality in man is of two kinds: natural and adventitious. Now the natural quality may be in the intellectual part, or in the body and its powers. From the very fact, therefore, that man is such by virtue of a natural quality which is in the intellectual part, he naturally desires his last end, which is happiness. Which desire, indeed, is a natural desire, and is not subject to free-will, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. LXXXII., AA. 1, 2). But on the part of the body and its powers man may be such by virtue of a natural quality, inasmuch as he is of such a temperament or disposition due to any impression whatever produced by corporeal causes, which cannot affect the intellectual part, since it is not the act of a
corporeal organ. And such as a man is by virtue of a corporeal quality, such also does his end seem to him, because from such a disposition a man is inclined to choose or reject something. But these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason, which the lower appetite obeys, as we have said (Q. LXXXI., A. 3). Wherefore this is in no way prejudicial to free-will.

The adventitious qualities are habits and passions, by virtue of which a man is inclined to one thing rather than to another. And yet even these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason. Such qualities, too, are subject to reason, as it is in our power either to acquire them, whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them, or to reject them. And so there is nothing in this that is repugnant to free-will.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER FREE-WILL IS A POWER?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:

Objection 1. It would seem that free-will is not a power. For free-will is nothing but a free judgment. But judgment denominates an act, not a power. Therefore free-will it not a power.

Obj. 2. Further, free-will is defined as the faculty of the will and reason. But faculty denominates a facility of power, which is due to a habit. Therefore free-will is a habit. Moreover Bernard says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. 1, 2) that free-will is the soul's habit of disposing of itself. Therefore it is not a power.

Obj. 3. Further, no natural power is forfeited through sin. But free-will is forfeited through sin; for Augustine says that man, by abusing free-will, loses both it and himself. Therefore free-will is not a power.

On the contrary, Nothing but a power, seemingly, is the subject of a habit. But free-will is the subject of grace, by the help of which it chooses what is good. Therefore free-will is a power.
I answer that, Although free-will* in its strict sense denotes an act, in the common manner of speaking we call free-will, that which is the principle of the act by which man judges freely. Now in us the principle of an act is both power and habit; for we say that we know something both by knowledge and by the intellectual power. Therefore free-will must be either a power or a habit, or a power with a habit. That it is neither a habit nor a power together with a habit, can be clearly proved in two ways. First of all, because, if it is a habit, it must be a natural habit; for it is natural to man to have a free-will. But there is no natural habit in us with respect to those things which come under free-will: for we are naturally inclined to those things of which we have natural habits—for instance, to assent to first principles: while those things to which we are naturally inclined are not subject to free-will, as we have said of the desire of happiness (Q. LXXXII., AA. 1, 2). Wherefore it is against the very notion of free-will that it should be a natural habit. And that it should be a non-natural habit is against its nature. Therefore in no sense is it a habit.

Secondly, this is clear because habits are defined as that by reason of which we are well or ill disposed with regard to actions and passions (Ethic. ii. 5); for by temperance we are well-disposed as regards concupiscences, and by in-temperance ill-disposed: and by knowledge we are well-disposed to the act of the intellect when we know the truth, and by the contrary habit ill-disposed. But the free-will is indifferent to good or evil choice: wherefore it is impossible for free-will to be a habit. Therefore it is a power.

Reply Obj. 1. It is not unusual for a power to be named from its act. And so from this act, which is a free judgment, is named the power which is the principle of this act. Otherwise, if free-will denominated an act, it would not always remain in man.

Reply Obj. 2. Faculty sometimes denominates a power ready for operation, and in this sense faculty is used in

* Liberum arbitrium—i.e., free judgment.
the definition of free-will. But Bernard takes habit, not as divided against power, but as signifying a certain aptitude by which a man has some sort of relation to an act. And this may be both by a power and by a habit: for by a power man is, as it were, empowered to do the action, and by the habit he is apt to act well or ill.

Reply Obj. 3. Man is said to have lost free-will by falling into sin, not as to natural liberty, which is freedom from coercion, but as regards freedom from fault and unhappiness. Of this we shall treat later in the treatise on Morals in the second part of this work (I.-II. Q. LXXXV. seqq.; Q. CIX.).

**Third Article.**

**Whether Free-will is an Appetitive Power?**

*We proceed thus to the Third Article:—*

*Objection 1.* It would seem that free-will is not an appetitive, but a cognitive power. For Damascene (De Fid. Orth. ii. 27) says that free-will straightway accompanies the rational nature. But reason is a cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.

*Obj. 2.* Further, free-will is so called as though it were a free judgment. But to judge is an act of a cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.

*Obj. 3.* Further, the principal function of the free-will is to choose. But choice seems to belong to knowledge, because it implies a certain comparison of one thing to another, which belongs to the cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.

*On the contrary,* The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii. 3) that choice is the desire of those things which are in us. But desire is an act of the appetitive power: therefore choice is also. But free-will is that by which we choose. Therefore free-will is an appetitive power.

*I answer that,* The proper act of free-will is choice: for we say that we have a free-will because we can take one thing while refusing another; and this is to choose. There-
For we must consider the nature of free-will, by considering the nature of choice. Now two things concur in choice: one on the part of the cognitive power, the other on the part of the appetitive power. On the part of the cognitive power, counsel is required, by which we judge one thing to be preferred to another: and on the part of the appetitive power, it is required that the appetite should accept the judgment of counsel. Therefore Aristotle (Ethic. vi. 2) leaves it in doubt whether choice belongs principally to the appetitive or the cognitive power: since he says that choice is either an appetitive intellect or an intellectual appetite. But (Ethic. iii., loc. cit.) he inclines to its being an intellectual appetite when he describes choice as a desire proceeding from counsel. And the reason of this is because the proper object of choice is the means to the end: and this, as such, is in the nature of that good which is called useful: wherefore since good, as such, is the object of the appetite, it follows that choice is principally an act of the appetitive power. And thus free-will is an appetitive power.

Reply Obj. 1. The appetitive powers accompany the apprehensive, and in this sense Damascene says that free-will straightway accompanies the rational power.

Reply Obj. 2. Judgment, as it were, concludes and terminates counsel. Now counsel is terminated, first, by the judgment of reason; secondly, by the acceptance of the appetite: whence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii., ibid.) says that, having formed a judgment by counsel, we desire in accordance with that counsel. And in this sense choice itself is a judgment from which free-will takes its name.

Reply Obj. 3. This comparison which is implied in the choice belongs to the preceding counsel, which is an act of reason. For though the appetite does not make comparisons, yet forasmuch as it is moved by the apprehensive power which does compare, it has some likeness of comparison by choosing one in preference to another.
Fourth Article.

Whether free-will is a power distinct from the will?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that free-will is a power distinct from the will. For Damascene says (De Fid. Orth. ii. 22) that Θέλησις is one thing and βουλήσις another. But Θέλησις is the will, while βουλήσις seems to be the free-will, because βουλήσις, according to him, is the will as concerning an object by way of comparison between two things. Therefore it seems that free-will is a distinct power from the will.

Obj. 2. Further, powers are known by their acts. But choice, which is the act of free-will, is distinct from the act of willing, because the act of the will regards the end, whereas choice regards the means to the end (Ethic. iii. 2). Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will.

Obj. 3. Further, the will is the intellectual appetite. But in the intellect there are two powers—the active and the passive. Therefore, also on the part of the intellectual appetite, there must be another power besides the will. And this, seemingly, can only be free-will. Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fid. Orth. iii. 14) free-will is nothing else than the will.

I answer that, The appetitive powers must be proportionate to the apprehensive powers, as we have said above (Q. LXIV., A. 2). Now, as on the part of the intellectual apprehension we have intellect and reason, so on the part of the intellectual appetite we have will, and free-will which is nothing else but the power of choice. And this is clear from their relations to their respective objects and acts. For the act of understanding implies the simple acceptation of something; whence we say that we understand first principles, which are known of themselves without any comparison. But to reason, properly speaking, is to
come from one thing to the knowledge of another: wherefore, properly speaking, we reason about conclusions, which are known from the principles. In like manner on the part of the appetite to will implies the simple appetite for something: wherefore the will is said to regard the end, which is desired for itself. But to choose is to desire something for the sake of obtaining something else: wherefore, properly speaking, it regards the means to the end. Now, in matters of knowledge, the principles are related to the conclusion to which we assent on account of the principles: just as, in appetitive matters, the end is related to the means, which is desired on account of the end. Wherefore it is evident that as the intellect is to reason, so is the will to the power of choice, which is free-will. But it has been shown above (Q. LXXIX., A. 8) that it belongs to the same power both to understand and to reason, even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and to be in movement. Wherefore it belongs also to the same power to will and to choose: and on this account the will and the free-will are not two powers, but one.

Reply Obj. 1. βουλήσεως is distinct from Θλήσεως on account of a distinction, not of powers, but of acts.

Reply Obj. 2. Choice and will—that is, the act of willing—are different acts: yet they belong to the same power, as also to understand and to reason, as we have said.

Reply Obj. 3. The intellect is compared to the will as moving the will. And therefore there is no need to distinguish in the will an active and a passive will.
QUESTION LXXXIV.

HOW THE SOUL WHILE UNITED TO THE BODY UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL THINGS BENEATH IT.

(In Eight Articles.)

We now have to consider the acts of the soul in regard to the intellectual and the appetitive powers: for the other powers of the soul do not come directly under the consideration of the theologian. Furthermore, the acts of the appetitive part of the soul come under the consideration of the science of morals; wherefore we shall treat of them in the second part of this work, to which the consideration of moral matters belongs. But of the acts of the intellectual part we shall treat now.

In treating of these acts we shall proceed in the following order: First, we shall inquire how the soul understands when united to the body; secondly, how it understands when separated therefrom.

The former of these inquiries will be threefold: (1) How the soul understands bodies which are beneath it. (2) How it understands itself and things contained in itself. (3) How it understands immaterial substances, which are above it.

In treating of the knowledge of corporeal things there are three points to be considered: (1) Through what does the soul know them? (2) How and in what order does it know them? (3) What does it know in them?

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect? (2) Whether it understands them through its essence, or through any species? (3) If through some species, whether the species of all things intelligible are naturally innate in the soul? (4) Whether these species are derived by the
soul from certain separate immaterial forms? (5) Whether our soul sees in the eternal ideas all that it understands? (6) Whether it acquires intellectual knowledge from the senses? (7) Whether the intellect can, through the species of which it is possessed, actually understand, without turning to the phantasms? (8) Whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered by an obstacle in the sensitive powers?

First Article.

Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the soul does not know bodies through the intellect. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii. 4) that bodies cannot be understood by the intellect: nor indeed anything corporeal unless it can be perceived by the senses. He says also (Gen. ad lit. xii. 24) that intellectual vision is of those things that are in the soul by their essence. But such are not bodies. Therefore the soul cannot know bodies through the intellect.

Obj. 2. Further, as sense is to the intelligible, so is the intellect to the sensible. But the soul can by no means, through the senses, understand spiritual things, which are intelligible. Therefore by no means can it, through the intellect, know bodies, which are sensible.

Obj. 3. Further, the intellect is concerned with things that are necessary and unchangeable. But all bodies are mobile and changeable. Therefore the soul cannot know bodies through the intellect.

On the contrary, Science is in the intellect. If, therefore, the intellect does not know bodies, it follows that there is no science of bodies; and thus perishes natural science, which treats of mobile bodies.

I answer, In order to elucidate this question, that the early philosophers, who inquired into the natures of things, thought there was nothing in the world save bodies. And
because they observed that all bodies are mobile, and considered them to be ever in a state of flux, they were of opinion that we can have no certain knowledge of the true nature of things. For what is in a continual state of flux, cannot be grasped with any degree of certitude, for it passes away ere the mind can form a judgment thereon: according to the saying of Heraclitus, that it is not possible twice to touch a drop of water in a passing torrent, as the Philosopher relates (Metaph. iv., Did. iii. 5).

After these came Plato, who, wishing to save the certitude of our knowledge of truth through the intellect, maintained that, besides these things corporeal, there is another genus of beings, separate from matter and movement, which beings he called species or ideas, by participation of which each one of these singular and sensible things is said to be either a man, or a horse, or the like. Wherefore he said that sciences and definitions, and whatever appertains to the act of the intellect, are not referred to these sensible bodies, but to those beings immaterial and separate: so that according to this the soul does not understand these corporeal things, but the separate species thereof.

Now this may be shown to be false for two reasons. First, because, since those species are immaterial and immovable, knowledge of movement and matter would be excluded from science (which knowledge is proper to natural science), and likewise all demonstration through moving and material causes. Secondly, because it seems ridiculous, when we seek for knowledge of things which are to us manifest, to introduce other beings, which cannot be the substance of those others, since they differ from them essentially: so that granted that we have a knowledge of those separate substances, we cannot for that reason claim to form a judgment concerning these sensible things.

Now it seems that Plato strayed from the truth because, having observed that all knowledge takes place through some kind of similitude, he thought that the form of the thing known must of necessity be in the knower in the same manner as in the thing known. Then he observed
that the form of the thing understood is in the intellect under conditions of universality, immateriality, and immobility: which is apparent from the very operation of the intellect, whose act of understanding has a universal extension, and is subject to a certain amount of necessity: for the mode of action corresponds to the mode of the agent's form. Wherefore he concluded that the things which we understand must have in themselves an existence under the same conditions of immateriality and immobility.

But there is no necessity for this. For even in sensible things it is to be observed that the form is otherwise in one sensible than in another: for instance, whiteness may be of great intensity in one, and of a less intensity in another: in one we find whiteness with sweetness, in another without sweetness. In the same way the sensible form is conditioned differently in the thing which is external to the soul, and in the senses which receive the forms of sensible things without receiving matter, such as the colour of gold without receiving gold. So also the intellect, according to its own mode, receives under conditions of immateriality and immobility, the species of material and mobile bodies: for the received is in the receiver according to the mode of the receiver. We must conclude, therefore, that through the intellect the soul knows bodies by a knowledge which is immaterial, universal, and necessary.

Reply Obj. 1. These words of Augustine are to be understood as referring to the medium of intellectual knowledge, and not to its object. For the intellect knows bodies by understanding them, not indeed through bodies, nor through material and corporeal species; but through immaterial and intelligible species, which can be in the soul by their own essence.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii. 29), it is not correct to say that as the sense knows only bodies so the intellect knows only spiritual things; for it follows that God and the angels would not know corporeal things. The reason of this diversity is that the lower power does not extend to those things that belong to the higher power;
whereas the higher power operates in a more excellent manner those things which belong to the lower power.

Reply Obj. 3. Every movement presupposes something immovable: for when a change of quality occurs, the substance remains unmoved; and when there is a change of substantial form, matter remains unmoved. Moreover the various conditions of mutable things are themselves immovable; for instance, though Socrates be not always sitting, yet it is an immovable truth that whenever he does sit he remains in one place. For this reason there is nothing to hinder our having an immovable science of movable things.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SOUL UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL THINGS THROUGH ITS ESSENCE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the soul understands corporeal things through its essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. x. 5) that the soul collects and lays hold of the images of bodies which are formed in the soul and of the soul: for in forming them it gives them something of its own substance. But the soul understands bodies by images of bodies. Therefore the soul knows bodies through its essence, which it employs for the formation of such images, and from which it forms them.

Obj. 2. Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii. 8) that the soul, after a fashion, is everything. Since, therefore, like is known by like, it seems that the soul knows corporeal things through itself.

Obj. 3. Further, the soul is superior to corporeal creatures. Now lower things are in higher things in a more eminent way than in themselves, as Dionysius says (Cæl. Hier. xii.). Therefore all corporeal creatures exist in a more excellent way in the soul than in themselves. Therefore the soul can know corporeal creatures through its essence.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. ix. 3) that
the mind gathers knowledge of corporeal things through the bodily senses. But the soul itself cannot be known through the bodily senses. Therefore it does not know corporeal things through itself.

1 answer that, The ancient philosophers held that the soul knows bodies through its essence. For it was universally admitted that like is known by like. But they thought that the form of the thing known is in the knower in the same mode as in the thing known. The Platonists however were of a contrary opinion. For Plato, having observed that the intellectual soul has an immaterial nature, and an immaterial mode of knowledge, held that the forms of things known subsist immaterially. While the earlier natural philosophers, observing that things known are corporeal and material, held that things known must exist materially even in the soul that knows them. And therefore, in order to ascribe to the soul a knowledge of all things, they held that it has the same nature in common with all. And because the nature of a result is determined by its principles, they ascribed to the soul the nature of a principle; so that those who thought fire to be the principle of all, held that the soul had the nature of fire; and in like manner as to air and water. Lastly, Empedocles, who held the existence of four material elements and two principles of movement, said that the soul was composed of these. Consequently, since they held that things exist in the soul materially, they maintained that all the soul's knowledge is material, thus failing to discern intellect from sense.

But this opinion will not hold. First, because in the material principle of which they spoke, the various results do not exist save in potentiality. But a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality, but only according as it is in act, as is shown Metaph. ix. (Did. viii. 9): whereas neither is a power known except through its act. It is therefore insufficient to ascribe to the soul the nature of the principles in order to explain the fact that it knows all, unless we further admit in the soul the natures and forms of each individual result, for instance, of bone, flesh, and
the like; thus does Aristotle argue against Empedocles (De Anima i. 5). Secondly, because if it were necessary for the thing known to exist materially in the knower, there would be no reason why things which have a material existence outside the soul should be devoid of knowledge; why, for instance, if by fire the soul knows fire, that fire also which is outside the soul should not have knowledge of fire.

We must conclude, therefore, that material things known must needs exist in the knower, not materially, but immaterially. The reason of this is, because the act of knowledge extends to things outside the knower: for we know things even that are external to us. Now by matter the form of a thing is determined to some one thing. Wherefore it is clear that knowledge is in inverse ratio to materiality. And consequently things that are not receptive of forms save materially, have no power of knowledge whatever—such as plants, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii. 12). But the more immaterially a thing receives the form of the thing known, the more perfect is its knowledge. Therefore the intellect which abstracts the species not only from matter, but also from the individuating conditions of matter, has more perfect knowledge than the senses, which receive the form of the thing known, without matter indeed, but subject to material conditions. Moreover, among the senses, sight has the most perfect knowledge, because it is the least material, as we have remarked above (Q. LXXVIII., A. 3): while among intellects the more perfect is the more immaterial.

It is therefore clear from the foregoing, that if there be an intellect which knows all things by its essence, then its essence must needs have all things in itself immaterially; thus the early philosophers held that the essence of the soul, that it may know all things, must be actually composed of the principles of all material things. Now this is proper to God, that His Essence comprise all things immaterially, as effects pre-exist virtually in their cause. God alone, therefore, understands all things through His Essence: but neither the human soul nor the angels can do so.
Reply Obj. 1. Augustine in that passage is speaking of an imaginary vision, which takes place through the image of bodies. To the formation of such images the soul gives part of its substance, just as a subject is given in order to be informed by some form. In this way the soul makes such images from itself; not that the soul or some part of the soul be turned into this or that image; but just as we say that a body is made into something coloured because of its being informed with colour. That this is the sense, is clear from what follows. For he says that the soul keeps something—namely, not informed with such image—which is able freely to judge of the species of these images: and that this is the mind or intellect. And he says that the part which is informed with these images—namely, the imagination—is common to us and beasts.

Reply Obj. 2. Aristotle did not hold that the soul is actually composed of all things, as did the earlier philosophers; he said that the soul is all things, after a fashion, forasmuch as it is in potentiality to all—through the senses, to all things sensible—through the intellect, to all things intelligible.

Reply Obj. 3. Every creature has a finite and determinate essence. Wherefore although the essence of the higher creature has a certain likeness to the lower creature, forasmuch as they have something in common generically, yet it has not a complete likeness thereof, because it is determined to a certain species other than the species of the lower creature. But the Divine Essence is a perfect likeness of all, whatsoever may be found to exist in things created, being the universal principle of all.
THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SOUL UNDERSTANDS ALL THINGS THROUGH INNATE SPECIES?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the soul understands all things through innate species. For Gregory says, in a homily for the Ascension (xxix. in Ev.), that man has understanding in common with the angels. But angels understand all things through innate species: wherefore in the book De Causis it is said that every intelligence is full of forms. Therefore the soul also has innate species of things, by means of which it understands corporeal things.

Obj. 2. Further, the intellectual soul is more excellent than corporeal primary matter. But primary matter was created by God under the forms to which it has potentiality. Therefore much more is the intellectual soul created by God under intelligible species. And so the soul understands corporeal things through innate species.

Obj. 3. Further, no one can answer the truth except concerning what he knows. But even a person untaught and devoid of acquired knowledge, answers the truth to every question if put to him in orderly fashion, as we find related in the Meno (xv. seqq.) of Plato, concerning a certain individual. Therefore we have some knowledge of things even before we acquire knowledge; which would not be the case unless we had innate species. Therefore the soul understands corporeal things through innate species.

On the contrary, The Philosopher, speaking of the intellect, says (De Anima iii. 4) that it is like a tablet on which nothing is written.

I answer that, Since form is the principle of action, a thing must be related to the form which is the principle of an action, as it is to that action: for instance, if upward motion is from lightness, then that which only potentially moves upwards must needs be only potentially light, but
that which actually moves upwards must needs be actually light. Now we observe that man sometimes is only a potential knower, both as to sense and as to intellect. And he is reduced from such potentiality to act;—through the action of sensible objects on his senses, to the act of sensation;—by instruction or discovery, to the act of understanding. Wherefore we must say that the cognitive soul is in potentiality both to the images which are the principles of sensing, and to those which are the principles of understanding. For this reason Aristotle (ibid.) held that the intellect by which the soul understands has no innate species, but is at first in potentiality to all such species.

But since that which has a form actually, is sometimes unable to act according to that form on account of some hindrance, as a light thing may be hindered from moving upwards; for this reason did Plato hold that naturally man’s intellect is filled with all intelligible species, but that, by being united to the body, it is hindered from the realization of its act. But this seems to be unreasonable. First, because, if the soul has a natural knowledge of all things, it seems impossible for the soul so far to forget the existence of such knowledge as not to know itself to be possessed thereof: for no man forgets what he knows naturally; that, for instance, the whole is larger than the part, and suchlike. And especially unreasonable does this seem if we suppose that it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, as we have established above (Q. LXXVI., A. i): for it is unreasonable that the natural operation of a thing be totally hindered by that which belongs to it naturally. Secondly, the falseness of this opinion is clearly proved from the fact that if a sense be wanting, the knowledge of what is apprehended through that sense is wanting also: for instance, a man who is born blind can have no knowledge of colours. This would not be the case if the soul had innate images of all intelligible things. We must therefore conclude that the soul does not know corporeal things through innate species.

Reply Obj. 1. Man indeed has intelligence in common
with the angels, but not in the same degree of perfection: just as the lower grades of bodies, which merely exist, according to Gregory (loc. cit.), have not the same degree of perfection as the higher bodies. For the matter of the lower bodies is not totally completed by its form, but is in potentiality to forms which it has not: whereas the matter of heavenly bodies is totally completed by its form, so that it is not in potentiality to any other form, as we have said above (Q. LXVI., A. 2). In the same way the angelic intellect is perfected by intelligible species, in accordance with its nature; whereas the human intellect is in potentiality to such species.

Reply Obj. 2. Primary matter has substantial being through its form, consequently it had need to be created under some form: else it would not be in act. But when once it exists under one form it is in potentiality to others. On the other hand, the intellect does not receive substantial being through the intelligible species; and therefore there is no comparison.

Reply Obj. 3. If questions be put in an orderly fashion they proceed from universal self-evident principles to what is particular. Now by such a process knowledge is produced in the mind of the learner. Wherefore when he answers the truth to a subsequent question, this is not because he had knowledge previously, but because he thus learns for the first time. For it matters not whether the teacher proceed from universal principles to conclusions by questioning or by asserting; for in either case the mind of the listener is assured of what follows by that which preceded.

Fourth Article.

Whether the intelligible species are derived by the soul from certain separate forms?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the intelligible species are derived by the soul from some separate forms. For whatever is such by participation is caused by what is such
essentially; for instance, that which is on fire is reduced to fire as the cause thereof. But the intellectual soul forasmuch as it is actually understanding, participates the thing understood: for, in a way, the intellect in act is the thing understood in act. Therefore what in itself and in its essence is understood in act, is the cause that the intellectual soul actually understands. Now that which in its essence is actually understood is a form existing without matter. Therefore the intelligible species, by which the soul understands, are caused by some separate forms.

Obj. 2. Further, the intelligible is to the intellect, as the sensible is to the sense. But the sensible species which are in the senses, and by which we sense, are caused by the sensible object which exists actually outside the soul. Therefore the intelligible species, by which our intellect understands, are caused by some things actually intelligible, existing outside the soul. But these can be nothing else than forms separate from matter. Therefore the intelligible forms of our intellect are derived from some separate substances.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever is in potentiality is reduced to act by something actual. If, therefore, our intellect, previously in potentiality, afterwards actually understands, this must needs be caused by some intellect which is always in act. But this is a separate intellect. Therefore the intelligible species, by which we actually understand, are caused by some separate substances.

On the contrary, If this were true we should not need the senses in order to understand. And this is proved to be false especially from the fact that if a man be wanting in a sense, he cannot have any knowledge of the sensibles corresponding to that sense.

I answer that, Some have held that the intelligible species of our intellect are derived from certain separate forms or substances. And this in two ways. For Plato, as we have said (A. 1), held that the forms of sensible things subsist by themselves without matter; for instance, the form of a man which he called per se man, and the form or idea
of a horse which he called per se horse, and so forth. He said therefore that these forms are participated both by our soul and by corporeal matter; by our soul, to the effect of knowledge thereof, and by corporeal matter to the effect of existence: so that, just as corporeal matter by participating the idea of a stone, becomes an individual stone, so our intellect, by participating the idea of a stone, is made to understand a stone. Now participation of an idea takes place by some image of the idea in the participator, just as a model is participated by a copy. So just as he held that the sensible forms, which are in corporeal matter, are derived from the ideas as certain images thereof: so he held that the intelligible species of our intellect are images of the ideas, derived therefrom. And for this reason, as we have said above (A. 1), he referred sciences and definitions to those ideas.

But since it is contrary to the nature of sensible things that their forms should subsist without matter, as Aristotle proves in many ways (Metaph. vi.), Avicenna (De Anima v.) setting this opinion aside, held that the intelligible species of all sensible things, instead of subsisting in themselves without matter, pre-exist immaterially in the separate intellects: from the first of which, said he, such species are derived by a second, and so on to the last separate intellect which he called the active intelligence, from which, according to him, intelligible species flow into our souls, and sensible species into corporeal matter. And so Avicenna agrees with Plato in this, that the intelligible species of our intellect are derived from certain separate forms; but these Plato held to subsist of themselves, while Avicenna placed them in the active intelligence. They differ, too, in this respect, that Avicenna held that the intelligible species do not remain in our intellect after it has ceased actually to understand, and that it needs to turn (to the active intellect) in order to receive them anew. Consequently he does not hold that the soul has innate knowledge, as Plato, who held that the participated ideas remain immovably in the soul,
But in this opinion no sufficient reason can be assigned for the soul being united to the body. For it cannot be said that the intellectual soul is united to the body for the sake of the body: for neither is form for the sake of matter, nor is the mover for the sake of the moved, but rather the reverse. Especially does the body seem necessary to the intellectual soul, for the latter’s proper operation which is to understand: since as to its being the soul does not depend on the body. But if the soul by its very nature had an inborn aptitude for receiving intelligible species through the influence of only certain separate principles, and were not to receive them from the senses, it would not need the body in order to understand: wherefore to no purpose would it be united to the body.

But if it be said that our soul needs the senses in order to understand, through being in some way awakened by them to the consideration of those things, the intelligible species of which it receives from the separate principles: even this seems an insufficient explanation. For this awakening does not seem necessary to the soul, except in as far as it is overcome by sluggishness, as the Platonists expressed it, and by forgetfulness, through its union with the body: and thus the senses would be of no use to the intellectual soul except for the purpose of removing the obstacle which the soul encounters through its union with the body. Consequently the reason of the union of the soul with the body still remains to be sought.

And if it be said with Avicenna, that the senses are necessary to the soul, because by them it is roused to turn to the active intelligence from which it receives the species: neither is this a sufficient explanation. Because if it is natural for the soul to understand through species derived from the active intelligence, it follows that at times the soul of an individual wanting in one of the senses can turn to the active intelligence, either from the inclination of its very nature, or through being roused by another sense, to the effect of receiving the intelligible species of which the corresponding sensible species are wanting. And thus a
man born blind could have knowledge of colours; which is clearly untrue. We must therefore conclude that the intelligible species, by which our soul understands, are not derived from separate forms.

Reply Obj. 1. The intelligible species which are participated by our intellect are reduced, as to their first cause, to a first principle which is by its essence intelligible—namely, God. But they proceed from that principle by means of the sensible forms and material things, from which we gather knowledge, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii.).

Reply Obj. 2. Material things, as to the being which they have outside the soul, may be actually sensible, but not actually intelligible. Wherefore there is no comparison between sense and intellect.

Reply Obj. 3. Our passive intellect is reduced from potentiality to act by some being in act, that is, by the active intellect, which is a power of the soul as we have said (Q. LXXIX., A. 4); and not by a separate intelligence, as proximate cause, although perchance as remote cause.

FIFTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS MATERIAL THINGS IN THE ETERNAL TYPES?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the intellectual soul does not know material things in the eternal types. For that in which anything is known must itself be known more and previously. But the intellectual soul of man, in the present state of life, does not know the eternal types: for it does not know God in Whom the eternal types exist, but is united to God as to the unknown, as Dionysius says (Myst. Theolog. i.). Therefore the soul does not know all in the eternal types.

Obj. 2. Further, it is written (Rom. i. 20) that the invisible things of God are clearly seen . . . by the things
that are made. But among the invisible things of God are the eternal types. Therefore the eternal types are known through creatures and not the converse.

Obj. 3. Further, the eternal types are nothing else but ideas, for Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIII., qu. 46) that ideas are permanent types existing in the Divine mind. If therefore we say that the intellectual soul knows all things in the eternal types, we come back to the opinion of Plato who said that all knowledge is derived from them.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. xii. 25): If we both see that what you say is true, and if we both see that what I say is true, where do we see this, I pray? Neither do I see it in you, nor do you see it in me: but we both see it in the unchangeable truth which is above our minds. Now the unchangeable truth is contained in the eternal types. Therefore the intellectual soul knows all true things in the eternal types.

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii. 11): If those who are called philosophers said by chance anything that was true and consistent with our faith, we must claim it from them as from unjust possessors. For some of the doctrines of the heathens are spurious imitations or superstitious inventions, which we must be careful to avoid when we renounce the society of the heathens. Consequently whenever Augustine, who was imbued with the doctrines of the Platonists, found in their teaching anything consistent with faith, he adopted it: and those things which he found contrary to faith he amended. Now Plato held, as we have said above (A. 4), that the forms of things subsist of themselves apart from matter; and these he called ideas, by participation of which he said that our intellect knows all things: so that just as corporeal matter by participating the idea of a stone becomes a stone, so our intellect, by participating the same idea, has knowledge of a stone. But since it seems contrary to faith that forms of things should subsist of themselves outside the things themselves and apart from matter, as the Platonists held, asserting that per se life or per se wisdom are creative
substances, as Dionysius relates (Div. Nom. xi.); therefore Augustine (QQ. LXXXIII., loc. cit.), for the ideas defended by Plato, substituted the types of all creatures existing in the Divine mind, according to which types all things are made in themselves, and are known to the human soul.

When, therefore, the question is asked: Does the human soul know all things in the eternal types? we must reply that one thing is said to be known in another in two ways. First, as in an object itself known; as one may see in a mirror the images of things reflected therein. In this way the soul, in the present state of life, cannot see all things in the eternal types, for they see God, and all things in Him. Secondly, one thing is said to be known in another as in a principle of knowledge: thus we might say that we see in the sun what we see by the sun. And thus we must needs say that the human soul knows all things in the eternal types, since by participation of these types we know all things. For the intellectual light itself which is in us, is nothing else than a participated likeness of the uncreated light, in which are contained the eternal types. Whence it is written (Ps. iv. 6, 7), Many say; who showeth us good things? which question the Psalmist answers, The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us, as though he were to say: By the seal of the Divine light in us, all things are made known to us.

But since besides the intellectual light which is in us, intelligible species, which are derived from things, are required in order for us to have knowledge of material things; therefore this same knowledge is not due merely to a participation of the eternal types, as the Platonists held, maintaining that the mere participation of ideas sufficed for knowledge. Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin. iv. 16): Although the philosophers prove by convincing arguments that all things occur in time according to the eternal types, were they able to see in the eternal types, or to find out from them how many kinds of animals there are and the origin of each? Did they not seek for this information from the story of times and places?
But that Augustine did not understand all things to be known in their eternal types or in the unchangeable truth, as though the eternal types themselves were seen, is clear from what he says (QQ. LXXXIII., loc. cit.)—viz., that not each and every rational soul can be said to be worthy of that vision, namely, of the eternal types, but only those that are holy and pure, such as the souls of the blessed.

From what has been said the objections are easily solved.

Sixth Article.

Whether intellectual knowledge is derived from sensible things?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things. For Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIII., qu. 9) that we cannot expect to learn the fulness of truth from the senses of the body. This he proves in two ways. First, because, whatever the bodily senses reach, is continually being changed; and what is never the same cannot be perceived. Secondly, because, whatever we perceive by the body, even when not present to the senses, may be present to the imagination, as when we are asleep or angry: yet we cannot discern by the senses, whether what we perceive be the sensible object, or the deceptive image thereof. Now nothing can be perceived which cannot be distinguished from its counterfeit. And so he concludes that we cannot expect to learn the truth from the senses. But intellectual knowledge apprehends the truth. Therefore intellectual knowledge cannot be conveyed by the senses.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii. 16): We must not think that the body can make any impression on the spirit, as though the spirit were to supply the place of matter in regard to the body's action; for that which acts is in every way more excellent than that which it acts on. Whence he concludes that the body does not cause its
image in the spirit, but the spirit causes it in itself. Therefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things.

Obj. 3. Further, an effect does not surpass the power of its cause. But intellectual knowledge extends beyond sensible things: for we understand some things which cannot be perceived by the senses. Therefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Metaph. i. 1; Poster. ii. 15) that the principle of knowledge is in the senses.

I answer that, On this point the philosophers held three opinions. For Democritus held that all knowledge is caused by images issuing from the bodies we think of and entering into our souls, as Augustine says in his letter to Dioscorus (cxviii. 4). And Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.) that Democritus held that knowledge is caused by a discharge of images. And the reason for this opinion was that both Democritus and the other early philosophers did not distinguish between intellect and sense, as Aristotle relates (De Anima iii. 3). Consequently, since the sense is affected by the sensible, they thought that all our knowledge is affected by this mere impression brought about by sensible things. Which impression Democritus held to be caused by a discharge of images.

Plato, on the other hand, held that the intellect is distinct from the senses: and that it is an immaterial power not making use of a corporeal organ for its action. And since the incorporeal cannot be affected by the corporeal, he held that intellectual knowledge is not brought about by sensible things affecting the intellect, but by separate intelligible forms being participated by the intellect, as we have said above (AA. 4, 5). Moreover he held that sense is a power operating of itself. Consequently neither is sense, since it is a spiritual power, affected by the sensible: but the sensible organs are affected by the sensible, the result being that the soul is in a way roused to form within itself the species of the sensible. Augustine seems to touch on this opinion (Gen. ad lit. xii. 24) where he says that the
body feels not, but the soul through the body, which it makes use of as a kind of messenger, for reproducing within itself what is announced from without. Thus according to Plato, neither does intellectual knowledge proceed from sensible knowledge, nor sensible knowledge exclusively from sensible things; but these rouse the sensible soul to the sentient act, while the senses rouse the intellect to the act of understanding.

Aristotle chose a middle course. For with Plato he agreed that intellect and sense are different. But he held that the sense has not its proper operation without the co-operation of the body; so that to feel is not an act of the soul alone, but of the composite. And he held the same in regard to all the operations of the sensitive part. Since, therefore, it is not unreasonable that the sensible objects which are outside the soul should produce some effect in the composite, Aristotle agreed with Democritus in this, that the operations of the sensitive part are caused by the impression of the sensible on the sense: not by a discharge, as Democritus said, but by some kind of operation. For Democritus maintained that every operation is by way of a discharge of atoms, as we gather from De Gener. i. 8. But Aristotle held that the intellect has an operation which is independent of the body's co-operation. Now nothing corporeal can make an impression on the incorporeal. And therefore in order to cause the intellectual operation, according to Aristotle, the impression caused by the sensible does not suffice, but something more noble is required, for the agent is more noble than the patient, as he says (ibid. 5). Not, indeed, in the sense that the intellectual operation is effected in us by the mere impression of some superior beings, as Plato held; but that the higher and more noble agent which he calls the active intellect, of which we have spoken above (Q. LXXIX., AA. 3, 4), causes the phantasms received from the senses to be actually intelligible, by a process of abstraction.

According to this opinion, then, on the part of the phantasms, intellectual knowledge is caused by the senses. But since the phantasms cannot of themselves affect the
passive intellect, and require to be made actually intelligible by the active intellect, it cannot be said that sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge, but rather that it is in a way the material cause.

Reply Obj. 1. Those words of Augustine mean that we must not expect the entire truth from the senses. For the light of the active intellect is needed, through which we achieve the unchangeable truth of changeable things, and discern things themselves from their likeness.

Reply Obj. 2. In this passage Augustine speaks not of intellectual but of imaginary knowledge. And since, according to the opinion of Plato, the imagination has an operation which belongs to the soul only, Augustine, in order to show that corporeal images are impressed on the imagination, not by bodies but by the soul, uses the same argument as Aristotle does in proving that the active intellect must be separate, namely, because the agent is more noble than the patient. And without doubt, according to the above opinion, in the imagination there must needs be not only a passive but also an active power. But if we hold, according to the opinion of Aristotle, that the action of the imagination is an action of the composite, there is no difficulty; because the sensible body is more noble than the organ of the animal, in so far as it is compared to it as a being in act to a being in potentiality; even as the object actually coloured is compared to the pupil which is potentially coloured. It may, however, be said, although the first impression of the imagination is through the agency of the sensible, since fancy is movement produced in accordance with sensation (De Anima iii. 3), that nevertheless there is in man an operation which by synthesis and analysis forms images of various things, even of things not perceived by the senses. And Augustine's words may be taken in this sense.

Reply Obj. 3. Sensitive knowledge is not the entire cause of intellectual knowledge. And therefore it is not strange that intellectual knowledge should extend further than sensitive knowledge.
Seventh Article.

Whether the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible species of which it is possessed, without turning to the phantasms?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible species of which it is possessed, without turning to the phantasms. For the intellect is made actual by the intelligible species by which it is informed. But if the intellect is in act, it understands. Therefore the intelligible species suffices for the intellect to understand actually, without turning to the phantasms.

Obj. 2. Further, the imagination is more dependent on the senses than the intellect on the imagination. But the imagination can actually imagine in the absence of the sensible. Therefore much more can the intellect understand without turning to the phantasms.

Obj. 3. There are no phantasms of incorporeal things: for the imagination does not transcend time and space. If, therefore, our intellect cannot understand anything actually without turning to the phantasms, it follows that it cannot understand anything incorporeal. Which is clearly false: for we understand truth, and God, and the angels.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii. 7) that the soul understands nothing without a phantasm.

I answer that, In the present state of life in which the soul is united to a possible body, it is impossible for our intellect to understand anything actually, except by turning to the phantasms. And of this there are two indications. First of all because the intellect, being a power that does not make use of a corporeal organ, would in no way be hindered in its act through the lesion of a corporeal organ, if for its act there were not required the act of some power that does make use of a corporeal organ. Now sense, imagination and the other powers belonging to the sensitive part, make use of a corporeal organ. Wherefore it is
clear that for the intellect to understand actually, not only when it acquires fresh knowledge, but also when it applies knowledge already acquired, there is need for the act of the imagination and of the other powers. For when the act of the imagination is hindered by a lesion of the corporeal organ, for instance, in a case of frenzy; or when the act of the memory is hindered, as in the case of lethargy, we see that a man is hindered from actually understanding things of which he had a previous knowledge. Secondly, anyone can experience this of himself, that when he tries to understand something, he forms certain phantasms to serve him by way of examples, in which as it were he examines what he is desirous of understanding. For this reason it is that when we wish to help someone to understand something, we lay examples before him, from which he forms phantasms for the purpose of understanding.

Now the reason of this is that the power of knowledge is proportioned to the thing known. Wherefore the proper object of the angelic intellect, which is entirely separate from a body, is an intelligible substance separate from a body. Whereas the proper object of the human intellect, which is united to a body, is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter; and through such natures of visible things it rises to a certain knowledge of things invisible. Now it belongs to such a nature to exist in an individual, and this cannot be apart from corporeal matter: for instance, it belongs to the nature of a stone to be in an individual stone, and to the nature of a horse to be in an individual horse, and so forth. Wherefore the nature of a stone or any material thing cannot be known completely and truly, except in as much as it is known as existing in the individual. Now we apprehend the individual through the senses and the imagination. And, therefore, for the intellect to understand actually its proper object, it must of necessity turn to the phantasms in order to perceive the universal nature existing in the individual. But if the proper object of our intellect were a separate form; or if, as the Platonists say, the natures of sensible things subsisted
apart from the individual; there would be no need for the intellect to turn to the phantasms whenever it understands.

Reply Obj. 1. The species preserved in the passive intellect exist there habitually when it does not understand them actually, as we have said above (Q. LXXIX., A. 6). Wherefore for us to understand actually, the fact that the species are preserved does not suffice; we need further to make use of them in a manner befitting the things of which they are the species, which things are natures existing in individuals.

Reply Obj. 2. Even the phantasm is the likeness of an individual thing; wherefore the imagination does not need any further likeness of the individual, whereas the intellect does.

Reply Obj. 3. Incorporeal things, of which there are no phantasms, are known to us by comparison with sensible bodies of which there are phantasms. Thus we understand truth by considering a thing of which we possess the truth; and God, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i.), we know as cause, by way of excess and by way of remotion. Other incorporeal substances we know, in the present state of life, only by way of remotion or by some comparison to corporeal things. And, therefore, when we understand something about these things, we need to turn to phantasms of bodies, although there are no phantasms of the things themselves.

Eighth Article.

Whether the Judgment of the Intellect is Hindered Through Suspension of the Sensitive Powers?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the judgment of the intellect is not hindered by suspension of the sensitive powers. For the superior does not depend on the inferior. But the judgment of the intellect is higher than the senses. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is not hindered through suspension of the senses.
Obj. 2. Further, to syllogize is an act of the intellect. But during sleep the senses are suspended, as is said in De Somn. et Vig. (i.) and yet it sometimes happens to us to syllogize while asleep. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is not hindered through suspension of the senses.

On the contrary, What a man does while asleep, against the moral law, is not imputed to him as a sin; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii. 15). But this would not be the case if man, while asleep, had free use of his reason and intellect. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is hindered by suspension of the senses.

I answer that, As we have said above (A. 7), our intellect's proper and proportionate object is the nature of a sensible thing. Now a perfect judgment concerning anything cannot be formed, unless all that pertains to that thing's nature be known; especially if that be ignored which is the term and end of judgment. Now the Philosopher says (De Coel. iii.), that as the end of a practical science is action, so the end of natural science is that which is perceived principally through the senses; for the smith does not seek knowledge of a knife except for the purpose of action, in order that he may produce a certain individual knife; and in like manner the natural philosopher does not seek to know the nature of a stone and of a horse, save for the purpose of knowing the essential properties of those things which he perceives with his senses. Now it is clear that a smith cannot judge perfectly of a knife unless he knows the action of the knife; and in like manner the natural philosopher cannot judge perfectly of natural things, unless he knows sensible things. But in the present state of life whatever we understand, we know by comparison to natural sensible things. Consequently it is not possible for our intellect to form a perfect judgment, while the senses are suspended, through which sensible things are known to us.

Reply Obj. 1. Although the intellect is superior to the senses, nevertheless in a manner it receives from the senses, and its first and principal objects are founded in sensible
things. And therefore suspension of the senses necessarily involves a hindrance to the judgment of the intellect.

Reply Obj. 2. The senses are suspended in the sleeper through certain evaporations and the escape of certain exhalations, as we read in De Somn. et Vig. (iii.). And, therefore, according to the amount of such evaporation, the senses are more or less suspended. For when the amount is considerable, not only are the senses suspended, but also the imagination, so that there are no phantasms; thus does it happen, especially when a man falls asleep after eating and drinking copiously. If, however, the evaporation be somewhat less, phantasms appear, but distorted and without sequence; thus it happens in a case of fever. And if the evaporation be still more attenuated, the phantasms will have a certain sequence: thus especially does it happen towards the end of sleep, in sober men and those who are gifted with a strong imagination. If the evaporation be very slight, not only does the imagination retain its freedom, but also the common sense is partly freed; so that sometimes while asleep a man may judge that what he sees is a dream, discerning, as it were, between things and their images. Nevertheless, the common sense remains partly suspended; and therefore, although it discriminates some images from the reality, yet is it always deceived in some particular. Therefore, while man is asleep, according as sense and imagination are free, so is the judgment of his intellect unfettered, though not entirely. Consequently, if a man syllogizes while asleep, when he wakes up he invariably recognizes a flaw in some respect.
QUESTION LXXXV.

OF THE MODE AND ORDER OF UNDERSTANDING.

(In Eight Articles.)

We come now to consider the mode and order of understanding. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether our intellect understands by abstracting the species from the phantasms? (2) Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms are what our intellect understands, or that whereby it understands? (3) Whether our intellect naturally first understands the more universal? (4) Whether our intellect can know many things at the same time? (5) Whether our intellect understands by the process of composition and division? (6) Whether the intellect can err? (7) Whether one intellect can understand better than another? (8) Whether our intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER OUR INTELLECT UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL AND MATERIAL THINGS BY ABSTRACTION FROM PHANTASMS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect does not understand corporeal and material things by abstraction from the phantasms. For the intellect is false if it understands an object otherwise than as it really is. Now the forms of material things do not exist as abstracted from the particular things represented by the phantasms. Therefore, if we understand material things by abstraction of the species from the phasm, there will be error in the intellect.

Obj. 2. Further, material things are those natural things
which include matter in their definition. But nothing can be understood apart from that which enters into its definition. Therefore material things cannot be understood apart from matter. Now matter is the principle of individualization. Therefore material things cannot be understood by abstraction of the universal from the particular, which is the process whereby the intelligible species is abstracted from the phantasm.

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii. 7) that the phantasm is to the intellectual soul what colour is to the sight. But seeing is not caused by abstraction of species from colour, but by colour impressing itself on the sight. Therefore neither does the act of understanding take place by abstraction of something from the phantasm, but by the phantasm impressing itself on the intellect.

Obj. 4. Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii. 5) there are two things in the intellectual soul—the passive intellect and the active intellect. But it does not belong to the passive intellect to abstract the intelligible species from the phantasm, but to receive them when abstracted. Neither does it seem to be the function of the active intellect, which is related to the phantasm, as light is to colour; since light does not abstract anything from colour, but rather streams on to it. Therefore in no way do we understand by abstraction from phantasms.

Obj. 5. Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii. 7) says that the intellect understands the species in the phantasm; and not, therefore, by abstraction.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii. 4) that things are intelligible in proportion as they are separable from matter. Therefore material things must needs be understood according as they are abstracted from matter and from material images, namely, phantasms.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7), the object of knowledge is proportionate to the power of knowledge. Now there are three grades of the cognitive powers. For one cognitive power, namely, the sense, is the act of a corporeal organ. And therefore the object of every sensi-
tive power is a form as existing in corporeal matter. And since such matter is the principle of individuality, therefore every power of the sensitive part can only have knowledge of the individual. There is another grade of cognitive power which is neither the act of a corporeal organ, nor in any way connected with corporeal matter; such is the angelic intellect, the object of whose cognitive power is therefore a form existing apart from matter: for though angels know material things, yet they do not know them save in something immaterial, namely, either in themselves or in God. But the human intellect holds a middle place: for it is not the act of an organ; yet it is a power of the soul which is the form of the body, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. LXXVI., A. 1). And therefore it is proper to it to know a form existing individually in corporeal matter, but not as existing in this individual matter. But to know what is in individual matter, not as existing in such matter, is to abstract the form from individual matter which is represented by the phantasms. Therefore we must needs say that our intellect understands material things by abstracting from the phantasms; and through material things thus considered we acquire some knowledge of immaterial things, just as, on the contrary, angels know material things through the immaterial.

But Plato, considering only the immateriality of the human intellect, and not its being in a way united to the body, held that the objects of the intellect are separate ideas; and that we understand not by abstraction, but by participating things abstract, as stated above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 1).

Reply Obj. 1. Abstraction may occur in two ways: First, by way of composition and division; thus we may understand that one thing does not exist in some other, or that it is separate therefrom. Secondly, by way of simple and absolute consideration; thus we understand one thing without considering the other. Thus for the intellect to abstract one from another things which are not really abstract from one another, does, in the first mode of abstraction, imply falsehood. But, in the second mode of abstrac-
tion, for the intellect to abstract things which are not really abstract from one another, does not involve falsehood, as clearly appears in the case of the senses. For if we understood or said that colour is not in a coloured body, or that it is separate from it, there would be error in this opinion or assertion. But if we consider colour and its properties, without reference to the apple which is coloured; or if we express in word what we thus understand, there is no error in such an opinion or assertion, because an apple is not essential to colour, and therefore colour can be understood independently of the apple. Likewise, the things which belong to the species of a material thing, such as a stone, or a man, or a horse, can be thought of apart from the individualizing principles which do not belong to the notion of the species. This is what we mean by abstracting the universal from the particular, or the intelligible species from the phantasm; that is, by considering the nature of the species apart from its individual qualities represented by the phantasms. If, therefore, the intellect is said to be false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it is, that is so, if the word otherwise refers to the thing understood; for the intellect is false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it is; and so the intellect would be false if it abstracted the species of a stone form its matter in such a way as to regard the species as not existing in matter, as Plato held. But it is not so, if the word otherwise be taken as referring to the one who understands. For it is quite true that the mode of understanding, in one who understands, is not the same as the mode of a thing in existing: since the thing understood is immaterially in the one who understands, according to the mode of the intellect, and not materially, according to the mode of a material thing.

Reply Obj. 2. Some have thought that the species of a natural thing is a form only, and that matter is not part of the species. If that were so, matter would not enter into the definition of natural things. Therefore it must be said otherwise, that matter is twofold, common, and signate or individual; common, such as flesh and bone; and
individual, as this flesh and these bones. The intellect therefore abstracts the species of a natural thing from the individual sensible matter, but not from the common sensible matter; for example, it abstracts the species of man from this flesh and these bones, which do not belong to the species as such, but to the individual (Metaph. vii., Did. vi. 10), and need not be considered in the species: whereas the species of man cannot be abstracted by the intellect from flesh and bones.

Mathematical species, however, can be abstracted by the intellect from sensible matter, not only from individual, but also from common matter; not from common intelligible matter, but only from individual matter. For sensible matter is corporeal matter as subject to sensible qualities, such as being cold or hot, hard or soft, and the like: while intelligible matter is substance as subject to quantity. Now it is manifest that quantity is in substance before other sensible qualities are. Hence quantities, such as number, dimension, and figures, which are the terminations of quantity, can be considered apart from sensible qualities; and this is to abstract them from sensible matter; but they cannot be considered without understanding the substance which is subject to the quantity; for that would be to abstract them from common intelligible matter. Yet they can be considered apart from this or that substance; for that is to abstract them from individual intelligible matter. But some things can be abstracted even from common intelligible matter, such as being, unity, power, act, and the like; all these can exist without matter, as is plain regarding immaterial things. Because Plato failed to consider the twofold kind of abstraction, as above explained (ad 1), he held that all those things which we have stated to be abstracted by the intellect, are abstract in reality.

Reply Obj. 3. Colours, as being in individual corporeal matter, have the same mode of existence as the power of sight: and therefore they can impress their own image on the eye. But phantasms, since they are images of individuals, and exist in corporeal organs, have not the same
mode of existence as the human intellect, and therefore have not the power of themselves to make an impression on the passive intellect. This is done by the power of the active intellect which by turning towards the phantasm produces in the passive intellect a certain likeness which represents, as to its specific conditions only, the thing reflected in the phantasm. It is thus that the intelligible species is said to be abstracted from the phantasm; not that the identical form which previously was in the phantasm is subsequently in the passive intellect, as a body transferred from one place to another.

Reply Obj. 4. Not only does the active intellect throw light on the phantasm; it does more; by its own power it abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm. It throws light on the phantasm, because, just as the sensitive part acquires a greater power by its conjunction with the intellectual part, so by the power of the active intellect the phantasms are made more fit for the abstraction therefrom of intelligible intentions. Furthermore, the active intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm, forasmuch as by the power of the active intellect we are able to disregard the conditions of individuality, and to take into our consideration the specific nature, the image of which informs the passive intellect.

Reply Obj. 5. Our intellect both abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasms, inasmuch as it considers the natures of things in universal, and, nevertheless, understands these natures in the phantasms, since it cannot understand even the things of which it abstracts the species, without turning to the phantasms, as we have said above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7).
SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES ABSTRACTED FROM THE PHANTASM IS RELATED TO OUR INTELLECT AS THAT WHICH IS UNDERSTOOD?

*We proceed thus to the Second Article:—*

**Objection 1.** It would seem that the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is understood. For the understood in act is in the one who understands: since the understood in act is the intellect itself in act. But nothing of what is understood is in the intellect; actually understanding, save the abstracted intelligible species. Therefore this species is what is actually understood.

**Obj. 2.** Further, what is actually understood must be in something; else it would be nothing. But it is not in something outside the soul: for, since what is outside the soul is material, nothing therein can be actually understood. Therefore what is actually understood is in the intellect. Consequently it can be nothing else than the aforesaid intelligible species.

**Obj. 3.** Further, the Philosopher says (i Peri Herm. i.) that words are signs of the passions in the soul. But words signify the things understood, for we express by word what we understand. Therefore these passions of the soul, viz., the intelligible species, are what is actually understood.

**On the contrary,** The intelligible species is to the intellect what the sensible image is to the sense. But the sensible image is not what is perceived, but rather that by which sense perceives. Therefore the intelligible species is not what is actually understood, but that by which the intellect understands.

*I answer that,* Some have asserted that our intellectual faculties know only the impression made on them; as, for example, that sense is cognizant only of the impression made on its own organ. According to this theory, the
intellect understands only its own impression, namely, the
intelligible species which it has received, so that this species
is what is understood.

This is, however, manifestly false for two reasons. First,
because the things we understand are the objects of science;
therefore if what we understand is merely the intelligible
species in the soul, it would follow that every science would
not be concerned with objects outside the soul, but only
with the intelligible species within the soul; thus, according
to the teaching of the Platonists all science is about ideas,
which they held to be actually understood.* Secondly, it
is untrue, because it would lead to the opinion of the
ancients who maintained that whatever seems, is true,† and
that consequently contradictories are true simultaneously.
For if the faculty knows its own impression only, it can
decide of that only. Now a thing seems, according to the
impression made on the cognitive faculty. Consequently
the cognitive faculty will always judge of its own impres-
sion as such; and so every judgment will be true: for
instance, if taste perceived only its own impression, when
anyone with a healthy taste perceives that honey is sweet,
he would judge truly; and if anyone with a corrupt taste
perceives that honey is bitter, this would be equally true;
for each would judge according to the impression on his
taste. Thus every opinion would be equally true; in fact,
every sort of apprehension.

Therefore it must be said that the intelligible species is
related to the intellect as that by which it understands:
which is proved thus. There is a twofold action (Metaeph.
ix., Did. viii. 8), one which remains in the agent; for
instance, to see and to understand; and another which
passes into an external object; for instance, to heat and to
cut; and each of these actions proceeds in virtue of some
form. And as the form from which proceeds an act tending
to something external is the likeness of the object of the
action, as heat in the heater is a likeness of the thing
heated; so the form from which proceeds an action remain-

* Cf. Q. LXXXIV., A. 1.  † Cf. Arist., Metaeph. iii. 5.
ing in the agent is the likeness of the object. Hence that by which the sight sees is the likeness of the visible thing; and the likeness of the thing understood, that is, the intelligible species, is the form by which the intellect understands. But since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflection it understands both its own act of intelligence, and the species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily; but that which is primarily understood is the object, of which the species is the likeness. This also appears from the opinion of the ancient philosophers, who said that like is known by like. For they said that the soul knows the earth outside itself by the earth within itself; and so of the rest. If, therefore, we take the species of the earth instead of the earth, according to Aristotle (De Anima iii. 8), who says that a stone is not in the soul, but only the likeness of the stone; it follows that the soul knows external things by means of its intelligible species.

Reply Obj. 1. The thing understood is in the intellect by its own likeness; and it is in this sense that we say that the thing actually understood is the intellect in act, because the likeness of the thing understood is the form of the intellect, as the likeness of a sensible thing is the form of the sense in act. Hence it does not follow that the intelligible species abstracted is what is actually understood; but rather that it is the likeness thereof.

Reply Obj. 2. In these words the thing actually understood there is a double implication:—the thing which is understood, and the fact that it is understood. In like manner the words abstract universal imply two things, the nature of a thing and its abstraction or universality. Therefore the nature itself to which it occurs to be understood, abstracted or considered as universal is only in individuals; but that it is understood, abstracted or considered as universal is in the intellect. We see something similar to this in the senses. For the sight sees the colour of the apple apart from its smell. If therefore it be asked where is the colour which is seen apart from the smell, it is quite
clear that the colour which is seen is only in the apple: but that it be perceived apart from the smell, this is owing to the sight, forasmuch as the faculty of sight receives the likeness of colour and not of smell. In like manner humanity understood is only in this or that man; but that humanity be apprehended without conditions of individuality, that is, that it be abstracted and consequently considered as universal, occurs to humanity inasmuch as it is brought under the consideration of the intellect, in which there is a likeness of the specific nature, but not of the principles of individuality.

Reply Obj. 3. There are two operations in the sensitive part. One, in regard of impression only, and thus the operation of the senses takes place by the senses being impressed by the sensible. The other is formation, inasmuch as the imagination forms for itself an image of an absent thing, or even of something never seen. Both of these operations are found in the intellect. For in the first place there is the passion of the passive intellect as informed by the intelligible species; and then the passive intellect thus informed forms a definition, or a division, or a composition, expressed by a word. Wherefore the concept conveyed by a word is its definition; and a proposition conveys the intellect's division or composition. Words do not therefore signify the intelligible species themselves; but that which the intellect forms for itself for the purpose of judging of external things.

**Third Article.**

**Whether the More Universal is First in Our Intellectual Cognition?**

*We proceed thus to the Third Article:—*

*Objection 1.* It would seem that the more universal is not first in our intellectual cognition. For what is first and more known in its own nature, is secondarily and less known in relation to ourselves. But universals come first as regards their nature, because *that is first which does*
not involve the existence of its correlative (Categor. ix.). Therefore the universals are secondarily known as regards our intellect.

Obj. 2. Further, the composite precedes the simple in relation to us. But universals are the more simple. Therefore they are known secondarily by us.

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. i. 1), that the object defined comes in our knowledge before the parts of its definition. But the more universal is part of the definition of the less universal, as animal is part of the definition of man. Therefore the universals are secondarily known by us.

Obj. 4. Further, we know causes and principles by their effects. But universals are principles. Therefore universals are secondarily known by us.

On the contrary, We must proceed from the universal to the singular and individual (Phys. i. ibid.).

I answer that, In our knowledge there are two things to be considered. First, that intellectual knowledge in some degree arises from sensible knowledge: and, because sense has singular and individual things for its object, and intellect has the universal for its object, it follows that our knowledge of the former comes before our knowledge of the latter. Secondly, we must consider that our intellect proceeds from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality; and every power thus proceeding from potentiality to actuality comes first to an incomplete act, which is the medium between potentiality and actuality, before accomplishing the perfect act. The perfect act of the intellect is complete knowledge, when the object is distinctly and determinately known; whereas the incomplete act is imperfect knowledge, when the object is known indistinctly, and as it were confusedly. A thing thus imperfectly known, is known partly in act and partly in potentiality, and hence the Philosopher says (Phys. i. ibid.), that what is manifest and certain is known to us at first confusedly; afterwards we know it by distinguishing its principles and elements. Now it is evident that to know an object that
comprises many things, without proper knowledge of each thing contained in it, is to know that thing confusedly. In this way we can have knowledge not only of the universal whole, which contains parts potentially, but also of the integral whole; for each whole can be known confusedly, without its parts being known. But to know distinctly what is contained in the universal whole is to know the less common, as to know animal indistinctly is to know it as animal; whereas to know animal distinctly is to know it as rational or irrational animal, that is, to know a man or a lion: therefore our intellect knows animal before it knows man; and the same reason holds in comparing any more universal idea with the less universal.

Moreover, as sense, like the intellect, proceeds from potentiality to act, the same order of knowledge appears in the senses. For by sense we judge of the more common before the less common, in reference both to place and time; in reference to place, when a thing is seen afar off it is seen to be a body before it is seen to be an animal; and to be an animal before it is seen to be a man, and to be a man before it is seen to be Socrates or Plato; and the same is true as regards time, for a child can distinguish man from not man before he distinguishes this man from that, and therefore children at first call all men fathers, and later on distinguish each one from the others (Phys. i. ibid.). The reason of this is clear: because he who knows a thing indistinctly is in a state of potentiality as regards its principle of distinction; as he who knows genus is in a state of potentiality as regards difference. Thus it is evident that indistinct knowledge is midway between potentiality and act.

We must therefore conclude that knowledge of the singular and individual is prior, as regards us, to the knowledge of the universal; as sensible knowledge is prior to intellectual knowledge. But in both sense and intellect the knowledge of the more common precedes the knowledge of the less common.

Reply Obj. 1. The universal can be considered in two
ways. First, the universal nature may be considered together with the intention of universality. And since the intention of universality—viz., the relation of one and the same to many—is due to intellectual abstraction, the universal thus considered is a secondary consideration. Hence it is said (De Anima i. 1) that the universal animal is either nothing or something secondary. But according to Plato, who held that universals are subsistent, the universal considered thus would be prior to the particular, for the latter, according to him, are mere participations of the subsistent universals which he called ideas.

Secondly, the universal can be considered in the nature itself—for instance, animality or humanity as existing in the individual. And thus we must distinguish two orders of nature: one, by way of generation and time; and thus the imperfect and the potential come first. In this way the more common comes first in the order of nature; as appears clearly in the generation of man and animal; for the animal is generated before man, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii. 3). The other order is the order of perfection or of the intention of nature: for instance, act considered absolutely is naturally prior to potentiality, and the perfect to the imperfect: thus the less common comes naturally before the more common; as man comes before animal. For the intention of nature does not stop at the generation of animal, but goes on to the generation of man.

Reply Obj. 2. The more common universal may be compared to the less common, as the whole, and as the part. As the whole, considering that in the more universal is potentially contained not only the less universal, but also other things, as in animal is contained not only man but also horse. As part, considering that the less common contains in its idea not only the more common, but also more; as man contains not only animal but also rational. Therefore animal in itself comes into our knowledge before man; but man comes before animal considered as part of the same idea.
Reply Obj. 3. A part can be known in two ways. First, absolutely considered in itself; and thus nothing prevents the parts being known before the whole, as stones are known before a house is known. Secondly, as belonging to a certain whole; and thus we must needs know the whole before its parts. For we know a house vaguely before we know its different parts. So likewise principles of definition are known before the thing defined is known; otherwise the thing defined would not be known at all. But as parts of the definition they are known after. For we know man vaguely as man before we know how to distinguish all that belongs to human nature.

Reply Obj. 4. The universal, as understood with the intention of universality, is, indeed, in a way, a principle of knowledge, in as far as the intention of universality results from the mode of understanding by way of abstraction. But what is a principle of knowledge is not of necessity a principle of existence, as Plato thought: since at times we know a cause through its effect, and substance through accidents. Wherefore the universal thus considered, according to the opinion of Aristotle, is neither a principle of existence, nor a substance, as he makes clear (Metaph. vii., Did. vi. 13). But if we consider the generic or specific nature itself as existing in the singular, thus in a way it is in the nature of a formal principle in regard to the singulairs: for the singular is the result of matter, while the idea of species is from the form. But the generic nature is compared to the specific nature rather after the fashion of a material principle, because the generic nature is taken from that which is material in a thing, while the idea of species is taken from that which is formal: thus the notion of animal is taken from the sensitive part, whereas the notion of man is taken from the intellectual part. Thus it is that the ultimate intention of nature is to the species and not to the individual, or the genus: because the form is the end of generation, while matter is for the sake of the form. Neither is it necessary that, as regards us, knowledge of any cause or principle should be secondary: since
at times through sensible causes we become acquainted with unknown effects, and sometimes conversely.

Fourth Article.

Whether we can understand many things at the same time?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that we can understand many things at the same time. For intellect is above time, whereas the succession of before and after belongs to time. Therefore the intellect does not understand different things in succession, but at the same time.

Obj. 2. Further, there is nothing to prevent different forms not opposed to each other from actually being in the same subject, as, for instance, colour and smell are in the apple. But intelligible species are not opposed to each other. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the same intellect being in act as regards different intelligible species, and thus it can understand many things at the same time.

Obj. 3. Further, the intellect understands a whole at the same time, such as a man or a house. But a whole contains many parts. Therefore the intellect understands many things at the same time.

Obj. 4. Further, we cannot know the difference between two things unless we know both at the same time (De Anima iii. 2), and the same is to said of any other comparison. But our intellect knows the difference and comparison between one thing and another. Therefore it knows many things at the same time.

On the contrary, It is said (Topic. ii. 10) that understanding is of one thing only, knowledge is of many.

I answer that, The intellect can, indeed, understand many things as one, but not as many: that is to say by one but not by many intelligible species. For the mode of every action follows the form which is the principle of that action. Therefore whatever things the intellect can
understand under one species, it can understand at the same time: hence it is that God sees all things at the same time, because He sees all in one, that is, in His Essence. But whatever things the intellect understands under different species, it does not understand at the same time. The reason of this is that it is impossible for one and the same subject to be perfected at the same time by many forms of one genus and diverse species, just as it is impossible for one and the same body at the same time to have different colours or different shapes. Now all intelligible species belong to one genus, because they are the perfections of one intellectual faculty: although the things which the species represent belong to different genera. Therefore it is impossible for one and the same intellect to be perfected at the same time by different intelligible species so as actually to understand different things.

Reply Obj. 1. The intellect is above that time, which is the measure of the movement of corporeal things. But the multitude itself of intelligible species causes a certain vicissitude of intelligible operations, according as one operation succeeds another. And this vicissitude is called time by Augustine, who says (Gen. ad lit. viii. 20, 22), that God moves the spiritual creature through time.

Reply Obj. 2. Not only is it impossible for opposite forms to exist at the same time in the same subject, but neither can any forms belonging to the same genus, although they be not opposed to one another, as is clear from the examples of colours and shapes.

Reply Obj. 3. Parts can be understood in two ways. First, in a confused way, as existing in the whole, and thus they are known through the one form of the whole, and so are known together. In another way they are known distinctly: thus each is known by its species; and so they are not understood at the same time.

Reply Obj. 4. If the intellect sees the difference or comparison between one thing and another, it knows both in relation to their difference or comparison; just, as we have said above (ad 3), as it knows the parts in the whole.
Fifth Article.

Whether our intellect understands by composition and division?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect does not understand by composition and division. For composition and division are only of many; whereas the intellect cannot understand many things at the same time. Therefore it cannot understand by composition and division.

Obj. 2. Further, every composition and division implies past, present, or future time. But the intellect abstracts from time, as also from other individual conditions. Therefore the intellect does not understand by composition and division.

Obj. 3. Further, the intellect understands things by a process of assimilation to them. But composition and division are not in things, for nothing is in things but what is signified by the predicate and the subject, and which is one and the same, provided that the composition be true, for man is truly what animal is. Therefore the intellect does not act by composition and division.

On the contrary, Words signify the conceptions of the intellect, as the Philosopher says (Peri Herm. i.). But in words we find composition and division, as appears in affirmative and negative propositions. Therefore the intellect acts by composition and division.

I answer that, The human intellect must of necessity understand by composition and division. For since the intellect passes from potentiality to act, it has a likeness to things which are generated, which do not attain to perfection all at once but acquire it by degrees: so likewise the human intellect does not acquire perfect knowledge by the first act of apprehension; but it first apprehends something about its object, such as its quiddity, and this is its first and proper object; and then it understands the properties, accidents, and the various relations of the essence. Thus
it necessarily compares one thing with another by composition or division; and from one composition and division it proceeds to another, which is the process of reasoning.

But the angelic and the Divine intellect, like all incorruptible things, have their perfection at once from the beginning. Hence the angelic and the Divine intellect have the entire knowledge of a thing at once and perfectly; and hence also in knowing the quiddity of a thing they know at once whatever we can know by composition, division, and reasoning. Therefore the human intellect knows by composition, division, and reasoning. But the Divine and the angelic intellect know, indeed, composition, division, and reasoning, not by the process itself, but by understanding the simple essence.

Reply Obj. 1. Composition and division of the intellect are made by differentiating and comparing. Hence the intellect knows many things by composition and division, as by knowing the difference and comparison of things.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the intellect abstracts from the phantasms, it does not understand actually without turning to the phantasms, as we have said (A. 1, and Q. LXXXIV., A. 7). And forasmuch as it turns to the phantasms, composition and division of the intellect involve time.

Reply Obj. 3. The likeness of a thing is received into the intellect according to the mode of the intellect, not according to the mode of the thing. Wherefore something on the part of the thing corresponds to the composition and division of the intellect; but it does not exist in the same way in the intellect and in the thing. For the proper object of the human intellect is the quiddity of a material thing, which comes under the action of the senses and the imagination. Now in a material thing there is a twofold composition. First, there is the composition of form with matter; and to this corresponds that composition of the intellect whereby the universal whole is predicated of its part: for the genus is derived from common matter, while the difference that completes the species is derived from the form, and the particular from individual matter. The
second composition is of accident with subject: and to this real composition corresponds that composition of the intellect, whereby accident is predicated of subject, as when we say the man is white. Nevertheless composition of the intellect differs from composition of things; for in the latter the things are diverse, whereas composition of the intellect is a sign of the identity of the components. For the above composition of the intellect does not imply that man and whiteness are identical, but the assertion, the man is white, means that the man is something having whiteness: and the subject, which is a man, is identified with a subject having whiteness. It is the same with the composition of form and matter: for animal signifies that which has a sensitive nature; rational, that which has an intellectual nature; man, that which has both; and Socrates that which has all these things together with individual matter; and according to this kind of identity our intellect predicates the composition of one thing with another.

Sixth Article.

Whether the intellect can be false?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the intellect can be false; for the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi., Did. v. 4) that truth and falsehood are in the mind. But the mind and intellect are the same, as is shown above (Q. LXXIX., A. 1). Therefore falsehood may be in the mind.

Obj. 2. Further, opinion and reasoning belong to the intellect. But falsehood exists in both. Therefore falsehood can be in the intellect.

Obj. 3. Further, sin is in the intellectual faculty. But sin involves falsehood: for those err that work evil (Prov. xiv. 22). Therefore falsehood can be in the intellect.

On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIII., qu. 32), that everyone who is deceived, does not rightly understand that wherein he is deceived. And the Philosopher says (De Anima iii. 10), that the intellect is always true.
I answer that, The Philosopher (ibid. 6) compares intellect with sense on this point. For sense is not deceived in its proper object, as sight in regard to colour; save accidentally through some hindrance occurring to the sensible organ—for example, the taste of a fever-stricken person judges a sweet thing to be bitter, through his tongue being vitiated by ill humours. Sense, however, may be deceived as regards common sensible objects, as size or figure; when, for example, it judges the sun to be only a foot in diameter, whereas in reality it exceeds the earth in size. Much more is sense deceived concerning accidental sensible objects, as when it judges that vinegar is honey by reason of the colour being the same. The reason of this is evident; for every faculty, as such, is per se directed to its proper object; and things of this kind are always the same. Hence, so long as the faculty exists, its judgment concerning its own proper object does not fail. Now the proper object of the intellect is the quiddity of a material thing; and hence, properly speaking, the intellect is not at fault concerning this quiddity; whereas it may go astray as regards the surroundings of the thing in its essence or quiddity, in referring one thing to another, as regards composition or division, or also in the process of reasoning. Therefore, also in regard to those propositions, which are understood as soon as the terms thereof are understood, the intellect cannot err, as in the case of first principles from which arises infallible truth in the certitude of scientific conclusions.

The intellect, however, may be accidentally deceived in the quiddity of composite things, not by the defect of its organ, for the intellect is a faculty that is independent of an organ; but on the part of the composition affecting the definition, when, for instance, the definition of a thing is false in relation to something else, as the definition of a circle applied to a triangle; or when a definition is false in itself as involving the composition of things incompatible; as, for instance, to describe anything as a rational winged animal. Hence as regards simple objects not subject to
composite definitions we cannot be deceived unless, indeed, we understand nothing whatever about them, as is said \textit{Metaph.} ix. (Did. viii. 10).

\textit{Reply Obj. 1.} The Philosopher says that falsehood is in the intellect in regard to composition and division. The same answer applies to the \textit{second objection} concerning opinion and reasoning, and to the \textit{third objection}, concerning the error of the sinner, who errs in the practical judgment of the appetible object. But in the absolute consideration of the quiddity of a thing, and of those things which are known thereby, the intellect is never deceived. In this sense are to be understood the authorities quoted in proof of the opposite conclusion.

\textbf{Seventh Article.}

\textbf{Whether one person can understand one and the same thing better than another can?}

\textit{We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—}

\textit{Objection 1.} It would seem that one person cannot understand one and the same thing better than another can. For Augustine says (\textit{QG.} LXXXIII., qu. 32), \textit{Whoever understands a thing otherwise than as it is, does not understand it at all. Hence it is clear that there is a perfect understanding, than which none other is more perfect: and therefore there are not infinite degrees of understanding a thing: nor can one person understand a thing better than another can.}

\textit{Obj. 2.} Further, the intellect is true in its act of understanding. But truth, being a certain equality between thought and thing, is not subject to more or less: for a thing cannot be said to be more or less equal. Therefore a thing cannot be more or less understood.

\textit{Obj. 3.} Further, the intellect is the most formal of all that is in man. But different forms cause different species. Therefore if one man understands better than another, it would seem that they do not belong to the same species.

\textit{On the contrary,} Experience shows that some understand more profoundly than do others; as one who carries a con-
clusion to its first principles and ultimate causes understands it better than the one who reduces it only to its proximate causes.

I answer that, A thing being understood more by one than by another may be taken in two senses. First, so that the word more be taken as determining the act of understanding as regards the thing understood; and thus, one cannot understand the same thing more than another, because to understand it otherwise than as it is, either better or worse, would entail being deceived, and such a one would not understand it, as Augustine argues (loc. cit.). In another sense the word more can be taken as determining the act of understanding on the part of him who understands; and so one may understand the same thing better than someone else, through having a greater power of understanding: just as a man may see a thing better with his bodily sight, whose power is greater, and whose sight is more perfect. The same applies to the intellect in two ways. First, as regards the intellect itself, which is more perfect. For it is plain that the better the disposition of a body, the better the soul allotted to it; which clearly appears in things of different species: and the reason thereof is that act and form are received into matter according to matter's capacity: thus because some men have bodies of better disposition, their souls have a greater power of understanding, wherefore it is said (De Anima ii. 9), that it is to be observed that those who have soft flesh are of apt mind. Secondly, this occurs in regard to the lower powers of which the intellect has need in its operation: for those in whom the imaginative, cogitative and memorative powers are of better disposition, are better disposed to understand.

The reply to the first objection is clear from the above; likewise the reply to the second, for the truth of the intellect consists in the intellect understanding a thing as it is.

Reply Obj. 3. The difference of form which is due only to the different disposition of matter, causes not a specific but only a numerical difference: for different individuals have different forms, diversified according to the difference of matter.
Eighth Article.

Whether the intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible. For the Philosopher says (Phys. i. 1) that we understand and know from the knowledge of principles and elements. But principles are indivisible, and elements are of divisible things. Therefore the indivisible is known to us before the divisible.

Obj. 2. Further, the definition of a thing contains what is known previously, for a definition proceeds from the first and more known, as is said Topic. vi. 4. But the indivisible is part of the definition of the divisible; as a point comes into the definition of a line; for as Euclid says, a line is length without breadth, the extremities of which are points; also unity comes into the definition of number, for number is multitude measured by one, as is said Metaph. x. (Did. ix. 6). Therefore our intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible.

Obj. 3. Further, Like is known by like. But the indivisible is more like to the intellect than is the divisible; because the intellect is simple (De Anima iii. 4). Therefore our intellect first knows the indivisible.

On the contrary, It is said (ibid. 6) that the indivisible is expressed as a privation. But privation is known secondarily. Therefore likewise is the indivisible.

I answer that, The object of our intellect in its present state is the quiddity of a material thing, which it abstracts from the phantasms, as above stated (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7). And since that which is known first and of itself by our cognitive power is its proper object, we must consider its relationship to that quiddity in order to discover in what order the indivisible is known. Now the indivisible is threefold, as is said De Anima iii. 6. First, the continuous is indivisible, since actually it is undivided, although poten-
tially divisible: and this indivisible is known to us before its division, which is a division into parts: because confused knowledge is prior to distinct knowledge, as we have said above (A. 3). Secondly, the indivisible is so called in relation to species, as man's reason is something indivisible. This way, also, the indivisible is understood before its division into logical parts, as we have said above (ibid.); and again before the intellect composes and divides by affirmation and negation. The reason of this is that both these kinds of indivisible are understood by the intellect of itself, as being its proper object. The third kind of indivisible is what is altogether indivisible, as a point and unity, which cannot be divided either actually or potentially. And this indivisible is known secondarily, through the privation of divisibility. Wherefore a point is defined by way of privation as that which has no parts: and in like manner the notion of one is that it is indivisible, as stated in Metaph. x. (Did. ix. 1). And the reason of this is that this indivisible has a certain opposition to a corporeal being, the quiddity of which is the primary and proper object of the intellect.

But if our intellect understood by participation of certain separate indivisible (forms), as the Platonists maintained, it would follow that a like indivisible is understood primarily: for according to the Platonists what is first is first participated by things.

Reply Obj. 1. In the acquisition of knowledge, principles and elements are not always (known) first: for sometimes from sensible effects we arrive at the knowledge of principles and intelligible causes. But in perfect knowledge, the knowledge of effects always depends on the knowledge of principles and elements: for as the Philosopher says in the same passage: Then do we consider that we know, when we can resolve principles into their causes.

Reply Obj. 2. A point is not included in the definition of a line in general: for it is manifest that in a line of indefinite length, and in a circular line, there is no point, save potentially. Euclid defines a finite straight line: and there-
fore he mentions a point in the definition, as the limit in the
definition of that which is limited.—Unity is the measure of
number: wherefore it is included in the definition of a
measured number. But it is not included in the definition
of the divisible, but rather conversely.

Reply Obj. 3. The likeness through which we understand
is the species of the known in the knower; therefore a thing
is known first, not on account of its natural likeness to the
cognitive power, but on account of the power’s aptitude for
the object: otherwise sight would perceive hearing rather
than colour.
QUESTION LXXXVI.

WHAT OUR INTELLECT KNOWS IN MATERIAL THINGS.

(In Four Articles.)

We now have to consider what our intellect knows in material things. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether it knows singulars? (2) Whether it knows the infinite? (3) Whether it knows contingent things? (4) Whether it knows future things?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER OUR INTELLECT KNOWS SINGULARS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect knows singulars. For whoever knows composition, knows the terms of composition. But our intellect knows this composition; Socrates is a man: for it belongs to the intellect to form a proposition. Therefore our intellect knows this singular, Socrates.

Obj. 2. Further, the practical intellect directs to action. But action has relation to singular things. Therefore the intellect knows the singular.

Obj. 3. Further, our intellect understands itself. But in itself it is a singular, otherwise it would have no action of its own; for actions belong to singulars. Therefore our intellect knows singulars.

Obj. 4. Further, a superior power can do whatever is done by an inferior power. But sense knows the singular. Much more, therefore, can the intellect know it.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Phys. i. 5), that the universal is known by reason; and the singular is known by sense.
I answer that, Our intellect cannot know the singular in material things directly and primarily. The reason of this is that the principle of singularity in material things is individual matter, whereas our intellect, as we have said above (Q. LXXXV., A. 1), understands by abstracting the intelligible species from such matter. Now what is abstracted from individual matter is the universal. Hence our intellect knows directly the universal only. But indirectly, and as it were by a kind of reflexion, it can know the singular, because, as we have said above (Q. LXXXV., A. 7), even after abstracting the intelligible species, the intellect, in order to understand, needs to turn to the phantasms in which it understands the species, as is said De Anima iii. 7. Therefore it understands the universal directly through the intelligible species, and indirectly the singular represented by the phantasm. And thus it forms the proposition, Socrates is a man. Wherefore the reply to the first objection is clear.

Reply Obj. 2. The choice of a particular thing to be done is as the conclusion of a syllogism formed by the practical intellect, as is said Ethic. vii. 3. But a singular proposition cannot be directly concluded from a universal proposition, except through the medium of a singular proposition. Therefore the universal principle of the practical intellect does not move save through the medium of the particular apprehension of the sensitive part, as is said De Anima iii. 11.

Reply Obj. 3. Intelligibility is incompatible with the singular not as such, but as material, for nothing can be understood otherwise than immaterially. Therefore if there be an immaterial singular such as the intellect, there is no reason why it should not be intelligible.

Reply Obj. 4. The higher power can do what the lower power can, but in a more eminent way. Wherefore what the sense knows materially and concretely, which is to know the singular directly, the intellect knows immaterially and in the abstract, which is to know the universal.
SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER OUR INTELLECT CAN KNOW THE INFINITE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect can know the infinite. For God excels all infinite things. But our intellect can know God, as we have said above (Q. XII., A. 1). Much more, therefore, can our intellect know all other infinite things.

Obj. 2. Further, our intellect can naturally know genera and species. But there is an infinity of species in some genera, as in number, proportion, and figure. Therefore our intellect can know the infinite.

Obj. 3. Further, if one body can coexist with another in the same place, there is nothing to prevent an infinite number of bodies being in one place. But one intelligible species can exist with another in the same intellect, for many things can be habitually known at the same time. Therefore our intellect can have an habitual knowledge of an infinite number of things.

Obj. 4. Further, as the intellect is not a corporeal faculty, as we have said (Q. LXXVI., A. 1), it appears to be an infinite power. But an infinite power has a capacity for an infinite object. Therefore our intellect can know the infinite.

On the contrary, It is said (Phys. i. 4) that the infinite, considered as such, is unknown.

I answer that, Since a faculty and its object are proportional to each other, the intellect must be related to the infinite, as is its object, which is the quiddity of a material thing. Now in material things the infinite does not exist actually, but only potentially, in the sense of one succeeding another, as is said ibid. iii. 6. Therefore infinity is potentially in our mind through its considering successively one thing after another: because never does our intellect understand so many things, that it cannot understand more.
On the other hand, our intellect cannot understand the infinite either actually or habitually. Not actually, for our intellect cannot know actually at the same time, except what it knows through one species. But the infinite is not represented by one species, for if it were it would be something whole and complete. Consequently it cannot be understood except by a successive consideration of one part after another, as is clear from its definition (ibid. iii. 6): for the infinite is that from which, however much we may take, there always remains something to be taken. Thus the infinite could not be known actually, unless all its parts were counted: which is impossible.

For the same reason we cannot have habitual knowledge of the infinite: because in us habitual knowledge results from actual consideration: since by understanding we acquire knowledge, as is said Ethic. ii. 1. Wherefore it would not be possible for us to have a habit of an infinity of things distinctly known, unless we had already considered the entire infinity thereof, counting them according to the succession of our knowledge: which is impossible. And therefore neither actually or habitually can our intellect know the infinite, but only potentially, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 1. As we have said above (Q. VII., A. 1), God is called infinite, because He is a form unlimited by matter; whereas in material things, the term infinite is applied to that which is deprived of any formal term. And form being known in itself, whereas matter cannot be known without form, it follows that the material infinite is in itself unknowable. But the formal infinite, God, is of Himself known; but He is unknown to us by reason of our feeble intellect, which in its present state has a natural aptitude for material objects only. Therefore we cannot know God in our present life except through material effects. In the future life this defect of intellect will be removed by the state of glory, when we shall be able to see the Essence of God Himself, but without being able to comprehend Him.
Reply Obj. 2. The nature of our mind is to know species abstracted from phantasms; therefore it cannot know actually or habitually species of numbers or figures that are not in the imagination, except in a general way and in their universal principles; and this is to know them potentially and confusedly.

Reply Obj. 3. If two or more bodies were in the same place, there would be no need for them to occupy the place successively, in order for the things placed to be counted according to this succession of occupation. On the other hand, the intelligible species enter into our intellect successively; since many things cannot be actually understood at the same time: and therefore there must be a definite and not an infinite number of species in our intellect.

Reply Obj. 4. As our intellect is infinite in power, so does it know the infinite. For its power is indeed infinite inasmuch as it is not terminated by corporeal matter. Moreover it can know the universal, which is abstracted from individual matter, and which consequently is not limited to one individual, but, considered in itself, extends to an infinite number of individuals.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER OUR INTELLECT CAN KNOW CONTINGENT THINGS?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the intellect cannot know contingent things: because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi. 6), the objects of understanding, wisdom and knowledge are not contingent, but necessary things.

Obj. 2. Further, as stated in Phys. iv. 12, what sometimes is and sometimes is not, is measured by time. Now the intellect abstracts from time, and from other material conditions. Therefore, as it is proper to a contingent thing sometime to be and sometime not to be, it seems that contingent things are not known by the intellect.
On the contrary, All knowledge is in the intellect. But some sciences are of contingent things, as the moral sciences, the objects of which are human actions subject to free-will; and, again, the natural sciences in as far as they relate to things generated and corruptible. Therefore the intellect knows contingent things.

I answer that, Contingent things can be considered in two ways; either as contingent, or as containing some element of necessity, since every contingent thing has in it something necessary: for example, that Socrates runs, is in itself contingent; but the relation of running to motion is necessary, for it is necessary that Socrates move if he runs. Now contingency arises from matter, for contingency is a potentiality to be or not to be, and potentiality belongs to matter; whereas necessity results from form, because whatever is consequent on form is of necessity in the subject. But matter is the individualizing principle: whereas the universal comes from the abstraction of the form from the particular matter. Moreover it was laid down above (A. 1) that the intellect of itself and directly has the universal for its object; while the object of sense is the singular, which in a certain way is the indirect object of the intellect, as we have said above (ibid.). Therefore the contingent, considered as such, is known directly by sense and indirectly by the intellect; while the universal and necessary principles of contingent things are known only by the intellect. Hence if we consider the objects of science in their universal principles, then all science is of necessary things. But if we consider the things themselves, thus some sciences are of necessary things, some of contingent things.

From which the replies to the objections are clear.
FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER OUR INTELLECT CAN KNOW THE FUTURE?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect knows the future. For our intellect knows by means of intelligible species abstracted from the here and now, and related indifferently to all time. But it can know the present. Therefore it can know the future.

Obj. 2. Further, man, while his senses are in suspense, can know some future things, as in sleep, and in frenzy. But the intellect is freer and more vigorous when removed from sense. Therefore the intellect of its own nature can know the future.

Obj. 3. The intellectual knowledge of man is superior to any knowledge of brutes. But some animals know the future; thus crows by their frequent cawing foretell rain. Therefore much more can the intellect know the future.

On the contrary, It is written (Eccles. viii. 6, 7), There is great affliction for man, because he is ignorant of things past; and things to come he cannot know by any messenger.

I answer that, We must apply the same distinction to future things, as we applied above (A. 3) to contingent things. For future things considered as subject to time are singular, and the human intellect knows them by reflection only, as stated above (A. 1). But the principles of future things may be universal; and thus they may enter the domain of the intellect and become the objects of science.

Speaking, however, of the knowledge of the future in a general way, we must observe that the future may be known in two ways: either in itself, or in its cause. The future cannot be known in itself save by God alone; to Whom even that is present which in the course of events is future, forasmuch as from eternity His glance embraces the whole course of time, as we have said above when treating of God's knowledge (Q. XIV., A. 13). But for-
asmuch as it exists in its cause, the future can be known by us also. And if, indeed, the cause be such as to have a necessary connection with its future result, then the future is known with scientific certitude, just as the astronomer foresees the future eclipse. If, however, the cause be such as to produce a certain result more frequently than not, then can the future be known more or less conjecturally, according as its cause is more or less inclined to produce the effect.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument considers that knowledge which is drawn from universal causal principles; from these the future may be known, according to the order of the effects to the cause.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (Confess. xii.),* the soul has a certain power of forecasting, so that by its very nature it can know the future; hence when withdrawn from corporeal sense, and, as it were, concentrated on itself, it shares in the knowledge of the future. Such an opinion would be reasonable if we were to admit that the soul receives knowledge by participating the ideas as the Platonists maintained, because in that case the soul by its nature would know the universal causes of all effects, and would only be impeded in its knowledge by the body; and hence when withdrawn from the corporeal senses it would know the future.

But since it is connatural to our intellect to know things, not thus, but by receiving its knowledge from the senses; it is not natural for the soul to know the future when withdrawn from the senses: rather does it know the future by the impression of superior spiritual and corporeal causes; of spiritual causes, when by Divine power the human intellect is enlightened through the ministry of angels, and the phantasms are directed to the knowledge of future events; or, by the influence of demons, when the imagination is moved regarding the future known to the demons, as explained above (Q. LVII., A. 3). The soul is naturally more inclined to receive these impressions of spiritual

* Gen. ad lit. xii. 13.
causes when it is withdrawn from the senses, as it is then nearer to the spiritual world, and freer from external distractions.—The same may also come from superior corporeal causes. For it is clear that superior bodies influence inferior bodies. Hence, in consequence of the sensitive faculties being acts of corporeal organs, the influence of the heavenly bodies causes the imagination to be affected, and so, as the heavenly bodies cause many future events, the imagination receives certain images of some such events. These images are perceived more at night and while we sleep than in the daytime and while we are awake, because, as stated in De Somn. et Vig. ii., impressions made by day are evanescent. The night air is calmer, when silence reigns, hence bodily impressions are made in sleep, when slight internal movements are felt more than in wakefulness, and such movements produce in the imagination images from which the future may be foreseen.

Reply Obj. 3. Brute animals have no power above the imagination wherewith to regulate it, as man has his reason, and therefore their imagination follows entirely the influence of the heavenly bodies. Thus from such animals' movements some future things, such as rain and the like, may be known rather than from human movements directed by reason. Hence the Philosopher says (ibid.), that some who are most imprudent are most far-seeing; for their intelligence is not burdened with cares, but is as it were barren and bare of all anxiety, moving at the caprice of whatever is brought to bear on it.

* De Divinat. per somn. ii.
QUESTION LXXXVII.
HOW THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS ITSELF
AND ALL WITHIN ITSELF.
(In Four Articles.)

We have now to consider how the intellectual soul knows itself and all within itself. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the soul knows itself by its own essence? (2) Whether it knows its own habits? (3) How does the intellect know its own act? (4) How does it know the act of the will?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS ITSELF BY ITS ESSENCE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the intellectual soul knows itself by its own essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. ix. 3), that the mind knows itself by itself, because it is incorporeal.

Obj. 2. Further, both angels and human souls belong to the genus of intellectual substance. But an angel understands itself by its own essence. Therefore likewise does the human soul.

Obj. 3. Further, in things void of matter, the intellect and that which is understood are the same (De Anima iii. 4). But the human mind is void of matter, not being the act of a body, as stated above (Q. LXXVI., A. 1). Therefore the intellect and its object are the same in the human mind; and therefore the human mind understands itself by its own essence.

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On the contrary, It is said (De Anima iii., ibid.) that the intellect understands itself in the same way as it understands other things. But it understands other things, not by their essence, but by their similitudes. Therefore it does not understand itself by its own essence.

I answer that, Everything is knowable so far as it is in act, and not, so far as it is in potentiality (Metaph. ix., Did. viii. 9) : for a thing is a being, and is true, and therefore knowable, according as it is actual. This is quite clear as regards sensible things, for the eye does not see what is potentially, but what is actually coloured. In like manner it is clear that the intellect, so far as it knows material things, does not know save what is in act: and hence it does not know primary matter except as proportionate to form, as is stated Phys. i. 7. Consequently immaterial substances are intelligible by their own essence, according as each one is actual by its own essence.

Therefore it is that the Essence of God, the pure and perfect act, is simply and perfectly in itself intelligible; and hence God by His own Essence knows Himself, and all other things also. The angelic essence belongs, indeed, to the genus of intelligible things as act, but not as a pure act, nor as a complete act, and hence the angel’s act of intelligence is not completed by his essence. For although an angel understands himself by his own essence, still he cannot understand all other things by his own essence; for he knows things other than himself by their likenesses. Now the human intellect is only a potentiality in the genus of intelligible beings, just as primary matter is a potentiality as regards sensible beings; and hence it is called possible.* Therefore in its essence the human mind is potentially understanding. Hence it has in itself the power to understand, but not to be understood, except as it is made actual. For even the Platonists asserted that an order of intelligible beings existed above the order of intellects, forasmuch as the intellect understands only by participation of the intelligible;

* Possibilis,—elsewhere in this translation rendered ‘passive.’—Ed.
for they said that the participator is below what it participates. If, therefore, the human intellect, as the Platonists held, became actual by participating separate intelligible forms, it would understand itself by such participation of incorporeal beings. But as in this life our intellect has material and sensible things for its proper natural object, as stated above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7), it understands itself according as it is made actual by the species abstracted from sensible things, through the light of the active intellect, which not only actuates the intelligible things themselves, but also, by their instrumentality, actuates the passive intellect. Therefore the intellect knows itself not by its essence, but by its act. This happens in two ways: In the first place, singularly, as when Socrates or Plato perceives that he has an intellectual soul because he perceives that he understands. In the second place, universally, as when we consider the nature of the human mind from knowledge of the intellectual act. It is true, however, that the judgment and force of this knowledge, whereby we know the nature of the soul, comes to us according to the derivation of our intellectual light from the Divine Truth which contains the types of all things as above stated (Q. LXXXIV., A. 5). Hence Augustine says (De Trin. ix. 6): We gaze on the inviolable truth whence we can as perfectly as possible define, not what each man's mind is, but what it ought to be in the light of the eternal types. There is, however, a difference between these two kinds of knowledge, and it consists in this that the mere presence of the mind suffices for the first; the mind itself being the principle of action whereby it perceives itself, and hence it is said to know itself by its own presence. But as regards the second kind of knowledge, the mere presence of the mind does not suffice, and there is further required a careful and subtle inquiry. Hence many are ignorant of the soul's nature, and many have erred about it. So Augustine says (De Trin. x. 9), concerning such mental inquiry: Let the mind strive not to see itself as if it were absent, but to discern itself as present—i.e., to know how
it differs from other things; which is to know its essence and nature.

Reply Obj. 1. The mind knows itself by means of itself, because at length it acquires knowledge of itself, though led thereto by its own act:—because it is itself that it knows, since it loves itself, as he says in the same passage. For a thing can be called self-evident in two ways, either because we can know it by nothing else except itself, as first principles are called self-evident; or because it is not accidentally knowable, as colour is visible of itself, whereas substance is visible by its accident.

Reply Obj. 2. The essence of an angel is as an act in the genus of intelligible things, and therefore it is both intellect and the thing understood. Hence an angel apprehends his own essence through itself: not so the human mind, which is either altogether in potentiality to intelligible things,—as is the passive intellect,—or is the act of intelligible things abstracted from the phantasms,—as is the active intellect.

Reply Obj. 3. This saying of the Philosopher is universally true in every kind of intellect. For as sense in act is the sensible in act, by reason of the sensible likeness which is the form of sense in act, so likewise the intellect in act is the object understood in act, by reason of the likeness of the thing understood, which is the form of the intellect in act. So the human intellect, which becomes actual by the species of the object understood, is itself understood by the same species as by its own form. Now to say that in things without matter the intellect and what is understood are the same, is equal to saying that as regards things actually understood the intellect and what is understood are the same. For a thing is actually understood in that it is immaterial. But a distinction must be drawn: since the essences of some things are immaterial,—as the separate substances called angels, each of which is understood and understands, whereas there are other things whose essences are not wholly immaterial, but only the abstract likenesses thereof. Hence the Commentator says (De Anima iii.)
that the proposition quoted is true only of separate substances; because in a sense it is verified in their regard, and not in regard of other substances, as already stated (Reply Obj. 2).

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER OUR INTELLECT KNOWS THE HABITS OF THE SOUL BY THEIR ESSENCE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiii. 1): Faith is not seen in the heart wherein it abides, as the soul of a man may be seen by another from the movement of the body; but we know most certainly that it is there, and conscience proclaims its existence; and the same principle applies to the other habits of the soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are not known by their acts, but by themselves.

Obj. 2. Further, material things outside the soul are known by their likeness being present in the soul, and are said therefore to be known by their likenesses. But the soul’s habits are present by their essence in the soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are known by their essence.

Obj. 3. Further, whatever is the cause of a thing being such is still more so. But habits and intelligible species cause things to be known by the soul. Therefore they are still more known by the soul in themselves.

On the contrary, Habits like powers are the principles of acts. But as is said (De Anima ii. 4), acts and operations are logically prior to powers. Therefore in the same way they are prior to habits; and thus habits, like the powers, are known by their acts.

I answer that, A habit is a kind of medium between mere power and mere act. Now, it has been said (A. 1) that nothing is known but as it is actual: therefore so far as a habit fails in being a perfect act, it falls short in being of itself knowable, and can be known only by its
act; thus, for example, anyone knows he has a habit from the fact that he can produce the act proper to that habit; or he may inquire into the nature and idea of the habit by considering the act. The first kind of knowledge of the habit arises from its being present, for the very fact of its presence causes the act whereby it is known. The second kind of knowledge of the habit arises from a careful inquiry, as is explained above of the mind (A. 1).

Reply Obj. 1. Although faith is not known by external movement of the body, it is perceived by the subject wherein it resides, by the interior act of the heart. For no one knows that he has faith unless he knows that he believes.

Reply Obj. 2. Habits are present in our intellect, not as its object,—since, in the present state of life, our intellect's object is the nature of a material thing as stated above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7),—but as that by which it understands.

Reply Obj. 3. The axiom, whatever is the cause of a thing being such, is still more so, is true of things that are of the same order, for instance, of the same kind of cause; for example, we may say that health is desirable on account of life, and therefore life is more desirable still. But if we take things of different orders the axiom is not true: for we may say that health is caused by medicine, but it does not follow that medicine is more desirable than health, for health belongs to the order of final causes, whereas medicine belongs to the order of efficient causes. So of two things belonging essentially to the order of the objects of knowledge, the one which is the cause of the other being known, is the more known, as principles are more known than conclusions. But habit as such does not belong to the order of objects of knowledge; nor are things known on account of the habit, as on account of an object known, but as on account of a disposition or form whereby the subject knows: and therefore the argument does not prove.
Third Article.

Whether our intellect knows its own act?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that our intellect does not know its own act. For what is known is the object of the knowing faculty. But the act differs from the object. Therefore the intellect does not know its own act.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is known is known by some act. If, then, the intellect knows its own act, it knows it by some act, and again it knows that act by some other act; this is to proceed indefinitely, which seems impossible.

Obj. 3. Further, the intellect has the same relation to its act as sense has to its act. But the proper sense does not feel its own act, for this belongs to the common sense, as stated De Anima iii. 2. Therefore neither does the intellect understand its own act.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x. 11), I understand that I understand.

I answer that, As stated above (AA. 1, 2) a thing is intelligible according as it is in act. Now the ultimate perfection of the intellect consists in its own operation: for this is not an act tending to something else in which lies the perfection of the work accomplished, as building is the perfection of the thing built; but it remains in the agent as its perfection and act, as is said Metaph. ix. (Did. viii. 8). Therefore the first thing understood of the intellect is its own act of understanding. This occurs in different ways with different intellects. For there is an intellect, namely, the Divine, which is its own act of intelligence, so that in God the understanding of His intelligence, and the understanding of His Essence, are one and the same act, because His Essence is His act of understanding. But there is another intellect, the angelic, which is not its own act of understanding, as we have said above (Q. LXXIX. A. 1), and yet the first object of that act is the angelic essence. Wherefore although there is a logical distinction between
the act whereby he understands that he understands, and
that whereby he understands his essence, yet he under-
stands both by one and the same act; because to under-
stand his own essence is the proper perfection of his
essence, and by one and the same act is a thing, together
with its perfection, understood. And there is yet another,
namely, the human intellect, which neither is its own act
of understanding, nor is its own essence the first object of
its act of understanding, for this object is the nature of a
material thing. And therefore that which is first known by
the human intellect is an object of this kind, and that which
is known secondarily is the act by which that object is
known; and through the act the intellect itself is known,
the perfection of which is this act of understanding. For
this reason did the Philosopher assert that objects are
known before acts, and acts before powers (De Anima ii. 4).

Reply Obj. 1. The object of the intellect is something
universal, namely, being and the true, in which the act also
of understanding is comprised. Therefore the intellect can
understand its own act. But not primarily, since the first
object of our intellect, in this state of life, is not every being
and everything true, but being and true, as considered in
material things, as we have said above (Q. LXXXIV.,
A. 7), from which it acquires knowledge of all other things.

Reply Obj. 2. The intelligent act of the human intellect
is not the act and perfection of the material nature under-
stood, as if the nature of the material thing and the intelli-
gent act could be understood by one act; just as a thing
and its perfection are understood by one act. Hence the
act whereby the intellect understands a stone is distinct
from the act whereby it understands that it understands a
stone; and so on. Nor is there any difficulty in the intellect
being thus potentially infinite, as explained above (Q.
LXXXVI., A. 2).

Reply Obj. 3. The proper sense feels by reason of the
immutation in the material organ caused by the external
sensible. A material object, however, cannot immute itself;
but one is immuted by another, and therefore the act of
the proper sense is perceived by the common sense. The intellect, on the contrary, does not perform the act of understanding by the material immutation of an organ; and so there is no comparison.

**Forth Article.**

**Whether the intellect understands the act of the will?**

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the intellect does not understand the act of the will. For nothing is known by the intellect, unless it be in some present in the intellect. But the act of the will is not in the intellect; since the will and the intellect are distinct. Therefore the act of the will is not known by the intellect.

Obj. 2. Further, the act is specified by the object. But the object of the will is not the same as the object of the intellect. Therefore the act of the will is specifically distinct from the object of the intellect, and therefore the act of the will is not known by the intellect.

Obj. 3. Augustine (Confess. x. 17) says of the soul's affections that they are known neither by images as bodies are known; nor by their presence, like the arts; but by certain notions. Now it does not seem that there can be in the soul any other notions of things, but either the essences of things known or the likenesses thereof. Therefore it seems impossible for the intellect to know such affections of the soul as the acts of the will.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. x. 11), I understand that I will.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. LIX., A. 1), the act of the will is nothing but an inclination consequent on the form understood; just as the natural appetite is an inclination consequent on the natural form. Now the inclination of a thing resides in it according to its mode of existence; and hence the natural inclination resides in a natural thing naturally, and the inclination called the sensible appetite
is in the sensible thing sensibly; and likewise the intelligible inclination, which is the act of the will, is in the intelligent subject intelligibly, as in its principle and proper subject. Hence the Philosopher expresses himself thus (De Anima iii. 9),—that the will is in the reason. Now whatever is intelligibly in an intelligent subject, is understood by that subject. Therefore the act of the will is understood by the intellect, both inasmuch as one knows that one wills; and inasmuch as one knows the nature of this act, and consequently, the nature of its principle which is the habit or power.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument would hold good if the will and the intellect were in different subjects, as they are distinct powers; for then whatever was in the will would not be in the intellect. But as both are rooted in the same substance of the soul, and since one is in a certain way the principle of the other, consequently what is in the will is, in a certain way, also in the intellect.

Reply Obj. 2. The good and the true which are the objects of the will and of the intellect, differ logically, but one is contained in the other, as we have said above (Q. LXXXII., A. 4, ad 1; Q. XVI., A. 4, ad 1); for the true is good, and the good is true. Therefore the objects of the will fall under the intellect, and those of the intellect can fall under the will.

Reply Obj. 3. The affections of the soul are in the intellect not by similitude only, like bodies; nor by being present in their subject, as the arts; but as the thing caused is in its principle, which contains some notion of the thing caused. And so Augustine says that the soul's affections are in the memory by certain notions.
QUESTION LXXXVIII.

HOW THE HUMAN SOUL KNOWS WHAT IS ABOVE ITSELF.

(In Three Articles.)

We must now consider how the human soul knows what is above itself, viz., immaterial substances. Under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand the immaterial substances called angels, in themselves? (2) Whether it can arrive at the knowledge thereof by the knowledge of material things? (3) Whether God is the first object of our knowledge?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE HUMAN SOUL IN THE PRESENT STATE OF LIFE CAN UNDERSTAND IMMATERIAL SUBSTANCES IN THEMSELVES?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the human soul in the present state of life can understand immaterial substances in themselves. For Augustine (De Trin. ix. 3) says: As the mind itself acquires the knowledge of corporeal things by means of the corporeal senses, so it gains from itself the knowledge of incorporeal things. But these are the immaterial substances. Therefore the human mind understands immaterial substances.

Obj. 2. Further, like is known by like. But the human mind is more akin to immaterial than to material things; since its own nature is immaterial, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. LXXVI., A. 1). Since then our mind understands material things, much more is it able to understand immaterial things.
Obj. 3. Further, the fact that objects which are in themselves most sensible are not most felt by us, comes from sense being corrupted by their very excellence. But the intellect is not subject to such a corrupting influence from its object as is stated De Anima iii. 4. Therefore things which are in themselves in the highest degree of intelligibility, are likewise to us most intelligible. As material things, however, are intelligible only so far as we make them actually so by abstracting them from material conditions, it is clear that those substances are more intelligible in themselves whose nature is immaterial. Therefore they are much more known to us than are material things.

Obj. 4. Further, the Commentator says (Metaph. ii.) that, nature would be frustrated in its end were we unable to understand abstract substances, because it would have made what in itself is naturally intelligible not to be understood at all. But in nature nothing is idle or purposeless. Therefore immaterial substances can be understood by us.

Obj. 5. Further, as sense is to the sensible, so is intellect to the intelligible. But our sight can see all things corporeal, whether superior and incorruptible; or lower and corruptible. Therefore our intellect can understand all intelligible substances, even the superior and immaterial.

On the contrary, It is written (Wisd. ix. 16): The things that are in heaven who shall search out? But these substances are said to be in heaven, according to Matthew xviii. 10, Their angels in heaven, etc. Therefore immaterial substances cannot be known by human investigation.

I answer that, In the opinion of Plato, immaterial substances are not only understood by us, but are the objects we understand first of all. For Plato taught that immaterial subsisting forms, which he called Ideas, are the proper objects of our intellect, and are thus first and per se understood by us; and, further, that material objects are known by the soul inasmuch as phantasy and sense are mixed up with the mind. Hence the purer the intellect is,
so much the more clearly does it perceive the intelligible truth of immaterial things.

But in Aristotle's opinion, which experience corroborates, our intellect in its present state of life has a natural relationship to the natures of material things; and therefore it can only understand by turning to the phantasms, as we have said above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7). Thus it clearly appears that immaterial substances which do not fall under sense and imagination, cannot first and _per se_ be known by us, according to the mode of knowledge which experience proves us to have.

Nevertheless Averroës (Comment. De Anima iii.) teaches that in this present life man can in the end arrive at the knowledge of separate substances by being coupled or united to some separate substance, which he calls the _active intellect_, and which, being a separate substance itself, can naturally understand separate substances. Hence, when it is perfectly united to us so that by its means we are able to understand perfectly, we also shall be able to understand separate substances, as in the present life through the medium of the passive intellect united to us, we can understand material things. Now he said that the active intellect is united to us, thus.—For since we understand by means of both the active intellect and intelligible objects, as, for instance, we understand conclusions by principles understood; it is clear that the active intellect must be compared to the objects understood, either as the principal agent is to the instrument, or as form to matter. For an action is ascribed to two principles in one of these two ways; to a principal agent and to an instrument, as cutting to the workman and the saw; to a form and its subject, as heating to heat and fire. In both these ways the active intellect can be compared to the intelligible object as perfection is to the perfectible, and as act is to potentiality. Now a subject is made perfect and receives its perfection at one and the same time, as the reception of what is actually visible synchronizes with the reception of light in the eye. Therefore the passive intellect receives
the intelligible object and the active intellect together; and
the more numerous the intelligible objects received, so
much the nearer do we come to the point of perfect union
between ourselves and the active intellect; so much so that
when we understand all the intelligible objects, the active
intellect becomes one with us, and by its instrumentality
we can understand all things material and immaterial. In
this he makes the ultimate happiness of man to consist.
Nor, as regards the present inquiry, does it matter whether
the passive intellect in that state of happiness understands
separate substances by the instrumentality of the active
intellect, as he himself maintains, or whether (as he says
Alexander holds) the passive intellect can never understand
separate substances (because according to him it is cor-
ruptible), but man understands separate substances by
means of the active intellect.

This opinion, however, is untrue. First, because, sup-
posing the active intellect to be a separate substance, we
could not formally understand by its instrumentality, for
the medium of an agent’s formal action consists in its form
and act, since every agent acts according to its actuality,
as was said of the passive intellect (Q. LXX., A. 1).
Secondly, this opinion is untrue, because in the above
explanation, the active intellect, supposing it to be a
separate substance, would not be joined to us in its sub-
stance, but only in its light, as participated in things
understood; and would not extend to the other acts of the
active intellect so as to enable us to understand immaterial
substances; just as when we see colours set off by the sun,
we are not united to the substance of the sun so as to act
like the sun, but its light only is united to us, that we may
see the colours. Thirdly, this opinion is untrue, because
granted that, as above explained, the active intellect were
united to us in substance, still it is not said that it is wholly
so united in regard to one intelligible object, or two;
but rather in regard to all intelligible objects. But all such
objects together do not equal the force of the active intellect,
as it is a much greater thing to understand separate sub-
stances than to understand all material things. Hence it clearly follows that the knowledge of all material things would not make the active intellect to be so united to us as to enable us by its instrumentality to understand separate substances.

Fourthly, this opinion is untrue, because it is hardly possible for anyone in this world to understand all material things: and thus no one, or very few, could reach to perfect felicity; which is against what the Philosopher says (Ethic. i. 9), that happiness is a kind of common good, communicable to all capable of virtue. Further, it is unreasonable that only the few of any species attain to the end of the species.

Fifthly, the Philosopher expressly says (Ethic. i. 10), that happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue; and after enumerating many virtues in the tenth book, he concludes (ch. 7) that ultimate happiness consisting in the knowledge of the highest things intelligible is attained through the virtue of wisdom, which in the sixth chapter he had named as the chief of speculative sciences. Hence Aristotle clearly places the ultimate felicity of man in the knowledge of separate substances, obtainable by speculative science; and not by being united to the active intellect, as some imagined.

Sixthly, as was shown above (Q. LXXIX., A. 4), the active intellect is not a separate substance; but a faculty of the soul, extending itself actively to the same objects to which the passive intellect extends receptively; because, as is stated (De Anima iii. 5), the passive intellect is all things potentially, and the active intellect is all things in act. Therefore both intelligents, according to the present state of life, extend to material things only, which are made actually intelligible by the active intellect, and are received in the passive intellect. Hence in the present state of life we cannot understand separate immaterial substances in themselves, either by the passive or by the active intellect.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine may be taken to mean that the knowledge of incorporeal things in the mind can be gained
by the mind itself. This is so true that philosophers also say that the knowledge concerning the soul is a principle for the knowledge of separate substances. For by knowing itself, it attains to some knowledge of incorporeal substances, such as is within its compass; not that the knowledge of itself gives it a perfect and absolute knowledge of them.

Reply Obj. 2. The likeness of nature is not a sufficient cause of knowledge; otherwise what Empedocles said would be true—that the soul needs to have the nature of all in order to know all. But knowledge requires that the likeness of the thing known be in the knower, as a kind of form thereof. Now our passive intellect, in the present state of life, is such that it can be informed with similitudes abstracted from phantasms: and therefore it knows material things rather than immaterial substances.

Reply Obj. 3. There must needs be some proportion between the object and the faculty of knowledge; such as of the active to the passive, and of perfection to the perfectible. Hence that sensible objects of great power are not grasped by the senses, is due not merely to the fact that they corrupt the organ, but also to their being improporsionate to the sensitive power. And thus it is that immaterial substances are improporsionate to our intellect, in our present state of life, so that it cannot understand them.

Reply Obj. 4. This argument of the Commentator fails in several ways. First, because if separate substances are not understood by us, it does not follow that they are not understood by any intellect; for they are understood by themselves, and by one another.

Secondly, to be understood by us is not the end of separate substances: while only that is vain and purposeless, which fails to attain its end. It does not follow, therefore, that immaterial substances are purposeless, even if they are not understood by us at all.

Reply Obj. 5. Sense knows bodies, whether superior or inferior, in the same way, that is, by the sensible acting on the organ. But we do not understand material and im-
material substances in the same way. The former we understand by a process of abstraction, which is impossible in the case of the latter, for there are no phantasms of what is immaterial.

**SECOND ARTICLE.**

**WHETHER OUR INTELLECT CAN UNDERSTAND IMMATERIAL SUBSTANCES THROUGH ITS KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL THINGS?**

*We proceed thus to the Second Article:—*

**Objection** 1. It would seem that our intellect can know immaterial substances through the knowledge of material things. For Dionysius says (*Cæl. Hier.* i.) that *the human mind cannot be raised up to immaterial contemplation of the heavenly hierarchies, unless it is led thereto by material guidance according to its own nature.* Therefore we can be led by material things to know immaterial substances.

**Obj.** 2. Further, science resides in the intellect. But there are sciences and definitions of immaterial substances; for Damascene defines an angel (*De Fid. Orth.* ii. 3); and we find angels treated of both in theology and philosophy. Therefore immaterial substances can be understood by us.

**Obj.** 3. Further, the human soul belongs to the genus of immaterial substances. But it can be understood by us through its act by which it understands material things. Therefore also other material substances can be understood by us, through their material effects.

**Obj.** 4. Further, the only cause which cannot be comprehended through its effects is that which is infinitely distant from them, and this belongs to God alone. Therefore other created immaterial substances can be understood by us through material things.

*On the contrary,* Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* i.) that *intelligible things cannot be understood through sensible things, nor composite things through simple, nor incorporeal through corporeal.*

*I answer that,* Averroës says (*De Anima* iii.) that a philo-
sopher named Avempace* taught that by the understanding of natural substances we can be led, according to true philosophical principles, to the knowledge of immaterial substances. For since the nature of our intellect is to abstract the quiddity of material things from matter, anything material residing in that abstracted quiddity can again be made subject to abstraction; and as the process of abstraction cannot go on for ever, it must arrive at length at some immaterial quiddity, absolutely without matter; and this would be the understanding of immaterial substance.

Now this opinion would be true, were immaterial substances the forms and species of these material things; as the Platonists supposed. But supposing, on the contrary, that immaterial substances differ altogether from the quiddity of material things, it follows that, however much our intellect abstract the quiddity of material things from matter, it could never arrive at anything akin to immaterial substance. Therefore we are not able perfectly to understand immaterial substances through material substances.

Reply Obj. 1. From material things we can rise to some kind of knowledge of immaterial things, but not to the perfect knowledge thereof; for there is no proper and adequate proportion between material and immaterial things, and the likenesses drawn from material things for the understanding of immaterial things are very dissimilar therefrom, as Dionysius says (Cæl. Hier. ii.).

Reply Obj. 2. Science treats of higher things principally by way of negation. Thus Aristotle (De Cæl. i. 3) explains the heavenly bodies by denying to them inferior corporeal properties. Hence it follows that much less can immaterial substances be known by us in such a way as to make us know their quiddity; but we may have a scientific knowledge of them by way of negation and by their relation to material things.

Reply Obj. 3. The human soul understands itself through its own act of understanding, which is proper to it, showing perfectly its power and nature. But the power and nature

* Ibn-Badja, Arabian Philosopher; ob. 1138.
of immaterial substances cannot be perfectly known through such act, nor through any other material thing, because there is no proportion between the latter and the power of the former.

Reply Obj. 4. Created immaterial substances are not in the same natural genus as material substances, for they do not agree in power or in matter; but they belong to the same logical genus, because even immaterial substances are in the predicament of substance, as their essence is distinct from their existence. But God has no connection with material things, as regards either natural genus or logical genus; because God is in no genus, as stated above (Q. III., A. 5). Hence through the likeness derived from material things we can know something positive concerning the angels, according to some common notion, though not according to the specific nature; whereas we cannot acquire any such knowledge at all about God.

**Third Article.**

**Whether God is the First Object Known by the Human Mind?**

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

**Objection 1.** It would seem that God is the first object known by the human mind. For that object in which all others are known, and by which we judge others, is the first thing known to us; as light is to the eye, and first principles to the intellect. But we know all things in the light of the first truth, and thereby judge of all things, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii. 2; De Vera Rel. xxxi.*). Therefore God is the first object known to us.

**Obj. 2.** Further, whatever causes a thing to be such is more so. But God is the cause of all our knowledge; for He is the true light which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world (Jo. i. 9). Therefore God is our first and most known object.

**Obj. 3.** Further, what is first known in the image is the

* Confess. xii. 25.
exemplar to which it is made. But in our mind is the image of God, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii. 4, 7). Therefore God is the first object known to our mind.

*On the contrary, No man hath seen God at any time* (Jo. i. 18).

*I answer that*, Since the human intellect in the present state of life cannot understand even immaterial created substances (A. 1), much less can it understand the essence of the uncreated substance. Hence it must be said simply that God is not the first object of our knowledge. Rather do we know God through creatures, according to the Apostle (Rom. i. 20), *the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made*: while the first object of our knowledge in this life is the *quiddity of a material thing*, which is the proper object of our intellect, as appears above in many passages (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7; Q. LXXXV., A. 8; Q. LXXXVII., A. 2, *ad 2*).

*Reply Obj. 1.* We see and judge of all things in the light of the first truth, forasmuch as the light itself of our mind, whether natural or gratuitous, is nothing else than the impression of the first truth upon it, as stated above, (Q. XII., A. 2). Hence, as the light itself of our intellect is not the object it understands, but the medium whereby it understands, much less can it be said that God is the first object known by our intellect.

*Reply Obj. 2.* The axiom, *Whatever causes a thing to be such is more so*, must be understood of things belonging to one and the same order, as explained above (Q. LXXXVII., A. 2, *ad 3*). Other things than God are known because of God; not as if He were the first known object, but because He is the first cause of our faculty of knowledge.

*Reply Obj. 3.* If there existed in our souls a perfect image of God, as the Son is the perfect image of the Father, our mind would know God at once. But the image in our mind is imperfect; hence the argument does not prove.
QUESTION LXXXIX.

OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOUL.

(In Eight Articles.)

We must now consider the knowledge of the separated soul. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether the soul separated from the body can understand? (2) Whether it understands separate substances? (3) Whether it understands all natural things? (4) Whether it understands individuals and singulars? (5) Whether the habits of knowledge acquired in this life remain? (6) Whether the soul can use the habit of knowledge here acquired? (7) Whether local distance impedes the separated soul's knowledge? (8) Whether souls separated from the body know what happens here?

FIRST ARTICLE.

Whether the separated soul can understand anything?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the soul separated from the body can understand nothing at all. For the Philosopher says (De Anima i. 4), that the understanding is corrupted together with its interior principle. But by death all human interior principles are corrupted. Therefore also the intellect itself is corrupted.

Obj. 2. Further, the human soul is hindered from understanding when the senses are tied, and by a distracted imagination, as explained above (Q. LXXXIV., AA. 7, 8). But death destroys the senses and imagination, as we have shown above (Q. LXXVII., A. 8). Therefore after death the soul understands nothing.
Obj. 3. Further, if the separated soul can understand, this must be by means of some species. But it does not understand by means of innate species, because it has none such; being at first like a tablet on which nothing is written: nor does it understand by species abstracted from things, for it does not then possess organs of sense and imagination which are necessary for the abstraction of species: nor does it understand by means of species, formerly abstracted and retained in the soul; for if that were so, a child’s soul would have no means of understanding at all: nor does it understand by means of intelligible species divinely infused, for such knowledge would not be natural, such as we treat of now, but the effect of grace. Therefore the soul apart from the body understands nothing.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima i. 1), If the soul had no proper operation, it could not be separated from the body. But the soul is separated from the body; therefore it has a proper operation, and above all, that which consists in intelligence. Therefore the soul can understand when it is apart from the body.

I answer that, The difficulty in solving this question arises from the fact that the soul united to the body can understand only by turning to the phantasms, as experience shows. Did this not proceed from the soul’s very nature, but accidentally through its being bound up with the body, as the Platonists said, the difficulty would vanish; for in that case when the body was once removed, the soul would at once return to its own nature, and would understand intelligible things simply, without turning to the phantasms, as is exemplified in the case of other separate substances. In that case, however, the union of soul and body would not be for the soul’s good, for evidently it would understand worse in the body than out of it; but for the good of the body, which would be unreasonable, since matter exists on account of the form, and not the form for the sake of the matter. But if we admit that the nature of the soul requires it to understand by turning to the phantasms, it will seem, since death does not change its nature, that it
can then naturally understand nothing; as the phantasms are wanting to which it may turn.

To solve this difficulty we must consider that as nothing acts except so far as it is actual, the mode of action in every agent follows from its mode of existence. Now the soul has one mode of being when in the body, and another when apart from it, its nature remaining always the same; but this does not mean that its union with the body is an accidental thing, for, on the contrary, such union belongs to its very nature, just as the nature of a light object is not changed, when it is in its proper place, which is natural to it, and outside its proper place, which is beside its nature. The soul, therefore, when united to the body, consistently with that mode of existence, has a mode of understanding, by turning to corporeal phantasms, which are in corporeal organs; but when it is separated from the body, it has a mode of understanding, by turning to simply intelligible objects, as is proper to other separate substances. Hence it is as natural for the soul to understand by turning to the phantasms as it is for it to be joined to the body; but to be separated from the body is not in accordance with its nature, and likewise to understand without turning to the phantasms is not natural to it; and hence it is united to the body in order that it may have an existence and an operation suitable to its nature. But here again a difficulty arises. For since nature is always ordered to what is best, and since it is better to understand by turning to simply intelligible objects than by turning to the phantasms; God should have ordered the soul's nature so that the nobler way of understanding would have been natural to it, and it would not have needed the body for that purpose.

In order to resolve this difficulty we must consider that while it is true that it is nobler in itself to understand by turning to something higher than to understand by turning to phantasms, nevertheless such a mode of understanding was not so perfect as regards what was possible to the soul. This will appear if we consider that every intellectual substance possesses intellective power by the influence of the
Divine light, which is one and simple in its first principle, and the farther off intellectual creatures are from the first principle so much the more is the light divided and diversified, as is the case with lines radiating from the centre of a circle. Hence it is that God by His one Essence understands all things; while the superior intellectual substances understand by means of a number of species, which nevertheless are fewer and more universal and bestow a deeper comprehension of things, because of the efficaciousness of the intellectual power of such natures: whereas the inferior intellectual natures possess a greater number of species, which are less universal, and bestow a lower degree of comprehension, in proportion as they recede from the intellectual power of the higher natures. If, therefore, the inferior substances received species in the same degree of universality as the superior substances, since they are not so strong in understanding, the knowledge which they would derive through them would be imperfect, and of a general and confused nature. We can see this to a certain extent in man, for those who are of weaker intellect fail to acquire perfect knowledge through the universal conceptions of those who have a better understanding, unless things are explained to them singly and in detail. Now it is clear that in the natural order human souls hold the lowest place among intellectual substances. But the perfection of the universe required various grades of being. If, therefore, God had willed human souls to understand in the same way as separate substances, it would follow that human knowledge, so far from being perfect, would be confused and general. Therefore to make it possible for human souls to possess perfect and proper knowledge, they were so made that their nature required them to be joined to bodies, and thus to receive the proper and adequate knowledge of sensible things from the sensible things themselves; thus we see in the case of uneducated men that they have to be taught by sensible examples.

It is clear then that it was for the soul’s good that it was united to a body, and that it understands by turning to the
phantasms. Nevertheless it is possible for it to exist apart from the body, and also to understand in another way.

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher's words carefully examined will show that he said this on the previous supposition that understanding is a movement of body and soul as united, just as sensation is, for he had not as yet explained the difference between intellect and sense. We may also say that he is referring to the way of understanding by turning to phantasms. This is also the meaning of the second objection.

Reply Obj. 3. The separated soul does not understand by way of innate species, nor by species abstracted then, nor only by species retained, and this the objection proves; but the soul in that state understands by means of participated species arising from the influence of the Divine light, shared by the soul as by other separate substances; though in a lesser degree. Hence as soon as it ceases to act by turning to corporeal (phantasms), the soul turns at once to the superior things; nor is this way of knowledge unnatural, for God is the author of the influx both of the light of grace and of the light of nature.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SEPARATED SOUL UNDERSTANDS SEPARATE SUBSTANCES?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the separated soul does not understand separate substances. For the soul is more perfect when joined to the body than when existing apart from it, being an essential part of human nature; and every part of a whole is more perfect when it exists in that whole. But the soul in the body does not understand separate substances, as shown above (Q. LXXXVIII., A. 1). Therefore much less is it able to do so when apart from the body.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever is known is known either by its presence or by its species. But separate substances
cannot be known to the soul by their presence, for God alone can enter into the soul; nor by means of species abstracted by the soul from an angel, for an angel is more simple than a soul. Therefore the separated soul cannot at all understand separate substances.

Obj. 3. Further, some philosophers said that the ultimate happiness of man consists in the knowledge of separate substances. If, therefore, the separated soul can understand separate substances, its happiness would be secured by its separation alone; which cannot reasonably be said.

On the contrary, Souls apart from the body know other separated souls; as we see in the case of the rich man in hell, who saw Lazarus and Abraham (Luke xvi. 23). Therefore separated souls see the devils and the angels.

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Trin. ix. 3), our mind acquires the knowledge of incorporeal things by itself—i.e., by knowing itself (Q. LXXXVIII., A. 1, ad 1). Therefore from the knowledge which the separated soul has of itself, we can judge how it knows other separate things. Now it was said above (A. 1), that as long as it is united to the body the soul understands by turning to phantasms, and therefore it does not understand itself save through becoming actually intelligent by means of ideas abstracted from phantasms; for thus it understands itself through its own act, as shown above (Q. LXXXVII., A. 1). When, however, it is separated from the body, it understands no longer by turning to phantasms, but by turning to simply intelligible objects; hence in that state it understands itself through itself. Now, every separate substance understands what is above itself and what is below itself, according to the mode of its substance (De Causis, viii.): for a thing is understood according as it is in the one who understands; while one thing is in another according to the nature of that in which it is. And the mode of existence of a separated soul is inferior to that of an angel, but is the same as that of other separated souls. Therefore the soul apart from the body has perfect knowledge of other separated souls, but it has an imperfect and defective knowledge of the angels so
far as its natural knowledge is concerned. But the knowledge of glory is otherwise.

Reply Obj. 1. The separated soul is, indeed, less perfect considering its nature in which it communicates with the nature of the body: but it has a greater freedom of intelligence, since the weight and care of the body is a clog upon the clearness of its intelligence in the present life.

Reply Obj. 2. The separated soul understands the angels by means of divinely impressed ideas; which, however, fail to give perfect knowledge of them, forasmuch as the nature of the soul is inferior to that of an angel.

Reply Obj. 3. Man’s ultimate happiness consists not in the knowledge of any separate substances; but in the knowledge of God, Who is seen only by grace. The knowledge of other separate substances if perfectly understood gives great happiness—not final and ultimate happiness. But the separated soul does not understand them perfectly, as was shown above in this article.

Third Article.

Whether the separated soul knows all natural things?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the separated soul knows all natural things. For the types of all natural things exist in separate substances. Therefore, as separated souls know separate substances, they also know all natural things.

Obj. 2. Further, whoever understands the greater intelligible, will be able much more to understand the lesser intelligible. But the separated soul understands immaterial substances, which are in the highest degree of intelligibility. Therefore much more can it understand all natural things which are in a lower degree of intelligibility.

On the contrary, The devils have greater natural knowledge than the separated soul; yet they do not know all natural things, but have to learn many things by long
experience, as Isidore says (De Summo Bono i.). Therefore neither can the separated soul know all natural things.

Further, if the soul as soon as separated gained knowledge of all natural things, the efforts of men to know would be vain and profitless. But this would be unreasonable. Therefore the separated soul does not know all natural things.

*I answer that,* As stated above (A. 1), the separated soul, like the angels, understands by means of species received from the influence of the Divine light. Nevertheless, as the soul by nature is inferior to an angel, to whom this kind of knowledge is natural, the soul apart from the body through such species does not receive perfect knowledge, but only a general and confused kind of knowledge. Separated souls, therefore, have the same relation through such species to imperfect and confused knowledge of natural things as the angels have to the perfect knowledge thereof. Now angels through such species know all natural things perfectly; because all that God has produced in the respective natures of natural things has been produced by Him in the angelic intelligence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii. 8). Hence it follows that separated souls know all natural things not with a certain and proper knowledge, but in a general and confused manner.

*Reply Obj. 1.* Even an angel does not understand all natural things through his substance, but through certain species, as stated above (Q. LXXXVII., A. 1). So it does not follow that the soul knows all natural things because it knows separate substances after a fashion.

*Reply Obj. 2.* As the soul separated from the body does not perfectly understand separate substances, so neither does it know all natural things perfectly; but it knows them confusedly, as above explained in this article.

*Reply Obj. 3.* Isidore speaks of the knowledge of the future which neither angels, nor demons, nor separated souls, know except so far as future things pre-exist in their causes or are known by Divine revelation. But we are here treating of the knowledge of natural things.
Reply Obj. 4. Knowledge acquired here by study is proper and perfect; the knowledge of which we speak is confused. Hence it does not follow that to study in order to learn is useless.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SEPARATED SOUL KNOWS SINGULARS?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the separated soul does not know singulars. For no cognitive power besides the intellect remains in the separated soul, as is clear from what has been said above (Q. LXXVII., A. 8). But the intellect cannot know singulars, as we have shown (Q. LXXXVI., A. 1). Therefore the separated soul cannot know singulars.

Obj. 2. Further, the knowledge of the singular is more determinate than knowledge of the universal. But the separated soul has no determinate knowledge of the species of natural things, therefore much less can it know singulars.

Obj. 3. Further, if it knew the singulars, yet not by sense, for the same reason it would know all singulars. But it does not know all singulars. Therefore it knows none.

On the contrary, The rich man in hell said: I have five brethren (Luke xvi. 28).

I answer that, Separated souls know some singulars, but not all, not even all present singulars. To understand this, we must consider that there is a twofold way of knowing things, one by means of abstraction from phantasms, and in this way singulars cannot be directly known by the intellect, but only indirectly, as stated above (Q. LXXXVI., A. 1). The other way of understanding is by the infusion of species by God, and in that way it is possible for the intellect to know singulars. For as God knows all things, universal and singular, by His Essence, as the cause of universal and individual principles (Q. XIV., A. 2), so likewise separate substances can know singulars by species which are a kind of participated similitude of the Divine Essence. There is a difference, however, between angels
and separated souls in the fact that through these species the angels have a perfect and proper knowledge of things; whereas separated souls have only a confused knowledge. Hence the angels, by reason of their perfect intellect, through these species, know not only the specific natures of things, but also the singulars contained in those species; whereas separated souls by these species know only those singulars to which they are determined by former knowledge in this life, or by some affection, or by natural aptitude, or by the disposition of the Divine order; because whatever is received into anything is conditioned according to the mode of the recipient.

Reply Obj. 1. The intellect does not know the singular by way of abstraction; neither does the separated soul know it thus; but as explained above.

Reply Obj. 2. The knowledge of the separated soul is confined to those species or individuals to which the soul has some kind of determinate relation, as we have said.

Reply Obj. 3. The separated soul has not the same relation to all singulars, but one relation to some, and another to others. Therefore there is not the same reason why it should know all singulars.

Fifth Article.

Whether the habit of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the habit of knowledge acquired in this life does not remain in the soul separated from the body: for the Apostle says: Knowledge shall be destroyed (1 Cor. xiii. 8).

Obj. 2. Further, some in this world who are less good enjoy knowledge denied to others who are better. If, therefore, the habit of knowledge remained in the soul after death, it would follow that some who are less good would, even in the future life, excel some who are better; which seems unreasonable.
Obj. 3. Further, separated souls will possess knowledge by influence of the Divine light. Supposing, therefore, that knowledge here acquired remained in the separated soul, it would follow that two forms of the same species would co-exist in the same subject, which cannot be.

Obj. 4. Further, the Philosopher says (Prædic. vi. 4, 5), that a habit is a quality hard to remove: yet sometimes knowledge is destroyed by sickness or the like. But in this life there is no change so thorough as death. Therefore it seems that the habit of knowledge is destroyed by death.

On the contrary, Jerome says (Ep. liii. ad Paulinum), Let us learn on earth that kind of knowledge which will remain with us in heaven.

I answer that, Some say that the habit of knowledge resides not in the intellect itself, but in the sensitive powers, namely, the imaginative, cogitative, and memorative, and that the intelligible species are not kept in the passive intellect. If this were true, it would follow that when the body is destroyed by death, knowledge here acquired would also be entirely destroyed.

But, since knowledge resides in the intellect, which is the abode of species, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii. 4), the habit of knowledge here acquired must be partly in the aforesaid sensitive powers, and partly in the intellect. This can be seen by considering the very actions from which knowledge arises. For habits are like the actions whereby they are acquired (Ethic. ii. 1). Now the actions of the intellect, by which knowledge is here acquired, are performed by the mind turning to the phantasms in the aforesaid sensitive powers. Hence through such acts the passive intellect acquires a certain facility in considering the species received: and the aforesaid sensitive powers acquire a certain aptitude in seconding the action of the intellect when it turns to them to consider the intelligible object. But as the intellectual act resides chiefly and formally in the intellect itself, whilst it resides materially and dispositively in the inferior powers, the same distinction is to be applied to habit.
Knowledge, therefore, acquired in the present life does not remain in the separated soul, as regards what belongs to the sensitive powers; but as regards what belongs to the intellect itself, it must remain; because, as the Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitæ ii.), a form may be corrupted in two ways; first, directly, when corrupted by its contrary, as heat, by cold; and, secondly, indirectly, when its subject is corrupted. Now it is evident that human knowledge is not corrupted through corruption of the subject, for the intellect is an incorruptible faculty, as above stated (Q. LXXIX., A. 2, ad 2). Neither can the intelligible species in the passive intellect be corrupted by their contrary; for there is no contrary to intelligible intentions, above all as regards simple intelligence of what a thing is. But contrariety may exist in the intellect as regards mental composition and division, or also reasoning; so far as what is false in statement or argument is contrary to truth. And thus knowledge may be corrupted by its contrary when a false argument seduces anyone from the knowledge of truth. For this reason the Philosopher in the above work mentions two ways in which knowledge is corrupted directly: namely, forgetfulness on the part of the memorative power, and deception on the part of a false argument. But these have no place in the separated soul. Therefore we must conclude that the habit of knowledge, so far as it is in the intellect, remains in the separated soul.

Reply Obj. 1. The Apostle is not speaking of knowledge as a habit, but as to the act of knowing; and hence he says, in proof of the assertion quoted, Now, I know in part.

Reply Obj. 2. As a less good man may exceed a better man in bodily stature, so the same kind of man may have a habit of knowledge in the future life which a better man may not have. Such knowledge, however, cannot be compared with the other prerogatives enjoyed by the better man.

Reply Obj. 3. These two kinds of knowledge are not of the same species, so there is no impossibility.

Reply Obj. 4. This objection considers the corruption of knowledge on the part of the sensitive powers.
SIXTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE ACT OF KNOWLEDGE ACQUIRED HERE REMAINS IN THE SEPARATED SOUL?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the act of knowledge here acquired does not remain in the separated soul. For the Philosopher says (De Anima i. 4), that when the body is corrupted, the soul neither remembers nor loves. But to consider what is previously known is an act of memory. Therefore the separated soul cannot retain an act of knowledge here acquired.

Obj. 2. Further, intelligible species cannot have greater power in the separated soul than they have in the soul united to the body. But in this life we cannot understand by intelligible species without turning to phantasms, as shown above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7). Therefore the separated soul cannot do so, and thus it cannot understand at all by intelligible species acquired in this life.

Obj. 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii. 1), that habits produce acts similar to those whereby they are acquired. But the habit of knowledge is acquired here by acts of the intellect turning to phantasms: therefore it cannot produce any other acts. These acts, however, are not adapted to the separated soul. Therefore the soul in the state of separation cannot produce any act of knowledge acquired in this life.

On the contrary, It was said to Dives in hell (Luke xvi. 25): Remember thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime.

I answer that, Action offers two things for our consideration—its species and its mode. Its species comes from the object, whereunto the faculty of knowledge is directed by the (intelligible) species, which is the object's similitude; whereas the mode is gathered from the power of the agent. Thus that a person see a stone is due to the species of the stone in his eye; but that he see it clearly, is due
to the eye's visual power. Therefore as the intelligible species remain in the separated soul, as stated above (A. 5), and since the state of the separated soul is not the same as it is in this life, it follows that through the intelligible species acquired in this life the soul apart from the body can understand what it understood formerly, but in a different way; not by turning to phantasms, but by a mode suited to a soul existing apart from the body. Thus the act of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul, but in a different way.

Reply Obj. 1. The Philosopher speaks of remembrance, according as memory belongs to the sensitive part, but not as belonging in a way to the intellect, as explained above (Q. LXXIX., A. 6).

Reply Obj. 2. The different mode of intelligence is produced by the different state of the intelligent soul; not by diversity of species.

Reply Obj. 3. The acts which produce a habit are like the acts caused by that habit, in species, but not in mode. For example, to do just things, but not justly, that is, pleasurably, causes the habit of political justice, whereby we act pleasurably. (Cf. Arist. Eth. v. 8: Magn. Moral. i. 34.)

Seventh Article.

Whether local distance impedes the knowledge in the separated soul?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that local distance impedes the separated soul's knowledge. For Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xiii.), that the souls of the dead are where they cannot know what is done here. But they know what is done among themselves. Therefore local distance impedes the knowledge in the separated soul.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (De Divin. Daemon. iii.), that the demons' rapidity of movement enables them to tell things unknown to us. But agility of movement
would be useless in that respect unless their knowledge was
impeded by local distance; which, therefore, is a much
greater hindrance to the knowledge of the separated soul,
whose nature is inferior to the demon's.

 Obj. 3. Further, as there is distance of place, so is there
distance of time. But distance of time impedes knowledge
in the separated soul, for the soul is ignorant of the future.
Therefore it seems that distance of place also impedes its
knowledge.

 On the contrary, It is written (Luke xvi. 23), that Dives,
lifting up his eyes when he was in torment, saw Abraham
afar off. Therefore local distance does not impede know-
ledge in the separated soul.

 I answer that, Some have held that the separated soul
knows the singular by abstraction from the sensible. If
that were so, it might be that local distance would impede
its knowledge; for either the sensible would need to act
upon the soul, or the soul upon the sensible, and in either
case a determinate distance would be necessary. This is,
however, impossible, because abstraction of the species
from the sensible is done through the senses and other
sensible faculties which do not remain actually in the soul
apart from the body. But the soul when separated under-
stands singulars by species derived from the Divine light,
which is indifferent to what is near or distant. Hence
knowledge in the separated soul is not hindered by local
distance.

 Reply Obj. 1. Augustine says that the souls of the
departed cannot see what is done here, not because they
are there, as if impeded by local distance; but for some
other cause, as we shall explain (A. 8).

 Reply Obj. 2. Augustine speaks there in accordance
with the opinion that demons have bodies naturally united
to them, and so have sensitive powers, which require local
distance. In the same book he expressly sets down this
opinion, though apparently rather by way of narration
than of assertion, as we may gather from De Civ. Dei
xxi. 10.
Reply Obj. 3. The future, which is distant in time, does not actually exist, and therefore is not knowable in itself, because so far as a thing falls short of being, so far does it fall short of being knowable. But what is locally distant exists actually, and is knowable in itself. Hence we cannot argue from distance of time to distance of place.

Eighth Article.

Whether separated souls know what takes place on earth?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that separated souls know what takes place on earth; for otherwise they would have no care for it, as they have, according to what Dives said (Luke xvi. 27, 28), I have five brethren ... he may testify unto them, lest they also come into the place of torments. Therefore separated souls know what passes on earth.

Obj. 2. Further, the dead often appear to the living, asleep or awake, and tell them of what takes place here; as Samuel appeared to Saul (1 Kings xxviii. 11). But this could not be unless they knew what takes place here. Therefore they know what takes place on earth.

Obj. 3. Further, separated souls know what happens among themselves. If, therefore, they do not know what takes place among us, it must be by reason of local distance; which has been shown to be false (A. 7).

On the contrary, It is written (Job xiv. 21): He will not understand whether his children come to honour or dishonour.

I answer that, By natural knowledge, of which we are treating now, the souls of the dead do not know what passes on earth. This follows from what has been laid down (A. 4), since the separated soul has knowledge of singulars, by being in a way determined to them, either by some vestige of previous knowledge or affection, or by the Divine order. Now the souls departed are in a state of separation from the living, both by Divine order and by
their mode of existence, whilst they are joined to the world of incorporeal spiritual substances; and hence they are ignorant of what goes on among us. Whereof Gregory gives the reason thus: *The dead do not know how the living act, for the life of the spirit is far from the life of the flesh; and so, as corporeal things differ from incorporeal in genus, so they are distinct in knowledge* (Moral. xii.). Augustine seems to say the same (*De Cura pro Mort. xiii.*), when he asserts that, *the souls of the dead have no concern in the affairs of the living.*

Gregory and Augustine, however, seem to be divided in opinion as regards the souls of the blessed in heaven, for Gregory continues the passage above quoted: *The case of the holy souls is different, for since they see the light of Almighty God, we cannot believe that external things are unknown to them.* But Augustine (*De Cura pro Mort. xiii.*) expressly says: *The dead, even the saints, do not know what is done by the living or by their own children,* as a gloss quotes on the text, *Abraham hath not known us* (Isa. lxiii. 16). He confirms this opinion by saying that he was not visited, nor consoled in sorrow by his mother, as when she was alive; and he could not think it possible that she was less kind when in a happier state; and again by the fact that the Lord promised to king Josias that he should die, lest he should see his people's afflictions (4 Kings xxii. 20). Yet Augustine says this in doubt; and premises, *Let every one take, as he pleases, what I say.* Gregory, on the other hand, is positive, since he says, *We cannot believe.* His opinion, indeed, seems to be the more probable one,—that the souls of the blessed who see God do know all that passes here. For they are equal to the angels, of whom Augustine says that they know what happens among those living on earth. But as the souls of the blessed are most perfectly united to Divine justice, they do not suffer from sorrow, nor do they interfere in mundane affairs, except in accordance with Divine justice.

*Reply Obj. 1.* The souls of the departed may care for the living, even if ignorant of their state; just as we care
for the dead by pouring forth prayer on their behalf, though we are ignorant of their state. Moreover, the affairs of the living can be made known to them not immediately, but souls who pass hence thither, or by angels and demons, or even by the revelation of the Holy Ghost, as Augustine says in the same book.

*Reply Obj. 2.* That the dead appear to the living in any way whatever is either by the special dispensation of God; in order that the souls of the dead may interfere in affairs of the living;—and this is to be accounted as miraculous. Or else such apparitions occur through the instrumentality of bad or good angels, without the knowledge of the departed; as may likewise happen when the living appear, without their own knowledge, to others living, as Augustine says in the same book. And so it may be said of Samuel that he appeared through Divine revelation; according to Ecclus. xlvi. 23, *he slept, and told the king the end of his life.* Or, again, this apparition was procured by the demons; unless, indeed, the authority of Ecclesiasticus be set aside through not being received by the Jews as canonical Scripture.

*Reply Obj. 3.* This kind of ignorance does not proceed from the obstacle of local distance, but from the cause mentioned above.
QUESTION XC.

OF THE FIRST PRODUCTION OF MAN’S SOUL.

(In Four Articles.)

After the foregoing we must consider the first production of man, concerning which there are four subjects of treatment: (1) The production of man himself. (2) The end of this production. (3) The state and condition of the first man. (4) The place of his abode. Concerning the production of man, there are three things to be considered: (1) The production of man’s soul. (2) The production of man’s body. (3) The production of the woman.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether man’s soul was something made, or was of the Divine substance? (2) Whether, if made, it was created? (3) Whether it was made by angelic instrumentality? (4) Whether it was made before the body?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE SOUL WAS MADE, OR WAS OF GOD’S SUBSTANCE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the soul was not made, but was of God’s substance. For it is written (Gen. ii. 7): God formed man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man was made a living soul. But he who breathes sends forth something of himself. Therefore the soul, whereby man lives, is of the Divine substance.

Obj. 2. Further, as above explained (Q. LXXV., A. 5), the soul is a simple form. But a form is an act. Therefore
the soul is a pure act; which applies to God alone. Therefore the soul is of God's substance.

*Obj. 3.* Further, things that exist and do not differ are the same. But God and the mind exist, and in no way differ, for they could only be differentiated by certain differences, and thus would be composite. Therefore God and the human mind are the same.

*On the contrary,* Augustine (*De Orig. Animae* lii. 15) mentions certain opinions which he calls *exceedingly and evidently perverse, and contrary to the Catholic Faith,* among which the first is the opinion that *God made the soul not out of nothing, but from Himself.*

*I answer that,* To say that the soul is of the Divine substance involves a manifest improbability. For, as is clear from what has been said (*Q. LXXVII.*, A. 2; *Q. LXXIX.*, A. 2; *Q. LXXXIV.*, A. 6), the human soul is sometimes in a state of potentiality to the act of intelligence,—acquires its knowledge somehow from things,—and has various powers; all of which are incompatible with the Divine Nature, Which is a pure act,—receives nothing from any other,—and admits of no variety in itself, as we have proved (*Q. III.*, AA. 1, 7; *Q. IX.*, A. 1).

This error seems to have originated from two statements of the ancients. For those who first began to observe the nature of things, being unable to rise above their imagination, supposed that nothing but bodies existed. Therefore they said that God was a body, which they considered to be the principle of other bodies. And since they held that the soul was of the same nature as that body which they regarded as the first principle, as is stated *De Anima* i. 2, it followed that the soul was of the nature of God Himself. According to this supposition, also, the Manichæans, thinking that God was a corporeal light, held that the soul was part of that light, bound up with the body.

Then a further step in advance was made, and some surmised the existence of something incorporeal, not apart from the body, but the form of a body; so that Varro said, *God is a soul governing the world by movement and reason,*
as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei vii. 6).* So some supposed man's soul to be part of that one soul, as man is a part of the whole world; for they were unable to go so far as to understand the different degrees of spiritual substance, except according to the distinction of bodies.

But, all these theories are impossible, as proved above (Q. III., AA. 1, 8; and Q. LXXV., A. 1), wherefore it is evidently false that the soul is of the substance of God.

Reply Obj. 1. The term "breathe" is not to be taken in the material sense; but as regards the act of God, to breathe (spirare), is the same as to make a spirit. Moreover, in the material sense, man by breathing does not send forth anything of his own substance, but an extraneous thing.

Reply Obj. 2. Although the soul is a simple form in its essence, yet it is not its own existence, but is a being by participation, as above explained (Q. LXXV., A. 5, ad 4). Therefore it is not a pure act like God.

Reply Obj. 3. That which differs, properly speaking, differs in something; wherefore we seek for difference where we find also resemblance. For this reason things which differ must in some way be compound; since they differ in something, and in something resemble each other. In this sense, although all that differ are diverse, yet all things that are diverse do not differ. For simple things are diverse; yet do not differ from one another by differences which enter into their composition. For instance, a man and a horse differ by the difference of rational and irrational; but we cannot say that these again differ by some further difference.

Second Article.

Whether the soul was produced by creation?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the soul was not produced by creation. For that which has in itself something

* The words as quoted are to be found iv. 31.
material is produced from matter. But the soul is in part material, since it is not a pure act. Therefore the soul was made of matter; and hence it was not created.

**Obj. 2.** Further, every actuality of matter is deduced from the potentiality of that matter; for since matter is in potentiality to act, any act pre-exists in matter potentially. But the soul is the act of corporeal matter, as is clear from its definition. Therefore the soul is deduced from the potentiality of matter.

**Obj. 3.** Further, the soul is a form. Therefore, if the soul is created, all other forms also are created. Thus no forms would come into existence by generation; which is not true.

*On the contrary,* It is written (Gen. i. 27): *God created man to His own image.* But man is like to God in his soul. Therefore the soul was created.

*I answer that,* The rational soul can be made only by creation; which, however, is not true of other forms. The reason is because, since to be made is the way to existence, a thing must be made in such a way as is suitable to its mode of existence. Now that properly exists which itself has existence; as it were, subsisting in its own existence. Wherefore only substances are properly and truly called beings; whereas an accident has not existence, but something is (modified) by it, and so far is it called a being; for instance, whiteness is called a being, because by it something is white. Hence it is said *Metaph.* vii. (Did. vi. i) that an accident should be described as of *something rather than as something.* The same is to be said of all non-substantive forms. Therefore, properly speaking, it does not belong to any non-existing form to be made; but such are said to be made through the composite substances being made. On the other hand, the rational soul is a subsistent form, as above explained (Q. LXXV., A. 2). Wherefore it is competent to be and to be made. And since it cannot be made of pre-existing matter,—whether corporeal, which would render it a corporeal being,—or spiritual, which would involve the transmutation of one spiritual substance
into another, we must conclude that it cannot exist except by creation.

Reply Obj. 1. The soul's simple essence is as the material element, while its participated existence is its formal element; which participated existence necessarily co-exists with the soul's essence, because existence naturally follows the form. The same reason holds if the soul is supposed to be composed of some spiritual matter, as some maintain; because the said matter is not in potentiality to another form, as neither is the matter of a celestial body; otherwise the soul would be corruptible. Wherefore the soul cannot in any way be made of pre-existent matter.

Reply Obj. 2. The production of act from the potentiality of matter is nothing else but something becoming actual that previously was in potentiality. But since the rational soul does not depend in its existence on corporeal matter, and is subsistent, and exceeds the capacity of corporeal matter, as we have seen (Q. LXXV., A. 2), it is not deduced from the potentiality of matter.

Reply Obj. 3. As we have said, there is no comparison between the rational soul and other forms.

Third Article.

Whether the rational soul is produced by God immediately?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the rational soul is not immediately made by God, but by the instrumentality of the angels. For spiritual things have more order than corporeal things. But inferior bodies are produced by means of the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv.). Therefore also the inferior spirits, who are the rational souls, are produced by means of the superior spirits, the angels.

Obj. 2. Further, the end corresponds to the beginning of things; for God is the beginning and end of all. Therefore the issue of things from their beginning corresponds to the
forwarding of them to their end. But inferior things are forwarded by the higher, as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v); therefore also the inferior are produced into existence by the higher, and souls by angels.

**Obj. 3.** Further, perfect is that which can produce its like, as is stated Metaph. v. But spiritual substances are much more perfect than corporeal. Therefore, since bodies produce their like in their own species, much more are angels able to produce something specifically inferior to themselves; and such is the rational soul.

*On the contrary,* It is written (Gen. ii. 7) that God Himself breathed into the face of man the breath of life.

*I answer that,* Some have held that angels, acting by the power of God, produce rational souls. But this is quite impossible, and is against faith. For it has been proved that the rational soul cannot be produced except by creation. Now, God alone can create; for the first agent alone can act without presupposing the existence of anything; while the second cause always presupposes something derived from the first cause, as above explained (Q. LXXV., A. 3): and every agent, that presupposes something to its act, acts by making a change therein. Therefore everything else acts by producing a change, whereas God alone acts by creation. Since, therefore, the rational soul cannot be produced by a change in matter, it cannot be produced, save immediately by God.

Thus the replies to the objections are clear. For that bodies produce their like or something inferior to themselves, and that the higher things lead forward the inferior,—all these things are effected through a certain transmutation.

**Fourth Article.**

**Whether the human soul was produced before the body?**

*We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—*

**Objection 1.** It would seem that the human soul was made before the body. For the work of creation preceded
the work of distinction and adornment, as shown above (Q. LXVI., A. 1; Q. LXX., A. 1). But the soul was made by creation; whereas the body was made at the end of the work of adornment. Therefore the soul of man was made before the body.

*Obj. 2.* Further, the rational soul has more in common with the angels than with the brute animals. But angels were created before bodies, or at least, at the beginning with corporeal matter; whereas the body of man was formed on the sixth day, when also the animals were made. Therefore the soul of man was created before the body.

*Obj. 3.* Further, the end is proportionate to the beginning. But in the end the soul outlasts the body. Therefore in the beginning it was created before the body.

*On the contrary,* The proper act is produced in its proper potentiality. Therefore, since the soul is the proper act of the body, the soul was produced in the body.

*I answer that,* Origen (*Peri Archon* i. 7, 8) held that not only the soul of the first man, but also the souls of all men were created at the same time as the angels, before their bodies: because he thought that all spiritual substances, whether souls or angels, are equal in their natural condition, and differ only by merit; so that some of them—namely, the souls of men or of heavenly bodies—are united to bodies while others remain in their different orders entirely free from matter. Of this opinion we have already spoken (Q. XLVII., A. 2); and so we need say nothing about it here.

Augustine, however (*Gen. ad lit. vii.* 24), says that the soul of the first man was created at the same time as the angels, before the body, for another reason; because he supposes that the body of man, during the work of the six days, was produced, not actually, but only as to some *causal virtues*; which cannot be said of the soul, because neither was it made of any pre-existing corporeal or spiritual matter, nor could it be produced from any created virtue. Therefore it seems that the soul itself, during the work of the six days, when all things were made, was created,
together with the angels; and that afterwards, by its own will, was joined to the service of the body. But he does not say this by way of assertion; as his words prove. For he says (loc. cit. 29): *We may believe, if neither Scripture nor reason forbid, that man was made on the sixth day, in the sense that his body was created as to its causal virtue in the elements of the world, but that the soul was already created.*

Now this could be upheld by those who hold that the soul has of itself a complete species and nature, and that it is not united to the body as its form, but as its administrator. But if the soul is united to the body as its form, and is naturally a part of human nature, the above supposition is quite impossible. For it is clear that God made the first things in their perfect natural state, as their species required. Now the soul, as a part of human nature, has its natural perfection only as united to the body. Therefore it would have been unfitting for the soul to be created without the body.

Therefore, if we admit the opinion of Augustine about the work of the six days (Q. LXXIV., A. 2), we may say that the human soul preceded in the work of the six days by a certain generic similitude, so far as it has intellectual nature in common with the angels; but was itself created at the same time as the body. According to other saints, both the body and soul of the first man were produced in the work of the six days.

*Reply Obj. 1.* If the soul by its nature were a complete species, so that it might be created as to itself, this reason would prove that the soul was created by itself in the beginning. But as the soul is naturally the form of the body, it was necessarily created, not separately, but in the body.

*Reply Obj. 2.* The same observation applies to the second objection. For if the soul had a species of itself it would have something still more in common with the angels. But, as the form of the body, it belongs to the animal genus, as a formal principle.

*Reply Obj. 3.* That the soul remains after the body, is due to a defect of the body, namely, death. Which defect was not due when the soul was first created.
QUESTION XCI.

THE PRODUCTION OF THE FIRST MAN'S BODY.

(In Four Articles.)

We have now to consider the production of the first man's body. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) The matter from which it was produced. (2) The author by whom it was produced. (3) The disposition it received in its production. (4) The mode and order of its production.

First Article.

Whether the body of the first man was made of the slime of the earth?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the body of the first man was not made of the slime of the earth. For it is an act of greater power to make something out of nothing than out of something; because not being is farther off from actual existence than being in potentiality. But since man is the most honourable of God's lower creatures, it was fitting that in the production of man's body, the power of God should be most clearly shown. Therefore it should not have been made of the slime of the earth, but out of nothing.

Obj. 2. Further, the heavenly bodies are nobler than earthly bodies. But the human body has the greatest nobility; since it is perfected by the noblest form, which is the rational soul. Therefore it should not be made of an earthly body, but of a heavenly body.

Obj. 3. Further, fire and air are nobler bodies than earth and water, as is clear from their subtlety. Therefore, since
the human body is most noble, it should rather have been made of fire and air than of the slime of the earth.

Obj. 4. Further, the human body is composed of the four elements. Therefore it was not made of the slime of the earth, but of the four elements.

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. ii. 7): God made man of the slime of the earth.

I answer that, As God is perfect in His works, He bestowed perfection on all of them according to their capacity: God’s works are perfect (Deut. xxxii. 4). He Himself is simply perfect by the fact that all things are pre-contained in Him, not as component parts, but as united in one simple whole, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v.); in the same way as various effects pre-exist in their cause, according to its one virtue. This perfection is bestowed on the angels, inasmuch as all things which are produced by God in nature through various forms come under their knowledge. But on man this perfection is bestowed in an inferior way. For he does not possess a natural knowledge of all natural things, but is in a manner composed of all things, since he has in himself a rational soul of the genus of spiritual substances, and in likeness to the heavenly bodies he is removed from contraries by an equable temperament. As to the elements, he has them in their very substance, yet in such a way that the higher elements, fire and air, predominate in him by their power; for life is mostly found where there is heat, which is from fire; and where there is humour, which is of the air. But the inferior elements abound in man by their substance; otherwise the mingling of elements would not be evenly balanced, unless the inferior elements, which have the less power, predominated in quantity. Therefore the body of man is said to have been formed from the slime of the earth; because earth and water mingled are called slime, and for this reason man is called a little world, because all creatures of the world are in a way to be found in him.

Reply Obj. 1. The power of the Divine Creator was
manifested in man's body when its matter was produced by creation. But it was fitting that the human body should be made of the four elements, that man might have something in common with the inferior bodies, as being something between spiritual and corporeal substances.

*Reply Obj. 2.* Although the heavenly body is in itself nobler than the earthly body, yet for the acts of the rational soul the heavenly body is less adapted. For the rational soul receives the knowledge of truth in a certain way through the senses, the organs of which cannot be formed of a heavenly body which is impassible. Nor is it true that something of the fifth essence enters materially into the composition of the human body, as some say, who suppose that the soul is united to the body by means of light. For, first of all, what they say is false—that light is a body. Secondly, it is impossible for something to be taken from the fifth essence, or from a heavenly body, and to be mingled with the elements, since a heavenly body is impassible; wherefore it does not enter into the composition of mixed bodies, except as in the effects of its power.

*Reply Obj. 3.* If fire and air, whose action is of greater power, predominated also in quantity in the human body, they would entirely draw the rest into themselves, and there would be no equality in the mingling, such as is required in the composition of man, for the sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses. For the organ of any particular sense must not actually have the contraries of which that sense has the perception, but only potentially; either in such a way that it is entirely void of the whole *genus* of such contraries,—thus, for instance, the pupil of the eye is without colour, so as to be in potentiality as regards all colours; which is not possible in the organ of touch, since it is composed of the very elements, the qualities of which are perceived by that sense:—or so that the organ is a medium between two contraries, as must needs be the case with regard to touch; for the medium is in potentiality to the extremes.

*Reply Obj. 4.* In the slime of the earth are earth, and
water binding the earth together. Of the other elements, Scripture makes no mention, because they are less in quantity in the human body, as we have said; and because also in the account of the Creation no mention is made of fire and air, which are not perceived by senses of uncultured men such as those to whom the Scripture was immediately addressed.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE HUMAN BODY WAS IMMEDIATELY PRODUCED BY GOD?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the human body was not produced by God immediately. For Augustine says (De Trin. iii. 4), that corporeal things are disposed by God through the angels. But the human body was made of corporeal matter, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore it was produced by the instrumentality of the angels, and not immediately by God.

Obj. 2. Further, whatever can be made by a created power, is not necessarily produced immediately by God. But the human body can be produced by the created power of a heavenly body; for even certain animals are produced from putrefaction by the active power of a heavenly body; and Albumazar says that man is not generated where heat and cold are extreme, but only in temperate regions. Therefore the human body was not necessarily produced immediately by God.

Obj. 3. Further, nothing is made of corporeal matter except by some material change. But all corporeal change is caused by a movement of a heavenly body, which is the first movement. Therefore, since the human body was produced from corporeal matter, it seems that a heavenly body had part in its production.

Obj. 4. Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii. 24) that man's body was made during the work of the six days, according to the causal virtues which God inserted in corporeal creatures; and that afterwards it was actually pro-
duced. But what pre-exists in the corporeal creature by reason of causal virtues can be produced by some corporeal body. Therefore the human body was produced by some created power, and not immediately by God.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. xvii. 1): God created man out of the earth.

I answer that, The first formation of the human body could not be by the instrumentality of any created power, but was immediately from God. Some, indeed, supposed that the forms which are in corporeal matter are derived from some immaterial forms; but the Philosopher refutes this opinion (Metaph. vii.), for the reason that forms cannot be made in themselves, but only in the composite, as we have explained (Q. LXV., A. 4); and because the agent must be like its effect, it is not fitting that a pure form, not existing in matter, should produce a form which is in matter, and which form is only made by the fact that the composite is made. So a form which is in matter can only be the cause of another form that is in matter, according as composite is made by composite. Now God, though He is absolutely immaterial, can alone by His own power produce matter by creation: wherefore He alone can produce a form in matter, without the aid of any preceding material form. For this reason the angels cannot transform a body except by making use of something in the nature of a seed, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii. 19). Therefore as no pre-existing body had been formed whereby another body of the same species could be generated, the first human body was of necessity made immediately by God.

Reply Obj. 1. Although the angels are the ministers of God, as regards what He does in bodies, yet God does something in bodies beyond the angels' power, as, for instance, raising the dead, or giving sight to the blind: and by this power He formed the body of the first man from the slime of the earth. Nevertheless the angels could act as ministers in the formation of the body of the first man, in the same way as they will do at the last resurrection, by collecting the dust.
Reply Obj. 2. Perfect animals, produced from seed, cannot be made by the sole power of a heavenly body, as Avicenna imagined; although the power of a heavenly body may assist by co-operation in the work of natural generation, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii. 26), *man and the sun beget man from matter*. For this reason, a place of moderate temperature is required for the production of man and other perfect animals. But the power of heavenly bodies suffices for the production of some imperfect animals from properly disposed matter: for it is clear that more conditions are required to produce a perfect than an imperfect thing.

Reply Obj. 3. The movement of the heavens causes natural changes; but not changes that surpass the order of nature, and are caused by the Divine Power alone, as for the dead to be raised to life, or the blind to see: like to which also is the making of man from the slime of the earth.

Reply Obj. 4. An effect may be said to pre-exist in the causal virtues of creatures, in two ways. First, both in active and in passive potentiality, so that not only can it be produced out of pre-existing matter, but also that some pre-existing creature can produce it. Secondly, in passive potentiality only; that is, that out of pre-existing matter it can be produced by God. In this sense, according to Augustine, the human body pre-existed in the previous works in their causal virtues.

Third Article.

Whether the body of man was given an apt disposition?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the body of man was not given an apt disposition. For since man is the noblest of animals, his body ought to be the best disposed in what is proper to an animal, that is, in sense and movement. But some animals have sharper senses and quicker movement than man; thus dogs have a keener smell, and birds a
swifter flight. Therefore man's body was not aptly disposed.

*Obj. 2.* Further, perfect is what lacks nothing. But the human body lacks more than the body of other animals, for these are provided with covering and natural arms of defence, in which man is lacking. Therefore the human body is very imperfectly disposed.

*Obj. 3.* Further, man is more distant from plants than he is from the brutes. But plants are erect in stature, while brutes are prone in stature. Therefore man should not be of erect stature.

*On the contrary,* It is written (Eccles. vii. 30): *God made man right.*

*I answer that,* All natural things were produced by the Divine art, and so may be called God's works of art. Now every artist intends to give to his work the best disposition; not absolutely the best, but the best as regards the proposed end; and even if this entails some defect, the artist cares not: thus, for instance, when a man makes himself a saw for the purpose of cutting, he makes it of iron, which is suitable for the object in view; and he does not prefer to make it of glass, though this be a more beautiful material, because this very beauty would be an obstacle to the end he has in view. Therefore God gave to each natural being the best disposition; not absolutely so, but in view of its proper end. This is what the Philosopher says (Phys. ii. 7): *And because it is better so, not absolutely, but for each one's substance.*

Now the proximate end of the human body is the rational soul and its operations; since matter is for the sake of the form, and instruments are for the action of the agent. I say, therefore, that God fashioned the human body in that disposition which was best, as most suited to such a form and to such operations. If defect exists in the disposition of the human body, it is well to observe that such defect arises as a necessary result of the matter, from the conditions required in the body, in order to make it suitably proportioned to the soul and its operations.
Reply Obj. 1. The sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses, is more perfect in man than in any other animal; and for this reason man must have the most equable temperament of all animals. Moreover man excels all other animals in the interior sensitive powers, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. LXXVIII., A. 4). But by a kind of necessity, man falls short of the other animals in some of the exterior senses; thus of all animals he has the least sense of smell. For man of all animals needs the largest brain as compared to the body; both for his greater freedom of action in the interior powers required for the intellectual operations, as we have seen above (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7); and in order that the low temperature of the brain may modify the heat of the heart, which has to be considerable in man for him to be able to stand up erect. So that the size of the brain, by reason of its humidity, is an impediment to the smell, which requires dryness. In the same way, we may suggest a reason why some animals have a keener sight, and a more acute hearing than man; namely, on account of a hindrance to his senses arising necessarily from the perfect equability of his temperament. The same reason suffices to explain why some animals are more rapid in movement than man, since this excellence of speed is inconsistent with the equability of the human temperament.

Reply Obj. 2. Horns and claws, which are the weapons of some animals, and toughness of hide and quantity of hair or feathers, which are the clothing of animals, are signs of an abundance of the earthly element; which does not agree with the equability and softness of the human temperament. Therefore such things do not suit the nature of man. Instead of these, he has reason and hands whereby he can make himself arms and clothes, and other necessaries of life, of infinite variety. Wherefore the hand is called by Aristotle (De Anima iii. 8), the organ of organs. Moreover this was more becoming to the rational nature, which is capable of conceiving an infinite number of things, so as to make for itself an infinite number of instruments.
Reply Obj. 3. An upright stature was becoming to man for four reasons. First, because the senses are given to man, not only for the purpose of procuring the necessaries of life, for which they are bestowed on other animals, but also for the purpose of knowledge. Hence, whereas the other animals take delight in the objects of the senses only as ordered to food and sex, man alone takes pleasure in the beauty of sensible objects for its own sake. Therefore, as the senses are situated chiefly in the face, other animals have the face turned to the ground, as it were for the purpose of seeking food and procuring a livelihood; whereas man has his face erect, in order that by the senses, and chiefly by sight, which is more subtle and penetrates further into the differences of things, he may freely survey the sensible objects around him, both heavenly and earthly, so as to gather intelligible truth from all things. Secondly, for the greater freedom of the acts of the interior powers; the brain, wherein these actions are, in a way, performed, not being low down, but lifted up above other parts of the body. Thirdly, because if man's stature were prone to the ground he would need to use his hands as fore-feet; and thus their utility for other purposes would cease. Fourthly, because if man's stature were prone to the ground, and he used his hands as fore-feet, he would be obliged to take hold of his food with his mouth. Thus he would have a protruding mouth, with thick and hard lips, and also a hard tongue, so as to keep it from being hurt by exterior things; as we see in other animals. Moreover, such an attitude would quite hinder speech, which is reason's proper operation.

Nevertheless, though of erect stature, man is far above plants. For man's superior part, his head, is turned towards the superior part of the world, and his inferior part is turned towards the inferior world; and therefore he is perfectly disposed as to the general situation of his body. Plants have the superior part turned towards the lower world, since their roots correspond to the mouth; and their inferior part towards the upper world. But brute animals have a
middle disposition, for the superior part of the animal is that by which it takes food, and the inferior part that by which it rids itself of the surplus.

Fourth Article.

Whether the production of the human body is fittingly described in Scripture?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:

Objection 1. It would seem that the production of the human body is not fittingly described in Scripture. For, as the human body was made by God, so also were the other works of the six days. But in the other works it is written, *God said; Let it be made, and it was made.* Therefore the same should have been said of man.

Obj. 2. Further, the human body was made by God immediately, as explained above (A. 2). Therefore it was not fittingly said, *Let us make man.*

Obj. 3. Further, the form of the human body is the soul itself which is the breath of life. Therefore, having said, *God made man of the slime of the earth,* he should not have added: *And He breathed into him the breath of life.*

Obj. 4. Further, the soul, which is the breath of life, is in the whole body, and chiefly in the heart. Therefore it was not fittingly said: *He breathed into his face the breath of life.*

Obj. 5. Further, the male and female sex belong to the body, while the image of God belongs to the soul. But the soul, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii. 24), was made before the body. Therefore having said: *To His image He made them,* he should not have added, *male and female He created them.*

On the contrary, Is the authority of Scripture.

Reply Obj. 1. As Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. vi. 12), man surpasses other things, not in the fact that God Himself made man, as though He did not make other things; since it is written (Ps. ci. 26), *The work of Thy hands is the*
heaven, and elsewhere (Ps. xciv. 5), His hands laid down the dry land; but in this, that man is made to God's image. Yet in describing man's production, Scripture uses a special way of speaking, to show that other things were made for man's sake. For we are accustomed to do with more deliberation and care what we have chiefly in mind.

Reply Obj. 2. We must not imagine that when God said Let us make man, He spoke to the angels, as some were perverse enough to think. But by these words is signified the plurality of the Divine Person, Whose image is more clearly expressed in man.

Reply Obj. 3. Some have thought that man's body was formed first in priority of time, and that afterwards the soul was infused into the formed body. But it is inconsistent with the perfection of the production of things, that God should have made either the body without the soul, or the soul without the body, since each is a part of human nature. This is especially unfitting as regards the body, for the body depends on the soul, and not the soul on the body.

To remove the difficulty some have said that the words, God made man, must be understood of the production of the body with the soul; and that the subsequent words, and He breathed into his face the breath of life, should be understood of the Holy Ghost; as the Lord breathed on His Apostles, saying, Receive ye the Holy Ghost (Jo. xx. 22). But this explanation, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii. 24), is excluded by the very words of Scripture. For we read farther on, And man was made a living soul; which words the Apostle (1 Cor. xv. 45) refers not to spiritual life, but to animal life. Therefore, by breath of life we must understand the soul, so that the words, He breathed into his face the breath of life, are a sort of exposition of what goes before; for the soul is the form of the body.

Reply Obj. 4. Since vital operations are more clearly seen in man's face, on account of the senses which are there expressed; therefore Scripture says that the breath of life was breathed into man's face.

Reply Obj. 5. According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit.
iv. 34), the works of the six days were done all at one time; wherefore according to him man's soul, which he holds to have been made with the angels, was not made before the sixth day; but on the sixth day both the soul of the first man was made actually, and his body in its causal elements. But other doctors hold that on the sixth day both body and soul of man were actually made.
QUESTION XCII.

THE PRODUCTION OF THE WOMAN.

(In Four Articles.)

We must next consider the production of the woman. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the woman should have been made in that first production of things? (2) Whether the woman should have been made from man? (3) Whether of man's rib? (4) Whether the woman was made immediately by God?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE WOMAN SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE FIRST PRODUCTION OF THINGS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the woman should not have been made in the first production of things. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii. 3), that the female is a misbegotten male. But nothing misbegotten or defective should have been in the first production of things. Therefore woman should not have been made at that first production.

Obj. 2. Further, subjection and limitation were a result of sin, for to the woman was it said after sin (Gen. iii. 16): Thou shalt be under the man's power; and Gregory says that, Where there is no sin, there is no inequality. But woman is naturally of less strength and dignity than man; for the agent is always more honourable than the patient, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii. 16). Therefore woman should not have been made in the first production of things before sin.

Obj. 3. Further, occasions of sin should be cut off. But
God foresaw that the woman would be an occasion of sin to man. Therefore He should not have made woman.

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. ii. 18): *It is not good for man to be alone; let us make him a helper like to himself.*

I answer that, It was necessary for woman to be made, as the Scripture says, as a helper to man; not, indeed, as a helpmate in other works, as some say, since man can be more efficiently helped by another man in other works; but as a helper in the work of generation. This can be made clear if we observe the mode of generation carried out in various living things. Some living things do not possess in themselves the power of generation, but are generated by some other specific agent, such as some plants and animals by the influence of the heavenly bodies, from some fitting matter and not from seed: others possess the active and passive generative power together; as we see in plants which are generated from seed; for the noblest vital function in plants is generation. Wherefore we observe that in these the active power of generation invariably accompanies the passive power. Among perfect animals the active power of generation belongs to the male sex, and the passive power to the female. And as among animals there is a vital operation nobler than generation, to which their life is principally directed; therefore the male sex is not found in continual union with the female in perfect animals, but only at the time of coition; so that we may consider that by this means the male and female are one, as in plants they are always united; although in some cases one of them preponderates, and in some the other. But man is yet further ordered to a still nobler vital action, and that is intellectual operation. Therefore there was greater reason for the distinction of these two forces in man; so that the female should be produced separately from the male; although they are carnally united for generation. Therefore directly after the formation of woman, it was said: *And they shall be two in one flesh* (Gen. ii. 24).

Reply Obj. 1. As regards the individual nature, woman is defective and misbegotten, for the active force in the male
seed tends to the production of a perfect likeness in the masculine sex; while the production of woman comes from defect in the active force or from some material indisposition, or even from some external influence; such as that of a south wind, which is moist, as the Philosopher observes (De Gener. Animal. iv. 2). On the other hand, as regards human nature in general, woman is not misbegotten, but is included in nature's intention as directed to the work of generation. Now the general intention of nature depends on God, Who is the universal Author of nature. Therefore, in producing nature, God formed not only the male but also the female.

Reply Obj. 2. Subjection is twofold. One is servile, by virtue of which a superior makes use of a subject for his own benefit; and this kind of subjection began after sin. There is another kind of subjection, which is called economic or civil, whereby the superior makes use of his subjects for their own benefit and good; and this kind of subjection existed even before sin. For good order would have been wanting in the human family if some were not governed by others wiser than themselves. So by such a kind of subjection woman is naturally subject to man, because in man the discretion of reason predominates. Nor is inequality among men excluded by the state of innocence, as we shall prove (Q. XCVI., A. 3).

Reply Obj. 3. If God had deprived the world of all those things which proved an occasion of sin, the universe would have been imperfect. Nor was it fitting for the common good to be destroyed in order that individual evil might be avoided; especially as God is so powerful that He can direct any evil to a good end.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER WOMAN SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE FROM MAN?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that woman should not have been made from man. For sex belongs both to man and
animals. But in the other animals the female was not made from the male. Therefore neither should it have been so with man.

*Obj. 2.* Further, things of the same species are of the same matter. But male and female are of the same species. Therefore, as man was made of the slime of the earth, so woman should have been made of the same, and not from man.

*Obj. 3.* Further, woman was made to be a helpmate to man in the work of generation. But close relationship makes a person unfit for that office; hence near relations are debarred from intermarriage, as is written (Lev. xviii. 6). Therefore woman should not have been made from man.

*On the contrary,* It is written (Ecclus. xvii. 5): *He created of him,* that is, out of man, *a helpmate like to himself,* that is, woman.

*I answer that,* When all things were first formed, it was more suitable for the woman to be made from the man than (for the female to be from the male) in other animals. First, in order thus to give the first man a certain dignity consisting in this, that as God is the principle of the whole universe, so the first man, in likeness to God, was the principle of the whole human race. Wherefore Paul says that *God made the whole human race from one* (Acts xvii. 26). Secondly, that man might love woman all the more, and cleave to her more closely, knowing her to be fashioned from himself. Hence it is written (Gen. ii. 23, 24): *She was taken out of man, wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife.* This was most necessary as regards the human race, in which the male and female live together for life; which is not the case with other animals. Thirdly, because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii. 12), the human male and female are united, not only for generation, as with other animals, but also for the purpose of domestic life, in which each has his or her particular duty, and in which the man is the head of the woman. Wherefore it was suitable for the woman to be made out of man, as out of her principle. Fourthly,
there is a sacramental reason for this. For by this is signified that the Church takes her origin from Christ. Wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. v. 32): *This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church.*

*Reply Obj. 1* is clear from the foregoing.

*Reply Obj. 2.* Matter is that from which something is made. Now created nature has a determinate principle; and since it is determined to one thing, it has also a determinate mode of proceeding. Wherefore from determinate matter it produces something in a determinate species. On the other hand, the Divine Power, being infinite, can produce things of the same species out of any matter, such as a man from the slime of the earth, and a woman from a man.

*Reply Obj. 3.* A certain affinity arises from natural generation, and this is an impediment to matrimony. Woman, however, was not produced from man by natural generation, but by the Divine Power alone. Wherefore Eve is not called the daughter of Adam; and so this argument does not prove.

**Third Article.**

*Whether the Woman was Fittingly Made from the Rib of Man?*

*We proceed thus to the Third Article:*—

*Objection 1.* It would seem that the woman should not have been formed from the rib of man. For the rib was much smaller than the woman's body. Now from a smaller thing a larger thing can be made only—either by addition (and then the woman ought to have been described as made out of that which was added, rather than out of the rib itself);—or by rarefaction, because, as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* x.): *A body cannot increase in bulk except by rarefaction.* But the woman's body is not more rarefied than man's—at least, not in the proportion of a rib to Eve's body. Therefore Eve was not formed from a rib of Adam.
Obj. 2. Further, in those things which were first created there was nothing superfluous. Therefore a rib of Adam belonged to the integrity of his body. So, if a rib was removed, his body remained imperfect; which is unreasonable to suppose.

Obj. 3. Further, a rib cannot be removed from man without pain. But there was no pain before sin. Therefore it was not right for a rib to be taken from the man, that Eve might be made from it.

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. ii. 22): God built the rib, which He took from Adam, into a woman.

I answer that, It was right for the woman to be made from a rib of man. First, to signify the social union of man and woman, for the woman should neither use authority over man, and so she was not made from his head; nor was it right for her to be subject to man’s contempt as his slave, and so she was not made from his feet. Secondly, for the sacramental signification; for from the side of Christ sleeping on the Cross the Sacraments flowed—namely, blood and water—on which the Church was established.

Reply Obj. 1. Some say that the woman’s body was formed by a material increase, without anything being added; in the same way as our Lord multiplied the five loaves. But this is quite impossible. For such an increase of matter would either be by a change of the very substance of the matter itself, or by a change of its dimensions. Not by change of the substance of the matter, both because matter, considered in itself, is quite unchangeable, since it has a potential existence, and has nothing but the nature of a subject, and because quantity and size are extraneous to the essence of matter itself. Wherefore multiplication of matter is quite unintelligible, as long as the matter itself remains the same without anything added to it; unless it receives greater dimensions. This implies rarefaction, which is for the same matter to receive greater dimensions, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iv.). To say, therefore, that the same matter is enlarged, without being rarefied, is
to combine contradictories—viz., the definition with the absence of the thing defined.

Wherefore, as no rarefaction is apparent in such multiplication of matter, we must admit an addition of matter: either by creation or, which is more probable, by conversion. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xxiv., in Joan.) that Christ filled five thousand men with five loaves, in the same way as from a few seeds He produces the harvest of corn—that is, by transformation of the nourishment. Nevertheless, we say that the crowds were fed with five loaves, or that woman was made from the rib, because an addition was made to the already existing matter of the loaves and of the rib.

Reply Obj. 2. The rib belonged to the integral perfection of Adam, not as an individual, but as the principle of the human race; just as the semen belongs to the perfection of the begetter, and is released by a natural and pleasurable operation. Much more, therefore, was it possible that by the Divine power the body of the woman should be produced from the man’s rib.

From this it is clear how to answer the third objection.

**Fourth Article.**

**Whether the woman was formed immediately by God?**

*We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—*

*Objection 1.* It would seem that the woman was not formed immediately by God. For no individual is produced immediately by God from another individual alike in species. But the woman was made from a man who is of the same species. Therefore she was not made immediately by God.

*Obj. 2.* Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii. 4) says that corporeal things are governed by God through the angels. But the woman’s body was formed from corporeal matter. Therefore it was made through the ministry of the angels, and not immediately by God.
Obj. 3. Further, those things which pre-exist in creatures as to their causal virtues are produced by the power of some creature, and not immediately by God. But the woman's body was produced in its causal virtues among the first created works, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix. 15). Therefore it was not produced immediately by God.

On the contrary, Augustine says, in the same work: God alone, to Whom all nature owes its existence, could form or build up the woman from the man's rib.

I answer that, As was said above (A. 2, ad 2), the natural generation of every species is from some determinate matter. Now the matter whence man is naturally begotten is the human semen of man or woman. Wherefore from any other matter an individual of the human species cannot naturally be generated. Now God alone, the Author of nature, can produce an effect into existence outside the ordinary course of nature. Therefore God alone could produce either a man from the slime of the earth, or a woman from the rib of man.

Reply Obj. 1. This argument is verified when an individual is begotten, by natural generation, from that which is like it in the same species.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix. 15), we do not know whether the angels were employed by God in the formation of the woman; but it is certain that, as the body of man was not formed by the angels from the slime of the earth, so neither was the body of the woman formed by them from the man's rib.

Reply Obj. 3. As Augustine says (ibid. 18): The first creation of things did not demand that woman should be made thus; it made it possible for her to be thus made. Therefore the body of the woman did indeed pre-exist in these causal virtues, in the things first created; not as regards active potentiality, but as regards a potentiality passive in relation to the active potentiality of the Creator.
QUESTION XCIII.

THE END OR TERM OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN.

(In Nine Articles.)

We now treat of the end or term of man's production, inasmuch as he is said to be made to the image and likeness of God. There are under this head nine points of inquiry: (1) Whether the image of God is in man? (2) Whether the image of God is in irrational creatures? (3) Whether the image of God is in the angels more than in man? (4) Whether the image of God is in every man? (5) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with the Essence, or with all the Divine Persons, or with one of them? (6) Whether the image of God is in man, as to his mind only? (7) Whether the image of God is in man's power or in his habits and acts? (8) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with every object? (9) Of the difference between image and likeness.

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE IMAGE OF GOD IS IN MAN?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God is not in man. For it is written (Isa. xl. 18): To whom have you likened God? or what image will you make for Him?

Obj. 2. Further, to be the image of God is the property of the First-Begotten, of Whom the Apostle says (Col. i. 15): Who is the image of the invisible God, the First-Born of every creature. Therefore the image of God is not to be found in man.

Obj. 3. Further, Hilary says (De Synod.*) that an

* Super i. can. Synod. Ancyr.
image is of the same species as that which it represents; and he also says that an image is the undivided and united likeness of one thing adequately representing another. But there is no species common to both God and man; nor can there be a comparison of equality between God and man. Therefore there can be no image of God in man.

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. i. 26): Let Us make man to Our own image and likeness.

I answer that, As Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIII.; qu. 74): Where an image exists, there forthwith is likeness; but where there is likeness, there is not necessarily an image. Hence it is clear that likeness is essential to an image; and that an image adds something to likeness—namely, that it is copied from something else. For an image is so called because it is produced as an imitation of something else; wherefore, for instance, an egg, however much like and equal to another egg, is not called an image of the other egg, because it is not copied from it.

But equality does not belong to the essence of an image; for, as Augustine says (ibid.): Where there is an image there is not necessarily equality, as we see in a person’s image reflected in a glass. Yet this is of the essence of a perfect image; for in a perfect image nothing is wanting that is to be found in that of which it is a copy. Now it is manifest that in man there is some likeness to God, copied from God as from an exemplar; yet this likeness is not one of equality, for such an exemplar infinitely excels its copy. Therefore there is in man a likeness to God; not, indeed, a perfect likeness, but imperfect. And Scripture implies the same when it says that man was made to God’s likeness; for the preposition to signifies a certain approach, as of something at a distance.

Reply Obj. 1. The Prophet speaks of bodily images made by man. Therefore he says pointedly: What image will you make for Him? But God made a spiritual image to Himself in man.

Reply Obj. 2. The First-Born of creatures is the perfect Image of God, reflecting perfectly that of which He is the
Image, and so He is said to be the Image, and never to the image. But man is said to be both image by reason of the likeness; and to the image by reason of the imperfect likeness. And since the perfect likeness to God cannot be except in an identical nature, the Image of God exists in His first-born Son; as the image of the king is in his son, who is of the same nature as himself: whereas it exists in man as in an alien nature, as the image of the king is in a silver coin, as Augustine explains in De decem Chordis (Serm. ix. al. xcvi., De Tempore).

Reply Obj. 3. As unity means absence of division, a species is said to be the same as far as it is one. Now a thing is said to be one not only numerically, specifically, or generically, but also according to a certain analogy or proportion. In this sense a creature is one with God, or like to Him; but when Hilary says of a thing which adequately represents another, this is to be understood of a perfect image.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE IMAGE OF GOD IS TO BE FOUND IN IRRATIONAL CREATURES?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii.): Effects are contingent images of their causes. But God is the cause not only of rational, but also of irrational creatures. Therefore the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures.

Obj. 2. Further, the more distinct a likeness is, the nearer it approaches to the nature of an image. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv.) that the solar ray has a very great similitude to the Divine goodness. Therefore it is made to the image of God.

Obj. 3. Further, the more perfect anything is in goodness, the more it is like God. But the whole universe is more perfect in goodness than man; for though each indi-
vidual thing is good, all things together are called very good (Gen. i. 31). Therefore the whole universe is to the image of God, and not only man.

Obj. 4. Further, Boëthius (De Consol. iii.) says of God: Holding the world in His mind, and forming it into His image. Therefore the whole world is to the image of God, and not only the rational creature.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi. 12): Man's excellence consists in the fact that God made him to His own image by giving him an intellectual soul, which raises him above the beasts of the field. Therefore things without intellect are not made to God's image.

I answer that, Not every likeness, not even what is copied from something else, is sufficient to make an image; for if the likeness be only generic, or existing by virtue of some common accident, this does not suffice for one thing to be the image of another. For instance, a worm, though from man it may originate, cannot be called man's image, merely because of the generic likeness. Nor, if anything is made white like something else, can we say that it is the image of that thing; for whiteness is an accident belonging to many species. But the nature of an image requires likeness in species; thus the image of the king exists in his son: or, at least, in some specific accident, and chiefly in the shape; thus, we speak of a man's image in copper. Whence Hilary says pointedly that an image is of the same species.

Now it is manifest that specific likeness follows the ultimate difference. But some things are like to God first and most commonly because they exist; secondly, because they live; and thirdly because they know or understand; and these last, as Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIII.; qu. 51), approach so near to God in likeness, that among all creatures nothing comes nearer to Him. It is clear, therefore, that intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are made to God's image.

Reply Obj. 1. Everything imperfect is a participation of what is perfect. Therefore even what falls short of the nature of an image, so far as it possesses any sort of like-
ness to God, participates in some degree the nature of an image. So Dionysius says that effects are contingent images of their causes; that is, as much as they happen (contingit) to be so, but not absolutely.

Reply Obj. 2. Dionysius compares the solar ray to Divine goodness, as regards its causality; not as regards its natural dignity which is involved in the idea of an image.

Reply Obj. 3. The universe is more perfect in goodness than the intellectual creature as regards extension and diffusion; but intensively and collectively the likeness to the Divine goodness is found rather in the intellectual creature, which has a capacity for the highest good. Or else we may say that a part is not rightly divided against the whole, but only against another part. Wherefore, when we say that the intellectual nature alone is to the image of God, we do not mean that the universe in any part is not to God’s image, but that the other parts are excluded.

Reply Obj. 4. Boëthius here uses the word image to express the likeness which the product of an art bears to the artistic species in the mind of the artist. Thus every creature is an image of the exemplar type thereof in the Divine mind. We are not, however, using the word image in this sense; but as it implies a likeness in nature, that is, inasmuch as all things, as being, are like to the First Being; as living, like to the First Life; and as intelligent, like to the Supreme Wisdom.

Third Article.

Whether the angels are more to the image of God than man is?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the angels are not more to the image of God than man is. For Augustine says in a sermon de Imagine xliii. (de verbis Apost. xxvii.) that God granted to no other creature besides man to be to His image. Therefore it is not true to say that the angels are more than man to the image of God.
Obj. 2. Further, according to Augustine (QQ. LXXXIII.; qu. 51), man is so much to God's image that God did not make any creature to be between Him and man: and therefore nothing is more akin to Him. But a creature is called God's image so far as it is akin to God. Therefore the angels are not more to the image of God than man.

Obj. 3. Further, a creature is said to be to God's image so far as it is of an intellectual nature. But the intellectual nature does not admit of intensity or remissness; for it is not an accidental thing, since it is a substance. Therefore the angels are not more to the image of God than man.

On the contrary, Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv.): The angel is called a "seal of resemblance" (Ezech. xxviii. 12) because in him the resemblance of the Divine image is wrought with greater expression.

I answer that, We may speak of God's image in two ways. First, we may consider in it that in which the image chiefly consists, that is, the intellectual nature. Thus the image of God is more perfect in the angels than in man, because their intellectual nature is more perfect, as is clear from what has been said (Q. LVIII., A. 3; Q. LXXIX., A. 8). Secondly, we may consider the image of God in man as regards its accidental qualities, so far as to observe in man a certain imitation of God, consisting in the fact that man proceeds from man, as God from God; and also in the fact that the whole human soul is in the whole body, and again, in every part, as God is in regard to the whole world. In these and the like things the image of God is more perfect in man than it is in the angels. But these do not of themselves belong to the nature of the Divine image in man, unless we presuppose the first likeness, which is in the intellectual nature; otherwise even brute animals would be to God's image. Therefore, as in their intellectual nature, the angels are more to the image of God than man is, we must grant that, absolutely speaking, the angels are more to the image of God than man is, but that in some respects man is more like to God.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine excludes the inferior creatures
bereft of reason from the image of God; but not the angels.

Reply Obj. 2. As fire is said to be specifically the most subtle of bodies, while, nevertheless, one kind of fire is more subtle than another; so we say that nothing is more like to God than the human soul in its generic and intellectual nature, because as Augustine had said previously, things which have knowledge, are so near to Him in likeness that of all creatures none are nearer. Wherefore this does not mean that the angels are not more to God’s image.

Reply Obj. 3. When we say that substance does not admit of more or less, we do not mean that one species of substance is not more perfect than another; but that one and the same individual does not participate in its specific nature at one time more than at another; nor do we mean that a species of substance is shared among different individuals in a greater or lesser degree.

FOURTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE IMAGE OF GOD IS FOUND IN EVERY MAN?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God is not found in every man. For the Apostle says that man is the image of God, but woman is the image (Vulg., glory) of man (1 Cor. xi. 7). Therefore, as woman is an individual of the human species, it is clear that every individual is not an image of God.

Obj. 2. Further, the Apostle says (Rom. viii. 29): Whom God foreknew, He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son. But all men are not predestinated. Therefore all men have not the conformity of image.

Obj. 3. Further, likeness belongs to the nature of the image, as above explained (A. 1). But by sin man becomes unlike God. Therefore he loses the image of God.

On the contrary, it is written (Ps. xxxviii. 7): Surely man passeth as an image.
I answer that, Since man is said to be to the image of God by reason of his intellectual nature, he is the most perfectly like God according to that in which he can best imitate God in his intellectual nature. Now the intellectual nature imitates God chiefly in this, that God understands and loves Himself. Wherefore we see that the image of God is in man in three ways. First, inasmuch as man possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God; and this aptitude consists in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all men. Secondly, inasmuch as man actually or habitually knows and loves God, though imperfectly; and this image consists in the conformity of grace. Thirdly, inasmuch as man knows and loves God perfectly; and this image consists in the likeness of glory. Wherefore on the words, The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us (Ps. iv. 7), the gloss distinguishes a threefold image, of creation, of re-creation, and of likeness. The first is found in all men, the second only in the just, the third only in the blessed.

Reply Obj. 1. The image of God, in its principal signification, namely the intellectual nature, is found both in man and in woman. Hence after the words, To the image of God He created him, it is added, Male and female He created them (Gen. i. 27). Moreover it is said them in the plural, as Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iii. 22) remarks, lest it should be thought that both sexes were united in one individual. But in a secondary sense the image of God is found in man, and not in woman: for man is the beginning and end of woman; as God is the beginning and end of every creature. So when the Apostle had said that man is the image and glory of God, but woman is the glory of man, he adds his reason for saying this: For man is not of woman, but woman of man; and man was not created for woman, but woman for man.

Reply Obs. 2 and 3. These reasons refer to the image consisting in the conformity of grace and glory.
Fifth Article.

Whether the Image of God is in man according to the Trinity of Persons?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God does not exist in man as to the Trinity of Persons. For Augustine says (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum, i.): One in essence is the Godhead of the Holy Trinity; and one is the image to which man was made. And Hilary (De Trin. v.) says: Man is made to the image of that which is common in the Trinity. Therefore the image of God in man is of the Divine Essence, and not of the Trinity of Persons.

Obj. 2. Further, it is said (De Eccl. Dogmat.) that the image of God in man is to be referred to eternity. Damascene also says (De Fid. Orth. ii. 12) that the image of God in man belongs to him as an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement. Gregory of Nyssa (De Homin. Opificio, xvi.) also asserts that, when Scripture says that man was made to the image of God, it means that human nature was made a participator of all good: for the Godhead is the fulness of goodness. Now all these things belong more to the unity of the Essence than to the distinction of the Persons. Therefore the image of God in man regards, not the Trinity of Persons, but the unity of the Essence.

Obj. 3. Further, an image leads to the knowledge of that of which it is the image. Therefore, if there is in man the image of God as to the Trinity of Persons; since man can know himself by his natural reason, it follows that by his natural knowledge man could know the Trinity of the Divine Persons; which is untrue, as was shown above (Q. XXXII., A. 1).

Obj. 4. Further, the name of Image is not applicable to any of the Three Persons, but only to the Son; for Augustine says (De Trin. vi. 2) that the Son alone is the image of the Father. Therefore, if in man there were an image of
God as regards the Person, this would not be an image of the Trinity, but only of the Son.

On the contrary, Hilary says (De Trin. iv.): The plurality of the Divine Persons is proved from the fact that man is said to have been made to the image of God.

I answer that, as we have seen (Q. XL., A. 2), the distinction of the Divine Persons is only according to origin, or, rather, relations of origin. Now the mode of origin is not the same in all things, but in each thing is adapted to the nature thereof; animated things being produced in one way, and inanimate in another; animals in one way, and plants in another. Wherefore it is manifest that the distinction of the Divine Persons is suitable to the Divine Nature; and therefore to be to the image of God by imitation of the Divine Nature does not exclude being to the same image by the representation of the Divine Persons: but rather one follows from the other. We must, therefore, say that in man there exists the image of God, both as regards the Divine Nature and as regards the Trinity of Persons; for also in God Himself there is one Nature in Three Persons.

Thus it is clear how to solve the first two objections.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument would avail if the image of God in man represented God in a perfect manner. But, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv. 6), there is a great difference between the trinity within ourselves and the Divine Trinity. Therefore, as he there says: We see, rather than believe, the trinity which is in ourselves; whereas we believe rather than see that God is Trinity.

Reply Obj. 4. Some have said that in man there is an image of the Son only. Augustine rejects this opinion (De Trin. xii. 5, 6). First, because as the Son is like to the Father by a likeness of essence, it would follow of necessity if man were made in likeness to the Son, that he is made to the likeness of the Father. Secondly, because if man were made only to the image of the Son, the Father would not have said, Let Us make man to Our own image and likeness; but to Thy image. When, therefore, it is written,
He made him to the image of God, the sense is not that the Father made man to the image of the Son only, Who is God, as some explained it, but that the Divine Trinity made man to Its image, that is, of the whole Trinity. When it is said that God made man to His image, this can be understood in two ways: first, so that this preposition to points to the term of the making, and then the sense is, Let Us make man in such a way that Our image may be in him. Secondly, this preposition to may point to the exemplar cause, as when we say, This book is made (like) to that one. Thus the image of God is the very Essence of God, Which is incorrectly called an image forasmuch as image is put for the exemplar. Or, as some say, the Divine Essence is called an image because thereby one Person imitates another.

Sixth Article.

Whether the image of God is in man as regards the mind only?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God is not only in man's mind. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. xi. 7) that the man is the image... of God. But man is not only mind. Therefore the image of God is to be observed not only in his mind.

Obj. 2. Further, it is written (Gen. i. 27): God created man to His own image; to the image of God He created him; male and female He created them. But the distinction of male and female is in the body. Therefore the image of God is also in the body, and not only in the mind.

Obj. 3. Further, an image seems to apply principally to the shape of a thing. But shape belongs to the body. Therefore the image of God is to be seen in man's body also, and not only in his mind.

Obj. 4. Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii. 7, 24) there is a threefold vision in us, corporeal, spiritual, or imaginary, and intellectual. Therefore, if in the intel-
lectual vision that belongs to the mind there exists in us a trinity by reason of which we are made to the image of God, for the like reason there must be another trinity in the others.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph. iv. 23, 24): Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man. Whence we are given to understand that our renewal which consists in putting on the new man, belongs to the mind. Now, he says (Col. iii. 10): Putting on the new man; him who is renewed unto knowledge of God, according to the image of Him that created him, where the renewal which consists in putting on the new man is ascribed to the image of God. Therefore to be to the image of God belongs to the mind only.

I answer that, While in all creatures there is some kind of likeness to God, in the rational creature alone we find a likeness of image as we have explained above (AA. 1, 2); whereas in other creatures we find a likeness by way of a trace. Now the intellect or mind is that whereby the rational creature excels other creatures; wherefore this image of God is not found even in the rational creature except in the mind; while in the other parts, which the rational creature may happen to possess, we find the likeness of a trace, as in other creatures to which, in reference to such parts, the rational creature can be likened. We may easily understand the reason of this if we consider the way in which a trace, and the way in which an image, represents anything. An image represents something by likeness in species, as we have said; while a trace represents something by way of an effect, which represents the cause in such a way as not to attain to the likeness of species. For imprints which are left by the movements of animals are called traces: so also ashes are a trace of fire, and desolation of the land a trace of a hostile army.

Therefore we may observe this difference between rational creatures and others, both as to the representation of the likeness of the Divine Nature in creatures, and as to the representation in them of the uncreated Trinity. For as to
the likeness of the Divine Nature, rational creatures seem to attain, after a fashion, to the representation of the species, inasmuch as they imitate God, not only in being and life, but also in intelligence, as above explained (A. 2); whereas other creatures do not understand, although we observe in them a certain trace of the Intellect that created them, if we consider their disposition. Likewise, as the uncreated Trinity is distinguished by the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and of Love from both of these, as we have seen (Q. XXVIII., A. 3); so we may say that in rational creatures wherein we find a procession of the word in the intellect, and a procession of the love in the will, there exists an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain representation of the species. In other creatures, however, we do not find the principle of the word, and the word and love; but we do see in them a certain trace of the existence of these in the Cause that produced them. For the fact that a creature has a modified and finite nature, proves that it proceeds from a principle; while its species points to the (mental) word of the maker, just as the shape of a house points to the idea of the architect; and order points to the maker's love by reason of which he directs the effect to a good end; as also the use of the house points to the will of the architect. So we find in man a likeness to God by way of an *image* in his mind; but in the other parts of his being by way of a *trace*.

*Reply Obj. 1.* Man is called the image of God; not that he is essentially an image; but that the image of God is impressed on his mind; as a coin is an image of the king, as having the image of the king. Wherefore there is no need to consider the image of God as existing in every part of man.

*Reply Obj. 2.* As Augustine says (*De Trin.* xii. 5), some have thought that the image of God was not in man individually, but severally. They held that the man represents *the Person of the Father*; those born of man denote the *person of the Son*; and that the woman is a third *person in likeness to the Holy Ghost, since she so proceeded from man*
as not to be his son or daughter. All of this is manifestly absurd; first, because it would follow that the Holy Ghost is the principle of the Son, as the woman is the principle of the man's offspring; secondly, because one man would be only the image of one Person; thirdly, because in that case Scripture should not have mentioned the image of God in man until after the birth of the offspring. Therefore we must understand that when Scripture had said, to the image of God He created him, it added, male and female He created them, not to imply that the image of God came through the distinction of sex, but that the image of God belongs to both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction. Wherefore the Apostle (Col. iii. 10), after saying, According to the image of Him that created him, added, Where there is neither male nor female* (Vulg., neither Gentile nor Jew).

Reply Obj. 3. Although the image of God in man is not to be found in his bodily shape, yet because the body of man alone among terrestrial animals is not inclined prone to the ground, but is adapted to look upward to heaven, for this reason we may rightly say that it is made to God's image and likeness, rather than the bodies of other animals, as Augustine remarks (QQ. LXXXIII.; qu. 51). But this is not to be understood as though the image of God were in man's body; but in the sense that the very shape of the human body represents the image of God in the soul by way of a trace.

Reply Obj. 4. Both in the corporeal and in the imaginary vision we may find a trinity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xi. 2). For in corporeal vision there is first the species of the exterior body; secondly, the act of vision, which occurs by the impression on the sight of a certain likeness of the said species; thirdly, the intention of the will applying the sight to see, and to rest on what is seen.

Likewise, in the imaginary vision we find first the species kept in the memory; secondly, the vision itself, which is caused by the penetrative power of the soul, that is, the

* These words are in reality from Gal. iii. 28.
faculty of imagination, informed by the species; and
thirdly, we find the intention of the will joining both
together. But each of these trinities falls short of the
Divine image. For the species of the external body is
extrinsic to the essence of the soul; while the species in the
memory, though not extrinsic to the soul, is adventitious to
it; and thus in both cases the species falls short of represen-
ting the connatural and co-eternity of the Divine
Persons. The corporeal vision, too, does not proceed only
from the species of the external body, but from this, and at
the same time from the sense of the seer; in like manner
imaginary vision is not from the species only which is pre-
served in the memory, but also from the imagination. For
these reasons the procession of the Son from the Father
alone is not suitably represented. Lastly the intention of
the will joining the two together, does not proceed from
them either in corporeal or spiritual vision. Wherefore the
procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son
is not thus properly represented.

Seventh Article.

Whether the Image of God is to be found in the Acts
of the Soul?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the image of God is not
found in the acts of the soul. For Augustine says (De Civ.
Dei xi. 26), that man was made to God’s image, inasmuch
as we exist and know that we exist, and love this existence
and knowledge. But to exist does not signify an act.
Therefore the image of God is not to be found in the soul’s
acts.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine (De Trin. ix. 4) assigns God’s
image in the soul to these three things—mind, knowledge,
and love. But mind does not signify an act, but rather the
power or the essence of the intellectual soul. Therefore
the image of God does not extend to the acts of the soul.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine (De Trin. x. 11) assigns the
image of the Trinity in the soul to memory, understanding, and will. But these three are natural powers of the soul, as the Master of the Sentences says (1 Sent., D. iii.). Therefore the image of God is in the powers, and does not extend to the acts of the soul.

Obj. 4. Further, the image of the Trinity always remains in the soul. But an act does not always remain. Therefore the image of God does not extend to the acts.

On the contrary, Augustine (De Trin. xi. 2 seqq.) assigns the trinity in the lower part of the soul, in relation to the actual vision, whether sensible or imaginative. Therefore, also, the trinity in the mind, by reason of which man is like to God's image, must be referred to actual vision.

I answer that, As above explained (A. 2), a certain representation of the species belongs to the nature of an image. Hence, if the image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, we must look for it where the soul approaches the nearest to a representation of the species of the Divine Persons. Now the Divine Persons are distinct from each other by reason of the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and the procession of Love connecting Both. But in our soul word cannot exist without actual thought, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv. 7). Therefore, first and chiefly, the image of the Trinity is to be found in the acts of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the knowledge which we possess, by actual thought we form an internal word; and thence break forth into love. But, since the principles of acts are the habits and powers, and everything exists virtually in its principle, therefore, secondarily and consequently, the image of the Trinity may be considered as existing in the powers, and still more in the habits, forasmuch as the acts virtually exist therein.

Reply Obj. 1. Our being bears the image of God so far as it is proper to us, and excels that of the other animals, that is to say, in so far as we are endowed with a mind. Therefore, this trinity is the same as that which Augustine mentions (De Trin. ix. 4), and which consists in mind, knowledge, and love,
Reply Obj. 2. Augustine observed this trinity, first, as existing in the mind. But because the mind, though it knows itself entirely in a certain degree, yet also in a way does not know itself—namely, as being distinct from others (and thus also it searches itself, as Augustine subsequently proves—De Trin. x. 3, 4); therefore, as though knowledge were not in equal proportion to mind, he takes three things in the soul which are proper to the mind, namely, memory, understanding, and will; which everyone is conscious of possessing; and assigns the image of the Trinity pre-eminently to these three, as though the first assignation were in part deficient.

Reply Obj. 3. As Augustine proves (De Trin. xiv. 7), we may be said to understand, will, and to love certain things, both when we actually consider them, and when we do not think of them. When they are not under our actual consideration, they are objects of our memory only, which, in his opinion, is nothing else than habitual retention of knowledge and love.* But since, as he says, a word cannot be there without actual thought (for we think everything that we say, even if we speak with that interior word belonging to no nation’s tongue), this image chiefly consists in these three things, memory, understanding, and will. And by understanding I mean here that whereby we understand with actual thought; and by will, love, or dilection I mean that which unites this child with its parent. From which it is clear that he places the image of the Divine Trinity more in actual understanding and will, than in these as existing in the habitual retention of the memory; although even thus the image of the Trinity exists in the soul in a certain degree, as he says in the same place. Thus it is clear that memory, understanding, and will are not three powers as stated in the Sentences.

Reply Obj. 4. Someone might answer by referring to Augustine’s statement (De Trin. xiv. 6), that the mind ever remembers itself, ever understands itself, ever loves itself; which some take to mean that the soul ever actually under-

* Cf. Q. LXXIX., A. 7, ad 1.
stands, and loves itself. But he excludes this interpretation by adding that it does not always think of itself as actually distinct from other things. Thus it is clear that the soul always understands and loves itself, not actually but habitually; though we might say that by perceiving its own act, it understands itself whenever it understands anything. But since it is not always actually understanding, as in the case of sleep, we must say that these acts, although not always actually existing, yet ever exist in their principles, the habits and powers. Wherefore, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv. 4): If the rational soul is made to the image of God in the sense that it can make use of reason and intellect to understand and consider God, then the image of God was in the soul from the beginning of its existence.

Eighth Article.

Whether the image of the divine trinity is in the soul only by comparison with God as its object?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the image of the Divine Trinity is in the soul not only by comparison with God as its object. For the image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, as shown above (A. 7), according as the word in us proceeds from the speaker; and love from both. But this is to be found in us as regards any object. Therefore the image of the Divine Trinity is in our mind as regards any object.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xii. 4) that when we seek trinity in the soul, we seek it in the whole of the soul, without separating the process of reasoning in temporal matters from the consideration of things eternal. Therefore the image of the Trinity is to be found in the soul, even as regards temporal objects.

Obj. 3. Further, it is by grace that we can know and love God. If, therefore, the image of the Trinity is found in the soul by reason of the memory, understanding, and will or
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love of God, this image is not in man by nature but by grace, and thus is not common to all.

Obj. 4. Further, the saints in heaven are most perfectly conformed to the image of God by the beatific vision; wherefore it is written (2 Cor. iii. 18): *We . . . are transformed into the same image from glory to glory.* But temporal things are known by the beatific vision. Therefore the image of God exists in us even according to temporal things.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Trin. xiv. 12*): *The image of God exists in the mind, not because it has a remembrance of itself, loves itself, and understands itself; but because it can also remember, understand, and love God by Whom it was made.* Much less, therefore, is the image of God in the soul, in respect of other objects.

*I answer that,* As above explained (*AA. 2, 7*), image means a likeness which in some degree, however small, attains to a representation of the species. Wherefore we need to seek in the image of the Divine Trinity in the soul some kind of representation of species of the Divine Persons, so far as this is possible to a creature. Now the Divine Persons, as above stated (*AA. 6, 7*), are distinguished from each other according to the procession of the word from the speaker, and the procession of love from both. Moreover the Word of God is born of God by the knowledge of Himself; and Love proceeds from God according as He loves Himself. But it is clear that diversity of objects diversifies the species of word and love; for in the human mind the species of a stone is specifically different from that of a horse, while also the love regarding each of them is specifically different. Hence we refer the Divine image in man to the verbal concept born of the knowledge of God, and to the love derived therefrom. Thus the image of God is found in the soul according as the soul turns to God, or possesses a nature that enables it to turn to God. Now the mind may turn towards an object in two ways: directly and immediately, or indirectly and meditately; as, for instance, when anyone sees a man reflected in a looking-glass he may be said to be turned towards that
man. So Augustine says (De Trin. xiv. 8), that the mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself. If we perceive this, we perceive a trinity, not, indeed, God, but, nevertheless, rightly called the image of God. But this is due to the fact, not that the mind reflects on itself absolutely, but that thereby it can furthermore turn to God, as appears from the authority quoted above (Arg. On the contrary).

Reply Obj. 1. For the notion of an image it is not enough that something proceed from another, but it is also necessary to observe what proceeds and whence it proceeds; namely, that what is Word of God proceeds from knowledge of God.

Reply Obj. 2. In all the soul we may see a kind of trinity, not, however, as though besides the action of temporal things and the contemplation of eternal things, any third thing should be required to make up the trinity, as he adds in the same passage. But in that part of the reason which is concerned with temporal things, although a trinity may be found, yet the image of God is not to be seen there, as he says farther on; forasmuch as this knowledge of temporal things is adventitious to the soul. Moreover even the habits whereby temporal things are known are not always present; but sometimes they are actually present, and sometimes present only in memory even after they begin to exist in the soul. Such is clearly the case with faith, which comes to us temporally for this present life; while in the future life faith will no longer exist, but only the remembrance of faith.

Reply Obj. 3. The meritorious knowledge and love of God can be in us only by grace. Yet there is a certain natural knowledge and love as seen above (Q. XII., A. 12; Q. LV1., A. 3; Q. LX., A. 5). This, too, is natural that the mind, in order to understand God, can make use of reason, in which sense we have already said that the image of God abides ever in the soul; whether this image of God be so obsolete, as it were clouded, as almost to amount to nothing, as in those who have not the use of reason; or
obscured and disfigured, as in sinners; or clear and beautiful, as in the just; as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv. 6).

Reply Obj. 4. By the vision of glory temporal things will be seen in God Himself; and such a vision of things temporal will belong to the image of God. This is what Augustine means (ibid.), when he says that in that nature to which the mind will blissfully adhere, whatever it sees it will see as unchangeable; for in the Uncreated Word are the types of all creatures.

NINTH ARTICLE.

WHETHER "LIKENESS" IS PROPERLY DISTINGUISHED FROM "IMAGE"?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that likeness is not properly distinguished from image. For genus is not properly distinguished from species. Now, likeness is to image as genus to species: because, where there is image, forthwith there is likeness, but not conversely as Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIII.; qu. 74). Therefore likeness is not properly to be distinguished from image.

Obj. 2. Further, the nature of the image consists not only in the representation of the Divine Persons, but also in the representation of the Divine Essence, to which representation belong immortality and indivisibility. So it is not true to say that the likeness is in the essence because it is immortal and indivisible; whereas the image is in other things (2 Sent., D. xvi.).

Obj. 3. Further, the image of God in man is threefold,—the image of nature, of grace and of glory, as above explained (A. 4). But innocence and righteousness belong to grace. Therefore it is incorrectly said (ibid.) that the image is taken from the memory, the understanding, and the will, while the likeness is from innocence and righteousness.

Obj. 4. Further, knowledge of truth belongs to the intellect, and love of virtue to the will; which two things are parts of the image. Therefore it is incorrect to say
(ibid.) that the image consists in the knowledge of truth, and the likeness in the love of virtue.

On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. LXXXIII.; qu. 51): Some consider that these two were mentioned not without reason, namely 'image' and 'likeness,' since, if they meant the same, one would have sufficed.

I answer that, Likeness is a kind of unity, for oneness in quality causes likeness, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v., Did. iv. 15). Now, since one is a transcendental, it is both common to all, and adapted to each single thing, just as the good and the true. Wherefore, as the good can be compared to each individual thing both as its preamble, and as subsequent to it, as signifying some perfection in it, so also in the same way there exists a kind of comparison between likeness and image. For the good is a preamble to man, inasmuch as man is an individual good; and, again, the good is subsequent to man, inasmuch as we may say of a certain man that he is good, by reason of his perfect virtue. In like manner, likeness may be considered in the light of a preamble to image, inasmuch as it is something more general than image, as we have said above (A. 1): and, again, it may be considered as subsequent to image, inasmuch as it signifies a certain perfection of image. For we say that an image is like or unlike what it represents, according as the representation is perfect or imperfect. Thus likeness may be distinguished from image in two ways: first as its preamble and existing in more things, and in this sense likeness regards things which are more common than the intellectual properties, wherein the image is properly to be seen. In this sense it is stated (QQ. LXXXIII.; qu. 51) that the spirit (namely, the mind) without doubt was made to the image of God. But the other parts of man, belonging to the soul's inferior faculties, or even to the body, are in the opinion of some made to God's likeness. In this sense he says (De Quant. Animae ii.) that the likeness of God is found in the soul's incorruptibility; for corruptible and incorruptible are differences of universal beings. But likeness may be considered in another way, as signify-
ing the expression and perfection of the image. In this
sense Damascene says (De Fid. Orth. ii. 12) that the image
implies an intelligent being, endowed with free-will and
self-movement, whereas likeness implies a likeness of power,
as far as this may be possible in man. In the same sense
likeness is said to belong to the love of virtue: for there is
no virtue without love of virtue.

Reply Obj. 1. Likeness is not distinct from image in the
general notion of likeness (for thus it is included in image);
but so far as any likeness falls short of image, or again, as
it perfects the idea of image.

Reply Obj. 2. The soul's essence belongs to the image,
as representing the Divine Essence in those things which
belong to the intellectual nature; but not in those condi-
tions subsequent to general notions of being, such as sim-
plicity and indissolubility.

Reply Obj. 3. Even certain virtues are natural to the
soul, at least, in their seeds, by reason of which we may
say that a natural likeness exists in the soul. Nor is it
unfitting to use the term image from one point of view, and
from another the term likeness.

Reply Obj. 4. Love of the word, which is knowledge
loved, belongs to the nature of image; but love of virtue
belongs to likeness, as virtue itself belongs to likeness.
QUESTION XCIV.

OF THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE FIRST MAN AS REGARDS HIS INTELLECT.

(In Four Articles.)

We next consider the state or condition of the first man; first, as regards his soul; secondly as regards his body. Concerning the first there are two things to be considered: (1) The condition of man as to his intellect; (2) the condition of man as to his will.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the first man saw the Essence of God? (2) Whether he could see the separate substances, that is, the angels? (3) Whether he possessed all knowledge? (4) Whether he could err or be deceived?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FIRST MAN SAW GOD THROUGH HIS ESSENCE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the first man saw God through His Essence. For man's happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. But the first man, while established in Paradise, led a life of happiness in the enjoyment of all things, as Damascene says (De Fid. Orth. ii. 11). And Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv. 10): If man was gifted with the same tastes as now, how happy must he have been in Paradise, that place of ineffable happiness! Therefore the first man in Paradise saw God through His Essence.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv. loc. cit.) that the first man lacked nothing which his good-will might obtain. But our good-will can obtain nothing better
than the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore man saw God through His Essence.

Obj. 3. Further, the vision of God in His Essence is whereby God is seen without a medium or enigma. But man in the state of innocence saw God immediately, as the Master of the Sentences asserts (4 Sent., D. i.). He also saw without an enigma, for an enigma implies obscurity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv. 9). Now, obscurity resulted from sin. Therefore man in the primitive state saw God through His Essence.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (1 Cor. xv. 46): That was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural. But to see God through His Essence is most spiritual. Therefore the first man in the primitive state of his natural life did not see God through His Essence.

I answer that, The first man did not see God through His Essence if we consider the ordinary state of that life; unless, perhaps, it be said that he saw God in a vision, when God cast a deep sleep upon Adam (Gen. ii. 21). The reason is because, since in the Divine Essence is beatitude itself, the intellect of a man who sees the Divine Essence has the same relation to God as a man has to beatitude. Now it is clear that man cannot willingly be turned away from beatitude, since naturally and necessarily he desires it, and shuns unhappiness. Wherefore no one who sees the Essence of God can willingly turn away from God, which means to sin. Hence all who see God through His Essence are so firmly established in the love of God, that for eternity they can never sin. Therefore, as Adam did sin, it is clear that he did not see God through His Essence.

Nevertheless he knew God with a more perfect knowledge than we do now. Thus in a sense his knowledge was midway between our knowledge in the present state, and the knowledge we shall have in heaven, when we see God through His Essence. To make this clear, we must consider that the vision of God through His Essence is contradistinguished from the vision of God through His creatures. Now the higher the creature is, and the more like it is to
God, the more clearly is God seen in it; for instance, a man is seen more clearly through a mirror in which his image is the more clearly expressed. Thus God is seen in a much more perfect manner through His intelligible effects than through those which are only sensible or corporeal. But in his present state man is impeded as regards the full and clear consideration of intelligible creatures, because he is distracted by and occupied with sensible things. Now, it is written (Eccles. vii. 30): God made man right. And man was made right by God in this sense, that in him the lower powers were subjected to the higher, and the higher nature was made so as not to be impeded by the lower. Wherefore the first man was not impeded by exterior things from a clear and steady contemplation of the intelligible effects which he perceived by the radiation of the first truth, whether by a natural or by a gratuitous knowledge. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi. 33) that, perhaps God used to speak to the first man as He speaks to the angels; by shedding on his mind a ray of the unchangeable truth, yet without bestowing on him the experience of which the angels are capable in the participation of the Divine Essence. Therefore, through these intelligible effects of God, man knew God then more clearly than we know Him now.

Reply Obj. 1. Man was happy in Paradise, but not with that perfect happiness to which he was destined, which consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. He was, however, endowed with a life of happiness in a certain measure, as Augustine says (ibid., 18), so far as he was gifted with natural integrity and perfection.

Reply Obj. 2. A good will is a well-ordered will; but the will of the first man would have been ill-ordered had he wished to have, while in the state of merit, what had been promised to him as a reward.

Reply Obj. 3. A medium (of knowledge) is twofold; one through which, and, at the same time, in which, something is seen, as, for example, a man is seen through a mirror, and is seen with the mirror: another kind of medium is that whereby we attain to the knowledge of something
unknown; such as the medium in a demonstration. God was seen without this second kind of medium, but not without the first kind. For there was no need for the first man to attain to the knowledge of God by demonstration drawn from an effect, such as we need; since he knew God simultaneously in His effects, especially in the intelligible effects, according to His capacity. Again, we must remark that the obscurity which is implied in the word enigma may be of two kinds: first, so far as every creature is something obscure when compared with the immensity of the Divine light; and thus Adam saw God in an enigma, because he saw Him in a created effect: secondly, we may take obscurity as an effect of sin, so far as man is impeded in the consideration of intelligible things by being preoccupied with sensible things; in which sense Adam did not see God in an enigma.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER ADAM IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE SAW THE ANGELS THROUGH THEIR ESSENCE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Adam, in the state of innocence, saw the angels through their essence. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv. 1): In Paradise man was accustomed to enjoy the words of God; and by purity of heart and loftiness of vision to have the company of the good angels.

Obj. 2. Further, the soul in the present state is impeded from the knowledge of separate substances by union with a corruptible body which is a load upon the soul, as is written Wisdom ix. 15. Wherefore the separate soul can see separate substances, as above explained (Q. LXXXIX., A. 2). But the body of the first man was not a load upon his soul; for the latter was not corruptible. Therefore he was able to see separate substances.

Obj. 3. Further, one separate substance knows another
separate substance, by knowing itself (*De Causis* xiii.). But the soul of the first man knew itself. Therefore it knew separate substances.

*On the contrary,* The soul of Adam was of the same nature as ours. But our souls cannot now understand separate substances. Therefore neither could Adam's soul.

*I answer that,* The state of the human soul may be distinguished in two ways. First, from a diversity of mode in its natural existence; and in this point the state of the separate soul is distinguished from the state of the soul joined to the body. Secondly, the state of the soul is distinguished in relation to integrity and corruption, the state of natural existence remaining the same; and thus the state of innocence is distinct from the state of man after sin. For man's soul, in the state of innocence, was adapted to perfect and govern the body; wherefore the first man is said to have been made into a *living soul*; that is, a soul giving life to the body,—namely animal life. But he was endowed with integrity as to this life, in that the body was entirely subject to the soul, hindering it in no way, as we have said above (A. 1). Now it is clear from what has been already said (*Q. LXXXIV.*, A. 7; *Q. LXXXV.*, A. 1; *Q. LXXXIX.*, A. 1) that since the soul is adapted to perfect and govern the body, as regards animal life, it is fitting that it should have that mode of understanding which is by turning to phantasms. Wherefore this mode of understanding was becoming to the soul of the first man also.

Now, in virtue of this mode of understanding, there are three degrees of movement in the soul, as Dionysius says (*Div. Nom.* iv.). The first is by the soul *passing from exterior things to concentrate its powers on itself*; the second is by the soul ascending *so as to be associated with the united superior powers*, namely the angels; the third is when the soul is *led on yet further to the supreme good*, that is, to God.

In virtue of the first movement of the soul from exterior things to itself, the soul's knowledge is perfected. This is because the intellectual operation of the soul has a
natural order to external things, as we have said above (Q. LXXXVII., A. 3): and so by the knowledge thereof, our intellectual operation can be known perfectly, as an act through its object. And through the intellectual operation itself, the human intellect can be known perfectly, as a power through its proper act. But in the second movement we do not find perfect knowledge. Because, since the angel does not understand by turning to phantasms, but by a far more excellent process, as we have said above (Q. LV., A. 2); the above-mentioned mode of knowledge, by which the soul knows itself, is not sufficient to lead it to the knowledge of an angel. Much less does the third movement lead to perfect knowledge: for even the angels themselves, by the fact that they know themselves, are not able to arrive at the knowledge of the Divine Substance, by reason of its surpassing excellence. Therefore the soul of the first man could not see the angels in their essence. Nevertheless he had a more excellent mode of knowledge regarding the angels than we possess, because his knowledge of intelligible things within him was more certain and fixed than our knowledge. And it was on account of this excellence of knowledge that Gregory says that he enjoyed the company of the angelic spirits.

This makes clear the reply to the first objection.

Reply Obj. 2. That the soul of the first man fell short of the knowledge regarding separate substances, was not owing to the fact that the body was a load upon it; but to the fact that its connatural object fell short of the excellence of separate substances. We, in our present state, fall short on account of both these reasons.

Reply Obj. 3. The soul of the first man was not able to arrive at knowledge of separate substances by means of its self-knowledge, as we have shown above; for even each separate substance knows others in its own measure.
THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FIRST MAN KNEW ALL THINGS?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the first man did not know all things. For if he had such knowledge it would be either by acquired species, or by connatural species, or by infused species. Not, however, by acquired species; for this kind of knowledge is acquired by experience, as stated in Metaph. i. 1; and the first man had not then gained experience of all things. Nor through connatural species, because he was of the same nature as we are; and our soul, as Aristotle says (De Anima iii. 4), is like a clean tablet on which nothing is written. And if his knowledge came by infused species, it would have been of a different kind from ours, which we acquire from things themselves.

Obj. 2. Further, individuals of the same species have the same way of arriving at perfection. Now other men have not, from the beginning, knowledge of all things, but they acquire it in the course of time according to their capacity. Therefore neither did Adam know all things when he was first created.

Obj. 3. Further, the present state of life is given to man in order that his soul may advance in knowledge and merit; indeed, the soul seems to be united to the body for that purpose. Now man would have advanced in merit in that state of life; therefore also in knowledge. Therefore he was not endowed with knowledge of all things.

On the contrary, Man named the animals (Gen. ii. 20). But names should be adapted to the nature of things. Therefore Adam knew the animals’ natures; and in like manner he was possessed of the knowledge of all other things.

I answer that, In the natural order, perfection comes before imperfection, as act precedes potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality is made actual only by something actual. And since God created things not only for their
own existence, but also that they might be the principles of other things; so creatures were produced in their perfect state to be the principles as regards others. Now man can be the principle of another man, not only by generation of the body, but also by instruction and government. Hence, as the first man was produced in his perfect state, as regards his body, for the work of generation, so also was his soul established in a perfect state to instruct and govern others.

Now no one can instruct others unless he has knowledge, and so the first man was established by God in such a manner as to have knowledge of all those things for which man has a natural aptitude. And such are whatever are virtually contained in the first self-evident principles, that is, whatever truths man is naturally able to know. Moreover, in order to direct his own life and that of others, man needs to know not only those things which can be naturally known, but also things surpassing natural knowledge; because the life of man is directed to a supernatural end: just as it is necessary for us to know the truths of faith in order to direct our own lives. Wherefore the first man was endowed with such a knowledge of these supernatural truths as was necessary for the direction of human life in that state. But those things which cannot be known by merely human effort, and which are not necessary for the direction of human life, were not known by the first man; such as the thoughts of men, future contingent events, and some individual facts, as for instance the number of pebbles in a stream; and the like.

Reply Obj. 1. The first man had knowledge of all things by divinely infused species. Yet his knowledge was not different from ours; as the eyes which Christ gave to the man born blind were not different from those given by nature.

Reply Obj. 2. To Adam, as being the first man, was due a degree of perfection which was not due to other men, as is clear from what is above explained.

Reply Obj. 3. Adam would have advanced in natural knowledge, not in the number of things known, but in the
manner of knowing; because what he knew speculatively he would subsequently have known by experience. But as regards supernatural knowledge, he would also have advanced as regards the number of things known, by further revelation; as the angels advance by further enlightenment. Moreover there is no comparison between advance in knowledge and advance in merit; since one man cannot be a principle of merit to another, although he can be to another a principle of knowledge.

**Fourth Article.**

**Whether man in his first state could be deceived?**

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that man in his primitive state could have been deceived. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. ii. 14) that *the woman being seduced was in the transgression.*

Obj. 2. Further, the Master says (2 Sent., D. xxi.) that, *the woman was not frightened at the serpent speaking, because she thought that he had received the faculty of speech from God.* But this was untrue. Therefore before sin the woman was deceived.

Obj. 3. Further, it is natural that the farther off anything is from us, the smaller it seems to be. Now, the nature of the eyes is not changed by sin. Therefore this would have been the case in the state of innocence. Wherefore man would have been deceived in the size of what he saw, just as he is deceived now.

Obj. 4. Further, Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit.* xii. 2) that, in sleep the soul adheres to the images of things as if they were the things themselves. But in the state of innocence man would have eaten and consequently have slept and dreamed. Therefore he would have been deceived, adhering to images as to realities.

Obj. 5. Further, the first man would have been ignorant of other men’s thoughts, and of future contingent events,
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as stated above (A. 3). So if anyone had told him what
was false about these things, he would have been deceived.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii. 18): To regard what is true as false, is not natural to man as
created; but is a punishment of man condemned.

I answer that, in the opinion of some, deception may
mean two things; namely, any slight surmise, in which
one adheres to what is false, as though it were true, but
without the assent of belief;—or it may mean a firm belief.
Thus before sin Adam could not be deceived in either of
these ways as regards those things to which his knowledge
extended; but as regards things to which his knowledge did
not extend, he might have been deceived, if we take decep-
tion in the wide sense of the term for any surmise without
assent of belief. This opinion was held with the idea that
it is not derogatory to man to entertain a false opinion in
such matters, and that provided he does not assent rashly,
he is not to be blamed.

Such an opinion, however, is not fitting as regards the
integrity of the primitive state of life; because, as Augustine
says (De Civ. Dei xiv. 10), in that state of life sin was
avoided without struggle, and while it remained so, no evil
could exist. Now it is clear that as truth is the good of the
intellect, so falsehood is its evil, as the Philosopher says
(Ethic. vi. 2). So that, as long as the state of innocence
continued, it was impossible for the human intellect to
assent to falsehood as if it were truth. For as some per-
fections, such as clarity, were lacking in the bodily members
of the first man, though no evil could be therein; so there
could be in his intellect the absence of some knowledge,
but no false opinion.

This is clear also from the very rectitude of the primitive
state, by virtue of which, while the soul remained subject
to God, the lower faculties in man were subject to the
higher, and were no impediment to their action. And
from what has preceded (Q. LXXXV., A. 6), it is clear that
as regards its proper object the intellect is ever true; and
hence it is never deceived of itself; but whatever deception
occurs must be ascribed to some lower faculty, such as the imagination or the like. Hence we see that when the natural power of judgment is free we are not deceived by such images, but only when it is not free, as is the case in sleep. Therefore it is clear that the rectitude of the primitive state was incompatible with deception of the intellect.

Reply Obj. 1. Though the woman was deceived before she sinned in deed, still it was not till she had already sinned by interior pride. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi. 30) that, the woman could not have believed the words of the serpent, had she not already acquiesced in the love of her own power, and in a presumption of self-conceit.

Reply Obj. 2. The woman thought that the serpent had received this faculty, not as acting in accordance with nature, but by virtue of some supernatural operation. We need not, however, follow the Master of the Sentences in this point.

Reply Obj. 3. Were anything presented to the imagination or sense of the first man, not in accordance with the nature of things, he would not have been deceived, for his reason would have enabled him to judge the truth.

Reply Obj. 4. A man is not accountable for what occurs during sleep; as he has not then the use of his reason, wherein consists man's proper action.

Reply Obj. 5. If anyone had said something untrue as regards future contingencies, or as regards secret thoughts, man in the primitive state would not have believed it was so: but he might have believed that such a thing was possible; which would not have been to entertain a false opinion.

It might also be said that he would have been divinely guided from above, so as not to be deceived in a matter to which his knowledge did not extend.

If any object, as some do, that he was not guided, when tempted, though he was then most in need of guidance, we reply that man had already sinned in his heart, and that he failed to have recourse to the Divine aid.
QUESTION XCV.

OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST MAN'S WILL—
NAMELY, GRACE AND RIGHTEOUSNESS.

(In Four Articles.)

We next consider what belongs to the will of the first man; concerning which there are two points for treatment: (1) The grace and righteousness of the first man; (2) the use of righteousness as regards his dominion over other things.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether the first man was created in grace? (2) Whether in the state of innocence he had passions of the soul? (3) Whether he had all virtues? (4) Whether what he did would have been as meritorious as now?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER THE FIRST MAN WAS CREATED IN GRACE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the first man was not created in grace. For the Apostle, distinguishing between Adam and Christ, says (1 Cor. xv. 45): The first Adam was made into a living soul; the last Adam into a quickening spirit. But the spirit is quickened by grace. Therefore Christ alone was made in grace.

Obj. 2. Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. 123*) that Adam did not possess the Holy Ghost. But whoever possesses grace, has the Holy Ghost. Therefore Adam was not created in grace.

Obj. 3. Further, Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. x.)

* Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of S. Augustine.
that God so ordered the life of angels and men, as to show first what they could do by free-will, then what they can do by His grace, and by the discernment of righteousness. God thus first created men and angels in the state of natural free-will only; and afterwards bestowed grace on them.

**Obj. 4.** Further, the Master says (2 Sent., D. xxiv.): *When man was created he was given sufficient help to stand, but not sufficient to advance.* But whoever has grace can advance by merit. Therefore the first man was not created in grace.

**Obj. 5.** Further, the reception of grace requires the consent of the recipient, since thereby a kind of spiritual marriage takes place between God and the soul. But consent presupposes existence. Therefore man did not receive grace in the first moment of his creation.

**Obj. 6.** Further, nature is more distant from grace than grace is from glory, which is but grace consummated. But in man grace precedes glory. Therefore much more did nature precede grace.

On the contrary, Man and angel are both ordained to grace. But the angels were created in grace, for Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* xii. 9): *God at the same time fashioned their nature and endowed them with grace.* Therefore man also was created in grace.

I answer that, Some say that man was not created in grace; but that it was bestowed on him subsequently before sin: and many authorities of the Saints declare that man possessed grace in the state of innocence.

But the very rectitude of the primitive state, wherewith man was endowed by God, seems to require that, as others say, he was created in grace, according to Eccles. vii. 30, *God made man right.* For this rectitude consisted in his reason being subject to God, the lower powers to reason, and the body to the soul: and the first subjection was the cause of both the second and the third; since while reason was subject to God, the lower powers remained subject to reason, as Augustine says. * Now it is clear that such a

* Cf. *De Civ. Dei* xiii. 13; *De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss.* i. 16.
subjection of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason, was not from nature; otherwise it would have remained after sin; since even in the demons the natural gifts remained after sin, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv.). Hence it is clear that also the primitive subjection by virtue of which reason was subject to God, was not a merely natural gift, but a supernatural endowment of grace; for it is not possible that the effect should be of greater efficiency than the cause. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii. 13) that, as soon as they disobeyed the Divine command, and forfeited Divine grace, they were ashamed of their nakedness, for they felt the impulse of disobedience in the flesh, as though it were a punishment corresponding to their own disobedience. Hence if the loss of grace dissolved the obedience of the flesh to the soul, we may gather that the inferior powers were subjected to the soul through grace existing therein.

Reply Obj. 1. The Apostle in these words means to show that there is a spiritual body, if there is an animal body, inasmuch as the spiritual life of the body began in Christ, who is the firstborn of the dead, as the body's animal life began in Adam. From the Apostle's words, therefore, we cannot gather that Adam had no spiritual life in his soul; but that he had not spiritual life as regards the body.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says in the same passage, it is not disputed that Adam, like other just souls, was in some degree gifted with the Holy Ghost; but he did not possess the Holy Ghost, as the faithful possess Him now, who are admitted to eternal happiness directly after death.

Reply Obj. 3. This passage from Augustine does not assert that angels or men were created with natural free-will before they possessed grace; but that God shows first what their free-will could do before being confirmed in grace, and what they acquired afterwards by being so confirmed.

Reply Obj. 4. The Master here speaks according to the opinion of those who held that man was not created in grace, but only in a state of nature. We may also say that, though man was created in grace, yet it was not by virtue
of the nature wherein he was created that he could advance by merit, but by virtue of the grace which was added.

Reply Obj. 5. As the motion of the will is not continuous there is nothing against the first man having consented to grace even in the first moment of his existence.

Reply Obj. 6. We merit glory by an act of grace; but we do not merit grace by an act of nature; hence the comparison fails.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER PASSIONS EXISTED IN THE SOUL OF THE FIRST MAN?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the first man's soul had no passions. For by the passions of the soul the flesh lusteth against the spirit (Gal. v. 7). But this did not happen in the state of innocence. Therefore in the state of innocence there were no passions of the soul.

Obj. 2. Further, Adam's soul was nobler than his body. But his body was impassible. Therefore no passions were in his soul.

Obj. 3. Further, the passions of the soul are restrained by the moral virtues. But in Adam the moral virtues were perfect. Therefore the passions were entirely excluded from him.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv. 10) that in our first parents there was undisturbed love of God, and other passions of the soul.

I answer that, The passions of the soul are in the sensual appetite, the object of which is good and evil. Wherefore some passions of the soul are directed to what is good, as love and joy; others to what is evil, as fear and sorrow. And since in the primitive state, evil was neither present nor imminent, nor was any good wanting which a good-will could desire to have then, as Augustine says (ibid.), therefore Adam had no passion with evil as its object; such as fear, sorrow, and the like; neither had he passions in
respect of good not possessed, but to be possessed then, as burning concupiscence. But those passions which regard present good, as joy and love; or which regard future good to be had at the proper time, as desire and hope that casteth not down, existed in the state of innocence; otherwise, however, than as they exist in ourselves. For our sensual appetite, wherein the passions reside, is not entirely subject to reason; hence at times our passions forestall and hinder reason's judgment; at other times they follow after reason's judgment, accordingly as the sensual appetite obeys reason to some extent. But in the state of innocence the inferior appetite was wholly subject to reason: so that in that state the passions of the soul existed only as consequent upon the judgment of reason.

Reply Obj. 1. The flesh lusts against the spirit by the rebellion of the passions against reason; which could not occur in the state of innocence.

Reply Obj. 2. The human body was impassible in the state of innocence as regards the passions which alter the disposition of nature, as will be explained later on (Q. XCVII., A. 2); likewise the soul was impassible as regards the passions which impede the free use of reason.

Reply Obj. 3. Perfection of moral virtue does not wholly take away the passions, but regulates them; for the temperate man desires as he ought to desire, and what he ought to desire, as stated in Ethic. iii. 11.

THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER ADAM HAD ALL THE VIRTUES?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that Adam had not all the virtues. For some virtues are directed to curb the passions; thus immoderate concupiscence is restrained by temperance, and immoderate fear by fortitude. But in the state of innocence no immoderation existed in the passions. Therefore neither did these virtues then exist.
Obj. 2. Further, some virtues are concerned with the passions which have evil as their object; as meekness with anger; fortitude with fear. But these passions did not exist in the state of innocence, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore neither did those virtues exist then.

Obj. 3. Further, penance is a virtue that regards sin committed. Mercy, too, is a virtue concerned with unhappiness. But in the state of innocence neither sin nor unhappiness existed. Therefore neither did those virtues exist.

Obj. 4. Further, perseverance is a virtue. But Adam possessed it not; as proved by his subsequent sin. Therefore he possessed not every virtue.

Obj. 5. Further, faith is a virtue. But it did not exist in the state of innocence; for it implies an obscurity of knowledge which seems to be incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state.

On the contrary, Augustine says, in a homily (Serm. contra Judæos): The prince of sin overcame Adam who was made from the slime of the earth to the image of God, adorned with modesty, restrained by temperance, refulgent with brightness.

I answer that, in the state of innocence man in a certain sense possessed all the virtues; and this can be proved from what precedes. For it was shown above (A. 1) that such was the rectitude of the primitive state, that reason was subject to God, and the lower powers to reason. Now the virtues are nothing but those perfections whereby reason is directed to God, and the inferior powers regulated according to the dictate of reason, as will be explained in the Treatise on the Virtues (I.-II., Q. LXIII., A. 2). Wherefore the rectitude of the primitive state required that man should in a sense possess every virtue.

It must, however, be noted that some virtues of their very nature do not involve imperfection, such as charity and justice; and these virtues did exist in the primitive state absolutely, both in habit and in act. But other virtues are of such a nature as to imply imperfection either in their
act, or on the part of the matter. If such imperfection be consistent with the perfection of the primitive state, such virtues necessarily existed in that state; as faith, which is of things not seen, and hope which is of things not yet possessed. For the perfection of that state did not extend to the vision of the Divine Essence, and the possession of God with the enjoyment of final beatitude. Hence faith and hope could exist in the primitive state, both as to habit and as to act. But any virtue which implies imperfection incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, could exist in that state as a habit, but not as to the act; for instance, penance, which is sorrow for sin committed; and mercy, which is sorrow for others' unhappiness; because sorrow, guilt, and unhappiness are incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state. Wherefore such virtues existed as habits in the first man, but not as to their acts; for he was so disposed that he would repent, if there had been a sin to repent for; and had he seen unhappiness in his neighbour, he would have done his best to remedy it. This is in accordance with what the Philosopher says, *Shame, which regards what is ill done, may be found in a virtuous man, but only conditionally; as being so disposed that he would be ashamed if he did wrong* (Ethic. iv. 9).

*Reply Obj. 1.* It is accidental to temperance and fortitude to subdue superabundant passion, in so far as they are in a subject which happens to have superabundant passions: and yet those virtues are *per se* competent to moderate the passions.

*Reply Obj. 2.* Passions which have evil for their object were incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, if that evil be in the one affected by the passion; such as fear and sorrow. But passions which relate to evil in another are not incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state; for in that state man could hate the demons' malice, as he could love God's goodness. Thus the virtues which relate to such passions could exist in the primitive state, in habit and in act. Virtues, however, relating to passions
which regard evil in the same subject, if relating to such passions only, could not exist in the primitive state in act, but only in habit, as we have said above of penance and of mercy. But other virtues there are which have relation not to such passions only, but to others; such as temperance, which relates not only to sorrow, but also to joy; and fortitude, which relates not only to fear, but also to daring and hope. Thus the act of temperance could exist in the primitive state, so far as it moderates pleasure; and in like manner fortitude, as moderating daring and hope, but not as moderating sorrow and fear.

Reply Obj. 3 appears from what has been said above.

Reply Obj. 4. Perseverance may be taken in two ways: in one sense as a particular virtue, signifying a habit whereby a man makes a choice of persevering in good; in that sense Adam possessed perseverance. In another sense it is taken as a circumstance of virtue; signifying a certain uninterrupted continuation of virtue; in which sense Adam did not possess perseverance.

Reply Obj. 5 appears from what has been said above.

Fourth Article.

Whether the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are. For grace is given to us through the mercy of God, Who succours most those who are most in need. Now we are more in need of grace than was man in the state of innocence. Therefore grace is more copiously poured out upon us; and since grace is the source of merit, our actions are more meritorious.

Obj. 2. Further, struggle and difficulty are required for merit; for it is written (2 Tim. ii. 5): He . . . is not crowned except he strive lawfully; and the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii. 3): The object of virtue is the difficult and
the good. But there is more strife and difficulty now. Therefore there is greater efficacy for merit.

Obj. 3. Further, the Master says (2 Sent., D. xxiv.) that man would not have merited in resisting temptation; whereas he does merit now, when he resists. Therefore our actions are more meritorious than in the primitive state.

On the contrary, if such were the case, man would be better off after sinning.

I answer that, Merit as regards degree may be gauged in two ways. First, in its root, which is grace and charity. Merit thus measured corresponds in degree to the essential reward, which consists in the enjoyment of God; for the greater the charity whence our actions proceed, the more perfectly shall we enjoy God. Secondly, the degree of merit is measured by the degree of the action itself. This degree is of two kinds, absolute and proportional. The widow who put two mites into the treasury performed a deed of absolutely less degree than others who put great sums therein. But in proportionate degree the widow gave more, as Our Lord said; because she gave more in proportion to her means. In each of these cases the degree of merit corresponds to the accidental reward, which consists in rejoicing for created good.

We conclude therefore that in the state of innocence man's works were more meritorious than after sin was committed, if we consider the degree of merit on the part of grace, which would have been more copious as meeting with no obstacle in human nature: and in like manner, if we consider the absolute degree of the work done; because, as man would have had greater virtue, he would have performed greater works. But if we consider the proportionate degree, a greater reason for merit exists after sin, on account of man's weakness; because a small deed is more beyond the capacity of one who works with difficulty than a great deed is beyond one who performs it easily.

Reply Obj. 1. After sin man requires grace for more things than before sin; but he does not need grace more: forasmuch as man even before sin required grace to obtain
eternal life, which is the chief reason for the need of grace. But after sin man required grace also for the remission of sin, and for the support of his weakness.

Reply Obj. 2. Difficulty and struggle belong to the degree of merit according to the proportionate degree of the work done, as above explained. It is also a sign of the will's promptitude striving after what is difficult to itself, and the promptitude of the will is caused by the intensity of charity. Yet it may happen that a person performs an easy deed with as prompt a will as another performs an arduous deed; because he is ready to do even what may be difficult to him. But the actual difficulty, by its penal character, enables the deed to satisfy for sin.

Reply Obj. 3. The first man would not have gained merit in resisting temptation, according to the opinion of those who say that he did not possess grace; even as now there is no merit to those who have not grace. But in this point there is a difference, inasmuch as in the primitive state there was no interior impulse to evil, as in our present state. Hence man was more able then than now to resist temptation even without grace.
QUESTION XCVI.

OF THE MASTERSHIP BELONGING TO MAN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE.

(In Four Articles.)

We next consider the mastership which belonged to man in the state of innocence. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether man in the state of innocence was master over the animals? (2) Whether he was master over all creatures? (3) Whether in the state of innocence all men were equal? (4) Whether in that state man would have been master over men?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER ADAM IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE HAD MASTERSHIP OVER THE ANIMALS?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of innocence Adam had no mastership over the animals. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix. 14), that the animals were brought to Adam, under the direction of the angels, to receive their names from him. But the angels need not have intervened thus, if man himself were master over the animals. Therefore in the state of innocence man had no mastership of the animals.

Obj. 2. Further, it is unfitting that elements hostile to one another should be brought under the mastership of one. But many animals are hostile to one another, as the sheep and the wolf. Therefore all animals were not brought under the mastership of man.
Obj. 3. Further, Jerome* says: God gave man mastership over the animals, although before sin he had no need of them: for God foresaw that after sin animals would become useful to man. Therefore, at least before sin, it was unfitting for man to make use of his mastership.

Obj. 4. Further, it is proper to a master to command. But a command is not given rightly save to a rational being. Therefore man had no mastership over the irrational animals.

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. i. 26): Let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the birds of the air, and the beasts of the earth (Vulg., and the whole earth).

I answer that, As above stated (Q. XCV., A. 1) for his disobedience to God, man was punished by the disobedience of those creatures which should be subject to him. Therefore in the state of innocence, before man had disobeyed, nothing disobeyed him that was naturally subject to him. Now all animals are naturally subject to man. This can be proved in three ways. First, from the order observed by nature; for just as in the generation of things we perceive a certain order of procession of the perfect from the imperfect (thus matter is for the sake of form; and the imperfect form, for the sake of the perfect), so also is there order in the use of natural things; thus the imperfect are for the use of the perfect; as the plants make use of the earth for their nourishment, and animals make use of plants, and man makes use of both plants and animals. Therefore it is in keeping with the order of nature, that man should be master over animals. Hence the Philosopher says (Politic. i. 5) that the hunting of wild animals is just and natural, because man thereby exercises a natural right. Secondly, this is proved from the order of Divine Providence which always governs inferior things by the superior. Wherefore, as man, being made to the image of God, is above other animals, these are rightly subject to his govern-

* The words quoted are not in S. Jerome's works. S. Thomas may have had in mind Bede, Hexaem., as quoted in the Glossa ordinaria on Gen. i. 26.
ment. Thirdly, this is proved from a property of man and of other animals. For we see in the latter a certain participated prudence of natural instinct, in regard to certain particular acts; whereas man possesses a universal prudence as regards all practical matters. Now whatever is participated is subject to what is essential and universal. Therefore the subjection of other animals to man is proved to be natural.

Reply Obj. 1. A higher power can do many things that an inferior power cannot do to those which are subject to them. Now an angel is naturally higher than man. Therefore certain things in regard to animals could be done by angels, which could not be done by man; for instance, the rapid gathering together of all the animals.

Reply Obj. 2. In the opinion of some, those animals which now are fierce and kill others, would, in that state, have been tame, not only in regard to man, but also in regard to other animals. But this is quite unreasonable. For the nature of animals was not changed by man’s sin, as if those whose nature now it is to devour the flesh of others, would then have lived on herbs, as the lion and falcon. Nor does Bede’s gloss on Gen. i. 30, say that trees and herbs were given as food to all animals and birds, but to some. Thus there would have been a natural antipathy between some animals. They would not, however, on this account have been excepted from the mastership of man: as neither at present are they for that reason excepted from the mastership of God, Whose Providence has ordained all this. Of this Providence man would have been the executor, as appears even now in regard to domestic animals, since fowls are given by men as food to the trained falcon.

Reply Obj. 3. In the state of innocence man would not have had any bodily need of animals;—neither for clothing, since then they were naked and not ashamed, there being no inordinate motions of concupiscence,—nor for food, since they fed on the trees of paradise,—nor to carry him about, his body being strong enough for that purpose. But man needed animals in order to have experimental
knowledge of their natures. This is signified by the fact that God led the animals to man, that he might give them names expressive of their respective natures.

Reply Obj. 4. All animals by their natural instinct have a certain participation of prudence and reason: which accounts for the fact that cranes follow their leader, and bees obey their queen. So all animals would have obeyed man of their own accord, as in the present state some domestic animals obey him.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER MAN HAD MASTERSHIP OVER ALL OTHER CREATURES?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of innocence man would not have had mastership over all other creatures. For an angel naturally has a greater power than man. But, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii. 8), corporeal matter would not have obeyed even the holy angels. Much less therefore would it have obeyed man in the state of innocence.

Obj. 2. Further, the only powers of the soul existing in plants are nutritive, augmentative, and generative. Now these do not naturally obey reason; as we can see in the case of any one man. Therefore, since it is by his reason that man is competent to have mastership, it seems that in the state of innocence man had no dominion over plants.

Obj. 3. Further, whosoever is master of a thing, can change it. But man could not have changed the course of the heavenly bodies; for this belongs to God alone, as Dionysius says (Ep. ad Polycarp, vii.). Therefore man had no dominion over them.

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. i. 26): That he may have dominion over . . . every creature.

I answer that, Man in a certain sense contains all things; and so according as he is master of what is within himself, in the same way he can have mastership over other things. Now we may consider four things in man: his reason,
which makes him like to the angels; his sensitive powers, whereby he is like the animals; his natural forces, which liken him to the plants; and the body itself, wherein he is like to inanimate things. Now in man reason has the position of a master and not of a subject. Wherefore man had no mastership over the angels in the primitive state; so when we read all creatures, we must understand the creatures which are not made to God’s image. Over the sensitive powers, as the irascible and concupiscible, which obey reason in some degree, the soul has mastership by commanding. So in the state of innocence man had mastership over the animals by commanding them. But of the natural powers and the body itself man is master not by commanding, but by using them. Thus also in the state of innocence man’s mastership over plants and inanimate things consisted not in commanding or in changing them, but in making use of them without hindrance.

The answers to the objections appear from the above.

**Third Article.**

**Whether men were equal in the state of innocence?**

*We proceed thus to the Third Article:—*

*Objection 1.* It would seem that in the state of innocence all would have been equal. For Gregory says (Moral. xxii.): *Where there is no sin, there is no inequality.* But in the state of innocence there was no sin. Therefore all were equal.

*Obj. 2.* Further, likeness and equality are the basis of mutual love, according to Ecclus. xiii. 19, *Every beast loveth its like; so also every man him that is nearest to himself.* Now in that state there was among men an abundance of love, which is the bond of peace. Therefore all were equal in the state of innocence.

*Obj. 3.* Further, the cause ceasing, the effect also ceases. But the cause of present inequality among men seems to arise, on the part of God, from the fact that He rewards
some and punishes others; and on the part of nature, from the fact that some, through a defect of nature, are born weak and deficient, others strong and perfect, which would not have been the case in the primitive state. Therefore, etc.

On the contrary, It is written (Rom. xiii. 1): The things which are of God, are well ordered (Vulg., Those that are, are ordained of God). But order chiefly consists in inequality; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix. 13): Order disposes things equal and unequal in their proper place. Therefore in the primitive state, which was most proper and orderly, inequality would have existed.

I answer that, We must needs admit that in the primitive state there would have been some inequality, at least as regards sex, because generation depends upon diversity of sex: and likewise as regards age; for some would have been born of others; nor would sexual union have been sterile.

Moreover, as regards the soul, there would have been inequality as to righteousness and knowledge. For man worked not of necessity, but of his own free-will, by virtue of which man can apply himself, more or less, to action, desire, or knowledge; hence some would have made a greater advance in virtue and knowledge than others.

There might also have been bodily disparity. For the human body was not entirely exempt from the laws of nature, so as not to receive from exterior sources more or less advantage and help: since indeed it was dependent on food wherewith to sustain life.

So we may say that, according to the climate, or the movement of the stars, some would have been born more robust in body than others, and also greater, and more beautiful, and in all ways better disposed; so that, however, in those who were thus surpassed, there would have been no defect or fault either in soul or body.

Reply Obj. 1. By those words Gregory means to exclude such inequality as exists between virtue and vice; the result of which is that some are placed in subjection to others as a penalty.
Reply Obj. 2. Equality is the cause of equality in mutual love. Yet between those who are unequal there can be a greater love than between equals; although there be not an equal response: for a father naturally loves his son more than a brother loves his brother; although the son does not love his father as much as he is loved by him.

Reply Obj. 3. The cause of inequality could be on the part of God; not indeed that He would punish some and reward others, but that He would exalt some above others; so that the beauty of order would the more shine forth among men. Inequality might also arise on the part of nature as above described, without any defect of nature.

Fourth Article.

Whether in the state of innocence man would have been master over man?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of innocence man would not have been master over man. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix. 15): God willed that man, who was endowed with reason and made to His image, should rule over none but irrational creatures; not over men, but over cattle.

Obj. 2. Further, what came into the world as a penalty for sin would not have existed in the state of innocence. But man was made subject to man as a penalty; for after sin it was said to the woman (Gen. iii. 16): Thou shalt be under thy husband’s power. Therefore in the state of innocence man would not have been subject to man.

Obj. 3. Further, subjection is opposed to liberty. But liberty is one of the chief blessings, and would not have been lacking in the state of innocence, where nothing was wanting that man’s good-will could desire, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv. 10). Therefore man would not have been master over man in the state of innocence.

On the contrary. The condition of man in the state of innocence was not more exalted than the condition of the
angels. But among the angels some rule over others; and so one order is called that of *Dominations*. Therefore it was not beneath the dignity of the state of innocence that one man should be subject to another.

*I answer that*, Mastership has a twofold meaning. First, as opposed to slavery, in which sense a master means one to whom another is subject as a slave. In another sense mastership is referred in a general sense to any kind of subject; and in this sense even he who has the office of governing and directing free men, can be called a master. In the state of innocence man could have been a master of men, not in the former but in the latter sense. This distinction is founded on the reason that a slave differs from a free man in that the latter has the disposal of himself, as is stated in the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, whereas a slave is ordered to another. So that one man is master of another as his slave when he refers the one whose master he is, to his own—namely, the master's use. And since every man's proper good is desirable to himself, and consequently it is a grievous matter to anyone to yield to another what ought to be one's own, therefore such dominion implies of necessity a pain inflicted on the subject; and consequently in the state of innocence such a mastership could not have existed between man and man.

But a man is the master of a free subject, by directing him either towards his proper welfare, or to the common good. Such a kind of mastership would have existed in the state of innocence between man and man, for two reasons. First, because man is naturally a social being, and so in the state of innocence he would have led a social life. Now a social life cannot exist among a number of people unless under the presidency of one to look after the common good; for many, as such, seek many things, whereas one attends only to one. Wherefore the Philosopher says, in the beginning of the *Politics*, that wherever many things are directed to one, we shall always find one at the head directing them. Secondly, if one man surpassed another in knowledge and virtue, this would not have been
fitting unless these gifts conduced to the benefit of others, according to 1 Pet. iv. 10, *As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another.* Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix. 14): *Just men command not by the love of domineering, but by the service of counsel:* and (ibid. 15): *The natural order of things requires this; and thus did God make man.*

From this appear the replies to the objections which are founded on the first-mentioned mode of mastership.
QUESTION XCVII.

OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE PRIMITIVE STATE.

(In Four Articles.)

We next consider what belongs to the bodily state of the first man: first, as regards the preservation of the individual; secondly, as regards the preservation of the species.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether man in the state of innocence was immortal? (2) Whether he was impassible? (3) Whether he stood in need of food? (4) Whether he would have obtained immortality by the tree of life?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE MAN WOULD HAVE BEEN IMMORTAL?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of innocence man was not immortal. For the term mortal belongs to the definition of man. But if you take away the definition, you take away the thing defined. Therefore as long as man was man he could not be immortal.

Obj. 2. Further, corruptible and incorruptible are generically distinct, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x., Did. ix. 10). But there can be no passing from one genus to another. Therefore if the first man was incorruptible, man could not be corruptible in the present state.

Obj. 3. Further, if man were immortal in the state of innocence, this would have been due either to nature or to grace. Not to nature, for since nature does not change
within the same species, he would also have been immortal now. Likewise neither would this be owing to grace; for the first man recovered grace by repentance, according to Wisdom x. 2: *He brought him out of his sins.* Hence he would have regained his immortality; which is clearly not the case. Therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence.

**Obj. 4.** Further, immortality is promised to man as a reward, according to Apoc. xxi. 4: *Death shall be no more.* But man was not created in the state of reward, but that he might deserve the reward. Therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence.

**On the contrary,** It is written (Rom. v. 12): *By sin death came into the world.* Therefore man was immortal before sin.

*I answer that,* A thing may be incorruptible in three ways. First, on the part of matter—that is to say, either because it possesses no matter, like an angel; or because it possesses matter that is in potentiality to one form only, like the heavenly bodies. Such things as these are incorruptible by their very nature. Secondly, a thing is incorruptible in its form, inasmuch as being by nature corruptible, yet it has an inherent disposition which preserves it wholly from corruption; and this is called incorruptibility of glory; because, as Augustine says (*Ep. ad Dioscor.*): *God made man's soul of such a powerful nature, that from its fulness of beatitude, there redounds to the body a fulness of health, with the vigour of incorruption.* Thirdly, a thing may be incorruptible on the part of its efficient cause; in this sense man was incorruptible and immortal in the state of innocence. For, as Augustine says (*QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. 19*): *God made man immortal as long as he did not sin; so that he might achieve for himself life or death.* For man's body was indissoluble not by reason of any intrinsic vigour of immortality, but by reason of a supernatural force given by God to the soul, whereby it was enabled to preserve the body from all corruption so

* See footnote, p. 316.
long as it remained itself subject to God. This entirely agrees with reason; for since the rational soul surpasses the capacity of corporeal matter, as above explained (Q. LXXVI., A. 1), it was most properly endowed at the beginning with the power of preserving the body in a manner surpassing the capacity of corporeal matter.

Reply Obj. 1 and 2. These objections are founded on natural incorruptibility and immortality.

Reply Obj. 3. This power of preserving the body was not natural to the soul, but was the gift of grace. And though man recovered grace as regards remission of guilt and the merit of glory; yet he did not recover immortality, the loss of which was an effect of sin; for this was reserved for Christ to accomplish, by Whom the defect of nature was to be restored into something better, as we shall explain further on (P. III., Q. XIV., A. 4, ad 1).

Reply Obj. 4. The promised reward of the immortality of glory differs from the immortality which was bestowed on man in the state of innocence.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE MAN WOULD HAVE BEEN PASSIBLE?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of innocence man was passible. For sensation is a kind of passion. But in the state of innocence man would have been sensitive. Therefore he would have been passible.

Obj. 2. Further, sleep is a kind of passion. Now, man slept in the state of innocence, according to Gen. ii. 21, God cast a deep sleep upon Adam. Therefore he would have been passible.

Obj. 3. Further, the same passage goes on to say that He took a rib out of Adam. Therefore he was passible even to the degree of the cutting out of part of his body.

Obj. 4. Further, man’s body was soft. But a soft body is naturally passible as regards a hard body; therefore if a
hard body had come in contact with the soft body of the first man, the latter would have suffered from the impact. Therefore the first man was possible.

On the contrary, Had man been possible, he would have been also corruptible, because, as the Philosopher says (Top. vi. 3): Excessive suffering wastes the very substance.

I answer that, Passion may be taken in two senses. First, in its proper sense, and thus a thing is said to suffer when changed from its natural disposition. For passion is the effect of action; and in nature contraries are mutually active or passive, according as one thing changes another from its natural disposition. Secondly, passion can be taken in a general sense for any kind of change, even if belonging to the perfecting process of nature. Thus understanding and sensation are said to be passions. In this second sense, man was possible in the state of innocence, and was passive both in soul and body. In the first sense, man was impassible, both in soul and body, as he was likewise immortal; for he could curb his passion, as he could avoid death, so long as he refrained from sin.

Thus it is clear how to reply to the first two objections; since sensation and sleep do not remove from man his natural disposition, but are ordered to his natural welfare.

Reply Obj. 3. As already explained (Q. XCII., A. 3, ad 2), the rib was in Adam as the principle of the human race, as the semen in man, who is a principle through generation. Hence as man does not suffer any natural deterioration by seminal issue; so neither did he through the separation of the rib.

Reply Obj. 4. Man's body in the state of innocence could be preserved from suffering injury from a hard body; partly by the use of his reason, whereby he could avoid what was harmful; and partly also by Divine Providence, so preserving him, that nothing of a harmful nature could come upon him unawares.
THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE MAN HAD NEED OF FOOD?

We proceed thus to the Third Article:

Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of innocence man did not require food. For food is necessary for man to restore what he has lost. But Adam's body suffered no loss, as being incorruptible. Therefore he had no need of food.

Obj. 2. Further, food is needed for nourishment. But nourishment involves possibility. Since, then, man's body was impassible; it does not appear how food could be needful to him.

Obj. 3. Further, we need food for the preservation of life. But Adam could preserve his life otherwise; for had he not sinned, he would not have died. Therefore he did not require food.

Obj. 4. Further, the consumption of food involves voiding of the surplus, which seems unsuitable to the state of innocence. Therefore it seems that man did not take food in the primitive state.

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. ii. 16): Of every tree in Paradise ye shall (Vulg., thou shalt) eat.

I answer that, In the state of innocence man had an animal life requiring food; but after the resurrection he will have a spiritual life needing no food. In order to make this clear, we must observe that the rational soul is both soul and spirit. It is called a soul by reason of what it possesses in common with other souls—that is, as giving life to the body; whence it is written (Gen. ii. 7): Man was made into a living soul; that is, a soul giving life to the body. But the soul is called a spirit according to what properly belongs to itself, and not to other souls, as possessing an intellectual immaterial power.

Thus in the primitive state, the rational soul communicated to the body what belonged to itself as a soul; and so
the body was called *animal,* through having its life from the soul. Now the first principle of life in these inferior creatures as the Philosopher says (*De Anima* ii. 4) is the vegetative soul: the operations of which are the use of food, generation, and growth. Wherefore such operations befitted man in the state of innocence. But in the final state, after the resurrection, the soul will, to a certain extent, communicate to the body what properly belongs to itself as a spirit; immortality to everyone; impassibility, glory, and power to the good, whose bodies will be called *spiritual.* So, after the resurrection, man will not require food; whereas he required it in the state of innocence.

*Reply Obj. 1.* As Augustine says (*QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test.*, qu. 19†): *How could man have an immortal body, which was sustained by food? Since an immortal being needs neither food nor drink.* For we have explained (A. 1) that the immortality of the primitive state was based on a supernatural force in the soul, and not on any intrinsic disposition of the body: so that by the action of heat, the body might lose part of its humid qualities; and to prevent the entire consumption of the humour, man was obliged to take food.

*Reply Obj. 2.* A certain passion and alteration attends nutriment, on the part of the food changed into the substance of the thing nourished. So we cannot thence conclude that man’s body was passible, but that the food taken was passible; although this kind of passion conduced to the perfection of the nature.

*Reply Obj. 3.* If man had not taken food he would have sinned; as he also sinned by taking the forbidden fruit. For he was told at the same time, to abstain from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and to eat of every other tree of Paradise.

*Reply Obj. 4.* Some say that in the state of innocence man would not have taken more than necessary food, so that there would have been nothing superfluous; which,

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*From *anima*, a soul. *Cf. 1 Cor. xv. 44 seqq.*
† See footnote, p. 316.
however, is unreasonable to suppose, as implying that there would have been no fecal matter. Wherefore there was need for voiding the surplus, yet so disposed by God as to be decorous and suitable to the state.

Fourth Article.

Whether in the state of innocence man would have acquired immortality by the tree of life?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that the tree of life could not be the cause of immortality. For nothing can act beyond its own species; as an effect does not exceed its cause. But the tree of life was corruptible, otherwise it could not be taken as food; since food is changed into the substance of the thing nourished. Therefore the tree of life could not give incorruptibility or immortality.

Obj. 2. Further, effects caused by the forces of plants and other natural agencies are natural. If therefore the tree of life caused immortality, this would have been natural immortality.

Obj. 3. Further, this would seem to be reduced to the ancient fable, that the gods, by eating a certain food, became immortal; which the Philosopher ridicules (Metaph iii., Did. ii. 4).

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. iii. 22): Lest perhaps he put forth his hand, and take of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever. Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. 19*): A taste of the tree of life warded off corruption of the body; and even after sin man would have remained immortal, had he been allowed to eat of the tree of life.

I answer that, The tree of life in a certain degree was the cause of immortality, but not absolutely. To understand this, we must observe that in the primitive state man possessed, for the preservation of life, two remedies, against

* See footnote, p. 316.
two defects. One of these defects was the loss of humidity by the action of natural heat, which acts as the soul's instrument: as a remedy against such loss man was provided with food, taken from the other trees of paradise, as now we are provided with the food, which we take for the same purpose. The second defect, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. i. 5), arises from the fact that the humour which is caused from extraneous sources, being added to the humour already existing, lessens the specific active power; as water added to wine takes at first the taste of wine, then, as more water is added, the strength of the wine is diminished, till the wine becomes watery. In like manner, we may observe that at first the active force of the species is so strong that it is able to transform so much of the food as is required to replace the lost tissue, as well as what suffices for growth; later on, however, the assimilated food does not suffice for growth, but only replaces what is lost. Last of all, in old age, it does not suffice even for this purpose; whereupon the body declines, and finally dies from natural causes. Against this defect man was provided with a remedy in the tree of life; for its effect was to strengthen the force of the species against the weakness resulting from the admixture of extraneous nutriment. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv. 26): Man had food to appease his hunger, drink to slake his thirst; and the tree of life to banish the breaking up of old age; and (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. 19*): The tree of life, like a drug, warded off all bodily corruption.

Yet it did not absolutely cause immortality; for neither was the soul's intrinsic power of preserving the body due to the tree of life, nor was it of such efficiency as to give the body a disposition to immortality, whereby it might become indissoluble; which is clear from the fact that every bodily power is finite; so the power of the tree of life could not go so far as to give the body the prerogative of living for an infinite time, but only for a definite time. For it is manifest that the greater a force is, the more durable is its

* See footnote, p. 316.
effect; therefore, since the power of the tree of life was finite, man's life was to be preserved for a definite time by partaking of it once; and when that time had elapsed, man was to be either transferred to a spiritual life, or had need to eat once more of the tree of life.

From this the replies to the objections clearly appear. For the first proves that the tree of life did not absolutely cause immortality; while the others show that it caused incorruption by warding off corruption, according to the explanation above given.
QUESTION XCVIII.
OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE SPECIES.
(In Two Articles.)

We next consider what belongs to the preservation of the species; and, first, of generation; secondly, of the state of the offspring. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation? (2) Whether generation would have been through coition?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE GENERATION EXISTED?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem there would have been no generation in the state of innocence. For, as stated in Phys. v. 5, corruption is contrary to generation. But contraries affect the same subject: also there would have been no corruption in the state of innocence. Therefore neither would there have been generation.

Obj. 2. Further, the object of generation is the preservation in the species of that which is corruptible in the individual. Wherefore there is no generation in those individual things which last for ever. But in the state of innocence man would have lived for ever. Therefore in the state of innocence there would have been no generation.

Obj. 3. Further, by generation man is multiplied. But the multiplication of masters requires the division of property, to avoid confusion of mastership. Therefore, since man was made master of the animals, it would have
been necessary to make a division of rights when the human race increased by generation. This is against the natural law, according to which all things are in common, as Isidore says (*Etym.* v. 4). Therefore there would have been no generation in the state of innocence.

*On the contrary,* It is written (Gen. i. 28): *Increase and multiply, and fill the earth.* But this increase could not come about save by generation, since the original number of mankind was two only. Therefore there would have been generation in the state of innocence.

*I answer that,* In the state of innocence there would have been generation of offspring for the multiplication of the human race; otherwise man's sin would have been very necessary, for such a great blessing to be its result. We must, therefore, observe that man, by his nature, is established, as it were, midway between corruptible and incorruptible creatures, his soul being naturally incorruptible, while his body is naturally corruptible. We must also observe that nature's purpose appears to be different as regards corruptible and incorruptible things. For that seems to be the direct purpose of nature, which is invariable and perpetual; while what is only for a time is seemingly not the chief purpose of nature, but, as it were, subordinate to something else; otherwise, when it ceased to exist, nature's purpose would become void.

Therefore, since in things corruptible none is everlasting and permanent except the species, it follows that the chief purpose of nature is the good of the species; for the preservation of which natural generation is ordained. On the other hand, incorruptible substances survive, not only in the species, but also in the individual; wherefore even the individuals are included in the chief purpose of nature.

Hence it belongs to man to beget offspring, on the part of the naturally corruptible body. But on the part of the soul, which is incorruptible, it is fitting that the multitude of individuals should be the direct purpose of nature, or rather of the Author of nature, Who alone is the Creator of the human soul. Wherefore, to provide for the multiplica-
tion of the human race, He established the begetting of offspring even in the state of innocence.

Reply Obj. 1. In the state of innocence the human body was in itself corruptible, but it could be preserved from corruption by the soul. Therefore, since generation belongs to things corruptible, man was not to be deprived thereof.

Reply Obj. 2. Although generation in the state of innocence might not have been required for the preservation of the species, yet it would have been required for the multiplication of the individual.

Reply Obj. 3. In our present state a division of possessions is necessary on account of the multiplicity of masters, inasmuch as community of possession is a source of strife, as the Philosopher says (Politic. ii. 5). In the state of innocence, however, the will of men would have been so ordered that without any danger of strife they would have used in common, according to each one’s need, those things of which they were masters—a state of things to be observed even now among many good men.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN GENERATION BY COITION?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that generation by coition would not have existed in the state of innocence. For, as Damascene says (De Fid. Orth. ii. ii: iv. 25), the first man in the terrestrial Paradise was like an angel. But in the future state of the resurrection, when men will be like to the angels, they shall neither marry nor be married, as it is written Matt. xxii. 30. Therefore neither in Paradise would there have been generation by coition.

Obj. 2. Further, our first parents were created at the age of perfect development. Therefore, if generation by coition had existed before sin, they would have had intercourse while still in Paradise: which was not the case according to Scripture (Gen. iv. 1).
Obj. 3. Further, in carnal intercourse, more than at any other time, man becomes like the beasts, on account of the vehement delight which he takes therein; whence continency is praiseworthy, whereby man refrains from such pleasures. But man is compared to beasts by reason of sin, according to Psalm xlviii. 13: *Man, when he was in honour, did not understand; he is compared to senseless beasts, and is become like to them.* Therefore, before sin, there would have been no such intercourse of man and woman.

Obj. 4. Further, in the state of innocence there would have been no corruption. But virginal integrity is corrupted by intercourse. Therefore there would have been no such thing in the state of innocence.

On the contrary, God made man and woman before sin (Gen. i. and ii.). But nothing is void in God's works. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, there would have been such intercourse, to which the distinction of sex is ordained. Moreover, we are told that woman was made to be a help to man (Gen. ii. 18, 20). But she was not fitted to help man except in generation, because another man would have proved a more effective help in anything else. Therefore there would have been such generation also in the state of innocence.

I answer that, Some of the earlier doctors, considering the nature of concupiscence as regards generation in our present state, concluded that in the state of innocence generation would not have been effected in the same way. Thus Gregory of Nyssa says (*De Hom. Opif.* xvii.) that in Paradise the human race would have been multiplied by some other means, as the angels were multiplied without coition by the operation of the Divine Power. He adds that God made man male and female before sin, because He foreknew the mode of generation which would take place after sin, which He foresaw. But this is unreasonable. For what is natural to man was neither acquired nor forfeited by sin. Now it is clear that generation by coition is natural to man by reason of his animal life, which he possessed even before sin, as above explained (Q. XCVII.,
A. 3), just as it is natural to other perfect animals, as the corporeal members make it clear. So we cannot allow that these members would not have had a natural use, as other members had, before sin.

Thus, as regards generation by coition, there are, in the present state of life, two things to be considered. One, which comes from nature, is the union of man and woman; for in every act of generation there is an active and a passive principle. Wherefore, since wherever there is distinction of sex, the active principle is male and the passive is female; the order of nature demands that for the purpose of generation there should be concurrence of male and female. The second thing to be observed is a certain deformity of excessive concupiscence, which in the state of innocence would not have existed, when the lower powers were entirely subject to reason. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv. 26): We must be far from supposing that offspring could not be begotten without concupiscence. All the bodily members would have been equally moved by the will, without ardent or wanton incentive, with calmness of soul and body.

Reply Obj. 1. In Paradise man would have been like an angel in his spirituality of mind, yet with an animal life in his body. After the resurrection man will be like an angel, spiritualized in soul and body. Wherefore there is no parallel.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix. 4), our first parents did not come together in Paradise, because on account of sin they were ejected from Paradise shortly after the creation of the woman; or because, having received the general Divine command relative to generation, they awaited the special command relative to the time.

Reply Obj. 3. Beasts are without reason. In this way man becomes, as it were, like them in coition, because he cannot moderate concupiscence. In the state of innocence nothing of this kind would have happened that was not regulated by reason, not because delight of sense was less, as some say (rather indeed would sensible delight have been
the greater in proportion to the greater purity of nature and the greater sensibility of the body), but because the force of concupiscence would not have so inordinately thrown itself into such pleasure, being curbed by reason, whose place it is not to lessen sensual pleasure, but to prevent the force of concupiscence from cleaving to it immoderately. By **immoderately** I mean going beyond the bounds of reason, as a sober person does not take less pleasure in food taken in moderation than the glutton, but his concupiscence lingers less in such pleasures. This is what Augustine means by the words quoted, which do not exclude intensity of pleasure from the state of innocence, but the ardour of desire and restlessness of the mind. Therefore continence would not have been praiseworthy in the state of innocence, whereas it is praiseworthy in our present state, not because it removes fecundity, but because it excludes inordinate desire. In that state fecundity would have been without lust.

*Reply Obj. 4.* As Augustine says *(De Civ. Dei xiv. 26)*: In that state intercourse would have been without prejudice to virginal integrity; this would have remained intact, as it does in the menses. And just as in giving birth the mother was then relieved, not by groans of pain, but by the instigations of maturity; so in conceiving, the union was one, not of lustful desire, but of deliberate action.
QUESTION XCIX.

OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS TO THE BODY.

(In Two Articles.)

We must now consider the condition of the offspring—first, as regard the body; secondly, as regards virtue; thirdly, in knowledge. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have had full powers of the body immediately after birth? (2) Whether all infants would have been of the male sex?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE CHILDREN WOULD HAVE HAD PERFECT STRENGTH OF BODY AS TO THE USE OF ITS MEMBERS IMMEDIATELY AFTER BIRTH?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have had perfect strength of the body, as to the use of its members, immediately after birth. For Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i. 38): This weakness of the body befits their weakness of mind. But in the state of innocence there would have been no weakness of mind. Therefore neither would there have been weakness of body in infants.

Obj. 2. Further, some animals at birth have sufficient strength to use their members. But man is nobler than other animals. Therefore much more is it natural to man to have strength to use his members at birth; and thus it appears to be a punishment of sin that he has not that strength.
Obj. 3. Further, inability to secure a proffered pleasure causes affliction. But if children had not full strength in the use of their limbs, they would often have been unable to procure something pleasurable offered to them; and so they would have been afflicted, which was not possible before sin. Therefore, in the state of innocence, children would not have been deprived of the use of their limbs.

Obj. 4. Further, the weakness of old age seems to correspond to that of infancy. But in the state of innocence there would have been no weakness of old age. Therefore neither would there have been such weakness in infancy.

On the contrary, Everything generated is first imperfect. But in the state of innocence children would have been begotten by generation. Therefore from the first they would have been imperfect in bodily size and power.

I answer that, By faith alone do we hold truths which are above nature, and what we believe rests on authority. Therefore, in making any assertion, we must be guided by the nature of things, except in those things which are above nature, and are made known to us by Divine authority. Now it is clear that it is as natural as it is befitting to the principles of human nature that children should not have sufficient strength for the use of their limbs immediately after birth. Because in proportion to other animals man has naturally a larger brain. Therefore it is natural, on account of the considerable humidity of the brain in children, that the nerves which are instruments of movement, should not be apt for moving the limbs. On the other hand, no Catholic doubts it possible for a child to have, by Divine power, the use of its limbs immediately after birth.

Now we have it on the authority of Scripture that God made man right (Eccles. vii. 30), which rightness, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv. 11), consists in the perfect subjection of the body to the soul. As, therefore, in the primitive state it was impossible to find in the human limbs anything repugnant to man's well-ordered will, so was it impossible for those limbs to fail in executing the will's
commands. Now the human will is well ordered when it tends to acts which are befitting to man. But the same acts are not befitting to man at every season of life. We must, therefore, conclude that children would not have had sufficient strength for the use of their limbs for the purpose of performing every kind of act; but only for the acts befitting the state of infancy, such as suckling, and the like.

Reply Obj. 1. Augustine is speaking of the weakness which we observe in children even as regards those acts which befit the state of infancy; as is clear from his preceding remark that even when close to the breast, and longing for it, they are more apt to cry than to suckle.

Reply Obj. 2. The fact that some animals have the use of their limbs immediately after birth, is due, not to their superiority, since more perfect animals are not so endowed; but to the dryness of the brain, and to the operations proper to such animals being imperfect, so that a small amount of strength suffices them.

Reply Obj. 3 is clear from what we have said above. We may add that they would have desired nothing except with an ordinate will; and only what was befitting to their state of life.

Reply Obj. 4. In the state of innocence man would have been born, yet not subject to corruption. Therefore in that state there could have been certain infantile defects which result from birth; but not senile defects leading to corruption.

SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER, IN THE PRIMITIVE STATE, WOMEN WOULD HAVE BEEN BORN?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in the primitive state woman would not have been born. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii. 3) that woman is a misbegotten male, as though she were a product outside the purpose of nature. But in that state nothing would have been un-
natural in human generation. Therefore in that state women would not have been born.

**Obj. 2.** Further, every agent produces its like, unless prevented by insufficient power or ineptness of matter: thus a small fire cannot burn green wood. But in generation the active force is in the male. Since, therefore, in the state of innocence man's active force was not subject to defect, nor was there inept matter on the part of the woman, it seems that males would always have been born.

**Obj. 3.** Further, in the state of innocence generation is ordered to the multiplication of the human race. But the race would have been sufficiently multiplied by the first man and woman, from the fact that they would have lived for ever. Therefore, in the state of innocence, there was no need for women to be born.

On the contrary, nature's process in generation would have been in harmony with the manner in which it was established by God. But God established male and female in human nature, as it is written (Gen. i. and ii.). Therefore also in the state of innocence male and female would have been born.

I answer that, Nothing belonging to the completeness of human nature would have been lacking in the state of innocence. And as different grades belong to the perfection of the universe, so also diversity of sex belongs to the perfection of human nature. Therefore in the state of innocence, both sexes would have been begotten.

**Reply Obj. 1.** Woman is said to be a misbegotten male, as being a product outside the purpose of nature considered in the individual case: but not against the purpose of universal nature, as above explained (Q. XCII., A. i, ad 2).

**Reply Obj. 2.** The generation of woman is not occasioned either by a defect of the active force or by inept matter, as the objection supposes; but sometimes by an extrinsic accidental cause; thus the Philosopher says (De Animal. Histor. vi. 19): The northern wind favours the generation of males, and the southern wind that of females: sometimes also by some impression in the soul (of the parents), which
may easily have some effect on the body (of the child). Especially was this the case in the state of innocence, when the body was more subject to the soul; so that by the mere will of the parent the sex of the offspring might be diversified.

Reply Obj. 3. The offspring would have been begotten to an animal life, as to the use of food and generation. Hence it was fitting that all should generate, and not only the first parents. From this it seems to follow that males and females would have been in equal number.
QUESTION C.

OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS
RIGHTeousness.

(In Two Articles.)

We now have to consider the condition of the offspring as to righteousness. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness? (2) Whether they would have been born confirmed in righteousness?

First Article.

whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of innocence men would not have been born in a state of righteousness. For Hugh of St. Victor says (De Sacram. i.): Before sin, the first man would have begotten children sinless; but not heirs to their father's righteousness.

Obj. 2. Further, righteousness is effected by grace, as the Apostle says (Rom. v. 16, 21). Now grace is not transfused from one to another, for thus it would be natural; but is infused by God alone. Therefore children would not have been born righteous.

Obj. 3. Further, righteousness is in the soul. But the soul is not transmitted from the parent. Therefore neither would righteousness have been transmitted from parents to the children.

On the contrary, Anselm says (De Concep. Virg. x.): As long as man did not sin, he would have begotten children endowed with righteousness together with the rational soul.
I answer that, Man naturally begets a specific likeness to himself. Hence whatever accidental qualities result from the nature of the species, must be alike in parent and child, unless nature fails in its operation, which would not have occurred in the state of innocence. But individual accidents do not necessarily exist alike in parent and child. Now original righteousness, in which the first man was created, was an accident pertaining to the nature of the species, not as caused by the principles of the species, but as a gift conferred by God on the entire human nature. This is clear from the fact that opposites are of the same genus; and original sin, which is opposed to original righteousness, is called the sin of nature, wherefore it is transmitted from the parent to the offspring; and for this reason also, the children would have been assimilated to their parents as regards original righteousness.

Reply Obj. 1. These words of Hugh are to be understood as referring, not to the habit of righteousness, but to the execution of the act thereof.

Reply Obj. 2. Some say that children would have been born, not with the righteousness of grace, which is the principle of merit, but with original righteousness. But since the root of original righteousness, which conferred righteousness on the first man when he was made, consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to God, which subjection results from sanctifying grace, as above explained (Q. XCV., A. 1), we must conclude that if children were born in original righteousness, they would also have been born in grace; thus we have said above that the first man was created in grace (ibid.). This grace, however, would not have been natural, for it would not have been transfused by virtue of the semen; but would have been conferred on man immediately on his receiving a rational soul. In the same way the rational soul, which is not transmitted by the parent, is infused by God as soon as the human body is apt to receive it.

From this the reply to the third objection is clear.
SECOND ARTICLE.

Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. For Gregory says (Moral. iv.) on the words of Job iii. 13: For now I should have been asleep, etc.: If no sinful corruption had injected our first parent, he would not have begotten 'children of hell'; no children would have been born of him but such as were destined to be saved by the Redeemer. Therefore all would have been born confirmed in righteousness.

Obj. 2. Further, Anselm says (Cur Deus Homo i. 18): If our first parents had lived so as not to yield to temptation, they would have been confirmed in grace, so that with their offspring they would have been unable to sin any more. Therefore the children would have been born confirmed in righteousness.

Obj. 3. Further, good is stronger than evil. But by the sin of the first man there resulted, in those born of him, the necessity of sin. Therefore, if the first man had persevered in righteousness, his descendants would have derived from him the necessity of preserving righteousness.

Obj. 4. Further, the angels who remained faithful to God, while the others sinned, were at once confirmed in grace, so as to be unable henceforth to sin. In like manner, therefore, man would have been confirmed in grace if he had persevered. But he would have begotten children like himself. Therefore they also would have been born confirmed in righteousness.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv. 10): Happy would have been the whole human race if neither they—that is, our first parents—had committed any evil to be transmitted to their descendants, nor any of their race had committed any sin for which they would have been
condemned. From which words we gather that even if our first parents had not sinned, any of their descendants might have done evil; and therefore they would not have been born confirmed in righteousness.

I answer that, It does not seem possible that in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. For it is clear that at their birth they would not have had greater perfection than their parents at the time of begetting. Now the parents, as long as they begot children, would not have been confirmed in righteousness. For the rational creature is confirmed in righteousness through the beatitude given by the clear vision of God; and when once it has seen God, it cannot but cleave to Him Who is the essence of goodness, wherefrom no one can turn away, since nothing is desired or loved but under the aspect of good. I say this according to the general law; for it may be otherwise in the case of special privilege, such as we believe was granted to the Virgin Mother of God. And as soon as Adam had attained to that happy state of seeing God in His Essence, he would have become spiritual in soul and body; and his animal life would have ceased, wherein alone there is generation. Hence it is clear that children would not have been born confirmed in righteousness.

Reply Obj. 1. If Adam had not sinned, he would not have begotten children of hell in the sense that they would contract from him sin which is the cause of hell: yet by sinning of their own free-will they could have become children of hell. If, however, they did not become children of hell by falling into sin, this would not have been owing to their being confirmed in righteousness, but to Divine Providence preserving them free from sin.

Reply Obj. 2. Anselm does not say this by way of assertion, but only as an opinion, which is clear from his mode of expression as follows: It seems that if they had lived, etc.

Reply Obj. 3. This argument is not conclusive, though Anselm seems to have been influenced by it, as appears
from his words above quoted. For the necessity of sin incurred by the descendants would not have been such that they could not return to righteousness, which is the case only with the damned. Wherefore neither would the parents have transmitted to their descendants the necessity of not sinning, which is only in the blessed.

Reply Obj. 4. There is no comparison between man and the angels; for man’s free-will is changeable, both before and after choice; whereas the angel’s is not changeable, as we have said above in treating of the angels (Q. LXIV., A. 2).
QUESTION CI.

OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS KNOWLEDGE.

(In Two Articles.)

We next consider the condition of the offspring as to knowledge. Under this head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge? (2) Whether they would have had perfect use of reason at the moment of birth?

FIRST ARTICLE.

WHETHER IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE CHILDREN WOULD HAVE BEEN BORN WITH PERFECT KNOWLEDGE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge. For Adam would have begotten children like himself. But Adam was gifted with perfect knowledge (Q. XCIV., A. 3). Therefore children would have been born of him with perfect knowledge.

Obj. 2. Further, ignorance is a result of sin, as Bede says (cf. I.–II., Q. LXXXV., A. 3). But ignorance is privation of knowledge. Therefore before sin children would have had perfect knowledge as soon as they were born.

Obj. 3. Further, children would have been gifted with righteousness from birth. But knowledge is required for righteousness, since it directs our actions. Therefore they would also have been gifted with knowledge.

On the contrary, The human soul is naturally like a blank
tablet on which nothing is written, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii. 4). But the nature of the soul is the same now as it would have been in the state of innocence. Therefore the souls of children would have been without knowledge at birth.

I answer that, As above stated (Q. XCIX., A. 1), as regards belief in matters which are above nature, we rely on authority alone; and so, when authority is wanting, we must be guided by the ordinary course of nature. Now it is natural for man to acquire knowledge through the senses, as above explained (Q. LV., A. 2; Q. LXXXIV., A. 6); and for this reason is the soul united to the body, that it needs it for its proper operation; and this would not be so if the soul were endowed at birth with knowledge not acquired through the sensitive powers. We must conclude then, that, in the state of innocence, children would not have been born with perfect knowledge; but in course of time they would have acquired knowledge without difficulty by discovery or learning.

Reply Obj. 1. The perfection of knowledge was an individual accident of our first parent, so far as he was established as the father and instructor of the whole human race. Therefore he begot children like himself, not in that respect, but only in those accidents which were natural or conferred gratuitously on the whole nature.

Reply Obj. 2. Ignorance is privation of knowledge due at some particular time; and this would not have been in children from their birth, for they would have possessed the knowledge due to them at that time. Hence, no ignorance would have been in them, but only nescience in regard to certain matters. Such nescience was even in the holy angels, according to Dionysius (Cael. Hier. vii.).

Reply Obj. 3. Children would have had sufficient knowledge to direct them to deeds of righteousness, in which men are guided by universal principles of right; and this knowledge of theirs would have been much more complete than what we have now by nature, as likewise their knowledge of other universal principles.
SECOND ARTICLE.

WHETHER CHILDREN WOULD HAVE HAD PERFECT USE OF REASON AT BIRTH?

We proceed thus to the Second Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that children would have had perfect use of reason at birth. For that children have not perfect use of reason in our present state, is due to the soul being weighed down by the body; which was not the case in paradise, because, as it is written, The corruptible body is a load upon the soul (Wisd. ix. 15). Therefore, before sin and the corruption which resulted therefrom, children would have had the perfect use of reason at birth.

Obj. 2. Further, some animals at birth have the use of their natural powers, as the lamb at once flies from the wolf. Much more, therefore, would men in the state of innocence have had perfect use of reason at birth.

On the contrary, In all things produced by generation nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. Therefore children would not have had the perfect use of reason from the very outset.

I answer that, As above stated (Q. LXXXIV., A. 7), the use of reason depends in a certain manner on the use of the sensitive powers; wherefore, while the senses are tied and the interior sensitive powers hampered, man has not the perfect use of reason, as we see in those who are asleep or delirious. Now the sensitive powers are situate in corporeal organs; and therefore, so long as the latter are hindered, the action of the former is of necessity hindered also; and likewise, consequently, the use of reason. Now children are hindered in the use of these powers on account of the humidity of the brain; wherefore they have perfect use neither of these powers nor of reason. Therefore, in the state of innocence, children would not have had the perfect use of reason, which they would have enjoyed later on in life. Yet they would have had a more perfect use than they have now, as to matters regarding that particular
state, as explained above regarding the use of their limbs (Q. XCIX., A. 1).

Reply Obj. 1. The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, because it hinders the use of reason even in those matters which belong to man at all ages.

Reply Obj. 2. Even other animals have not at birth such a perfect use of their natural powers as they have later on. This is clear from the fact that birds teach their young to fly; and the like may be observed in other animals. Moreover a special impediment exists in man from the humidity of the brain, as we have said above (Q. XCIX., A. 1).
QUESTION CII.
OF MAN'S ABODE, WHICH IS PARADISE.
(In Four Articles.)

We next consider man's abode, which is paradise. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether paradise is a corporeal place? (2) Whether it is a place apt for human habitation? (3) For what purpose was man placed in paradise? (4) Whether he should have been created in paradise?

FIRST ARTICLE.
WHETHER PARADISE IS A CORPOREAL PLACE?

We proceed thus to the First Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that paradise is not a corporeal place. For Bede* says that paradise reaches to the lunar circle. But no earthly place answers that description, both because it is contrary to the nature of the earth to be raised up so high, and because beneath the moon is the region of fire, which would consume the earth. Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place.

Obj. 2. Further, Scripture mentions four rivers as rising in paradise (Gen. ii. 10). But the rivers there mentioned have visible sources elsewhere, as is clear from the Philosopher (Meteor. i.). Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place.

Obj. 3. Further, although men have explored the entire habitable world, yet none have made mention of the place of paradise. Therefore apparently it is not a corporeal place.

* Strabus, Gloss on Gen. ii. 8.

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Obj. 4. Further, the tree of life is described as growing in paradise. But the tree of life is a spiritual thing, for it is written of Wisdom that She is a tree of life to them that lay hold on her (Prov. iii. 18). Therefore paradise also is not a corporeal, but a spiritual place.

Obj. 5. Further, if paradise be a corporeal place, the trees also of paradise must be corporeal. But it seems they were not; for corporeal trees were produced on the third day, while the planting of the trees of paradise is recorded after the work of the six days. Therefore paradise was not a corporeal place.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii. 1): Three general opinions prevail about paradise. Some understand a place merely corporeal; others a place entirely spiritual; while others, whose opinion, I confess, pleases me, hold that paradise was both corporeal and spiritual.

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii. 21): Nothing prevents us from holding, within proper limits, a spiritual paradise; so long as we believe in the truth of the events narrated as having there occurred. For whatever Scripture tells us about paradise is set down as matter of history; and wherever Scripture makes use of this method, we must hold to the historical truth of the narrative as a foundation of whatever spiritual explanation we may offer. And so paradise, as Isidore says (Etym. xiv. 3), is a place situated in the east, its name being the Greek for garden. It was fitting that it should be in the east; for it is to be believed that it was situated in the most excellent part of the earth. Now the east is the right hand of the heavens, as the Philosopher explains (De Cæl. ii. 2); and the right hand is nobler than the left: hence it was fitting that God should place the earthly paradise in the east.

Reply Obj. 1. Bede’s assertion is untrue, if taken in its obvious sense. It may, however, be explained to mean that paradise reaches to the moon, not literally, but figuratively; because, as Isidore says (loc. cit.), the atmosphere there is of a continually even temperature; and in this respect it is like the heavenly bodies, which are devoid of opposing
elements. Mention, however, is made of the moon rather than of other bodies, because, of all the heavenly bodies, the moon is nearest to us, and is, moreover, the most akin to the earth; hence it is observed to be overshadowed by clouds so as to be almost obscured. Others say that paradise reached to the moon—that is, to the middle space of the air, where rain, and wind, and the like arise; because the moon is said to have influence on such changes. But in this sense it would not be a fit place for human dwelling, through being uneven in temperature, and not attuned to the human temperament, as is the lower atmosphere in the neighbourhood of the earth.

Reply Obj. 2. Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii. 7): It is probable that man has no idea where paradise was, and that the rivers, whose sources are said to be known, flowed for some distance underground, and then sprang up elsewhere. For who is not aware that such is the case with some other streams?

Reply Obj. 3. The situation of paradise is shut off from the habitable world by mountains, or seas, or some torrid region, which cannot be crossed; and so people who have written about topography make no mention of it.

Reply Obj. 4. The tree of life is a material tree, and so called because its fruit was endowed with a life-preserving power, as above stated (Q. XCVII., A. 4). Yet it had a spiritual signification; as the rock in the desert was of a material nature, and yet signified Christ. In like manner the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was a material tree, so called in view of future events; because, after eating of it, man was to learn, by experience of the consequent punishment, the difference between the good of obedience and the evil of rebellion. It may also be said to signify spiritually the free-will, as some say.

Reply Obj. 5. According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v. 5, viii. 3), the plants were not actually produced on the third day, but in their seminal virtues: whereas, after the work of the six days, the plants, both of paradise and others, were actually produced. According to other holy writers, we
ought to say that all the plants were actually produced on the third day, including the trees of paradise; and what is said of the trees of paradise being planted after the work of the six days is to be understood, they say, by way of recapitulation. Whence our text reads: *The Lord God had planted a paradise of pleasure from the beginning* (Gen. ii. 8).

**SECOND ARTICLE.**

**WHETHER PARADISE WAS A PLACE ADAPTED TO BE THE ABODE OF MAN?**

*We proceed thus to the Second Article:—*

**Objection 1.** It would seem that paradise was not a place adapted to be the abode of man. For man and angels are similarly ordered to beatitude. But the angels from the very beginning of their existence were made to dwell in the abode of the blessed—that is, the empyrean heaven. Therefore the place of man's habitation should have been there also.

**Obj. 2.** Further, if some definite place were required for man's abode, this would be required on the part either of the soul or of the body. If on the part of the soul, the place would be in heaven, which is adapted to the nature of the soul; since the desire of heaven is implanted in all. On the part of the body, there was no need for any other place than the one provided for other animals. Therefore paradise was not at all adapted to be the abode of man.

**Obj. 3.** Further, a place which contains nothing is useless. But after sin, paradise was not occupied by man. Therefore if it were adapted as a dwelling-place for man, it seems that God made paradise to no purpose.

**Obj. 4.** Further, since man is of an even temperament, a fitting place for him should be of even temperature. But paradise was not of an even temperature; for it is said to have been on the equator—a situation of extreme heat, since twice in the year the sun passes vertically over the heads of its inhabitants. Therefore paradise was not a fit dwelling-place for man.
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fid. Orth. ii. 11): Paradise was a divinely ordered region, and worthy of him who was made to God's image.

I answer that, as above stated (Q. XCVII., A. 1), Man was incorruptible and immortal, not because his body had a disposition to incorruptibility, but because in his soul there was a power preserving the body from corruption. Now the human body may be corrupted from within or from without. From within, the body is corrupted by the consumption of the humours, and by old age, as above explained (ibid., A. 4), and man was able to ward off such corruption by food. Among those things which corrupt the body from without, the chief seems to be an atmosphere of unequal temperature; and to such corruption a remedy is found in an atmosphere of equable nature. In paradise both conditions were found; because, as Damascene says (loc. cit.): Paradise was permeated with the all-pervading brightness of a temperate, pure, and exquisite atmosphere, and decked with ever-flowering plants. Whence it is clear that paradise was most fit to be a dwelling-place for man, and in keeping with his original state of immortality.

Reply Obj. 1. The empyrean heaven is the highest of corporeal places, and is outside the region of change. By the first of these two conditions, it is a fitting abode for the angelic nature: for, as Augustine says (De Trin. ii.), God rules corporeal creatures through spiritual creatures. Hence it is fitting that the spiritual nature should be established above the entire corporeal nature, as presiding over it. By the second condition, it is a fitting abode for the state of beatitude, which is endowed with the highest degree of stability. Thus the abode of beatitude was suited to the very nature of the angel; therefore he was created there. But it is not suited to man's nature, since man is not set as a ruler over the entire corporeal creation: it is a fitting abode for man in regard only to his beatitude. Wherefore he was not placed from the beginning in the empyrean heaven, but was destined to be transferred thither in the state of his final beatitude.
Reply Obj. 2. It is ridiculous to assert that any particular place is natural to the soul or to any spiritual substances, though some particular place may have a certain fitness in regard to spiritual substances. For the earthly paradise was a place adapted to man, as regards both his body and his soul—that is, inasmuch as in his soul was the force which preserved the human body from corruption. This could not be said of the other animals. Therefore, as Damascene says (loc. cit.): *No irrational animal inhabited paradise*; although, by a certain dispensation, the animals were brought thither by God to Adam; and the serpent was able to trespass therein by the complicity of the devil.

Reply Obj. 3. Paradise did not become useless through being unoccupied by man after sin, just as immortality was not conferred on man in vain, though he was to lose it. For thereby we learn God's kindness to man, and what man lost by sin. Moreover, some say that Enoch and Elias still dwell in that paradise.

Reply Obj. 4. Those who say that paradise was on the equinoctial line are of opinion that such a situation is most temperate, on account of the unvarying equality of day and night; that it is never too cold there, because the sun is never too far off; and never too hot, because, although the sun passes over the heads of the inhabitants, it does not remain long in that position. However, Aristotle distinctly says (*Meteor.* ii. 5) that such a region is uninhabit- able on account of the heat. This seems to be more probable; because, even those regions where the sun does not pass vertically overhead, are extremely hot on account of the mere proximity of the sun. But whatever be the truth of the matter, we must hold that paradise was situated in a most temperate situation, whether on the equator or elsewhere.
THIRD ARTICLE.

WHETHER MAN WAS PLACED IN PARADISE TO DRESS IT AND KEEP IT?

_We proceed thus to the Third Article:_

Objection 1. It would seem that man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it. For what was brought on him as a punishment of sin would not have existed in paradise in the state of innocence. But the cultivation of the soil was a punishment of sin (Gen. iii. 17). Therefore man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it.

_Obj. 2._ Further, there is no need of a keeper when there is no fear of trespass with violence. But in paradise there was no fear of trespass with violence. Therefore there was no need for man to keep paradise.

_Obj. 3._ Further, if man was placed in paradise to dress and keep it, man would apparently have been made for the sake of paradise, and not contrariwise; which seems to be false. Therefore man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it.

_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. ii. 15): _The Lord God took man and placed him in the paradise of pleasure, to dress and keep it._

_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii. 10), these words of Genesis may be understood in two ways. First, in the sense that God placed man in paradise that He might Himself work in man and keep him, by sanctifying him (for if this work cease, man at once relapses into darkness, as the air grows dark when the light ceases to shine); and by keeping man from all corruption and evil. Secondly, that man might dress and keep paradise, which dressing would not have involved labour, as it did after sin; but would have been pleasant on account of man's practical knowledge of the powers of nature. Nor would man have kept paradise against a trespasser; but he would have striven to keep paradise for himself lest he should lose it
by sin. All of which was for man's good; wherefore paradise was ordered to man's benefit, and not conversely. Whence the Replies to the Objections are made clear.

Fourth Article.

Whether man was created in paradise?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article:—

Objection 1. It would seem that man was created in paradise. For the angel was created in his dwelling-place—namely, the empyrean heaven. But before sin paradise was a fitting abode for man. Therefore it seems that man was created in paradise.

Obj. 2. Further, other animals remain in the place where they are produced, as the fish in water, and walking animals on the earth from which they were made. Now man would have remained in paradise after he was created (Q. XCVII., A. 4). Therefore he was created in paradise.

Obj. 3. Further, woman was made in paradise. But man is greater than woman. Therefore much more should man have been made in paradise.

On the contrary, It is written (Gen. ii. 15): God took man and placed him in paradise.

I answer that, Paradise was a fitting abode for man as regards the incorruptibility of the primitive state. Now this incorruptibility was man's, not by nature, but by a supernatural gift of God. Therefore that this might be attributed to God, and not to human nature, God made man outside of paradise, and afterwards placed him there to live there during the whole of his animal life; and, having attained to the spiritual life, to be transferred thence to heaven.

Reply Obj. 1. The empyrean heaven was a fitting abode for the angels as regards their nature, and therefore they were created there.

In the same way I reply to the second objection, for those places befit those animals in their nature.
Reply Obj. 3. Woman was made in paradise, not by reason of her own dignity, but on account of the dignity of the principle from which her body was formed. For the same reason the children would have been born in paradise, where their parents were already.
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